>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Keycie Street\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐1209 \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \n v. \n\nKEYCIE A. STREET, \n Defendant‐Appellant. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Eastern District of Wisconsin. \n No. 2:15‐CR‐228‐PP‐3 — Pamela Pepper, Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED OCTOBER 25, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 1, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. \n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. On October 24, 2015, law \nenforcement officers in Pewaukee, Wisconsin were searching \nfor two African‐American men who moments before had \ncommitted an armed robbery. The robbers had been tracked \nto the parking lot of a nearby Walmart store. An officer \nstopped and questioned appellant Keycie Street, the only \nAfrican‐American man in the crowded Walmart. Street was \nnot arrested then, but during the stop, he provided \n\f2 No. 18‐1209 \n\nidentifying information that helped lead to his later arrest for \nthe robbery. \n Street contends that the stop violated his Fourth Amend‐\nment rights because he was stopped based on just a hunch \nand his race and sex. We disagree. The officers stopped Street \nbased on much more information than his race and sex. They \ndid not carry out a dragnet that used racial profiling. Rather, \nthe police had the combination of Street being where he was, \nwhen he was there, and one of a handful of African‐American \nmen on the scene, thus fitting the description of the men who \nhad committed an armed robbery just minutes before. That \ninformation gave the officers a reasonable suspicion that \nStreet may have just been involved with an armed robbery, \nthus authorizing the stop. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. \n1 (1968); United States v. Arthur, 764 F.3d 92, 97–98 (1st Cir. \n2014) (affirming denial of motion to suppress results of Terry \nstop in similar robbery case). We conclude by addressing a \nprocedural issue that arose from the district court’s reference \nof Street’s motion to suppress to a magistrate judge for a re‐\nport and recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The mag‐\nistrate judge recommended denying the motion. The govern‐\nment did not need to file its own objection to the recommen‐\ndation to argue that the motion to suppress should also be de‐\nnied on another theory that the magistrate judge had rejected. \nWe affirm Street’s conviction. \nI. Facts and Procedural History \n A. The Robbery \n On October 24, 2015, a cellular telephone store in \nPewaukee, Wisconsin was robbed at gunpoint by two \nAfrican‐American men wearing black hooded sweatshirts. \n\fNo. 18‐1209 3\n\nDuring the robbery, the lone store employee managed to \npress a silent alarm. Before police arrived, the robbers stole \nmore than thirty cellular telephones and fled in a white sport \nutility vehicle. One of the telephones they stole was equipped \nwith an active GPS tracking device. Officers began tracking \nthe GPS signal. Approximately five minutes after law \nenforcement learned of the robbery, the signal indicated the \nstolen telephone had stopped at a nearby Walmart. \n Officers from several jurisdictions began arriving at the \nWalmart. The first officers to arrive spotted a white SUV \nparked awkwardly to the side of the store. The officers saw, \nbetween the SUV and the store entrance, three African‐\nAmerican men walking together toward the entrance. One \nwas wearing a red parka or raincoat. When the officers \napproached, one of the men who was not wearing red took off \nrunning. Both officers chased him on foot. The fleeing man, \nlater identified as Demonte Oliver, was apprehended quickly. \nBut by the time the officers returned with Oliver, the other \ntwo men had disappeared. The officers then focused on \nfinding those two men as quickly as possible. \n After arresting Oliver, officers approached the abandoned \nSUV. In plain view, they saw the stolen cellular telephones, \nthe cash drawer from the store, and a handgun. In other \nwords, the officers knew they were in the right place. One of‐\nficer speculated over the radio that one of the men he had seen \nmight have entered the Walmart store to try to evade police. \nThat officer also told Deputies Niles and Knipfer of the \nWaukesha County Sheriff’s Department of this possibility af‐\nter they arrived on the scene. \n\f4 No. 18‐1209 \n\n B. The Stop of Defendant Street \n While only one suspect was in custody, officers worked \nwith Walmart staff to conduct a controlled evacuation of the \nstore to try to locate the other suspects. To control the evacu‐\nation, the officers blocked all but one exit. While the prepara‐\ntions were still underway, the officers organizing the evacua‐\ntion learned that a second man (later identified as the getaway \ndriver for the robbery) had been arrested in a nearby marsh. \nThe officers continued to prepare a controlled evacuation and \nsearch of the store. At that time, they could not be sure \nwhether the two arrested men were actually the two robbers, \nnor did they know whether the two robbers had worked with \na getaway driver. Also, the officers had not yet located the \nthird man whom officers had first seen in the trio walking \naway from the abandoned SUV.1 \n The officers then ordered all shoppers and employees to \nexit the Walmart store. Deputy Niles was outside the store \nand spotted Keycie Street in the crowd leaving through the \nsingle unlocked exit. Street’s clothing did not match the de‐\nscription of the suspect(s) they were looking for, but he was \nthe only African‐American man among the crowd who was \nnot a Walmart employee. Deputy Niles suggested to his lieu‐\ntenant that they stop people leaving the store for brief ques‐\ntioning before they lost the opportunity. He specifically \npointed out Street as someone who should be interviewed be‐\ncause he partially matched the description of the suspects and \nwas the only person in the crowd who did. The lieutenant \nagreed and told Deputy Knipfer to stop and identify Street. \n\n \n 1 The man in the red jacket turned out to have been a Walmart em‐\n\nployee, but the officers did not know that at the time. \n\fNo. 18‐1209 5\n\nDeputy Knipfer was aware that the man they were looking for \nwas described as possibly wearing red or dark clothing, but \nhe also knew there was “the possibility that [a suspect] could \nhave obtained different clothing while inside the store.” \n Deputy Knipfer approached Street and told him the offic‐\ners were investigating a robbery and wanted to rule him out \nas a suspect. Street was cooperative. He gave the deputy his \nfull name, date of birth, and home address. The deputy used \nthat information to check for outstanding warrants. Street also \ntold the deputy that friends had dropped him off at the store \nto buy a video game, which he was carrying in a Walmart bag, \nand that his friends would be back to pick him up soon. After \nfinding no outstanding warrants, Deputy Knipfer told Street \nhe was free to leave. Deputy Knipfer then went inside the \nstore to help with the ongoing search. Knipfer testified that \nhis entire exchange with Street took approximately ten to fif‐\nteen minutes. \n Not long after the stop of Street, officers reviewed record‐\nings from Walmart security cameras. They confirmed that \nthree African‐American men had exited the white SUV when \nit arrived. One of the men appeared to be Keycie Street. Offic‐\ners went back to the parking lot to search for Street but could \nnot find him. Officers then used the identifying information \nDeputy Knipfer obtained from the stop to obtain photographs \nof Street from the Illinois Department of Transportation and \nfrom an internal law enforcement database. \n The two men who had been arrested outside the Walmart, \nDemonte Oliver and Romero Eddmonds, admitted their in‐\nvolvement in the robbery. They also told detectives that a \nthird man they knew as “Lil Key” and “Little One” was also \na part of the robbery but that they did not know his real name. \n\f6 No. 18‐1209 \n\nOliver identified Keycie Street from his Department of Trans‐\nportation photograph. Eddmonds separately identified Street \nin the photograph from the law enforcement database. An ar‐\nrest warrant was issued for Street, who soon surrendered. \nStreet’s DNA matched DNA on a bottle that officers recovered \nfrom the abandoned SUV. \n C. District Court Proceedings \n Street was indicted for Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. \n§ 1951. He moved to suppress the identifying information he \nhad given to Deputy Knipfer and the additional evidence the \npolice had obtained by using that information, including the \nDNA evidence and the identifications by Oliver and Edd‐\nmonds. The district judge referred the motion to suppress to \nMagistrate Judge Jones, who held an evidentiary hearing to \nprepare a report and recommendation. Street argued that \nDeputy Knipfer had stopped him based on only a hunch, \nwithout the reasonable suspicion required by the Fourth \nAmendment. Street pointed out that his clothing did not \nmatch the suspects’ and that he was not acting suspiciously as \nhe left the store. He also argued that because the police al‐\nready had two suspects in custody, they had no reason to be‐\nlieve there was a third suspect involved in the robbery and \nthus had no reason to continue the investigation when they \nstopped him. Street contended that the officers stopped him \nonly because his race and sex matched the description of the \nsuspects, which he argued was not enough to justify an inves‐\ntigatory stop. \n The magistrate judge agreed that the officers did not have \nreasonable suspicion to stop Street because the stop was \nbased on only a “hunch” that if a third person had been in‐\nvolved in the robbery, he would also have been an African‐\n\fNo. 18‐1209 7\n\nAmerican man. The magistrate judge recommended the mo‐\ntion to suppress be denied, though, on the ground that the \nevidence used to prosecute Street was too attenuated from the \nconstitutional violation to justify suppression and that the \nstop was made in good faith.2 \n Street then filed an objection to the magistrate judge’s rec‐\nommendation. The government did not file its own objection, \nbut its response to Street’s objection argued that the stop was \nlegal. District Judge Pepper adopted the magistrate judge’s \nrecommendation. The government then asked the district \njudge to reconsider whether the officers had reasonable sus‐\npicion to stop Street. The judge denied that motion. Street \nthen entered a guilty plea on the condition that he could re‐\nvoke the plea if he successfully appealed the denial of his mo‐\ntion to suppress. \nII. Analysis \n Street argues on appeal that the district court erred by ap‐\nplying the attenuation doctrine to deny his motion to sup‐\npress. He also argues that the government waived the argu‐\nment that the stop was constitutional because it did not file its \nown objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. We \nexplain first why the stop of Street was based on reasonable \nsuspicion and thus constitutional, without reaching the atten‐\nuation theory. We then explain briefly why the government \ndid not need to file its own objection to the magistrate judge’s \nrecommendation in its favor. \n\n \n 2 The magistrate judge also found in the alternative that the evidence \n\nshould not be suppressed because the discovery of Street’s identity was \ninevitable. The government has not pressed this rationale on appeal, so \nwe do not consider it. \n\f8 No. 18‐1209 \n\n A. The Terry Stop of Defendant Street \n The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches \nand seizures. If Deputy Knipfer had constitutional authority \nto stop and question Street, it was on the strength of Terry v. \nOhio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). While this stop was peaceful and co‐\noperative, it was not consensual. An investigative stop under \nTerry imposes a substantial intrusion on a person’s liberty and \ndignity. Terry stops cannot be made lightly. “[W]henever a po‐\nlice officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to \nwalk away, he has ‘seized’ that person. * * * It is a serious in‐\ntrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict \ngreat indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to \nbe undertaken lightly.” Id. at 16−17; see also United States v. \nLopez, 907 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 2018) (“With the authority to \nstop comes the authority to require the subject to submit to \nthe stop, and to use reasonable force to make him submit.”). \n To seize a person for a brief investigatory Terry stop, an \nofficer must “have reasonable suspicion based on articulable \nfacts that a crime is about to be or has been committed.” \nUnited States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2010). Rea‐\nsonable suspicion requires “more than a hunch but less than \nprobable cause.” United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 683 \n(7th Cir. 2013), quoting Jewett v. Anders, 521 F.3d 818, 823 (7th \nCir. 2008). The suspicion “must be based on specific, articula‐\nble facts which, judged in light of the officers’ experience, \nwould justify the intrusion.” United States v. Marrocco, 578 \nF.3d 627, 633 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (“in \njustifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be \nable to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken to‐\ngether with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably \nwarrant that intrusion”). \n\fNo. 18‐1209 9\n\n To determine whether a Terry stop was reasonable, we \n“must consider the totality of circumstances known to the of‐\nficer at the time of the stop.” United States v. Quinn, 83 F.3d \n917, 921 (7th Cir. 1996). If the stop was unreasonable under \nthis standard, “unless one of various exceptions applies, ex‐\nclusion will run not only to the unconstitutionally obtained \nevidence, but also to the fruits of that evidence—the so‐called \nfruit of the poisonous tree.” United States v. Conrad, 673 F.3d \n728, 732 (7th Cir. 2012). \n The district court held that the officers lacked reasonable \nsuspicion to stop Street and thus violated the Fourth Amend‐\nment. However, the district court denied the motion to sup‐\npress on the grounds that the attenuation doctrine applied. \nThat doctrine allows a court to deny a motion to suppress \nwhen the causal connection between the constitutional viola‐\ntion and the evidence obtained is remote or suppression \nwould not serve the interest protected by the constitutional \nguarantee. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006) (viola‐\ntion of knock‐and‐announce rule in executing search warrant \ndid not require suppression of evidence seized); United States \nv. Carter, 573 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2009) (“the exclusionary \nrule should not apply when the causal connection between il‐\nlegal police conduct and the procurement of evidence is \n‘so attenuated as to dissipate the taint’ of the illegal action”), \nquoting United States v. Fazio, 914 F.2d 950, 957 (7th Cir. 1990). \n On appeal, Street argues that the district court erred by \napplying the attenuation doctrine. The government contends \nthe doctrine should apply but need not be relied upon be‐\ncause the officers had reasonable suspicion to make the stop \nin the first place. “When reviewing a district court’s decision \non a motion to suppress, we review findings of historical fact \n\f10 No. 18‐1209 \n\nfor clear error and conclusions of law (as well as mixed ques‐\ntions of law and fact, such as determinations of reasonable \nsuspicion) de novo.” United States v. Ruiz, 785 F.3d 1134, 1140–\n41 (7th Cir. 2015); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 \n(1996). \n Street contends the officers stopped him solely because his \nrace and sex matched those of the two robbers. He argues that \nDeputy Knipfer stopped him on the mere hunch that, if a \nthird person had been involved, he would also have been an \nAfrican‐American man. Street’s general point about race and \nsex is well taken, but we conclude it does not apply to his case. \nThe record does not support his attempt to have us view this \nstop in such isolation. \n When considering whether an officer had reasonable sus‐\npicion for a Terry stop, we “look at the totality of the circum‐\nstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a \n‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal \nwrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). \nThis approach recognizes that officers may “draw on their \nown experience and specialized training to make inferences \nfrom and deductions about the cumulative information avail‐\nable to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’” Id., \nquoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). \n Terry does not authorize broad dragnets, but it also does \nnot require perfection or precision. Without more, a descrip‐\ntion that applies to large numbers of people will not justify \nthe seizure of a particular individual. See, e.g., United States v. \nTurner, 699 A.2d 1125, 1128–29 (D.C. 1997). This is especially \ntrue where the description is based primarily on race and sex, \nas important and helpful as those factors can be in describing \na suspect. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 891 F.3d 93, 105 (3d \n\fNo. 18‐1209 11\n\nCir. 2018) (vague descriptions, including race and sex, “with‐\nout more, are not enough to support reasonable suspicion”); \nBrown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 333–34 (2d Cir. 2000) \n(“a description of race and gender alone will rarely provide \nreasonable suspicion justifying a police search or seizure”); \nUnited States v. Montero‐Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1134 n.21 (9th \nCir. 2000) (en banc) (acknowledging importance of “the use of \nracial or ethnic appearance as one factor relevant to reasona‐\nble suspicion or probable cause when a particular suspect has \nbeen identified as having a specific racial or ethnic appear‐\nance”). The totality of circumstances, however, may provide \nadditional and reasonable limits, particularly with respect to \nplace and time, so as to allow a stop based on a fairly general \ndescription. \n Here, the totality of the circumstances shows reasonable \nsuspicion for stopping Street to investigate him. The police \nwere searching for suspects who had committed an armed \nrobbery only minutes before. They had more general descrip‐\ntions than was ideal. That’s not unusual when events unfold \nso quickly. But a lack of better, more detailed descriptions \ndoes not mean officers must disregard the limited information \nthey do have. See, e.g., Foster, 891 F.3d at 104–06 (affirming \ndenial of motion to suppress; armed robbery suspect was de‐\nscribed only as black man fleeing on foot, and police had rea‐\nsonable suspicion to stop the only black man on foot in vicin‐\nity); United States v. Arthur, 764 F.3d 92, 97–98 (1st Cir. 2014) \n(affirming denial of motion to suppress; armed robbery of cell \nphone store by two black men who fled on foot led to seizure \nof two black men walking away from robbed store); Turner, \n699 A.2d at 1128–30 (reversing grant of motion to suppress; \ndescription of suspect as black male wearing black jacket and \nblue jeans was sufficient to stop nearby suspect even though \n\f12 No. 18‐1209 \n\ndescription also resulted in stop of second suspect who fit de‐\nscription: “we have routinely held that an imperfect descrip‐\ntion, coupled with close spatial and temporal proximity be‐\ntween the reported crime and seizure, justifies a Terry stop”); \n4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.5(h) at 760 (5th ed. \n2018) (“But it cannot be said that there must always be several \npoints of comparison … the most important consideration is \nwhether the description is sufficiently unique to permit a rea‐\nsonable degree of selectivity from the group of all potential \nsuspects.”). \n The analysis in Arthur is especially helpful. In Arthur, two \narmed African‐American men described as wearing dark, \nheavy clothing robbed a telephone store and fled on foot. 764 \nF.3d at 96. An officer patrolling the area was informed only of \nthis general description of the robbers. He drove down the \nstreet where the men were last seen and turned onto an adja‐\ncent street. He saw two African‐American men walking in a \ndirection that led away from the robbery. The two men were \nonly an eighth of a mile from the store. They were the only \npedestrians the officer had seen, and he spotted them approx‐\nimately five minutes after the police were dispatched to the \nscene. The officer approached the men with his hand on his \ngun holster, told them he was investigating an armed robbery, \nand ordered them to show him their hands. Id. at 97. That \namounted to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. After \nbeing charged with the robbery, one of the men moved to sup‐\npress the evidence against him, claiming the officer lacked \nreasonable suspicion to make the stop. The district court de‐\nnied the motion. \n The First Circuit affirmed, noting that the officer “had re‐\nceived a reliable, though generic, description of the number \n\fNo. 18‐1209 13\n\nof suspects and their race, gender, clothing, and approximate \nlocation, as well as information about the direction in which \nthey were heading.” 764 F.3d at 97. The First Circuit empha‐\nsized: “Ubiquitous or vague physical descriptions or general \nlocations, without more, are not enough to support reasona‐\nble suspicion.” Id. at 99. Considering the totality of the circum‐\nstances, however, the court found not only that the stop was \nproper but that “a failure to stop the men and question them \nbriefly would have verged on a dereliction of duty.” Id. at 98. \n Here, as in Arthur, the order to stop Street was based on \nreasonable suspicion that went well beyond race and sex. As \nin Arthur, the officers had only limited physical descriptions \nof the suspects, but timing, location, and reliable information \nabout the suspects’ movements made it reasonable to stop \nStreet. The officers knew the men who robbed the store were \narmed and had been described as African‐American. They \nknew that the GPS in one stolen telephone had led them hot \non the robbers’ heels to the Walmart parking lot, where they \nfound the abandoned getaway car with the stolen goods, cash, \nand a gun. The first officers on the scene saw three African‐\nAmerican men walking away from that vehicle, and one of the \nmen ran in response to the police. See District of Columbia v. \nWesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 587 (2018) (unprovoked flight upon no‐\nticing the police is certainly suggestive of wrongdoing and \ncan be treated as suspicious behavior), quoting Illinois v. \nWardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000). \n The magistrate judge and district judge focused on the fact \nthat when Street was stopped, two men had already been \ntaken into custody. Street argues that the officers could only \nspeculate about whether a third person had been involved in \nthe robbery, let alone whether a third person would also have \n\f14 No. 18‐1209 \n\nbeen an African‐American man. We respectfully disagree \nwith the premise of this logic. At the time Street was stopped, \nthe officers could not be certain the two men they had arrested \nwere actually the two robbers. Nor could they be sure that \nonly two men were involved in the robbery. There was also \ngood reason to look for the third African‐American man who \nhad walked away from the getaway car. \n To be clear, officers are not permitted to stop a person \nbased solely on his race and sex. See Whren v. United States, \n517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“the Constitution prohibits selective \nenforcement of the law based on considerations such as \nrace”); Brown, 221 F.3d at 334 (“a description of race and gen‐\nder alone will rarely provide reasonable suspicion justifying \na police search or seizure”); United States v. Swindle, 407 F.3d \n562, 569–70 (2d Cir. 2005) (“race, when considered by itself \nand sometimes even in tandem with other factors, does not \ngenerate reasonable suspicion for a stop”); Montero‐Camargo, \n208 F.3d at 1134 n.21 (9th Cir. 2000) (“a stop based solely on \nthe fact that the racial or ethnic appearance of an individual \nmatches the racial or ethnic description of a specific suspect \nwould not be justified”). But race and sex are basic and com‐\nmon elements of descriptions of people. We do not expect of‐\nficers to ignore such defining features. See United States v. \nMorrison, 254 F.3d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 2001) (“When police are \nsearching for a bank robber described as a black male, it is \nreasonable for them to be looking for a black man.”). \n Street was the only African‐American man in the crowd \nleaving the Walmart during the evacuation. His clothing did \nnot fit the description from the robbery, but the officers could \nreasonably think the third man had had a chance to change \nclothes in the store. Under all of these circumstances—hot \n\fNo. 18‐1209 15\n\npursuit of fleeing armed robbers to the Walmart, the general \ndescriptions of the robbers, the first officers’ observation of \nthe three men seeming to walk away from the getaway car, \nand the fact that Street seemed to be the only man leaving the \nWalmart who fit the general descriptions—the officers had \nspecific, articulable reasons that made it reasonable to stop \nStreet to investigate. \n If the officers had arbitrarily stopped Street on the basis of \nhis race and sex, as Street contends, this would be a very dif‐\nferent case. It would be a mistake to read this decision as say‐\ning such a vague description of the robbers would be enough \nto justify a Terry stop of any African‐American man the police \nencountered. But Street was in the right place at the right time, \nas far as the police were concerned. They had reason to be \nlooking—there and then—for another African‐American \nman, and Street was the only African‐American man in the \ncrowd leaving the store. \n Street also argues that the stop was unreasonable because \nDeputy Knipfer did not himself have reasonable suspicion to \nmake the stop and nothing indicates that Deputy Knipfer \nknew he was looking for a third suspect. Because the record \ndoes not show Knipfer had reasonable suspicion to make the \nstop, Street reasons, the stop was based on nothing more than \na hunch. The collective knowledge doctrine refutes this argu‐\nment. \n When more than one police officer is involved in the \nreasonable‐suspicion analysis, courts consider their collective \nknowledge. “The collective knowledge doctrine permits an \nofficer to stop, search, or arrest a suspect at the direction of \nanother officer … even if the officer himself does not have \nfirsthand knowledge of facts that amount to the necessary \n\f16 No. 18‐1209 \n\nlevel of suspicion to permit the given action.” United States v. \nWilliams, 627 F.3d 247, 252–53 (7th Cir. 2010) (Constitution \npermits officers to stop a person based on “wanted” bulletins \nissued by other law enforcement agencies even if officer \nmaking stop lacks personal knowledge of basis), citing \nHensley, 469 U.S. at 232. \n To rely on collective knowledge to support a stop, we have \ninterpreted Hensley to require that “(1) the officer taking the \naction must act in objective reliance on the information re‐\nceived, (2) the officer providing the information—or the \nagency for which he works—must have facts supporting the \nlevel of suspicion required, and (3) the stop must be no more \nintrusive than would have been permissible for the officer re‐\nquesting it.” Id.; see also United States v. Wheeler, 800 F.2d 100, \n103 (7th Cir. 1986) (establishing three‐part collective \nknowledge test based on Hensley, 469 U.S. 221), overruled on \nother grounds by United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382 (7th \nCir. 1987). \n Here, all three elements were satisfied. First, Deputy \nKnipfer relied on his fellow officers when he stopped Street to \nidentify him. See Doran v. Eckold, 409 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. \n2005) (noting “settled principle that law enforcement officers \nmay rely on information provided by others in the law en‐\nforcement community, so long as the reliance is reasonable”), \nciting Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232. Next, as discussed above, the \nofficers Knipfer was working with had articulable reasons to \nstop Street. Finally, the stop was no more intrusive than one \nthe requesting officers could have conducted. Deputy Knipfer \nasked Street only for his name, address, date of birth, and his \nreason for being at Walmart before running a warrant check \nand letting him go. \n\fNo. 18‐1209 17\n\n In sum, the totality of the circumstances known to the of‐\nficers at the time of the stop rose to the level of reasonable \nsuspicion to conduct a brief investigatory stop of Street. Be‐\ncause the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Street and \nidentify him, they were entitled to use that information to \npursue the investigation further, leading ultimately to Street’s \narrest and conviction. \n B. Objection by Prevailing Party? \n Street has also argued on appeal that we should not even \nconsider the government’s arguments in favor of the Terry \nstop because the government waived that contention by fail‐\ning to file its own objection to the magistrate judge’s recom‐\nmendation. That recommendation was that the district judge \nfind the stop unconstitutional but deny the motion to sup‐\npress based on attenuation. We disagree with this waiver ar‐\ngument. Much as an appellee is free to argue alternative \ngrounds to support a judgment without filing a cross‐appeal, \nthe government was free to argue different grounds support‐\ning the same bottom‐line recommendation: denial of the mo‐\ntion to suppress. \n For certain pretrial matters, including motions to sup‐\npress, a district judge may “designate a magistrate judge to \nconduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to sub‐\nmit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and rec‐\nommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court” of \nsuch matters. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59 \n(b)(1). The parties may file objections to the magistrate judge’s \nproposed findings of fact and recommendation with the dis‐\ntrict court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2). Failing to object to the \nrecommendation “in accordance with this rule waives a \nparty’s right to review.” Id.; see also Video Views, Inc. v. Studio \n\f18 No. 18‐1209 \n\n21, Ltd., 797 F.2d 538, 539 (7th Cir. 1986) (failing to object to \nrecommendation “waives the right to appeal all issues, both \nfactual and legal”). In both civil and criminal cases, requiring \na written objection prevents parties from “’sandbagging’ the \ndistrict judge by failing to object and then appealing.” Otto v. \nVariable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 134 F.3d 841, 854 (7th Cir. 1998), \nquoting United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1499, 1504 (7th Cir. \n1996). This waiver rule is not jurisdictional, though, and we \nhave recognized exceptions when enforcing it would “defeat \nthe ends of justice.” Video Views 797 F.2d at 540; see also Brown, \n79 F.3d at 1505 (excusing waiver of challenge to recommenda‐\ntion to deny substitution of counsel when attorney who de‐\nfendant claimed was inadequate had not filed objection). \n Rule 59(b)(2)’s operative language—“Failure to object in \naccordance with this rule waives a party’s right to review”—\ndoes not prevent a district judge from reviewing a recommen‐\ndation on her own initiative. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, \n154 (1985) (“The district judge has jurisdiction over the case at \nall times. * * * [W]hile the statute [§ 636(b)] does not require \nthe judge to review an issue de novo if no objections are filed, \nit does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua \nsponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other \nstandard.”); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 680 (1980) \n(“While the district court judge alone acts as the ultimate de‐\ncisionmaker, [§ 636(b)(1)(B)] grants the judge the broad dis‐\ncretion to accept, reject, or modify the magistrate’s proposed \nfindings.”); Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Centers, Inc., 577 F.3d 752, \n760 (7th Cir. 2009) (“although the district judge must make an \nindependent determination of a magistrate judge’s order \nupon objection, he is not precluded from reviewing a magis‐\ntrate judge’s order to which a party did not object”). The dis‐\ntrict judge was free to consider any issues she wished to. \n\fNo. 18‐1209 19\n\n The rule’s waiver language does not distinguish between \nthe prevailing party and the losing party, and Street quotes \nthe general language from Video Views to argue that the gov‐\nernment waived its right to review the magistrate judge’s rec‐\nommended finding that the stop violated the Fourth Amend‐\nment. We disagree. \n The waiver rules in Rule 59(b)(2) and its civil counterpart, \nFed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), seem to come up on appeal only when \nthe party unhappy with the magistrate judge’s bottom‐line \nrecommendation has failed to object at all or has objected on \ngrounds different from those argued on appeal. We have writ‐\nten that this rule applies to “any party” who does not object \nto the magistrate judge’s recommendations, but we have \nfound no precedent from our circuit prohibiting prevailing \nparties from arguing on appeal a rationale that the magistrate \njudge rejected. \n Other circuits that have addressed this issue agree that “a \nparty, who substantially prevails in a magistrate judgeʹs rec‐\nommendation, does not waive the right to appeal secondary \nissues resolved against him by failing to object to the recom‐\nmendation,” for such a requirement would frustrate the pur‐\npose of a waiver rule. Vanwinkle v. United States, 645 F.3d 365, \n371 (6th Cir. 2011), quoting Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 586 \n(6th Cir. 2005); see also M. v. Falmouth School Depʹt, 847 F.3d \n19, 26 (1st Cir. 2017) (prevailing party before magistrate judge \ndid not waive secondary argument on appeal by failing to ob‐\nject to magistrate judge’s findings when district court was \naware of argument); Cooper v. Taylor, 103 F.3d 366, 373 (4th Cir. \n1996) (en banc) (“Although we and the Supreme Court have \nlong held that the losing party before the district court and \nbefore a magistrate must preserve every claim it intends to \n\f20 No. 18‐1209 \n\nraise on appeal lest it waive those claims … we have consist‐\nently held that the prevailing party in either forum need not \nadvance on appeal every error it believes was committed by \nthe magistrate or court in the course of ruling in that party’s \nfavor.”) (Luttig, J., concurring). \n In the absence of more specific language in § 636(b) and \nRule 59(b)(2), we seek guidance from the parallel (and more \nfrequently litigated) problem of distinguishing between an \nappellee’s arguments that require a cross‐appeal and alterna‐\ntive arguments for affirming the judgment in the appellee’s \nfavor. \n When a prevailing party raises an alternative argument on \nappeal that was unsuccessful before the district court without \na cross‐appeal, the appellate court must consider whether the \nargument will produce the same outcome as the district \ncourt’s order. United States v. Terzakis, 854 F.3d 951, 954 (7th \nCir. 2017) (holding appellant was not required to cross‐appeal \nor to obtain certificate of appealability to reargue grounds the \ndistrict court rejected because the theory was part of the rec‐\nord and did not propose to expand his rights under the judg‐\nment), citing Jennings v. Stephens, 135 S. Ct. 793 (2015); see also \nDeposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 \n(1980) (“A party who receives all that he has sought generally \nis not aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and can‐\nnot appeal from it.”). \n Rule 59(b)(2) differs from the rule for cross‐appeals in that \nthe objection requirement is not jurisdictional and the district \njudge can act sua sponte to review the findings of the magis‐\ntrate judge. Those differences do not favor a more rigorous \nwaiver rule, however. The similar rationales for and parallel \napplications of the two rules lead us to conclude that Rule \n\fNo. 18‐1209 21\n\n59(b)(2) does not require the prevailing party to object to the \nreasoning of the magistrate judge if the recommendation is a \ndecision in the party’s favor and the prevailing party seeks no \nmore favorable relief. \n The government thus did not waive the right to argue the \nstop was legal. Although the magistrate judge recommended \nthe motion be denied on grounds the government did not be‐\nlieve were strongest, the government did not need to object \nmerely because it would have preferred the alternative rea‐\nsons it offered for the ruling in its favor. \n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Keycie Street\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐1209 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nKEYCIE A. STREET, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Eastern District of Wisconsin. \\n No. 2:15‐CR‐228‐PP‐3 — Pamela Pepper, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED OCTOBER 25, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 1, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. \\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. On October 24, 2015, law \\nenforcement officers in Pewaukee, Wisconsin were searching \\nfor two African‐American men who moments before had \\ncommitted an armed robbery. The robbers had been tracked \\nto the parking lot of a nearby Walmart store. An officer \\nstopped and questioned appellant Keycie Street, the only \\nAfrican‐American man in the crowded Walmart. Street was \\nnot arrested then, but during the stop, he provided \\n\\f2 No. 18‐1209 \\n\\nidentifying information that helped lead to his later arrest for \\nthe robbery. \\n Street contends that the stop violated his Fourth Amend‐\\nment rights because he was stopped based on just a hunch \\nand his race and sex. We disagree. The officers stopped Street \\nbased on much more information than his race and sex. They \\ndid not carry out a dragnet that used racial profiling. Rather, \\nthe police had the combination of Street being where he was, \\nwhen he was there, and one of a handful of African‐American \\nmen on the scene, thus fitting the description of the men who \\nhad committed an armed robbery just minutes before. That \\ninformation gave the officers a reasonable suspicion that \\nStreet may have just been involved with an armed robbery, \\nthus authorizing the stop. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. \\n1 (1968); United States v. Arthur, 764 F.3d 92, 97–98 (1st Cir. \\n2014) (affirming denial of motion to suppress results of Terry \\nstop in similar robbery case). We conclude by addressing a \\nprocedural issue that arose from the district court’s reference \\nof Street’s motion to suppress to a magistrate judge for a re‐\\nport and recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The mag‐\\nistrate judge recommended denying the motion. The govern‐\\nment did not need to file its own objection to the recommen‐\\ndation to argue that the motion to suppress should also be de‐\\nnied on another theory that the magistrate judge had rejected. \\nWe affirm Street’s conviction. \\nI. Facts and Procedural History \\n A. The Robbery \\n On October 24, 2015, a cellular telephone store in \\nPewaukee, Wisconsin was robbed at gunpoint by two \\nAfrican‐American men wearing black hooded sweatshirts. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1209 3\\n\\nDuring the robbery, the lone store employee managed to \\npress a silent alarm. Before police arrived, the robbers stole \\nmore than thirty cellular telephones and fled in a white sport \\nutility vehicle. One of the telephones they stole was equipped \\nwith an active GPS tracking device. Officers began tracking \\nthe GPS signal. Approximately five minutes after law \\nenforcement learned of the robbery, the signal indicated the \\nstolen telephone had stopped at a nearby Walmart. \\n Officers from several jurisdictions began arriving at the \\nWalmart. The first officers to arrive spotted a white SUV \\nparked awkwardly to the side of the store. The officers saw, \\nbetween the SUV and the store entrance, three African‐\\nAmerican men walking together toward the entrance. One \\nwas wearing a red parka or raincoat. When the officers \\napproached, one of the men who was not wearing red took off \\nrunning. Both officers chased him on foot. The fleeing man, \\nlater identified as Demonte Oliver, was apprehended quickly. \\nBut by the time the officers returned with Oliver, the other \\ntwo men had disappeared. The officers then focused on \\nfinding those two men as quickly as possible. \\n After arresting Oliver, officers approached the abandoned \\nSUV. In plain view, they saw the stolen cellular telephones, \\nthe cash drawer from the store, and a handgun. In other \\nwords, the officers knew they were in the right place. One of‐\\nficer speculated over the radio that one of the men he had seen \\nmight have entered the Walmart store to try to evade police. \\nThat officer also told Deputies Niles and Knipfer of the \\nWaukesha County Sheriff’s Department of this possibility af‐\\nter they arrived on the scene. \\n\\f4 No. 18‐1209 \\n\\n B. The Stop of Defendant Street \\n While only one suspect was in custody, officers worked \\nwith Walmart staff to conduct a controlled evacuation of the \\nstore to try to locate the other suspects. To control the evacu‐\\nation, the officers blocked all but one exit. While the prepara‐\\ntions were still underway, the officers organizing the evacua‐\\ntion learned that a second man (later identified as the getaway \\ndriver for the robbery) had been arrested in a nearby marsh. \\nThe officers continued to prepare a controlled evacuation and \\nsearch of the store. At that time, they could not be sure \\nwhether the two arrested men were actually the two robbers, \\nnor did they know whether the two robbers had worked with \\na getaway driver. Also, the officers had not yet located the \\nthird man whom officers had first seen in the trio walking \\naway from the abandoned SUV.1 \\n The officers then ordered all shoppers and employees to \\nexit the Walmart store. Deputy Niles was outside the store \\nand spotted Keycie Street in the crowd leaving through the \\nsingle unlocked exit. Street’s clothing did not match the de‐\\nscription of the suspect(s) they were looking for, but he was \\nthe only African‐American man among the crowd who was \\nnot a Walmart employee. Deputy Niles suggested to his lieu‐\\ntenant that they stop people leaving the store for brief ques‐\\ntioning before they lost the opportunity. He specifically \\npointed out Street as someone who should be interviewed be‐\\ncause he partially matched the description of the suspects and \\nwas the only person in the crowd who did. The lieutenant \\nagreed and told Deputy Knipfer to stop and identify Street. \\n\\n \\n 1 The man in the red jacket turned out to have been a Walmart em‐\\n\\nployee, but the officers did not know that at the time. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1209 5\\n\\nDeputy Knipfer was aware that the man they were looking for \\nwas described as possibly wearing red or dark clothing, but \\nhe also knew there was “the possibility that [a suspect] could \\nhave obtained different clothing while inside the store.” \\n Deputy Knipfer approached Street and told him the offic‐\\ners were investigating a robbery and wanted to rule him out \\nas a suspect. Street was cooperative. He gave the deputy his \\nfull name, date of birth, and home address. The deputy used \\nthat information to check for outstanding warrants. Street also \\ntold the deputy that friends had dropped him off at the store \\nto buy a video game, which he was carrying in a Walmart bag, \\nand that his friends would be back to pick him up soon. After \\nfinding no outstanding warrants, Deputy Knipfer told Street \\nhe was free to leave. Deputy Knipfer then went inside the \\nstore to help with the ongoing search. Knipfer testified that \\nhis entire exchange with Street took approximately ten to fif‐\\nteen minutes. \\n Not long after the stop of Street, officers reviewed record‐\\nings from Walmart security cameras. They confirmed that \\nthree African‐American men had exited the white SUV when \\nit arrived. One of the men appeared to be Keycie Street. Offic‐\\ners went back to the parking lot to search for Street but could \\nnot find him. Officers then used the identifying information \\nDeputy Knipfer obtained from the stop to obtain photographs \\nof Street from the Illinois Department of Transportation and \\nfrom an internal law enforcement database. \\n The two men who had been arrested outside the Walmart, \\nDemonte Oliver and Romero Eddmonds, admitted their in‐\\nvolvement in the robbery. They also told detectives that a \\nthird man they knew as “Lil Key” and “Little One” was also \\na part of the robbery but that they did not know his real name. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐1209 \\n\\nOliver identified Keycie Street from his Department of Trans‐\\nportation photograph. Eddmonds separately identified Street \\nin the photograph from the law enforcement database. An ar‐\\nrest warrant was issued for Street, who soon surrendered. \\nStreet’s DNA matched DNA on a bottle that officers recovered \\nfrom the abandoned SUV. \\n C. District Court Proceedings \\n Street was indicted for Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. \\n§ 1951. He moved to suppress the identifying information he \\nhad given to Deputy Knipfer and the additional evidence the \\npolice had obtained by using that information, including the \\nDNA evidence and the identifications by Oliver and Edd‐\\nmonds. The district judge referred the motion to suppress to \\nMagistrate Judge Jones, who held an evidentiary hearing to \\nprepare a report and recommendation. Street argued that \\nDeputy Knipfer had stopped him based on only a hunch, \\nwithout the reasonable suspicion required by the Fourth \\nAmendment. Street pointed out that his clothing did not \\nmatch the suspects’ and that he was not acting suspiciously as \\nhe left the store. He also argued that because the police al‐\\nready had two suspects in custody, they had no reason to be‐\\nlieve there was a third suspect involved in the robbery and \\nthus had no reason to continue the investigation when they \\nstopped him. Street contended that the officers stopped him \\nonly because his race and sex matched the description of the \\nsuspects, which he argued was not enough to justify an inves‐\\ntigatory stop. \\n The magistrate judge agreed that the officers did not have \\nreasonable suspicion to stop Street because the stop was \\nbased on only a “hunch” that if a third person had been in‐\\nvolved in the robbery, he would also have been an African‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐1209 7\\n\\nAmerican man. The magistrate judge recommended the mo‐\\ntion to suppress be denied, though, on the ground that the \\nevidence used to prosecute Street was too attenuated from the \\nconstitutional violation to justify suppression and that the \\nstop was made in good faith.2 \\n Street then filed an objection to the magistrate judge’s rec‐\\nommendation. The government did not file its own objection, \\nbut its response to Street’s objection argued that the stop was \\nlegal. District Judge Pepper adopted the magistrate judge’s \\nrecommendation. The government then asked the district \\njudge to reconsider whether the officers had reasonable sus‐\\npicion to stop Street. The judge denied that motion. Street \\nthen entered a guilty plea on the condition that he could re‐\\nvoke the plea if he successfully appealed the denial of his mo‐\\ntion to suppress. \\nII. Analysis \\n Street argues on appeal that the district court erred by ap‐\\nplying the attenuation doctrine to deny his motion to sup‐\\npress. He also argues that the government waived the argu‐\\nment that the stop was constitutional because it did not file its \\nown objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. We \\nexplain first why the stop of Street was based on reasonable \\nsuspicion and thus constitutional, without reaching the atten‐\\nuation theory. We then explain briefly why the government \\ndid not need to file its own objection to the magistrate judge’s \\nrecommendation in its favor. \\n\\n \\n 2 The magistrate judge also found in the alternative that the evidence \\n\\nshould not be suppressed because the discovery of Street’s identity was \\ninevitable. The government has not pressed this rationale on appeal, so \\nwe do not consider it. \\n\\f8 No. 18‐1209 \\n\\n A. The Terry Stop of Defendant Street \\n The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches \\nand seizures. If Deputy Knipfer had constitutional authority \\nto stop and question Street, it was on the strength of Terry v. \\nOhio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). While this stop was peaceful and co‐\\noperative, it was not consensual. An investigative stop under \\nTerry imposes a substantial intrusion on a person’s liberty and \\ndignity. Terry stops cannot be made lightly. “[W]henever a po‐\\nlice officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to \\nwalk away, he has ‘seized’ that person. * * * It is a serious in‐\\ntrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict \\ngreat indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to \\nbe undertaken lightly.” Id. at 16−17; see also United States v. \\nLopez, 907 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 2018) (“With the authority to \\nstop comes the authority to require the subject to submit to \\nthe stop, and to use reasonable force to make him submit.”). \\n To seize a person for a brief investigatory Terry stop, an \\nofficer must “have reasonable suspicion based on articulable \\nfacts that a crime is about to be or has been committed.” \\nUnited States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2010). Rea‐\\nsonable suspicion requires “more than a hunch but less than \\nprobable cause.” United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 683 \\n(7th Cir. 2013), quoting Jewett v. Anders, 521 F.3d 818, 823 (7th \\nCir. 2008). The suspicion “must be based on specific, articula‐\\nble facts which, judged in light of the officers’ experience, \\nwould justify the intrusion.” United States v. Marrocco, 578 \\nF.3d 627, 633 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (“in \\njustifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be \\nable to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken to‐\\ngether with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably \\nwarrant that intrusion”). \\n\\fNo. 18‐1209 9\\n\\n To determine whether a Terry stop was reasonable, we \\n“must consider the totality of circumstances known to the of‐\\nficer at the time of the stop.” United States v. Quinn, 83 F.3d \\n917, 921 (7th Cir. 1996). If the stop was unreasonable under \\nthis standard, “unless one of various exceptions applies, ex‐\\nclusion will run not only to the unconstitutionally obtained \\nevidence, but also to the fruits of that evidence—the so‐called \\nfruit of the poisonous tree.” United States v. Conrad, 673 F.3d \\n728, 732 (7th Cir. 2012). \\n The district court held that the officers lacked reasonable \\nsuspicion to stop Street and thus violated the Fourth Amend‐\\nment. However, the district court denied the motion to sup‐\\npress on the grounds that the attenuation doctrine applied. \\nThat doctrine allows a court to deny a motion to suppress \\nwhen the causal connection between the constitutional viola‐\\ntion and the evidence obtained is remote or suppression \\nwould not serve the interest protected by the constitutional \\nguarantee. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006) (viola‐\\ntion of knock‐and‐announce rule in executing search warrant \\ndid not require suppression of evidence seized); United States \\nv. Carter, 573 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2009) (“the exclusionary \\nrule should not apply when the causal connection between il‐\\nlegal police conduct and the procurement of evidence is \\n‘so attenuated as to dissipate the taint’ of the illegal action”), \\nquoting United States v. Fazio, 914 F.2d 950, 957 (7th Cir. 1990). \\n On appeal, Street argues that the district court erred by \\napplying the attenuation doctrine. The government contends \\nthe doctrine should apply but need not be relied upon be‐\\ncause the officers had reasonable suspicion to make the stop \\nin the first place. “When reviewing a district court’s decision \\non a motion to suppress, we review findings of historical fact \\n\\f10 No. 18‐1209 \\n\\nfor clear error and conclusions of law (as well as mixed ques‐\\ntions of law and fact, such as determinations of reasonable \\nsuspicion) de novo.” United States v. Ruiz, 785 F.3d 1134, 1140–\\n41 (7th Cir. 2015); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 \\n(1996). \\n Street contends the officers stopped him solely because his \\nrace and sex matched those of the two robbers. He argues that \\nDeputy Knipfer stopped him on the mere hunch that, if a \\nthird person had been involved, he would also have been an \\nAfrican‐American man. Street’s general point about race and \\nsex is well taken, but we conclude it does not apply to his case. \\nThe record does not support his attempt to have us view this \\nstop in such isolation. \\n When considering whether an officer had reasonable sus‐\\npicion for a Terry stop, we “look at the totality of the circum‐\\nstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a \\n‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal \\nwrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). \\nThis approach recognizes that officers may “draw on their \\nown experience and specialized training to make inferences \\nfrom and deductions about the cumulative information avail‐\\nable to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’” Id., \\nquoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). \\n Terry does not authorize broad dragnets, but it also does \\nnot require perfection or precision. Without more, a descrip‐\\ntion that applies to large numbers of people will not justify \\nthe seizure of a particular individual. See, e.g., United States v. \\nTurner, 699 A.2d 1125, 1128–29 (D.C. 1997). This is especially \\ntrue where the description is based primarily on race and sex, \\nas important and helpful as those factors can be in describing \\na suspect. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 891 F.3d 93, 105 (3d \\n\\fNo. 18‐1209 11\\n\\nCir. 2018) (vague descriptions, including race and sex, “with‐\\nout more, are not enough to support reasonable suspicion”); \\nBrown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 333–34 (2d Cir. 2000) \\n(“a description of race and gender alone will rarely provide \\nreasonable suspicion justifying a police search or seizure”); \\nUnited States v. Montero‐Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1134 n.21 (9th \\nCir. 2000) (en banc) (acknowledging importance of “the use of \\nracial or ethnic appearance as one factor relevant to reasona‐\\nble suspicion or probable cause when a particular suspect has \\nbeen identified as having a specific racial or ethnic appear‐\\nance”). The totality of circumstances, however, may provide \\nadditional and reasonable limits, particularly with respect to \\nplace and time, so as to allow a stop based on a fairly general \\ndescription. \\n Here, the totality of the circumstances shows reasonable \\nsuspicion for stopping Street to investigate him. The police \\nwere searching for suspects who had committed an armed \\nrobbery only minutes before. They had more general descrip‐\\ntions than was ideal. That’s not unusual when events unfold \\nso quickly. But a lack of better, more detailed descriptions \\ndoes not mean officers must disregard the limited information \\nthey do have. See, e.g., Foster, 891 F.3d at 104–06 (affirming \\ndenial of motion to suppress; armed robbery suspect was de‐\\nscribed only as black man fleeing on foot, and police had rea‐\\nsonable suspicion to stop the only black man on foot in vicin‐\\nity); United States v. Arthur, 764 F.3d 92, 97–98 (1st Cir. 2014) \\n(affirming denial of motion to suppress; armed robbery of cell \\nphone store by two black men who fled on foot led to seizure \\nof two black men walking away from robbed store); Turner, \\n699 A.2d at 1128–30 (reversing grant of motion to suppress; \\ndescription of suspect as black male wearing black jacket and \\nblue jeans was sufficient to stop nearby suspect even though \\n\\f12 No. 18‐1209 \\n\\ndescription also resulted in stop of second suspect who fit de‐\\nscription: “we have routinely held that an imperfect descrip‐\\ntion, coupled with close spatial and temporal proximity be‐\\ntween the reported crime and seizure, justifies a Terry stop”); \\n4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.5(h) at 760 (5th ed. \\n2018) (“But it cannot be said that there must always be several \\npoints of comparison … the most important consideration is \\nwhether the description is sufficiently unique to permit a rea‐\\nsonable degree of selectivity from the group of all potential \\nsuspects.”). \\n The analysis in Arthur is especially helpful. In Arthur, two \\narmed African‐American men described as wearing dark, \\nheavy clothing robbed a telephone store and fled on foot. 764 \\nF.3d at 96. An officer patrolling the area was informed only of \\nthis general description of the robbers. He drove down the \\nstreet where the men were last seen and turned onto an adja‐\\ncent street. He saw two African‐American men walking in a \\ndirection that led away from the robbery. The two men were \\nonly an eighth of a mile from the store. They were the only \\npedestrians the officer had seen, and he spotted them approx‐\\nimately five minutes after the police were dispatched to the \\nscene. The officer approached the men with his hand on his \\ngun holster, told them he was investigating an armed robbery, \\nand ordered them to show him their hands. Id. at 97. That \\namounted to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. After \\nbeing charged with the robbery, one of the men moved to sup‐\\npress the evidence against him, claiming the officer lacked \\nreasonable suspicion to make the stop. The district court de‐\\nnied the motion. \\n The First Circuit affirmed, noting that the officer “had re‐\\nceived a reliable, though generic, description of the number \\n\\fNo. 18‐1209 13\\n\\nof suspects and their race, gender, clothing, and approximate \\nlocation, as well as information about the direction in which \\nthey were heading.” 764 F.3d at 97. The First Circuit empha‐\\nsized: “Ubiquitous or vague physical descriptions or general \\nlocations, without more, are not enough to support reasona‐\\nble suspicion.” Id. at 99. Considering the totality of the circum‐\\nstances, however, the court found not only that the stop was \\nproper but that “a failure to stop the men and question them \\nbriefly would have verged on a dereliction of duty.” Id. at 98. \\n Here, as in Arthur, the order to stop Street was based on \\nreasonable suspicion that went well beyond race and sex. As \\nin Arthur, the officers had only limited physical descriptions \\nof the suspects, but timing, location, and reliable information \\nabout the suspects’ movements made it reasonable to stop \\nStreet. The officers knew the men who robbed the store were \\narmed and had been described as African‐American. They \\nknew that the GPS in one stolen telephone had led them hot \\non the robbers’ heels to the Walmart parking lot, where they \\nfound the abandoned getaway car with the stolen goods, cash, \\nand a gun. The first officers on the scene saw three African‐\\nAmerican men walking away from that vehicle, and one of the \\nmen ran in response to the police. See District of Columbia v. \\nWesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 587 (2018) (unprovoked flight upon no‐\\nticing the police is certainly suggestive of wrongdoing and \\ncan be treated as suspicious behavior), quoting Illinois v. \\nWardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000). \\n The magistrate judge and district judge focused on the fact \\nthat when Street was stopped, two men had already been \\ntaken into custody. Street argues that the officers could only \\nspeculate about whether a third person had been involved in \\nthe robbery, let alone whether a third person would also have \\n\\f14 No. 18‐1209 \\n\\nbeen an African‐American man. We respectfully disagree \\nwith the premise of this logic. At the time Street was stopped, \\nthe officers could not be certain the two men they had arrested \\nwere actually the two robbers. Nor could they be sure that \\nonly two men were involved in the robbery. There was also \\ngood reason to look for the third African‐American man who \\nhad walked away from the getaway car. \\n To be clear, officers are not permitted to stop a person \\nbased solely on his race and sex. See Whren v. United States, \\n517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“the Constitution prohibits selective \\nenforcement of the law based on considerations such as \\nrace”); Brown, 221 F.3d at 334 (“a description of race and gen‐\\nder alone will rarely provide reasonable suspicion justifying \\na police search or seizure”); United States v. Swindle, 407 F.3d \\n562, 569–70 (2d Cir. 2005) (“race, when considered by itself \\nand sometimes even in tandem with other factors, does not \\ngenerate reasonable suspicion for a stop”); Montero‐Camargo, \\n208 F.3d at 1134 n.21 (9th Cir. 2000) (“a stop based solely on \\nthe fact that the racial or ethnic appearance of an individual \\nmatches the racial or ethnic description of a specific suspect \\nwould not be justified”). But race and sex are basic and com‐\\nmon elements of descriptions of people. We do not expect of‐\\nficers to ignore such defining features. See United States v. \\nMorrison, 254 F.3d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 2001) (“When police are \\nsearching for a bank robber described as a black male, it is \\nreasonable for them to be looking for a black man.”). \\n Street was the only African‐American man in the crowd \\nleaving the Walmart during the evacuation. His clothing did \\nnot fit the description from the robbery, but the officers could \\nreasonably think the third man had had a chance to change \\nclothes in the store. Under all of these circumstances—hot \\n\\fNo. 18‐1209 15\\n\\npursuit of fleeing armed robbers to the Walmart, the general \\ndescriptions of the robbers, the first officers’ observation of \\nthe three men seeming to walk away from the getaway car, \\nand the fact that Street seemed to be the only man leaving the \\nWalmart who fit the general descriptions—the officers had \\nspecific, articulable reasons that made it reasonable to stop \\nStreet to investigate. \\n If the officers had arbitrarily stopped Street on the basis of \\nhis race and sex, as Street contends, this would be a very dif‐\\nferent case. It would be a mistake to read this decision as say‐\\ning such a vague description of the robbers would be enough \\nto justify a Terry stop of any African‐American man the police \\nencountered. But Street was in the right place at the right time, \\nas far as the police were concerned. They had reason to be \\nlooking—there and then—for another African‐American \\nman, and Street was the only African‐American man in the \\ncrowd leaving the store. \\n Street also argues that the stop was unreasonable because \\nDeputy Knipfer did not himself have reasonable suspicion to \\nmake the stop and nothing indicates that Deputy Knipfer \\nknew he was looking for a third suspect. Because the record \\ndoes not show Knipfer had reasonable suspicion to make the \\nstop, Street reasons, the stop was based on nothing more than \\na hunch. The collective knowledge doctrine refutes this argu‐\\nment. \\n When more than one police officer is involved in the \\nreasonable‐suspicion analysis, courts consider their collective \\nknowledge. “The collective knowledge doctrine permits an \\nofficer to stop, search, or arrest a suspect at the direction of \\nanother officer … even if the officer himself does not have \\nfirsthand knowledge of facts that amount to the necessary \\n\\f16 No. 18‐1209 \\n\\nlevel of suspicion to permit the given action.” United States v. \\nWilliams, 627 F.3d 247, 252–53 (7th Cir. 2010) (Constitution \\npermits officers to stop a person based on “wanted” bulletins \\nissued by other law enforcement agencies even if officer \\nmaking stop lacks personal knowledge of basis), citing \\nHensley, 469 U.S. at 232. \\n To rely on collective knowledge to support a stop, we have \\ninterpreted Hensley to require that “(1) the officer taking the \\naction must act in objective reliance on the information re‐\\nceived, (2) the officer providing the information—or the \\nagency for which he works—must have facts supporting the \\nlevel of suspicion required, and (3) the stop must be no more \\nintrusive than would have been permissible for the officer re‐\\nquesting it.” Id.; see also United States v. Wheeler, 800 F.2d 100, \\n103 (7th Cir. 1986) (establishing three‐part collective \\nknowledge test based on Hensley, 469 U.S. 221), overruled on \\nother grounds by United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382 (7th \\nCir. 1987). \\n Here, all three elements were satisfied. First, Deputy \\nKnipfer relied on his fellow officers when he stopped Street to \\nidentify him. See Doran v. Eckold, 409 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. \\n2005) (noting “settled principle that law enforcement officers \\nmay rely on information provided by others in the law en‐\\nforcement community, so long as the reliance is reasonable”), \\nciting Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232. Next, as discussed above, the \\nofficers Knipfer was working with had articulable reasons to \\nstop Street. Finally, the stop was no more intrusive than one \\nthe requesting officers could have conducted. Deputy Knipfer \\nasked Street only for his name, address, date of birth, and his \\nreason for being at Walmart before running a warrant check \\nand letting him go. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1209 17\\n\\n In sum, the totality of the circumstances known to the of‐\\nficers at the time of the stop rose to the level of reasonable \\nsuspicion to conduct a brief investigatory stop of Street. Be‐\\ncause the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Street and \\nidentify him, they were entitled to use that information to \\npursue the investigation further, leading ultimately to Street’s \\narrest and conviction. \\n B. Objection by Prevailing Party? \\n Street has also argued on appeal that we should not even \\nconsider the government’s arguments in favor of the Terry \\nstop because the government waived that contention by fail‐\\ning to file its own objection to the magistrate judge’s recom‐\\nmendation. That recommendation was that the district judge \\nfind the stop unconstitutional but deny the motion to sup‐\\npress based on attenuation. We disagree with this waiver ar‐\\ngument. Much as an appellee is free to argue alternative \\ngrounds to support a judgment without filing a cross‐appeal, \\nthe government was free to argue different grounds support‐\\ning the same bottom‐line recommendation: denial of the mo‐\\ntion to suppress. \\n For certain pretrial matters, including motions to sup‐\\npress, a district judge may “designate a magistrate judge to \\nconduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to sub‐\\nmit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and rec‐\\nommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court” of \\nsuch matters. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59 \\n(b)(1). The parties may file objections to the magistrate judge’s \\nproposed findings of fact and recommendation with the dis‐\\ntrict court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2). Failing to object to the \\nrecommendation “in accordance with this rule waives a \\nparty’s right to review.” Id.; see also Video Views, Inc. v. Studio \\n\\f18 No. 18‐1209 \\n\\n21, Ltd., 797 F.2d 538, 539 (7th Cir. 1986) (failing to object to \\nrecommendation “waives the right to appeal all issues, both \\nfactual and legal”). In both civil and criminal cases, requiring \\na written objection prevents parties from “’sandbagging’ the \\ndistrict judge by failing to object and then appealing.” Otto v. \\nVariable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 134 F.3d 841, 854 (7th Cir. 1998), \\nquoting United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1499, 1504 (7th Cir. \\n1996). This waiver rule is not jurisdictional, though, and we \\nhave recognized exceptions when enforcing it would “defeat \\nthe ends of justice.” Video Views 797 F.2d at 540; see also Brown, \\n79 F.3d at 1505 (excusing waiver of challenge to recommenda‐\\ntion to deny substitution of counsel when attorney who de‐\\nfendant claimed was inadequate had not filed objection). \\n Rule 59(b)(2)’s operative language—“Failure to object in \\naccordance with this rule waives a party’s right to review”—\\ndoes not prevent a district judge from reviewing a recommen‐\\ndation on her own initiative. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, \\n154 (1985) (“The district judge has jurisdiction over the case at \\nall times. * * * [W]hile the statute [§ 636(b)] does not require \\nthe judge to review an issue de novo if no objections are filed, \\nit does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua \\nsponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other \\nstandard.”); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 680 (1980) \\n(“While the district court judge alone acts as the ultimate de‐\\ncisionmaker, [§ 636(b)(1)(B)] grants the judge the broad dis‐\\ncretion to accept, reject, or modify the magistrate’s proposed \\nfindings.”); Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Centers, Inc., 577 F.3d 752, \\n760 (7th Cir. 2009) (“although the district judge must make an \\nindependent determination of a magistrate judge’s order \\nupon objection, he is not precluded from reviewing a magis‐\\ntrate judge’s order to which a party did not object”). The dis‐\\ntrict judge was free to consider any issues she wished to. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1209 19\\n\\n The rule’s waiver language does not distinguish between \\nthe prevailing party and the losing party, and Street quotes \\nthe general language from Video Views to argue that the gov‐\\nernment waived its right to review the magistrate judge’s rec‐\\nommended finding that the stop violated the Fourth Amend‐\\nment. We disagree. \\n The waiver rules in Rule 59(b)(2) and its civil counterpart, \\nFed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), seem to come up on appeal only when \\nthe party unhappy with the magistrate judge’s bottom‐line \\nrecommendation has failed to object at all or has objected on \\ngrounds different from those argued on appeal. We have writ‐\\nten that this rule applies to “any party” who does not object \\nto the magistrate judge’s recommendations, but we have \\nfound no precedent from our circuit prohibiting prevailing \\nparties from arguing on appeal a rationale that the magistrate \\njudge rejected. \\n Other circuits that have addressed this issue agree that “a \\nparty, who substantially prevails in a magistrate judgeʹs rec‐\\nommendation, does not waive the right to appeal secondary \\nissues resolved against him by failing to object to the recom‐\\nmendation,” for such a requirement would frustrate the pur‐\\npose of a waiver rule. Vanwinkle v. United States, 645 F.3d 365, \\n371 (6th Cir. 2011), quoting Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 586 \\n(6th Cir. 2005); see also M. v. Falmouth School Depʹt, 847 F.3d \\n19, 26 (1st Cir. 2017) (prevailing party before magistrate judge \\ndid not waive secondary argument on appeal by failing to ob‐\\nject to magistrate judge’s findings when district court was \\naware of argument); Cooper v. Taylor, 103 F.3d 366, 373 (4th Cir. \\n1996) (en banc) (“Although we and the Supreme Court have \\nlong held that the losing party before the district court and \\nbefore a magistrate must preserve every claim it intends to \\n\\f20 No. 18‐1209 \\n\\nraise on appeal lest it waive those claims … we have consist‐\\nently held that the prevailing party in either forum need not \\nadvance on appeal every error it believes was committed by \\nthe magistrate or court in the course of ruling in that party’s \\nfavor.”) (Luttig, J., concurring). \\n In the absence of more specific language in § 636(b) and \\nRule 59(b)(2), we seek guidance from the parallel (and more \\nfrequently litigated) problem of distinguishing between an \\nappellee’s arguments that require a cross‐appeal and alterna‐\\ntive arguments for affirming the judgment in the appellee’s \\nfavor. \\n When a prevailing party raises an alternative argument on \\nappeal that was unsuccessful before the district court without \\na cross‐appeal, the appellate court must consider whether the \\nargument will produce the same outcome as the district \\ncourt’s order. United States v. Terzakis, 854 F.3d 951, 954 (7th \\nCir. 2017) (holding appellant was not required to cross‐appeal \\nor to obtain certificate of appealability to reargue grounds the \\ndistrict court rejected because the theory was part of the rec‐\\nord and did not propose to expand his rights under the judg‐\\nment), citing Jennings v. Stephens, 135 S. Ct. 793 (2015); see also \\nDeposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 \\n(1980) (“A party who receives all that he has sought generally \\nis not aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and can‐\\nnot appeal from it.”). \\n Rule 59(b)(2) differs from the rule for cross‐appeals in that \\nthe objection requirement is not jurisdictional and the district \\njudge can act sua sponte to review the findings of the magis‐\\ntrate judge. Those differences do not favor a more rigorous \\nwaiver rule, however. The similar rationales for and parallel \\napplications of the two rules lead us to conclude that Rule \\n\\fNo. 18‐1209 21\\n\\n59(b)(2) does not require the prevailing party to object to the \\nreasoning of the magistrate judge if the recommendation is a \\ndecision in the party’s favor and the prevailing party seeks no \\nmore favorable relief. \\n The government thus did not waive the right to argue the \\nstop was legal. Although the magistrate judge recommended \\nthe motion be denied on grounds the government did not be‐\\nlieve were strongest, the government did not need to object \\nmerely because it would have preferred the alternative rea‐\\nsons it offered for the ruling in its favor. \\n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1156,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4595623,"string":"4,595,623"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"TRINITY 83 DEVELOPMENT, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLFIN MIDWEST FUNDING, LLC, Defendant-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Trinity 83 Development LLC v. Colfin Midwest Funding LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2117"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Easterbrook, Barrett, Scudder\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 18-2117\\nTRINITY 83 DEVELOPMENT, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nCOLFIN MIDWEST FUNDING, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 2844 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In 2006 Trinity 83 Develop-\\nment borrowed about $2 million from a bank, giving in re-\\nturn a note and a mortgage on certain real property. In 2011\\nthe bank sold the note and mortgage to ColFin Midwest\\nFunding. ColFin relied on Midland Loan Services to collect\\nthe payments. In 2013 Midland recorded a document (cap-\\ntioned “satisfaction”) stating that the loan had been paid and\\n\\f2 No. 18-2117\\n\\nthe mortgage released. But the loan was still outstanding,\\nand Trinity continued paying. In 2015 ColFin realized Mid-\\nland’s mistake and recorded a document cancelling the satis-\\nfaction. Soon afterward Trinity stopped paying, and ColFin\\nfiled a foreclosure action in state court.\\n Trinity commenced a federal bankruptcy proceeding,\\nwhich stayed the state-court action. It then filed an adversary\\naction against ColFin, contending that the release extin-\\nguished the debt and security interest. Bankruptcy Judge\\nThorne disagreed, however, holding that the release was a\\nunilateral error that could be rectified unilaterally—and, as\\nno one else had recorded a security interest between those\\ntwo events, ColFin retained its original rights. A district\\njudge affirmed, and Trinity appealed to us.\\n Before the appeal was heard, the property was sold un-\\nder the bankruptcy court’s auspices. ColFin contends that\\nthis moots the appeal. It relies on 11 U.S.C. §363(m), which\\nreads:\\n The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under\\n subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property\\n does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authori-\\n zation to an entity that purchased or leased such property in\\n good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of\\n the appeal, unless such authorization and such sale or lease were\\n stayed pending appeal.\\n\\nColFin also relies on In re River West Plaza—Chicago, LLC, 664\\nF.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2011), which holds that §363(m) blocks not\\nonly a request to upset the sale but also any possibility of\\nordering the recipient of the sale’s proceeds to turn that\\nmoney over to the bankruptcy estate (the relief that Trinity\\nnow seeks), which makes an appeal moot.\\n\\fNo. 18-2117 3\\n\\n Mootness is a constitutional doctrine designed to avoid\\nthe issuance of advisory opinions. “[A] suit becomes moot,\\nwhen the issues presented are no longer live or the parties\\nlack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. [This oc-\\ncurs] only when it is impossible for a court to grant any\\neffectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Chafin v.\\nChafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (internal citations and quota-\\ntion marks omioed). It is possible for a court to grant relief\\nhere, as it was possible in River West: one side wants money\\nfrom the other. That request may be inconsistent with a stat-\\nute, but a defense to payment concerns the merits, not moot-\\nness. Courts do not say, when a defendant wins on the law,\\nthat the case is moot. Cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).\\n Many a statute forecloses particular relief. Think of the\\nNorris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §101, which prohibits the\\nuse of injunctions in some labor disputes. When a court con-\\ncludes that the Act applies, it dismisses the suit but does not\\ndeclare it moot. See, e.g., Burlington Northern R.R. v. Brother-\\nhood of Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 429 (1987). The\\nrequest for an injunction against an ongoing strike presents a\\nreal case or controversy within the scope of Article III, a con-\\ntroversy not eliminated by a statute that entitles the defend-\\nant to prevail. Just so with §363(m). There is a live controver-\\nsy about who should get the money generated by the sale.\\nThat’s why we held long ago that §363(m) does not concern\\nmootness. See In re UNR Industries, Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th\\nCir. 1994). Accord, In re 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership, 126\\nF.3d 955, 961 (7th Cir. 1997), reversed on the merits, 526 U.S.\\n434 (1999). A defense, even an ironclad defense, does not de-\\nfeat jurisdiction, see, e.g., Builders Bank v. FDIC, 846 F.3d 272\\n(7th Cir. 2017), and mootness is a jurisdictional doctrine. The\\nopinion in River West does not cite UNR or LaSalle Street\\n\\f4 No. 18-2117\\n\\nPartnership and so created an unappreciated intra-circuit\\nconflict.\\n There is a further problem with River West—one inde-\\npendent of the question whether §363(m) concerns moot-\\nness. Section 363(m) does not say one word about the dispo-\\nsition of the proceeds of a sale or lease. The text is straight-\\nforward: “The reversal or modification on appeal of an au-\\nthorization … of a sale or lease of property does not affect\\nthe validity of a sale or lease … to an entity that purchased\\nor leased such property in good faith”. What should be done\\nwith the proceeds is a subject within the control of the bank-\\nruptcy court. We have recognized this multiple times. See,\\ne.g., In re Lloyd, 37 F.3d 271, 273 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Edwards,\\n962 F.2d 641, 643–44 (7th Cir. 1992). Many decisions from\\noutside this circuit after River West likewise hold that\\n§363(m) does not specify what happens to the money. E.g.,\\nIn re Hope 7 Monroe Street L.P., 743 F.3d 867, 872–73 (D.C. Cir.\\n2014); In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d 547, 554 (3d Cir. 2015);\\nIn re Brown, 851 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2017). River West con-\\nflicts with Lloyd and Edwards, and the panel did not appreci-\\nate that it was creating a second intra-circuit conflict.\\n River West relied on In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1986),\\nwhich held an appeal to be moot when the appellant sought\\nto undo a sale that came within the scope of §363(m). Sax\\narose from a challenge to the sale itself, not a dispute about\\nwho was entitled to the proceeds. It therefore does not sup-\\nport the conclusion of River West that §363(m) prevents any\\njudicial order requiring proceeds to be handed over to a\\ntrustee or estate in bankruptcy. In re Edwards, 962 F.2d at 644,\\nobserved that it would be mistaken to read Sax as limiting\\njudicial control over the disposition of the money generated\\n\\fNo. 18-2117 5\\n\\nby a sale—yet that is what River West did, citing Sax but not\\nEdwards.\\n The disagreement among panels must be cleared up. We\\nnow hold that §363(m) does not make any dispute moot or\\nprevent a bankruptcy court from deciding what shall be\\ndone with the proceeds of a sale or lease. River West is over-\\nruled, as is Part III of Sax (which treated as moot all disputes\\nwithin the scope of §363(m)). Any other decision in this cir-\\ncuit that treats §363(m) as making a controversy moot, rather\\nthan giving the purchaser or lessee a defense to a request to\\nupset the sale or lease, is disapproved. This opinion has been\\ncirculated before release to all active judges. See Circuit Rule\\n40(e). None wanted to hear the appeal en banc.\\n This brings us to the merits. Trinity maintains that the re-\\nlease erroneously filed in 2013 abrogated ColFin’s rights. If\\nthat’s so, then the proceeds from the sale must be distributed\\namong Trinity’s other creditors. The bankruptcy judge and\\ndistrict judge concluded, however, that Trinity did not ob-\\ntain rights from the 2013 filing, for it was unilateral and\\nwithout consideration. It therefore was not a contract, and\\nbecause no one (including Trinity) detrimentally relied on\\nthe release, ColFin could rescind it.\\n That conclusion is sound as a maoer of Illinois law,\\nwhich applies to ColFin’s security interest. Illinois treats a\\nmistaken release of a mortgage as ineffective between the\\nmortgagor and mortgagee, see Hale v. Morgan, 68 Ill. 244\\n(1873); Ogle v. Turpin, 102 Ill. 148 (1881); LennarU v. Quilty,\\n191 Ill. 174, 179–80 (1901), although third parties that rely on\\nthe mistake may obtain security given the apparent lack of a\\nsenior security interest. Bank of New York v. Langman, 2013 IL\\nApp (2d) 120609 ¶21.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2117\\n\\n Trinity relies on this clause in the mortgage: “Lender\\nshall not be deemed to have waived any rights under this\\nMortgage unless such waiver is given in writing and signed\\nby Lender.” Trinity treats this as if it read: “Lender shall be\\ndeemed to have irrevocably waived any rights under this\\nmortgage whenever it or its agent signs a wrioen document\\nto that effect.” But that’s not what the clause provides. It\\nsays that only an authorized writing accomplishes a waiver,\\nnot that any particular document does so. To say “only A can\\naccomplish B” is not at all to say “every A accomplishes B.”\\nThe no-waiver clause negates oral waivers and waivers im-\\nplied from conduct; accepting a late payment thus does not\\nwaive the deadline for payments. This language does not\\nmean that mistaken unilateral writings are beyond recall.\\n According to Trinity, In re Motors Liquidation Co., 777 F.3d\\n100 (2d Cir. 2015), shows that a mistaken release cannot be\\nundone. That may be true if, as in Motors Liquidation, the er-\\nror comes to light only after bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy\\nCode gives the Trustee or debtor in possession the rights of a\\nhypothetical lien creditor. 11 U.S.C. §544(a)(1). Because a\\nmistaken release in Illinois allows third parties to take effec-\\ntive security interests if they act before the release is rescind-\\ned, a mistake not caught before the date of the bankruptcy\\nfiling brings §544(a)(1) into play and prevents the secured\\ncreditor from regaining its original position. That’s what\\nhappened in the Second Circuit’s case, leaving the secured\\ncreditors to argue that the release (which all conceded to be\\nmistaken) should be disregarded because it had been unau-\\nthorized. The Second Circuit concluded that the release had\\nbeen authorized, so it counted—and §544(a)(1) did the re-\\nmaining work. But ColFin caught the problem before Trinity\\nfiled its bankruptcy petition, so a hypothetical lien perfected\\n\\fNo. 18-2117 7\\n\\non the date of the bankruptcy would have been junior to\\nColFin’s interest.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4372876/\", \"author_raw\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4595623/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: TRINITY 83 DEVELOPMENT, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLFIN MIDWEST FUNDING, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-2117\nTRINITY 83 DEVELOPMENT, LLC,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nCOLFIN MIDWEST FUNDING, LLC,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 17 C 2844 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 1, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit\nJudges.\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In 2006 Trinity 83 Develop-\nment borrowed about $2 million from a bank, giving in re-\nturn a note and a mortgage on certain real property. In 2011\nthe bank sold the note and mortgage to ColFin Midwest\nFunding. ColFin relied on Midland Loan Services to collect\nthe payments. In 2013 Midland recorded a document (cap-\ntioned “satisfaction”) stating that the loan had been paid and\n\f2 No. 18-2117\n\nthe mortgage released. But the loan was still outstanding,\nand Trinity continued paying. In 2015 ColFin realized Mid-\nland’s mistake and recorded a document cancelling the satis-\nfaction. Soon afterward Trinity stopped paying, and ColFin\nfiled a foreclosure action in state court.\n Trinity commenced a federal bankruptcy proceeding,\nwhich stayed the state-court action. It then filed an adversary\naction against ColFin, contending that the release extin-\nguished the debt and security interest. Bankruptcy Judge\nThorne disagreed, however, holding that the release was a\nunilateral error that could be rectified unilaterally—and, as\nno one else had recorded a security interest between those\ntwo events, ColFin retained its original rights. A district\njudge affirmed, and Trinity appealed to us.\n Before the appeal was heard, the property was sold un-\nder the bankruptcy court’s auspices. ColFin contends that\nthis moots the appeal. It relies on 11 U.S.C. §363(m), which\nreads:\n The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under\n subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property\n does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authori-\n zation to an entity that purchased or leased such property in\n good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of\n the appeal, unless such authorization and such sale or lease were\n stayed pending appeal.\n\nColFin also relies on In re River West Plaza—Chicago, LLC, 664\nF.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2011), which holds that §363(m) blocks not\nonly a request to upset the sale but also any possibility of\nordering the recipient of the sale’s proceeds to turn that\nmoney over to the bankruptcy estate (the relief that Trinity\nnow seeks), which makes an appeal moot.\n\fNo. 18-2117 3\n\n Mootness is a constitutional doctrine designed to avoid\nthe issuance of advisory opinions. “[A] suit becomes moot,\nwhen the issues presented are no longer live or the parties\nlack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. [This oc-\ncurs] only when it is impossible for a court to grant any\neffectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Chafin v.\nChafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (internal citations and quota-\ntion marks omioed). It is possible for a court to grant relief\nhere, as it was possible in River West: one side wants money\nfrom the other. That request may be inconsistent with a stat-\nute, but a defense to payment concerns the merits, not moot-\nness. Courts do not say, when a defendant wins on the law,\nthat the case is moot. Cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).\n Many a statute forecloses particular relief. Think of the\nNorris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §101, which prohibits the\nuse of injunctions in some labor disputes. When a court con-\ncludes that the Act applies, it dismisses the suit but does not\ndeclare it moot. See, e.g., Burlington Northern R.R. v. Brother-\nhood of Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 429 (1987). The\nrequest for an injunction against an ongoing strike presents a\nreal case or controversy within the scope of Article III, a con-\ntroversy not eliminated by a statute that entitles the defend-\nant to prevail. Just so with §363(m). There is a live controver-\nsy about who should get the money generated by the sale.\nThat’s why we held long ago that §363(m) does not concern\nmootness. See In re UNR Industries, Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th\nCir. 1994). Accord, In re 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership, 126\nF.3d 955, 961 (7th Cir. 1997), reversed on the merits, 526 U.S.\n434 (1999). A defense, even an ironclad defense, does not de-\nfeat jurisdiction, see, e.g., Builders Bank v. FDIC, 846 F.3d 272\n(7th Cir. 2017), and mootness is a jurisdictional doctrine. The\nopinion in River West does not cite UNR or LaSalle Street\n\f4 No. 18-2117\n\nPartnership and so created an unappreciated intra-circuit\nconflict.\n There is a further problem with River West—one inde-\npendent of the question whether §363(m) concerns moot-\nness. Section 363(m) does not say one word about the dispo-\nsition of the proceeds of a sale or lease. The text is straight-\nforward: “The reversal or modification on appeal of an au-\nthorization … of a sale or lease of property does not affect\nthe validity of a sale or lease … to an entity that purchased\nor leased such property in good faith”. What should be done\nwith the proceeds is a subject within the control of the bank-\nruptcy court. We have recognized this multiple times. See,\ne.g., In re Lloyd, 37 F.3d 271, 273 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Edwards,\n962 F.2d 641, 643–44 (7th Cir. 1992). Many decisions from\noutside this circuit after River West likewise hold that\n§363(m) does not specify what happens to the money. E.g.,\nIn re Hope 7 Monroe Street L.P., 743 F.3d 867, 872–73 (D.C. Cir.\n2014); In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d 547, 554 (3d Cir. 2015);\nIn re Brown, 851 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2017). River West con-\nflicts with Lloyd and Edwards, and the panel did not appreci-\nate that it was creating a second intra-circuit conflict.\n River West relied on In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1986),\nwhich held an appeal to be moot when the appellant sought\nto undo a sale that came within the scope of §363(m). Sax\narose from a challenge to the sale itself, not a dispute about\nwho was entitled to the proceeds. It therefore does not sup-\nport the conclusion of River West that §363(m) prevents any\njudicial order requiring proceeds to be handed over to a\ntrustee or estate in bankruptcy. In re Edwards, 962 F.2d at 644,\nobserved that it would be mistaken to read Sax as limiting\njudicial control over the disposition of the money generated\n\fNo. 18-2117 5\n\nby a sale—yet that is what River West did, citing Sax but not\nEdwards.\n The disagreement among panels must be cleared up. We\nnow hold that §363(m) does not make any dispute moot or\nprevent a bankruptcy court from deciding what shall be\ndone with the proceeds of a sale or lease. River West is over-\nruled, as is Part III of Sax (which treated as moot all disputes\nwithin the scope of §363(m)). Any other decision in this cir-\ncuit that treats §363(m) as making a controversy moot, rather\nthan giving the purchaser or lessee a defense to a request to\nupset the sale or lease, is disapproved. This opinion has been\ncirculated before release to all active judges. See Circuit Rule\n40(e). None wanted to hear the appeal en banc.\n This brings us to the merits. Trinity maintains that the re-\nlease erroneously filed in 2013 abrogated ColFin’s rights. If\nthat’s so, then the proceeds from the sale must be distributed\namong Trinity’s other creditors. The bankruptcy judge and\ndistrict judge concluded, however, that Trinity did not ob-\ntain rights from the 2013 filing, for it was unilateral and\nwithout consideration. It therefore was not a contract, and\nbecause no one (including Trinity) detrimentally relied on\nthe release, ColFin could rescind it.\n That conclusion is sound as a maoer of Illinois law,\nwhich applies to ColFin’s security interest. Illinois treats a\nmistaken release of a mortgage as ineffective between the\nmortgagor and mortgagee, see Hale v. Morgan, 68 Ill. 244\n(1873); Ogle v. Turpin, 102 Ill. 148 (1881); LennarU v. Quilty,\n191 Ill. 174, 179–80 (1901), although third parties that rely on\nthe mistake may obtain security given the apparent lack of a\nsenior security interest. Bank of New York v. Langman, 2013 IL\nApp (2d) 120609 ¶21.\n\f6 No. 18-2117\n\n Trinity relies on this clause in the mortgage: “Lender\nshall not be deemed to have waived any rights under this\nMortgage unless such waiver is given in writing and signed\nby Lender.” Trinity treats this as if it read: “Lender shall be\ndeemed to have irrevocably waived any rights under this\nmortgage whenever it or its agent signs a wrioen document\nto that effect.” But that’s not what the clause provides. It\nsays that only an authorized writing accomplishes a waiver,\nnot that any particular document does so. To say “only A can\naccomplish B” is not at all to say “every A accomplishes B.”\nThe no-waiver clause negates oral waivers and waivers im-\nplied from conduct; accepting a late payment thus does not\nwaive the deadline for payments. This language does not\nmean that mistaken unilateral writings are beyond recall.\n According to Trinity, In re Motors Liquidation Co., 777 F.3d\n100 (2d Cir. 2015), shows that a mistaken release cannot be\nundone. That may be true if, as in Motors Liquidation, the er-\nror comes to light only after bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy\nCode gives the Trustee or debtor in possession the rights of a\nhypothetical lien creditor. 11 U.S.C. §544(a)(1). Because a\nmistaken release in Illinois allows third parties to take effec-\ntive security interests if they act before the release is rescind-\ned, a mistake not caught before the date of the bankruptcy\nfiling brings §544(a)(1) into play and prevents the secured\ncreditor from regaining its original position. That’s what\nhappened in the Second Circuit’s case, leaving the secured\ncreditors to argue that the release (which all conceded to be\nmistaken) should be disregarded because it had been unau-\nthorized. The Second Circuit concluded that the release had\nbeen authorized, so it counted—and §544(a)(1) did the re-\nmaining work. But ColFin caught the problem before Trinity\nfiled its bankruptcy petition, so a hypothetical lien perfected\n\fNo. 18-2117 7\n\non the date of the bankruptcy would have been junior to\nColFin’s interest.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: TRINITY 83 DEVELOPMENT, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLFIN MIDWEST FUNDING, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 18-2117\\nTRINITY 83 DEVELOPMENT, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nCOLFIN MIDWEST FUNDING, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 2844 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In 2006 Trinity 83 Develop-\\nment borrowed about $2 million from a bank, giving in re-\\nturn a note and a mortgage on certain real property. In 2011\\nthe bank sold the note and mortgage to ColFin Midwest\\nFunding. ColFin relied on Midland Loan Services to collect\\nthe payments. In 2013 Midland recorded a document (cap-\\ntioned “satisfaction”) stating that the loan had been paid and\\n\\f2 No. 18-2117\\n\\nthe mortgage released. But the loan was still outstanding,\\nand Trinity continued paying. In 2015 ColFin realized Mid-\\nland’s mistake and recorded a document cancelling the satis-\\nfaction. Soon afterward Trinity stopped paying, and ColFin\\nfiled a foreclosure action in state court.\\n Trinity commenced a federal bankruptcy proceeding,\\nwhich stayed the state-court action. It then filed an adversary\\naction against ColFin, contending that the release extin-\\nguished the debt and security interest. Bankruptcy Judge\\nThorne disagreed, however, holding that the release was a\\nunilateral error that could be rectified unilaterally—and, as\\nno one else had recorded a security interest between those\\ntwo events, ColFin retained its original rights. A district\\njudge affirmed, and Trinity appealed to us.\\n Before the appeal was heard, the property was sold un-\\nder the bankruptcy court’s auspices. ColFin contends that\\nthis moots the appeal. It relies on 11 U.S.C. §363(m), which\\nreads:\\n The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under\\n subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property\\n does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authori-\\n zation to an entity that purchased or leased such property in\\n good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of\\n the appeal, unless such authorization and such sale or lease were\\n stayed pending appeal.\\n\\nColFin also relies on In re River West Plaza—Chicago, LLC, 664\\nF.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2011), which holds that §363(m) blocks not\\nonly a request to upset the sale but also any possibility of\\nordering the recipient of the sale’s proceeds to turn that\\nmoney over to the bankruptcy estate (the relief that Trinity\\nnow seeks), which makes an appeal moot.\\n\\fNo. 18-2117 3\\n\\n Mootness is a constitutional doctrine designed to avoid\\nthe issuance of advisory opinions. “[A] suit becomes moot,\\nwhen the issues presented are no longer live or the parties\\nlack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. [This oc-\\ncurs] only when it is impossible for a court to grant any\\neffectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Chafin v.\\nChafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (internal citations and quota-\\ntion marks omioed). It is possible for a court to grant relief\\nhere, as it was possible in River West: one side wants money\\nfrom the other. That request may be inconsistent with a stat-\\nute, but a defense to payment concerns the merits, not moot-\\nness. Courts do not say, when a defendant wins on the law,\\nthat the case is moot. Cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).\\n Many a statute forecloses particular relief. Think of the\\nNorris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §101, which prohibits the\\nuse of injunctions in some labor disputes. When a court con-\\ncludes that the Act applies, it dismisses the suit but does not\\ndeclare it moot. See, e.g., Burlington Northern R.R. v. Brother-\\nhood of Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 429 (1987). The\\nrequest for an injunction against an ongoing strike presents a\\nreal case or controversy within the scope of Article III, a con-\\ntroversy not eliminated by a statute that entitles the defend-\\nant to prevail. Just so with §363(m). There is a live controver-\\nsy about who should get the money generated by the sale.\\nThat’s why we held long ago that §363(m) does not concern\\nmootness. See In re UNR Industries, Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th\\nCir. 1994). Accord, In re 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership, 126\\nF.3d 955, 961 (7th Cir. 1997), reversed on the merits, 526 U.S.\\n434 (1999). A defense, even an ironclad defense, does not de-\\nfeat jurisdiction, see, e.g., Builders Bank v. FDIC, 846 F.3d 272\\n(7th Cir. 2017), and mootness is a jurisdictional doctrine. The\\nopinion in River West does not cite UNR or LaSalle Street\\n\\f4 No. 18-2117\\n\\nPartnership and so created an unappreciated intra-circuit\\nconflict.\\n There is a further problem with River West—one inde-\\npendent of the question whether §363(m) concerns moot-\\nness. Section 363(m) does not say one word about the dispo-\\nsition of the proceeds of a sale or lease. The text is straight-\\nforward: “The reversal or modification on appeal of an au-\\nthorization … of a sale or lease of property does not affect\\nthe validity of a sale or lease … to an entity that purchased\\nor leased such property in good faith”. What should be done\\nwith the proceeds is a subject within the control of the bank-\\nruptcy court. We have recognized this multiple times. See,\\ne.g., In re Lloyd, 37 F.3d 271, 273 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Edwards,\\n962 F.2d 641, 643–44 (7th Cir. 1992). Many decisions from\\noutside this circuit after River West likewise hold that\\n§363(m) does not specify what happens to the money. E.g.,\\nIn re Hope 7 Monroe Street L.P., 743 F.3d 867, 872–73 (D.C. Cir.\\n2014); In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d 547, 554 (3d Cir. 2015);\\nIn re Brown, 851 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2017). River West con-\\nflicts with Lloyd and Edwards, and the panel did not appreci-\\nate that it was creating a second intra-circuit conflict.\\n River West relied on In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1986),\\nwhich held an appeal to be moot when the appellant sought\\nto undo a sale that came within the scope of §363(m). Sax\\narose from a challenge to the sale itself, not a dispute about\\nwho was entitled to the proceeds. It therefore does not sup-\\nport the conclusion of River West that §363(m) prevents any\\njudicial order requiring proceeds to be handed over to a\\ntrustee or estate in bankruptcy. In re Edwards, 962 F.2d at 644,\\nobserved that it would be mistaken to read Sax as limiting\\njudicial control over the disposition of the money generated\\n\\fNo. 18-2117 5\\n\\nby a sale—yet that is what River West did, citing Sax but not\\nEdwards.\\n The disagreement among panels must be cleared up. We\\nnow hold that §363(m) does not make any dispute moot or\\nprevent a bankruptcy court from deciding what shall be\\ndone with the proceeds of a sale or lease. River West is over-\\nruled, as is Part III of Sax (which treated as moot all disputes\\nwithin the scope of §363(m)). Any other decision in this cir-\\ncuit that treats §363(m) as making a controversy moot, rather\\nthan giving the purchaser or lessee a defense to a request to\\nupset the sale or lease, is disapproved. This opinion has been\\ncirculated before release to all active judges. See Circuit Rule\\n40(e). None wanted to hear the appeal en banc.\\n This brings us to the merits. Trinity maintains that the re-\\nlease erroneously filed in 2013 abrogated ColFin’s rights. If\\nthat’s so, then the proceeds from the sale must be distributed\\namong Trinity’s other creditors. The bankruptcy judge and\\ndistrict judge concluded, however, that Trinity did not ob-\\ntain rights from the 2013 filing, for it was unilateral and\\nwithout consideration. It therefore was not a contract, and\\nbecause no one (including Trinity) detrimentally relied on\\nthe release, ColFin could rescind it.\\n That conclusion is sound as a maoer of Illinois law,\\nwhich applies to ColFin’s security interest. Illinois treats a\\nmistaken release of a mortgage as ineffective between the\\nmortgagor and mortgagee, see Hale v. Morgan, 68 Ill. 244\\n(1873); Ogle v. Turpin, 102 Ill. 148 (1881); LennarU v. Quilty,\\n191 Ill. 174, 179–80 (1901), although third parties that rely on\\nthe mistake may obtain security given the apparent lack of a\\nsenior security interest. Bank of New York v. Langman, 2013 IL\\nApp (2d) 120609 ¶21.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2117\\n\\n Trinity relies on this clause in the mortgage: “Lender\\nshall not be deemed to have waived any rights under this\\nMortgage unless such waiver is given in writing and signed\\nby Lender.” Trinity treats this as if it read: “Lender shall be\\ndeemed to have irrevocably waived any rights under this\\nmortgage whenever it or its agent signs a wrioen document\\nto that effect.” But that’s not what the clause provides. It\\nsays that only an authorized writing accomplishes a waiver,\\nnot that any particular document does so. To say “only A can\\naccomplish B” is not at all to say “every A accomplishes B.”\\nThe no-waiver clause negates oral waivers and waivers im-\\nplied from conduct; accepting a late payment thus does not\\nwaive the deadline for payments. This language does not\\nmean that mistaken unilateral writings are beyond recall.\\n According to Trinity, In re Motors Liquidation Co., 777 F.3d\\n100 (2d Cir. 2015), shows that a mistaken release cannot be\\nundone. That may be true if, as in Motors Liquidation, the er-\\nror comes to light only after bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy\\nCode gives the Trustee or debtor in possession the rights of a\\nhypothetical lien creditor. 11 U.S.C. §544(a)(1). Because a\\nmistaken release in Illinois allows third parties to take effec-\\ntive security interests if they act before the release is rescind-\\ned, a mistake not caught before the date of the bankruptcy\\nfiling brings §544(a)(1) into play and prevents the secured\\ncreditor from regaining its original position. That’s what\\nhappened in the Second Circuit’s case, leaving the secured\\ncreditors to argue that the release (which all conceded to be\\nmistaken) should be disregarded because it had been unau-\\nthorized. The Second Circuit concluded that the release had\\nbeen authorized, so it counted—and §544(a)(1) did the re-\\nmaining work. But ColFin caught the problem before Trinity\\nfiled its bankruptcy petition, so a hypothetical lien perfected\\n\\fNo. 18-2117 7\\n\\non the date of the bankruptcy would have been junior to\\nColFin’s interest.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1157,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4595748,"string":"4,595,748"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Trinity 83 Development LLC v. Colfin Midwest Funding LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2117"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 18-2117\\nTRINITY 83 DEVELOPMENT, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nCOLFIN MIDWEST FUNDING, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 2844 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In 2006 Trinity 83 Develop-\\nment borrowed about $2 million from a bank, giving in re-\\nturn a note and a mortgage on certain real property. In 2011\\nthe bank sold the note and mortgage to ColFin Midwest\\nFunding. ColFin relied on Midland Loan Services to collect\\nthe payments. In 2013 Midland recorded a document (cap-\\ntioned “satisfaction”) stating that the loan had been paid and\\n\\f2 No. 18-2117\\n\\nthe mortgage released. But the loan was still outstanding,\\nand Trinity continued paying. In 2015 ColFin realized Mid-\\nland’s mistake and recorded a document cancelling the satis-\\nfaction. Soon afterward Trinity stopped paying, and ColFin\\nfiled a foreclosure action in state court.\\n Trinity commenced a federal bankruptcy proceeding,\\nwhich stayed the state-court action. It then filed an adversary\\naction against ColFin, contending that the release extin-\\nguished the debt and security interest. Bankruptcy Judge\\nThorne disagreed, however, holding that the release was a\\nunilateral error that could be rectified unilaterally—and, as\\nno one else had recorded a security interest between those\\ntwo events, ColFin retained its original rights. A district\\njudge affirmed, and Trinity appealed to us.\\n Before the appeal was heard, the property was sold un-\\nder the bankruptcy court’s auspices. ColFin contends that\\nthis moots the appeal. It relies on 11 U.S.C. §363(m), which\\nreads:\\n The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under\\n subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property\\n does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authori-\\n zation to an entity that purchased or leased such property in\\n good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of\\n the appeal, unless such authorization and such sale or lease were\\n stayed pending appeal.\\n\\nColFin also relies on In re River West Plaza—Chicago, LLC, 664\\nF.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2011), which holds that §363(m) blocks not\\nonly a request to upset the sale but also any possibility of\\nordering the recipient of the sale’s proceeds to turn that\\nmoney over to the bankruptcy estate (the relief that Trinity\\nnow seeks), which makes an appeal moot.\\n\\fNo. 18-2117 3\\n\\n Mootness is a constitutional doctrine designed to avoid\\nthe issuance of advisory opinions. “[A] suit becomes moot,\\nwhen the issues presented are no longer live or the parties\\nlack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. [This oc-\\ncurs] only when it is impossible for a court to grant any\\neffectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Chafin v.\\nChafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (internal citations and quota-\\ntion marks omioed). It is possible for a court to grant relief\\nhere, as it was possible in River West: one side wants money\\nfrom the other. That request may be inconsistent with a stat-\\nute, but a defense to payment concerns the merits, not moot-\\nness. Courts do not say, when a defendant wins on the law,\\nthat the case is moot. Cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).\\n Many a statute forecloses particular relief. Think of the\\nNorris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §101, which prohibits the\\nuse of injunctions in some labor disputes. When a court con-\\ncludes that the Act applies, it dismisses the suit but does not\\ndeclare it moot. See, e.g., Burlington Northern R.R. v. Brother-\\nhood of Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 429 (1987). The\\nrequest for an injunction against an ongoing strike presents a\\nreal case or controversy within the scope of Article III, a con-\\ntroversy not eliminated by a statute that entitles the defend-\\nant to prevail. Just so with §363(m). There is a live controver-\\nsy about who should get the money generated by the sale.\\nThat’s why we held long ago that §363(m) does not concern\\nmootness. See In re UNR Industries, Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th\\nCir. 1994). Accord, In re 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership, 126\\nF.3d 955, 961 (7th Cir. 1997), reversed on the merits, 526 U.S.\\n434 (1999). A defense, even an ironclad defense, does not de-\\nfeat jurisdiction, see, e.g., Builders Bank v. FDIC, 846 F.3d 272\\n(7th Cir. 2017), and mootness is a jurisdictional doctrine. The\\nopinion in River West does not cite UNR or LaSalle Street\\n\\f4 No. 18-2117\\n\\nPartnership and so created an unappreciated intra-circuit\\nconflict.\\n There is a further problem with River West—one inde-\\npendent of the question whether §363(m) concerns moot-\\nness. Section 363(m) does not say one word about the dispo-\\nsition of the proceeds of a sale or lease. The text is straight-\\nforward: “The reversal or modification on appeal of an au-\\nthorization … of a sale or lease of property does not affect\\nthe validity of a sale or lease … to an entity that purchased\\nor leased such property in good faith”. What should be done\\nwith the proceeds is a subject within the control of the bank-\\nruptcy court. We have recognized this multiple times. See,\\ne.g., In re Lloyd, 37 F.3d 271, 273 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Edwards,\\n962 F.2d 641, 643–44 (7th Cir. 1992). Many decisions from\\noutside this circuit after River West likewise hold that\\n§363(m) does not specify what happens to the money. E.g.,\\nIn re Hope 7 Monroe Street L.P., 743 F.3d 867, 872–73 (D.C. Cir.\\n2014); In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d 547, 554 (3d Cir. 2015);\\nIn re Brown, 851 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2017). River West con-\\nflicts with Lloyd and Edwards, and the panel did not appreci-\\nate that it was creating a second intra-circuit conflict.\\n River West relied on In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1986),\\nwhich held an appeal to be moot when the appellant sought\\nto undo a sale that came within the scope of §363(m). Sax\\narose from a challenge to the sale itself, not a dispute about\\nwho was entitled to the proceeds. It therefore does not sup-\\nport the conclusion of River West that §363(m) prevents any\\njudicial order requiring proceeds to be handed over to a\\ntrustee or estate in bankruptcy. In re Edwards, 962 F.2d at 644,\\nobserved that it would be mistaken to read Sax as limiting\\njudicial control over the disposition of the money generated\\n\\fNo. 18-2117 5\\n\\nby a sale—yet that is what River West did, citing Sax but not\\nEdwards.\\n The disagreement among panels must be cleared up. We\\nnow hold that §363(m) does not make any dispute moot or\\nprevent a bankruptcy court from deciding what shall be\\ndone with the proceeds of a sale or lease. River West is over-\\nruled, as is Part III of Sax (which treated as moot all disputes\\nwithin the scope of §363(m)). Any other decision in this cir-\\ncuit that treats §363(m) as making a controversy moot, rather\\nthan giving the purchaser or lessee a defense to a request to\\nupset the sale or lease, is disapproved. This opinion has been\\ncirculated before release to all active judges. See Circuit Rule\\n40(e). None wanted to hear the appeal en banc.\\n This brings us to the merits. Trinity maintains that the re-\\nlease erroneously filed in 2013 abrogated ColFin’s rights. If\\nthat’s so, then the proceeds from the sale must be distributed\\namong Trinity’s other creditors. The bankruptcy judge and\\ndistrict judge concluded, however, that Trinity did not ob-\\ntain rights from the 2013 filing, for it was unilateral and\\nwithout consideration. It therefore was not a contract, and\\nbecause no one (including Trinity) detrimentally relied on\\nthe release, ColFin could rescind it.\\n That conclusion is sound as a maoer of Illinois law,\\nwhich applies to ColFin’s security interest. Illinois treats a\\nmistaken release of a mortgage as ineffective between the\\nmortgagor and mortgagee, see Hale v. Morgan, 68 Ill. 244\\n(1873); Ogle v. Turpin, 102 Ill. 148 (1881); LennarU v. Quilty,\\n191 Ill. 174, 179–80 (1901), although third parties that rely on\\nthe mistake may obtain security given the apparent lack of a\\nsenior security interest. Bank of New York v. Langman, 2013 IL\\nApp (2d) 120609 ¶21.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2117\\n\\n Trinity relies on this clause in the mortgage: “Lender\\nshall not be deemed to have waived any rights under this\\nMortgage unless such waiver is given in writing and signed\\nby Lender.” Trinity treats this as if it read: “Lender shall be\\ndeemed to have irrevocably waived any rights under this\\nmortgage whenever it or its agent signs a wrioen document\\nto that effect.” But that’s not what the clause provides. It\\nsays that only an authorized writing accomplishes a waiver,\\nnot that any particular document does so. To say “only A can\\naccomplish B” is not at all to say “every A accomplishes B.”\\nThe no-waiver clause negates oral waivers and waivers im-\\nplied from conduct; accepting a late payment thus does not\\nwaive the deadline for payments. This language does not\\nmean that mistaken unilateral writings are beyond recall.\\n According to Trinity, In re Motors Liquidation Co., 777 F.3d\\n100 (2d Cir. 2015), shows that a mistaken release cannot be\\nundone. That may be true if, as in Motors Liquidation, the er-\\nror comes to light only after bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy\\nCode gives the Trustee or debtor in possession the rights of a\\nhypothetical lien creditor. 11 U.S.C. §544(a)(1). Because a\\nmistaken release in Illinois allows third parties to take effec-\\ntive security interests if they act before the release is rescind-\\ned, a mistake not caught before the date of the bankruptcy\\nfiling brings §544(a)(1) into play and prevents the secured\\ncreditor from regaining its original position. That’s what\\nhappened in the Second Circuit’s case, leaving the secured\\ncreditors to argue that the release (which all conceded to be\\nmistaken) should be disregarded because it had been unau-\\nthorized. The Second Circuit concluded that the release had\\nbeen authorized, so it counted—and §544(a)(1) did the re-\\nmaining work. But ColFin caught the problem before Trinity\\nfiled its bankruptcy petition, so a hypothetical lien perfected\\n\\fNo. 18-2117 7\\n\\non the date of the bankruptcy would have been junior to\\nColFin’s interest.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4373001/\", \"author_raw\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4595748/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Trinity 83 Development LLC v. Colfin Midwest Funding LLC\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-2117\nTRINITY 83 DEVELOPMENT, LLC,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nCOLFIN MIDWEST FUNDING, LLC,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 17 C 2844 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 1, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit\nJudges.\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In 2006 Trinity 83 Develop-\nment borrowed about $2 million from a bank, giving in re-\nturn a note and a mortgage on certain real property. In 2011\nthe bank sold the note and mortgage to ColFin Midwest\nFunding. ColFin relied on Midland Loan Services to collect\nthe payments. In 2013 Midland recorded a document (cap-\ntioned “satisfaction”) stating that the loan had been paid and\n\f2 No. 18-2117\n\nthe mortgage released. But the loan was still outstanding,\nand Trinity continued paying. In 2015 ColFin realized Mid-\nland’s mistake and recorded a document cancelling the satis-\nfaction. Soon afterward Trinity stopped paying, and ColFin\nfiled a foreclosure action in state court.\n Trinity commenced a federal bankruptcy proceeding,\nwhich stayed the state-court action. It then filed an adversary\naction against ColFin, contending that the release extin-\nguished the debt and security interest. Bankruptcy Judge\nThorne disagreed, however, holding that the release was a\nunilateral error that could be rectified unilaterally—and, as\nno one else had recorded a security interest between those\ntwo events, ColFin retained its original rights. A district\njudge affirmed, and Trinity appealed to us.\n Before the appeal was heard, the property was sold un-\nder the bankruptcy court’s auspices. ColFin contends that\nthis moots the appeal. It relies on 11 U.S.C. §363(m), which\nreads:\n The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under\n subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property\n does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authori-\n zation to an entity that purchased or leased such property in\n good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of\n the appeal, unless such authorization and such sale or lease were\n stayed pending appeal.\n\nColFin also relies on In re River West Plaza—Chicago, LLC, 664\nF.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2011), which holds that §363(m) blocks not\nonly a request to upset the sale but also any possibility of\nordering the recipient of the sale’s proceeds to turn that\nmoney over to the bankruptcy estate (the relief that Trinity\nnow seeks), which makes an appeal moot.\n\fNo. 18-2117 3\n\n Mootness is a constitutional doctrine designed to avoid\nthe issuance of advisory opinions. “[A] suit becomes moot,\nwhen the issues presented are no longer live or the parties\nlack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. [This oc-\ncurs] only when it is impossible for a court to grant any\neffectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Chafin v.\nChafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (internal citations and quota-\ntion marks omioed). It is possible for a court to grant relief\nhere, as it was possible in River West: one side wants money\nfrom the other. That request may be inconsistent with a stat-\nute, but a defense to payment concerns the merits, not moot-\nness. Courts do not say, when a defendant wins on the law,\nthat the case is moot. Cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).\n Many a statute forecloses particular relief. Think of the\nNorris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §101, which prohibits the\nuse of injunctions in some labor disputes. When a court con-\ncludes that the Act applies, it dismisses the suit but does not\ndeclare it moot. See, e.g., Burlington Northern R.R. v. Brother-\nhood of Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 429 (1987). The\nrequest for an injunction against an ongoing strike presents a\nreal case or controversy within the scope of Article III, a con-\ntroversy not eliminated by a statute that entitles the defend-\nant to prevail. Just so with §363(m). There is a live controver-\nsy about who should get the money generated by the sale.\nThat’s why we held long ago that §363(m) does not concern\nmootness. See In re UNR Industries, Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th\nCir. 1994). Accord, In re 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership, 126\nF.3d 955, 961 (7th Cir. 1997), reversed on the merits, 526 U.S.\n434 (1999). A defense, even an ironclad defense, does not de-\nfeat jurisdiction, see, e.g., Builders Bank v. FDIC, 846 F.3d 272\n(7th Cir. 2017), and mootness is a jurisdictional doctrine. The\nopinion in River West does not cite UNR or LaSalle Street\n\f4 No. 18-2117\n\nPartnership and so created an unappreciated intra-circuit\nconflict.\n There is a further problem with River West—one inde-\npendent of the question whether §363(m) concerns moot-\nness. Section 363(m) does not say one word about the dispo-\nsition of the proceeds of a sale or lease. The text is straight-\nforward: “The reversal or modification on appeal of an au-\nthorization … of a sale or lease of property does not affect\nthe validity of a sale or lease … to an entity that purchased\nor leased such property in good faith”. What should be done\nwith the proceeds is a subject within the control of the bank-\nruptcy court. We have recognized this multiple times. See,\ne.g., In re Lloyd, 37 F.3d 271, 273 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Edwards,\n962 F.2d 641, 643–44 (7th Cir. 1992). Many decisions from\noutside this circuit after River West likewise hold that\n§363(m) does not specify what happens to the money. E.g.,\nIn re Hope 7 Monroe Street L.P., 743 F.3d 867, 872–73 (D.C. Cir.\n2014); In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d 547, 554 (3d Cir. 2015);\nIn re Brown, 851 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2017). River West con-\nflicts with Lloyd and Edwards, and the panel did not appreci-\nate that it was creating a second intra-circuit conflict.\n River West relied on In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1986),\nwhich held an appeal to be moot when the appellant sought\nto undo a sale that came within the scope of §363(m). Sax\narose from a challenge to the sale itself, not a dispute about\nwho was entitled to the proceeds. It therefore does not sup-\nport the conclusion of River West that §363(m) prevents any\njudicial order requiring proceeds to be handed over to a\ntrustee or estate in bankruptcy. In re Edwards, 962 F.2d at 644,\nobserved that it would be mistaken to read Sax as limiting\njudicial control over the disposition of the money generated\n\fNo. 18-2117 5\n\nby a sale—yet that is what River West did, citing Sax but not\nEdwards.\n The disagreement among panels must be cleared up. We\nnow hold that §363(m) does not make any dispute moot or\nprevent a bankruptcy court from deciding what shall be\ndone with the proceeds of a sale or lease. River West is over-\nruled, as is Part III of Sax (which treated as moot all disputes\nwithin the scope of §363(m)). Any other decision in this cir-\ncuit that treats §363(m) as making a controversy moot, rather\nthan giving the purchaser or lessee a defense to a request to\nupset the sale or lease, is disapproved. This opinion has been\ncirculated before release to all active judges. See Circuit Rule\n40(e). None wanted to hear the appeal en banc.\n This brings us to the merits. Trinity maintains that the re-\nlease erroneously filed in 2013 abrogated ColFin’s rights. If\nthat’s so, then the proceeds from the sale must be distributed\namong Trinity’s other creditors. The bankruptcy judge and\ndistrict judge concluded, however, that Trinity did not ob-\ntain rights from the 2013 filing, for it was unilateral and\nwithout consideration. It therefore was not a contract, and\nbecause no one (including Trinity) detrimentally relied on\nthe release, ColFin could rescind it.\n That conclusion is sound as a maoer of Illinois law,\nwhich applies to ColFin’s security interest. Illinois treats a\nmistaken release of a mortgage as ineffective between the\nmortgagor and mortgagee, see Hale v. Morgan, 68 Ill. 244\n(1873); Ogle v. Turpin, 102 Ill. 148 (1881); LennarU v. Quilty,\n191 Ill. 174, 179–80 (1901), although third parties that rely on\nthe mistake may obtain security given the apparent lack of a\nsenior security interest. Bank of New York v. Langman, 2013 IL\nApp (2d) 120609 ¶21.\n\f6 No. 18-2117\n\n Trinity relies on this clause in the mortgage: “Lender\nshall not be deemed to have waived any rights under this\nMortgage unless such waiver is given in writing and signed\nby Lender.” Trinity treats this as if it read: “Lender shall be\ndeemed to have irrevocably waived any rights under this\nmortgage whenever it or its agent signs a wrioen document\nto that effect.” But that’s not what the clause provides. It\nsays that only an authorized writing accomplishes a waiver,\nnot that any particular document does so. To say “only A can\naccomplish B” is not at all to say “every A accomplishes B.”\nThe no-waiver clause negates oral waivers and waivers im-\nplied from conduct; accepting a late payment thus does not\nwaive the deadline for payments. This language does not\nmean that mistaken unilateral writings are beyond recall.\n According to Trinity, In re Motors Liquidation Co., 777 F.3d\n100 (2d Cir. 2015), shows that a mistaken release cannot be\nundone. That may be true if, as in Motors Liquidation, the er-\nror comes to light only after bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy\nCode gives the Trustee or debtor in possession the rights of a\nhypothetical lien creditor. 11 U.S.C. §544(a)(1). Because a\nmistaken release in Illinois allows third parties to take effec-\ntive security interests if they act before the release is rescind-\ned, a mistake not caught before the date of the bankruptcy\nfiling brings §544(a)(1) into play and prevents the secured\ncreditor from regaining its original position. That’s what\nhappened in the Second Circuit’s case, leaving the secured\ncreditors to argue that the release (which all conceded to be\nmistaken) should be disregarded because it had been unau-\nthorized. The Second Circuit concluded that the release had\nbeen authorized, so it counted—and §544(a)(1) did the re-\nmaining work. But ColFin caught the problem before Trinity\nfiled its bankruptcy petition, so a hypothetical lien perfected\n\fNo. 18-2117 7\n\non the date of the bankruptcy would have been junior to\nColFin’s interest.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Trinity 83 Development LLC v. Colfin Midwest Funding LLC\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 18-2117\\nTRINITY 83 DEVELOPMENT, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nCOLFIN MIDWEST FUNDING, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 2844 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 1, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In 2006 Trinity 83 Develop-\\nment borrowed about $2 million from a bank, giving in re-\\nturn a note and a mortgage on certain real property. In 2011\\nthe bank sold the note and mortgage to ColFin Midwest\\nFunding. ColFin relied on Midland Loan Services to collect\\nthe payments. In 2013 Midland recorded a document (cap-\\ntioned “satisfaction”) stating that the loan had been paid and\\n\\f2 No. 18-2117\\n\\nthe mortgage released. But the loan was still outstanding,\\nand Trinity continued paying. In 2015 ColFin realized Mid-\\nland’s mistake and recorded a document cancelling the satis-\\nfaction. Soon afterward Trinity stopped paying, and ColFin\\nfiled a foreclosure action in state court.\\n Trinity commenced a federal bankruptcy proceeding,\\nwhich stayed the state-court action. It then filed an adversary\\naction against ColFin, contending that the release extin-\\nguished the debt and security interest. Bankruptcy Judge\\nThorne disagreed, however, holding that the release was a\\nunilateral error that could be rectified unilaterally—and, as\\nno one else had recorded a security interest between those\\ntwo events, ColFin retained its original rights. A district\\njudge affirmed, and Trinity appealed to us.\\n Before the appeal was heard, the property was sold un-\\nder the bankruptcy court’s auspices. ColFin contends that\\nthis moots the appeal. It relies on 11 U.S.C. §363(m), which\\nreads:\\n The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under\\n subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property\\n does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authori-\\n zation to an entity that purchased or leased such property in\\n good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of\\n the appeal, unless such authorization and such sale or lease were\\n stayed pending appeal.\\n\\nColFin also relies on In re River West Plaza—Chicago, LLC, 664\\nF.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2011), which holds that §363(m) blocks not\\nonly a request to upset the sale but also any possibility of\\nordering the recipient of the sale’s proceeds to turn that\\nmoney over to the bankruptcy estate (the relief that Trinity\\nnow seeks), which makes an appeal moot.\\n\\fNo. 18-2117 3\\n\\n Mootness is a constitutional doctrine designed to avoid\\nthe issuance of advisory opinions. “[A] suit becomes moot,\\nwhen the issues presented are no longer live or the parties\\nlack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. [This oc-\\ncurs] only when it is impossible for a court to grant any\\neffectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Chafin v.\\nChafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (internal citations and quota-\\ntion marks omioed). It is possible for a court to grant relief\\nhere, as it was possible in River West: one side wants money\\nfrom the other. That request may be inconsistent with a stat-\\nute, but a defense to payment concerns the merits, not moot-\\nness. Courts do not say, when a defendant wins on the law,\\nthat the case is moot. Cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).\\n Many a statute forecloses particular relief. Think of the\\nNorris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §101, which prohibits the\\nuse of injunctions in some labor disputes. When a court con-\\ncludes that the Act applies, it dismisses the suit but does not\\ndeclare it moot. See, e.g., Burlington Northern R.R. v. Brother-\\nhood of Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U.S. 429 (1987). The\\nrequest for an injunction against an ongoing strike presents a\\nreal case or controversy within the scope of Article III, a con-\\ntroversy not eliminated by a statute that entitles the defend-\\nant to prevail. Just so with §363(m). There is a live controver-\\nsy about who should get the money generated by the sale.\\nThat’s why we held long ago that §363(m) does not concern\\nmootness. See In re UNR Industries, Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th\\nCir. 1994). Accord, In re 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership, 126\\nF.3d 955, 961 (7th Cir. 1997), reversed on the merits, 526 U.S.\\n434 (1999). A defense, even an ironclad defense, does not de-\\nfeat jurisdiction, see, e.g., Builders Bank v. FDIC, 846 F.3d 272\\n(7th Cir. 2017), and mootness is a jurisdictional doctrine. The\\nopinion in River West does not cite UNR or LaSalle Street\\n\\f4 No. 18-2117\\n\\nPartnership and so created an unappreciated intra-circuit\\nconflict.\\n There is a further problem with River West—one inde-\\npendent of the question whether §363(m) concerns moot-\\nness. Section 363(m) does not say one word about the dispo-\\nsition of the proceeds of a sale or lease. The text is straight-\\nforward: “The reversal or modification on appeal of an au-\\nthorization … of a sale or lease of property does not affect\\nthe validity of a sale or lease … to an entity that purchased\\nor leased such property in good faith”. What should be done\\nwith the proceeds is a subject within the control of the bank-\\nruptcy court. We have recognized this multiple times. See,\\ne.g., In re Lloyd, 37 F.3d 271, 273 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Edwards,\\n962 F.2d 641, 643–44 (7th Cir. 1992). Many decisions from\\noutside this circuit after River West likewise hold that\\n§363(m) does not specify what happens to the money. E.g.,\\nIn re Hope 7 Monroe Street L.P., 743 F.3d 867, 872–73 (D.C. Cir.\\n2014); In re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d 547, 554 (3d Cir. 2015);\\nIn re Brown, 851 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2017). River West con-\\nflicts with Lloyd and Edwards, and the panel did not appreci-\\nate that it was creating a second intra-circuit conflict.\\n River West relied on In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1986),\\nwhich held an appeal to be moot when the appellant sought\\nto undo a sale that came within the scope of §363(m). Sax\\narose from a challenge to the sale itself, not a dispute about\\nwho was entitled to the proceeds. It therefore does not sup-\\nport the conclusion of River West that §363(m) prevents any\\njudicial order requiring proceeds to be handed over to a\\ntrustee or estate in bankruptcy. In re Edwards, 962 F.2d at 644,\\nobserved that it would be mistaken to read Sax as limiting\\njudicial control over the disposition of the money generated\\n\\fNo. 18-2117 5\\n\\nby a sale—yet that is what River West did, citing Sax but not\\nEdwards.\\n The disagreement among panels must be cleared up. We\\nnow hold that §363(m) does not make any dispute moot or\\nprevent a bankruptcy court from deciding what shall be\\ndone with the proceeds of a sale or lease. River West is over-\\nruled, as is Part III of Sax (which treated as moot all disputes\\nwithin the scope of §363(m)). Any other decision in this cir-\\ncuit that treats §363(m) as making a controversy moot, rather\\nthan giving the purchaser or lessee a defense to a request to\\nupset the sale or lease, is disapproved. This opinion has been\\ncirculated before release to all active judges. See Circuit Rule\\n40(e). None wanted to hear the appeal en banc.\\n This brings us to the merits. Trinity maintains that the re-\\nlease erroneously filed in 2013 abrogated ColFin’s rights. If\\nthat’s so, then the proceeds from the sale must be distributed\\namong Trinity’s other creditors. The bankruptcy judge and\\ndistrict judge concluded, however, that Trinity did not ob-\\ntain rights from the 2013 filing, for it was unilateral and\\nwithout consideration. It therefore was not a contract, and\\nbecause no one (including Trinity) detrimentally relied on\\nthe release, ColFin could rescind it.\\n That conclusion is sound as a maoer of Illinois law,\\nwhich applies to ColFin’s security interest. Illinois treats a\\nmistaken release of a mortgage as ineffective between the\\nmortgagor and mortgagee, see Hale v. Morgan, 68 Ill. 244\\n(1873); Ogle v. Turpin, 102 Ill. 148 (1881); LennarU v. Quilty,\\n191 Ill. 174, 179–80 (1901), although third parties that rely on\\nthe mistake may obtain security given the apparent lack of a\\nsenior security interest. Bank of New York v. Langman, 2013 IL\\nApp (2d) 120609 ¶21.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2117\\n\\n Trinity relies on this clause in the mortgage: “Lender\\nshall not be deemed to have waived any rights under this\\nMortgage unless such waiver is given in writing and signed\\nby Lender.” Trinity treats this as if it read: “Lender shall be\\ndeemed to have irrevocably waived any rights under this\\nmortgage whenever it or its agent signs a wrioen document\\nto that effect.” But that’s not what the clause provides. It\\nsays that only an authorized writing accomplishes a waiver,\\nnot that any particular document does so. To say “only A can\\naccomplish B” is not at all to say “every A accomplishes B.”\\nThe no-waiver clause negates oral waivers and waivers im-\\nplied from conduct; accepting a late payment thus does not\\nwaive the deadline for payments. This language does not\\nmean that mistaken unilateral writings are beyond recall.\\n According to Trinity, In re Motors Liquidation Co., 777 F.3d\\n100 (2d Cir. 2015), shows that a mistaken release cannot be\\nundone. That may be true if, as in Motors Liquidation, the er-\\nror comes to light only after bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy\\nCode gives the Trustee or debtor in possession the rights of a\\nhypothetical lien creditor. 11 U.S.C. §544(a)(1). Because a\\nmistaken release in Illinois allows third parties to take effec-\\ntive security interests if they act before the release is rescind-\\ned, a mistake not caught before the date of the bankruptcy\\nfiling brings §544(a)(1) into play and prevents the secured\\ncreditor from regaining its original position. That’s what\\nhappened in the Second Circuit’s case, leaving the secured\\ncreditors to argue that the release (which all conceded to be\\nmistaken) should be disregarded because it had been unau-\\nthorized. The Second Circuit concluded that the release had\\nbeen authorized, so it counted—and §544(a)(1) did the re-\\nmaining work. But ColFin caught the problem before Trinity\\nfiled its bankruptcy petition, so a hypothetical lien perfected\\n\\fNo. 18-2117 7\\n\\non the date of the bankruptcy would have been junior to\\nColFin’s interest.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1158,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443909,"string":"8,443,909"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Keycie A. STREET"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Street"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 18-1209"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Barrett, Hamilton, Rovner\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415340/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443909/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Keycie A. STREET\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Keycie A. STREET\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1159,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4596115,"string":"4,596,115"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Martha Conway v. General Electric Company"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1522"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Joel Martin Flaum\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\nLAJIM, LLC, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nGENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.\\n No. 13-cv-50348 — Iain D. Johnston, Magistrate Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 15, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 4, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-appellants purchased land\\nnear a former General Electric Company manufacturing plant\\nthat had operated for sixty years; the plant leached toxic\\nchemicals that seeped into the groundwater. The Illinois En-\\nvironmental Protection Agency filed suit under state law\\nagainst General Electric in 2004 and has been working with\\nthe company since then to investigate and develop a plan to\\naddress the contamination. In 2013, plaintiffs filed suit under\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nthe citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and\\nRecovery Act, seeking a mandatory injunction ordering Gen-\\neral Electric to conduct additional investigation into the scope\\nof the contamination and ordering the company to remove the\\ncontamination. The district court found the company liable\\nfor the contamination on summary judgment but denied\\nplaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief because, despite the\\nmany opportunities the court provided, plaintiffs did not of-\\nfer evidence establishing a need for injunctive relief beyond\\nwhat the company had already done in the state action. For\\nthe following reasons, we affirm.\\n I. Background\\n A. Statutory Scheme\\n The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”),\\n42 U.S.C. § 6901, et seq., “is a comprehensive environmental\\nstatute that governs the treatment, storage, and disposal of\\nsolid and hazardous waste.” Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S.\\n479, 483 (1996). The RCRA “is not principally designed to ef-\\nfectuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites or to compensate\\nthose who have attended to the remediation of environmental\\nhazards.” Id. Rather, the primary purpose of the RCRA “is to\\nreduce the generation of hazardous waste and to ensure the\\nproper treatment … of that waste which is nonetheless gener-\\nated, ‘so as to minimize the present and future threat to hu-\\nman health and the environment.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6902(b)).\\n The RCRA contains a citizen suit provision, which pro-\\nvides that “any person may commence a civil action” against\\n“any person” who has allegedly violated “any permit, stand-\\nard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 3\\n\\nwhich has become effective pursuant to this chapter,” or\\n“who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or\\npresent handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or dis-\\nposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an\\nimminent and substantial endangerment to health or the en-\\nvironment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1). Once the violation or po-\\ntential endangerment is shown, a district court “shall have ju-\\nrisdiction … to restrain any person who has contributed or\\nwho is contributing to the past or present handling, storage,\\ntreatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazard-\\nous waste” and “to order such person to take such other ac-\\ntion as may be necessary.” Id. § 6972(a).\\n B. Factual Background\\n 1. General Electric Plant in Morrison, Illinois\\n Defendant-appellee General Electric Company (“GE”) op-\\nerated a manufacturing plant in Morrison, Illinois from 1949\\nto 2010. To remove oil from the automotive and appliance\\nparts it manufactured, the plant used chlorinated organic sol-\\nvents, including trichloroethylene (“TCE”), perchloroethene\\n(“PCE”), and trichloroethane (“TCA”). These solvents are\\ntoxic and are regulated by federal and state environmental\\nagencies. GE used these solvents and stored them in degreas-\\ners located at the plant until 1994, when it switched to a soap-\\nlike solution to clean the parts.\\n In 1986, chlorinated solvents were detected in three mu-\\nnicipal supply wells that provided water to the City of Morri-\\nson, located several thousand feet southeast of the GE plant.\\nShortly thereafter, the Illinois Environmental Protection\\nAgency (“IEPA”) installed monitoring wells to analyze the\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\ngroundwater around the GE plant, which uncovered addi-\\ntional contamination. The IEPA completed a Phase I Remedial\\nInvestigation in 1987, which included sampling and analysis\\nof soil, water, and sediment. Based on the investigation, the\\nIEPA identified the GE plant as the source of the solvent con-\\ntamination.\\n In 1988, GE installed additional monitoring wells and an\\nair stripper to treat water pumped from one of Morrison’s\\nmunicipal wells to a level of contamination below the maxi-\\nmum contaminant level (“MCL”) so the city could continue to\\nuse the well as a source of drinking water; the other two mu-\\nnicipal supply wells were sealed. GE also conducted a Phase\\nII Remedial Investigation, which identified elevated concen-\\ntrations of solvents beneath the plant’s former degreasing op-\\nerations. Under the IEPA’s supervision, GE continued to sam-\\nple and monitor the groundwater in the monitoring wells and\\nsubmitted reports of the results to the IEPA.\\n In 1994, the IEPA required GE to conduct a Phase III Re-\\nmedial Investigation of the groundwater at and downgradi-\\nent from the plant. GE reported the results of the investigation\\nin 2001. According to the report, the solvents in the ground-\\nwater had decreased significantly by 2001, and the report\\nmodeled that the contaminants would naturally attenuate\\n(i.e., reduce) to concentrations below the MCL. Additionally,\\nthe report stated that Rock Creek was a natural groundwater\\ndivide that would prevent the contaminating solvents from\\nmigrating south from the GE plant across the creek. The re-\\nport concluded that the contamination did not pose a risk to\\nthe public because a City of Morrison ordinance prohibited\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 5\\n\\nthe use of groundwater as a source of drinking water and be-\\ncause GE’s air stripper at the remaining municipal supply\\nwell provided safe drinking water.\\n In response, however, the IEPA did not approve GE’s pro-\\nposal for natural attenuation of the contamination; instead,\\nthe IEPA concluded that active remediation of the site would\\nbe appropriate. The Illinois Attorney General commenced suit\\nagainst GE in 2004 under the Illinois Environmental Protec-\\ntion Act: for cost recovery (Count I), see 415 Ill. Comp. Stat.\\n5/22.2(f); to enjoin water pollution (Count II), see 415 Ill.\\nComp. Stat. 5/42(d)–(e); and to enjoin a water pollution haz-\\nard (Count III), see 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12(d). The state\\nsought to recover costs it had incurred as well as an injunction\\nrequiring that GE investigate the nature and extent of the con-\\ntamination and then perform remediation. In 2010, GE and Il-\\nlinois entered into a Consent Order in which GE agreed to\\nsubmit to the IEPA a series of reports, including: (1) “a work\\nplan to survey private wells, install additional monitoring\\nwells, and complete additional soil borings”; (2) “a Focused\\nSite Investigation Report (‘FSI’) summarizing the results of\\nthe work plan”; (3) “a Remedial Objectives Report to address\\nthe impact of the soil and groundwater contamination”; and\\n(4) “a Remedial Action Plan to meet the remediation objec-\\ntives within six years of the entry of the Consent Order.” Also\\nin 2010, the City of Morrison passed an ordinance prohibiting\\ngroundwater as a source of potable water and prohibiting the\\ninstallation of wells “to limit threats to human health from\\ngroundwater contamination.”\\n After approval of a work plan, GE installed monitoring\\nwells along Rock Creek. Then, in 2013, GE submitted its FSI\\ndetailing the data obtained from the various monitoring\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nwells; the report explained that the solvents had migrated\\nsouth of the plant and that the monitoring wells along Rock\\nCreek tested positive for contamination at levels above the\\nMCL. Tests from wells on the other side of Rock Creek (and\\nfurther from the plant) either did not detect chlorinated sol-\\nvents or detected TCE at a level below the MCL. Following\\ndiscussions between GE and the IEPA on the work plan and\\nFSI, the IEPA conditionally approved the FSI in March 2015.\\nIt determined that GE “adequately defined the nature and ex-\\ntent of the contamination.” The IEPA conditionally approved\\nGE’s revised Remedial Objectives Report in August 2016, after\\na number of additional submissions and a meeting between\\nthe technical representatives from GE and the IEPA.\\n In March 2017, GE submitted its Remedial Action Plan\\n(“RAP”) to the IEPA, proposing to achieve the remediation\\nobjectives through a “combination of institutional controls\\nand monitored natural attenuation.” The IEPA denied GE’s\\nproposal in June 2017, posing several questions about the\\nplan, and specifically noting that it did not accept “an open-\\nended period of monitored natural attenuation as a remedia-\\ntion technology.” GE submitted a revised RAP to the IEPA in\\nOctober 2017, responding to the IEPA’s questions and com-\\nments and proposing to address the remaining contamination\\nthrough institutional controls. The IEPA approved GE’s re-\\nvised Remedial Action Plan in March 2018.\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 7\\n\\n 2. Plaintiffs’ Interest in the Land\\n Plaintiff-appellant Lowell Beggs1 purchased land near the\\nsite of the shuttered GE plant in 2007. He conveyed the prop-\\nerty to plaintiff-appellant Prairie Ridge Golf Course, LLC,\\nwhich plaintiff-appellant LAJIM, LLC operated. Beggs moved\\ninto a home next to the golf course with his companion, plain-\\ntiff-appellant Martha Kai Conway (the “Conway home”). The\\ngolf course and Conway home are located south of the former\\nGE plant and downgradient from the plant.\\n When Beggs considered purchasing the golf course in\\nApril 2007, the seller advised him: “the golf course has con-\\ntamination on the first hole. This was caused by General Elec-\\ntric. If you go to the EPA web site, GE is listed as a superfund\\nsite. No further remediation was needed according to what I\\ncan find.” Beggs did not inquire further about the environ-\\nmental condition of the golf course before completing the pur-\\nchase in May 2007. The purchase agreement noted, “[S]eller []\\nhas disclosed to Purchaser that there is contamination on the\\nfirst hole of the Real Estate, such contamination having been\\ncaused by General Electric, as which contamination is part of\\nthe Superfund Site that apparently does not require any fur-\\nther remediation.” Additionally, Beggs walked the golf\\ncourse prior to completing the purchase and noticed a moni-\\ntoring well head protruding above the ground. After purchas-\\ning the property, Beggs contacted GE to fix a leak from the\\nfixture, which he knew monitored “how much stuff was com-\\ning out of GE.”\\n\\n\\n 1Beggs passed away during the course of this litigation. His interest\\nis now represented by the executor of his estate, plaintiff-appellant First\\nNational Bank of Amboy.\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\n C. Procedural Background\\n Plaintiffs filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois on\\nNovember 1, 2013 seeking: (1) a mandatory injunction requir-\\ning GE to remediate the contamination under the RCRA, see\\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (Count I); (2) cost recovery (Count II)\\nand a declaratory judgment (Count III) under the Compre-\\nhensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-\\nity Act (“CERCLA”), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(g)(3); and\\n(3) recovery under state law for nuisance (Count IV), trespass\\n(Count V), and negligence (Count VI).\\n After what the district court characterized as “extensive\\ndiscovery,” the court considered the parties’ cross-motions\\nfor partial summary judgment. Plaintiffs moved for summary\\njudgment on their RCRA claim. GE did not dispute that plain-\\ntiffs satisfied the first two elements of the claim—(1) defend-\\nant has generated solid or hazardous waste, and (2) defendant\\nhas contributed to the handling of the waste. See Albany Bank\\n& Tr. Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2002).\\nOn the sole remaining question—whether plaintiffs estab-\\nlished that the contamination “may present an imminent and\\nsubstantial danger to health or the environment,” id.—the dis-\\ntrict court found for plaintiffs and granted summary judg-\\nment as to GE’s liability under the RCRA. At plaintiffs’ re-\\nquest, the court deferred consideration as to whether plain-\\ntiffs were entitled to injunctive relief. On GE’s cross-motion\\nfor summary judgment on the state law claims, the district\\ncourt found the continuing tort doctrine did not apply and\\nfound the claims time-barred because plaintiffs had\\nknowledge of the claims more than five years before they filed\\nsuit.\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 9\\n\\n Over the next two years, the district court considered\\nplaintiffs’ request for a mandatory injunction in a number of\\nhearings and a series of opinions. On October 4, 2016, the\\ncourt held that the plain language of the RCRA permitted, but\\ndid not require, the court to grant injunctive relief despite the\\nongoing state proceeding; thus, the question before the court\\nwas not whether it could grant relief but whether it should. On\\nthis point, the court concluded plaintiffs had not yet provided\\nthe court with facts supporting their assertion that the Con-\\nsent Order in the state action was deficient and ineffective.\\nThe court ordered an evidentiary hearing and invited the\\nIEPA and the Illinois Attorney General to provide their views\\non the progress under the Consent Order and whether the\\ncourt should order injunctive relief under the RCRA. The Illi-\\nnois Attorney General’s Office submitted an amicus brief ex-\\nplaining that the State did not believe the court should impose\\ninjunctive relief because any court-ordered injunctive relief\\nwould overlap with the work currently being done—i.e., “site\\ninvestigation, monitoring and payment of costs as well as an\\norder barring further endangerment … [and] some type of re-\\nmedial effort.” The State asserted that all such actions were\\nalready underway and were “being done with diligence and\\nrigorous oversight by the Illinois EPA,” and that injunctive re-\\nlief “may result in a clean-up that is inconsistent with clean\\nups of other contaminated sites in Illinois.”\\n After two days of evidentiary hearing on June 1 and 2,\\n2017, the court issued an opinion on September 7, 2017 deny-\\ning the requested injunctive relief. Both parties had presented\\nexpert testimony at the hearing; the district court credited\\nGE’s expert as having “provided reasonable, rational and\\ncredible bases explaining why certain actions were taken and\\nothers were not,” whereas it found plaintiffs’ expert did not\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nprovide conclusions but merely “testified that additional in-\\nvestigation and testing was necessary to opine on the proper\\nscope of remediation for the site.” Notably, when asked by the\\ndistrict court judge what specific cleanup he recommended,\\nplaintiffs’ expert declined to make a recommendation. The\\ndistrict court thus concluded that plaintiffs had not met their\\nburden of showing harm not already addressed sufficiently\\nby the IEPA proceeding. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion\\nto reconsider the denial of injunctive relief on November 7,\\n2017. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the remaining count un-\\nder the CERCLA with prejudice and filed a notice of appeal\\non March 6, 2018.\\n Then, on March 23, 2018, plaintiffs filed a motion for an\\nindicative ruling under Rule 62.1 and motion to reconsider\\nbased on newly discovered evidence. Plaintiffs pointed to the\\nIEPA’s March 2, 2018 approval of GE’s Remedial Action Plan,\\nwhich relies solely on institutional controls to address the re-\\nmaining contamination. The district court denied plaintiffs’\\nmotion on August 14, 2018, and plaintiffs appealed. That ap-\\npeal was consolidated with plaintiffs’ original appeal; both\\nare jointly before us now.\\n II. Discussion\\n A. Injunctive Relief\\n Plaintiffs raise several issues related to the district court’s\\ndenial of injunctive relief: they assert (1) the district court did\\nnot have discretion to deny injunctive relief once it found GE\\nliable under the RCRA; (2) the district court erred in conduct-\\ning the traditional balancing of equitable factors for injunctive\\nrelief; and (3) the district court erred in finding plaintiffs failed\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 11\\n\\nto establish irreparable harm. Plaintiffs’ arguments on each is-\\nsue fail to carry the day. We note that the denial of injunctive\\nrelief after a district court has found a risk of imminent and\\nsubstantial danger to public health or to the environment\\nshould be rare. Here, however, plaintiffs failed to provide the\\ndistrict court with any evidence that injunctive relief, in addi-\\ntion to what the IEPA had already ordered in the state action,\\nwould improve the environment and not cause additional\\nharm.\\n 1. Discretion to Deny Relief\\n On summary judgment, the district court found GE liable\\nfor contaminating groundwater in a manner that “may pre-\\nsent an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or\\nthe environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). This finding has\\nnot been challenged on appeal. After finding GE liable, the\\ndistrict court then considered whether plaintiffs were entitled\\nto injunctive relief as a remedy for the violation. Plaintiffs as-\\nsert, however, that once the district court made a finding of\\nliability, the RCRA required the court to order injunctive re-\\nlief.\\n In analyzing whether the RCRA mandates the imposition\\nof injunctive relief upon a finding of liability, we first look to\\nthe plain language of the statute. See United States v. Marcotte,\\n835 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2016). The RCRA provides, in rele-\\nvant part:\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\n [A]ny person may commence a civil action on\\n his own behalf— …\\n (1)(B) against any person, … including any\\n past or present generator, past or present\\n transporter, or past or present owner or op-\\n erator of a treatment, storage, or disposal fa-\\n cility, who has contributed or who is contrib-\\n uting to the past or present handling, stor-\\n age, treatment, transportation, or disposal of\\n any solid or hazardous waste which may\\n present an imminent and substantial endan-\\n germent to health or the environment; ….\\n The district court shall have jurisdiction … to re-\\n strain any person who has contributed or who is\\n contributing to the past or present handling,\\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal\\n of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in\\n paragraph (1)(B), [or] to order such person to take\\n such other action as may be necessary ….\\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (emphasis added). As plaintiffs\\nacknowledge, this language authorizes injunctive relief—it\\nprovides the district court with jurisdiction to restrain a vio-\\nlator or to order other necessary action. But nothing in the lan-\\nguage mandates injunctive relief; “shall” pertains only to the\\ngrant of jurisdiction and not to the relief the district court may\\norder.\\n Nor do our past comments on the RCRA indicate injunc-\\ntive relief is mandatory upon a finding of liability. In Adkins\\nv. VIM Recycling, Inc., we considered whether the prohibitions\\nin the RCRA or several abstention doctrines precluded the\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 13\\n\\nplaintiffs from bringing a citizen suit under the RCRA after\\nthe state had already filed enforcement actions against the\\nsame alleged violators. 644 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2011). We\\nconcluded that neither the statutory language nor the absten-\\ntion doctrines prevented the Adkins plaintiffs from pursuing\\ntheir citizen suit. Id. Critically, we made clear that “[w]e [did]\\nnot suggest, of course, that once a citizen suit has cleared\\nRCRA’s statutory hurdles it is immune from all other consti-\\ntutional and preclusive doctrines, such as standing, mootness,\\nand claim or issue preclusion.” Id. at 503. In so stating, we ad-\\nvised courts to consider these doctrines before awarding re-\\nlief, thus evidencing that plaintiffs are not presumptively en-\\ntitled to injunctive relief once they have “cleared RCRA’s stat-\\nutory hurdles.”\\n Furthermore, the Supreme Court applies traditional equi-\\ntable principles to environmental statutes. For example, in a\\nFederal Water Pollution Control Act case, the Supreme Court\\nexplained that the statute did not require courts to immedi-\\nately enjoin all statutory violations; instead, the Court high-\\nlighted that long-established principles of equity applied:\\n It goes without saying that an injunction is an\\n equitable remedy. It is not a remedy which is-\\n sues as of course or to restrain an act the injuri-\\n ous consequences of which are merely trifling.\\n An injunction should issue only where the in-\\n tervention of a court of equity is essential in or-\\n der effectually to protect property rights against\\n injuries otherwise irremediable.\\nWeinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12 (1982) (cita-\\ntions and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Winter v.\\nNat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008) (“An injunction\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nis a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from suc-\\ncess on the merits as a matter of course.”) (reversing and va-\\ncating grant of injunction under National Environmental Pol-\\nicy Act); Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 648, 651 (2d\\nCir. 1989) (“In applying these general equitable standards for\\nthe issuance of injunctions in the area of environmental stat-\\nutes, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the notion that\\nan injunction follows as a matter of course upon a finding of\\nstatutory violation.”). The same principles apply to the\\nRCRA; the remedy of an injunction does not issue as a matter\\nof course upon a finding of liability but only as necessary to\\nprotect against otherwise irremediable harm.\\n Thus, the district court correctly held that it has discretion\\nto award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not required\\nto order relief after a finding of liability.\\n 2. Traditional Balancing of Equitable Factors\\n In a similar but distinct argument, plaintiffs assert that the\\ndistrict court erred in applying the traditional equitable fac-\\ntors when considering whether to award injunctive relief. To\\nmerit injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate:\\n (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;\\n (2) that remedies available at law, such as mon-\\n etary damages, are inadequate to compensate\\n for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance\\n of hardships between the plaintiff and defend-\\n ant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and\\n (4) that the public interest would not be dis-\\n served by a permanent injunction.\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 15\\n\\neBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).\\n Plaintiffs base their argument on their role in this citizen\\nsuit as private attorneys general, acting on behalf of the pub-\\nlic. They argue that it is common in environmental protection\\ncases for courts to order injunctive relief without the tradi-\\ntional balancing of equitable factors where the only statutory\\nrelief available is injunctive relief and where the plaintiff is a\\nsovereign or private attorney general. However, commenting\\ndirectly on the RCRA, we have reasoned that “[o]rdinarily, a\\ncourt is obligated to conduct an equitable balancing of harms\\nbefore awarding injunctive relief, even under an environmen-\\ntal statute which specifically authorizes such relief (as does\\nRCRA section 3008(a)).” United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,\\n38 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1994).\\n True, once a court finds a defendant liable for creating a\\nrisk of imminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the\\ncase that injunctive relief is warranted. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vil-\\nlage of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) (“Environmental in-\\njury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by\\nmoney damages and is often permanent or at least of long du-\\nration, i.e., irreparable.… [T]herefore, the balance of harms\\nwill usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the\\nenvironment.”). But that is not always the case. Courts must\\nconsider the traditional equitable factors, which appears to be\\nwhat the district court did here. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. One as-\\npect of the district court’s reasoning does, however, give us\\npause. Despite the previous finding that GE created a risk of\\nimminent and substantial harm, the district court stated at the\\nrelief stage that irreparable harm is an “essential require-\\nment” for injunctive relief and defined irreparable harm as\\n“both certain and great, not merely serious or substantial.” To\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nthe extent that language might be interpreted as requiring\\nRCRA plaintiffs to demonstrate harm above and beyond that\\nshown at the merits stage, the district court erred.\\n Multiple circuits have held that RCRA plaintiffs need only\\nshow “a risk of harm,” not “the traditional requirement of\\nthreatened irreparable harm,” to justify an injunction. United\\nStates v. Price, 688 F.2d 201, 211 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Attorney\\nGen. of Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 777 (10th\\nCir. 2009) (“Our prior case law indicates that under RCRA a\\nplaintiff need not ‘show proof of actual harm to health or the\\nenvironment’ to establish endangerment, but rather injunc-\\ntive relief is appropriate where there simply may be a risk of\\nharm.”); Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1356 (2d\\nCir. 1991) (quoting Price for the same proposition); United\\nStates v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984)\\n(same).\\n The standard adopted by our sister circuits makes sense,\\nespecially in the permanent injunction context. RCRA author-\\nizes only injunctive relief. Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 484. Accord-\\ningly, absent a permanent injunction, a prevailing RCRA\\nplaintiff will receive no remedy. The proven harm is, by defi-\\nnition, irreparable absent an injunction. See generally Walgreen\\nCo. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., B.V., 966 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir.\\n1992). A RCRA plaintiff either demonstrates irreparable harm\\nor fails to prove his or her case on the merits.\\n We reiterate, however, that a permanent injunction does\\nnot automatically follow from success on the merits. See Me.\\nPeople’s All. & Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471\\nF.3d 277, 296–97 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[I]n an environmental case,\\n[the court] should consider the balance of relevant harms be-\\nfore granting injunctive relief, even though the statute itself\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 17\\n\\nauthorizes such relief. … [I]t is true that a district court is not\\ncommanded, regardless of the circumstances, to issue an in-\\njunction after a finding of liability” under the RCRA.); United\\nStates v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329, 1360 (5th Cir.\\n1996) (“We find nothing in RCRA which, ‘in so many words,\\nor by necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s\\njurisdiction in equity.’” (quoting Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313)).\\nDistrict courts should apply the traditional equitable factors\\nto determine the necessity of injunctive relief.2\\n 3. Necessity of Injunctive Relief\\n Plaintiffs next claim the district court erred in denying in-\\njunctive relief because it found they failed to establish irrepa-\\nrable harm. We review a district court’s denial of injunctive\\nrelief for an abuse of discretion; we review its factual determi-\\nnations for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo, and\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 The unique procedural history of this case may also be a source of\\nplaintiffs’ confusion regarding the applicable standard. Here, the court\\nmade a liability finding—that the contamination “may present an immi-\\nnent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment,” 42\\nU.S.C. § 6972(a)—nearly two years before it denied the injunction. In find-\\ning GE liable under the RCRA, the district court agreed that there may be\\na risk of endangerment from the contamination. But in denying the injunc-\\ntion, the district court found that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate harm not\\nalready addressed in the state action. We do not see a conflict between the\\ndistrict court’s holdings on liability (which acknowledges the risk of harm)\\nand the injunction (which it denied for lack of evidence of unaddressed\\nharm).\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nwe give deference to the court’s balancing of the equitable fac-\\ntors. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State\\nDep’t of Health, 896 F.3d 809, 816 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n As an initial matter, we must address GE’s contention that\\nplaintiffs abandoned their request for remediation at the evi-\\ndentiary hearing, instead deferring to a request for additional\\ninvestigation prior to remediation. According to GE, plaintiffs\\nhave thus waived their claim to an injunction ordering reme-\\ndiation. We disagree. GE mischaracterizes plaintiffs’ position;\\nalthough plaintiffs’ expert at the evidentiary hearing testified\\nhe believed additional investigation was necessary to deter-\\nmine the extent of the contamination and the correspondingly\\nappropriate remedy, at no point did plaintiffs retreat from\\ntheir request for remediation. They reiterated that request in\\ntheir complaint, in their initial motion for an injunction, in ar-\\ngument at the evidentiary hearing, and in their motions for\\nreconsideration. Plaintiffs have not waived their request for\\nan injunction requiring GE to remediate the contamination.\\n Turning to plaintiffs’ argument regarding the irreparable\\nharm finding, we note that it is somewhat indirect. Rather\\nthan directly challenging the district court’s factual findings,\\nplaintiffs repeat their general assertion: There is contamina-\\ntion, therefore there is harm. And because there is harm, there\\nmust be an injunction. In oversimplifying the argument,\\nplaintiffs fail to grapple with the thoughtful and nuanced de-\\ncisions the district court made that led it to deny injunctive\\nrelief. In their request for an injunction, plaintiffs claimed ac-\\ntion under the RCRA was necessary because the Consent Or-\\nder and actions in the state proceeding were insufficient to\\nremedy their injury. For that reason, the district court in-\\nformed the parties repeatedly that it was looking for evidence\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 19\\n\\nof harm not already being addressed through the state pro-\\nceeding and for what exactly plaintiffs wanted the court to or-\\nder GE to do to address that harm.\\n At the evidentiary hearing, plaintiffs argued that the ex-\\ntent of the contamination had not been determined and that\\nthe IEPA’s analysis based on a limited investigation was\\nflawed; as such, their expert testified that additional investi-\\ngation was necessary before he could opine on the proper re-\\nmediation. Plaintiffs requested GE perform the following ad-\\nditional investigation: additional and deeper monitoring\\nwells, soil borings penetrating the bedrock, and vapor-intru-\\nsion monitoring to the extent necessary to (1) determine if a\\ndense non-aqueous phase liquid (“DNAPL”) is present and,\\nrelatedly, determine the vertical and horizontal extent of the\\ngroundwater contamination; (2) determine whether Rock\\nCreek is a groundwater divide, and if so, explain the presence\\nof contamination in the well across the creek; and (3) deter-\\nmine the source of and monitor the vapors present in the Con-\\nway home. Noting that many of these issues are interrelated,\\nthe district court considered the competing expert testimony\\npresented on each avenue of investigation.\\n Although plaintiffs do not directly challenge the district\\ncourt’s factual findings, we review those findings briefly to\\nhighlight the court’s thoroughness in evaluating the evidence\\n(or lack thereof) supporting plaintiffs’ request for injunctive\\nrelief. A district court’s finding of an expert witness’s credibil-\\nity is one of fact that we review for clear error. Madden v. U.S.\\nDep’t of Veterans Affairs, 873 F.3d 971, 973 (7th Cir. 2017). Clear\\nerror is a deferential standard of review that only merits re-\\nversal if “after reviewing the entire record, we are left with\\nthe firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nmade.” United States v. Ranjel, 872 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2017)\\n(quoting United States v. Marty, 450 F.3d 687, 689–90 (7th Cir.\\n2006)). “[I]n a case of dueling experts, as this one was, it is left\\nto the trier of fact, not the reviewing court, to decide how to\\nweigh the competing expert testimony.” Madden, 873 F.3d at\\n973–74 (alteration in original) (quoting Wipf v. Kowalski, 519\\nF.3d 380, 385 (7th Cir. 2008)).\\n i. DNAPL and Groundwater Contamination\\n Plaintiffs argued that GE’s testing was insufficient to de-\\ntermine whether a DNAPL is present. However, plaintiffs did\\nnot take any of their own samples or conduct any of their own\\ntests, despite their expert—Dr. Banaszak—testifying that\\ngroundwater sampling is not prohibitively expensive. In-\\nstead, Dr. Banaszak advocated that GE drill deeper soil bor-\\nings that penetrate the bedrock and that GE install additional\\nmonitoring wells north of the existing wells to determine if\\nthe groundwater traveled north and carried contamination\\nnorth of the plant. Based on his review of GE’s testing, Dr.\\nBanaszak concluded that the results did not show that the\\ncontamination plume “is stable or shrinking, which leaves the\\npossibility that a DNAPL exists.”\\n GE’s expert, Dr. Vagt, who has been the project director of\\nthe site since 2008, testified that additional investigation is un-\\nnecessary because the evidence demonstrates no DNAPL is\\npresent. He explained that the concentration of TCE in the\\nsamples has decreased over time, whereas, if a DNAPL were\\npresent, the TCE concentrations would have remained con-\\nstant. As to the need for a north monitoring well, Dr. Vagt tes-\\ntified that soil samples taken north of the plant (near the site\\nof an alleged potential additional source of TCE) detected lit-\\ntle to no TCE. Dr. Vagt concluded (and the IEPA agreed), that\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 21\\n\\nno additional testing was necessary. And Dr. Vagt conducted\\nsite visits, which led him to conclude that the groundwater\\nflowed south, not north, as Dr. Banaszak had hypothesized\\nbased on a conceptual site model. Additionally, Dr. Vogt ad-\\nvocated against drilling through the bedrock; he opined that\\nthe only conduit for contamination through the bedrock was\\nthe preexisting city well, and that any additional drilling\\ncould be harmful in that it could provide a new route for con-\\ntamination to travel through the bedrock.\\n The district court concluded that GE’s investigation into\\nthe presence of DNAPL, and the IEPA’s approval of the inves-\\ntigation, was not unreasonable. Because plaintiffs “merely of-\\nfer[ed] different conclusions about the data collected by [GE]\\nand the data they hope[d] to develop with additional investi-\\ngation and testing,” the district court found that plaintiffs had\\nnot met their burden to show that any additional testing for\\nDNAPL was necessary. The district court weighed the com-\\npeting expert testimony and found GE’s expert made reason-\\nable conclusions supported by facts; we see nothing in the\\ncourt’s factual findings that are clearly erroneous.\\n ii. Rock Creek\\n As to Rock Creek’s status as a groundwater divide, plain-\\ntiffs and GE again offered differing interpretations of the same\\ndata. Plaintiffs argued that the lone sample from the south\\nwell containing trace amounts of TCE evidences that contam-\\nination is flowing past Rock Creek. They further contended\\nthat the rest of the wells on the south of Rock Creek, which\\ndid not detect contamination, are not deep enough to\\nproperly measure contamination. GE, on the other hand,\\nmaintained that Rock Creek is a groundwater divide. The\\nIEPA required that GE install additional monitoring wells and\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\ntest the residential wells south of Rock Creek to confirm this\\nproposition. Dr. Vagt contrasted the contaminated samples\\nfrom the north side of Rock Creek with the lack of contamina-\\ntion from the south side wells; he testified that the single sam-\\nple from the south well with trace levels of contamination was\\nan outlier when compared with the lack of contamination in\\nthe six other monitoring wells and residential wells located in\\nclose proximity and at varying depths.\\n Weighing the competing expert testimony, the district\\ncourt found that plaintiffs had not offered any additional test-\\ning that would “seriously challenge the finding that Rock\\nCreek is a groundwater divide.” Again, we cannot conclude\\nthis conclusion is clearly erroneous.\\n iii. Vapor Intrusion\\n Lastly, the district court considered plaintiffs’ request for\\nvapor intrusion monitoring for the Conway home and the sur-\\nrounding residences. By the time of the evidentiary hearing,\\nplaintiffs had sold the Conway home. They agreed the court\\ndid not have the power to force access into the home for test-\\ning but asked the court to order GE to obtain consent from the\\nnew owners. They based this request on a 2012 test that de-\\ntected the compound 1,2 DCA in the indoor air in the Conway\\nhome at a level above the residential standard. After detecting\\nthis compound, however, GE took samples of the groundwa-\\nter and sub-slab under and around the Conway home, which\\ndid not reflect contamination. GE thus maintained that there\\nis no complete pathway between the source of the GE-site\\ncontamination and the indoor air in the Conway home, and\\nthat 1,2 DCA comes from a variety of sources unrelated to the\\nsite contamination (such as household cleaners). The IEPA\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 23\\n\\nagreed that, without a complete pathway, no additional test-\\ning was necessary.\\n The district court stated that it was “not in a position to\\nsecond guess the IEPA’s decision based on Plaintiffs’ discon-\\ntent with the decision.” Considering that plaintiffs no longer\\nown the Conway home and the court does not have authority\\nto force the new owners to consent to testing, as well as the\\nlack of a complete pathway from the site contamination to the\\nhome, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred.\\n * * *\\n While an injunction does not follow automatically from a\\nfinding of a risk of imminent and substantial endangerment—\\nas this case demonstrates—such a finding usually goes a long\\nway towards justifying an injunction. Here however, despite\\nthe district court’s admonition that it was looking for evi-\\ndence of harm requiring relief in addition to the IEPA action,\\nat no point did plaintiffs ever conduct their own investigation\\nto contradict GE’s test results. Rather, they continue to insist\\nthat irreparable harm is “self-evident” where there is contam-\\nination and criticize GE’s investigation, which had been con-\\nducted subject to the IEPA’s oversight and direction. As\\ndemonstrated by the two years it spent grappling with the in-\\njunctive relief questions, the district court understood it had\\nto “walk a fine line” between supplementing and supplanting\\nthe Consent Order. The court focused on the facts before it,\\ncommenting repeatedly that “facts matter,” and it provided\\nplaintiffs with numerous opportunities to present evidence\\nthat the state proceedings were not adequately protecting the\\npublic and the environment. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago\\nBridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining\\nthat ongoing remediation in independent proceedings may\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\njustify the denial of injunctive relief in the RCRA action); Ad-\\nkins, 644 F.3d 501–02 (“When this case finally addresses the\\nmerits, and if the [state environmental] actions have been re-\\nsolved by then, the federal court will be entitled to insist that\\nplaintiffs show how the resolution of those cases was not suf-\\nficient.”). In the end, plaintiffs could not present contradictory\\nfacts because they did not conduct any of their own investi-\\ngation. As the district court held, plaintiffs “have not pro-\\nvided the evidence necessary for this Court to second guess\\n[GE]’s Remedial Action Plan” and order relief in addition to\\nwhat the IEPA has already required.\\n Nevertheless, plaintiffs insist they are entitled to relief be-\\ncause they did not get what they wanted; they want more than\\nthe IEPA found adequate and will be satisfied with nothing\\nless than a mandatory injunction ordering GE to remove any\\ncontamination on their property. We sympathize with plain-\\ntiffs’ position—TCE is a dangerous contaminant and the cur-\\nrent plan leaves the contamination in place (though contained\\nand restricted from access). But, despite plaintiffs’ characteri-\\nzation, the RCRA is not a “cleanup” statute. See Meghrig, 516\\nU.S. at 483 (“[The] RCRA is not principally designed to effec-\\ntuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites ….”). Under the RCRA,\\nthe district court may “restrain” the handling of hazardous\\nwaste that “may present an imminent and substantial endan-\\ngerment to health or the environment,” or order actions that\\nmay be “necessary” to eliminate that danger. 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6972(a).\\n Here, the district court considered both parties’ expert\\npresentations and concluded that plaintiffs had not estab-\\nlished any additional actions were “necessary” to eliminate\\nthe danger. In spite of the district court’s multiple inquiries to\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 25\\n\\nplaintiffs’ expert as to what remedy he proposed the court or-\\nder, he did not make a recommendation, leaving the court\\nwithout guidance. Conversely, the court found GE’s explana-\\ntions for the actions it had taken to investigate and develop its\\nremediation plans “reasonable, rational and credible.” The\\nRCRA does not require a court-ordered cleanup where the\\ncourt has not found such action necessary to prevent harm to\\nthe public or the environment, especially where, as here, an\\nexpert the court found credible testified that additional\\ncleanup could cause further harm.\\n The district court did not abuse its discretion in conclud-\\ning plaintiffs had not carried their burden to establish manda-\\ntory injunctive relief was necessary under the RCRA.\\n B. Motion for Indicative Ruling and for Reconsidera-\\n tion\\n Next, plaintiffs contend the district court erred in denying\\ntheir motion for indicative ruling under Rule 62.1 and for re-\\nconsideration under Rule 60(b)(2). Relief under Rule 60(b) is\\n“an extraordinary remedy … granted only in exceptional cir-\\ncumstances.” Davis v. Moroney, 857 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir.\\n2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Bakery Mach. & Fabrica-\\ntion, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc., 570 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir.\\n2009)). We review the district court’s decision for abuse of dis-\\ncretion. Gleason v. Jansen, 888 F.3d 847, 851–52 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n A refresher of the timeline of events is necessary: Prior to\\nthe district court’s ruling on the motion for injunction, the\\nIEPA had denied GE’s initial Remedial Action Plan, which\\nproposed natural attenuation and institutional controls to ad-\\ndress the contamination. After the district court denied the in-\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\njunction in September 2017, plaintiffs dismissed their remain-\\ning claim with prejudice and filed a notice of appeal. In Octo-\\nber 2017, GE submitted a revised RAP to the IEPA, in which\\nGE proposed institutional controls as the sole method of re-\\nmedial action. Then, on March 2, 2018, the IEPA approved\\nGE’s revised RAP. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed a motion\\nfor indicative ruling under Rule 62.1(a)(3), which provides:\\n If a timely motion is made for relief that the\\n court lacks authority to grant because of an ap-\\n peal that has been docketed and is pending, the\\n court may: … state either that it would grant the\\n motion if the court of appeals remands for that\\n purpose or that the motion raises a substantial\\n issue.\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a)(3). In the motion, plaintiffs raised a sin-\\ngle basis for their requested relief: the IEPA’s approval of GE’s\\nrevised RAP. Plaintiffs asserted that the IEPA’s March 2, 2018\\napproval was newly discovered evidence supporting recon-\\nsideration of the denial of the injunction.3\\n Plaintiffs’ arguments fail for two reasons. First, the IEPA’s\\nMarch 2, 2018 approval of GE’s RAP is not “newly discovered\\nevidence” under Rule 60(b)(2). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2)\\n(“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or\\nits legal representative from a final judgment … for … newly\\ndiscovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could\\n\\n\\n 3 Although plaintiffs did not file a separate motion for relief from judg-\\n\\nment and failed to explain that they were seeking relief under Rule\\n60(b)(2) until their reply brief, the district court excused this omission and\\ntreated the Rule 62.1 motion as a joint motion for reconsideration under\\nRule 60(b)(2).\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 27\\n\\nnot have been discovered in time to move for a new trial un-\\nder Rule 59(b).”). Newly discovered evidence must have been\\nin existence at the time of the original judgment or pertain to\\nfacts in existence at the time of the judgment. Peacock v. Bd. of\\nSch. Comm’rs of City of Indianapolis, 721 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir.\\n1983) (per curiam). The district court did not abuse its discre-\\ntion in finding that neither the revised RAP submitted in Oc-\\ntober 2017 nor the IEPA’s March 2, 2018 approval existed at\\nthe time of its September 2017 judgment. Rather, they were\\nnew evidence that did not exist and thus could not have been\\ndiscovered at the time. Nor did the district court err in con-\\ncluding that the revised RAP did not pertain to facts in exist-\\nence at the time of judgment. To the contrary, the revised RAP\\nresponded to the IEPA’s questions and concerns, contained\\nnew information for the IEPA to consider, and included a new\\nproposed remedy.\\n Second, even if it were “newly discovered” evidence, the\\ndistrict court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the\\nIEPA’s approval of the revised RAP would not have changed\\nthe outcome. According to plaintiffs, the district court’s denial\\nof injunctive relief was predicated on the IEPA’s rejection of\\nGE’s initial RAP. For that reason, they claim that the IEPA’s\\nacceptance of the revised RAP that did not require any addi-\\ntional remedies is a basis upon which the district court should\\nhave reconsidered injunctive relief. In support, plaintiffs\\npointed to the district court’s statement that “[t]he IEPA’s ac-\\ntions, including the latest [RAP] rejection, is strong evidence\\nthat Plaintiffs’ injuries are being remedied in the parallel state-\\ncourt proceeding.” In denying the Rule 62.1 motion, however,\\nthe district court explained that plaintiffs misunderstood its\\nruling: “The [c]ourt merely used the IEPA’s most recent rejec-\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\ntion to highlight that the IEPA had been making well-rea-\\nsoned decisions under the Consent Order and had challenged\\nnumerous actions [GE] had taken ….” Noting that plaintiffs\\nwere using the approval of the revised RAP to make the same\\narguments the court had rejected throughout the case, the dis-\\ntrict court concluded that plaintiffs had not offered any newly\\ndiscovered evidence that would necessitate injunctive relief.\\n The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying\\nthe motions for indicative relief and for reconsideration.\\n C. State Law Tort Claims\\n Lastly, plaintiffs assert that the district court erred in\\ngranting summary judgment to GE on their state law claims\\nof nuisance, trespass, and negligence. We review a grant of\\nsummary judgment de novo, viewing the record in a light\\nmost favorable to the nonmoving party. Minerva Dairy, Inc. v.\\nHarsdorf, 905 F.3d 1047, 1053 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n In Illinois, the statute of limitations for tort claims for dam-\\nage to property is five years. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-205. It is\\nundisputed that, here, Lowell Beggs knew about the contam-\\nination of the golf course from the GE plant at the time he\\npurchased the property in 2007, but he did not file suit until\\nNovember 2013, more than five years later. Plaintiffs argue,\\nhowever, that GE is committing a continuous violation be-\\ncause it “is doing nothing to stop its contamination from mi-\\ngrating,” and that, under the continuing tort doctrine, the\\nfive-year statute of limitations does not bar their claims.\\n “[W]hen ‘a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury,\\nthe limitations period does not begin to run until the date of\\nthe last injury or the date the tortious acts cease.’” Brooks v.\\nRoss, 578 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Belleville Toyota\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 29\\n\\nv. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 770 N.E.2d 177, 190 (Ill. 2002)).\\nThe problem with plaintiffs’ argument is that the “continu-\\ning” action they allege is not that GE is continuing to release\\ncontaminants, but that the original contamination is continu-\\ning to migrate. However, “[a] continuing violation or tort is\\noccasioned by continuing unlawful acts and conduct, not by\\ncontinual ill effects from an initial violation.” Feltmeier v. Felt-\\nmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 85 (Ill. 2003); see Village of DePue v. Viacom\\nInt’l, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 2d 774, 779 (C.D. Ill. 2010) (continuing\\ntort doctrine did not apply where plaintiff’s allegations were\\nlimited to injury from water flowing from contaminated site\\nbecause tortious conduct had ceased when manufacturing at\\nsite ended years prior); Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Tang Indus., Inc.,\\n998 F.Supp. 889, 896–97 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (continuing tort doc-\\ntrine did not apply where defendant stopped dumping con-\\ntaminants years prior, “although the effects from [defend-\\nant]’s violations may be persisting”). The continuing migra-\\ntion plaintiffs allege is merely an ill effect from the original\\nviolation, not a continuing unlawful act.\\n Nor does plaintiffs’ assertion that GE retains possession of\\nthe plant and has mismanaged the remediation suffice as a\\ncontinuing injury. As the district court explained, application\\nof the continuing tort doctrine “turns on continuing conduct,\\nnot continuing ownership or continuing injury.” Compare Vil-\\nlage of DePue, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 779 (“merely owning the Site”\\nafter contamination insufficient for liability under continuing\\ntort doctrine), with City of Evanston v. Texaco, Inc., 19 F. Supp.\\n3d 817, 827–28 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (continuing tort doctrine ap-\\nplied “at least at the pleadings stage” where defendant’s un-\\nderground tanks allegedly continued leaking contaminants\\ninto the environment even though defendant no longer\\nowned the property). That GE retains possession of the plant\\n\\f30 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nis of no import where there is a lack of demonstrated contin-\\nuing unlawful conduct.\\n Because plaintiffs do not allege a continuing unlawful act\\nnecessary to invoke the continuing tort doctrine, we affirm the\\ngrant of summary judgment to GE on plaintiffs’ state law tort\\nclaims.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\\ndistrict court.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4373368/\", \"author_raw\": \"Joel Martin Flaum\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4596115/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Martha Conway v. General Electric Company\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\nLAJIM, LLC, et al.,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n v.\n\nGENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.\n No. 13-cv-50348 — Iain D. Johnston, Magistrate Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JANUARY 15, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 4, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-appellants purchased land\nnear a former General Electric Company manufacturing plant\nthat had operated for sixty years; the plant leached toxic\nchemicals that seeped into the groundwater. The Illinois En-\nvironmental Protection Agency filed suit under state law\nagainst General Electric in 2004 and has been working with\nthe company since then to investigate and develop a plan to\naddress the contamination. In 2013, plaintiffs filed suit under\n\f2 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\nthe citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and\nRecovery Act, seeking a mandatory injunction ordering Gen-\neral Electric to conduct additional investigation into the scope\nof the contamination and ordering the company to remove the\ncontamination. The district court found the company liable\nfor the contamination on summary judgment but denied\nplaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief because, despite the\nmany opportunities the court provided, plaintiffs did not of-\nfer evidence establishing a need for injunctive relief beyond\nwhat the company had already done in the state action. For\nthe following reasons, we affirm.\n I. Background\n A. Statutory Scheme\n The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”),\n42 U.S.C. § 6901, et seq., “is a comprehensive environmental\nstatute that governs the treatment, storage, and disposal of\nsolid and hazardous waste.” Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S.\n479, 483 (1996). The RCRA “is not principally designed to ef-\nfectuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites or to compensate\nthose who have attended to the remediation of environmental\nhazards.” Id. Rather, the primary purpose of the RCRA “is to\nreduce the generation of hazardous waste and to ensure the\nproper treatment … of that waste which is nonetheless gener-\nated, ‘so as to minimize the present and future threat to hu-\nman health and the environment.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.\n§ 6902(b)).\n The RCRA contains a citizen suit provision, which pro-\nvides that “any person may commence a civil action” against\n“any person” who has allegedly violated “any permit, stand-\nard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 3\n\nwhich has become effective pursuant to this chapter,” or\n“who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or\npresent handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or dis-\nposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an\nimminent and substantial endangerment to health or the en-\nvironment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1). Once the violation or po-\ntential endangerment is shown, a district court “shall have ju-\nrisdiction … to restrain any person who has contributed or\nwho is contributing to the past or present handling, storage,\ntreatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazard-\nous waste” and “to order such person to take such other ac-\ntion as may be necessary.” Id. § 6972(a).\n B. Factual Background\n 1. General Electric Plant in Morrison, Illinois\n Defendant-appellee General Electric Company (“GE”) op-\nerated a manufacturing plant in Morrison, Illinois from 1949\nto 2010. To remove oil from the automotive and appliance\nparts it manufactured, the plant used chlorinated organic sol-\nvents, including trichloroethylene (“TCE”), perchloroethene\n(“PCE”), and trichloroethane (“TCA”). These solvents are\ntoxic and are regulated by federal and state environmental\nagencies. GE used these solvents and stored them in degreas-\ners located at the plant until 1994, when it switched to a soap-\nlike solution to clean the parts.\n In 1986, chlorinated solvents were detected in three mu-\nnicipal supply wells that provided water to the City of Morri-\nson, located several thousand feet southeast of the GE plant.\nShortly thereafter, the Illinois Environmental Protection\nAgency (“IEPA”) installed monitoring wells to analyze the\n\f4 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\ngroundwater around the GE plant, which uncovered addi-\ntional contamination. The IEPA completed a Phase I Remedial\nInvestigation in 1987, which included sampling and analysis\nof soil, water, and sediment. Based on the investigation, the\nIEPA identified the GE plant as the source of the solvent con-\ntamination.\n In 1988, GE installed additional monitoring wells and an\nair stripper to treat water pumped from one of Morrison’s\nmunicipal wells to a level of contamination below the maxi-\nmum contaminant level (“MCL”) so the city could continue to\nuse the well as a source of drinking water; the other two mu-\nnicipal supply wells were sealed. GE also conducted a Phase\nII Remedial Investigation, which identified elevated concen-\ntrations of solvents beneath the plant’s former degreasing op-\nerations. Under the IEPA’s supervision, GE continued to sam-\nple and monitor the groundwater in the monitoring wells and\nsubmitted reports of the results to the IEPA.\n In 1994, the IEPA required GE to conduct a Phase III Re-\nmedial Investigation of the groundwater at and downgradi-\nent from the plant. GE reported the results of the investigation\nin 2001. According to the report, the solvents in the ground-\nwater had decreased significantly by 2001, and the report\nmodeled that the contaminants would naturally attenuate\n(i.e., reduce) to concentrations below the MCL. Additionally,\nthe report stated that Rock Creek was a natural groundwater\ndivide that would prevent the contaminating solvents from\nmigrating south from the GE plant across the creek. The re-\nport concluded that the contamination did not pose a risk to\nthe public because a City of Morrison ordinance prohibited\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 5\n\nthe use of groundwater as a source of drinking water and be-\ncause GE’s air stripper at the remaining municipal supply\nwell provided safe drinking water.\n In response, however, the IEPA did not approve GE’s pro-\nposal for natural attenuation of the contamination; instead,\nthe IEPA concluded that active remediation of the site would\nbe appropriate. The Illinois Attorney General commenced suit\nagainst GE in 2004 under the Illinois Environmental Protec-\ntion Act: for cost recovery (Count I), see 415 Ill. Comp. Stat.\n5/22.2(f); to enjoin water pollution (Count II), see 415 Ill.\nComp. Stat. 5/42(d)–(e); and to enjoin a water pollution haz-\nard (Count III), see 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12(d). The state\nsought to recover costs it had incurred as well as an injunction\nrequiring that GE investigate the nature and extent of the con-\ntamination and then perform remediation. In 2010, GE and Il-\nlinois entered into a Consent Order in which GE agreed to\nsubmit to the IEPA a series of reports, including: (1) “a work\nplan to survey private wells, install additional monitoring\nwells, and complete additional soil borings”; (2) “a Focused\nSite Investigation Report (‘FSI’) summarizing the results of\nthe work plan”; (3) “a Remedial Objectives Report to address\nthe impact of the soil and groundwater contamination”; and\n(4) “a Remedial Action Plan to meet the remediation objec-\ntives within six years of the entry of the Consent Order.” Also\nin 2010, the City of Morrison passed an ordinance prohibiting\ngroundwater as a source of potable water and prohibiting the\ninstallation of wells “to limit threats to human health from\ngroundwater contamination.”\n After approval of a work plan, GE installed monitoring\nwells along Rock Creek. Then, in 2013, GE submitted its FSI\ndetailing the data obtained from the various monitoring\n\f6 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\nwells; the report explained that the solvents had migrated\nsouth of the plant and that the monitoring wells along Rock\nCreek tested positive for contamination at levels above the\nMCL. Tests from wells on the other side of Rock Creek (and\nfurther from the plant) either did not detect chlorinated sol-\nvents or detected TCE at a level below the MCL. Following\ndiscussions between GE and the IEPA on the work plan and\nFSI, the IEPA conditionally approved the FSI in March 2015.\nIt determined that GE “adequately defined the nature and ex-\ntent of the contamination.” The IEPA conditionally approved\nGE’s revised Remedial Objectives Report in August 2016, after\na number of additional submissions and a meeting between\nthe technical representatives from GE and the IEPA.\n In March 2017, GE submitted its Remedial Action Plan\n(“RAP”) to the IEPA, proposing to achieve the remediation\nobjectives through a “combination of institutional controls\nand monitored natural attenuation.” The IEPA denied GE’s\nproposal in June 2017, posing several questions about the\nplan, and specifically noting that it did not accept “an open-\nended period of monitored natural attenuation as a remedia-\ntion technology.” GE submitted a revised RAP to the IEPA in\nOctober 2017, responding to the IEPA’s questions and com-\nments and proposing to address the remaining contamination\nthrough institutional controls. The IEPA approved GE’s re-\nvised Remedial Action Plan in March 2018.\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 7\n\n 2. Plaintiffs’ Interest in the Land\n Plaintiff-appellant Lowell Beggs1 purchased land near the\nsite of the shuttered GE plant in 2007. He conveyed the prop-\nerty to plaintiff-appellant Prairie Ridge Golf Course, LLC,\nwhich plaintiff-appellant LAJIM, LLC operated. Beggs moved\ninto a home next to the golf course with his companion, plain-\ntiff-appellant Martha Kai Conway (the “Conway home”). The\ngolf course and Conway home are located south of the former\nGE plant and downgradient from the plant.\n When Beggs considered purchasing the golf course in\nApril 2007, the seller advised him: “the golf course has con-\ntamination on the first hole. This was caused by General Elec-\ntric. If you go to the EPA web site, GE is listed as a superfund\nsite. No further remediation was needed according to what I\ncan find.” Beggs did not inquire further about the environ-\nmental condition of the golf course before completing the pur-\nchase in May 2007. The purchase agreement noted, “[S]eller []\nhas disclosed to Purchaser that there is contamination on the\nfirst hole of the Real Estate, such contamination having been\ncaused by General Electric, as which contamination is part of\nthe Superfund Site that apparently does not require any fur-\nther remediation.” Additionally, Beggs walked the golf\ncourse prior to completing the purchase and noticed a moni-\ntoring well head protruding above the ground. After purchas-\ning the property, Beggs contacted GE to fix a leak from the\nfixture, which he knew monitored “how much stuff was com-\ning out of GE.”\n\n\n 1Beggs passed away during the course of this litigation. His interest\nis now represented by the executor of his estate, plaintiff-appellant First\nNational Bank of Amboy.\n\f8 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\n C. Procedural Background\n Plaintiffs filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois on\nNovember 1, 2013 seeking: (1) a mandatory injunction requir-\ning GE to remediate the contamination under the RCRA, see\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (Count I); (2) cost recovery (Count II)\nand a declaratory judgment (Count III) under the Compre-\nhensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-\nity Act (“CERCLA”), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(g)(3); and\n(3) recovery under state law for nuisance (Count IV), trespass\n(Count V), and negligence (Count VI).\n After what the district court characterized as “extensive\ndiscovery,” the court considered the parties’ cross-motions\nfor partial summary judgment. Plaintiffs moved for summary\njudgment on their RCRA claim. GE did not dispute that plain-\ntiffs satisfied the first two elements of the claim—(1) defend-\nant has generated solid or hazardous waste, and (2) defendant\nhas contributed to the handling of the waste. See Albany Bank\n& Tr. Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2002).\nOn the sole remaining question—whether plaintiffs estab-\nlished that the contamination “may present an imminent and\nsubstantial danger to health or the environment,” id.—the dis-\ntrict court found for plaintiffs and granted summary judg-\nment as to GE’s liability under the RCRA. At plaintiffs’ re-\nquest, the court deferred consideration as to whether plain-\ntiffs were entitled to injunctive relief. On GE’s cross-motion\nfor summary judgment on the state law claims, the district\ncourt found the continuing tort doctrine did not apply and\nfound the claims time-barred because plaintiffs had\nknowledge of the claims more than five years before they filed\nsuit.\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 9\n\n Over the next two years, the district court considered\nplaintiffs’ request for a mandatory injunction in a number of\nhearings and a series of opinions. On October 4, 2016, the\ncourt held that the plain language of the RCRA permitted, but\ndid not require, the court to grant injunctive relief despite the\nongoing state proceeding; thus, the question before the court\nwas not whether it could grant relief but whether it should. On\nthis point, the court concluded plaintiffs had not yet provided\nthe court with facts supporting their assertion that the Con-\nsent Order in the state action was deficient and ineffective.\nThe court ordered an evidentiary hearing and invited the\nIEPA and the Illinois Attorney General to provide their views\non the progress under the Consent Order and whether the\ncourt should order injunctive relief under the RCRA. The Illi-\nnois Attorney General’s Office submitted an amicus brief ex-\nplaining that the State did not believe the court should impose\ninjunctive relief because any court-ordered injunctive relief\nwould overlap with the work currently being done—i.e., “site\ninvestigation, monitoring and payment of costs as well as an\norder barring further endangerment … [and] some type of re-\nmedial effort.” The State asserted that all such actions were\nalready underway and were “being done with diligence and\nrigorous oversight by the Illinois EPA,” and that injunctive re-\nlief “may result in a clean-up that is inconsistent with clean\nups of other contaminated sites in Illinois.”\n After two days of evidentiary hearing on June 1 and 2,\n2017, the court issued an opinion on September 7, 2017 deny-\ning the requested injunctive relief. Both parties had presented\nexpert testimony at the hearing; the district court credited\nGE’s expert as having “provided reasonable, rational and\ncredible bases explaining why certain actions were taken and\nothers were not,” whereas it found plaintiffs’ expert did not\n\f10 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\nprovide conclusions but merely “testified that additional in-\nvestigation and testing was necessary to opine on the proper\nscope of remediation for the site.” Notably, when asked by the\ndistrict court judge what specific cleanup he recommended,\nplaintiffs’ expert declined to make a recommendation. The\ndistrict court thus concluded that plaintiffs had not met their\nburden of showing harm not already addressed sufficiently\nby the IEPA proceeding. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion\nto reconsider the denial of injunctive relief on November 7,\n2017. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the remaining count un-\nder the CERCLA with prejudice and filed a notice of appeal\non March 6, 2018.\n Then, on March 23, 2018, plaintiffs filed a motion for an\nindicative ruling under Rule 62.1 and motion to reconsider\nbased on newly discovered evidence. Plaintiffs pointed to the\nIEPA’s March 2, 2018 approval of GE’s Remedial Action Plan,\nwhich relies solely on institutional controls to address the re-\nmaining contamination. The district court denied plaintiffs’\nmotion on August 14, 2018, and plaintiffs appealed. That ap-\npeal was consolidated with plaintiffs’ original appeal; both\nare jointly before us now.\n II. Discussion\n A. Injunctive Relief\n Plaintiffs raise several issues related to the district court’s\ndenial of injunctive relief: they assert (1) the district court did\nnot have discretion to deny injunctive relief once it found GE\nliable under the RCRA; (2) the district court erred in conduct-\ning the traditional balancing of equitable factors for injunctive\nrelief; and (3) the district court erred in finding plaintiffs failed\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 11\n\nto establish irreparable harm. Plaintiffs’ arguments on each is-\nsue fail to carry the day. We note that the denial of injunctive\nrelief after a district court has found a risk of imminent and\nsubstantial danger to public health or to the environment\nshould be rare. Here, however, plaintiffs failed to provide the\ndistrict court with any evidence that injunctive relief, in addi-\ntion to what the IEPA had already ordered in the state action,\nwould improve the environment and not cause additional\nharm.\n 1. Discretion to Deny Relief\n On summary judgment, the district court found GE liable\nfor contaminating groundwater in a manner that “may pre-\nsent an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or\nthe environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). This finding has\nnot been challenged on appeal. After finding GE liable, the\ndistrict court then considered whether plaintiffs were entitled\nto injunctive relief as a remedy for the violation. Plaintiffs as-\nsert, however, that once the district court made a finding of\nliability, the RCRA required the court to order injunctive re-\nlief.\n In analyzing whether the RCRA mandates the imposition\nof injunctive relief upon a finding of liability, we first look to\nthe plain language of the statute. See United States v. Marcotte,\n835 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2016). The RCRA provides, in rele-\nvant part:\n\f12 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\n [A]ny person may commence a civil action on\n his own behalf— …\n (1)(B) against any person, … including any\n past or present generator, past or present\n transporter, or past or present owner or op-\n erator of a treatment, storage, or disposal fa-\n cility, who has contributed or who is contrib-\n uting to the past or present handling, stor-\n age, treatment, transportation, or disposal of\n any solid or hazardous waste which may\n present an imminent and substantial endan-\n germent to health or the environment; ….\n The district court shall have jurisdiction … to re-\n strain any person who has contributed or who is\n contributing to the past or present handling,\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal\n of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in\n paragraph (1)(B), [or] to order such person to take\n such other action as may be necessary ….\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (emphasis added). As plaintiffs\nacknowledge, this language authorizes injunctive relief—it\nprovides the district court with jurisdiction to restrain a vio-\nlator or to order other necessary action. But nothing in the lan-\nguage mandates injunctive relief; “shall” pertains only to the\ngrant of jurisdiction and not to the relief the district court may\norder.\n Nor do our past comments on the RCRA indicate injunc-\ntive relief is mandatory upon a finding of liability. In Adkins\nv. VIM Recycling, Inc., we considered whether the prohibitions\nin the RCRA or several abstention doctrines precluded the\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 13\n\nplaintiffs from bringing a citizen suit under the RCRA after\nthe state had already filed enforcement actions against the\nsame alleged violators. 644 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2011). We\nconcluded that neither the statutory language nor the absten-\ntion doctrines prevented the Adkins plaintiffs from pursuing\ntheir citizen suit. Id. Critically, we made clear that “[w]e [did]\nnot suggest, of course, that once a citizen suit has cleared\nRCRA’s statutory hurdles it is immune from all other consti-\ntutional and preclusive doctrines, such as standing, mootness,\nand claim or issue preclusion.” Id. at 503. In so stating, we ad-\nvised courts to consider these doctrines before awarding re-\nlief, thus evidencing that plaintiffs are not presumptively en-\ntitled to injunctive relief once they have “cleared RCRA’s stat-\nutory hurdles.”\n Furthermore, the Supreme Court applies traditional equi-\ntable principles to environmental statutes. For example, in a\nFederal Water Pollution Control Act case, the Supreme Court\nexplained that the statute did not require courts to immedi-\nately enjoin all statutory violations; instead, the Court high-\nlighted that long-established principles of equity applied:\n It goes without saying that an injunction is an\n equitable remedy. It is not a remedy which is-\n sues as of course or to restrain an act the injuri-\n ous consequences of which are merely trifling.\n An injunction should issue only where the in-\n tervention of a court of equity is essential in or-\n der effectually to protect property rights against\n injuries otherwise irremediable.\nWeinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12 (1982) (cita-\ntions and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Winter v.\nNat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008) (“An injunction\n\f14 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\nis a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from suc-\ncess on the merits as a matter of course.”) (reversing and va-\ncating grant of injunction under National Environmental Pol-\nicy Act); Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 648, 651 (2d\nCir. 1989) (“In applying these general equitable standards for\nthe issuance of injunctions in the area of environmental stat-\nutes, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the notion that\nan injunction follows as a matter of course upon a finding of\nstatutory violation.”). The same principles apply to the\nRCRA; the remedy of an injunction does not issue as a matter\nof course upon a finding of liability but only as necessary to\nprotect against otherwise irremediable harm.\n Thus, the district court correctly held that it has discretion\nto award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not required\nto order relief after a finding of liability.\n 2. Traditional Balancing of Equitable Factors\n In a similar but distinct argument, plaintiffs assert that the\ndistrict court erred in applying the traditional equitable fac-\ntors when considering whether to award injunctive relief. To\nmerit injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate:\n (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;\n (2) that remedies available at law, such as mon-\n etary damages, are inadequate to compensate\n for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance\n of hardships between the plaintiff and defend-\n ant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and\n (4) that the public interest would not be dis-\n served by a permanent injunction.\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 15\n\neBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).\n Plaintiffs base their argument on their role in this citizen\nsuit as private attorneys general, acting on behalf of the pub-\nlic. They argue that it is common in environmental protection\ncases for courts to order injunctive relief without the tradi-\ntional balancing of equitable factors where the only statutory\nrelief available is injunctive relief and where the plaintiff is a\nsovereign or private attorney general. However, commenting\ndirectly on the RCRA, we have reasoned that “[o]rdinarily, a\ncourt is obligated to conduct an equitable balancing of harms\nbefore awarding injunctive relief, even under an environmen-\ntal statute which specifically authorizes such relief (as does\nRCRA section 3008(a)).” United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,\n38 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1994).\n True, once a court finds a defendant liable for creating a\nrisk of imminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the\ncase that injunctive relief is warranted. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vil-\nlage of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) (“Environmental in-\njury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by\nmoney damages and is often permanent or at least of long du-\nration, i.e., irreparable.… [T]herefore, the balance of harms\nwill usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the\nenvironment.”). But that is not always the case. Courts must\nconsider the traditional equitable factors, which appears to be\nwhat the district court did here. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. One as-\npect of the district court’s reasoning does, however, give us\npause. Despite the previous finding that GE created a risk of\nimminent and substantial harm, the district court stated at the\nrelief stage that irreparable harm is an “essential require-\nment” for injunctive relief and defined irreparable harm as\n“both certain and great, not merely serious or substantial.” To\n\f16 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\nthe extent that language might be interpreted as requiring\nRCRA plaintiffs to demonstrate harm above and beyond that\nshown at the merits stage, the district court erred.\n Multiple circuits have held that RCRA plaintiffs need only\nshow “a risk of harm,” not “the traditional requirement of\nthreatened irreparable harm,” to justify an injunction. United\nStates v. Price, 688 F.2d 201, 211 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Attorney\nGen. of Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 777 (10th\nCir. 2009) (“Our prior case law indicates that under RCRA a\nplaintiff need not ‘show proof of actual harm to health or the\nenvironment’ to establish endangerment, but rather injunc-\ntive relief is appropriate where there simply may be a risk of\nharm.”); Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1356 (2d\nCir. 1991) (quoting Price for the same proposition); United\nStates v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984)\n(same).\n The standard adopted by our sister circuits makes sense,\nespecially in the permanent injunction context. RCRA author-\nizes only injunctive relief. Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 484. Accord-\ningly, absent a permanent injunction, a prevailing RCRA\nplaintiff will receive no remedy. The proven harm is, by defi-\nnition, irreparable absent an injunction. See generally Walgreen\nCo. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., B.V., 966 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir.\n1992). A RCRA plaintiff either demonstrates irreparable harm\nor fails to prove his or her case on the merits.\n We reiterate, however, that a permanent injunction does\nnot automatically follow from success on the merits. See Me.\nPeople’s All. & Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471\nF.3d 277, 296–97 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[I]n an environmental case,\n[the court] should consider the balance of relevant harms be-\nfore granting injunctive relief, even though the statute itself\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 17\n\nauthorizes such relief. … [I]t is true that a district court is not\ncommanded, regardless of the circumstances, to issue an in-\njunction after a finding of liability” under the RCRA.); United\nStates v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329, 1360 (5th Cir.\n1996) (“We find nothing in RCRA which, ‘in so many words,\nor by necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s\njurisdiction in equity.’” (quoting Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313)).\nDistrict courts should apply the traditional equitable factors\nto determine the necessity of injunctive relief.2\n 3. Necessity of Injunctive Relief\n Plaintiffs next claim the district court erred in denying in-\njunctive relief because it found they failed to establish irrepa-\nrable harm. We review a district court’s denial of injunctive\nrelief for an abuse of discretion; we review its factual determi-\nnations for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo, and\n\n\n\n\n 2 The unique procedural history of this case may also be a source of\nplaintiffs’ confusion regarding the applicable standard. Here, the court\nmade a liability finding—that the contamination “may present an immi-\nnent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment,” 42\nU.S.C. § 6972(a)—nearly two years before it denied the injunction. In find-\ning GE liable under the RCRA, the district court agreed that there may be\na risk of endangerment from the contamination. But in denying the injunc-\ntion, the district court found that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate harm not\nalready addressed in the state action. We do not see a conflict between the\ndistrict court’s holdings on liability (which acknowledges the risk of harm)\nand the injunction (which it denied for lack of evidence of unaddressed\nharm).\n\f18 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\nwe give deference to the court’s balancing of the equitable fac-\ntors. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State\nDep’t of Health, 896 F.3d 809, 816 (7th Cir. 2018).\n As an initial matter, we must address GE’s contention that\nplaintiffs abandoned their request for remediation at the evi-\ndentiary hearing, instead deferring to a request for additional\ninvestigation prior to remediation. According to GE, plaintiffs\nhave thus waived their claim to an injunction ordering reme-\ndiation. We disagree. GE mischaracterizes plaintiffs’ position;\nalthough plaintiffs’ expert at the evidentiary hearing testified\nhe believed additional investigation was necessary to deter-\nmine the extent of the contamination and the correspondingly\nappropriate remedy, at no point did plaintiffs retreat from\ntheir request for remediation. They reiterated that request in\ntheir complaint, in their initial motion for an injunction, in ar-\ngument at the evidentiary hearing, and in their motions for\nreconsideration. Plaintiffs have not waived their request for\nan injunction requiring GE to remediate the contamination.\n Turning to plaintiffs’ argument regarding the irreparable\nharm finding, we note that it is somewhat indirect. Rather\nthan directly challenging the district court’s factual findings,\nplaintiffs repeat their general assertion: There is contamina-\ntion, therefore there is harm. And because there is harm, there\nmust be an injunction. In oversimplifying the argument,\nplaintiffs fail to grapple with the thoughtful and nuanced de-\ncisions the district court made that led it to deny injunctive\nrelief. In their request for an injunction, plaintiffs claimed ac-\ntion under the RCRA was necessary because the Consent Or-\nder and actions in the state proceeding were insufficient to\nremedy their injury. For that reason, the district court in-\nformed the parties repeatedly that it was looking for evidence\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 19\n\nof harm not already being addressed through the state pro-\nceeding and for what exactly plaintiffs wanted the court to or-\nder GE to do to address that harm.\n At the evidentiary hearing, plaintiffs argued that the ex-\ntent of the contamination had not been determined and that\nthe IEPA’s analysis based on a limited investigation was\nflawed; as such, their expert testified that additional investi-\ngation was necessary before he could opine on the proper re-\nmediation. Plaintiffs requested GE perform the following ad-\nditional investigation: additional and deeper monitoring\nwells, soil borings penetrating the bedrock, and vapor-intru-\nsion monitoring to the extent necessary to (1) determine if a\ndense non-aqueous phase liquid (“DNAPL”) is present and,\nrelatedly, determine the vertical and horizontal extent of the\ngroundwater contamination; (2) determine whether Rock\nCreek is a groundwater divide, and if so, explain the presence\nof contamination in the well across the creek; and (3) deter-\nmine the source of and monitor the vapors present in the Con-\nway home. Noting that many of these issues are interrelated,\nthe district court considered the competing expert testimony\npresented on each avenue of investigation.\n Although plaintiffs do not directly challenge the district\ncourt’s factual findings, we review those findings briefly to\nhighlight the court’s thoroughness in evaluating the evidence\n(or lack thereof) supporting plaintiffs’ request for injunctive\nrelief. A district court’s finding of an expert witness’s credibil-\nity is one of fact that we review for clear error. Madden v. U.S.\nDep’t of Veterans Affairs, 873 F.3d 971, 973 (7th Cir. 2017). Clear\nerror is a deferential standard of review that only merits re-\nversal if “after reviewing the entire record, we are left with\nthe firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been\n\f20 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\nmade.” United States v. Ranjel, 872 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2017)\n(quoting United States v. Marty, 450 F.3d 687, 689–90 (7th Cir.\n2006)). “[I]n a case of dueling experts, as this one was, it is left\nto the trier of fact, not the reviewing court, to decide how to\nweigh the competing expert testimony.” Madden, 873 F.3d at\n973–74 (alteration in original) (quoting Wipf v. Kowalski, 519\nF.3d 380, 385 (7th Cir. 2008)).\n i. DNAPL and Groundwater Contamination\n Plaintiffs argued that GE’s testing was insufficient to de-\ntermine whether a DNAPL is present. However, plaintiffs did\nnot take any of their own samples or conduct any of their own\ntests, despite their expert—Dr. Banaszak—testifying that\ngroundwater sampling is not prohibitively expensive. In-\nstead, Dr. Banaszak advocated that GE drill deeper soil bor-\nings that penetrate the bedrock and that GE install additional\nmonitoring wells north of the existing wells to determine if\nthe groundwater traveled north and carried contamination\nnorth of the plant. Based on his review of GE’s testing, Dr.\nBanaszak concluded that the results did not show that the\ncontamination plume “is stable or shrinking, which leaves the\npossibility that a DNAPL exists.”\n GE’s expert, Dr. Vagt, who has been the project director of\nthe site since 2008, testified that additional investigation is un-\nnecessary because the evidence demonstrates no DNAPL is\npresent. He explained that the concentration of TCE in the\nsamples has decreased over time, whereas, if a DNAPL were\npresent, the TCE concentrations would have remained con-\nstant. As to the need for a north monitoring well, Dr. Vagt tes-\ntified that soil samples taken north of the plant (near the site\nof an alleged potential additional source of TCE) detected lit-\ntle to no TCE. Dr. Vagt concluded (and the IEPA agreed), that\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 21\n\nno additional testing was necessary. And Dr. Vagt conducted\nsite visits, which led him to conclude that the groundwater\nflowed south, not north, as Dr. Banaszak had hypothesized\nbased on a conceptual site model. Additionally, Dr. Vogt ad-\nvocated against drilling through the bedrock; he opined that\nthe only conduit for contamination through the bedrock was\nthe preexisting city well, and that any additional drilling\ncould be harmful in that it could provide a new route for con-\ntamination to travel through the bedrock.\n The district court concluded that GE’s investigation into\nthe presence of DNAPL, and the IEPA’s approval of the inves-\ntigation, was not unreasonable. Because plaintiffs “merely of-\nfer[ed] different conclusions about the data collected by [GE]\nand the data they hope[d] to develop with additional investi-\ngation and testing,” the district court found that plaintiffs had\nnot met their burden to show that any additional testing for\nDNAPL was necessary. The district court weighed the com-\npeting expert testimony and found GE’s expert made reason-\nable conclusions supported by facts; we see nothing in the\ncourt’s factual findings that are clearly erroneous.\n ii. Rock Creek\n As to Rock Creek’s status as a groundwater divide, plain-\ntiffs and GE again offered differing interpretations of the same\ndata. Plaintiffs argued that the lone sample from the south\nwell containing trace amounts of TCE evidences that contam-\nination is flowing past Rock Creek. They further contended\nthat the rest of the wells on the south of Rock Creek, which\ndid not detect contamination, are not deep enough to\nproperly measure contamination. GE, on the other hand,\nmaintained that Rock Creek is a groundwater divide. The\nIEPA required that GE install additional monitoring wells and\n\f22 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\ntest the residential wells south of Rock Creek to confirm this\nproposition. Dr. Vagt contrasted the contaminated samples\nfrom the north side of Rock Creek with the lack of contamina-\ntion from the south side wells; he testified that the single sam-\nple from the south well with trace levels of contamination was\nan outlier when compared with the lack of contamination in\nthe six other monitoring wells and residential wells located in\nclose proximity and at varying depths.\n Weighing the competing expert testimony, the district\ncourt found that plaintiffs had not offered any additional test-\ning that would “seriously challenge the finding that Rock\nCreek is a groundwater divide.” Again, we cannot conclude\nthis conclusion is clearly erroneous.\n iii. Vapor Intrusion\n Lastly, the district court considered plaintiffs’ request for\nvapor intrusion monitoring for the Conway home and the sur-\nrounding residences. By the time of the evidentiary hearing,\nplaintiffs had sold the Conway home. They agreed the court\ndid not have the power to force access into the home for test-\ning but asked the court to order GE to obtain consent from the\nnew owners. They based this request on a 2012 test that de-\ntected the compound 1,2 DCA in the indoor air in the Conway\nhome at a level above the residential standard. After detecting\nthis compound, however, GE took samples of the groundwa-\nter and sub-slab under and around the Conway home, which\ndid not reflect contamination. GE thus maintained that there\nis no complete pathway between the source of the GE-site\ncontamination and the indoor air in the Conway home, and\nthat 1,2 DCA comes from a variety of sources unrelated to the\nsite contamination (such as household cleaners). The IEPA\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 23\n\nagreed that, without a complete pathway, no additional test-\ning was necessary.\n The district court stated that it was “not in a position to\nsecond guess the IEPA’s decision based on Plaintiffs’ discon-\ntent with the decision.” Considering that plaintiffs no longer\nown the Conway home and the court does not have authority\nto force the new owners to consent to testing, as well as the\nlack of a complete pathway from the site contamination to the\nhome, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred.\n * * *\n While an injunction does not follow automatically from a\nfinding of a risk of imminent and substantial endangerment—\nas this case demonstrates—such a finding usually goes a long\nway towards justifying an injunction. Here however, despite\nthe district court’s admonition that it was looking for evi-\ndence of harm requiring relief in addition to the IEPA action,\nat no point did plaintiffs ever conduct their own investigation\nto contradict GE’s test results. Rather, they continue to insist\nthat irreparable harm is “self-evident” where there is contam-\nination and criticize GE’s investigation, which had been con-\nducted subject to the IEPA’s oversight and direction. As\ndemonstrated by the two years it spent grappling with the in-\njunctive relief questions, the district court understood it had\nto “walk a fine line” between supplementing and supplanting\nthe Consent Order. The court focused on the facts before it,\ncommenting repeatedly that “facts matter,” and it provided\nplaintiffs with numerous opportunities to present evidence\nthat the state proceedings were not adequately protecting the\npublic and the environment. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago\nBridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining\nthat ongoing remediation in independent proceedings may\n\f24 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\njustify the denial of injunctive relief in the RCRA action); Ad-\nkins, 644 F.3d 501–02 (“When this case finally addresses the\nmerits, and if the [state environmental] actions have been re-\nsolved by then, the federal court will be entitled to insist that\nplaintiffs show how the resolution of those cases was not suf-\nficient.”). In the end, plaintiffs could not present contradictory\nfacts because they did not conduct any of their own investi-\ngation. As the district court held, plaintiffs “have not pro-\nvided the evidence necessary for this Court to second guess\n[GE]’s Remedial Action Plan” and order relief in addition to\nwhat the IEPA has already required.\n Nevertheless, plaintiffs insist they are entitled to relief be-\ncause they did not get what they wanted; they want more than\nthe IEPA found adequate and will be satisfied with nothing\nless than a mandatory injunction ordering GE to remove any\ncontamination on their property. We sympathize with plain-\ntiffs’ position—TCE is a dangerous contaminant and the cur-\nrent plan leaves the contamination in place (though contained\nand restricted from access). But, despite plaintiffs’ characteri-\nzation, the RCRA is not a “cleanup” statute. See Meghrig, 516\nU.S. at 483 (“[The] RCRA is not principally designed to effec-\ntuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites ….”). Under the RCRA,\nthe district court may “restrain” the handling of hazardous\nwaste that “may present an imminent and substantial endan-\ngerment to health or the environment,” or order actions that\nmay be “necessary” to eliminate that danger. 42 U.S.C.\n§ 6972(a).\n Here, the district court considered both parties’ expert\npresentations and concluded that plaintiffs had not estab-\nlished any additional actions were “necessary” to eliminate\nthe danger. In spite of the district court’s multiple inquiries to\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 25\n\nplaintiffs’ expert as to what remedy he proposed the court or-\nder, he did not make a recommendation, leaving the court\nwithout guidance. Conversely, the court found GE’s explana-\ntions for the actions it had taken to investigate and develop its\nremediation plans “reasonable, rational and credible.” The\nRCRA does not require a court-ordered cleanup where the\ncourt has not found such action necessary to prevent harm to\nthe public or the environment, especially where, as here, an\nexpert the court found credible testified that additional\ncleanup could cause further harm.\n The district court did not abuse its discretion in conclud-\ning plaintiffs had not carried their burden to establish manda-\ntory injunctive relief was necessary under the RCRA.\n B. Motion for Indicative Ruling and for Reconsidera-\n tion\n Next, plaintiffs contend the district court erred in denying\ntheir motion for indicative ruling under Rule 62.1 and for re-\nconsideration under Rule 60(b)(2). Relief under Rule 60(b) is\n“an extraordinary remedy … granted only in exceptional cir-\ncumstances.” Davis v. Moroney, 857 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir.\n2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Bakery Mach. & Fabrica-\ntion, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc., 570 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir.\n2009)). We review the district court’s decision for abuse of dis-\ncretion. Gleason v. Jansen, 888 F.3d 847, 851–52 (7th Cir. 2018).\n A refresher of the timeline of events is necessary: Prior to\nthe district court’s ruling on the motion for injunction, the\nIEPA had denied GE’s initial Remedial Action Plan, which\nproposed natural attenuation and institutional controls to ad-\ndress the contamination. After the district court denied the in-\n\f26 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\njunction in September 2017, plaintiffs dismissed their remain-\ning claim with prejudice and filed a notice of appeal. In Octo-\nber 2017, GE submitted a revised RAP to the IEPA, in which\nGE proposed institutional controls as the sole method of re-\nmedial action. Then, on March 2, 2018, the IEPA approved\nGE’s revised RAP. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed a motion\nfor indicative ruling under Rule 62.1(a)(3), which provides:\n If a timely motion is made for relief that the\n court lacks authority to grant because of an ap-\n peal that has been docketed and is pending, the\n court may: … state either that it would grant the\n motion if the court of appeals remands for that\n purpose or that the motion raises a substantial\n issue.\nFed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a)(3). In the motion, plaintiffs raised a sin-\ngle basis for their requested relief: the IEPA’s approval of GE’s\nrevised RAP. Plaintiffs asserted that the IEPA’s March 2, 2018\napproval was newly discovered evidence supporting recon-\nsideration of the denial of the injunction.3\n Plaintiffs’ arguments fail for two reasons. First, the IEPA’s\nMarch 2, 2018 approval of GE’s RAP is not “newly discovered\nevidence” under Rule 60(b)(2). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2)\n(“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or\nits legal representative from a final judgment … for … newly\ndiscovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could\n\n\n 3 Although plaintiffs did not file a separate motion for relief from judg-\n\nment and failed to explain that they were seeking relief under Rule\n60(b)(2) until their reply brief, the district court excused this omission and\ntreated the Rule 62.1 motion as a joint motion for reconsideration under\nRule 60(b)(2).\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 27\n\nnot have been discovered in time to move for a new trial un-\nder Rule 59(b).”). Newly discovered evidence must have been\nin existence at the time of the original judgment or pertain to\nfacts in existence at the time of the judgment. Peacock v. Bd. of\nSch. Comm’rs of City of Indianapolis, 721 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir.\n1983) (per curiam). The district court did not abuse its discre-\ntion in finding that neither the revised RAP submitted in Oc-\ntober 2017 nor the IEPA’s March 2, 2018 approval existed at\nthe time of its September 2017 judgment. Rather, they were\nnew evidence that did not exist and thus could not have been\ndiscovered at the time. Nor did the district court err in con-\ncluding that the revised RAP did not pertain to facts in exist-\nence at the time of judgment. To the contrary, the revised RAP\nresponded to the IEPA’s questions and concerns, contained\nnew information for the IEPA to consider, and included a new\nproposed remedy.\n Second, even if it were “newly discovered” evidence, the\ndistrict court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the\nIEPA’s approval of the revised RAP would not have changed\nthe outcome. According to plaintiffs, the district court’s denial\nof injunctive relief was predicated on the IEPA’s rejection of\nGE’s initial RAP. For that reason, they claim that the IEPA’s\nacceptance of the revised RAP that did not require any addi-\ntional remedies is a basis upon which the district court should\nhave reconsidered injunctive relief. In support, plaintiffs\npointed to the district court’s statement that “[t]he IEPA’s ac-\ntions, including the latest [RAP] rejection, is strong evidence\nthat Plaintiffs’ injuries are being remedied in the parallel state-\ncourt proceeding.” In denying the Rule 62.1 motion, however,\nthe district court explained that plaintiffs misunderstood its\nruling: “The [c]ourt merely used the IEPA’s most recent rejec-\n\f28 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\ntion to highlight that the IEPA had been making well-rea-\nsoned decisions under the Consent Order and had challenged\nnumerous actions [GE] had taken ….” Noting that plaintiffs\nwere using the approval of the revised RAP to make the same\narguments the court had rejected throughout the case, the dis-\ntrict court concluded that plaintiffs had not offered any newly\ndiscovered evidence that would necessitate injunctive relief.\n The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying\nthe motions for indicative relief and for reconsideration.\n C. State Law Tort Claims\n Lastly, plaintiffs assert that the district court erred in\ngranting summary judgment to GE on their state law claims\nof nuisance, trespass, and negligence. We review a grant of\nsummary judgment de novo, viewing the record in a light\nmost favorable to the nonmoving party. Minerva Dairy, Inc. v.\nHarsdorf, 905 F.3d 1047, 1053 (7th Cir. 2018).\n In Illinois, the statute of limitations for tort claims for dam-\nage to property is five years. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-205. It is\nundisputed that, here, Lowell Beggs knew about the contam-\nination of the golf course from the GE plant at the time he\npurchased the property in 2007, but he did not file suit until\nNovember 2013, more than five years later. Plaintiffs argue,\nhowever, that GE is committing a continuous violation be-\ncause it “is doing nothing to stop its contamination from mi-\ngrating,” and that, under the continuing tort doctrine, the\nfive-year statute of limitations does not bar their claims.\n “[W]hen ‘a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury,\nthe limitations period does not begin to run until the date of\nthe last injury or the date the tortious acts cease.’” Brooks v.\nRoss, 578 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Belleville Toyota\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 29\n\nv. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 770 N.E.2d 177, 190 (Ill. 2002)).\nThe problem with plaintiffs’ argument is that the “continu-\ning” action they allege is not that GE is continuing to release\ncontaminants, but that the original contamination is continu-\ning to migrate. However, “[a] continuing violation or tort is\noccasioned by continuing unlawful acts and conduct, not by\ncontinual ill effects from an initial violation.” Feltmeier v. Felt-\nmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 85 (Ill. 2003); see Village of DePue v. Viacom\nInt’l, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 2d 774, 779 (C.D. Ill. 2010) (continuing\ntort doctrine did not apply where plaintiff’s allegations were\nlimited to injury from water flowing from contaminated site\nbecause tortious conduct had ceased when manufacturing at\nsite ended years prior); Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Tang Indus., Inc.,\n998 F.Supp. 889, 896–97 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (continuing tort doc-\ntrine did not apply where defendant stopped dumping con-\ntaminants years prior, “although the effects from [defend-\nant]’s violations may be persisting”). The continuing migra-\ntion plaintiffs allege is merely an ill effect from the original\nviolation, not a continuing unlawful act.\n Nor does plaintiffs’ assertion that GE retains possession of\nthe plant and has mismanaged the remediation suffice as a\ncontinuing injury. As the district court explained, application\nof the continuing tort doctrine “turns on continuing conduct,\nnot continuing ownership or continuing injury.” Compare Vil-\nlage of DePue, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 779 (“merely owning the Site”\nafter contamination insufficient for liability under continuing\ntort doctrine), with City of Evanston v. Texaco, Inc., 19 F. Supp.\n3d 817, 827–28 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (continuing tort doctrine ap-\nplied “at least at the pleadings stage” where defendant’s un-\nderground tanks allegedly continued leaking contaminants\ninto the environment even though defendant no longer\nowned the property). That GE retains possession of the plant\n\f30 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\nis of no import where there is a lack of demonstrated contin-\nuing unlawful conduct.\n Because plaintiffs do not allege a continuing unlawful act\nnecessary to invoke the continuing tort doctrine, we affirm the\ngrant of summary judgment to GE on plaintiffs’ state law tort\nclaims.\n III. Conclusion\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\ndistrict court.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Martha Conway v. General Electric Company\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\nLAJIM, LLC, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nGENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.\\n No. 13-cv-50348 — Iain D. Johnston, Magistrate Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 15, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 4, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-appellants purchased land\\nnear a former General Electric Company manufacturing plant\\nthat had operated for sixty years; the plant leached toxic\\nchemicals that seeped into the groundwater. The Illinois En-\\nvironmental Protection Agency filed suit under state law\\nagainst General Electric in 2004 and has been working with\\nthe company since then to investigate and develop a plan to\\naddress the contamination. In 2013, plaintiffs filed suit under\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nthe citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and\\nRecovery Act, seeking a mandatory injunction ordering Gen-\\neral Electric to conduct additional investigation into the scope\\nof the contamination and ordering the company to remove the\\ncontamination. The district court found the company liable\\nfor the contamination on summary judgment but denied\\nplaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief because, despite the\\nmany opportunities the court provided, plaintiffs did not of-\\nfer evidence establishing a need for injunctive relief beyond\\nwhat the company had already done in the state action. For\\nthe following reasons, we affirm.\\n I. Background\\n A. Statutory Scheme\\n The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”),\\n42 U.S.C. § 6901, et seq., “is a comprehensive environmental\\nstatute that governs the treatment, storage, and disposal of\\nsolid and hazardous waste.” Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S.\\n479, 483 (1996). The RCRA “is not principally designed to ef-\\nfectuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites or to compensate\\nthose who have attended to the remediation of environmental\\nhazards.” Id. Rather, the primary purpose of the RCRA “is to\\nreduce the generation of hazardous waste and to ensure the\\nproper treatment … of that waste which is nonetheless gener-\\nated, ‘so as to minimize the present and future threat to hu-\\nman health and the environment.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6902(b)).\\n The RCRA contains a citizen suit provision, which pro-\\nvides that “any person may commence a civil action” against\\n“any person” who has allegedly violated “any permit, stand-\\nard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 3\\n\\nwhich has become effective pursuant to this chapter,” or\\n“who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or\\npresent handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or dis-\\nposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an\\nimminent and substantial endangerment to health or the en-\\nvironment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1). Once the violation or po-\\ntential endangerment is shown, a district court “shall have ju-\\nrisdiction … to restrain any person who has contributed or\\nwho is contributing to the past or present handling, storage,\\ntreatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazard-\\nous waste” and “to order such person to take such other ac-\\ntion as may be necessary.” Id. § 6972(a).\\n B. Factual Background\\n 1. General Electric Plant in Morrison, Illinois\\n Defendant-appellee General Electric Company (“GE”) op-\\nerated a manufacturing plant in Morrison, Illinois from 1949\\nto 2010. To remove oil from the automotive and appliance\\nparts it manufactured, the plant used chlorinated organic sol-\\nvents, including trichloroethylene (“TCE”), perchloroethene\\n(“PCE”), and trichloroethane (“TCA”). These solvents are\\ntoxic and are regulated by federal and state environmental\\nagencies. GE used these solvents and stored them in degreas-\\ners located at the plant until 1994, when it switched to a soap-\\nlike solution to clean the parts.\\n In 1986, chlorinated solvents were detected in three mu-\\nnicipal supply wells that provided water to the City of Morri-\\nson, located several thousand feet southeast of the GE plant.\\nShortly thereafter, the Illinois Environmental Protection\\nAgency (“IEPA”) installed monitoring wells to analyze the\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\ngroundwater around the GE plant, which uncovered addi-\\ntional contamination. The IEPA completed a Phase I Remedial\\nInvestigation in 1987, which included sampling and analysis\\nof soil, water, and sediment. Based on the investigation, the\\nIEPA identified the GE plant as the source of the solvent con-\\ntamination.\\n In 1988, GE installed additional monitoring wells and an\\nair stripper to treat water pumped from one of Morrison’s\\nmunicipal wells to a level of contamination below the maxi-\\nmum contaminant level (“MCL”) so the city could continue to\\nuse the well as a source of drinking water; the other two mu-\\nnicipal supply wells were sealed. GE also conducted a Phase\\nII Remedial Investigation, which identified elevated concen-\\ntrations of solvents beneath the plant’s former degreasing op-\\nerations. Under the IEPA’s supervision, GE continued to sam-\\nple and monitor the groundwater in the monitoring wells and\\nsubmitted reports of the results to the IEPA.\\n In 1994, the IEPA required GE to conduct a Phase III Re-\\nmedial Investigation of the groundwater at and downgradi-\\nent from the plant. GE reported the results of the investigation\\nin 2001. According to the report, the solvents in the ground-\\nwater had decreased significantly by 2001, and the report\\nmodeled that the contaminants would naturally attenuate\\n(i.e., reduce) to concentrations below the MCL. Additionally,\\nthe report stated that Rock Creek was a natural groundwater\\ndivide that would prevent the contaminating solvents from\\nmigrating south from the GE plant across the creek. The re-\\nport concluded that the contamination did not pose a risk to\\nthe public because a City of Morrison ordinance prohibited\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 5\\n\\nthe use of groundwater as a source of drinking water and be-\\ncause GE’s air stripper at the remaining municipal supply\\nwell provided safe drinking water.\\n In response, however, the IEPA did not approve GE’s pro-\\nposal for natural attenuation of the contamination; instead,\\nthe IEPA concluded that active remediation of the site would\\nbe appropriate. The Illinois Attorney General commenced suit\\nagainst GE in 2004 under the Illinois Environmental Protec-\\ntion Act: for cost recovery (Count I), see 415 Ill. Comp. Stat.\\n5/22.2(f); to enjoin water pollution (Count II), see 415 Ill.\\nComp. Stat. 5/42(d)–(e); and to enjoin a water pollution haz-\\nard (Count III), see 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12(d). The state\\nsought to recover costs it had incurred as well as an injunction\\nrequiring that GE investigate the nature and extent of the con-\\ntamination and then perform remediation. In 2010, GE and Il-\\nlinois entered into a Consent Order in which GE agreed to\\nsubmit to the IEPA a series of reports, including: (1) “a work\\nplan to survey private wells, install additional monitoring\\nwells, and complete additional soil borings”; (2) “a Focused\\nSite Investigation Report (‘FSI’) summarizing the results of\\nthe work plan”; (3) “a Remedial Objectives Report to address\\nthe impact of the soil and groundwater contamination”; and\\n(4) “a Remedial Action Plan to meet the remediation objec-\\ntives within six years of the entry of the Consent Order.” Also\\nin 2010, the City of Morrison passed an ordinance prohibiting\\ngroundwater as a source of potable water and prohibiting the\\ninstallation of wells “to limit threats to human health from\\ngroundwater contamination.”\\n After approval of a work plan, GE installed monitoring\\nwells along Rock Creek. Then, in 2013, GE submitted its FSI\\ndetailing the data obtained from the various monitoring\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nwells; the report explained that the solvents had migrated\\nsouth of the plant and that the monitoring wells along Rock\\nCreek tested positive for contamination at levels above the\\nMCL. Tests from wells on the other side of Rock Creek (and\\nfurther from the plant) either did not detect chlorinated sol-\\nvents or detected TCE at a level below the MCL. Following\\ndiscussions between GE and the IEPA on the work plan and\\nFSI, the IEPA conditionally approved the FSI in March 2015.\\nIt determined that GE “adequately defined the nature and ex-\\ntent of the contamination.” The IEPA conditionally approved\\nGE’s revised Remedial Objectives Report in August 2016, after\\na number of additional submissions and a meeting between\\nthe technical representatives from GE and the IEPA.\\n In March 2017, GE submitted its Remedial Action Plan\\n(“RAP”) to the IEPA, proposing to achieve the remediation\\nobjectives through a “combination of institutional controls\\nand monitored natural attenuation.” The IEPA denied GE’s\\nproposal in June 2017, posing several questions about the\\nplan, and specifically noting that it did not accept “an open-\\nended period of monitored natural attenuation as a remedia-\\ntion technology.” GE submitted a revised RAP to the IEPA in\\nOctober 2017, responding to the IEPA’s questions and com-\\nments and proposing to address the remaining contamination\\nthrough institutional controls. The IEPA approved GE’s re-\\nvised Remedial Action Plan in March 2018.\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 7\\n\\n 2. Plaintiffs’ Interest in the Land\\n Plaintiff-appellant Lowell Beggs1 purchased land near the\\nsite of the shuttered GE plant in 2007. He conveyed the prop-\\nerty to plaintiff-appellant Prairie Ridge Golf Course, LLC,\\nwhich plaintiff-appellant LAJIM, LLC operated. Beggs moved\\ninto a home next to the golf course with his companion, plain-\\ntiff-appellant Martha Kai Conway (the “Conway home”). The\\ngolf course and Conway home are located south of the former\\nGE plant and downgradient from the plant.\\n When Beggs considered purchasing the golf course in\\nApril 2007, the seller advised him: “the golf course has con-\\ntamination on the first hole. This was caused by General Elec-\\ntric. If you go to the EPA web site, GE is listed as a superfund\\nsite. No further remediation was needed according to what I\\ncan find.” Beggs did not inquire further about the environ-\\nmental condition of the golf course before completing the pur-\\nchase in May 2007. The purchase agreement noted, “[S]eller []\\nhas disclosed to Purchaser that there is contamination on the\\nfirst hole of the Real Estate, such contamination having been\\ncaused by General Electric, as which contamination is part of\\nthe Superfund Site that apparently does not require any fur-\\nther remediation.” Additionally, Beggs walked the golf\\ncourse prior to completing the purchase and noticed a moni-\\ntoring well head protruding above the ground. After purchas-\\ning the property, Beggs contacted GE to fix a leak from the\\nfixture, which he knew monitored “how much stuff was com-\\ning out of GE.”\\n\\n\\n 1Beggs passed away during the course of this litigation. His interest\\nis now represented by the executor of his estate, plaintiff-appellant First\\nNational Bank of Amboy.\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\n C. Procedural Background\\n Plaintiffs filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois on\\nNovember 1, 2013 seeking: (1) a mandatory injunction requir-\\ning GE to remediate the contamination under the RCRA, see\\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (Count I); (2) cost recovery (Count II)\\nand a declaratory judgment (Count III) under the Compre-\\nhensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-\\nity Act (“CERCLA”), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(g)(3); and\\n(3) recovery under state law for nuisance (Count IV), trespass\\n(Count V), and negligence (Count VI).\\n After what the district court characterized as “extensive\\ndiscovery,” the court considered the parties’ cross-motions\\nfor partial summary judgment. Plaintiffs moved for summary\\njudgment on their RCRA claim. GE did not dispute that plain-\\ntiffs satisfied the first two elements of the claim—(1) defend-\\nant has generated solid or hazardous waste, and (2) defendant\\nhas contributed to the handling of the waste. See Albany Bank\\n& Tr. Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2002).\\nOn the sole remaining question—whether plaintiffs estab-\\nlished that the contamination “may present an imminent and\\nsubstantial danger to health or the environment,” id.—the dis-\\ntrict court found for plaintiffs and granted summary judg-\\nment as to GE’s liability under the RCRA. At plaintiffs’ re-\\nquest, the court deferred consideration as to whether plain-\\ntiffs were entitled to injunctive relief. On GE’s cross-motion\\nfor summary judgment on the state law claims, the district\\ncourt found the continuing tort doctrine did not apply and\\nfound the claims time-barred because plaintiffs had\\nknowledge of the claims more than five years before they filed\\nsuit.\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 9\\n\\n Over the next two years, the district court considered\\nplaintiffs’ request for a mandatory injunction in a number of\\nhearings and a series of opinions. On October 4, 2016, the\\ncourt held that the plain language of the RCRA permitted, but\\ndid not require, the court to grant injunctive relief despite the\\nongoing state proceeding; thus, the question before the court\\nwas not whether it could grant relief but whether it should. On\\nthis point, the court concluded plaintiffs had not yet provided\\nthe court with facts supporting their assertion that the Con-\\nsent Order in the state action was deficient and ineffective.\\nThe court ordered an evidentiary hearing and invited the\\nIEPA and the Illinois Attorney General to provide their views\\non the progress under the Consent Order and whether the\\ncourt should order injunctive relief under the RCRA. The Illi-\\nnois Attorney General’s Office submitted an amicus brief ex-\\nplaining that the State did not believe the court should impose\\ninjunctive relief because any court-ordered injunctive relief\\nwould overlap with the work currently being done—i.e., “site\\ninvestigation, monitoring and payment of costs as well as an\\norder barring further endangerment … [and] some type of re-\\nmedial effort.” The State asserted that all such actions were\\nalready underway and were “being done with diligence and\\nrigorous oversight by the Illinois EPA,” and that injunctive re-\\nlief “may result in a clean-up that is inconsistent with clean\\nups of other contaminated sites in Illinois.”\\n After two days of evidentiary hearing on June 1 and 2,\\n2017, the court issued an opinion on September 7, 2017 deny-\\ning the requested injunctive relief. Both parties had presented\\nexpert testimony at the hearing; the district court credited\\nGE’s expert as having “provided reasonable, rational and\\ncredible bases explaining why certain actions were taken and\\nothers were not,” whereas it found plaintiffs’ expert did not\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nprovide conclusions but merely “testified that additional in-\\nvestigation and testing was necessary to opine on the proper\\nscope of remediation for the site.” Notably, when asked by the\\ndistrict court judge what specific cleanup he recommended,\\nplaintiffs’ expert declined to make a recommendation. The\\ndistrict court thus concluded that plaintiffs had not met their\\nburden of showing harm not already addressed sufficiently\\nby the IEPA proceeding. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion\\nto reconsider the denial of injunctive relief on November 7,\\n2017. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the remaining count un-\\nder the CERCLA with prejudice and filed a notice of appeal\\non March 6, 2018.\\n Then, on March 23, 2018, plaintiffs filed a motion for an\\nindicative ruling under Rule 62.1 and motion to reconsider\\nbased on newly discovered evidence. Plaintiffs pointed to the\\nIEPA’s March 2, 2018 approval of GE’s Remedial Action Plan,\\nwhich relies solely on institutional controls to address the re-\\nmaining contamination. The district court denied plaintiffs’\\nmotion on August 14, 2018, and plaintiffs appealed. That ap-\\npeal was consolidated with plaintiffs’ original appeal; both\\nare jointly before us now.\\n II. Discussion\\n A. Injunctive Relief\\n Plaintiffs raise several issues related to the district court’s\\ndenial of injunctive relief: they assert (1) the district court did\\nnot have discretion to deny injunctive relief once it found GE\\nliable under the RCRA; (2) the district court erred in conduct-\\ning the traditional balancing of equitable factors for injunctive\\nrelief; and (3) the district court erred in finding plaintiffs failed\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 11\\n\\nto establish irreparable harm. Plaintiffs’ arguments on each is-\\nsue fail to carry the day. We note that the denial of injunctive\\nrelief after a district court has found a risk of imminent and\\nsubstantial danger to public health or to the environment\\nshould be rare. Here, however, plaintiffs failed to provide the\\ndistrict court with any evidence that injunctive relief, in addi-\\ntion to what the IEPA had already ordered in the state action,\\nwould improve the environment and not cause additional\\nharm.\\n 1. Discretion to Deny Relief\\n On summary judgment, the district court found GE liable\\nfor contaminating groundwater in a manner that “may pre-\\nsent an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or\\nthe environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). This finding has\\nnot been challenged on appeal. After finding GE liable, the\\ndistrict court then considered whether plaintiffs were entitled\\nto injunctive relief as a remedy for the violation. Plaintiffs as-\\nsert, however, that once the district court made a finding of\\nliability, the RCRA required the court to order injunctive re-\\nlief.\\n In analyzing whether the RCRA mandates the imposition\\nof injunctive relief upon a finding of liability, we first look to\\nthe plain language of the statute. See United States v. Marcotte,\\n835 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2016). The RCRA provides, in rele-\\nvant part:\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\n [A]ny person may commence a civil action on\\n his own behalf— …\\n (1)(B) against any person, … including any\\n past or present generator, past or present\\n transporter, or past or present owner or op-\\n erator of a treatment, storage, or disposal fa-\\n cility, who has contributed or who is contrib-\\n uting to the past or present handling, stor-\\n age, treatment, transportation, or disposal of\\n any solid or hazardous waste which may\\n present an imminent and substantial endan-\\n germent to health or the environment; ….\\n The district court shall have jurisdiction … to re-\\n strain any person who has contributed or who is\\n contributing to the past or present handling,\\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal\\n of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in\\n paragraph (1)(B), [or] to order such person to take\\n such other action as may be necessary ….\\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (emphasis added). As plaintiffs\\nacknowledge, this language authorizes injunctive relief—it\\nprovides the district court with jurisdiction to restrain a vio-\\nlator or to order other necessary action. But nothing in the lan-\\nguage mandates injunctive relief; “shall” pertains only to the\\ngrant of jurisdiction and not to the relief the district court may\\norder.\\n Nor do our past comments on the RCRA indicate injunc-\\ntive relief is mandatory upon a finding of liability. In Adkins\\nv. VIM Recycling, Inc., we considered whether the prohibitions\\nin the RCRA or several abstention doctrines precluded the\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 13\\n\\nplaintiffs from bringing a citizen suit under the RCRA after\\nthe state had already filed enforcement actions against the\\nsame alleged violators. 644 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2011). We\\nconcluded that neither the statutory language nor the absten-\\ntion doctrines prevented the Adkins plaintiffs from pursuing\\ntheir citizen suit. Id. Critically, we made clear that “[w]e [did]\\nnot suggest, of course, that once a citizen suit has cleared\\nRCRA’s statutory hurdles it is immune from all other consti-\\ntutional and preclusive doctrines, such as standing, mootness,\\nand claim or issue preclusion.” Id. at 503. In so stating, we ad-\\nvised courts to consider these doctrines before awarding re-\\nlief, thus evidencing that plaintiffs are not presumptively en-\\ntitled to injunctive relief once they have “cleared RCRA’s stat-\\nutory hurdles.”\\n Furthermore, the Supreme Court applies traditional equi-\\ntable principles to environmental statutes. For example, in a\\nFederal Water Pollution Control Act case, the Supreme Court\\nexplained that the statute did not require courts to immedi-\\nately enjoin all statutory violations; instead, the Court high-\\nlighted that long-established principles of equity applied:\\n It goes without saying that an injunction is an\\n equitable remedy. It is not a remedy which is-\\n sues as of course or to restrain an act the injuri-\\n ous consequences of which are merely trifling.\\n An injunction should issue only where the in-\\n tervention of a court of equity is essential in or-\\n der effectually to protect property rights against\\n injuries otherwise irremediable.\\nWeinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12 (1982) (cita-\\ntions and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Winter v.\\nNat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008) (“An injunction\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nis a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from suc-\\ncess on the merits as a matter of course.”) (reversing and va-\\ncating grant of injunction under National Environmental Pol-\\nicy Act); Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 648, 651 (2d\\nCir. 1989) (“In applying these general equitable standards for\\nthe issuance of injunctions in the area of environmental stat-\\nutes, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the notion that\\nan injunction follows as a matter of course upon a finding of\\nstatutory violation.”). The same principles apply to the\\nRCRA; the remedy of an injunction does not issue as a matter\\nof course upon a finding of liability but only as necessary to\\nprotect against otherwise irremediable harm.\\n Thus, the district court correctly held that it has discretion\\nto award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not required\\nto order relief after a finding of liability.\\n 2. Traditional Balancing of Equitable Factors\\n In a similar but distinct argument, plaintiffs assert that the\\ndistrict court erred in applying the traditional equitable fac-\\ntors when considering whether to award injunctive relief. To\\nmerit injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate:\\n (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;\\n (2) that remedies available at law, such as mon-\\n etary damages, are inadequate to compensate\\n for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance\\n of hardships between the plaintiff and defend-\\n ant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and\\n (4) that the public interest would not be dis-\\n served by a permanent injunction.\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 15\\n\\neBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).\\n Plaintiffs base their argument on their role in this citizen\\nsuit as private attorneys general, acting on behalf of the pub-\\nlic. They argue that it is common in environmental protection\\ncases for courts to order injunctive relief without the tradi-\\ntional balancing of equitable factors where the only statutory\\nrelief available is injunctive relief and where the plaintiff is a\\nsovereign or private attorney general. However, commenting\\ndirectly on the RCRA, we have reasoned that “[o]rdinarily, a\\ncourt is obligated to conduct an equitable balancing of harms\\nbefore awarding injunctive relief, even under an environmen-\\ntal statute which specifically authorizes such relief (as does\\nRCRA section 3008(a)).” United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,\\n38 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1994).\\n True, once a court finds a defendant liable for creating a\\nrisk of imminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the\\ncase that injunctive relief is warranted. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vil-\\nlage of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) (“Environmental in-\\njury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by\\nmoney damages and is often permanent or at least of long du-\\nration, i.e., irreparable.… [T]herefore, the balance of harms\\nwill usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the\\nenvironment.”). But that is not always the case. Courts must\\nconsider the traditional equitable factors, which appears to be\\nwhat the district court did here. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. One as-\\npect of the district court’s reasoning does, however, give us\\npause. Despite the previous finding that GE created a risk of\\nimminent and substantial harm, the district court stated at the\\nrelief stage that irreparable harm is an “essential require-\\nment” for injunctive relief and defined irreparable harm as\\n“both certain and great, not merely serious or substantial.” To\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nthe extent that language might be interpreted as requiring\\nRCRA plaintiffs to demonstrate harm above and beyond that\\nshown at the merits stage, the district court erred.\\n Multiple circuits have held that RCRA plaintiffs need only\\nshow “a risk of harm,” not “the traditional requirement of\\nthreatened irreparable harm,” to justify an injunction. United\\nStates v. Price, 688 F.2d 201, 211 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Attorney\\nGen. of Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 777 (10th\\nCir. 2009) (“Our prior case law indicates that under RCRA a\\nplaintiff need not ‘show proof of actual harm to health or the\\nenvironment’ to establish endangerment, but rather injunc-\\ntive relief is appropriate where there simply may be a risk of\\nharm.”); Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1356 (2d\\nCir. 1991) (quoting Price for the same proposition); United\\nStates v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984)\\n(same).\\n The standard adopted by our sister circuits makes sense,\\nespecially in the permanent injunction context. RCRA author-\\nizes only injunctive relief. Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 484. Accord-\\ningly, absent a permanent injunction, a prevailing RCRA\\nplaintiff will receive no remedy. The proven harm is, by defi-\\nnition, irreparable absent an injunction. See generally Walgreen\\nCo. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., B.V., 966 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir.\\n1992). A RCRA plaintiff either demonstrates irreparable harm\\nor fails to prove his or her case on the merits.\\n We reiterate, however, that a permanent injunction does\\nnot automatically follow from success on the merits. See Me.\\nPeople’s All. & Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471\\nF.3d 277, 296–97 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[I]n an environmental case,\\n[the court] should consider the balance of relevant harms be-\\nfore granting injunctive relief, even though the statute itself\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 17\\n\\nauthorizes such relief. … [I]t is true that a district court is not\\ncommanded, regardless of the circumstances, to issue an in-\\njunction after a finding of liability” under the RCRA.); United\\nStates v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329, 1360 (5th Cir.\\n1996) (“We find nothing in RCRA which, ‘in so many words,\\nor by necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s\\njurisdiction in equity.’” (quoting Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313)).\\nDistrict courts should apply the traditional equitable factors\\nto determine the necessity of injunctive relief.2\\n 3. Necessity of Injunctive Relief\\n Plaintiffs next claim the district court erred in denying in-\\njunctive relief because it found they failed to establish irrepa-\\nrable harm. We review a district court’s denial of injunctive\\nrelief for an abuse of discretion; we review its factual determi-\\nnations for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo, and\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 The unique procedural history of this case may also be a source of\\nplaintiffs’ confusion regarding the applicable standard. Here, the court\\nmade a liability finding—that the contamination “may present an immi-\\nnent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment,” 42\\nU.S.C. § 6972(a)—nearly two years before it denied the injunction. In find-\\ning GE liable under the RCRA, the district court agreed that there may be\\na risk of endangerment from the contamination. But in denying the injunc-\\ntion, the district court found that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate harm not\\nalready addressed in the state action. We do not see a conflict between the\\ndistrict court’s holdings on liability (which acknowledges the risk of harm)\\nand the injunction (which it denied for lack of evidence of unaddressed\\nharm).\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nwe give deference to the court’s balancing of the equitable fac-\\ntors. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State\\nDep’t of Health, 896 F.3d 809, 816 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n As an initial matter, we must address GE’s contention that\\nplaintiffs abandoned their request for remediation at the evi-\\ndentiary hearing, instead deferring to a request for additional\\ninvestigation prior to remediation. According to GE, plaintiffs\\nhave thus waived their claim to an injunction ordering reme-\\ndiation. We disagree. GE mischaracterizes plaintiffs’ position;\\nalthough plaintiffs’ expert at the evidentiary hearing testified\\nhe believed additional investigation was necessary to deter-\\nmine the extent of the contamination and the correspondingly\\nappropriate remedy, at no point did plaintiffs retreat from\\ntheir request for remediation. They reiterated that request in\\ntheir complaint, in their initial motion for an injunction, in ar-\\ngument at the evidentiary hearing, and in their motions for\\nreconsideration. Plaintiffs have not waived their request for\\nan injunction requiring GE to remediate the contamination.\\n Turning to plaintiffs’ argument regarding the irreparable\\nharm finding, we note that it is somewhat indirect. Rather\\nthan directly challenging the district court’s factual findings,\\nplaintiffs repeat their general assertion: There is contamina-\\ntion, therefore there is harm. And because there is harm, there\\nmust be an injunction. In oversimplifying the argument,\\nplaintiffs fail to grapple with the thoughtful and nuanced de-\\ncisions the district court made that led it to deny injunctive\\nrelief. In their request for an injunction, plaintiffs claimed ac-\\ntion under the RCRA was necessary because the Consent Or-\\nder and actions in the state proceeding were insufficient to\\nremedy their injury. For that reason, the district court in-\\nformed the parties repeatedly that it was looking for evidence\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 19\\n\\nof harm not already being addressed through the state pro-\\nceeding and for what exactly plaintiffs wanted the court to or-\\nder GE to do to address that harm.\\n At the evidentiary hearing, plaintiffs argued that the ex-\\ntent of the contamination had not been determined and that\\nthe IEPA’s analysis based on a limited investigation was\\nflawed; as such, their expert testified that additional investi-\\ngation was necessary before he could opine on the proper re-\\nmediation. Plaintiffs requested GE perform the following ad-\\nditional investigation: additional and deeper monitoring\\nwells, soil borings penetrating the bedrock, and vapor-intru-\\nsion monitoring to the extent necessary to (1) determine if a\\ndense non-aqueous phase liquid (“DNAPL”) is present and,\\nrelatedly, determine the vertical and horizontal extent of the\\ngroundwater contamination; (2) determine whether Rock\\nCreek is a groundwater divide, and if so, explain the presence\\nof contamination in the well across the creek; and (3) deter-\\nmine the source of and monitor the vapors present in the Con-\\nway home. Noting that many of these issues are interrelated,\\nthe district court considered the competing expert testimony\\npresented on each avenue of investigation.\\n Although plaintiffs do not directly challenge the district\\ncourt’s factual findings, we review those findings briefly to\\nhighlight the court’s thoroughness in evaluating the evidence\\n(or lack thereof) supporting plaintiffs’ request for injunctive\\nrelief. A district court’s finding of an expert witness’s credibil-\\nity is one of fact that we review for clear error. Madden v. U.S.\\nDep’t of Veterans Affairs, 873 F.3d 971, 973 (7th Cir. 2017). Clear\\nerror is a deferential standard of review that only merits re-\\nversal if “after reviewing the entire record, we are left with\\nthe firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nmade.” United States v. Ranjel, 872 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2017)\\n(quoting United States v. Marty, 450 F.3d 687, 689–90 (7th Cir.\\n2006)). “[I]n a case of dueling experts, as this one was, it is left\\nto the trier of fact, not the reviewing court, to decide how to\\nweigh the competing expert testimony.” Madden, 873 F.3d at\\n973–74 (alteration in original) (quoting Wipf v. Kowalski, 519\\nF.3d 380, 385 (7th Cir. 2008)).\\n i. DNAPL and Groundwater Contamination\\n Plaintiffs argued that GE’s testing was insufficient to de-\\ntermine whether a DNAPL is present. However, plaintiffs did\\nnot take any of their own samples or conduct any of their own\\ntests, despite their expert—Dr. Banaszak—testifying that\\ngroundwater sampling is not prohibitively expensive. In-\\nstead, Dr. Banaszak advocated that GE drill deeper soil bor-\\nings that penetrate the bedrock and that GE install additional\\nmonitoring wells north of the existing wells to determine if\\nthe groundwater traveled north and carried contamination\\nnorth of the plant. Based on his review of GE’s testing, Dr.\\nBanaszak concluded that the results did not show that the\\ncontamination plume “is stable or shrinking, which leaves the\\npossibility that a DNAPL exists.”\\n GE’s expert, Dr. Vagt, who has been the project director of\\nthe site since 2008, testified that additional investigation is un-\\nnecessary because the evidence demonstrates no DNAPL is\\npresent. He explained that the concentration of TCE in the\\nsamples has decreased over time, whereas, if a DNAPL were\\npresent, the TCE concentrations would have remained con-\\nstant. As to the need for a north monitoring well, Dr. Vagt tes-\\ntified that soil samples taken north of the plant (near the site\\nof an alleged potential additional source of TCE) detected lit-\\ntle to no TCE. Dr. Vagt concluded (and the IEPA agreed), that\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 21\\n\\nno additional testing was necessary. And Dr. Vagt conducted\\nsite visits, which led him to conclude that the groundwater\\nflowed south, not north, as Dr. Banaszak had hypothesized\\nbased on a conceptual site model. Additionally, Dr. Vogt ad-\\nvocated against drilling through the bedrock; he opined that\\nthe only conduit for contamination through the bedrock was\\nthe preexisting city well, and that any additional drilling\\ncould be harmful in that it could provide a new route for con-\\ntamination to travel through the bedrock.\\n The district court concluded that GE’s investigation into\\nthe presence of DNAPL, and the IEPA’s approval of the inves-\\ntigation, was not unreasonable. Because plaintiffs “merely of-\\nfer[ed] different conclusions about the data collected by [GE]\\nand the data they hope[d] to develop with additional investi-\\ngation and testing,” the district court found that plaintiffs had\\nnot met their burden to show that any additional testing for\\nDNAPL was necessary. The district court weighed the com-\\npeting expert testimony and found GE’s expert made reason-\\nable conclusions supported by facts; we see nothing in the\\ncourt’s factual findings that are clearly erroneous.\\n ii. Rock Creek\\n As to Rock Creek’s status as a groundwater divide, plain-\\ntiffs and GE again offered differing interpretations of the same\\ndata. Plaintiffs argued that the lone sample from the south\\nwell containing trace amounts of TCE evidences that contam-\\nination is flowing past Rock Creek. They further contended\\nthat the rest of the wells on the south of Rock Creek, which\\ndid not detect contamination, are not deep enough to\\nproperly measure contamination. GE, on the other hand,\\nmaintained that Rock Creek is a groundwater divide. The\\nIEPA required that GE install additional monitoring wells and\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\ntest the residential wells south of Rock Creek to confirm this\\nproposition. Dr. Vagt contrasted the contaminated samples\\nfrom the north side of Rock Creek with the lack of contamina-\\ntion from the south side wells; he testified that the single sam-\\nple from the south well with trace levels of contamination was\\nan outlier when compared with the lack of contamination in\\nthe six other monitoring wells and residential wells located in\\nclose proximity and at varying depths.\\n Weighing the competing expert testimony, the district\\ncourt found that plaintiffs had not offered any additional test-\\ning that would “seriously challenge the finding that Rock\\nCreek is a groundwater divide.” Again, we cannot conclude\\nthis conclusion is clearly erroneous.\\n iii. Vapor Intrusion\\n Lastly, the district court considered plaintiffs’ request for\\nvapor intrusion monitoring for the Conway home and the sur-\\nrounding residences. By the time of the evidentiary hearing,\\nplaintiffs had sold the Conway home. They agreed the court\\ndid not have the power to force access into the home for test-\\ning but asked the court to order GE to obtain consent from the\\nnew owners. They based this request on a 2012 test that de-\\ntected the compound 1,2 DCA in the indoor air in the Conway\\nhome at a level above the residential standard. After detecting\\nthis compound, however, GE took samples of the groundwa-\\nter and sub-slab under and around the Conway home, which\\ndid not reflect contamination. GE thus maintained that there\\nis no complete pathway between the source of the GE-site\\ncontamination and the indoor air in the Conway home, and\\nthat 1,2 DCA comes from a variety of sources unrelated to the\\nsite contamination (such as household cleaners). The IEPA\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 23\\n\\nagreed that, without a complete pathway, no additional test-\\ning was necessary.\\n The district court stated that it was “not in a position to\\nsecond guess the IEPA’s decision based on Plaintiffs’ discon-\\ntent with the decision.” Considering that plaintiffs no longer\\nown the Conway home and the court does not have authority\\nto force the new owners to consent to testing, as well as the\\nlack of a complete pathway from the site contamination to the\\nhome, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred.\\n * * *\\n While an injunction does not follow automatically from a\\nfinding of a risk of imminent and substantial endangerment—\\nas this case demonstrates—such a finding usually goes a long\\nway towards justifying an injunction. Here however, despite\\nthe district court’s admonition that it was looking for evi-\\ndence of harm requiring relief in addition to the IEPA action,\\nat no point did plaintiffs ever conduct their own investigation\\nto contradict GE’s test results. Rather, they continue to insist\\nthat irreparable harm is “self-evident” where there is contam-\\nination and criticize GE’s investigation, which had been con-\\nducted subject to the IEPA’s oversight and direction. As\\ndemonstrated by the two years it spent grappling with the in-\\njunctive relief questions, the district court understood it had\\nto “walk a fine line” between supplementing and supplanting\\nthe Consent Order. The court focused on the facts before it,\\ncommenting repeatedly that “facts matter,” and it provided\\nplaintiffs with numerous opportunities to present evidence\\nthat the state proceedings were not adequately protecting the\\npublic and the environment. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago\\nBridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining\\nthat ongoing remediation in independent proceedings may\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\njustify the denial of injunctive relief in the RCRA action); Ad-\\nkins, 644 F.3d 501–02 (“When this case finally addresses the\\nmerits, and if the [state environmental] actions have been re-\\nsolved by then, the federal court will be entitled to insist that\\nplaintiffs show how the resolution of those cases was not suf-\\nficient.”). In the end, plaintiffs could not present contradictory\\nfacts because they did not conduct any of their own investi-\\ngation. As the district court held, plaintiffs “have not pro-\\nvided the evidence necessary for this Court to second guess\\n[GE]’s Remedial Action Plan” and order relief in addition to\\nwhat the IEPA has already required.\\n Nevertheless, plaintiffs insist they are entitled to relief be-\\ncause they did not get what they wanted; they want more than\\nthe IEPA found adequate and will be satisfied with nothing\\nless than a mandatory injunction ordering GE to remove any\\ncontamination on their property. We sympathize with plain-\\ntiffs’ position—TCE is a dangerous contaminant and the cur-\\nrent plan leaves the contamination in place (though contained\\nand restricted from access). But, despite plaintiffs’ characteri-\\nzation, the RCRA is not a “cleanup” statute. See Meghrig, 516\\nU.S. at 483 (“[The] RCRA is not principally designed to effec-\\ntuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites ….”). Under the RCRA,\\nthe district court may “restrain” the handling of hazardous\\nwaste that “may present an imminent and substantial endan-\\ngerment to health or the environment,” or order actions that\\nmay be “necessary” to eliminate that danger. 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6972(a).\\n Here, the district court considered both parties’ expert\\npresentations and concluded that plaintiffs had not estab-\\nlished any additional actions were “necessary” to eliminate\\nthe danger. In spite of the district court’s multiple inquiries to\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 25\\n\\nplaintiffs’ expert as to what remedy he proposed the court or-\\nder, he did not make a recommendation, leaving the court\\nwithout guidance. Conversely, the court found GE’s explana-\\ntions for the actions it had taken to investigate and develop its\\nremediation plans “reasonable, rational and credible.” The\\nRCRA does not require a court-ordered cleanup where the\\ncourt has not found such action necessary to prevent harm to\\nthe public or the environment, especially where, as here, an\\nexpert the court found credible testified that additional\\ncleanup could cause further harm.\\n The district court did not abuse its discretion in conclud-\\ning plaintiffs had not carried their burden to establish manda-\\ntory injunctive relief was necessary under the RCRA.\\n B. Motion for Indicative Ruling and for Reconsidera-\\n tion\\n Next, plaintiffs contend the district court erred in denying\\ntheir motion for indicative ruling under Rule 62.1 and for re-\\nconsideration under Rule 60(b)(2). Relief under Rule 60(b) is\\n“an extraordinary remedy … granted only in exceptional cir-\\ncumstances.” Davis v. Moroney, 857 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir.\\n2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Bakery Mach. & Fabrica-\\ntion, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc., 570 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir.\\n2009)). We review the district court’s decision for abuse of dis-\\ncretion. Gleason v. Jansen, 888 F.3d 847, 851–52 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n A refresher of the timeline of events is necessary: Prior to\\nthe district court’s ruling on the motion for injunction, the\\nIEPA had denied GE’s initial Remedial Action Plan, which\\nproposed natural attenuation and institutional controls to ad-\\ndress the contamination. After the district court denied the in-\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\njunction in September 2017, plaintiffs dismissed their remain-\\ning claim with prejudice and filed a notice of appeal. In Octo-\\nber 2017, GE submitted a revised RAP to the IEPA, in which\\nGE proposed institutional controls as the sole method of re-\\nmedial action. Then, on March 2, 2018, the IEPA approved\\nGE’s revised RAP. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed a motion\\nfor indicative ruling under Rule 62.1(a)(3), which provides:\\n If a timely motion is made for relief that the\\n court lacks authority to grant because of an ap-\\n peal that has been docketed and is pending, the\\n court may: … state either that it would grant the\\n motion if the court of appeals remands for that\\n purpose or that the motion raises a substantial\\n issue.\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a)(3). In the motion, plaintiffs raised a sin-\\ngle basis for their requested relief: the IEPA’s approval of GE’s\\nrevised RAP. Plaintiffs asserted that the IEPA’s March 2, 2018\\napproval was newly discovered evidence supporting recon-\\nsideration of the denial of the injunction.3\\n Plaintiffs’ arguments fail for two reasons. First, the IEPA’s\\nMarch 2, 2018 approval of GE’s RAP is not “newly discovered\\nevidence” under Rule 60(b)(2). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2)\\n(“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or\\nits legal representative from a final judgment … for … newly\\ndiscovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could\\n\\n\\n 3 Although plaintiffs did not file a separate motion for relief from judg-\\n\\nment and failed to explain that they were seeking relief under Rule\\n60(b)(2) until their reply brief, the district court excused this omission and\\ntreated the Rule 62.1 motion as a joint motion for reconsideration under\\nRule 60(b)(2).\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 27\\n\\nnot have been discovered in time to move for a new trial un-\\nder Rule 59(b).”). Newly discovered evidence must have been\\nin existence at the time of the original judgment or pertain to\\nfacts in existence at the time of the judgment. Peacock v. Bd. of\\nSch. Comm’rs of City of Indianapolis, 721 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir.\\n1983) (per curiam). The district court did not abuse its discre-\\ntion in finding that neither the revised RAP submitted in Oc-\\ntober 2017 nor the IEPA’s March 2, 2018 approval existed at\\nthe time of its September 2017 judgment. Rather, they were\\nnew evidence that did not exist and thus could not have been\\ndiscovered at the time. Nor did the district court err in con-\\ncluding that the revised RAP did not pertain to facts in exist-\\nence at the time of judgment. To the contrary, the revised RAP\\nresponded to the IEPA’s questions and concerns, contained\\nnew information for the IEPA to consider, and included a new\\nproposed remedy.\\n Second, even if it were “newly discovered” evidence, the\\ndistrict court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the\\nIEPA’s approval of the revised RAP would not have changed\\nthe outcome. According to plaintiffs, the district court’s denial\\nof injunctive relief was predicated on the IEPA’s rejection of\\nGE’s initial RAP. For that reason, they claim that the IEPA’s\\nacceptance of the revised RAP that did not require any addi-\\ntional remedies is a basis upon which the district court should\\nhave reconsidered injunctive relief. In support, plaintiffs\\npointed to the district court’s statement that “[t]he IEPA’s ac-\\ntions, including the latest [RAP] rejection, is strong evidence\\nthat Plaintiffs’ injuries are being remedied in the parallel state-\\ncourt proceeding.” In denying the Rule 62.1 motion, however,\\nthe district court explained that plaintiffs misunderstood its\\nruling: “The [c]ourt merely used the IEPA’s most recent rejec-\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\ntion to highlight that the IEPA had been making well-rea-\\nsoned decisions under the Consent Order and had challenged\\nnumerous actions [GE] had taken ….” Noting that plaintiffs\\nwere using the approval of the revised RAP to make the same\\narguments the court had rejected throughout the case, the dis-\\ntrict court concluded that plaintiffs had not offered any newly\\ndiscovered evidence that would necessitate injunctive relief.\\n The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying\\nthe motions for indicative relief and for reconsideration.\\n C. State Law Tort Claims\\n Lastly, plaintiffs assert that the district court erred in\\ngranting summary judgment to GE on their state law claims\\nof nuisance, trespass, and negligence. We review a grant of\\nsummary judgment de novo, viewing the record in a light\\nmost favorable to the nonmoving party. Minerva Dairy, Inc. v.\\nHarsdorf, 905 F.3d 1047, 1053 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n In Illinois, the statute of limitations for tort claims for dam-\\nage to property is five years. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-205. It is\\nundisputed that, here, Lowell Beggs knew about the contam-\\nination of the golf course from the GE plant at the time he\\npurchased the property in 2007, but he did not file suit until\\nNovember 2013, more than five years later. Plaintiffs argue,\\nhowever, that GE is committing a continuous violation be-\\ncause it “is doing nothing to stop its contamination from mi-\\ngrating,” and that, under the continuing tort doctrine, the\\nfive-year statute of limitations does not bar their claims.\\n “[W]hen ‘a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury,\\nthe limitations period does not begin to run until the date of\\nthe last injury or the date the tortious acts cease.’” Brooks v.\\nRoss, 578 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Belleville Toyota\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 29\\n\\nv. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 770 N.E.2d 177, 190 (Ill. 2002)).\\nThe problem with plaintiffs’ argument is that the “continu-\\ning” action they allege is not that GE is continuing to release\\ncontaminants, but that the original contamination is continu-\\ning to migrate. However, “[a] continuing violation or tort is\\noccasioned by continuing unlawful acts and conduct, not by\\ncontinual ill effects from an initial violation.” Feltmeier v. Felt-\\nmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 85 (Ill. 2003); see Village of DePue v. Viacom\\nInt’l, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 2d 774, 779 (C.D. Ill. 2010) (continuing\\ntort doctrine did not apply where plaintiff’s allegations were\\nlimited to injury from water flowing from contaminated site\\nbecause tortious conduct had ceased when manufacturing at\\nsite ended years prior); Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Tang Indus., Inc.,\\n998 F.Supp. 889, 896–97 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (continuing tort doc-\\ntrine did not apply where defendant stopped dumping con-\\ntaminants years prior, “although the effects from [defend-\\nant]’s violations may be persisting”). The continuing migra-\\ntion plaintiffs allege is merely an ill effect from the original\\nviolation, not a continuing unlawful act.\\n Nor does plaintiffs’ assertion that GE retains possession of\\nthe plant and has mismanaged the remediation suffice as a\\ncontinuing injury. As the district court explained, application\\nof the continuing tort doctrine “turns on continuing conduct,\\nnot continuing ownership or continuing injury.” Compare Vil-\\nlage of DePue, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 779 (“merely owning the Site”\\nafter contamination insufficient for liability under continuing\\ntort doctrine), with City of Evanston v. Texaco, Inc., 19 F. Supp.\\n3d 817, 827–28 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (continuing tort doctrine ap-\\nplied “at least at the pleadings stage” where defendant’s un-\\nderground tanks allegedly continued leaking contaminants\\ninto the environment even though defendant no longer\\nowned the property). That GE retains possession of the plant\\n\\f30 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nis of no import where there is a lack of demonstrated contin-\\nuing unlawful conduct.\\n Because plaintiffs do not allege a continuing unlawful act\\nnecessary to invoke the continuing tort doctrine, we affirm the\\ngrant of summary judgment to GE on plaintiffs’ state law tort\\nclaims.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\\ndistrict court.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1160,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4596240,"string":"4,596,240"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jason GALLOWAY, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Jason Galloway"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1304"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Bauer, Kanne, Brennan\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1304\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nJASON GALLOWAY,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division.\\n No. 3:16-cr-00012-RLY-MPB-1 — Richard L. Young, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 4, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Jason Galloway pleaded guilty to\\npossessing ammunition as a felon. He now appeals his\\nsentence, raising an unpreserved argument that the district\\ncourt used an incorrect guideline range. We dismiss his\\nappeal, however, because in his plea agreement Galloway\\nwaived his appellate rights.\\n\\f2 No. 18-1304\\n\\n I.\\n On January 21, 2016, police officers responded to a domes-\\ntic violence 911 call from Galloway’s ex-wife in Evansville,\\nIndiana. The officers found Galloway a short distance from\\nhis ex-wife’s house and arrested him. A search incident to\\narrest yielded four bullets from his pant pocket. Galloway, a\\nconvicted felon, was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g)(1) by possessing a firearm (a revolver found at his\\nex-wife’s house) and ammunition (the bullets in his pocket).\\n Before trial, the parties reached an agreement in which\\nGalloway pleaded guilty to the ammunition count in\\nexchange for dismissal of the firearm count (among other\\nthings). The written plea agreement that Galloway signed\\ncontained the following appellate waiver, which we repeat in\\nfull because of its importance to this case:\\n 24. Direct Appeal: The defendant under-\\n stands that the defendant has a statutory right\\n to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed\\n and the manner in which the sentence was\\n determined. Acknowledging this right, and in\\n exchange for the concessions made by the Gov-\\n ernment in this Plea Agreement, the defendant\\n expressly waives the defendant’s right to appeal\\n the conviction imposed in this case on any\\n ground, including the right to appeal conferred\\n by 18 U.S.C. § 3742. The defendant further\\n agrees that in the event the Court sentences the\\n defendant to a sentence higher or lower than\\n any recommendation of either party, regardless\\n of the defendant’s criminal history category or\\n how the sentence is calculated by the Court,\\n\\fNo. 18-1304 3\\n\\n then the defendant expressly waives the\\n defendant’s right to appeal the sentence\\n imposed in this case on any ground, including\\n the right to appeal conferred by 18 U.S.C.\\n § 3742. This waiver of appeal specifically\\n includes all provisions of the guilty plea and\\n sentence imposed, including the length and\\n conditions [of] supervised release and the\\n amount of any fine.\\nPetition to Enter Plea of Guilty and Plea Agreement at ¶24,\\nECF No. 68.\\n The second sentence in the paragraph above explains\\nGalloway unconditionally waived his right to appeal his\\nconviction. With respect to sentencing issues, however, the\\nthird sentence conditions Galloway’s appellate waiver on a\\ndeviation by the district court from a recommendation made\\nby one of the parties.\\n At the change of plea hearing, the district court reviewed\\nthe language of the appellate waiver verbatim. The district\\ncourt also engaged in the following colloquy with Galloway:\\n THE COURT: Mr. Galloway, what this\\n paragraph tells us is that in exchange for\\n concessions made to you by the United States in\\n arriving at this plea agreement, if I accept the\\n plea agreement and sentence you pursuant to\\n the plea agreement, then you’ll be giving up or\\n waiving your right to appeal the conviction and\\n sentence in this case to a higher court. Is that\\n your understanding as well?\\n GALLOWAY: Yes, sir.\\n\\f4 No. 18-1304\\n\\n THE COURT: Did you discuss this with your\\n attorney?\\n GALLOWAY: Yeah, we did.\\n THE COURT: Is this all voluntary?\\n GALLOWAY: Yes.\\nFollowing this exchange, the district court accepted\\nGalloway’s guilty plea and set a date for sentencing.\\n The probation officer’s sentencing recommendation stated\\nGalloway’s guideline range would have been 130 to 162\\nmonths in prison, were it not capped by the 120-month\\nstatutory maximum. The government filed a sentencing\\nmemorandum asking the district court to give Galloway the\\nfull 120 months. Galloway did not file a sentencing memoran-\\ndum, nor did he lodge any written objections to the probation\\nofficer’s guideline calculations.\\n At sentencing, Galloway’s attorney told the court he had\\ndetermined, after reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines and\\napplicable case law, that “there was no way to make an objec-\\ntion to the probation officer’s findings” and that he believed\\nher guideline calculations were correct. Defense counsel did\\nargue the guideline range “clearly overstate[s] the events that\\ntook place that night and can and should be addressed by way\\nof a departure by this Court.” For its part, the government\\nreiterated its position that 120 months was the correct prison\\nterm.\\n After hearing argument, the district court sentenced\\nGalloway to 120 months in prison, three years of supervised\\nrelease, a $1,000 fine, and a $100 special assessment. The\\ndistrict court also informed Galloway that, in its opinion,\\n\\fNo. 18-1304 5\\n\\nGalloway had waived his appellate rights because the\\nsentence was “pursuant to the plea agreement” and “below\\nwhat the guidelines call for.” Galloway nevertheless appealed\\nthe sentence.\\n II.\\n A defendant may waive appellate rights through a plea\\nagreement, assuming such waiver is voluntary and knowing.\\nUnited States v. Worthen, 842 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2016)\\n(“Generally speaking, appeal waivers are enforceable and\\npreclude appellate review.”) (citing United States v. Sines, 303\\nF.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2002)); see also United States v. Malone,\\n815 F.3d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 2016). A written appellate waiver\\nsigned by the defendant will typically be voluntary and\\nknowing, and thus enforceable through dismissal of a subse-\\nquent appeal. United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 668 (7th\\nCir. 1999).\\n Here, Galloway does not dispute that he voluntarily and\\nknowingly agreed to the waiver in his plea agreement—a\\nsensible concession after his plea colloquy. Galloway instead\\nargues the waiver, according to its own terms, does not apply.\\nSee Garza v. Idaho, No. 17-1026, 2019 WL 938523, at *4 (U.S.\\nFeb. 27, 2019) (“As courts widely agree, a valid and enforcea-\\nble appeal waiver only precludes challenges that fall within\\nits scope.”) (internal punctuation marks and citation omitted);\\nsee also United States v. Chapa, 602 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nGalloway asserts the district court did not impose a “sentence\\nhigher or lower than any recommendation of either party”\\nbecause it followed the government’s recommendation for a\\n120-month prison term and he (allegedly) did not make any\\n“recommendation” whatsoever.\\n\\f6 No. 18-1304\\n\\n We interpret plea agreements—including appellate\\nwaivers contained within them—according to ordinary\\nprinciples of contract law. Malone, 815 F.3d at 370. Unambig-\\nuous terms must be given their plain meaning. Id. But we\\nconsider the parties’ reasonable expectations and construe\\nambiguous terms in the light most favorable to the defendant.\\nUnited States v. O’Doherty, 643 F.3d 209, 217 (7th Cir. 2011); see\\nalso United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n The language used in this appellate waiver is unusual.1 If\\nthe district court did not deviate from “any recommendation”\\nmade by either party regarding sentencing, then the waiver is\\nnot triggered. Thus, the viability of Galloway’s appeal relies\\non his premise that his lawyer’s sentencing arguments did not\\nconstitute a recommendation because they did not include a\\nspecific proposal for a certain length of incarceration. We see\\nno authority for such a restrictive interpretation of the term\\n“recommendation.”\\n True, sentencing recommendations often take the form of\\na requested term of imprisonment, which frequently includes\\na number or range of months. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York,\\n404 U.S. 257, 259 (1971) (government “recommended the max-\\nimum one-year sentence”); United States v. Peterson, 891 F.3d\\n296, 300 (7th Cir. 2018) (defendant filed a “recommendation”\\nasking “for a sentence of only one day time served”). But the\\nword “recommendation” (as used in the context of federal\\nsentencings) does not exclusively refer to a proposed length\\nof custody: other suggestions regarding the terms of a\\n\\n\\n 1 Counsel for both parties represented to the court at oral argument\\nthat, in their experience, the waiver language at issue is uncommon in\\nfederal plea agreements and perhaps a unique local practice.\\n\\fNo. 18-1304 7\\n\\ndefendant’s sentence count as well. See, e.g., United States v.\\nSmith, 906 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2018) (referring to proposed\\nsupervised release conditions as part of a “sentencing recom-\\nmendation”); United States v. Stochel, 901 F.3d 883, 887 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (calling proffered offense level calculations “sentencing\\nrecommendations”); United States v. Harris, 843 F.3d 311, 313\\n(7th Cir. 2016) (describing a joint “recommendation” regard-\\ning criminal history calculations); United States v. Morris, 836\\nF.3d 868, 869 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining a plea agreement\\nrequired the government “to make several specific sentencing\\nrecommendations” on different issues).\\n Although Galloway’s lawyer may not have spelled out the\\nnumber of months he proposed Galloway should spend\\nbehind bars, he unmistakably advocated for a\\nbelow-guideline sentence. He told the district court, “[T]he\\nfindings of the probation officer clearly overstate the events\\nthat took place that night and can and should be addressed\\nby way of a departure by this Court.” Defense counsel\\nconcluded his argument by saying, “While I agree the\\ncriminal history speaks for itself, I also think there’s a whole\\nlot more to this story and how this fit[s] together, and I do\\nthink Jason is an appropriate person for the Court to issue a\\ndeparture on.” Galloway’s lawyer’s comments can be read\\nonly as a request that the district court sentence Galloway to\\nsomething less than the 120-month statutory maximum. Such\\nstatements constitute a “recommendation” for purposes of\\nthe plea agreement. See Recommendation, BLACK’S LAW\\nDICTIONARY (10 ed. 2014) (“A specific piece of advice about\\nwhat to do, esp. when given officially.”); see also Recommend,\\nBALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (“To advise in\\nfavor of a course of action to be taken.”); Recommend,\\nWEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961)\\n\\f8 No. 18-1304\\n\\n(“[T]o mention or introduce as being worthy of acceptance,\\nuse, or trial.”).\\n To be sure, there exists a grey area between simple oral\\nadvocacy at a hearing and making a sentencing “recommen-\\ndation.” Compare United States v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 475 (7th\\nCir. 2016) (holding the government did not make a\\nrecommendation when describing the defendant’s conduct as\\n“horrific,” “egregious,” “aggravated,” etc.) with United States\\nv. Salazar, 453 F.3d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting the\\ngovernment may breach a commitment to recommend a\\nparticular sentence by “requesting a light sentence while\\nsimultaneously arguing forcefully that a defendant is\\nvicious”). But even if Galloway’s lawyer did not understand\\nhe was making a recommendation, this would not render the\\nterm “recommendation” ambiguous. Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA &\\nBRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 31–32 (2012) (distinguishing\\nambiguity from vagueness and noting “[a] word or phrase is\\nambiguous when the question is which of two or more\\nmeanings applies; it is vague when its unquestionable mean-\\ning has uncertain application to various factual situations”);\\nVesuvius USA Corp. v. American Commercial Lines LLC, 910 F.3d\\n331, 334 (7th Cir. 2018) (recognizing a term is not ambiguous\\nmerely because the parties disagree as to the proper interpre-\\ntation). Galloway’s interpretation proposes he could have his\\ncake and eat it too: defense counsel could advocate for a\\nbelow-guideline prison term so long as he avoided magic\\nwords triggering the appellate waiver. Such a strained\\ninterpretation of “recommendation” is not reasonable.\\n In short, the argument by Galloway’s lawyer asking the\\ndistrict court to depart from the guideline range qualifies as a\\n“recommendation” within the plain meaning of the plea\\n\\fNo. 18-1304 9\\n\\nagreement’s appellate waiver. Although the waiver language\\nused in this plea agreement is anomalous, that does not\\nrender Galloway’s voluntary and knowing waiver of his\\nappellate rights any less valid or enforceable. Cf. Williams, 184\\nF.3d at 669 (“[T]he fact that we could envision a more precise\\ncolloquy does not alone render this appeal waiver invalid.”).\\n III.\\n Because Galloway waived his appellate rights, we have no\\noccasion to reach his merits arguments. United States v.\\nJemison, 237 F.3d 911, 916 (7th Cir. 2001). This appeal is\\nDISMISSED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4373493/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4596240/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jason GALLOWAY, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1304\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nJASON GALLOWAY,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division.\n No. 3:16-cr-00012-RLY-MPB-1 — Richard L. Young, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 4, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Jason Galloway pleaded guilty to\npossessing ammunition as a felon. He now appeals his\nsentence, raising an unpreserved argument that the district\ncourt used an incorrect guideline range. We dismiss his\nappeal, however, because in his plea agreement Galloway\nwaived his appellate rights.\n\f2 No. 18-1304\n\n I.\n On January 21, 2016, police officers responded to a domes-\ntic violence 911 call from Galloway’s ex-wife in Evansville,\nIndiana. The officers found Galloway a short distance from\nhis ex-wife’s house and arrested him. A search incident to\narrest yielded four bullets from his pant pocket. Galloway, a\nconvicted felon, was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C.\n§ 922(g)(1) by possessing a firearm (a revolver found at his\nex-wife’s house) and ammunition (the bullets in his pocket).\n Before trial, the parties reached an agreement in which\nGalloway pleaded guilty to the ammunition count in\nexchange for dismissal of the firearm count (among other\nthings). The written plea agreement that Galloway signed\ncontained the following appellate waiver, which we repeat in\nfull because of its importance to this case:\n 24. Direct Appeal: The defendant under-\n stands that the defendant has a statutory right\n to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed\n and the manner in which the sentence was\n determined. Acknowledging this right, and in\n exchange for the concessions made by the Gov-\n ernment in this Plea Agreement, the defendant\n expressly waives the defendant’s right to appeal\n the conviction imposed in this case on any\n ground, including the right to appeal conferred\n by 18 U.S.C. § 3742. The defendant further\n agrees that in the event the Court sentences the\n defendant to a sentence higher or lower than\n any recommendation of either party, regardless\n of the defendant’s criminal history category or\n how the sentence is calculated by the Court,\n\fNo. 18-1304 3\n\n then the defendant expressly waives the\n defendant’s right to appeal the sentence\n imposed in this case on any ground, including\n the right to appeal conferred by 18 U.S.C.\n § 3742. This waiver of appeal specifically\n includes all provisions of the guilty plea and\n sentence imposed, including the length and\n conditions [of] supervised release and the\n amount of any fine.\nPetition to Enter Plea of Guilty and Plea Agreement at ¶24,\nECF No. 68.\n The second sentence in the paragraph above explains\nGalloway unconditionally waived his right to appeal his\nconviction. With respect to sentencing issues, however, the\nthird sentence conditions Galloway’s appellate waiver on a\ndeviation by the district court from a recommendation made\nby one of the parties.\n At the change of plea hearing, the district court reviewed\nthe language of the appellate waiver verbatim. The district\ncourt also engaged in the following colloquy with Galloway:\n THE COURT: Mr. Galloway, what this\n paragraph tells us is that in exchange for\n concessions made to you by the United States in\n arriving at this plea agreement, if I accept the\n plea agreement and sentence you pursuant to\n the plea agreement, then you’ll be giving up or\n waiving your right to appeal the conviction and\n sentence in this case to a higher court. Is that\n your understanding as well?\n GALLOWAY: Yes, sir.\n\f4 No. 18-1304\n\n THE COURT: Did you discuss this with your\n attorney?\n GALLOWAY: Yeah, we did.\n THE COURT: Is this all voluntary?\n GALLOWAY: Yes.\nFollowing this exchange, the district court accepted\nGalloway’s guilty plea and set a date for sentencing.\n The probation officer’s sentencing recommendation stated\nGalloway’s guideline range would have been 130 to 162\nmonths in prison, were it not capped by the 120-month\nstatutory maximum. The government filed a sentencing\nmemorandum asking the district court to give Galloway the\nfull 120 months. Galloway did not file a sentencing memoran-\ndum, nor did he lodge any written objections to the probation\nofficer’s guideline calculations.\n At sentencing, Galloway’s attorney told the court he had\ndetermined, after reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines and\napplicable case law, that “there was no way to make an objec-\ntion to the probation officer’s findings” and that he believed\nher guideline calculations were correct. Defense counsel did\nargue the guideline range “clearly overstate[s] the events that\ntook place that night and can and should be addressed by way\nof a departure by this Court.” For its part, the government\nreiterated its position that 120 months was the correct prison\nterm.\n After hearing argument, the district court sentenced\nGalloway to 120 months in prison, three years of supervised\nrelease, a $1,000 fine, and a $100 special assessment. The\ndistrict court also informed Galloway that, in its opinion,\n\fNo. 18-1304 5\n\nGalloway had waived his appellate rights because the\nsentence was “pursuant to the plea agreement” and “below\nwhat the guidelines call for.” Galloway nevertheless appealed\nthe sentence.\n II.\n A defendant may waive appellate rights through a plea\nagreement, assuming such waiver is voluntary and knowing.\nUnited States v. Worthen, 842 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2016)\n(“Generally speaking, appeal waivers are enforceable and\npreclude appellate review.”) (citing United States v. Sines, 303\nF.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2002)); see also United States v. Malone,\n815 F.3d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 2016). A written appellate waiver\nsigned by the defendant will typically be voluntary and\nknowing, and thus enforceable through dismissal of a subse-\nquent appeal. United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 668 (7th\nCir. 1999).\n Here, Galloway does not dispute that he voluntarily and\nknowingly agreed to the waiver in his plea agreement—a\nsensible concession after his plea colloquy. Galloway instead\nargues the waiver, according to its own terms, does not apply.\nSee Garza v. Idaho, No. 17-1026, 2019 WL 938523, at *4 (U.S.\nFeb. 27, 2019) (“As courts widely agree, a valid and enforcea-\nble appeal waiver only precludes challenges that fall within\nits scope.”) (internal punctuation marks and citation omitted);\nsee also United States v. Chapa, 602 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2010).\nGalloway asserts the district court did not impose a “sentence\nhigher or lower than any recommendation of either party”\nbecause it followed the government’s recommendation for a\n120-month prison term and he (allegedly) did not make any\n“recommendation” whatsoever.\n\f6 No. 18-1304\n\n We interpret plea agreements—including appellate\nwaivers contained within them—according to ordinary\nprinciples of contract law. Malone, 815 F.3d at 370. Unambig-\nuous terms must be given their plain meaning. Id. But we\nconsider the parties’ reasonable expectations and construe\nambiguous terms in the light most favorable to the defendant.\nUnited States v. O’Doherty, 643 F.3d 209, 217 (7th Cir. 2011); see\nalso United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2010).\n The language used in this appellate waiver is unusual.1 If\nthe district court did not deviate from “any recommendation”\nmade by either party regarding sentencing, then the waiver is\nnot triggered. Thus, the viability of Galloway’s appeal relies\non his premise that his lawyer’s sentencing arguments did not\nconstitute a recommendation because they did not include a\nspecific proposal for a certain length of incarceration. We see\nno authority for such a restrictive interpretation of the term\n“recommendation.”\n True, sentencing recommendations often take the form of\na requested term of imprisonment, which frequently includes\na number or range of months. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York,\n404 U.S. 257, 259 (1971) (government “recommended the max-\nimum one-year sentence”); United States v. Peterson, 891 F.3d\n296, 300 (7th Cir. 2018) (defendant filed a “recommendation”\nasking “for a sentence of only one day time served”). But the\nword “recommendation” (as used in the context of federal\nsentencings) does not exclusively refer to a proposed length\nof custody: other suggestions regarding the terms of a\n\n\n 1 Counsel for both parties represented to the court at oral argument\nthat, in their experience, the waiver language at issue is uncommon in\nfederal plea agreements and perhaps a unique local practice.\n\fNo. 18-1304 7\n\ndefendant’s sentence count as well. See, e.g., United States v.\nSmith, 906 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2018) (referring to proposed\nsupervised release conditions as part of a “sentencing recom-\nmendation”); United States v. Stochel, 901 F.3d 883, 887 (7th Cir.\n2018) (calling proffered offense level calculations “sentencing\nrecommendations”); United States v. Harris, 843 F.3d 311, 313\n(7th Cir. 2016) (describing a joint “recommendation” regard-\ning criminal history calculations); United States v. Morris, 836\nF.3d 868, 869 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining a plea agreement\nrequired the government “to make several specific sentencing\nrecommendations” on different issues).\n Although Galloway’s lawyer may not have spelled out the\nnumber of months he proposed Galloway should spend\nbehind bars, he unmistakably advocated for a\nbelow-guideline sentence. He told the district court, “[T]he\nfindings of the probation officer clearly overstate the events\nthat took place that night and can and should be addressed\nby way of a departure by this Court.” Defense counsel\nconcluded his argument by saying, “While I agree the\ncriminal history speaks for itself, I also think there’s a whole\nlot more to this story and how this fit[s] together, and I do\nthink Jason is an appropriate person for the Court to issue a\ndeparture on.” Galloway’s lawyer’s comments can be read\nonly as a request that the district court sentence Galloway to\nsomething less than the 120-month statutory maximum. Such\nstatements constitute a “recommendation” for purposes of\nthe plea agreement. See Recommendation, BLACK’S LAW\nDICTIONARY (10 ed. 2014) (“A specific piece of advice about\nwhat to do, esp. when given officially.”); see also Recommend,\nBALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (“To advise in\nfavor of a course of action to be taken.”); Recommend,\nWEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961)\n\f8 No. 18-1304\n\n(“[T]o mention or introduce as being worthy of acceptance,\nuse, or trial.”).\n To be sure, there exists a grey area between simple oral\nadvocacy at a hearing and making a sentencing “recommen-\ndation.” Compare United States v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 475 (7th\nCir. 2016) (holding the government did not make a\nrecommendation when describing the defendant’s conduct as\n“horrific,” “egregious,” “aggravated,” etc.) with United States\nv. Salazar, 453 F.3d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting the\ngovernment may breach a commitment to recommend a\nparticular sentence by “requesting a light sentence while\nsimultaneously arguing forcefully that a defendant is\nvicious”). But even if Galloway’s lawyer did not understand\nhe was making a recommendation, this would not render the\nterm “recommendation” ambiguous. Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA &\nBRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 31–32 (2012) (distinguishing\nambiguity from vagueness and noting “[a] word or phrase is\nambiguous when the question is which of two or more\nmeanings applies; it is vague when its unquestionable mean-\ning has uncertain application to various factual situations”);\nVesuvius USA Corp. v. American Commercial Lines LLC, 910 F.3d\n331, 334 (7th Cir. 2018) (recognizing a term is not ambiguous\nmerely because the parties disagree as to the proper interpre-\ntation). Galloway’s interpretation proposes he could have his\ncake and eat it too: defense counsel could advocate for a\nbelow-guideline prison term so long as he avoided magic\nwords triggering the appellate waiver. Such a strained\ninterpretation of “recommendation” is not reasonable.\n In short, the argument by Galloway’s lawyer asking the\ndistrict court to depart from the guideline range qualifies as a\n“recommendation” within the plain meaning of the plea\n\fNo. 18-1304 9\n\nagreement’s appellate waiver. Although the waiver language\nused in this plea agreement is anomalous, that does not\nrender Galloway’s voluntary and knowing waiver of his\nappellate rights any less valid or enforceable. Cf. Williams, 184\nF.3d at 669 (“[T]he fact that we could envision a more precise\ncolloquy does not alone render this appeal waiver invalid.”).\n III.\n Because Galloway waived his appellate rights, we have no\noccasion to reach his merits arguments. United States v.\nJemison, 237 F.3d 911, 916 (7th Cir. 2001). This appeal is\nDISMISSED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jason GALLOWAY, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1304\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nJASON GALLOWAY,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division.\\n No. 3:16-cr-00012-RLY-MPB-1 — Richard L. Young, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 4, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Jason Galloway pleaded guilty to\\npossessing ammunition as a felon. He now appeals his\\nsentence, raising an unpreserved argument that the district\\ncourt used an incorrect guideline range. We dismiss his\\nappeal, however, because in his plea agreement Galloway\\nwaived his appellate rights.\\n\\f2 No. 18-1304\\n\\n I.\\n On January 21, 2016, police officers responded to a domes-\\ntic violence 911 call from Galloway’s ex-wife in Evansville,\\nIndiana. The officers found Galloway a short distance from\\nhis ex-wife’s house and arrested him. A search incident to\\narrest yielded four bullets from his pant pocket. Galloway, a\\nconvicted felon, was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g)(1) by possessing a firearm (a revolver found at his\\nex-wife’s house) and ammunition (the bullets in his pocket).\\n Before trial, the parties reached an agreement in which\\nGalloway pleaded guilty to the ammunition count in\\nexchange for dismissal of the firearm count (among other\\nthings). The written plea agreement that Galloway signed\\ncontained the following appellate waiver, which we repeat in\\nfull because of its importance to this case:\\n 24. Direct Appeal: The defendant under-\\n stands that the defendant has a statutory right\\n to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed\\n and the manner in which the sentence was\\n determined. Acknowledging this right, and in\\n exchange for the concessions made by the Gov-\\n ernment in this Plea Agreement, the defendant\\n expressly waives the defendant’s right to appeal\\n the conviction imposed in this case on any\\n ground, including the right to appeal conferred\\n by 18 U.S.C. § 3742. The defendant further\\n agrees that in the event the Court sentences the\\n defendant to a sentence higher or lower than\\n any recommendation of either party, regardless\\n of the defendant’s criminal history category or\\n how the sentence is calculated by the Court,\\n\\fNo. 18-1304 3\\n\\n then the defendant expressly waives the\\n defendant’s right to appeal the sentence\\n imposed in this case on any ground, including\\n the right to appeal conferred by 18 U.S.C.\\n § 3742. This waiver of appeal specifically\\n includes all provisions of the guilty plea and\\n sentence imposed, including the length and\\n conditions [of] supervised release and the\\n amount of any fine.\\nPetition to Enter Plea of Guilty and Plea Agreement at ¶24,\\nECF No. 68.\\n The second sentence in the paragraph above explains\\nGalloway unconditionally waived his right to appeal his\\nconviction. With respect to sentencing issues, however, the\\nthird sentence conditions Galloway’s appellate waiver on a\\ndeviation by the district court from a recommendation made\\nby one of the parties.\\n At the change of plea hearing, the district court reviewed\\nthe language of the appellate waiver verbatim. The district\\ncourt also engaged in the following colloquy with Galloway:\\n THE COURT: Mr. Galloway, what this\\n paragraph tells us is that in exchange for\\n concessions made to you by the United States in\\n arriving at this plea agreement, if I accept the\\n plea agreement and sentence you pursuant to\\n the plea agreement, then you’ll be giving up or\\n waiving your right to appeal the conviction and\\n sentence in this case to a higher court. Is that\\n your understanding as well?\\n GALLOWAY: Yes, sir.\\n\\f4 No. 18-1304\\n\\n THE COURT: Did you discuss this with your\\n attorney?\\n GALLOWAY: Yeah, we did.\\n THE COURT: Is this all voluntary?\\n GALLOWAY: Yes.\\nFollowing this exchange, the district court accepted\\nGalloway’s guilty plea and set a date for sentencing.\\n The probation officer’s sentencing recommendation stated\\nGalloway’s guideline range would have been 130 to 162\\nmonths in prison, were it not capped by the 120-month\\nstatutory maximum. The government filed a sentencing\\nmemorandum asking the district court to give Galloway the\\nfull 120 months. Galloway did not file a sentencing memoran-\\ndum, nor did he lodge any written objections to the probation\\nofficer’s guideline calculations.\\n At sentencing, Galloway’s attorney told the court he had\\ndetermined, after reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines and\\napplicable case law, that “there was no way to make an objec-\\ntion to the probation officer’s findings” and that he believed\\nher guideline calculations were correct. Defense counsel did\\nargue the guideline range “clearly overstate[s] the events that\\ntook place that night and can and should be addressed by way\\nof a departure by this Court.” For its part, the government\\nreiterated its position that 120 months was the correct prison\\nterm.\\n After hearing argument, the district court sentenced\\nGalloway to 120 months in prison, three years of supervised\\nrelease, a $1,000 fine, and a $100 special assessment. The\\ndistrict court also informed Galloway that, in its opinion,\\n\\fNo. 18-1304 5\\n\\nGalloway had waived his appellate rights because the\\nsentence was “pursuant to the plea agreement” and “below\\nwhat the guidelines call for.” Galloway nevertheless appealed\\nthe sentence.\\n II.\\n A defendant may waive appellate rights through a plea\\nagreement, assuming such waiver is voluntary and knowing.\\nUnited States v. Worthen, 842 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2016)\\n(“Generally speaking, appeal waivers are enforceable and\\npreclude appellate review.”) (citing United States v. Sines, 303\\nF.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2002)); see also United States v. Malone,\\n815 F.3d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 2016). A written appellate waiver\\nsigned by the defendant will typically be voluntary and\\nknowing, and thus enforceable through dismissal of a subse-\\nquent appeal. United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 668 (7th\\nCir. 1999).\\n Here, Galloway does not dispute that he voluntarily and\\nknowingly agreed to the waiver in his plea agreement—a\\nsensible concession after his plea colloquy. Galloway instead\\nargues the waiver, according to its own terms, does not apply.\\nSee Garza v. Idaho, No. 17-1026, 2019 WL 938523, at *4 (U.S.\\nFeb. 27, 2019) (“As courts widely agree, a valid and enforcea-\\nble appeal waiver only precludes challenges that fall within\\nits scope.”) (internal punctuation marks and citation omitted);\\nsee also United States v. Chapa, 602 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nGalloway asserts the district court did not impose a “sentence\\nhigher or lower than any recommendation of either party”\\nbecause it followed the government’s recommendation for a\\n120-month prison term and he (allegedly) did not make any\\n“recommendation” whatsoever.\\n\\f6 No. 18-1304\\n\\n We interpret plea agreements—including appellate\\nwaivers contained within them—according to ordinary\\nprinciples of contract law. Malone, 815 F.3d at 370. Unambig-\\nuous terms must be given their plain meaning. Id. But we\\nconsider the parties’ reasonable expectations and construe\\nambiguous terms in the light most favorable to the defendant.\\nUnited States v. O’Doherty, 643 F.3d 209, 217 (7th Cir. 2011); see\\nalso United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n The language used in this appellate waiver is unusual.1 If\\nthe district court did not deviate from “any recommendation”\\nmade by either party regarding sentencing, then the waiver is\\nnot triggered. Thus, the viability of Galloway’s appeal relies\\non his premise that his lawyer’s sentencing arguments did not\\nconstitute a recommendation because they did not include a\\nspecific proposal for a certain length of incarceration. We see\\nno authority for such a restrictive interpretation of the term\\n“recommendation.”\\n True, sentencing recommendations often take the form of\\na requested term of imprisonment, which frequently includes\\na number or range of months. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York,\\n404 U.S. 257, 259 (1971) (government “recommended the max-\\nimum one-year sentence”); United States v. Peterson, 891 F.3d\\n296, 300 (7th Cir. 2018) (defendant filed a “recommendation”\\nasking “for a sentence of only one day time served”). But the\\nword “recommendation” (as used in the context of federal\\nsentencings) does not exclusively refer to a proposed length\\nof custody: other suggestions regarding the terms of a\\n\\n\\n 1 Counsel for both parties represented to the court at oral argument\\nthat, in their experience, the waiver language at issue is uncommon in\\nfederal plea agreements and perhaps a unique local practice.\\n\\fNo. 18-1304 7\\n\\ndefendant’s sentence count as well. See, e.g., United States v.\\nSmith, 906 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2018) (referring to proposed\\nsupervised release conditions as part of a “sentencing recom-\\nmendation”); United States v. Stochel, 901 F.3d 883, 887 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (calling proffered offense level calculations “sentencing\\nrecommendations”); United States v. Harris, 843 F.3d 311, 313\\n(7th Cir. 2016) (describing a joint “recommendation” regard-\\ning criminal history calculations); United States v. Morris, 836\\nF.3d 868, 869 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining a plea agreement\\nrequired the government “to make several specific sentencing\\nrecommendations” on different issues).\\n Although Galloway’s lawyer may not have spelled out the\\nnumber of months he proposed Galloway should spend\\nbehind bars, he unmistakably advocated for a\\nbelow-guideline sentence. He told the district court, “[T]he\\nfindings of the probation officer clearly overstate the events\\nthat took place that night and can and should be addressed\\nby way of a departure by this Court.” Defense counsel\\nconcluded his argument by saying, “While I agree the\\ncriminal history speaks for itself, I also think there’s a whole\\nlot more to this story and how this fit[s] together, and I do\\nthink Jason is an appropriate person for the Court to issue a\\ndeparture on.” Galloway’s lawyer’s comments can be read\\nonly as a request that the district court sentence Galloway to\\nsomething less than the 120-month statutory maximum. Such\\nstatements constitute a “recommendation” for purposes of\\nthe plea agreement. See Recommendation, BLACK’S LAW\\nDICTIONARY (10 ed. 2014) (“A specific piece of advice about\\nwhat to do, esp. when given officially.”); see also Recommend,\\nBALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (“To advise in\\nfavor of a course of action to be taken.”); Recommend,\\nWEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961)\\n\\f8 No. 18-1304\\n\\n(“[T]o mention or introduce as being worthy of acceptance,\\nuse, or trial.”).\\n To be sure, there exists a grey area between simple oral\\nadvocacy at a hearing and making a sentencing “recommen-\\ndation.” Compare United States v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 475 (7th\\nCir. 2016) (holding the government did not make a\\nrecommendation when describing the defendant’s conduct as\\n“horrific,” “egregious,” “aggravated,” etc.) with United States\\nv. Salazar, 453 F.3d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting the\\ngovernment may breach a commitment to recommend a\\nparticular sentence by “requesting a light sentence while\\nsimultaneously arguing forcefully that a defendant is\\nvicious”). But even if Galloway’s lawyer did not understand\\nhe was making a recommendation, this would not render the\\nterm “recommendation” ambiguous. Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA &\\nBRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 31–32 (2012) (distinguishing\\nambiguity from vagueness and noting “[a] word or phrase is\\nambiguous when the question is which of two or more\\nmeanings applies; it is vague when its unquestionable mean-\\ning has uncertain application to various factual situations”);\\nVesuvius USA Corp. v. American Commercial Lines LLC, 910 F.3d\\n331, 334 (7th Cir. 2018) (recognizing a term is not ambiguous\\nmerely because the parties disagree as to the proper interpre-\\ntation). Galloway’s interpretation proposes he could have his\\ncake and eat it too: defense counsel could advocate for a\\nbelow-guideline prison term so long as he avoided magic\\nwords triggering the appellate waiver. Such a strained\\ninterpretation of “recommendation” is not reasonable.\\n In short, the argument by Galloway’s lawyer asking the\\ndistrict court to depart from the guideline range qualifies as a\\n“recommendation” within the plain meaning of the plea\\n\\fNo. 18-1304 9\\n\\nagreement’s appellate waiver. Although the waiver language\\nused in this plea agreement is anomalous, that does not\\nrender Galloway’s voluntary and knowing waiver of his\\nappellate rights any less valid or enforceable. Cf. Williams, 184\\nF.3d at 669 (“[T]he fact that we could envision a more precise\\ncolloquy does not alone render this appeal waiver invalid.”).\\n III.\\n Because Galloway waived his appellate rights, we have no\\noccasion to reach his merits arguments. United States v.\\nJemison, 237 F.3d 911, 916 (7th Cir. 2001). This appeal is\\nDISMISSED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1161,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4596241,"string":"4,596,241"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Martha Conway v. General Electric Company"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1522"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Joel Martin Flaum\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\nLAJIM, LLC, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nGENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.\\n No. 13-cv-50348 — Iain D. Johnston, Magistrate Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 15, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 4, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-appellants purchased land\\nnear a former General Electric Company manufacturing plant\\nthat had operated for sixty years; the plant leached toxic\\nchemicals that seeped into the groundwater. The Illinois En-\\nvironmental Protection Agency filed suit under state law\\nagainst General Electric in 2004 and has been working with\\nthe company since then to investigate and develop a plan to\\naddress the contamination. In 2013, plaintiffs filed suit under\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nthe citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and\\nRecovery Act, seeking a mandatory injunction ordering Gen-\\neral Electric to conduct additional investigation into the scope\\nof the contamination and ordering the company to remove the\\ncontamination. The district court found the company liable\\nfor the contamination on summary judgment but denied\\nplaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief because, despite the\\nmany opportunities the court provided, plaintiffs did not of-\\nfer evidence establishing a need for injunctive relief beyond\\nwhat the company had already done in the state action. For\\nthe following reasons, we affirm.\\n I. Background\\n A. Statutory Scheme\\n The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”),\\n42 U.S.C. § 6901, et seq., “is a comprehensive environmental\\nstatute that governs the treatment, storage, and disposal of\\nsolid and hazardous waste.” Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S.\\n479, 483 (1996). The RCRA “is not principally designed to ef-\\nfectuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites or to compensate\\nthose who have attended to the remediation of environmental\\nhazards.” Id. Rather, the primary purpose of the RCRA “is to\\nreduce the generation of hazardous waste and to ensure the\\nproper treatment … of that waste which is nonetheless gener-\\nated, ‘so as to minimize the present and future threat to hu-\\nman health and the environment.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6902(b)).\\n The RCRA contains a citizen suit provision, which pro-\\nvides that “any person may commence a civil action” against\\n“any person” who has allegedly violated “any permit, stand-\\nard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 3\\n\\nwhich has become effective pursuant to this chapter,” or\\n“who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or\\npresent handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or dis-\\nposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an\\nimminent and substantial endangerment to health or the en-\\nvironment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1). Once the violation or po-\\ntential endangerment is shown, a district court “shall have ju-\\nrisdiction … to restrain any person who has contributed or\\nwho is contributing to the past or present handling, storage,\\ntreatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazard-\\nous waste” and “to order such person to take such other ac-\\ntion as may be necessary.” Id. § 6972(a).\\n B. Factual Background\\n 1. General Electric Plant in Morrison, Illinois\\n Defendant-appellee General Electric Company (“GE”) op-\\nerated a manufacturing plant in Morrison, Illinois from 1949\\nto 2010. To remove oil from the automotive and appliance\\nparts it manufactured, the plant used chlorinated organic sol-\\nvents, including trichloroethylene (“TCE”), perchloroethene\\n(“PCE”), and trichloroethane (“TCA”). These solvents are\\ntoxic and are regulated by federal and state environmental\\nagencies. GE used these solvents and stored them in degreas-\\ners located at the plant until 1994, when it switched to a soap-\\nlike solution to clean the parts.\\n In 1986, chlorinated solvents were detected in three mu-\\nnicipal supply wells that provided water to the City of Morri-\\nson, located several thousand feet southeast of the GE plant.\\nShortly thereafter, the Illinois Environmental Protection\\nAgency (“IEPA”) installed monitoring wells to analyze the\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\ngroundwater around the GE plant, which uncovered addi-\\ntional contamination. The IEPA completed a Phase I Remedial\\nInvestigation in 1987, which included sampling and analysis\\nof soil, water, and sediment. Based on the investigation, the\\nIEPA identified the GE plant as the source of the solvent con-\\ntamination.\\n In 1988, GE installed additional monitoring wells and an\\nair stripper to treat water pumped from one of Morrison’s\\nmunicipal wells to a level of contamination below the maxi-\\nmum contaminant level (“MCL”) so the city could continue to\\nuse the well as a source of drinking water; the other two mu-\\nnicipal supply wells were sealed. GE also conducted a Phase\\nII Remedial Investigation, which identified elevated concen-\\ntrations of solvents beneath the plant’s former degreasing op-\\nerations. Under the IEPA’s supervision, GE continued to sam-\\nple and monitor the groundwater in the monitoring wells and\\nsubmitted reports of the results to the IEPA.\\n In 1994, the IEPA required GE to conduct a Phase III Re-\\nmedial Investigation of the groundwater at and downgradi-\\nent from the plant. GE reported the results of the investigation\\nin 2001. According to the report, the solvents in the ground-\\nwater had decreased significantly by 2001, and the report\\nmodeled that the contaminants would naturally attenuate\\n(i.e., reduce) to concentrations below the MCL. Additionally,\\nthe report stated that Rock Creek was a natural groundwater\\ndivide that would prevent the contaminating solvents from\\nmigrating south from the GE plant across the creek. The re-\\nport concluded that the contamination did not pose a risk to\\nthe public because a City of Morrison ordinance prohibited\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 5\\n\\nthe use of groundwater as a source of drinking water and be-\\ncause GE’s air stripper at the remaining municipal supply\\nwell provided safe drinking water.\\n In response, however, the IEPA did not approve GE’s pro-\\nposal for natural attenuation of the contamination; instead,\\nthe IEPA concluded that active remediation of the site would\\nbe appropriate. The Illinois Attorney General commenced suit\\nagainst GE in 2004 under the Illinois Environmental Protec-\\ntion Act: for cost recovery (Count I), see 415 Ill. Comp. Stat.\\n5/22.2(f); to enjoin water pollution (Count II), see 415 Ill.\\nComp. Stat. 5/42(d)–(e); and to enjoin a water pollution haz-\\nard (Count III), see 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12(d). The state\\nsought to recover costs it had incurred as well as an injunction\\nrequiring that GE investigate the nature and extent of the con-\\ntamination and then perform remediation. In 2010, GE and Il-\\nlinois entered into a Consent Order in which GE agreed to\\nsubmit to the IEPA a series of reports, including: (1) “a work\\nplan to survey private wells, install additional monitoring\\nwells, and complete additional soil borings”; (2) “a Focused\\nSite Investigation Report (‘FSI’) summarizing the results of\\nthe work plan”; (3) “a Remedial Objectives Report to address\\nthe impact of the soil and groundwater contamination”; and\\n(4) “a Remedial Action Plan to meet the remediation objec-\\ntives within six years of the entry of the Consent Order.” Also\\nin 2010, the City of Morrison passed an ordinance prohibiting\\ngroundwater as a source of potable water and prohibiting the\\ninstallation of wells “to limit threats to human health from\\ngroundwater contamination.”\\n After approval of a work plan, GE installed monitoring\\nwells along Rock Creek. Then, in 2013, GE submitted its FSI\\ndetailing the data obtained from the various monitoring\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nwells; the report explained that the solvents had migrated\\nsouth of the plant and that the monitoring wells along Rock\\nCreek tested positive for contamination at levels above the\\nMCL. Tests from wells on the other side of Rock Creek (and\\nfurther from the plant) either did not detect chlorinated sol-\\nvents or detected TCE at a level below the MCL. Following\\ndiscussions between GE and the IEPA on the work plan and\\nFSI, the IEPA conditionally approved the FSI in March 2015.\\nIt determined that GE “adequately defined the nature and ex-\\ntent of the contamination.” The IEPA conditionally approved\\nGE’s revised Remedial Objectives Report in August 2016, after\\na number of additional submissions and a meeting between\\nthe technical representatives from GE and the IEPA.\\n In March 2017, GE submitted its Remedial Action Plan\\n(“RAP”) to the IEPA, proposing to achieve the remediation\\nobjectives through a “combination of institutional controls\\nand monitored natural attenuation.” The IEPA denied GE’s\\nproposal in June 2017, posing several questions about the\\nplan, and specifically noting that it did not accept “an open-\\nended period of monitored natural attenuation as a remedia-\\ntion technology.” GE submitted a revised RAP to the IEPA in\\nOctober 2017, responding to the IEPA’s questions and com-\\nments and proposing to address the remaining contamination\\nthrough institutional controls. The IEPA approved GE’s re-\\nvised Remedial Action Plan in March 2018.\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 7\\n\\n 2. Plaintiffs’ Interest in the Land\\n Plaintiff-appellant Lowell Beggs1 purchased land near the\\nsite of the shuttered GE plant in 2007. He conveyed the prop-\\nerty to plaintiff-appellant Prairie Ridge Golf Course, LLC,\\nwhich plaintiff-appellant LAJIM, LLC operated. Beggs moved\\ninto a home next to the golf course with his companion, plain-\\ntiff-appellant Martha Kai Conway (the “Conway home”). The\\ngolf course and Conway home are located south of the former\\nGE plant and downgradient from the plant.\\n When Beggs considered purchasing the golf course in\\nApril 2007, the seller advised him: “the golf course has con-\\ntamination on the first hole. This was caused by General Elec-\\ntric. If you go to the EPA web site, GE is listed as a superfund\\nsite. No further remediation was needed according to what I\\ncan find.” Beggs did not inquire further about the environ-\\nmental condition of the golf course before completing the pur-\\nchase in May 2007. The purchase agreement noted, “[S]eller []\\nhas disclosed to Purchaser that there is contamination on the\\nfirst hole of the Real Estate, such contamination having been\\ncaused by General Electric, as which contamination is part of\\nthe Superfund Site that apparently does not require any fur-\\nther remediation.” Additionally, Beggs walked the golf\\ncourse prior to completing the purchase and noticed a moni-\\ntoring well head protruding above the ground. After purchas-\\ning the property, Beggs contacted GE to fix a leak from the\\nfixture, which he knew monitored “how much stuff was com-\\ning out of GE.”\\n\\n\\n 1Beggs passed away during the course of this litigation. His interest\\nis now represented by the executor of his estate, plaintiff-appellant First\\nNational Bank of Amboy.\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\n C. Procedural Background\\n Plaintiffs filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois on\\nNovember 1, 2013 seeking: (1) a mandatory injunction requir-\\ning GE to remediate the contamination under the RCRA, see\\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (Count I); (2) cost recovery (Count II)\\nand a declaratory judgment (Count III) under the Compre-\\nhensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-\\nity Act (“CERCLA”), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(g)(3); and\\n(3) recovery under state law for nuisance (Count IV), trespass\\n(Count V), and negligence (Count VI).\\n After what the district court characterized as “extensive\\ndiscovery,” the court considered the parties’ cross-motions\\nfor partial summary judgment. Plaintiffs moved for summary\\njudgment on their RCRA claim. GE did not dispute that plain-\\ntiffs satisfied the first two elements of the claim—(1) defend-\\nant has generated solid or hazardous waste, and (2) defendant\\nhas contributed to the handling of the waste. See Albany Bank\\n& Tr. Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2002).\\nOn the sole remaining question—whether plaintiffs estab-\\nlished that the contamination “may present an imminent and\\nsubstantial danger to health or the environment,” id.—the dis-\\ntrict court found for plaintiffs and granted summary judg-\\nment as to GE’s liability under the RCRA. At plaintiffs’ re-\\nquest, the court deferred consideration as to whether plain-\\ntiffs were entitled to injunctive relief. On GE’s cross-motion\\nfor summary judgment on the state law claims, the district\\ncourt found the continuing tort doctrine did not apply and\\nfound the claims time-barred because plaintiffs had\\nknowledge of the claims more than five years before they filed\\nsuit.\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 9\\n\\n Over the next two years, the district court considered\\nplaintiffs’ request for a mandatory injunction in a number of\\nhearings and a series of opinions. On October 4, 2016, the\\ncourt held that the plain language of the RCRA permitted, but\\ndid not require, the court to grant injunctive relief despite the\\nongoing state proceeding; thus, the question before the court\\nwas not whether it could grant relief but whether it should. On\\nthis point, the court concluded plaintiffs had not yet provided\\nthe court with facts supporting their assertion that the Con-\\nsent Order in the state action was deficient and ineffective.\\nThe court ordered an evidentiary hearing and invited the\\nIEPA and the Illinois Attorney General to provide their views\\non the progress under the Consent Order and whether the\\ncourt should order injunctive relief under the RCRA. The Illi-\\nnois Attorney General’s Office submitted an amicus brief ex-\\nplaining that the State did not believe the court should impose\\ninjunctive relief because any court-ordered injunctive relief\\nwould overlap with the work currently being done—i.e., “site\\ninvestigation, monitoring and payment of costs as well as an\\norder barring further endangerment … [and] some type of re-\\nmedial effort.” The State asserted that all such actions were\\nalready underway and were “being done with diligence and\\nrigorous oversight by the Illinois EPA,” and that injunctive re-\\nlief “may result in a clean-up that is inconsistent with clean\\nups of other contaminated sites in Illinois.”\\n After two days of evidentiary hearing on June 1 and 2,\\n2017, the court issued an opinion on September 7, 2017 deny-\\ning the requested injunctive relief. Both parties had presented\\nexpert testimony at the hearing; the district court credited\\nGE’s expert as having “provided reasonable, rational and\\ncredible bases explaining why certain actions were taken and\\nothers were not,” whereas it found plaintiffs’ expert did not\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nprovide conclusions but merely “testified that additional in-\\nvestigation and testing was necessary to opine on the proper\\nscope of remediation for the site.” Notably, when asked by the\\ndistrict court judge what specific cleanup he recommended,\\nplaintiffs’ expert declined to make a recommendation. The\\ndistrict court thus concluded that plaintiffs had not met their\\nburden of showing harm not already addressed sufficiently\\nby the IEPA proceeding. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion\\nto reconsider the denial of injunctive relief on November 7,\\n2017. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the remaining count un-\\nder the CERCLA with prejudice and filed a notice of appeal\\non March 6, 2018.\\n Then, on March 23, 2018, plaintiffs filed a motion for an\\nindicative ruling under Rule 62.1 and motion to reconsider\\nbased on newly discovered evidence. Plaintiffs pointed to the\\nIEPA’s March 2, 2018 approval of GE’s Remedial Action Plan,\\nwhich relies solely on institutional controls to address the re-\\nmaining contamination. The district court denied plaintiffs’\\nmotion on August 14, 2018, and plaintiffs appealed. That ap-\\npeal was consolidated with plaintiffs’ original appeal; both\\nare jointly before us now.\\n II. Discussion\\n A. Injunctive Relief\\n Plaintiffs raise several issues related to the district court’s\\ndenial of injunctive relief: they assert (1) the district court did\\nnot have discretion to deny injunctive relief once it found GE\\nliable under the RCRA; (2) the district court erred in conduct-\\ning the traditional balancing of equitable factors for injunctive\\nrelief; and (3) the district court erred in finding plaintiffs failed\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 11\\n\\nto establish irreparable harm. Plaintiffs’ arguments on each is-\\nsue fail to carry the day. We note that the denial of injunctive\\nrelief after a district court has found a risk of imminent and\\nsubstantial danger to public health or to the environment\\nshould be rare. Here, however, plaintiffs failed to provide the\\ndistrict court with any evidence that injunctive relief, in addi-\\ntion to what the IEPA had already ordered in the state action,\\nwould improve the environment and not cause additional\\nharm.\\n 1. Discretion to Deny Relief\\n On summary judgment, the district court found GE liable\\nfor contaminating groundwater in a manner that “may pre-\\nsent an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or\\nthe environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). This finding has\\nnot been challenged on appeal. After finding GE liable, the\\ndistrict court then considered whether plaintiffs were entitled\\nto injunctive relief as a remedy for the violation. Plaintiffs as-\\nsert, however, that once the district court made a finding of\\nliability, the RCRA required the court to order injunctive re-\\nlief.\\n In analyzing whether the RCRA mandates the imposition\\nof injunctive relief upon a finding of liability, we first look to\\nthe plain language of the statute. See United States v. Marcotte,\\n835 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2016). The RCRA provides, in rele-\\nvant part:\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\n [A]ny person may commence a civil action on\\n his own behalf— …\\n (1)(B) against any person, … including any\\n past or present generator, past or present\\n transporter, or past or present owner or op-\\n erator of a treatment, storage, or disposal fa-\\n cility, who has contributed or who is contrib-\\n uting to the past or present handling, stor-\\n age, treatment, transportation, or disposal of\\n any solid or hazardous waste which may\\n present an imminent and substantial endan-\\n germent to health or the environment; ….\\n The district court shall have jurisdiction … to re-\\n strain any person who has contributed or who is\\n contributing to the past or present handling,\\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal\\n of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in\\n paragraph (1)(B), [or] to order such person to take\\n such other action as may be necessary ….\\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (emphasis added). As plaintiffs\\nacknowledge, this language authorizes injunctive relief—it\\nprovides the district court with jurisdiction to restrain a vio-\\nlator or to order other necessary action. But nothing in the lan-\\nguage mandates injunctive relief; “shall” pertains only to the\\ngrant of jurisdiction and not to the relief the district court may\\norder.\\n Nor do our past comments on the RCRA indicate injunc-\\ntive relief is mandatory upon a finding of liability. In Adkins\\nv. VIM Recycling, Inc., we considered whether the prohibitions\\nin the RCRA or several abstention doctrines precluded the\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 13\\n\\nplaintiffs from bringing a citizen suit under the RCRA after\\nthe state had already filed enforcement actions against the\\nsame alleged violators. 644 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2011). We\\nconcluded that neither the statutory language nor the absten-\\ntion doctrines prevented the Adkins plaintiffs from pursuing\\ntheir citizen suit. Id. Critically, we made clear that “[w]e [did]\\nnot suggest, of course, that once a citizen suit has cleared\\nRCRA’s statutory hurdles it is immune from all other consti-\\ntutional and preclusive doctrines, such as standing, mootness,\\nand claim or issue preclusion.” Id. at 503. In so stating, we ad-\\nvised courts to consider these doctrines before awarding re-\\nlief, thus evidencing that plaintiffs are not presumptively en-\\ntitled to injunctive relief once they have “cleared RCRA’s stat-\\nutory hurdles.”\\n Furthermore, the Supreme Court applies traditional equi-\\ntable principles to environmental statutes. For example, in a\\nFederal Water Pollution Control Act case, the Supreme Court\\nexplained that the statute did not require courts to immedi-\\nately enjoin all statutory violations; instead, the Court high-\\nlighted that long-established principles of equity applied:\\n It goes without saying that an injunction is an\\n equitable remedy. It is not a remedy which is-\\n sues as of course or to restrain an act the injuri-\\n ous consequences of which are merely trifling.\\n An injunction should issue only where the in-\\n tervention of a court of equity is essential in or-\\n der effectually to protect property rights against\\n injuries otherwise irremediable.\\nWeinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12 (1982) (cita-\\ntions and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Winter v.\\nNat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008) (“An injunction\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nis a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from suc-\\ncess on the merits as a matter of course.”) (reversing and va-\\ncating grant of injunction under National Environmental Pol-\\nicy Act); Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 648, 651 (2d\\nCir. 1989) (“In applying these general equitable standards for\\nthe issuance of injunctions in the area of environmental stat-\\nutes, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the notion that\\nan injunction follows as a matter of course upon a finding of\\nstatutory violation.”). The same principles apply to the\\nRCRA; the remedy of an injunction does not issue as a matter\\nof course upon a finding of liability but only as necessary to\\nprotect against otherwise irremediable harm.\\n Thus, the district court correctly held that it has discretion\\nto award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not required\\nto order relief after a finding of liability.\\n 2. Traditional Balancing of Equitable Factors\\n In a similar but distinct argument, plaintiffs assert that the\\ndistrict court erred in applying the traditional equitable fac-\\ntors when considering whether to award injunctive relief. To\\nmerit injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate:\\n (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;\\n (2) that remedies available at law, such as mon-\\n etary damages, are inadequate to compensate\\n for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance\\n of hardships between the plaintiff and defend-\\n ant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and\\n (4) that the public interest would not be dis-\\n served by a permanent injunction.\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 15\\n\\neBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).\\n Plaintiffs base their argument on their role in this citizen\\nsuit as private attorneys general, acting on behalf of the pub-\\nlic. They argue that it is common in environmental protection\\ncases for courts to order injunctive relief without the tradi-\\ntional balancing of equitable factors where the only statutory\\nrelief available is injunctive relief and where the plaintiff is a\\nsovereign or private attorney general. However, commenting\\ndirectly on the RCRA, we have reasoned that “[o]rdinarily, a\\ncourt is obligated to conduct an equitable balancing of harms\\nbefore awarding injunctive relief, even under an environmen-\\ntal statute which specifically authorizes such relief (as does\\nRCRA section 3008(a)).” United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,\\n38 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1994).\\n True, once a court finds a defendant liable for creating a\\nrisk of imminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the\\ncase that injunctive relief is warranted. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vil-\\nlage of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) (“Environmental in-\\njury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by\\nmoney damages and is often permanent or at least of long du-\\nration, i.e., irreparable.… [T]herefore, the balance of harms\\nwill usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the\\nenvironment.”). But that is not always the case. Courts must\\nconsider the traditional equitable factors, which appears to be\\nwhat the district court did here. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. One as-\\npect of the district court’s reasoning does, however, give us\\npause. Despite the previous finding that GE created a risk of\\nimminent and substantial harm, the district court stated at the\\nrelief stage that irreparable harm is an “essential require-\\nment” for injunctive relief and defined irreparable harm as\\n“both certain and great, not merely serious or substantial.” To\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nthe extent that language might be interpreted as requiring\\nRCRA plaintiffs to demonstrate harm above and beyond that\\nshown at the merits stage, the district court erred.\\n Multiple circuits have held that RCRA plaintiffs need only\\nshow “a risk of harm,” not “the traditional requirement of\\nthreatened irreparable harm,” to justify an injunction. United\\nStates v. Price, 688 F.2d 201, 211 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Attorney\\nGen. of Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 777 (10th\\nCir. 2009) (“Our prior case law indicates that under RCRA a\\nplaintiff need not ‘show proof of actual harm to health or the\\nenvironment’ to establish endangerment, but rather injunc-\\ntive relief is appropriate where there simply may be a risk of\\nharm.”); Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1356 (2d\\nCir. 1991) (quoting Price for the same proposition); United\\nStates v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984)\\n(same).\\n The standard adopted by our sister circuits makes sense,\\nespecially in the permanent injunction context. RCRA author-\\nizes only injunctive relief. Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 484. Accord-\\ningly, absent a permanent injunction, a prevailing RCRA\\nplaintiff will receive no remedy. The proven harm is, by defi-\\nnition, irreparable absent an injunction. See generally Walgreen\\nCo. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., B.V., 966 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir.\\n1992). A RCRA plaintiff either demonstrates irreparable harm\\nor fails to prove his or her case on the merits.\\n We reiterate, however, that a permanent injunction does\\nnot automatically follow from success on the merits. See Me.\\nPeople’s All. & Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471\\nF.3d 277, 296–97 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[I]n an environmental case,\\n[the court] should consider the balance of relevant harms be-\\nfore granting injunctive relief, even though the statute itself\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 17\\n\\nauthorizes such relief. … [I]t is true that a district court is not\\ncommanded, regardless of the circumstances, to issue an in-\\njunction after a finding of liability” under the RCRA.); United\\nStates v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329, 1360 (5th Cir.\\n1996) (“We find nothing in RCRA which, ‘in so many words,\\nor by necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s\\njurisdiction in equity.’” (quoting Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313)).\\nDistrict courts should apply the traditional equitable factors\\nto determine the necessity of injunctive relief.2\\n 3. Necessity of Injunctive Relief\\n Plaintiffs next claim the district court erred in denying in-\\njunctive relief because it found they failed to establish irrepa-\\nrable harm. We review a district court’s denial of injunctive\\nrelief for an abuse of discretion; we review its factual determi-\\nnations for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo, and\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 The unique procedural history of this case may also be a source of\\nplaintiffs’ confusion regarding the applicable standard. Here, the court\\nmade a liability finding—that the contamination “may present an immi-\\nnent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment,” 42\\nU.S.C. § 6972(a)—nearly two years before it denied the injunction. In find-\\ning GE liable under the RCRA, the district court agreed that there may be\\na risk of endangerment from the contamination. But in denying the injunc-\\ntion, the district court found that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate harm not\\nalready addressed in the state action. We do not see a conflict between the\\ndistrict court’s holdings on liability (which acknowledges the risk of harm)\\nand the injunction (which it denied for lack of evidence of unaddressed\\nharm).\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nwe give deference to the court’s balancing of the equitable fac-\\ntors. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State\\nDep’t of Health, 896 F.3d 809, 816 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n As an initial matter, we must address GE’s contention that\\nplaintiffs abandoned their request for remediation at the evi-\\ndentiary hearing, instead deferring to a request for additional\\ninvestigation prior to remediation. According to GE, plaintiffs\\nhave thus waived their claim to an injunction ordering reme-\\ndiation. We disagree. GE mischaracterizes plaintiffs’ position;\\nalthough plaintiffs’ expert at the evidentiary hearing testified\\nhe believed additional investigation was necessary to deter-\\nmine the extent of the contamination and the correspondingly\\nappropriate remedy, at no point did plaintiffs retreat from\\ntheir request for remediation. They reiterated that request in\\ntheir complaint, in their initial motion for an injunction, in ar-\\ngument at the evidentiary hearing, and in their motions for\\nreconsideration. Plaintiffs have not waived their request for\\nan injunction requiring GE to remediate the contamination.\\n Turning to plaintiffs’ argument regarding the irreparable\\nharm finding, we note that it is somewhat indirect. Rather\\nthan directly challenging the district court’s factual findings,\\nplaintiffs repeat their general assertion: There is contamina-\\ntion, therefore there is harm. And because there is harm, there\\nmust be an injunction. In oversimplifying the argument,\\nplaintiffs fail to grapple with the thoughtful and nuanced de-\\ncisions the district court made that led it to deny injunctive\\nrelief. In their request for an injunction, plaintiffs claimed ac-\\ntion under the RCRA was necessary because the Consent Or-\\nder and actions in the state proceeding were insufficient to\\nremedy their injury. For that reason, the district court in-\\nformed the parties repeatedly that it was looking for evidence\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 19\\n\\nof harm not already being addressed through the state pro-\\nceeding and for what exactly plaintiffs wanted the court to or-\\nder GE to do to address that harm.\\n At the evidentiary hearing, plaintiffs argued that the ex-\\ntent of the contamination had not been determined and that\\nthe IEPA’s analysis based on a limited investigation was\\nflawed; as such, their expert testified that additional investi-\\ngation was necessary before he could opine on the proper re-\\nmediation. Plaintiffs requested GE perform the following ad-\\nditional investigation: additional and deeper monitoring\\nwells, soil borings penetrating the bedrock, and vapor-intru-\\nsion monitoring to the extent necessary to (1) determine if a\\ndense non-aqueous phase liquid (“DNAPL”) is present and,\\nrelatedly, determine the vertical and horizontal extent of the\\ngroundwater contamination; (2) determine whether Rock\\nCreek is a groundwater divide, and if so, explain the presence\\nof contamination in the well across the creek; and (3) deter-\\nmine the source of and monitor the vapors present in the Con-\\nway home. Noting that many of these issues are interrelated,\\nthe district court considered the competing expert testimony\\npresented on each avenue of investigation.\\n Although plaintiffs do not directly challenge the district\\ncourt’s factual findings, we review those findings briefly to\\nhighlight the court’s thoroughness in evaluating the evidence\\n(or lack thereof) supporting plaintiffs’ request for injunctive\\nrelief. A district court’s finding of an expert witness’s credibil-\\nity is one of fact that we review for clear error. Madden v. U.S.\\nDep’t of Veterans Affairs, 873 F.3d 971, 973 (7th Cir. 2017). Clear\\nerror is a deferential standard of review that only merits re-\\nversal if “after reviewing the entire record, we are left with\\nthe firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nmade.” United States v. Ranjel, 872 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2017)\\n(quoting United States v. Marty, 450 F.3d 687, 689–90 (7th Cir.\\n2006)). “[I]n a case of dueling experts, as this one was, it is left\\nto the trier of fact, not the reviewing court, to decide how to\\nweigh the competing expert testimony.” Madden, 873 F.3d at\\n973–74 (alteration in original) (quoting Wipf v. Kowalski, 519\\nF.3d 380, 385 (7th Cir. 2008)).\\n i. DNAPL and Groundwater Contamination\\n Plaintiffs argued that GE’s testing was insufficient to de-\\ntermine whether a DNAPL is present. However, plaintiffs did\\nnot take any of their own samples or conduct any of their own\\ntests, despite their expert—Dr. Banaszak—testifying that\\ngroundwater sampling is not prohibitively expensive. In-\\nstead, Dr. Banaszak advocated that GE drill deeper soil bor-\\nings that penetrate the bedrock and that GE install additional\\nmonitoring wells north of the existing wells to determine if\\nthe groundwater traveled north and carried contamination\\nnorth of the plant. Based on his review of GE’s testing, Dr.\\nBanaszak concluded that the results did not show that the\\ncontamination plume “is stable or shrinking, which leaves the\\npossibility that a DNAPL exists.”\\n GE’s expert, Dr. Vagt, who has been the project director of\\nthe site since 2008, testified that additional investigation is un-\\nnecessary because the evidence demonstrates no DNAPL is\\npresent. He explained that the concentration of TCE in the\\nsamples has decreased over time, whereas, if a DNAPL were\\npresent, the TCE concentrations would have remained con-\\nstant. As to the need for a north monitoring well, Dr. Vagt tes-\\ntified that soil samples taken north of the plant (near the site\\nof an alleged potential additional source of TCE) detected lit-\\ntle to no TCE. Dr. Vagt concluded (and the IEPA agreed), that\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 21\\n\\nno additional testing was necessary. And Dr. Vagt conducted\\nsite visits, which led him to conclude that the groundwater\\nflowed south, not north, as Dr. Banaszak had hypothesized\\nbased on a conceptual site model. Additionally, Dr. Vogt ad-\\nvocated against drilling through the bedrock; he opined that\\nthe only conduit for contamination through the bedrock was\\nthe preexisting city well, and that any additional drilling\\ncould be harmful in that it could provide a new route for con-\\ntamination to travel through the bedrock.\\n The district court concluded that GE’s investigation into\\nthe presence of DNAPL, and the IEPA’s approval of the inves-\\ntigation, was not unreasonable. Because plaintiffs “merely of-\\nfer[ed] different conclusions about the data collected by [GE]\\nand the data they hope[d] to develop with additional investi-\\ngation and testing,” the district court found that plaintiffs had\\nnot met their burden to show that any additional testing for\\nDNAPL was necessary. The district court weighed the com-\\npeting expert testimony and found GE’s expert made reason-\\nable conclusions supported by facts; we see nothing in the\\ncourt’s factual findings that are clearly erroneous.\\n ii. Rock Creek\\n As to Rock Creek’s status as a groundwater divide, plain-\\ntiffs and GE again offered differing interpretations of the same\\ndata. Plaintiffs argued that the lone sample from the south\\nwell containing trace amounts of TCE evidences that contam-\\nination is flowing past Rock Creek. They further contended\\nthat the rest of the wells on the south of Rock Creek, which\\ndid not detect contamination, are not deep enough to\\nproperly measure contamination. GE, on the other hand,\\nmaintained that Rock Creek is a groundwater divide. The\\nIEPA required that GE install additional monitoring wells and\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\ntest the residential wells south of Rock Creek to confirm this\\nproposition. Dr. Vagt contrasted the contaminated samples\\nfrom the north side of Rock Creek with the lack of contamina-\\ntion from the south side wells; he testified that the single sam-\\nple from the south well with trace levels of contamination was\\nan outlier when compared with the lack of contamination in\\nthe six other monitoring wells and residential wells located in\\nclose proximity and at varying depths.\\n Weighing the competing expert testimony, the district\\ncourt found that plaintiffs had not offered any additional test-\\ning that would “seriously challenge the finding that Rock\\nCreek is a groundwater divide.” Again, we cannot conclude\\nthis conclusion is clearly erroneous.\\n iii. Vapor Intrusion\\n Lastly, the district court considered plaintiffs’ request for\\nvapor intrusion monitoring for the Conway home and the sur-\\nrounding residences. By the time of the evidentiary hearing,\\nplaintiffs had sold the Conway home. They agreed the court\\ndid not have the power to force access into the home for test-\\ning but asked the court to order GE to obtain consent from the\\nnew owners. They based this request on a 2012 test that de-\\ntected the compound 1,2 DCA in the indoor air in the Conway\\nhome at a level above the residential standard. After detecting\\nthis compound, however, GE took samples of the groundwa-\\nter and sub-slab under and around the Conway home, which\\ndid not reflect contamination. GE thus maintained that there\\nis no complete pathway between the source of the GE-site\\ncontamination and the indoor air in the Conway home, and\\nthat 1,2 DCA comes from a variety of sources unrelated to the\\nsite contamination (such as household cleaners). The IEPA\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 23\\n\\nagreed that, without a complete pathway, no additional test-\\ning was necessary.\\n The district court stated that it was “not in a position to\\nsecond guess the IEPA’s decision based on Plaintiffs’ discon-\\ntent with the decision.” Considering that plaintiffs no longer\\nown the Conway home and the court does not have authority\\nto force the new owners to consent to testing, as well as the\\nlack of a complete pathway from the site contamination to the\\nhome, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred.\\n * * *\\n While an injunction does not follow automatically from a\\nfinding of a risk of imminent and substantial endangerment—\\nas this case demonstrates—such a finding usually goes a long\\nway towards justifying an injunction. Here however, despite\\nthe district court’s admonition that it was looking for evi-\\ndence of harm requiring relief in addition to the IEPA action,\\nat no point did plaintiffs ever conduct their own investigation\\nto contradict GE’s test results. Rather, they continue to insist\\nthat irreparable harm is “self-evident” where there is contam-\\nination and criticize GE’s investigation, which had been con-\\nducted subject to the IEPA’s oversight and direction. As\\ndemonstrated by the two years it spent grappling with the in-\\njunctive relief questions, the district court understood it had\\nto “walk a fine line” between supplementing and supplanting\\nthe Consent Order. The court focused on the facts before it,\\ncommenting repeatedly that “facts matter,” and it provided\\nplaintiffs with numerous opportunities to present evidence\\nthat the state proceedings were not adequately protecting the\\npublic and the environment. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago\\nBridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining\\nthat ongoing remediation in independent proceedings may\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\njustify the denial of injunctive relief in the RCRA action); Ad-\\nkins, 644 F.3d 501–02 (“When this case finally addresses the\\nmerits, and if the [state environmental] actions have been re-\\nsolved by then, the federal court will be entitled to insist that\\nplaintiffs show how the resolution of those cases was not suf-\\nficient.”). In the end, plaintiffs could not present contradictory\\nfacts because they did not conduct any of their own investi-\\ngation. As the district court held, plaintiffs “have not pro-\\nvided the evidence necessary for this Court to second guess\\n[GE]’s Remedial Action Plan” and order relief in addition to\\nwhat the IEPA has already required.\\n Nevertheless, plaintiffs insist they are entitled to relief be-\\ncause they did not get what they wanted; they want more than\\nthe IEPA found adequate and will be satisfied with nothing\\nless than a mandatory injunction ordering GE to remove any\\ncontamination on their property. We sympathize with plain-\\ntiffs’ position—TCE is a dangerous contaminant and the cur-\\nrent plan leaves the contamination in place (though contained\\nand restricted from access). But, despite plaintiffs’ characteri-\\nzation, the RCRA is not a “cleanup” statute. See Meghrig, 516\\nU.S. at 483 (“[The] RCRA is not principally designed to effec-\\ntuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites ….”). Under the RCRA,\\nthe district court may “restrain” the handling of hazardous\\nwaste that “may present an imminent and substantial endan-\\ngerment to health or the environment,” or order actions that\\nmay be “necessary” to eliminate that danger. 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6972(a).\\n Here, the district court considered both parties’ expert\\npresentations and concluded that plaintiffs had not estab-\\nlished any additional actions were “necessary” to eliminate\\nthe danger. In spite of the district court’s multiple inquiries to\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 25\\n\\nplaintiffs’ expert as to what remedy he proposed the court or-\\nder, he did not make a recommendation, leaving the court\\nwithout guidance. Conversely, the court found GE’s explana-\\ntions for the actions it had taken to investigate and develop its\\nremediation plans “reasonable, rational and credible.” The\\nRCRA does not require a court-ordered cleanup where the\\ncourt has not found such action necessary to prevent harm to\\nthe public or the environment, especially where, as here, an\\nexpert the court found credible testified that additional\\ncleanup could cause further harm.\\n The district court did not abuse its discretion in conclud-\\ning plaintiffs had not carried their burden to establish manda-\\ntory injunctive relief was necessary under the RCRA.\\n B. Motion for Indicative Ruling and for Reconsidera-\\n tion\\n Next, plaintiffs contend the district court erred in denying\\ntheir motion for indicative ruling under Rule 62.1 and for re-\\nconsideration under Rule 60(b)(2). Relief under Rule 60(b) is\\n“an extraordinary remedy … granted only in exceptional cir-\\ncumstances.” Davis v. Moroney, 857 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir.\\n2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Bakery Mach. & Fabrica-\\ntion, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc., 570 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir.\\n2009)). We review the district court’s decision for abuse of dis-\\ncretion. Gleason v. Jansen, 888 F.3d 847, 851–52 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n A refresher of the timeline of events is necessary: Prior to\\nthe district court’s ruling on the motion for injunction, the\\nIEPA had denied GE’s initial Remedial Action Plan, which\\nproposed natural attenuation and institutional controls to ad-\\ndress the contamination. After the district court denied the in-\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\njunction in September 2017, plaintiffs dismissed their remain-\\ning claim with prejudice and filed a notice of appeal. In Octo-\\nber 2017, GE submitted a revised RAP to the IEPA, in which\\nGE proposed institutional controls as the sole method of re-\\nmedial action. Then, on March 2, 2018, the IEPA approved\\nGE’s revised RAP. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed a motion\\nfor indicative ruling under Rule 62.1(a)(3), which provides:\\n If a timely motion is made for relief that the\\n court lacks authority to grant because of an ap-\\n peal that has been docketed and is pending, the\\n court may: … state either that it would grant the\\n motion if the court of appeals remands for that\\n purpose or that the motion raises a substantial\\n issue.\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a)(3). In the motion, plaintiffs raised a sin-\\ngle basis for their requested relief: the IEPA’s approval of GE’s\\nrevised RAP. Plaintiffs asserted that the IEPA’s March 2, 2018\\napproval was newly discovered evidence supporting recon-\\nsideration of the denial of the injunction.3\\n Plaintiffs’ arguments fail for two reasons. First, the IEPA’s\\nMarch 2, 2018 approval of GE’s RAP is not “newly discovered\\nevidence” under Rule 60(b)(2). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2)\\n(“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or\\nits legal representative from a final judgment … for … newly\\ndiscovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could\\n\\n\\n 3 Although plaintiffs did not file a separate motion for relief from judg-\\n\\nment and failed to explain that they were seeking relief under Rule\\n60(b)(2) until their reply brief, the district court excused this omission and\\ntreated the Rule 62.1 motion as a joint motion for reconsideration under\\nRule 60(b)(2).\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 27\\n\\nnot have been discovered in time to move for a new trial un-\\nder Rule 59(b).”). Newly discovered evidence must have been\\nin existence at the time of the original judgment or pertain to\\nfacts in existence at the time of the judgment. Peacock v. Bd. of\\nSch. Comm’rs of City of Indianapolis, 721 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir.\\n1983) (per curiam). The district court did not abuse its discre-\\ntion in finding that neither the revised RAP submitted in Oc-\\ntober 2017 nor the IEPA’s March 2, 2018 approval existed at\\nthe time of its September 2017 judgment. Rather, they were\\nnew evidence that did not exist and thus could not have been\\ndiscovered at the time. Nor did the district court err in con-\\ncluding that the revised RAP did not pertain to facts in exist-\\nence at the time of judgment. To the contrary, the revised RAP\\nresponded to the IEPA’s questions and concerns, contained\\nnew information for the IEPA to consider, and included a new\\nproposed remedy.\\n Second, even if it were “newly discovered” evidence, the\\ndistrict court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the\\nIEPA’s approval of the revised RAP would not have changed\\nthe outcome. According to plaintiffs, the district court’s denial\\nof injunctive relief was predicated on the IEPA’s rejection of\\nGE’s initial RAP. For that reason, they claim that the IEPA’s\\nacceptance of the revised RAP that did not require any addi-\\ntional remedies is a basis upon which the district court should\\nhave reconsidered injunctive relief. In support, plaintiffs\\npointed to the district court’s statement that “[t]he IEPA’s ac-\\ntions, including the latest [RAP] rejection, is strong evidence\\nthat Plaintiffs’ injuries are being remedied in the parallel state-\\ncourt proceeding.” In denying the Rule 62.1 motion, however,\\nthe district court explained that plaintiffs misunderstood its\\nruling: “The [c]ourt merely used the IEPA’s most recent rejec-\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\ntion to highlight that the IEPA had been making well-rea-\\nsoned decisions under the Consent Order and had challenged\\nnumerous actions [GE] had taken ….” Noting that plaintiffs\\nwere using the approval of the revised RAP to make the same\\narguments the court had rejected throughout the case, the dis-\\ntrict court concluded that plaintiffs had not offered any newly\\ndiscovered evidence that would necessitate injunctive relief.\\n The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying\\nthe motions for indicative relief and for reconsideration.\\n C. State Law Tort Claims\\n Lastly, plaintiffs assert that the district court erred in\\ngranting summary judgment to GE on their state law claims\\nof nuisance, trespass, and negligence. We review a grant of\\nsummary judgment de novo, viewing the record in a light\\nmost favorable to the nonmoving party. Minerva Dairy, Inc. v.\\nHarsdorf, 905 F.3d 1047, 1053 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n In Illinois, the statute of limitations for tort claims for dam-\\nage to property is five years. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-205. It is\\nundisputed that, here, Lowell Beggs knew about the contam-\\nination of the golf course from the GE plant at the time he\\npurchased the property in 2007, but he did not file suit until\\nNovember 2013, more than five years later. Plaintiffs argue,\\nhowever, that GE is committing a continuous violation be-\\ncause it “is doing nothing to stop its contamination from mi-\\ngrating,” and that, under the continuing tort doctrine, the\\nfive-year statute of limitations does not bar their claims.\\n “[W]hen ‘a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury,\\nthe limitations period does not begin to run until the date of\\nthe last injury or the date the tortious acts cease.’” Brooks v.\\nRoss, 578 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Belleville Toyota\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 29\\n\\nv. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 770 N.E.2d 177, 190 (Ill. 2002)).\\nThe problem with plaintiffs’ argument is that the “continu-\\ning” action they allege is not that GE is continuing to release\\ncontaminants, but that the original contamination is continu-\\ning to migrate. However, “[a] continuing violation or tort is\\noccasioned by continuing unlawful acts and conduct, not by\\ncontinual ill effects from an initial violation.” Feltmeier v. Felt-\\nmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 85 (Ill. 2003); see Village of DePue v. Viacom\\nInt’l, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 2d 774, 779 (C.D. Ill. 2010) (continuing\\ntort doctrine did not apply where plaintiff’s allegations were\\nlimited to injury from water flowing from contaminated site\\nbecause tortious conduct had ceased when manufacturing at\\nsite ended years prior); Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Tang Indus., Inc.,\\n998 F.Supp. 889, 896–97 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (continuing tort doc-\\ntrine did not apply where defendant stopped dumping con-\\ntaminants years prior, “although the effects from [defend-\\nant]’s violations may be persisting”). The continuing migra-\\ntion plaintiffs allege is merely an ill effect from the original\\nviolation, not a continuing unlawful act.\\n Nor does plaintiffs’ assertion that GE retains possession of\\nthe plant and has mismanaged the remediation suffice as a\\ncontinuing injury. As the district court explained, application\\nof the continuing tort doctrine “turns on continuing conduct,\\nnot continuing ownership or continuing injury.” Compare Vil-\\nlage of DePue, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 779 (“merely owning the Site”\\nafter contamination insufficient for liability under continuing\\ntort doctrine), with City of Evanston v. Texaco, Inc., 19 F. Supp.\\n3d 817, 827–28 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (continuing tort doctrine ap-\\nplied “at least at the pleadings stage” where defendant’s un-\\nderground tanks allegedly continued leaking contaminants\\ninto the environment even though defendant no longer\\nowned the property). That GE retains possession of the plant\\n\\f30 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nis of no import where there is a lack of demonstrated contin-\\nuing unlawful conduct.\\n Because plaintiffs do not allege a continuing unlawful act\\nnecessary to invoke the continuing tort doctrine, we affirm the\\ngrant of summary judgment to GE on plaintiffs’ state law tort\\nclaims.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\\ndistrict court.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4373494/\", \"author_raw\": \"Joel Martin Flaum\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4596241/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Martha Conway v. General Electric Company\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\nLAJIM, LLC, et al.,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n v.\n\nGENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.\n No. 13-cv-50348 — Iain D. Johnston, Magistrate Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JANUARY 15, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 4, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-appellants purchased land\nnear a former General Electric Company manufacturing plant\nthat had operated for sixty years; the plant leached toxic\nchemicals that seeped into the groundwater. The Illinois En-\nvironmental Protection Agency filed suit under state law\nagainst General Electric in 2004 and has been working with\nthe company since then to investigate and develop a plan to\naddress the contamination. In 2013, plaintiffs filed suit under\n\f2 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\nthe citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and\nRecovery Act, seeking a mandatory injunction ordering Gen-\neral Electric to conduct additional investigation into the scope\nof the contamination and ordering the company to remove the\ncontamination. The district court found the company liable\nfor the contamination on summary judgment but denied\nplaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief because, despite the\nmany opportunities the court provided, plaintiffs did not of-\nfer evidence establishing a need for injunctive relief beyond\nwhat the company had already done in the state action. For\nthe following reasons, we affirm.\n I. Background\n A. Statutory Scheme\n The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”),\n42 U.S.C. § 6901, et seq., “is a comprehensive environmental\nstatute that governs the treatment, storage, and disposal of\nsolid and hazardous waste.” Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S.\n479, 483 (1996). The RCRA “is not principally designed to ef-\nfectuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites or to compensate\nthose who have attended to the remediation of environmental\nhazards.” Id. Rather, the primary purpose of the RCRA “is to\nreduce the generation of hazardous waste and to ensure the\nproper treatment … of that waste which is nonetheless gener-\nated, ‘so as to minimize the present and future threat to hu-\nman health and the environment.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.\n§ 6902(b)).\n The RCRA contains a citizen suit provision, which pro-\nvides that “any person may commence a civil action” against\n“any person” who has allegedly violated “any permit, stand-\nard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 3\n\nwhich has become effective pursuant to this chapter,” or\n“who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or\npresent handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or dis-\nposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an\nimminent and substantial endangerment to health or the en-\nvironment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1). Once the violation or po-\ntential endangerment is shown, a district court “shall have ju-\nrisdiction … to restrain any person who has contributed or\nwho is contributing to the past or present handling, storage,\ntreatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazard-\nous waste” and “to order such person to take such other ac-\ntion as may be necessary.” Id. § 6972(a).\n B. Factual Background\n 1. General Electric Plant in Morrison, Illinois\n Defendant-appellee General Electric Company (“GE”) op-\nerated a manufacturing plant in Morrison, Illinois from 1949\nto 2010. To remove oil from the automotive and appliance\nparts it manufactured, the plant used chlorinated organic sol-\nvents, including trichloroethylene (“TCE”), perchloroethene\n(“PCE”), and trichloroethane (“TCA”). These solvents are\ntoxic and are regulated by federal and state environmental\nagencies. GE used these solvents and stored them in degreas-\ners located at the plant until 1994, when it switched to a soap-\nlike solution to clean the parts.\n In 1986, chlorinated solvents were detected in three mu-\nnicipal supply wells that provided water to the City of Morri-\nson, located several thousand feet southeast of the GE plant.\nShortly thereafter, the Illinois Environmental Protection\nAgency (“IEPA”) installed monitoring wells to analyze the\n\f4 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\ngroundwater around the GE plant, which uncovered addi-\ntional contamination. The IEPA completed a Phase I Remedial\nInvestigation in 1987, which included sampling and analysis\nof soil, water, and sediment. Based on the investigation, the\nIEPA identified the GE plant as the source of the solvent con-\ntamination.\n In 1988, GE installed additional monitoring wells and an\nair stripper to treat water pumped from one of Morrison’s\nmunicipal wells to a level of contamination below the maxi-\nmum contaminant level (“MCL”) so the city could continue to\nuse the well as a source of drinking water; the other two mu-\nnicipal supply wells were sealed. GE also conducted a Phase\nII Remedial Investigation, which identified elevated concen-\ntrations of solvents beneath the plant’s former degreasing op-\nerations. Under the IEPA’s supervision, GE continued to sam-\nple and monitor the groundwater in the monitoring wells and\nsubmitted reports of the results to the IEPA.\n In 1994, the IEPA required GE to conduct a Phase III Re-\nmedial Investigation of the groundwater at and downgradi-\nent from the plant. GE reported the results of the investigation\nin 2001. According to the report, the solvents in the ground-\nwater had decreased significantly by 2001, and the report\nmodeled that the contaminants would naturally attenuate\n(i.e., reduce) to concentrations below the MCL. Additionally,\nthe report stated that Rock Creek was a natural groundwater\ndivide that would prevent the contaminating solvents from\nmigrating south from the GE plant across the creek. The re-\nport concluded that the contamination did not pose a risk to\nthe public because a City of Morrison ordinance prohibited\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 5\n\nthe use of groundwater as a source of drinking water and be-\ncause GE’s air stripper at the remaining municipal supply\nwell provided safe drinking water.\n In response, however, the IEPA did not approve GE’s pro-\nposal for natural attenuation of the contamination; instead,\nthe IEPA concluded that active remediation of the site would\nbe appropriate. The Illinois Attorney General commenced suit\nagainst GE in 2004 under the Illinois Environmental Protec-\ntion Act: for cost recovery (Count I), see 415 Ill. Comp. Stat.\n5/22.2(f); to enjoin water pollution (Count II), see 415 Ill.\nComp. Stat. 5/42(d)–(e); and to enjoin a water pollution haz-\nard (Count III), see 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12(d). The state\nsought to recover costs it had incurred as well as an injunction\nrequiring that GE investigate the nature and extent of the con-\ntamination and then perform remediation. In 2010, GE and Il-\nlinois entered into a Consent Order in which GE agreed to\nsubmit to the IEPA a series of reports, including: (1) “a work\nplan to survey private wells, install additional monitoring\nwells, and complete additional soil borings”; (2) “a Focused\nSite Investigation Report (‘FSI’) summarizing the results of\nthe work plan”; (3) “a Remedial Objectives Report to address\nthe impact of the soil and groundwater contamination”; and\n(4) “a Remedial Action Plan to meet the remediation objec-\ntives within six years of the entry of the Consent Order.” Also\nin 2010, the City of Morrison passed an ordinance prohibiting\ngroundwater as a source of potable water and prohibiting the\ninstallation of wells “to limit threats to human health from\ngroundwater contamination.”\n After approval of a work plan, GE installed monitoring\nwells along Rock Creek. Then, in 2013, GE submitted its FSI\ndetailing the data obtained from the various monitoring\n\f6 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\nwells; the report explained that the solvents had migrated\nsouth of the plant and that the monitoring wells along Rock\nCreek tested positive for contamination at levels above the\nMCL. Tests from wells on the other side of Rock Creek (and\nfurther from the plant) either did not detect chlorinated sol-\nvents or detected TCE at a level below the MCL. Following\ndiscussions between GE and the IEPA on the work plan and\nFSI, the IEPA conditionally approved the FSI in March 2015.\nIt determined that GE “adequately defined the nature and ex-\ntent of the contamination.” The IEPA conditionally approved\nGE’s revised Remedial Objectives Report in August 2016, after\na number of additional submissions and a meeting between\nthe technical representatives from GE and the IEPA.\n In March 2017, GE submitted its Remedial Action Plan\n(“RAP”) to the IEPA, proposing to achieve the remediation\nobjectives through a “combination of institutional controls\nand monitored natural attenuation.” The IEPA denied GE’s\nproposal in June 2017, posing several questions about the\nplan, and specifically noting that it did not accept “an open-\nended period of monitored natural attenuation as a remedia-\ntion technology.” GE submitted a revised RAP to the IEPA in\nOctober 2017, responding to the IEPA’s questions and com-\nments and proposing to address the remaining contamination\nthrough institutional controls. The IEPA approved GE’s re-\nvised Remedial Action Plan in March 2018.\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 7\n\n 2. Plaintiffs’ Interest in the Land\n Plaintiff-appellant Lowell Beggs1 purchased land near the\nsite of the shuttered GE plant in 2007. He conveyed the prop-\nerty to plaintiff-appellant Prairie Ridge Golf Course, LLC,\nwhich plaintiff-appellant LAJIM, LLC operated. Beggs moved\ninto a home next to the golf course with his companion, plain-\ntiff-appellant Martha Kai Conway (the “Conway home”). The\ngolf course and Conway home are located south of the former\nGE plant and downgradient from the plant.\n When Beggs considered purchasing the golf course in\nApril 2007, the seller advised him: “the golf course has con-\ntamination on the first hole. This was caused by General Elec-\ntric. If you go to the EPA web site, GE is listed as a superfund\nsite. No further remediation was needed according to what I\ncan find.” Beggs did not inquire further about the environ-\nmental condition of the golf course before completing the pur-\nchase in May 2007. The purchase agreement noted, “[S]eller []\nhas disclosed to Purchaser that there is contamination on the\nfirst hole of the Real Estate, such contamination having been\ncaused by General Electric, as which contamination is part of\nthe Superfund Site that apparently does not require any fur-\nther remediation.” Additionally, Beggs walked the golf\ncourse prior to completing the purchase and noticed a moni-\ntoring well head protruding above the ground. After purchas-\ning the property, Beggs contacted GE to fix a leak from the\nfixture, which he knew monitored “how much stuff was com-\ning out of GE.”\n\n\n 1Beggs passed away during the course of this litigation. His interest\nis now represented by the executor of his estate, plaintiff-appellant First\nNational Bank of Amboy.\n\f8 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\n C. Procedural Background\n Plaintiffs filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois on\nNovember 1, 2013 seeking: (1) a mandatory injunction requir-\ning GE to remediate the contamination under the RCRA, see\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (Count I); (2) cost recovery (Count II)\nand a declaratory judgment (Count III) under the Compre-\nhensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-\nity Act (“CERCLA”), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(g)(3); and\n(3) recovery under state law for nuisance (Count IV), trespass\n(Count V), and negligence (Count VI).\n After what the district court characterized as “extensive\ndiscovery,” the court considered the parties’ cross-motions\nfor partial summary judgment. Plaintiffs moved for summary\njudgment on their RCRA claim. GE did not dispute that plain-\ntiffs satisfied the first two elements of the claim—(1) defend-\nant has generated solid or hazardous waste, and (2) defendant\nhas contributed to the handling of the waste. See Albany Bank\n& Tr. Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2002).\nOn the sole remaining question—whether plaintiffs estab-\nlished that the contamination “may present an imminent and\nsubstantial danger to health or the environment,” id.—the dis-\ntrict court found for plaintiffs and granted summary judg-\nment as to GE’s liability under the RCRA. At plaintiffs’ re-\nquest, the court deferred consideration as to whether plain-\ntiffs were entitled to injunctive relief. On GE’s cross-motion\nfor summary judgment on the state law claims, the district\ncourt found the continuing tort doctrine did not apply and\nfound the claims time-barred because plaintiffs had\nknowledge of the claims more than five years before they filed\nsuit.\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 9\n\n Over the next two years, the district court considered\nplaintiffs’ request for a mandatory injunction in a number of\nhearings and a series of opinions. On October 4, 2016, the\ncourt held that the plain language of the RCRA permitted, but\ndid not require, the court to grant injunctive relief despite the\nongoing state proceeding; thus, the question before the court\nwas not whether it could grant relief but whether it should. On\nthis point, the court concluded plaintiffs had not yet provided\nthe court with facts supporting their assertion that the Con-\nsent Order in the state action was deficient and ineffective.\nThe court ordered an evidentiary hearing and invited the\nIEPA and the Illinois Attorney General to provide their views\non the progress under the Consent Order and whether the\ncourt should order injunctive relief under the RCRA. The Illi-\nnois Attorney General’s Office submitted an amicus brief ex-\nplaining that the State did not believe the court should impose\ninjunctive relief because any court-ordered injunctive relief\nwould overlap with the work currently being done—i.e., “site\ninvestigation, monitoring and payment of costs as well as an\norder barring further endangerment … [and] some type of re-\nmedial effort.” The State asserted that all such actions were\nalready underway and were “being done with diligence and\nrigorous oversight by the Illinois EPA,” and that injunctive re-\nlief “may result in a clean-up that is inconsistent with clean\nups of other contaminated sites in Illinois.”\n After two days of evidentiary hearing on June 1 and 2,\n2017, the court issued an opinion on September 7, 2017 deny-\ning the requested injunctive relief. Both parties had presented\nexpert testimony at the hearing; the district court credited\nGE’s expert as having “provided reasonable, rational and\ncredible bases explaining why certain actions were taken and\nothers were not,” whereas it found plaintiffs’ expert did not\n\f10 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\nprovide conclusions but merely “testified that additional in-\nvestigation and testing was necessary to opine on the proper\nscope of remediation for the site.” Notably, when asked by the\ndistrict court judge what specific cleanup he recommended,\nplaintiffs’ expert declined to make a recommendation. The\ndistrict court thus concluded that plaintiffs had not met their\nburden of showing harm not already addressed sufficiently\nby the IEPA proceeding. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion\nto reconsider the denial of injunctive relief on November 7,\n2017. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the remaining count un-\nder the CERCLA with prejudice and filed a notice of appeal\non March 6, 2018.\n Then, on March 23, 2018, plaintiffs filed a motion for an\nindicative ruling under Rule 62.1 and motion to reconsider\nbased on newly discovered evidence. Plaintiffs pointed to the\nIEPA’s March 2, 2018 approval of GE’s Remedial Action Plan,\nwhich relies solely on institutional controls to address the re-\nmaining contamination. The district court denied plaintiffs’\nmotion on August 14, 2018, and plaintiffs appealed. That ap-\npeal was consolidated with plaintiffs’ original appeal; both\nare jointly before us now.\n II. Discussion\n A. Injunctive Relief\n Plaintiffs raise several issues related to the district court’s\ndenial of injunctive relief: they assert (1) the district court did\nnot have discretion to deny injunctive relief once it found GE\nliable under the RCRA; (2) the district court erred in conduct-\ning the traditional balancing of equitable factors for injunctive\nrelief; and (3) the district court erred in finding plaintiffs failed\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 11\n\nto establish irreparable harm. Plaintiffs’ arguments on each is-\nsue fail to carry the day. We note that the denial of injunctive\nrelief after a district court has found a risk of imminent and\nsubstantial danger to public health or to the environment\nshould be rare. Here, however, plaintiffs failed to provide the\ndistrict court with any evidence that injunctive relief, in addi-\ntion to what the IEPA had already ordered in the state action,\nwould improve the environment and not cause additional\nharm.\n 1. Discretion to Deny Relief\n On summary judgment, the district court found GE liable\nfor contaminating groundwater in a manner that “may pre-\nsent an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or\nthe environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). This finding has\nnot been challenged on appeal. After finding GE liable, the\ndistrict court then considered whether plaintiffs were entitled\nto injunctive relief as a remedy for the violation. Plaintiffs as-\nsert, however, that once the district court made a finding of\nliability, the RCRA required the court to order injunctive re-\nlief.\n In analyzing whether the RCRA mandates the imposition\nof injunctive relief upon a finding of liability, we first look to\nthe plain language of the statute. See United States v. Marcotte,\n835 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2016). The RCRA provides, in rele-\nvant part:\n\f12 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\n [A]ny person may commence a civil action on\n his own behalf— …\n (1)(B) against any person, … including any\n past or present generator, past or present\n transporter, or past or present owner or op-\n erator of a treatment, storage, or disposal fa-\n cility, who has contributed or who is contrib-\n uting to the past or present handling, stor-\n age, treatment, transportation, or disposal of\n any solid or hazardous waste which may\n present an imminent and substantial endan-\n germent to health or the environment; ….\n The district court shall have jurisdiction … to re-\n strain any person who has contributed or who is\n contributing to the past or present handling,\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal\n of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in\n paragraph (1)(B), [or] to order such person to take\n such other action as may be necessary ….\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (emphasis added). As plaintiffs\nacknowledge, this language authorizes injunctive relief—it\nprovides the district court with jurisdiction to restrain a vio-\nlator or to order other necessary action. But nothing in the lan-\nguage mandates injunctive relief; “shall” pertains only to the\ngrant of jurisdiction and not to the relief the district court may\norder.\n Nor do our past comments on the RCRA indicate injunc-\ntive relief is mandatory upon a finding of liability. In Adkins\nv. VIM Recycling, Inc., we considered whether the prohibitions\nin the RCRA or several abstention doctrines precluded the\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 13\n\nplaintiffs from bringing a citizen suit under the RCRA after\nthe state had already filed enforcement actions against the\nsame alleged violators. 644 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2011). We\nconcluded that neither the statutory language nor the absten-\ntion doctrines prevented the Adkins plaintiffs from pursuing\ntheir citizen suit. Id. Critically, we made clear that “[w]e [did]\nnot suggest, of course, that once a citizen suit has cleared\nRCRA’s statutory hurdles it is immune from all other consti-\ntutional and preclusive doctrines, such as standing, mootness,\nand claim or issue preclusion.” Id. at 503. In so stating, we ad-\nvised courts to consider these doctrines before awarding re-\nlief, thus evidencing that plaintiffs are not presumptively en-\ntitled to injunctive relief once they have “cleared RCRA’s stat-\nutory hurdles.”\n Furthermore, the Supreme Court applies traditional equi-\ntable principles to environmental statutes. For example, in a\nFederal Water Pollution Control Act case, the Supreme Court\nexplained that the statute did not require courts to immedi-\nately enjoin all statutory violations; instead, the Court high-\nlighted that long-established principles of equity applied:\n It goes without saying that an injunction is an\n equitable remedy. It is not a remedy which is-\n sues as of course or to restrain an act the injuri-\n ous consequences of which are merely trifling.\n An injunction should issue only where the in-\n tervention of a court of equity is essential in or-\n der effectually to protect property rights against\n injuries otherwise irremediable.\nWeinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12 (1982) (cita-\ntions and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Winter v.\nNat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008) (“An injunction\n\f14 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\nis a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from suc-\ncess on the merits as a matter of course.”) (reversing and va-\ncating grant of injunction under National Environmental Pol-\nicy Act); Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 648, 651 (2d\nCir. 1989) (“In applying these general equitable standards for\nthe issuance of injunctions in the area of environmental stat-\nutes, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the notion that\nan injunction follows as a matter of course upon a finding of\nstatutory violation.”). The same principles apply to the\nRCRA; the remedy of an injunction does not issue as a matter\nof course upon a finding of liability but only as necessary to\nprotect against otherwise irremediable harm.\n Thus, the district court correctly held that it has discretion\nto award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not required\nto order relief after a finding of liability.\n 2. Traditional Balancing of Equitable Factors\n In a similar but distinct argument, plaintiffs assert that the\ndistrict court erred in applying the traditional equitable fac-\ntors when considering whether to award injunctive relief. To\nmerit injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate:\n (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;\n (2) that remedies available at law, such as mon-\n etary damages, are inadequate to compensate\n for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance\n of hardships between the plaintiff and defend-\n ant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and\n (4) that the public interest would not be dis-\n served by a permanent injunction.\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 15\n\neBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).\n Plaintiffs base their argument on their role in this citizen\nsuit as private attorneys general, acting on behalf of the pub-\nlic. They argue that it is common in environmental protection\ncases for courts to order injunctive relief without the tradi-\ntional balancing of equitable factors where the only statutory\nrelief available is injunctive relief and where the plaintiff is a\nsovereign or private attorney general. However, commenting\ndirectly on the RCRA, we have reasoned that “[o]rdinarily, a\ncourt is obligated to conduct an equitable balancing of harms\nbefore awarding injunctive relief, even under an environmen-\ntal statute which specifically authorizes such relief (as does\nRCRA section 3008(a)).” United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,\n38 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1994).\n True, once a court finds a defendant liable for creating a\nrisk of imminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the\ncase that injunctive relief is warranted. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vil-\nlage of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) (“Environmental in-\njury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by\nmoney damages and is often permanent or at least of long du-\nration, i.e., irreparable.… [T]herefore, the balance of harms\nwill usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the\nenvironment.”). But that is not always the case. Courts must\nconsider the traditional equitable factors, which appears to be\nwhat the district court did here. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. One as-\npect of the district court’s reasoning does, however, give us\npause. Despite the previous finding that GE created a risk of\nimminent and substantial harm, the district court stated at the\nrelief stage that irreparable harm is an “essential require-\nment” for injunctive relief and defined irreparable harm as\n“both certain and great, not merely serious or substantial.” To\n\f16 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\nthe extent that language might be interpreted as requiring\nRCRA plaintiffs to demonstrate harm above and beyond that\nshown at the merits stage, the district court erred.\n Multiple circuits have held that RCRA plaintiffs need only\nshow “a risk of harm,” not “the traditional requirement of\nthreatened irreparable harm,” to justify an injunction. United\nStates v. Price, 688 F.2d 201, 211 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Attorney\nGen. of Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 777 (10th\nCir. 2009) (“Our prior case law indicates that under RCRA a\nplaintiff need not ‘show proof of actual harm to health or the\nenvironment’ to establish endangerment, but rather injunc-\ntive relief is appropriate where there simply may be a risk of\nharm.”); Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1356 (2d\nCir. 1991) (quoting Price for the same proposition); United\nStates v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984)\n(same).\n The standard adopted by our sister circuits makes sense,\nespecially in the permanent injunction context. RCRA author-\nizes only injunctive relief. Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 484. Accord-\ningly, absent a permanent injunction, a prevailing RCRA\nplaintiff will receive no remedy. The proven harm is, by defi-\nnition, irreparable absent an injunction. See generally Walgreen\nCo. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., B.V., 966 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir.\n1992). A RCRA plaintiff either demonstrates irreparable harm\nor fails to prove his or her case on the merits.\n We reiterate, however, that a permanent injunction does\nnot automatically follow from success on the merits. See Me.\nPeople’s All. & Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471\nF.3d 277, 296–97 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[I]n an environmental case,\n[the court] should consider the balance of relevant harms be-\nfore granting injunctive relief, even though the statute itself\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 17\n\nauthorizes such relief. … [I]t is true that a district court is not\ncommanded, regardless of the circumstances, to issue an in-\njunction after a finding of liability” under the RCRA.); United\nStates v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329, 1360 (5th Cir.\n1996) (“We find nothing in RCRA which, ‘in so many words,\nor by necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s\njurisdiction in equity.’” (quoting Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313)).\nDistrict courts should apply the traditional equitable factors\nto determine the necessity of injunctive relief.2\n 3. Necessity of Injunctive Relief\n Plaintiffs next claim the district court erred in denying in-\njunctive relief because it found they failed to establish irrepa-\nrable harm. We review a district court’s denial of injunctive\nrelief for an abuse of discretion; we review its factual determi-\nnations for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo, and\n\n\n\n\n 2 The unique procedural history of this case may also be a source of\nplaintiffs’ confusion regarding the applicable standard. Here, the court\nmade a liability finding—that the contamination “may present an immi-\nnent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment,” 42\nU.S.C. § 6972(a)—nearly two years before it denied the injunction. In find-\ning GE liable under the RCRA, the district court agreed that there may be\na risk of endangerment from the contamination. But in denying the injunc-\ntion, the district court found that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate harm not\nalready addressed in the state action. We do not see a conflict between the\ndistrict court’s holdings on liability (which acknowledges the risk of harm)\nand the injunction (which it denied for lack of evidence of unaddressed\nharm).\n\f18 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\nwe give deference to the court’s balancing of the equitable fac-\ntors. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State\nDep’t of Health, 896 F.3d 809, 816 (7th Cir. 2018).\n As an initial matter, we must address GE’s contention that\nplaintiffs abandoned their request for remediation at the evi-\ndentiary hearing, instead deferring to a request for additional\ninvestigation prior to remediation. According to GE, plaintiffs\nhave thus waived their claim to an injunction ordering reme-\ndiation. We disagree. GE mischaracterizes plaintiffs’ position;\nalthough plaintiffs’ expert at the evidentiary hearing testified\nhe believed additional investigation was necessary to deter-\nmine the extent of the contamination and the correspondingly\nappropriate remedy, at no point did plaintiffs retreat from\ntheir request for remediation. They reiterated that request in\ntheir complaint, in their initial motion for an injunction, in ar-\ngument at the evidentiary hearing, and in their motions for\nreconsideration. Plaintiffs have not waived their request for\nan injunction requiring GE to remediate the contamination.\n Turning to plaintiffs’ argument regarding the irreparable\nharm finding, we note that it is somewhat indirect. Rather\nthan directly challenging the district court’s factual findings,\nplaintiffs repeat their general assertion: There is contamina-\ntion, therefore there is harm. And because there is harm, there\nmust be an injunction. In oversimplifying the argument,\nplaintiffs fail to grapple with the thoughtful and nuanced de-\ncisions the district court made that led it to deny injunctive\nrelief. In their request for an injunction, plaintiffs claimed ac-\ntion under the RCRA was necessary because the Consent Or-\nder and actions in the state proceeding were insufficient to\nremedy their injury. For that reason, the district court in-\nformed the parties repeatedly that it was looking for evidence\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 19\n\nof harm not already being addressed through the state pro-\nceeding and for what exactly plaintiffs wanted the court to or-\nder GE to do to address that harm.\n At the evidentiary hearing, plaintiffs argued that the ex-\ntent of the contamination had not been determined and that\nthe IEPA’s analysis based on a limited investigation was\nflawed; as such, their expert testified that additional investi-\ngation was necessary before he could opine on the proper re-\nmediation. Plaintiffs requested GE perform the following ad-\nditional investigation: additional and deeper monitoring\nwells, soil borings penetrating the bedrock, and vapor-intru-\nsion monitoring to the extent necessary to (1) determine if a\ndense non-aqueous phase liquid (“DNAPL”) is present and,\nrelatedly, determine the vertical and horizontal extent of the\ngroundwater contamination; (2) determine whether Rock\nCreek is a groundwater divide, and if so, explain the presence\nof contamination in the well across the creek; and (3) deter-\nmine the source of and monitor the vapors present in the Con-\nway home. Noting that many of these issues are interrelated,\nthe district court considered the competing expert testimony\npresented on each avenue of investigation.\n Although plaintiffs do not directly challenge the district\ncourt’s factual findings, we review those findings briefly to\nhighlight the court’s thoroughness in evaluating the evidence\n(or lack thereof) supporting plaintiffs’ request for injunctive\nrelief. A district court’s finding of an expert witness’s credibil-\nity is one of fact that we review for clear error. Madden v. U.S.\nDep’t of Veterans Affairs, 873 F.3d 971, 973 (7th Cir. 2017). Clear\nerror is a deferential standard of review that only merits re-\nversal if “after reviewing the entire record, we are left with\nthe firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been\n\f20 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\nmade.” United States v. Ranjel, 872 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2017)\n(quoting United States v. Marty, 450 F.3d 687, 689–90 (7th Cir.\n2006)). “[I]n a case of dueling experts, as this one was, it is left\nto the trier of fact, not the reviewing court, to decide how to\nweigh the competing expert testimony.” Madden, 873 F.3d at\n973–74 (alteration in original) (quoting Wipf v. Kowalski, 519\nF.3d 380, 385 (7th Cir. 2008)).\n i. DNAPL and Groundwater Contamination\n Plaintiffs argued that GE’s testing was insufficient to de-\ntermine whether a DNAPL is present. However, plaintiffs did\nnot take any of their own samples or conduct any of their own\ntests, despite their expert—Dr. Banaszak—testifying that\ngroundwater sampling is not prohibitively expensive. In-\nstead, Dr. Banaszak advocated that GE drill deeper soil bor-\nings that penetrate the bedrock and that GE install additional\nmonitoring wells north of the existing wells to determine if\nthe groundwater traveled north and carried contamination\nnorth of the plant. Based on his review of GE’s testing, Dr.\nBanaszak concluded that the results did not show that the\ncontamination plume “is stable or shrinking, which leaves the\npossibility that a DNAPL exists.”\n GE’s expert, Dr. Vagt, who has been the project director of\nthe site since 2008, testified that additional investigation is un-\nnecessary because the evidence demonstrates no DNAPL is\npresent. He explained that the concentration of TCE in the\nsamples has decreased over time, whereas, if a DNAPL were\npresent, the TCE concentrations would have remained con-\nstant. As to the need for a north monitoring well, Dr. Vagt tes-\ntified that soil samples taken north of the plant (near the site\nof an alleged potential additional source of TCE) detected lit-\ntle to no TCE. Dr. Vagt concluded (and the IEPA agreed), that\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 21\n\nno additional testing was necessary. And Dr. Vagt conducted\nsite visits, which led him to conclude that the groundwater\nflowed south, not north, as Dr. Banaszak had hypothesized\nbased on a conceptual site model. Additionally, Dr. Vogt ad-\nvocated against drilling through the bedrock; he opined that\nthe only conduit for contamination through the bedrock was\nthe preexisting city well, and that any additional drilling\ncould be harmful in that it could provide a new route for con-\ntamination to travel through the bedrock.\n The district court concluded that GE’s investigation into\nthe presence of DNAPL, and the IEPA’s approval of the inves-\ntigation, was not unreasonable. Because plaintiffs “merely of-\nfer[ed] different conclusions about the data collected by [GE]\nand the data they hope[d] to develop with additional investi-\ngation and testing,” the district court found that plaintiffs had\nnot met their burden to show that any additional testing for\nDNAPL was necessary. The district court weighed the com-\npeting expert testimony and found GE’s expert made reason-\nable conclusions supported by facts; we see nothing in the\ncourt’s factual findings that are clearly erroneous.\n ii. Rock Creek\n As to Rock Creek’s status as a groundwater divide, plain-\ntiffs and GE again offered differing interpretations of the same\ndata. Plaintiffs argued that the lone sample from the south\nwell containing trace amounts of TCE evidences that contam-\nination is flowing past Rock Creek. They further contended\nthat the rest of the wells on the south of Rock Creek, which\ndid not detect contamination, are not deep enough to\nproperly measure contamination. GE, on the other hand,\nmaintained that Rock Creek is a groundwater divide. The\nIEPA required that GE install additional monitoring wells and\n\f22 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\ntest the residential wells south of Rock Creek to confirm this\nproposition. Dr. Vagt contrasted the contaminated samples\nfrom the north side of Rock Creek with the lack of contamina-\ntion from the south side wells; he testified that the single sam-\nple from the south well with trace levels of contamination was\nan outlier when compared with the lack of contamination in\nthe six other monitoring wells and residential wells located in\nclose proximity and at varying depths.\n Weighing the competing expert testimony, the district\ncourt found that plaintiffs had not offered any additional test-\ning that would “seriously challenge the finding that Rock\nCreek is a groundwater divide.” Again, we cannot conclude\nthis conclusion is clearly erroneous.\n iii. Vapor Intrusion\n Lastly, the district court considered plaintiffs’ request for\nvapor intrusion monitoring for the Conway home and the sur-\nrounding residences. By the time of the evidentiary hearing,\nplaintiffs had sold the Conway home. They agreed the court\ndid not have the power to force access into the home for test-\ning but asked the court to order GE to obtain consent from the\nnew owners. They based this request on a 2012 test that de-\ntected the compound 1,2 DCA in the indoor air in the Conway\nhome at a level above the residential standard. After detecting\nthis compound, however, GE took samples of the groundwa-\nter and sub-slab under and around the Conway home, which\ndid not reflect contamination. GE thus maintained that there\nis no complete pathway between the source of the GE-site\ncontamination and the indoor air in the Conway home, and\nthat 1,2 DCA comes from a variety of sources unrelated to the\nsite contamination (such as household cleaners). The IEPA\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 23\n\nagreed that, without a complete pathway, no additional test-\ning was necessary.\n The district court stated that it was “not in a position to\nsecond guess the IEPA’s decision based on Plaintiffs’ discon-\ntent with the decision.” Considering that plaintiffs no longer\nown the Conway home and the court does not have authority\nto force the new owners to consent to testing, as well as the\nlack of a complete pathway from the site contamination to the\nhome, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred.\n * * *\n While an injunction does not follow automatically from a\nfinding of a risk of imminent and substantial endangerment—\nas this case demonstrates—such a finding usually goes a long\nway towards justifying an injunction. Here however, despite\nthe district court’s admonition that it was looking for evi-\ndence of harm requiring relief in addition to the IEPA action,\nat no point did plaintiffs ever conduct their own investigation\nto contradict GE’s test results. Rather, they continue to insist\nthat irreparable harm is “self-evident” where there is contam-\nination and criticize GE’s investigation, which had been con-\nducted subject to the IEPA’s oversight and direction. As\ndemonstrated by the two years it spent grappling with the in-\njunctive relief questions, the district court understood it had\nto “walk a fine line” between supplementing and supplanting\nthe Consent Order. The court focused on the facts before it,\ncommenting repeatedly that “facts matter,” and it provided\nplaintiffs with numerous opportunities to present evidence\nthat the state proceedings were not adequately protecting the\npublic and the environment. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago\nBridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining\nthat ongoing remediation in independent proceedings may\n\f24 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\njustify the denial of injunctive relief in the RCRA action); Ad-\nkins, 644 F.3d 501–02 (“When this case finally addresses the\nmerits, and if the [state environmental] actions have been re-\nsolved by then, the federal court will be entitled to insist that\nplaintiffs show how the resolution of those cases was not suf-\nficient.”). In the end, plaintiffs could not present contradictory\nfacts because they did not conduct any of their own investi-\ngation. As the district court held, plaintiffs “have not pro-\nvided the evidence necessary for this Court to second guess\n[GE]’s Remedial Action Plan” and order relief in addition to\nwhat the IEPA has already required.\n Nevertheless, plaintiffs insist they are entitled to relief be-\ncause they did not get what they wanted; they want more than\nthe IEPA found adequate and will be satisfied with nothing\nless than a mandatory injunction ordering GE to remove any\ncontamination on their property. We sympathize with plain-\ntiffs’ position—TCE is a dangerous contaminant and the cur-\nrent plan leaves the contamination in place (though contained\nand restricted from access). But, despite plaintiffs’ characteri-\nzation, the RCRA is not a “cleanup” statute. See Meghrig, 516\nU.S. at 483 (“[The] RCRA is not principally designed to effec-\ntuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites ….”). Under the RCRA,\nthe district court may “restrain” the handling of hazardous\nwaste that “may present an imminent and substantial endan-\ngerment to health or the environment,” or order actions that\nmay be “necessary” to eliminate that danger. 42 U.S.C.\n§ 6972(a).\n Here, the district court considered both parties’ expert\npresentations and concluded that plaintiffs had not estab-\nlished any additional actions were “necessary” to eliminate\nthe danger. In spite of the district court’s multiple inquiries to\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 25\n\nplaintiffs’ expert as to what remedy he proposed the court or-\nder, he did not make a recommendation, leaving the court\nwithout guidance. Conversely, the court found GE’s explana-\ntions for the actions it had taken to investigate and develop its\nremediation plans “reasonable, rational and credible.” The\nRCRA does not require a court-ordered cleanup where the\ncourt has not found such action necessary to prevent harm to\nthe public or the environment, especially where, as here, an\nexpert the court found credible testified that additional\ncleanup could cause further harm.\n The district court did not abuse its discretion in conclud-\ning plaintiffs had not carried their burden to establish manda-\ntory injunctive relief was necessary under the RCRA.\n B. Motion for Indicative Ruling and for Reconsidera-\n tion\n Next, plaintiffs contend the district court erred in denying\ntheir motion for indicative ruling under Rule 62.1 and for re-\nconsideration under Rule 60(b)(2). Relief under Rule 60(b) is\n“an extraordinary remedy … granted only in exceptional cir-\ncumstances.” Davis v. Moroney, 857 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir.\n2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Bakery Mach. & Fabrica-\ntion, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc., 570 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir.\n2009)). We review the district court’s decision for abuse of dis-\ncretion. Gleason v. Jansen, 888 F.3d 847, 851–52 (7th Cir. 2018).\n A refresher of the timeline of events is necessary: Prior to\nthe district court’s ruling on the motion for injunction, the\nIEPA had denied GE’s initial Remedial Action Plan, which\nproposed natural attenuation and institutional controls to ad-\ndress the contamination. After the district court denied the in-\n\f26 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\njunction in September 2017, plaintiffs dismissed their remain-\ning claim with prejudice and filed a notice of appeal. In Octo-\nber 2017, GE submitted a revised RAP to the IEPA, in which\nGE proposed institutional controls as the sole method of re-\nmedial action. Then, on March 2, 2018, the IEPA approved\nGE’s revised RAP. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed a motion\nfor indicative ruling under Rule 62.1(a)(3), which provides:\n If a timely motion is made for relief that the\n court lacks authority to grant because of an ap-\n peal that has been docketed and is pending, the\n court may: … state either that it would grant the\n motion if the court of appeals remands for that\n purpose or that the motion raises a substantial\n issue.\nFed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a)(3). In the motion, plaintiffs raised a sin-\ngle basis for their requested relief: the IEPA’s approval of GE’s\nrevised RAP. Plaintiffs asserted that the IEPA’s March 2, 2018\napproval was newly discovered evidence supporting recon-\nsideration of the denial of the injunction.3\n Plaintiffs’ arguments fail for two reasons. First, the IEPA’s\nMarch 2, 2018 approval of GE’s RAP is not “newly discovered\nevidence” under Rule 60(b)(2). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2)\n(“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or\nits legal representative from a final judgment … for … newly\ndiscovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could\n\n\n 3 Although plaintiffs did not file a separate motion for relief from judg-\n\nment and failed to explain that they were seeking relief under Rule\n60(b)(2) until their reply brief, the district court excused this omission and\ntreated the Rule 62.1 motion as a joint motion for reconsideration under\nRule 60(b)(2).\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 27\n\nnot have been discovered in time to move for a new trial un-\nder Rule 59(b).”). Newly discovered evidence must have been\nin existence at the time of the original judgment or pertain to\nfacts in existence at the time of the judgment. Peacock v. Bd. of\nSch. Comm’rs of City of Indianapolis, 721 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir.\n1983) (per curiam). The district court did not abuse its discre-\ntion in finding that neither the revised RAP submitted in Oc-\ntober 2017 nor the IEPA’s March 2, 2018 approval existed at\nthe time of its September 2017 judgment. Rather, they were\nnew evidence that did not exist and thus could not have been\ndiscovered at the time. Nor did the district court err in con-\ncluding that the revised RAP did not pertain to facts in exist-\nence at the time of judgment. To the contrary, the revised RAP\nresponded to the IEPA’s questions and concerns, contained\nnew information for the IEPA to consider, and included a new\nproposed remedy.\n Second, even if it were “newly discovered” evidence, the\ndistrict court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the\nIEPA’s approval of the revised RAP would not have changed\nthe outcome. According to plaintiffs, the district court’s denial\nof injunctive relief was predicated on the IEPA’s rejection of\nGE’s initial RAP. For that reason, they claim that the IEPA’s\nacceptance of the revised RAP that did not require any addi-\ntional remedies is a basis upon which the district court should\nhave reconsidered injunctive relief. In support, plaintiffs\npointed to the district court’s statement that “[t]he IEPA’s ac-\ntions, including the latest [RAP] rejection, is strong evidence\nthat Plaintiffs’ injuries are being remedied in the parallel state-\ncourt proceeding.” In denying the Rule 62.1 motion, however,\nthe district court explained that plaintiffs misunderstood its\nruling: “The [c]ourt merely used the IEPA’s most recent rejec-\n\f28 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\ntion to highlight that the IEPA had been making well-rea-\nsoned decisions under the Consent Order and had challenged\nnumerous actions [GE] had taken ….” Noting that plaintiffs\nwere using the approval of the revised RAP to make the same\narguments the court had rejected throughout the case, the dis-\ntrict court concluded that plaintiffs had not offered any newly\ndiscovered evidence that would necessitate injunctive relief.\n The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying\nthe motions for indicative relief and for reconsideration.\n C. State Law Tort Claims\n Lastly, plaintiffs assert that the district court erred in\ngranting summary judgment to GE on their state law claims\nof nuisance, trespass, and negligence. We review a grant of\nsummary judgment de novo, viewing the record in a light\nmost favorable to the nonmoving party. Minerva Dairy, Inc. v.\nHarsdorf, 905 F.3d 1047, 1053 (7th Cir. 2018).\n In Illinois, the statute of limitations for tort claims for dam-\nage to property is five years. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-205. It is\nundisputed that, here, Lowell Beggs knew about the contam-\nination of the golf course from the GE plant at the time he\npurchased the property in 2007, but he did not file suit until\nNovember 2013, more than five years later. Plaintiffs argue,\nhowever, that GE is committing a continuous violation be-\ncause it “is doing nothing to stop its contamination from mi-\ngrating,” and that, under the continuing tort doctrine, the\nfive-year statute of limitations does not bar their claims.\n “[W]hen ‘a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury,\nthe limitations period does not begin to run until the date of\nthe last injury or the date the tortious acts cease.’” Brooks v.\nRoss, 578 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Belleville Toyota\n\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 29\n\nv. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 770 N.E.2d 177, 190 (Ill. 2002)).\nThe problem with plaintiffs’ argument is that the “continu-\ning” action they allege is not that GE is continuing to release\ncontaminants, but that the original contamination is continu-\ning to migrate. However, “[a] continuing violation or tort is\noccasioned by continuing unlawful acts and conduct, not by\ncontinual ill effects from an initial violation.” Feltmeier v. Felt-\nmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 85 (Ill. 2003); see Village of DePue v. Viacom\nInt’l, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 2d 774, 779 (C.D. Ill. 2010) (continuing\ntort doctrine did not apply where plaintiff’s allegations were\nlimited to injury from water flowing from contaminated site\nbecause tortious conduct had ceased when manufacturing at\nsite ended years prior); Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Tang Indus., Inc.,\n998 F.Supp. 889, 896–97 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (continuing tort doc-\ntrine did not apply where defendant stopped dumping con-\ntaminants years prior, “although the effects from [defend-\nant]’s violations may be persisting”). The continuing migra-\ntion plaintiffs allege is merely an ill effect from the original\nviolation, not a continuing unlawful act.\n Nor does plaintiffs’ assertion that GE retains possession of\nthe plant and has mismanaged the remediation suffice as a\ncontinuing injury. As the district court explained, application\nof the continuing tort doctrine “turns on continuing conduct,\nnot continuing ownership or continuing injury.” Compare Vil-\nlage of DePue, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 779 (“merely owning the Site”\nafter contamination insufficient for liability under continuing\ntort doctrine), with City of Evanston v. Texaco, Inc., 19 F. Supp.\n3d 817, 827–28 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (continuing tort doctrine ap-\nplied “at least at the pleadings stage” where defendant’s un-\nderground tanks allegedly continued leaking contaminants\ninto the environment even though defendant no longer\nowned the property). That GE retains possession of the plant\n\f30 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\n\nis of no import where there is a lack of demonstrated contin-\nuing unlawful conduct.\n Because plaintiffs do not allege a continuing unlawful act\nnecessary to invoke the continuing tort doctrine, we affirm the\ngrant of summary judgment to GE on plaintiffs’ state law tort\nclaims.\n III. Conclusion\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\ndistrict court.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Martha Conway v. General Electric Company\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\nLAJIM, LLC, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nGENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.\\n No. 13-cv-50348 — Iain D. Johnston, Magistrate Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 15, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 4, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-appellants purchased land\\nnear a former General Electric Company manufacturing plant\\nthat had operated for sixty years; the plant leached toxic\\nchemicals that seeped into the groundwater. The Illinois En-\\nvironmental Protection Agency filed suit under state law\\nagainst General Electric in 2004 and has been working with\\nthe company since then to investigate and develop a plan to\\naddress the contamination. In 2013, plaintiffs filed suit under\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nthe citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and\\nRecovery Act, seeking a mandatory injunction ordering Gen-\\neral Electric to conduct additional investigation into the scope\\nof the contamination and ordering the company to remove the\\ncontamination. The district court found the company liable\\nfor the contamination on summary judgment but denied\\nplaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief because, despite the\\nmany opportunities the court provided, plaintiffs did not of-\\nfer evidence establishing a need for injunctive relief beyond\\nwhat the company had already done in the state action. For\\nthe following reasons, we affirm.\\n I. Background\\n A. Statutory Scheme\\n The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”),\\n42 U.S.C. § 6901, et seq., “is a comprehensive environmental\\nstatute that governs the treatment, storage, and disposal of\\nsolid and hazardous waste.” Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S.\\n479, 483 (1996). The RCRA “is not principally designed to ef-\\nfectuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites or to compensate\\nthose who have attended to the remediation of environmental\\nhazards.” Id. Rather, the primary purpose of the RCRA “is to\\nreduce the generation of hazardous waste and to ensure the\\nproper treatment … of that waste which is nonetheless gener-\\nated, ‘so as to minimize the present and future threat to hu-\\nman health and the environment.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6902(b)).\\n The RCRA contains a citizen suit provision, which pro-\\nvides that “any person may commence a civil action” against\\n“any person” who has allegedly violated “any permit, stand-\\nard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 3\\n\\nwhich has become effective pursuant to this chapter,” or\\n“who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or\\npresent handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or dis-\\nposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an\\nimminent and substantial endangerment to health or the en-\\nvironment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1). Once the violation or po-\\ntential endangerment is shown, a district court “shall have ju-\\nrisdiction … to restrain any person who has contributed or\\nwho is contributing to the past or present handling, storage,\\ntreatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazard-\\nous waste” and “to order such person to take such other ac-\\ntion as may be necessary.” Id. § 6972(a).\\n B. Factual Background\\n 1. General Electric Plant in Morrison, Illinois\\n Defendant-appellee General Electric Company (“GE”) op-\\nerated a manufacturing plant in Morrison, Illinois from 1949\\nto 2010. To remove oil from the automotive and appliance\\nparts it manufactured, the plant used chlorinated organic sol-\\nvents, including trichloroethylene (“TCE”), perchloroethene\\n(“PCE”), and trichloroethane (“TCA”). These solvents are\\ntoxic and are regulated by federal and state environmental\\nagencies. GE used these solvents and stored them in degreas-\\ners located at the plant until 1994, when it switched to a soap-\\nlike solution to clean the parts.\\n In 1986, chlorinated solvents were detected in three mu-\\nnicipal supply wells that provided water to the City of Morri-\\nson, located several thousand feet southeast of the GE plant.\\nShortly thereafter, the Illinois Environmental Protection\\nAgency (“IEPA”) installed monitoring wells to analyze the\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\ngroundwater around the GE plant, which uncovered addi-\\ntional contamination. The IEPA completed a Phase I Remedial\\nInvestigation in 1987, which included sampling and analysis\\nof soil, water, and sediment. Based on the investigation, the\\nIEPA identified the GE plant as the source of the solvent con-\\ntamination.\\n In 1988, GE installed additional monitoring wells and an\\nair stripper to treat water pumped from one of Morrison’s\\nmunicipal wells to a level of contamination below the maxi-\\nmum contaminant level (“MCL”) so the city could continue to\\nuse the well as a source of drinking water; the other two mu-\\nnicipal supply wells were sealed. GE also conducted a Phase\\nII Remedial Investigation, which identified elevated concen-\\ntrations of solvents beneath the plant’s former degreasing op-\\nerations. Under the IEPA’s supervision, GE continued to sam-\\nple and monitor the groundwater in the monitoring wells and\\nsubmitted reports of the results to the IEPA.\\n In 1994, the IEPA required GE to conduct a Phase III Re-\\nmedial Investigation of the groundwater at and downgradi-\\nent from the plant. GE reported the results of the investigation\\nin 2001. According to the report, the solvents in the ground-\\nwater had decreased significantly by 2001, and the report\\nmodeled that the contaminants would naturally attenuate\\n(i.e., reduce) to concentrations below the MCL. Additionally,\\nthe report stated that Rock Creek was a natural groundwater\\ndivide that would prevent the contaminating solvents from\\nmigrating south from the GE plant across the creek. The re-\\nport concluded that the contamination did not pose a risk to\\nthe public because a City of Morrison ordinance prohibited\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 5\\n\\nthe use of groundwater as a source of drinking water and be-\\ncause GE’s air stripper at the remaining municipal supply\\nwell provided safe drinking water.\\n In response, however, the IEPA did not approve GE’s pro-\\nposal for natural attenuation of the contamination; instead,\\nthe IEPA concluded that active remediation of the site would\\nbe appropriate. The Illinois Attorney General commenced suit\\nagainst GE in 2004 under the Illinois Environmental Protec-\\ntion Act: for cost recovery (Count I), see 415 Ill. Comp. Stat.\\n5/22.2(f); to enjoin water pollution (Count II), see 415 Ill.\\nComp. Stat. 5/42(d)–(e); and to enjoin a water pollution haz-\\nard (Count III), see 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12(d). The state\\nsought to recover costs it had incurred as well as an injunction\\nrequiring that GE investigate the nature and extent of the con-\\ntamination and then perform remediation. In 2010, GE and Il-\\nlinois entered into a Consent Order in which GE agreed to\\nsubmit to the IEPA a series of reports, including: (1) “a work\\nplan to survey private wells, install additional monitoring\\nwells, and complete additional soil borings”; (2) “a Focused\\nSite Investigation Report (‘FSI’) summarizing the results of\\nthe work plan”; (3) “a Remedial Objectives Report to address\\nthe impact of the soil and groundwater contamination”; and\\n(4) “a Remedial Action Plan to meet the remediation objec-\\ntives within six years of the entry of the Consent Order.” Also\\nin 2010, the City of Morrison passed an ordinance prohibiting\\ngroundwater as a source of potable water and prohibiting the\\ninstallation of wells “to limit threats to human health from\\ngroundwater contamination.”\\n After approval of a work plan, GE installed monitoring\\nwells along Rock Creek. Then, in 2013, GE submitted its FSI\\ndetailing the data obtained from the various monitoring\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nwells; the report explained that the solvents had migrated\\nsouth of the plant and that the monitoring wells along Rock\\nCreek tested positive for contamination at levels above the\\nMCL. Tests from wells on the other side of Rock Creek (and\\nfurther from the plant) either did not detect chlorinated sol-\\nvents or detected TCE at a level below the MCL. Following\\ndiscussions between GE and the IEPA on the work plan and\\nFSI, the IEPA conditionally approved the FSI in March 2015.\\nIt determined that GE “adequately defined the nature and ex-\\ntent of the contamination.” The IEPA conditionally approved\\nGE’s revised Remedial Objectives Report in August 2016, after\\na number of additional submissions and a meeting between\\nthe technical representatives from GE and the IEPA.\\n In March 2017, GE submitted its Remedial Action Plan\\n(“RAP”) to the IEPA, proposing to achieve the remediation\\nobjectives through a “combination of institutional controls\\nand monitored natural attenuation.” The IEPA denied GE’s\\nproposal in June 2017, posing several questions about the\\nplan, and specifically noting that it did not accept “an open-\\nended period of monitored natural attenuation as a remedia-\\ntion technology.” GE submitted a revised RAP to the IEPA in\\nOctober 2017, responding to the IEPA’s questions and com-\\nments and proposing to address the remaining contamination\\nthrough institutional controls. The IEPA approved GE’s re-\\nvised Remedial Action Plan in March 2018.\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 7\\n\\n 2. Plaintiffs’ Interest in the Land\\n Plaintiff-appellant Lowell Beggs1 purchased land near the\\nsite of the shuttered GE plant in 2007. He conveyed the prop-\\nerty to plaintiff-appellant Prairie Ridge Golf Course, LLC,\\nwhich plaintiff-appellant LAJIM, LLC operated. Beggs moved\\ninto a home next to the golf course with his companion, plain-\\ntiff-appellant Martha Kai Conway (the “Conway home”). The\\ngolf course and Conway home are located south of the former\\nGE plant and downgradient from the plant.\\n When Beggs considered purchasing the golf course in\\nApril 2007, the seller advised him: “the golf course has con-\\ntamination on the first hole. This was caused by General Elec-\\ntric. If you go to the EPA web site, GE is listed as a superfund\\nsite. No further remediation was needed according to what I\\ncan find.” Beggs did not inquire further about the environ-\\nmental condition of the golf course before completing the pur-\\nchase in May 2007. The purchase agreement noted, “[S]eller []\\nhas disclosed to Purchaser that there is contamination on the\\nfirst hole of the Real Estate, such contamination having been\\ncaused by General Electric, as which contamination is part of\\nthe Superfund Site that apparently does not require any fur-\\nther remediation.” Additionally, Beggs walked the golf\\ncourse prior to completing the purchase and noticed a moni-\\ntoring well head protruding above the ground. After purchas-\\ning the property, Beggs contacted GE to fix a leak from the\\nfixture, which he knew monitored “how much stuff was com-\\ning out of GE.”\\n\\n\\n 1Beggs passed away during the course of this litigation. His interest\\nis now represented by the executor of his estate, plaintiff-appellant First\\nNational Bank of Amboy.\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\n C. Procedural Background\\n Plaintiffs filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois on\\nNovember 1, 2013 seeking: (1) a mandatory injunction requir-\\ning GE to remediate the contamination under the RCRA, see\\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (Count I); (2) cost recovery (Count II)\\nand a declaratory judgment (Count III) under the Compre-\\nhensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-\\nity Act (“CERCLA”), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(g)(3); and\\n(3) recovery under state law for nuisance (Count IV), trespass\\n(Count V), and negligence (Count VI).\\n After what the district court characterized as “extensive\\ndiscovery,” the court considered the parties’ cross-motions\\nfor partial summary judgment. Plaintiffs moved for summary\\njudgment on their RCRA claim. GE did not dispute that plain-\\ntiffs satisfied the first two elements of the claim—(1) defend-\\nant has generated solid or hazardous waste, and (2) defendant\\nhas contributed to the handling of the waste. See Albany Bank\\n& Tr. Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2002).\\nOn the sole remaining question—whether plaintiffs estab-\\nlished that the contamination “may present an imminent and\\nsubstantial danger to health or the environment,” id.—the dis-\\ntrict court found for plaintiffs and granted summary judg-\\nment as to GE’s liability under the RCRA. At plaintiffs’ re-\\nquest, the court deferred consideration as to whether plain-\\ntiffs were entitled to injunctive relief. On GE’s cross-motion\\nfor summary judgment on the state law claims, the district\\ncourt found the continuing tort doctrine did not apply and\\nfound the claims time-barred because plaintiffs had\\nknowledge of the claims more than five years before they filed\\nsuit.\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 9\\n\\n Over the next two years, the district court considered\\nplaintiffs’ request for a mandatory injunction in a number of\\nhearings and a series of opinions. On October 4, 2016, the\\ncourt held that the plain language of the RCRA permitted, but\\ndid not require, the court to grant injunctive relief despite the\\nongoing state proceeding; thus, the question before the court\\nwas not whether it could grant relief but whether it should. On\\nthis point, the court concluded plaintiffs had not yet provided\\nthe court with facts supporting their assertion that the Con-\\nsent Order in the state action was deficient and ineffective.\\nThe court ordered an evidentiary hearing and invited the\\nIEPA and the Illinois Attorney General to provide their views\\non the progress under the Consent Order and whether the\\ncourt should order injunctive relief under the RCRA. The Illi-\\nnois Attorney General’s Office submitted an amicus brief ex-\\nplaining that the State did not believe the court should impose\\ninjunctive relief because any court-ordered injunctive relief\\nwould overlap with the work currently being done—i.e., “site\\ninvestigation, monitoring and payment of costs as well as an\\norder barring further endangerment … [and] some type of re-\\nmedial effort.” The State asserted that all such actions were\\nalready underway and were “being done with diligence and\\nrigorous oversight by the Illinois EPA,” and that injunctive re-\\nlief “may result in a clean-up that is inconsistent with clean\\nups of other contaminated sites in Illinois.”\\n After two days of evidentiary hearing on June 1 and 2,\\n2017, the court issued an opinion on September 7, 2017 deny-\\ning the requested injunctive relief. Both parties had presented\\nexpert testimony at the hearing; the district court credited\\nGE’s expert as having “provided reasonable, rational and\\ncredible bases explaining why certain actions were taken and\\nothers were not,” whereas it found plaintiffs’ expert did not\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nprovide conclusions but merely “testified that additional in-\\nvestigation and testing was necessary to opine on the proper\\nscope of remediation for the site.” Notably, when asked by the\\ndistrict court judge what specific cleanup he recommended,\\nplaintiffs’ expert declined to make a recommendation. The\\ndistrict court thus concluded that plaintiffs had not met their\\nburden of showing harm not already addressed sufficiently\\nby the IEPA proceeding. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion\\nto reconsider the denial of injunctive relief on November 7,\\n2017. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the remaining count un-\\nder the CERCLA with prejudice and filed a notice of appeal\\non March 6, 2018.\\n Then, on March 23, 2018, plaintiffs filed a motion for an\\nindicative ruling under Rule 62.1 and motion to reconsider\\nbased on newly discovered evidence. Plaintiffs pointed to the\\nIEPA’s March 2, 2018 approval of GE’s Remedial Action Plan,\\nwhich relies solely on institutional controls to address the re-\\nmaining contamination. The district court denied plaintiffs’\\nmotion on August 14, 2018, and plaintiffs appealed. That ap-\\npeal was consolidated with plaintiffs’ original appeal; both\\nare jointly before us now.\\n II. Discussion\\n A. Injunctive Relief\\n Plaintiffs raise several issues related to the district court’s\\ndenial of injunctive relief: they assert (1) the district court did\\nnot have discretion to deny injunctive relief once it found GE\\nliable under the RCRA; (2) the district court erred in conduct-\\ning the traditional balancing of equitable factors for injunctive\\nrelief; and (3) the district court erred in finding plaintiffs failed\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 11\\n\\nto establish irreparable harm. Plaintiffs’ arguments on each is-\\nsue fail to carry the day. We note that the denial of injunctive\\nrelief after a district court has found a risk of imminent and\\nsubstantial danger to public health or to the environment\\nshould be rare. Here, however, plaintiffs failed to provide the\\ndistrict court with any evidence that injunctive relief, in addi-\\ntion to what the IEPA had already ordered in the state action,\\nwould improve the environment and not cause additional\\nharm.\\n 1. Discretion to Deny Relief\\n On summary judgment, the district court found GE liable\\nfor contaminating groundwater in a manner that “may pre-\\nsent an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or\\nthe environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). This finding has\\nnot been challenged on appeal. After finding GE liable, the\\ndistrict court then considered whether plaintiffs were entitled\\nto injunctive relief as a remedy for the violation. Plaintiffs as-\\nsert, however, that once the district court made a finding of\\nliability, the RCRA required the court to order injunctive re-\\nlief.\\n In analyzing whether the RCRA mandates the imposition\\nof injunctive relief upon a finding of liability, we first look to\\nthe plain language of the statute. See United States v. Marcotte,\\n835 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2016). The RCRA provides, in rele-\\nvant part:\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\n [A]ny person may commence a civil action on\\n his own behalf— …\\n (1)(B) against any person, … including any\\n past or present generator, past or present\\n transporter, or past or present owner or op-\\n erator of a treatment, storage, or disposal fa-\\n cility, who has contributed or who is contrib-\\n uting to the past or present handling, stor-\\n age, treatment, transportation, or disposal of\\n any solid or hazardous waste which may\\n present an imminent and substantial endan-\\n germent to health or the environment; ….\\n The district court shall have jurisdiction … to re-\\n strain any person who has contributed or who is\\n contributing to the past or present handling,\\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal\\n of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in\\n paragraph (1)(B), [or] to order such person to take\\n such other action as may be necessary ….\\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (emphasis added). As plaintiffs\\nacknowledge, this language authorizes injunctive relief—it\\nprovides the district court with jurisdiction to restrain a vio-\\nlator or to order other necessary action. But nothing in the lan-\\nguage mandates injunctive relief; “shall” pertains only to the\\ngrant of jurisdiction and not to the relief the district court may\\norder.\\n Nor do our past comments on the RCRA indicate injunc-\\ntive relief is mandatory upon a finding of liability. In Adkins\\nv. VIM Recycling, Inc., we considered whether the prohibitions\\nin the RCRA or several abstention doctrines precluded the\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 13\\n\\nplaintiffs from bringing a citizen suit under the RCRA after\\nthe state had already filed enforcement actions against the\\nsame alleged violators. 644 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2011). We\\nconcluded that neither the statutory language nor the absten-\\ntion doctrines prevented the Adkins plaintiffs from pursuing\\ntheir citizen suit. Id. Critically, we made clear that “[w]e [did]\\nnot suggest, of course, that once a citizen suit has cleared\\nRCRA’s statutory hurdles it is immune from all other consti-\\ntutional and preclusive doctrines, such as standing, mootness,\\nand claim or issue preclusion.” Id. at 503. In so stating, we ad-\\nvised courts to consider these doctrines before awarding re-\\nlief, thus evidencing that plaintiffs are not presumptively en-\\ntitled to injunctive relief once they have “cleared RCRA’s stat-\\nutory hurdles.”\\n Furthermore, the Supreme Court applies traditional equi-\\ntable principles to environmental statutes. For example, in a\\nFederal Water Pollution Control Act case, the Supreme Court\\nexplained that the statute did not require courts to immedi-\\nately enjoin all statutory violations; instead, the Court high-\\nlighted that long-established principles of equity applied:\\n It goes without saying that an injunction is an\\n equitable remedy. It is not a remedy which is-\\n sues as of course or to restrain an act the injuri-\\n ous consequences of which are merely trifling.\\n An injunction should issue only where the in-\\n tervention of a court of equity is essential in or-\\n der effectually to protect property rights against\\n injuries otherwise irremediable.\\nWeinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12 (1982) (cita-\\ntions and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Winter v.\\nNat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008) (“An injunction\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nis a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from suc-\\ncess on the merits as a matter of course.”) (reversing and va-\\ncating grant of injunction under National Environmental Pol-\\nicy Act); Town of Huntington v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 648, 651 (2d\\nCir. 1989) (“In applying these general equitable standards for\\nthe issuance of injunctions in the area of environmental stat-\\nutes, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the notion that\\nan injunction follows as a matter of course upon a finding of\\nstatutory violation.”). The same principles apply to the\\nRCRA; the remedy of an injunction does not issue as a matter\\nof course upon a finding of liability but only as necessary to\\nprotect against otherwise irremediable harm.\\n Thus, the district court correctly held that it has discretion\\nto award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not required\\nto order relief after a finding of liability.\\n 2. Traditional Balancing of Equitable Factors\\n In a similar but distinct argument, plaintiffs assert that the\\ndistrict court erred in applying the traditional equitable fac-\\ntors when considering whether to award injunctive relief. To\\nmerit injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate:\\n (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;\\n (2) that remedies available at law, such as mon-\\n etary damages, are inadequate to compensate\\n for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance\\n of hardships between the plaintiff and defend-\\n ant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and\\n (4) that the public interest would not be dis-\\n served by a permanent injunction.\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 15\\n\\neBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).\\n Plaintiffs base their argument on their role in this citizen\\nsuit as private attorneys general, acting on behalf of the pub-\\nlic. They argue that it is common in environmental protection\\ncases for courts to order injunctive relief without the tradi-\\ntional balancing of equitable factors where the only statutory\\nrelief available is injunctive relief and where the plaintiff is a\\nsovereign or private attorney general. However, commenting\\ndirectly on the RCRA, we have reasoned that “[o]rdinarily, a\\ncourt is obligated to conduct an equitable balancing of harms\\nbefore awarding injunctive relief, even under an environmen-\\ntal statute which specifically authorizes such relief (as does\\nRCRA section 3008(a)).” United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,\\n38 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1994).\\n True, once a court finds a defendant liable for creating a\\nrisk of imminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the\\ncase that injunctive relief is warranted. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vil-\\nlage of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) (“Environmental in-\\njury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by\\nmoney damages and is often permanent or at least of long du-\\nration, i.e., irreparable.… [T]herefore, the balance of harms\\nwill usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the\\nenvironment.”). But that is not always the case. Courts must\\nconsider the traditional equitable factors, which appears to be\\nwhat the district court did here. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. One as-\\npect of the district court’s reasoning does, however, give us\\npause. Despite the previous finding that GE created a risk of\\nimminent and substantial harm, the district court stated at the\\nrelief stage that irreparable harm is an “essential require-\\nment” for injunctive relief and defined irreparable harm as\\n“both certain and great, not merely serious or substantial.” To\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nthe extent that language might be interpreted as requiring\\nRCRA plaintiffs to demonstrate harm above and beyond that\\nshown at the merits stage, the district court erred.\\n Multiple circuits have held that RCRA plaintiffs need only\\nshow “a risk of harm,” not “the traditional requirement of\\nthreatened irreparable harm,” to justify an injunction. United\\nStates v. Price, 688 F.2d 201, 211 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Attorney\\nGen. of Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 777 (10th\\nCir. 2009) (“Our prior case law indicates that under RCRA a\\nplaintiff need not ‘show proof of actual harm to health or the\\nenvironment’ to establish endangerment, but rather injunc-\\ntive relief is appropriate where there simply may be a risk of\\nharm.”); Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1356 (2d\\nCir. 1991) (quoting Price for the same proposition); United\\nStates v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984)\\n(same).\\n The standard adopted by our sister circuits makes sense,\\nespecially in the permanent injunction context. RCRA author-\\nizes only injunctive relief. Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 484. Accord-\\ningly, absent a permanent injunction, a prevailing RCRA\\nplaintiff will receive no remedy. The proven harm is, by defi-\\nnition, irreparable absent an injunction. See generally Walgreen\\nCo. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., B.V., 966 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir.\\n1992). A RCRA plaintiff either demonstrates irreparable harm\\nor fails to prove his or her case on the merits.\\n We reiterate, however, that a permanent injunction does\\nnot automatically follow from success on the merits. See Me.\\nPeople’s All. & Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471\\nF.3d 277, 296–97 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[I]n an environmental case,\\n[the court] should consider the balance of relevant harms be-\\nfore granting injunctive relief, even though the statute itself\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 17\\n\\nauthorizes such relief. … [I]t is true that a district court is not\\ncommanded, regardless of the circumstances, to issue an in-\\njunction after a finding of liability” under the RCRA.); United\\nStates v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329, 1360 (5th Cir.\\n1996) (“We find nothing in RCRA which, ‘in so many words,\\nor by necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s\\njurisdiction in equity.’” (quoting Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313)).\\nDistrict courts should apply the traditional equitable factors\\nto determine the necessity of injunctive relief.2\\n 3. Necessity of Injunctive Relief\\n Plaintiffs next claim the district court erred in denying in-\\njunctive relief because it found they failed to establish irrepa-\\nrable harm. We review a district court’s denial of injunctive\\nrelief for an abuse of discretion; we review its factual determi-\\nnations for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo, and\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 The unique procedural history of this case may also be a source of\\nplaintiffs’ confusion regarding the applicable standard. Here, the court\\nmade a liability finding—that the contamination “may present an immi-\\nnent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment,” 42\\nU.S.C. § 6972(a)—nearly two years before it denied the injunction. In find-\\ning GE liable under the RCRA, the district court agreed that there may be\\na risk of endangerment from the contamination. But in denying the injunc-\\ntion, the district court found that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate harm not\\nalready addressed in the state action. We do not see a conflict between the\\ndistrict court’s holdings on liability (which acknowledges the risk of harm)\\nand the injunction (which it denied for lack of evidence of unaddressed\\nharm).\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nwe give deference to the court’s balancing of the equitable fac-\\ntors. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State\\nDep’t of Health, 896 F.3d 809, 816 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n As an initial matter, we must address GE’s contention that\\nplaintiffs abandoned their request for remediation at the evi-\\ndentiary hearing, instead deferring to a request for additional\\ninvestigation prior to remediation. According to GE, plaintiffs\\nhave thus waived their claim to an injunction ordering reme-\\ndiation. We disagree. GE mischaracterizes plaintiffs’ position;\\nalthough plaintiffs’ expert at the evidentiary hearing testified\\nhe believed additional investigation was necessary to deter-\\nmine the extent of the contamination and the correspondingly\\nappropriate remedy, at no point did plaintiffs retreat from\\ntheir request for remediation. They reiterated that request in\\ntheir complaint, in their initial motion for an injunction, in ar-\\ngument at the evidentiary hearing, and in their motions for\\nreconsideration. Plaintiffs have not waived their request for\\nan injunction requiring GE to remediate the contamination.\\n Turning to plaintiffs’ argument regarding the irreparable\\nharm finding, we note that it is somewhat indirect. Rather\\nthan directly challenging the district court’s factual findings,\\nplaintiffs repeat their general assertion: There is contamina-\\ntion, therefore there is harm. And because there is harm, there\\nmust be an injunction. In oversimplifying the argument,\\nplaintiffs fail to grapple with the thoughtful and nuanced de-\\ncisions the district court made that led it to deny injunctive\\nrelief. In their request for an injunction, plaintiffs claimed ac-\\ntion under the RCRA was necessary because the Consent Or-\\nder and actions in the state proceeding were insufficient to\\nremedy their injury. For that reason, the district court in-\\nformed the parties repeatedly that it was looking for evidence\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 19\\n\\nof harm not already being addressed through the state pro-\\nceeding and for what exactly plaintiffs wanted the court to or-\\nder GE to do to address that harm.\\n At the evidentiary hearing, plaintiffs argued that the ex-\\ntent of the contamination had not been determined and that\\nthe IEPA’s analysis based on a limited investigation was\\nflawed; as such, their expert testified that additional investi-\\ngation was necessary before he could opine on the proper re-\\nmediation. Plaintiffs requested GE perform the following ad-\\nditional investigation: additional and deeper monitoring\\nwells, soil borings penetrating the bedrock, and vapor-intru-\\nsion monitoring to the extent necessary to (1) determine if a\\ndense non-aqueous phase liquid (“DNAPL”) is present and,\\nrelatedly, determine the vertical and horizontal extent of the\\ngroundwater contamination; (2) determine whether Rock\\nCreek is a groundwater divide, and if so, explain the presence\\nof contamination in the well across the creek; and (3) deter-\\nmine the source of and monitor the vapors present in the Con-\\nway home. Noting that many of these issues are interrelated,\\nthe district court considered the competing expert testimony\\npresented on each avenue of investigation.\\n Although plaintiffs do not directly challenge the district\\ncourt’s factual findings, we review those findings briefly to\\nhighlight the court’s thoroughness in evaluating the evidence\\n(or lack thereof) supporting plaintiffs’ request for injunctive\\nrelief. A district court’s finding of an expert witness’s credibil-\\nity is one of fact that we review for clear error. Madden v. U.S.\\nDep’t of Veterans Affairs, 873 F.3d 971, 973 (7th Cir. 2017). Clear\\nerror is a deferential standard of review that only merits re-\\nversal if “after reviewing the entire record, we are left with\\nthe firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nmade.” United States v. Ranjel, 872 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2017)\\n(quoting United States v. Marty, 450 F.3d 687, 689–90 (7th Cir.\\n2006)). “[I]n a case of dueling experts, as this one was, it is left\\nto the trier of fact, not the reviewing court, to decide how to\\nweigh the competing expert testimony.” Madden, 873 F.3d at\\n973–74 (alteration in original) (quoting Wipf v. Kowalski, 519\\nF.3d 380, 385 (7th Cir. 2008)).\\n i. DNAPL and Groundwater Contamination\\n Plaintiffs argued that GE’s testing was insufficient to de-\\ntermine whether a DNAPL is present. However, plaintiffs did\\nnot take any of their own samples or conduct any of their own\\ntests, despite their expert—Dr. Banaszak—testifying that\\ngroundwater sampling is not prohibitively expensive. In-\\nstead, Dr. Banaszak advocated that GE drill deeper soil bor-\\nings that penetrate the bedrock and that GE install additional\\nmonitoring wells north of the existing wells to determine if\\nthe groundwater traveled north and carried contamination\\nnorth of the plant. Based on his review of GE’s testing, Dr.\\nBanaszak concluded that the results did not show that the\\ncontamination plume “is stable or shrinking, which leaves the\\npossibility that a DNAPL exists.”\\n GE’s expert, Dr. Vagt, who has been the project director of\\nthe site since 2008, testified that additional investigation is un-\\nnecessary because the evidence demonstrates no DNAPL is\\npresent. He explained that the concentration of TCE in the\\nsamples has decreased over time, whereas, if a DNAPL were\\npresent, the TCE concentrations would have remained con-\\nstant. As to the need for a north monitoring well, Dr. Vagt tes-\\ntified that soil samples taken north of the plant (near the site\\nof an alleged potential additional source of TCE) detected lit-\\ntle to no TCE. Dr. Vagt concluded (and the IEPA agreed), that\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 21\\n\\nno additional testing was necessary. And Dr. Vagt conducted\\nsite visits, which led him to conclude that the groundwater\\nflowed south, not north, as Dr. Banaszak had hypothesized\\nbased on a conceptual site model. Additionally, Dr. Vogt ad-\\nvocated against drilling through the bedrock; he opined that\\nthe only conduit for contamination through the bedrock was\\nthe preexisting city well, and that any additional drilling\\ncould be harmful in that it could provide a new route for con-\\ntamination to travel through the bedrock.\\n The district court concluded that GE’s investigation into\\nthe presence of DNAPL, and the IEPA’s approval of the inves-\\ntigation, was not unreasonable. Because plaintiffs “merely of-\\nfer[ed] different conclusions about the data collected by [GE]\\nand the data they hope[d] to develop with additional investi-\\ngation and testing,” the district court found that plaintiffs had\\nnot met their burden to show that any additional testing for\\nDNAPL was necessary. The district court weighed the com-\\npeting expert testimony and found GE’s expert made reason-\\nable conclusions supported by facts; we see nothing in the\\ncourt’s factual findings that are clearly erroneous.\\n ii. Rock Creek\\n As to Rock Creek’s status as a groundwater divide, plain-\\ntiffs and GE again offered differing interpretations of the same\\ndata. Plaintiffs argued that the lone sample from the south\\nwell containing trace amounts of TCE evidences that contam-\\nination is flowing past Rock Creek. They further contended\\nthat the rest of the wells on the south of Rock Creek, which\\ndid not detect contamination, are not deep enough to\\nproperly measure contamination. GE, on the other hand,\\nmaintained that Rock Creek is a groundwater divide. The\\nIEPA required that GE install additional monitoring wells and\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\ntest the residential wells south of Rock Creek to confirm this\\nproposition. Dr. Vagt contrasted the contaminated samples\\nfrom the north side of Rock Creek with the lack of contamina-\\ntion from the south side wells; he testified that the single sam-\\nple from the south well with trace levels of contamination was\\nan outlier when compared with the lack of contamination in\\nthe six other monitoring wells and residential wells located in\\nclose proximity and at varying depths.\\n Weighing the competing expert testimony, the district\\ncourt found that plaintiffs had not offered any additional test-\\ning that would “seriously challenge the finding that Rock\\nCreek is a groundwater divide.” Again, we cannot conclude\\nthis conclusion is clearly erroneous.\\n iii. Vapor Intrusion\\n Lastly, the district court considered plaintiffs’ request for\\nvapor intrusion monitoring for the Conway home and the sur-\\nrounding residences. By the time of the evidentiary hearing,\\nplaintiffs had sold the Conway home. They agreed the court\\ndid not have the power to force access into the home for test-\\ning but asked the court to order GE to obtain consent from the\\nnew owners. They based this request on a 2012 test that de-\\ntected the compound 1,2 DCA in the indoor air in the Conway\\nhome at a level above the residential standard. After detecting\\nthis compound, however, GE took samples of the groundwa-\\nter and sub-slab under and around the Conway home, which\\ndid not reflect contamination. GE thus maintained that there\\nis no complete pathway between the source of the GE-site\\ncontamination and the indoor air in the Conway home, and\\nthat 1,2 DCA comes from a variety of sources unrelated to the\\nsite contamination (such as household cleaners). The IEPA\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 23\\n\\nagreed that, without a complete pathway, no additional test-\\ning was necessary.\\n The district court stated that it was “not in a position to\\nsecond guess the IEPA’s decision based on Plaintiffs’ discon-\\ntent with the decision.” Considering that plaintiffs no longer\\nown the Conway home and the court does not have authority\\nto force the new owners to consent to testing, as well as the\\nlack of a complete pathway from the site contamination to the\\nhome, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred.\\n * * *\\n While an injunction does not follow automatically from a\\nfinding of a risk of imminent and substantial endangerment—\\nas this case demonstrates—such a finding usually goes a long\\nway towards justifying an injunction. Here however, despite\\nthe district court’s admonition that it was looking for evi-\\ndence of harm requiring relief in addition to the IEPA action,\\nat no point did plaintiffs ever conduct their own investigation\\nto contradict GE’s test results. Rather, they continue to insist\\nthat irreparable harm is “self-evident” where there is contam-\\nination and criticize GE’s investigation, which had been con-\\nducted subject to the IEPA’s oversight and direction. As\\ndemonstrated by the two years it spent grappling with the in-\\njunctive relief questions, the district court understood it had\\nto “walk a fine line” between supplementing and supplanting\\nthe Consent Order. The court focused on the facts before it,\\ncommenting repeatedly that “facts matter,” and it provided\\nplaintiffs with numerous opportunities to present evidence\\nthat the state proceedings were not adequately protecting the\\npublic and the environment. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago\\nBridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining\\nthat ongoing remediation in independent proceedings may\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\njustify the denial of injunctive relief in the RCRA action); Ad-\\nkins, 644 F.3d 501–02 (“When this case finally addresses the\\nmerits, and if the [state environmental] actions have been re-\\nsolved by then, the federal court will be entitled to insist that\\nplaintiffs show how the resolution of those cases was not suf-\\nficient.”). In the end, plaintiffs could not present contradictory\\nfacts because they did not conduct any of their own investi-\\ngation. As the district court held, plaintiffs “have not pro-\\nvided the evidence necessary for this Court to second guess\\n[GE]’s Remedial Action Plan” and order relief in addition to\\nwhat the IEPA has already required.\\n Nevertheless, plaintiffs insist they are entitled to relief be-\\ncause they did not get what they wanted; they want more than\\nthe IEPA found adequate and will be satisfied with nothing\\nless than a mandatory injunction ordering GE to remove any\\ncontamination on their property. We sympathize with plain-\\ntiffs’ position—TCE is a dangerous contaminant and the cur-\\nrent plan leaves the contamination in place (though contained\\nand restricted from access). But, despite plaintiffs’ characteri-\\nzation, the RCRA is not a “cleanup” statute. See Meghrig, 516\\nU.S. at 483 (“[The] RCRA is not principally designed to effec-\\ntuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites ….”). Under the RCRA,\\nthe district court may “restrain” the handling of hazardous\\nwaste that “may present an imminent and substantial endan-\\ngerment to health or the environment,” or order actions that\\nmay be “necessary” to eliminate that danger. 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6972(a).\\n Here, the district court considered both parties’ expert\\npresentations and concluded that plaintiffs had not estab-\\nlished any additional actions were “necessary” to eliminate\\nthe danger. In spite of the district court’s multiple inquiries to\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 25\\n\\nplaintiffs’ expert as to what remedy he proposed the court or-\\nder, he did not make a recommendation, leaving the court\\nwithout guidance. Conversely, the court found GE’s explana-\\ntions for the actions it had taken to investigate and develop its\\nremediation plans “reasonable, rational and credible.” The\\nRCRA does not require a court-ordered cleanup where the\\ncourt has not found such action necessary to prevent harm to\\nthe public or the environment, especially where, as here, an\\nexpert the court found credible testified that additional\\ncleanup could cause further harm.\\n The district court did not abuse its discretion in conclud-\\ning plaintiffs had not carried their burden to establish manda-\\ntory injunctive relief was necessary under the RCRA.\\n B. Motion for Indicative Ruling and for Reconsidera-\\n tion\\n Next, plaintiffs contend the district court erred in denying\\ntheir motion for indicative ruling under Rule 62.1 and for re-\\nconsideration under Rule 60(b)(2). Relief under Rule 60(b) is\\n“an extraordinary remedy … granted only in exceptional cir-\\ncumstances.” Davis v. Moroney, 857 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir.\\n2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Bakery Mach. & Fabrica-\\ntion, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc., 570 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir.\\n2009)). We review the district court’s decision for abuse of dis-\\ncretion. Gleason v. Jansen, 888 F.3d 847, 851–52 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n A refresher of the timeline of events is necessary: Prior to\\nthe district court’s ruling on the motion for injunction, the\\nIEPA had denied GE’s initial Remedial Action Plan, which\\nproposed natural attenuation and institutional controls to ad-\\ndress the contamination. After the district court denied the in-\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\njunction in September 2017, plaintiffs dismissed their remain-\\ning claim with prejudice and filed a notice of appeal. In Octo-\\nber 2017, GE submitted a revised RAP to the IEPA, in which\\nGE proposed institutional controls as the sole method of re-\\nmedial action. Then, on March 2, 2018, the IEPA approved\\nGE’s revised RAP. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed a motion\\nfor indicative ruling under Rule 62.1(a)(3), which provides:\\n If a timely motion is made for relief that the\\n court lacks authority to grant because of an ap-\\n peal that has been docketed and is pending, the\\n court may: … state either that it would grant the\\n motion if the court of appeals remands for that\\n purpose or that the motion raises a substantial\\n issue.\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a)(3). In the motion, plaintiffs raised a sin-\\ngle basis for their requested relief: the IEPA’s approval of GE’s\\nrevised RAP. Plaintiffs asserted that the IEPA’s March 2, 2018\\napproval was newly discovered evidence supporting recon-\\nsideration of the denial of the injunction.3\\n Plaintiffs’ arguments fail for two reasons. First, the IEPA’s\\nMarch 2, 2018 approval of GE’s RAP is not “newly discovered\\nevidence” under Rule 60(b)(2). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2)\\n(“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or\\nits legal representative from a final judgment … for … newly\\ndiscovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could\\n\\n\\n 3 Although plaintiffs did not file a separate motion for relief from judg-\\n\\nment and failed to explain that they were seeking relief under Rule\\n60(b)(2) until their reply brief, the district court excused this omission and\\ntreated the Rule 62.1 motion as a joint motion for reconsideration under\\nRule 60(b)(2).\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 27\\n\\nnot have been discovered in time to move for a new trial un-\\nder Rule 59(b).”). Newly discovered evidence must have been\\nin existence at the time of the original judgment or pertain to\\nfacts in existence at the time of the judgment. Peacock v. Bd. of\\nSch. Comm’rs of City of Indianapolis, 721 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir.\\n1983) (per curiam). The district court did not abuse its discre-\\ntion in finding that neither the revised RAP submitted in Oc-\\ntober 2017 nor the IEPA’s March 2, 2018 approval existed at\\nthe time of its September 2017 judgment. Rather, they were\\nnew evidence that did not exist and thus could not have been\\ndiscovered at the time. Nor did the district court err in con-\\ncluding that the revised RAP did not pertain to facts in exist-\\nence at the time of judgment. To the contrary, the revised RAP\\nresponded to the IEPA’s questions and concerns, contained\\nnew information for the IEPA to consider, and included a new\\nproposed remedy.\\n Second, even if it were “newly discovered” evidence, the\\ndistrict court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the\\nIEPA’s approval of the revised RAP would not have changed\\nthe outcome. According to plaintiffs, the district court’s denial\\nof injunctive relief was predicated on the IEPA’s rejection of\\nGE’s initial RAP. For that reason, they claim that the IEPA’s\\nacceptance of the revised RAP that did not require any addi-\\ntional remedies is a basis upon which the district court should\\nhave reconsidered injunctive relief. In support, plaintiffs\\npointed to the district court’s statement that “[t]he IEPA’s ac-\\ntions, including the latest [RAP] rejection, is strong evidence\\nthat Plaintiffs’ injuries are being remedied in the parallel state-\\ncourt proceeding.” In denying the Rule 62.1 motion, however,\\nthe district court explained that plaintiffs misunderstood its\\nruling: “The [c]ourt merely used the IEPA’s most recent rejec-\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\ntion to highlight that the IEPA had been making well-rea-\\nsoned decisions under the Consent Order and had challenged\\nnumerous actions [GE] had taken ….” Noting that plaintiffs\\nwere using the approval of the revised RAP to make the same\\narguments the court had rejected throughout the case, the dis-\\ntrict court concluded that plaintiffs had not offered any newly\\ndiscovered evidence that would necessitate injunctive relief.\\n The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying\\nthe motions for indicative relief and for reconsideration.\\n C. State Law Tort Claims\\n Lastly, plaintiffs assert that the district court erred in\\ngranting summary judgment to GE on their state law claims\\nof nuisance, trespass, and negligence. We review a grant of\\nsummary judgment de novo, viewing the record in a light\\nmost favorable to the nonmoving party. Minerva Dairy, Inc. v.\\nHarsdorf, 905 F.3d 1047, 1053 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n In Illinois, the statute of limitations for tort claims for dam-\\nage to property is five years. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-205. It is\\nundisputed that, here, Lowell Beggs knew about the contam-\\nination of the golf course from the GE plant at the time he\\npurchased the property in 2007, but he did not file suit until\\nNovember 2013, more than five years later. Plaintiffs argue,\\nhowever, that GE is committing a continuous violation be-\\ncause it “is doing nothing to stop its contamination from mi-\\ngrating,” and that, under the continuing tort doctrine, the\\nfive-year statute of limitations does not bar their claims.\\n “[W]hen ‘a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury,\\nthe limitations period does not begin to run until the date of\\nthe last injury or the date the tortious acts cease.’” Brooks v.\\nRoss, 578 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Belleville Toyota\\n\\fNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 29\\n\\nv. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 770 N.E.2d 177, 190 (Ill. 2002)).\\nThe problem with plaintiffs’ argument is that the “continu-\\ning” action they allege is not that GE is continuing to release\\ncontaminants, but that the original contamination is continu-\\ning to migrate. However, “[a] continuing violation or tort is\\noccasioned by continuing unlawful acts and conduct, not by\\ncontinual ill effects from an initial violation.” Feltmeier v. Felt-\\nmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 85 (Ill. 2003); see Village of DePue v. Viacom\\nInt’l, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 2d 774, 779 (C.D. Ill. 2010) (continuing\\ntort doctrine did not apply where plaintiff’s allegations were\\nlimited to injury from water flowing from contaminated site\\nbecause tortious conduct had ceased when manufacturing at\\nsite ended years prior); Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Tang Indus., Inc.,\\n998 F.Supp. 889, 896–97 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (continuing tort doc-\\ntrine did not apply where defendant stopped dumping con-\\ntaminants years prior, “although the effects from [defend-\\nant]’s violations may be persisting”). The continuing migra-\\ntion plaintiffs allege is merely an ill effect from the original\\nviolation, not a continuing unlawful act.\\n Nor does plaintiffs’ assertion that GE retains possession of\\nthe plant and has mismanaged the remediation suffice as a\\ncontinuing injury. As the district court explained, application\\nof the continuing tort doctrine “turns on continuing conduct,\\nnot continuing ownership or continuing injury.” Compare Vil-\\nlage of DePue, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 779 (“merely owning the Site”\\nafter contamination insufficient for liability under continuing\\ntort doctrine), with City of Evanston v. Texaco, Inc., 19 F. Supp.\\n3d 817, 827–28 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (continuing tort doctrine ap-\\nplied “at least at the pleadings stage” where defendant’s un-\\nderground tanks allegedly continued leaking contaminants\\ninto the environment even though defendant no longer\\nowned the property). That GE retains possession of the plant\\n\\f30 Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\\n\\nis of no import where there is a lack of demonstrated contin-\\nuing unlawful conduct.\\n Because plaintiffs do not allege a continuing unlawful act\\nnecessary to invoke the continuing tort doctrine, we affirm the\\ngrant of summary judgment to GE on plaintiffs’ state law tort\\nclaims.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\\ndistrict court.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1162,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4596361,"string":"4,596,361"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Jason Galloway"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1304"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1304\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nJASON GALLOWAY,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division.\\n No. 3:16-cr-00012-RLY-MPB-1 — Richard L. Young, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 4, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Jason Galloway pleaded guilty to\\npossessing ammunition as a felon. He now appeals his\\nsentence, raising an unpreserved argument that the district\\ncourt used an incorrect guideline range. We dismiss his\\nappeal, however, because in his plea agreement Galloway\\nwaived his appellate rights.\\n\\f2 No. 18-1304\\n\\n I.\\n On January 21, 2016, police officers responded to a domes-\\ntic violence 911 call from Galloway’s ex-wife in Evansville,\\nIndiana. The officers found Galloway a short distance from\\nhis ex-wife’s house and arrested him. A search incident to\\narrest yielded four bullets from his pant pocket. Galloway, a\\nconvicted felon, was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g)(1) by possessing a firearm (a revolver found at his\\nex-wife’s house) and ammunition (the bullets in his pocket).\\n Before trial, the parties reached an agreement in which\\nGalloway pleaded guilty to the ammunition count in\\nexchange for dismissal of the firearm count (among other\\nthings). The written plea agreement that Galloway signed\\ncontained the following appellate waiver, which we repeat in\\nfull because of its importance to this case:\\n 24. Direct Appeal: The defendant under-\\n stands that the defendant has a statutory right\\n to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed\\n and the manner in which the sentence was\\n determined. Acknowledging this right, and in\\n exchange for the concessions made by the Gov-\\n ernment in this Plea Agreement, the defendant\\n expressly waives the defendant’s right to appeal\\n the conviction imposed in this case on any\\n ground, including the right to appeal conferred\\n by 18 U.S.C. § 3742. The defendant further\\n agrees that in the event the Court sentences the\\n defendant to a sentence higher or lower than\\n any recommendation of either party, regardless\\n of the defendant’s criminal history category or\\n how the sentence is calculated by the Court,\\n\\fNo. 18-1304 3\\n\\n then the defendant expressly waives the\\n defendant’s right to appeal the sentence\\n imposed in this case on any ground, including\\n the right to appeal conferred by 18 U.S.C.\\n § 3742. This waiver of appeal specifically\\n includes all provisions of the guilty plea and\\n sentence imposed, including the length and\\n conditions [of] supervised release and the\\n amount of any fine.\\nPetition to Enter Plea of Guilty and Plea Agreement at ¶24,\\nECF No. 68.\\n The second sentence in the paragraph above explains\\nGalloway unconditionally waived his right to appeal his\\nconviction. With respect to sentencing issues, however, the\\nthird sentence conditions Galloway’s appellate waiver on a\\ndeviation by the district court from a recommendation made\\nby one of the parties.\\n At the change of plea hearing, the district court reviewed\\nthe language of the appellate waiver verbatim. The district\\ncourt also engaged in the following colloquy with Galloway:\\n THE COURT: Mr. Galloway, what this\\n paragraph tells us is that in exchange for\\n concessions made to you by the United States in\\n arriving at this plea agreement, if I accept the\\n plea agreement and sentence you pursuant to\\n the plea agreement, then you’ll be giving up or\\n waiving your right to appeal the conviction and\\n sentence in this case to a higher court. Is that\\n your understanding as well?\\n GALLOWAY: Yes, sir.\\n\\f4 No. 18-1304\\n\\n THE COURT: Did you discuss this with your\\n attorney?\\n GALLOWAY: Yeah, we did.\\n THE COURT: Is this all voluntary?\\n GALLOWAY: Yes.\\nFollowing this exchange, the district court accepted\\nGalloway’s guilty plea and set a date for sentencing.\\n The probation officer’s sentencing recommendation stated\\nGalloway’s guideline range would have been 130 to 162\\nmonths in prison, were it not capped by the 120-month\\nstatutory maximum. The government filed a sentencing\\nmemorandum asking the district court to give Galloway the\\nfull 120 months. Galloway did not file a sentencing memoran-\\ndum, nor did he lodge any written objections to the probation\\nofficer’s guideline calculations.\\n At sentencing, Galloway’s attorney told the court he had\\ndetermined, after reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines and\\napplicable case law, that “there was no way to make an objec-\\ntion to the probation officer’s findings” and that he believed\\nher guideline calculations were correct. Defense counsel did\\nargue the guideline range “clearly overstate[s] the events that\\ntook place that night and can and should be addressed by way\\nof a departure by this Court.” For its part, the government\\nreiterated its position that 120 months was the correct prison\\nterm.\\n After hearing argument, the district court sentenced\\nGalloway to 120 months in prison, three years of supervised\\nrelease, a $1,000 fine, and a $100 special assessment. The\\ndistrict court also informed Galloway that, in its opinion,\\n\\fNo. 18-1304 5\\n\\nGalloway had waived his appellate rights because the\\nsentence was “pursuant to the plea agreement” and “below\\nwhat the guidelines call for.” Galloway nevertheless appealed\\nthe sentence.\\n II.\\n A defendant may waive appellate rights through a plea\\nagreement, assuming such waiver is voluntary and knowing.\\nUnited States v. Worthen, 842 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2016)\\n(“Generally speaking, appeal waivers are enforceable and\\npreclude appellate review.”) (citing United States v. Sines, 303\\nF.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2002)); see also United States v. Malone,\\n815 F.3d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 2016). A written appellate waiver\\nsigned by the defendant will typically be voluntary and\\nknowing, and thus enforceable through dismissal of a subse-\\nquent appeal. United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 668 (7th\\nCir. 1999).\\n Here, Galloway does not dispute that he voluntarily and\\nknowingly agreed to the waiver in his plea agreement—a\\nsensible concession after his plea colloquy. Galloway instead\\nargues the waiver, according to its own terms, does not apply.\\nSee Garza v. Idaho, No. 17-1026, 2019 WL 938523, at *4 (U.S.\\nFeb. 27, 2019) (“As courts widely agree, a valid and enforcea-\\nble appeal waiver only precludes challenges that fall within\\nits scope.”) (internal punctuation marks and citation omitted);\\nsee also United States v. Chapa, 602 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nGalloway asserts the district court did not impose a “sentence\\nhigher or lower than any recommendation of either party”\\nbecause it followed the government’s recommendation for a\\n120-month prison term and he (allegedly) did not make any\\n“recommendation” whatsoever.\\n\\f6 No. 18-1304\\n\\n We interpret plea agreements—including appellate\\nwaivers contained within them—according to ordinary\\nprinciples of contract law. Malone, 815 F.3d at 370. Unambig-\\nuous terms must be given their plain meaning. Id. But we\\nconsider the parties’ reasonable expectations and construe\\nambiguous terms in the light most favorable to the defendant.\\nUnited States v. O’Doherty, 643 F.3d 209, 217 (7th Cir. 2011); see\\nalso United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n The language used in this appellate waiver is unusual.1 If\\nthe district court did not deviate from “any recommendation”\\nmade by either party regarding sentencing, then the waiver is\\nnot triggered. Thus, the viability of Galloway’s appeal relies\\non his premise that his lawyer’s sentencing arguments did not\\nconstitute a recommendation because they did not include a\\nspecific proposal for a certain length of incarceration. We see\\nno authority for such a restrictive interpretation of the term\\n“recommendation.”\\n True, sentencing recommendations often take the form of\\na requested term of imprisonment, which frequently includes\\na number or range of months. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York,\\n404 U.S. 257, 259 (1971) (government “recommended the max-\\nimum one-year sentence”); United States v. Peterson, 891 F.3d\\n296, 300 (7th Cir. 2018) (defendant filed a “recommendation”\\nasking “for a sentence of only one day time served”). But the\\nword “recommendation” (as used in the context of federal\\nsentencings) does not exclusively refer to a proposed length\\nof custody: other suggestions regarding the terms of a\\n\\n\\n 1 Counsel for both parties represented to the court at oral argument\\nthat, in their experience, the waiver language at issue is uncommon in\\nfederal plea agreements and perhaps a unique local practice.\\n\\fNo. 18-1304 7\\n\\ndefendant’s sentence count as well. See, e.g., United States v.\\nSmith, 906 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2018) (referring to proposed\\nsupervised release conditions as part of a “sentencing recom-\\nmendation”); United States v. Stochel, 901 F.3d 883, 887 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (calling proffered offense level calculations “sentencing\\nrecommendations”); United States v. Harris, 843 F.3d 311, 313\\n(7th Cir. 2016) (describing a joint “recommendation” regard-\\ning criminal history calculations); United States v. Morris, 836\\nF.3d 868, 869 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining a plea agreement\\nrequired the government “to make several specific sentencing\\nrecommendations” on different issues).\\n Although Galloway’s lawyer may not have spelled out the\\nnumber of months he proposed Galloway should spend\\nbehind bars, he unmistakably advocated for a\\nbelow-guideline sentence. He told the district court, “[T]he\\nfindings of the probation officer clearly overstate the events\\nthat took place that night and can and should be addressed\\nby way of a departure by this Court.” Defense counsel\\nconcluded his argument by saying, “While I agree the\\ncriminal history speaks for itself, I also think there’s a whole\\nlot more to this story and how this fit[s] together, and I do\\nthink Jason is an appropriate person for the Court to issue a\\ndeparture on.” Galloway’s lawyer’s comments can be read\\nonly as a request that the district court sentence Galloway to\\nsomething less than the 120-month statutory maximum. Such\\nstatements constitute a “recommendation” for purposes of\\nthe plea agreement. See Recommendation, BLACK’S LAW\\nDICTIONARY (10 ed. 2014) (“A specific piece of advice about\\nwhat to do, esp. when given officially.”); see also Recommend,\\nBALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (“To advise in\\nfavor of a course of action to be taken.”); Recommend,\\nWEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961)\\n\\f8 No. 18-1304\\n\\n(“[T]o mention or introduce as being worthy of acceptance,\\nuse, or trial.”).\\n To be sure, there exists a grey area between simple oral\\nadvocacy at a hearing and making a sentencing “recommen-\\ndation.” Compare United States v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 475 (7th\\nCir. 2016) (holding the government did not make a\\nrecommendation when describing the defendant’s conduct as\\n“horrific,” “egregious,” “aggravated,” etc.) with United States\\nv. Salazar, 453 F.3d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting the\\ngovernment may breach a commitment to recommend a\\nparticular sentence by “requesting a light sentence while\\nsimultaneously arguing forcefully that a defendant is\\nvicious”). But even if Galloway’s lawyer did not understand\\nhe was making a recommendation, this would not render the\\nterm “recommendation” ambiguous. Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA &\\nBRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 31–32 (2012) (distinguishing\\nambiguity from vagueness and noting “[a] word or phrase is\\nambiguous when the question is which of two or more\\nmeanings applies; it is vague when its unquestionable mean-\\ning has uncertain application to various factual situations”);\\nVesuvius USA Corp. v. American Commercial Lines LLC, 910 F.3d\\n331, 334 (7th Cir. 2018) (recognizing a term is not ambiguous\\nmerely because the parties disagree as to the proper interpre-\\ntation). Galloway’s interpretation proposes he could have his\\ncake and eat it too: defense counsel could advocate for a\\nbelow-guideline prison term so long as he avoided magic\\nwords triggering the appellate waiver. Such a strained\\ninterpretation of “recommendation” is not reasonable.\\n In short, the argument by Galloway’s lawyer asking the\\ndistrict court to depart from the guideline range qualifies as a\\n“recommendation” within the plain meaning of the plea\\n\\fNo. 18-1304 9\\n\\nagreement’s appellate waiver. Although the waiver language\\nused in this plea agreement is anomalous, that does not\\nrender Galloway’s voluntary and knowing waiver of his\\nappellate rights any less valid or enforceable. Cf. Williams, 184\\nF.3d at 669 (“[T]he fact that we could envision a more precise\\ncolloquy does not alone render this appeal waiver invalid.”).\\n III.\\n Because Galloway waived his appellate rights, we have no\\noccasion to reach his merits arguments. United States v.\\nJemison, 237 F.3d 911, 916 (7th Cir. 2001). This appeal is\\nDISMISSED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4373614/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4596361/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Jason Galloway\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1304\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nJASON GALLOWAY,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division.\n No. 3:16-cr-00012-RLY-MPB-1 — Richard L. Young, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 4, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Jason Galloway pleaded guilty to\npossessing ammunition as a felon. He now appeals his\nsentence, raising an unpreserved argument that the district\ncourt used an incorrect guideline range. We dismiss his\nappeal, however, because in his plea agreement Galloway\nwaived his appellate rights.\n\f2 No. 18-1304\n\n I.\n On January 21, 2016, police officers responded to a domes-\ntic violence 911 call from Galloway’s ex-wife in Evansville,\nIndiana. The officers found Galloway a short distance from\nhis ex-wife’s house and arrested him. A search incident to\narrest yielded four bullets from his pant pocket. Galloway, a\nconvicted felon, was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C.\n§ 922(g)(1) by possessing a firearm (a revolver found at his\nex-wife’s house) and ammunition (the bullets in his pocket).\n Before trial, the parties reached an agreement in which\nGalloway pleaded guilty to the ammunition count in\nexchange for dismissal of the firearm count (among other\nthings). The written plea agreement that Galloway signed\ncontained the following appellate waiver, which we repeat in\nfull because of its importance to this case:\n 24. Direct Appeal: The defendant under-\n stands that the defendant has a statutory right\n to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed\n and the manner in which the sentence was\n determined. Acknowledging this right, and in\n exchange for the concessions made by the Gov-\n ernment in this Plea Agreement, the defendant\n expressly waives the defendant’s right to appeal\n the conviction imposed in this case on any\n ground, including the right to appeal conferred\n by 18 U.S.C. § 3742. The defendant further\n agrees that in the event the Court sentences the\n defendant to a sentence higher or lower than\n any recommendation of either party, regardless\n of the defendant’s criminal history category or\n how the sentence is calculated by the Court,\n\fNo. 18-1304 3\n\n then the defendant expressly waives the\n defendant’s right to appeal the sentence\n imposed in this case on any ground, including\n the right to appeal conferred by 18 U.S.C.\n § 3742. This waiver of appeal specifically\n includes all provisions of the guilty plea and\n sentence imposed, including the length and\n conditions [of] supervised release and the\n amount of any fine.\nPetition to Enter Plea of Guilty and Plea Agreement at ¶24,\nECF No. 68.\n The second sentence in the paragraph above explains\nGalloway unconditionally waived his right to appeal his\nconviction. With respect to sentencing issues, however, the\nthird sentence conditions Galloway’s appellate waiver on a\ndeviation by the district court from a recommendation made\nby one of the parties.\n At the change of plea hearing, the district court reviewed\nthe language of the appellate waiver verbatim. The district\ncourt also engaged in the following colloquy with Galloway:\n THE COURT: Mr. Galloway, what this\n paragraph tells us is that in exchange for\n concessions made to you by the United States in\n arriving at this plea agreement, if I accept the\n plea agreement and sentence you pursuant to\n the plea agreement, then you’ll be giving up or\n waiving your right to appeal the conviction and\n sentence in this case to a higher court. Is that\n your understanding as well?\n GALLOWAY: Yes, sir.\n\f4 No. 18-1304\n\n THE COURT: Did you discuss this with your\n attorney?\n GALLOWAY: Yeah, we did.\n THE COURT: Is this all voluntary?\n GALLOWAY: Yes.\nFollowing this exchange, the district court accepted\nGalloway’s guilty plea and set a date for sentencing.\n The probation officer’s sentencing recommendation stated\nGalloway’s guideline range would have been 130 to 162\nmonths in prison, were it not capped by the 120-month\nstatutory maximum. The government filed a sentencing\nmemorandum asking the district court to give Galloway the\nfull 120 months. Galloway did not file a sentencing memoran-\ndum, nor did he lodge any written objections to the probation\nofficer’s guideline calculations.\n At sentencing, Galloway’s attorney told the court he had\ndetermined, after reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines and\napplicable case law, that “there was no way to make an objec-\ntion to the probation officer’s findings” and that he believed\nher guideline calculations were correct. Defense counsel did\nargue the guideline range “clearly overstate[s] the events that\ntook place that night and can and should be addressed by way\nof a departure by this Court.” For its part, the government\nreiterated its position that 120 months was the correct prison\nterm.\n After hearing argument, the district court sentenced\nGalloway to 120 months in prison, three years of supervised\nrelease, a $1,000 fine, and a $100 special assessment. The\ndistrict court also informed Galloway that, in its opinion,\n\fNo. 18-1304 5\n\nGalloway had waived his appellate rights because the\nsentence was “pursuant to the plea agreement” and “below\nwhat the guidelines call for.” Galloway nevertheless appealed\nthe sentence.\n II.\n A defendant may waive appellate rights through a plea\nagreement, assuming such waiver is voluntary and knowing.\nUnited States v. Worthen, 842 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2016)\n(“Generally speaking, appeal waivers are enforceable and\npreclude appellate review.”) (citing United States v. Sines, 303\nF.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2002)); see also United States v. Malone,\n815 F.3d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 2016). A written appellate waiver\nsigned by the defendant will typically be voluntary and\nknowing, and thus enforceable through dismissal of a subse-\nquent appeal. United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 668 (7th\nCir. 1999).\n Here, Galloway does not dispute that he voluntarily and\nknowingly agreed to the waiver in his plea agreement—a\nsensible concession after his plea colloquy. Galloway instead\nargues the waiver, according to its own terms, does not apply.\nSee Garza v. Idaho, No. 17-1026, 2019 WL 938523, at *4 (U.S.\nFeb. 27, 2019) (“As courts widely agree, a valid and enforcea-\nble appeal waiver only precludes challenges that fall within\nits scope.”) (internal punctuation marks and citation omitted);\nsee also United States v. Chapa, 602 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2010).\nGalloway asserts the district court did not impose a “sentence\nhigher or lower than any recommendation of either party”\nbecause it followed the government’s recommendation for a\n120-month prison term and he (allegedly) did not make any\n“recommendation” whatsoever.\n\f6 No. 18-1304\n\n We interpret plea agreements—including appellate\nwaivers contained within them—according to ordinary\nprinciples of contract law. Malone, 815 F.3d at 370. Unambig-\nuous terms must be given their plain meaning. Id. But we\nconsider the parties’ reasonable expectations and construe\nambiguous terms in the light most favorable to the defendant.\nUnited States v. O’Doherty, 643 F.3d 209, 217 (7th Cir. 2011); see\nalso United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2010).\n The language used in this appellate waiver is unusual.1 If\nthe district court did not deviate from “any recommendation”\nmade by either party regarding sentencing, then the waiver is\nnot triggered. Thus, the viability of Galloway’s appeal relies\non his premise that his lawyer’s sentencing arguments did not\nconstitute a recommendation because they did not include a\nspecific proposal for a certain length of incarceration. We see\nno authority for such a restrictive interpretation of the term\n“recommendation.”\n True, sentencing recommendations often take the form of\na requested term of imprisonment, which frequently includes\na number or range of months. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York,\n404 U.S. 257, 259 (1971) (government “recommended the max-\nimum one-year sentence”); United States v. Peterson, 891 F.3d\n296, 300 (7th Cir. 2018) (defendant filed a “recommendation”\nasking “for a sentence of only one day time served”). But the\nword “recommendation” (as used in the context of federal\nsentencings) does not exclusively refer to a proposed length\nof custody: other suggestions regarding the terms of a\n\n\n 1 Counsel for both parties represented to the court at oral argument\nthat, in their experience, the waiver language at issue is uncommon in\nfederal plea agreements and perhaps a unique local practice.\n\fNo. 18-1304 7\n\ndefendant’s sentence count as well. See, e.g., United States v.\nSmith, 906 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2018) (referring to proposed\nsupervised release conditions as part of a “sentencing recom-\nmendation”); United States v. Stochel, 901 F.3d 883, 887 (7th Cir.\n2018) (calling proffered offense level calculations “sentencing\nrecommendations”); United States v. Harris, 843 F.3d 311, 313\n(7th Cir. 2016) (describing a joint “recommendation” regard-\ning criminal history calculations); United States v. Morris, 836\nF.3d 868, 869 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining a plea agreement\nrequired the government “to make several specific sentencing\nrecommendations” on different issues).\n Although Galloway’s lawyer may not have spelled out the\nnumber of months he proposed Galloway should spend\nbehind bars, he unmistakably advocated for a\nbelow-guideline sentence. He told the district court, “[T]he\nfindings of the probation officer clearly overstate the events\nthat took place that night and can and should be addressed\nby way of a departure by this Court.” Defense counsel\nconcluded his argument by saying, “While I agree the\ncriminal history speaks for itself, I also think there’s a whole\nlot more to this story and how this fit[s] together, and I do\nthink Jason is an appropriate person for the Court to issue a\ndeparture on.” Galloway’s lawyer’s comments can be read\nonly as a request that the district court sentence Galloway to\nsomething less than the 120-month statutory maximum. Such\nstatements constitute a “recommendation” for purposes of\nthe plea agreement. See Recommendation, BLACK’S LAW\nDICTIONARY (10 ed. 2014) (“A specific piece of advice about\nwhat to do, esp. when given officially.”); see also Recommend,\nBALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (“To advise in\nfavor of a course of action to be taken.”); Recommend,\nWEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961)\n\f8 No. 18-1304\n\n(“[T]o mention or introduce as being worthy of acceptance,\nuse, or trial.”).\n To be sure, there exists a grey area between simple oral\nadvocacy at a hearing and making a sentencing “recommen-\ndation.” Compare United States v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 475 (7th\nCir. 2016) (holding the government did not make a\nrecommendation when describing the defendant’s conduct as\n“horrific,” “egregious,” “aggravated,” etc.) with United States\nv. Salazar, 453 F.3d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting the\ngovernment may breach a commitment to recommend a\nparticular sentence by “requesting a light sentence while\nsimultaneously arguing forcefully that a defendant is\nvicious”). But even if Galloway’s lawyer did not understand\nhe was making a recommendation, this would not render the\nterm “recommendation” ambiguous. Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA &\nBRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 31–32 (2012) (distinguishing\nambiguity from vagueness and noting “[a] word or phrase is\nambiguous when the question is which of two or more\nmeanings applies; it is vague when its unquestionable mean-\ning has uncertain application to various factual situations”);\nVesuvius USA Corp. v. American Commercial Lines LLC, 910 F.3d\n331, 334 (7th Cir. 2018) (recognizing a term is not ambiguous\nmerely because the parties disagree as to the proper interpre-\ntation). Galloway’s interpretation proposes he could have his\ncake and eat it too: defense counsel could advocate for a\nbelow-guideline prison term so long as he avoided magic\nwords triggering the appellate waiver. Such a strained\ninterpretation of “recommendation” is not reasonable.\n In short, the argument by Galloway’s lawyer asking the\ndistrict court to depart from the guideline range qualifies as a\n“recommendation” within the plain meaning of the plea\n\fNo. 18-1304 9\n\nagreement’s appellate waiver. Although the waiver language\nused in this plea agreement is anomalous, that does not\nrender Galloway’s voluntary and knowing waiver of his\nappellate rights any less valid or enforceable. Cf. Williams, 184\nF.3d at 669 (“[T]he fact that we could envision a more precise\ncolloquy does not alone render this appeal waiver invalid.”).\n III.\n Because Galloway waived his appellate rights, we have no\noccasion to reach his merits arguments. United States v.\nJemison, 237 F.3d 911, 916 (7th Cir. 2001). This appeal is\nDISMISSED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Jason Galloway\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1304\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nJASON GALLOWAY,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division.\\n No. 3:16-cr-00012-RLY-MPB-1 — Richard L. Young, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 4, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Jason Galloway pleaded guilty to\\npossessing ammunition as a felon. He now appeals his\\nsentence, raising an unpreserved argument that the district\\ncourt used an incorrect guideline range. We dismiss his\\nappeal, however, because in his plea agreement Galloway\\nwaived his appellate rights.\\n\\f2 No. 18-1304\\n\\n I.\\n On January 21, 2016, police officers responded to a domes-\\ntic violence 911 call from Galloway’s ex-wife in Evansville,\\nIndiana. The officers found Galloway a short distance from\\nhis ex-wife’s house and arrested him. A search incident to\\narrest yielded four bullets from his pant pocket. Galloway, a\\nconvicted felon, was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g)(1) by possessing a firearm (a revolver found at his\\nex-wife’s house) and ammunition (the bullets in his pocket).\\n Before trial, the parties reached an agreement in which\\nGalloway pleaded guilty to the ammunition count in\\nexchange for dismissal of the firearm count (among other\\nthings). The written plea agreement that Galloway signed\\ncontained the following appellate waiver, which we repeat in\\nfull because of its importance to this case:\\n 24. Direct Appeal: The defendant under-\\n stands that the defendant has a statutory right\\n to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed\\n and the manner in which the sentence was\\n determined. Acknowledging this right, and in\\n exchange for the concessions made by the Gov-\\n ernment in this Plea Agreement, the defendant\\n expressly waives the defendant’s right to appeal\\n the conviction imposed in this case on any\\n ground, including the right to appeal conferred\\n by 18 U.S.C. § 3742. The defendant further\\n agrees that in the event the Court sentences the\\n defendant to a sentence higher or lower than\\n any recommendation of either party, regardless\\n of the defendant’s criminal history category or\\n how the sentence is calculated by the Court,\\n\\fNo. 18-1304 3\\n\\n then the defendant expressly waives the\\n defendant’s right to appeal the sentence\\n imposed in this case on any ground, including\\n the right to appeal conferred by 18 U.S.C.\\n § 3742. This waiver of appeal specifically\\n includes all provisions of the guilty plea and\\n sentence imposed, including the length and\\n conditions [of] supervised release and the\\n amount of any fine.\\nPetition to Enter Plea of Guilty and Plea Agreement at ¶24,\\nECF No. 68.\\n The second sentence in the paragraph above explains\\nGalloway unconditionally waived his right to appeal his\\nconviction. With respect to sentencing issues, however, the\\nthird sentence conditions Galloway’s appellate waiver on a\\ndeviation by the district court from a recommendation made\\nby one of the parties.\\n At the change of plea hearing, the district court reviewed\\nthe language of the appellate waiver verbatim. The district\\ncourt also engaged in the following colloquy with Galloway:\\n THE COURT: Mr. Galloway, what this\\n paragraph tells us is that in exchange for\\n concessions made to you by the United States in\\n arriving at this plea agreement, if I accept the\\n plea agreement and sentence you pursuant to\\n the plea agreement, then you’ll be giving up or\\n waiving your right to appeal the conviction and\\n sentence in this case to a higher court. Is that\\n your understanding as well?\\n GALLOWAY: Yes, sir.\\n\\f4 No. 18-1304\\n\\n THE COURT: Did you discuss this with your\\n attorney?\\n GALLOWAY: Yeah, we did.\\n THE COURT: Is this all voluntary?\\n GALLOWAY: Yes.\\nFollowing this exchange, the district court accepted\\nGalloway’s guilty plea and set a date for sentencing.\\n The probation officer’s sentencing recommendation stated\\nGalloway’s guideline range would have been 130 to 162\\nmonths in prison, were it not capped by the 120-month\\nstatutory maximum. The government filed a sentencing\\nmemorandum asking the district court to give Galloway the\\nfull 120 months. Galloway did not file a sentencing memoran-\\ndum, nor did he lodge any written objections to the probation\\nofficer’s guideline calculations.\\n At sentencing, Galloway’s attorney told the court he had\\ndetermined, after reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines and\\napplicable case law, that “there was no way to make an objec-\\ntion to the probation officer’s findings” and that he believed\\nher guideline calculations were correct. Defense counsel did\\nargue the guideline range “clearly overstate[s] the events that\\ntook place that night and can and should be addressed by way\\nof a departure by this Court.” For its part, the government\\nreiterated its position that 120 months was the correct prison\\nterm.\\n After hearing argument, the district court sentenced\\nGalloway to 120 months in prison, three years of supervised\\nrelease, a $1,000 fine, and a $100 special assessment. The\\ndistrict court also informed Galloway that, in its opinion,\\n\\fNo. 18-1304 5\\n\\nGalloway had waived his appellate rights because the\\nsentence was “pursuant to the plea agreement” and “below\\nwhat the guidelines call for.” Galloway nevertheless appealed\\nthe sentence.\\n II.\\n A defendant may waive appellate rights through a plea\\nagreement, assuming such waiver is voluntary and knowing.\\nUnited States v. Worthen, 842 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2016)\\n(“Generally speaking, appeal waivers are enforceable and\\npreclude appellate review.”) (citing United States v. Sines, 303\\nF.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2002)); see also United States v. Malone,\\n815 F.3d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 2016). A written appellate waiver\\nsigned by the defendant will typically be voluntary and\\nknowing, and thus enforceable through dismissal of a subse-\\nquent appeal. United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 668 (7th\\nCir. 1999).\\n Here, Galloway does not dispute that he voluntarily and\\nknowingly agreed to the waiver in his plea agreement—a\\nsensible concession after his plea colloquy. Galloway instead\\nargues the waiver, according to its own terms, does not apply.\\nSee Garza v. Idaho, No. 17-1026, 2019 WL 938523, at *4 (U.S.\\nFeb. 27, 2019) (“As courts widely agree, a valid and enforcea-\\nble appeal waiver only precludes challenges that fall within\\nits scope.”) (internal punctuation marks and citation omitted);\\nsee also United States v. Chapa, 602 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nGalloway asserts the district court did not impose a “sentence\\nhigher or lower than any recommendation of either party”\\nbecause it followed the government’s recommendation for a\\n120-month prison term and he (allegedly) did not make any\\n“recommendation” whatsoever.\\n\\f6 No. 18-1304\\n\\n We interpret plea agreements—including appellate\\nwaivers contained within them—according to ordinary\\nprinciples of contract law. Malone, 815 F.3d at 370. Unambig-\\nuous terms must be given their plain meaning. Id. But we\\nconsider the parties’ reasonable expectations and construe\\nambiguous terms in the light most favorable to the defendant.\\nUnited States v. O’Doherty, 643 F.3d 209, 217 (7th Cir. 2011); see\\nalso United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n The language used in this appellate waiver is unusual.1 If\\nthe district court did not deviate from “any recommendation”\\nmade by either party regarding sentencing, then the waiver is\\nnot triggered. Thus, the viability of Galloway’s appeal relies\\non his premise that his lawyer’s sentencing arguments did not\\nconstitute a recommendation because they did not include a\\nspecific proposal for a certain length of incarceration. We see\\nno authority for such a restrictive interpretation of the term\\n“recommendation.”\\n True, sentencing recommendations often take the form of\\na requested term of imprisonment, which frequently includes\\na number or range of months. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York,\\n404 U.S. 257, 259 (1971) (government “recommended the max-\\nimum one-year sentence”); United States v. Peterson, 891 F.3d\\n296, 300 (7th Cir. 2018) (defendant filed a “recommendation”\\nasking “for a sentence of only one day time served”). But the\\nword “recommendation” (as used in the context of federal\\nsentencings) does not exclusively refer to a proposed length\\nof custody: other suggestions regarding the terms of a\\n\\n\\n 1 Counsel for both parties represented to the court at oral argument\\nthat, in their experience, the waiver language at issue is uncommon in\\nfederal plea agreements and perhaps a unique local practice.\\n\\fNo. 18-1304 7\\n\\ndefendant’s sentence count as well. See, e.g., United States v.\\nSmith, 906 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 2018) (referring to proposed\\nsupervised release conditions as part of a “sentencing recom-\\nmendation”); United States v. Stochel, 901 F.3d 883, 887 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (calling proffered offense level calculations “sentencing\\nrecommendations”); United States v. Harris, 843 F.3d 311, 313\\n(7th Cir. 2016) (describing a joint “recommendation” regard-\\ning criminal history calculations); United States v. Morris, 836\\nF.3d 868, 869 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining a plea agreement\\nrequired the government “to make several specific sentencing\\nrecommendations” on different issues).\\n Although Galloway’s lawyer may not have spelled out the\\nnumber of months he proposed Galloway should spend\\nbehind bars, he unmistakably advocated for a\\nbelow-guideline sentence. He told the district court, “[T]he\\nfindings of the probation officer clearly overstate the events\\nthat took place that night and can and should be addressed\\nby way of a departure by this Court.” Defense counsel\\nconcluded his argument by saying, “While I agree the\\ncriminal history speaks for itself, I also think there’s a whole\\nlot more to this story and how this fit[s] together, and I do\\nthink Jason is an appropriate person for the Court to issue a\\ndeparture on.” Galloway’s lawyer’s comments can be read\\nonly as a request that the district court sentence Galloway to\\nsomething less than the 120-month statutory maximum. Such\\nstatements constitute a “recommendation” for purposes of\\nthe plea agreement. See Recommendation, BLACK’S LAW\\nDICTIONARY (10 ed. 2014) (“A specific piece of advice about\\nwhat to do, esp. when given officially.”); see also Recommend,\\nBALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (“To advise in\\nfavor of a course of action to be taken.”); Recommend,\\nWEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961)\\n\\f8 No. 18-1304\\n\\n(“[T]o mention or introduce as being worthy of acceptance,\\nuse, or trial.”).\\n To be sure, there exists a grey area between simple oral\\nadvocacy at a hearing and making a sentencing “recommen-\\ndation.” Compare United States v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 475 (7th\\nCir. 2016) (holding the government did not make a\\nrecommendation when describing the defendant’s conduct as\\n“horrific,” “egregious,” “aggravated,” etc.) with United States\\nv. Salazar, 453 F.3d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting the\\ngovernment may breach a commitment to recommend a\\nparticular sentence by “requesting a light sentence while\\nsimultaneously arguing forcefully that a defendant is\\nvicious”). But even if Galloway’s lawyer did not understand\\nhe was making a recommendation, this would not render the\\nterm “recommendation” ambiguous. Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA &\\nBRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 31–32 (2012) (distinguishing\\nambiguity from vagueness and noting “[a] word or phrase is\\nambiguous when the question is which of two or more\\nmeanings applies; it is vague when its unquestionable mean-\\ning has uncertain application to various factual situations”);\\nVesuvius USA Corp. v. American Commercial Lines LLC, 910 F.3d\\n331, 334 (7th Cir. 2018) (recognizing a term is not ambiguous\\nmerely because the parties disagree as to the proper interpre-\\ntation). Galloway’s interpretation proposes he could have his\\ncake and eat it too: defense counsel could advocate for a\\nbelow-guideline prison term so long as he avoided magic\\nwords triggering the appellate waiver. Such a strained\\ninterpretation of “recommendation” is not reasonable.\\n In short, the argument by Galloway’s lawyer asking the\\ndistrict court to depart from the guideline range qualifies as a\\n“recommendation” within the plain meaning of the plea\\n\\fNo. 18-1304 9\\n\\nagreement’s appellate waiver. Although the waiver language\\nused in this plea agreement is anomalous, that does not\\nrender Galloway’s voluntary and knowing waiver of his\\nappellate rights any less valid or enforceable. Cf. Williams, 184\\nF.3d at 669 (“[T]he fact that we could envision a more precise\\ncolloquy does not alone render this appeal waiver invalid.”).\\n III.\\n Because Galloway waived his appellate rights, we have no\\noccasion to reach his merits arguments. United States v.\\nJemison, 237 F.3d 911, 916 (7th Cir. 2001). This appeal is\\nDISMISSED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1163,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443911,"string":"8,443,911"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"LAJIM, LLC v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"LAJIM, LLC v. Gen. Elec. Co."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Flaum, Hamilton, Kanne\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415342/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443911/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: LAJIM, LLC v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: LAJIM, LLC v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1164,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4597177,"string":"4,597,177"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"William LIEBHART & Nancy Liebhart, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SPX CORPORATION, TRC Environmental Corporation, & Apollo Dismantling Services, Inc. Defendants-Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1918 & 18-2598"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Bauer, Kanne, Brennan\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Michael Stephen Kanne\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\nWILLIAM LIEBHART & NANCY LIEBHART,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nSPX CORPORATION, TRC ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION, &\\nAPOLLO DISMANTLING SERVICES, INC.\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-700 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n KANNE, Circuit Judge. William and Nancy Liebhart to-\\ngether own three houses on the same block in Watertown,\\nWisconsin. Besides a few other houses, the rest of the block\\nwas previously occupied by an abandoned transformer fac-\\ntory, last owned by SPX Corporation. In 2014, SPX demol-\\nished the building with the assistance of TRC Environmental\\nCorporation and Apollo Dismantling Services (collectively,\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n“the defendants”). The Liebharts allege that dust and debris\\ncontaining toxic chemicals migrated onto their properties,\\ncontaminating their yards and jeopardizing their health and\\nthe health of their tenants.\\n The Liebharts sued under federal statutes authorizing pri-\\nvate rights of action for environmental contamination. They\\nalso brought various state-law claims. Following discovery\\nand the submission of expert witness reports, the district\\ncourt denied the Liebharts’ motion for partial summary judg-\\nment and granted summary judgment to the defendants with\\ncosts. Although the district court adequately evaluated the ex-\\npert witnesses and did not abuse its discretion in its proce-\\ndural decisions, the court set the bar unnecessarily high for\\nthe plaintiffs to show a violation of the applicable federal stat-\\nutes. For that reason, we vacate the district court’s judgment\\nand remand for reconsideration.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n The factory dates to the 1920s and was used to manufac-\\nture various industrial equipment. Most relevant to our pur-\\npose, the factory manufactured power transformers contain-\\ning polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a carcinogenic chemi-\\ncal banned by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1979.\\nSee Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Pro-\\ncessing, Distribution in Commerce, and Use Prohibitions, 44\\nFed. Reg. 31,514 (May 31, 1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 761).\\nThe parties all agree that the facility has not manufactured or\\nhandled any items containing PCBs since 1971, and that it\\nshut down completely in 2005.\\n But even with all the products and manufacturing equip-\\nment removed, PCB contaminants remained in the facility. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 3\\n\\n2009, SPX retained TRC and another company (not named as\\na defendant in this suit) to study the property and determine\\nthe extent and precise location of any PCB contamination.\\nThose studies revealed that the concrete floor of the factory\\nwas generally contaminated, with concentrated amounts lo-\\ncated in specific areas throughout the site.\\n Several years went by. In 2014, SPX decided to move ahead\\nwith the demolition, retaining Apollo to conduct the work\\nand TRC to supervise the project. That November, the defend-\\nants timely proposed a self-implementing cleanup plan to the\\nEPA, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 761.61(a). The trouble began\\nas demolition commenced in January 2015. The Liebharts al-\\nlege that Apollo demolished the building recklessly, failing to\\nuse appropriate safety methods to control the dust generated\\nby demolition equipment. They assert that their properties\\nwere covered in dust, and they submitted hundreds of photos\\nand videos of dust from the facility blowing toward their\\nhomes to support their allegation.\\n The Liebharts filed a complaint with the local government\\nin February. They also collected a dust-covered sample of\\nsnow from their yard and placed it in a mason jar. Soon there-\\nafter, a representative of the Wisconsin Department of Natu-\\nral Resources (“DNR”) contacted the defendants about the\\nLiebharts’ concerns. In April, TRC collected samples of the\\nsurface soil (roughly down to eight inches below ground) on\\nboth the industrial and residential properties. Sure enough,\\nthe properties tested positive for the presence of PCBs. In Au-\\ngust, the Liebharts vacated the property on advice of their\\nphysician to avoid further exposure to the chemicals. Frus-\\ntrated with the lack of action, William Liebhart had the snow\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nsample tested for PCBs. Although the sample did, in fact, con-\\ntain PCBs, the irregular manner of collection and storage\\nspoiled the sample, and the laboratory declined to endorse the\\nresults with any confidence.\\n In September 2015, SPX submitted a plan to remediate the\\ncontamination to the DNR. In turn, the Liebharts sued in fed-\\neral district court in October. The complaint sought injunctive\\nrelief under both the Resource Conservation and Recovery\\nAct (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and the Toxic Substances\\nControl Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. In addition, the\\nLiebharts brought a host of state-law claims under supple-\\nmental jurisdiction, including strict liability, negligence, tres-\\npass, nuisance, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.\\n During discovery, the Liebharts submitted to further test-\\ning for PCBs both in their yard and inside their home. They\\nalso underwent blood testing. Although the external surveys\\nrevealed a more comprehensive picture of the extent to which\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ properties contained PCBs, the in-\\nternal sampling and blood tests were both negative for con-\\ntamination. The Liebharts later learned in October 2017 that\\nthe defendants allegedly buried some of the concrete remains\\non-site rather than removing them to a toxic waste dump as\\nrequired by the EPA-approved clean-up plan.\\n The parties prepared and submitted the reports of the ex-\\npert witnesses who were to testify at trial. Among those, three\\nare pertinent to our discussion. First, the Liebharts submitted\\na report by John Woodyard, a licensed professional engineer.\\nHis report included a description of standard methods used\\nwhen demolishing PCB-contaminated buildings and an anal-\\nysis of the purported ways in which the defendants deviated\\nfrom those practices, thereby causing the contamination of the\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 5\\n\\nresidences. The Liebharts’ second expert was Dr. David Car-\\npenter, a public health physician who opined on ways in\\nwhich the Liebharts might have been exposed to PCBs and the\\npotential health effects of continuing exposure. He concluded\\nthat “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not\\nincrease the risk of disease.” Finally, the defendants submit-\\nted a report prepared by Dr. Russell Keenan, a toxicologist\\nwho analyzed the survey data and determined that it was im-\\npossible to determine whether the presence of PCBs on the\\nLiebharts’ property was due to the recent demolition or to\\nrunoff that occurred over the last several decades.\\n In December 2017, the Liebharts moved for partial sum-\\nmary judgment on the issue of causation, reserving the issue\\nof damages for a jury trial. The defendants cross-moved for\\nsummary judgment; they also filed a motion to exclude the\\ntestimony of plaintiffs’ experts Woodyard and Carpenter un-\\nder Fed. R. Evid. 702. In February 2018, after those motions\\nwere fully briefed to the court, the Liebharts sought leave to\\namend their complaint. In light of the information they ob-\\ntained through discovery regarding the burial of concrete on\\nthe property, they intended to allege separate RCRA and\\nTSCA violations and seek an enlargement of the proposed in-\\njunction to include removal of that material.\\n The district court issued its decisions on March 30. First,\\nthe court granted in part the defendants’ motion to exclude\\nthe plaintiffs’ expert witness reports. The court explained that\\nWoodyard’s report was “equivocal” as to the issue of causa-\\ntion; it hedged on whether the contaminants came from dem-\\nolition or from runoff during the preceding decades. See\\nLiebhart v. SPX Corp., No. 16-cv-700-jdp, 2018 WL 1583296 at\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n*3–4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2018). Second, the report “over-\\nlook[ed] too much significant evidence” and failed to account\\nfor “obvious alternative explanations” in determining the\\ncause of the contamination. Id. at *4 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702\\nadvisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments). Finally, the\\ncourt noted that Woodyard’s report depended on “unreliable\\nor uninformative” evidence, including the Liebharts’ defec-\\ntive snow sample, while omitting other evidence such as grass\\nclippings and a chromatogram that allegedly detected PCBs\\non the property. Id. at *4–5. For those reasons, the court ex-\\ncluded Woodyard’s report in its entirety. Id. at *5.\\n Although the court admitted the vast majority of Dr. Car-\\npenter’s report, it struck Carpenter’s conclusion that “there is\\nno ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not increase the\\nrisk of disease” as unsupported by the medical studies he\\ncited. Id. at *5. In doing so, the court pointed to the absence of\\nPCBs inside the Liebharts’ home and in their blood, suggest-\\ning that the Liebharts had not actually been exposed to PCBs\\nand so could not have suffered harm. Id. at 5–6.\\n With that expert testimony off the table, the district court\\nconcluded that the Liebharts failed to present any admissible\\nevidence to support their RCRA and TSCA claims. The re-\\nmaining photos and videos certainly showed dust migrating\\nonto the Liebharts’ property, but there was no reliable evi-\\ndence proving that the dust contained PCBs. Given that any\\nPCBs detected in the soil may have been there prior to the\\ndemolition, the lack of evidence doomed the Liebharts’ case.\\nThe court denied partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs,\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal\\nclaims, and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 7\\n\\n The district court also denied the Liebharts’ petition for\\nleave to amend their complaint on two grounds. First, alt-\\nhough the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs discovered\\nthe factual basis for the new counts over a year after filing the\\ninitial complaint, it also noted that they took an additional\\nfour months thereafter to seek leave to amend. During that\\nintervening period, the parties had submitted and briefed\\ntheir motions for summary judgment, and the trial date was\\nfast approaching. It found their petition untimely. Second, the\\ndistrict court determined that the new claims were futile un-\\nder both statutes' advance-notice requirements.\\n The plaintiffs immediately appealed. Several months after\\nthe judgment, the clerk of the district court imposed costs on\\nthe Liebharts in the amount of $46,320.02. The Liebharts sep-\\narately appealed that decision. We consolidated the two ap-\\npeals and now consider them together.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n The Liebharts raise five issues for our consideration. First,\\nthey argue that the district court erred in excluding the opin-\\nions of expert witnesses Woodyard in full and Carpenter in\\npart. As part of that argument, they allege that the district\\ncourt failed to apply the same stringent standard to the de-\\nfendants’ expert Keenan. Second, they contend that summary\\njudgment was inappropriate because, even absent the testi-\\nmony of their expert witnesses, they submitted adequate pho-\\ntographic and scientific evidence to state a valid claim under\\nRCRA and TSCA. Third, they challenge the district court’s de-\\nnial of injunctive relief in light of deficiencies they have iden-\\ntified in SPX’s state-approved clean-up plan. Fourth, they ar-\\ngue that the district court abused its discretion in denying\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nleave to amend their complaint. Finally, they challenge the\\nimposition of costs.\\n But there’s a larger issue looming in the background. The\\ndistrict court’s opinion operates under the assumption that\\nRCRA plaintiffs must demonstrate “an imminent and sub-\\nstantial danger with evidence of health problems they have\\nalready suffered.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *6. Relying\\nprimarily on Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C.\\n1996), the district court set a high bar for RCRA plaintiffs,\\nholding that “it doesn’t follow necessarily that there is an im-\\nminent and substantial risk of harm simply because there is\\nsome amount of PCBs on the property.” Liebhart 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *5. We review that question of law, which was the\\nunderlying basis for the award of summary judgment, de\\nnovo. Daugherty v. Harrington, 906 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n A. RCRA Requires Only that Harm “May” Be Imminent\\n The question of how much harm a plaintiff must prove to\\nmake out a prima facie violation of RCRA has led to much dis-\\ncussion among the circuits. We have yet to tackle that issue\\nhead on, so the district court necessarily had to look else-\\nwhere for guidance. Passed in 1976, “RCRA is a comprehen-\\nsive environmental statute that empowers [the] EPA to regu-\\nlate hazardous wastes from cradle to grave.” City of Chicago v.\\nEnvtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). The statute’s “pri-\\nmary purpose … is to reduce the generation of hazardous\\nwaste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and dis-\\nposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, ‘so as to\\nminimize the present and future threat to human health and\\nthe environment.’” Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479,\\n483 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 9\\n\\n Although the EPA has the primary responsibility for en-\\nforcing the law, the statute, “like other environmental laws,\\n… contains a citizen suit provision, § 6972, which permits pri-\\nvate citizens to enforce its provisions in some circumstances.”\\nId. at 484. As relevant to this case, the statute provides that\\n any person may commence a civil action on his own\\n behalf … against any person, … including … any\\n past or present owner or operator of a treatment,\\n storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or\\n who is contributing to the past or present handling,\\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any\\n solid or hazardous waste which may present an im-\\n minent and substantial endangerment to health or\\n the environment.\\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Notably, Con-\\ngress amended the language in 1980 by substituting the\\nphrase “may present” for the original 1976 wording “is pre-\\nsenting.” Maine People’s All. and Nat. Res. Def. Council v.\\nMallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Solid\\nWaste Disposal Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–482, § 25, 94 Stat. 2334,\\n2348). The section authorizes district courts to grant injunctive\\nrelief and “order [a violator] to take such other action as may\\nbe necessary” to remediate the endangerment. Id.; see also Me-\\nghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (“Under a plain reading of this remedial\\nscheme, a private citizen suing under § 6972(a)(1)(B) could\\nseek a mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible\\nparty to ‘take action’ by attending to the cleanup and proper\\ndisposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one\\nthat ‘restrains’ a responsible party from further violating\\nRCRA.”); Avondale Fed. Sav. Bank v. Amoco Oil Co., 170 F.3d\\n692, 694 (7th Cir. 1999).\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n The critical question in this case is how to determine\\nwhether alleged contamination “may present an imminent\\nand substantial endangerment to health.” § 6972(a)(1)(b). We\\ntouched on this question only briefly in Albany Bank & Trust\\nCo. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2002).\\nThere, we first outlined the elements of a prima facie RCRA\\nclaim: “a plaintiff must allege (1) that the defendant has gen-\\nerated solid or hazardous waste, (2) that the defendant is con-\\ntributing to or has contributed to the handling of this waste,\\nand (3) that this waste may present an imminent and substan-\\ntial danger to health or the environment.” Id. (citing Cox v.\\nCity of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 2001)). We then ob-\\nserved, interpreting the final element, that “[i]mminence does\\nnot require an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\nharm.” Id. (citing Cox, 256 F.3d at 299). That is the extent of\\nour circuit precedent on the “may present” language con-\\ntained in § 6972(a)(1)(B).\\n But our sister circuits have engaged with this question in\\ngreat depth. In the first major case interpreting the provision,\\nthe Third Circuit emphasized that the statute “enhanced the\\ncourts’ traditional equitable powers by authorizing the issu-\\nance of injunctions when there is but a risk of harm, a more\\nlenient standard than the traditional requirement of threat-\\nened irreparable harm.” United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204,\\n211 (3d Cir. 1982). The court found the statutory language\\n“unequivocal,” demonstrating that Congress “intended to\\nconfer upon the courts the authority to grant affirmative eq-\\nuitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate” the risks\\nposed by toxic waste. Id. at 213–14.\\n In the subsequent decades, several other circuits adopted\\nand further developed the same interpretation of § 6972. See\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 11\\n\\nMallinckrodt, 471 F.3d at 277; Dague v. City of Burlington, 935\\nF.2d 1343, 1355–56 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds,\\n502 U.S. 1071 (1992); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l,\\nInc., 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Waste Indus.,\\nInc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument\\nthat “[§ 6972] was designed to control pollution only in emer-\\ngency situations”); Cox, 256 F.3d at 299–301; Price v. United\\nStates Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994); Burlington N.\\nand Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1019–22 (10th Cir.\\n2007); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1014–\\n15 (11th Cir. 2004). We now join those courts and explicitly\\nembrace the core content of their interpretation.\\n The district court therefore used an incorrect legal stand-\\nard to evaluate the Liebharts’ argument that PCBs from the\\ndemolition may present an imminent and substantial danger\\nto their health and that of their tenants. It did not cite any of\\nthe cases we listed above, but instead relied on a single district\\ncourt decision from a circuit that has not yet addressed the\\nissue. See Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *5 (quoting Foster, 922\\nF. Supp. at 662 (“While there can be no question that the levels\\nof contamination present at the Site may warrant future re-\\nsponse action, the plaintiff cannot establish either a current\\nrisk of substantial or serious threatened harm, or some neces-\\nsity for action.”)).\\n That error undercuts several of the reasons the district\\ncourt gave for rejecting the Liebharts’ RCRA claim. For exam-\\nple, the district court cursorily adopted a passing statement\\nwe made over twenty-five years ago that “[t]he [EPA’s] ac-\\ncepted safe level of PCBs in the environment is fifty parts per\\nmillion,” id. (quoting Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nServ., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1994)), to create a require-\\nment that the Liebharts show that PCB contamination on their\\nproperty met that threshold. But there is no requirement in\\nRCRA for a plaintiff to make “a particular quantitative show-\\ning as a sine qua non for liability.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 260; see\\nalso Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. Only one circuit has come to an\\narguably contrary conclusion. In Price v. United States Navy,\\n818 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (S.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d 39 F.3d 1011 (9th\\nCir. 1994), the district court required RCRA plaintiffs to show\\nthat “the level of contaminants [was] above levels that are con-\\nsidered acceptable by the State.” But as the Interfaith court\\nnoted, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion affirming the district\\ncourt’s judgment did not discuss that requirement. RCRA\\ndoes not require that plaintiffs demonstrate contamination\\nabove some agency-derived threshold level of concentration.\\n399 F.3d at 260–61. It merely requires that they show that con-\\ntaminants on the property are seriously dangerous to human\\nhealth (or will be, given prolonged exposure over time). See\\nCox, 256 F.3d at 299–300 (“an endangerment is ‘substantial’ if\\nit is ‘serious’” (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019)).\\n That’s especially true when the standard is taken out of\\ncontext. The district court relied on Cincinnati Ins. Co. to sup-\\nport its contention that contamination below the threshold\\nlevel of fifty parts per million (“ppm”) does not qualify as a\\nregulatory violation, thereby contradicting Woodyard’s opin-\\nion regarding safe levels of PCBs and providing the grounds\\nfor excluding it. In that case, we evaluated whether an insur-\\nance company was required to indemnify its insured for dam-\\nages arising out of PCB contamination at an industrial site.\\nThe EPA had identified the insured as potentially liable under\\nthe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,\\nand Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 13\\n\\nthat context, we noted that the contaminated site contained\\nPCBs concentrated at levels up to 58,000 ppm, well above the\\nEPA’s general regulatory threshold of fifty ppm. 40 F.3d at 148\\n(citing 40 C.F.R. § 761.60).\\n But that regulation, still in effect today, identifies indus-\\ntrial equipment and other wastes contaminated at levels\\nabove fifty ppm and requires special procedures for their stor-\\nage and disposal. It does not unequivocally state that PCBs\\nconcentrated at levels lower than fifty ppm are safe for human\\nexposure. Neither Cincinnati Ins. Co. nor the EPA regulation\\nstand for the proposition that PCBs concentrated at forty-nine\\nppm on residential property do not present a substantial endan-\\ngerment to the health of the residents. That is especially ap-\\nparent when we consider that the same set of regulations dis-\\ntinguishes between low and high-occupancy areas and re-\\nquires that, in high-occupancy areas, bulk PCB remediation\\nwaste, such as soil, be cleaned up to levels of concentration at\\nor below one ppm. § 761.61(a)(4)(i)(A). Section 761.3 confirms\\nthat the term “high-occupancy area” includes residences. See\\nalso § 761.123 (regulating spills of PCBs concentrated at fifty\\nppm or greater but emphasizing that “[t]he concentration of\\nPCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concentration in the\\nmaterial spilled as opposed to the concentration of PCBs in\\nthe material onto which the PCBs were spilled”). “Proof of\\ncontamination in excess of [agency] standards may support a\\nfinding of liability, and may alone suffice for liability in some\\ncases, but its required use is without justification in the stat-\\nute.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 261.\\n This is not to say that all the plaintiffs must do is to show\\nsome bit of soil on their property that tests positive for PCBs\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nabove one ppm (or even above the purported lower Wiscon-\\nsin DNR standard, which the defendants seem to have\\nacknowledged in their state-approved clean-up plan). Of\\ncourse, there must be accompanying evidence that establishes\\nsome connection between the existing contaminants and\\nsome imminent and substantial endangerment to health. 1 But\\nthe Liebharts attempted to provide such evidence, and the\\ndistrict court held the bar higher than necessary under\\nRCRA’s standard. In criticizing expert witness Carpenter’s\\nstatement that “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that\\ndoes not increase the risk of disease,” the district court re-\\njected Carpenter’s citation to studies showing the general\\nrisks of PCB exposure because “the Liebharts do not cite any\\nevidence that they have been exposed to PCBs.” Liebhart, 2018\\nWL 1583296 at *5. Moreover, the district court concluded that\\n“[t]he Liebharts do not contend that they can prove an immi-\\nnent and substantial danger with evidence of health problems\\nthey have already suffered.” Id. at *6.\\n As we noted in Albany Bank, “[i]mminence does not re-\\nquire an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\n\\n\\n 1 On appeal, the Liebharts contend that there is no separate require-\\nment for expert witness testimony because the photos and videos they\\nhave submitted into evidence suffice to prove their RCRA claim. The de-\\nfendants push back on that argument, insisting that many of the issues are\\nbeyond the competence of lay fact-finders and require the assistance of\\nexperts to address. See, e.g., C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827,\\n838 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Given the complex nature of this case, … [and w]ith\\nno experts to prove causation … the appellants cannot prove their toxic-\\ntort case under [state] law.”) Because the district court did not make a fac-\\ntual finding as to whether this case is sufficient complex to require expert\\ntestimony, and because we remand for reconsideration of a separate legal\\nissue, we need not reach that question today.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 15\\n\\nharm.” 310 F.3d at 973. Although the Supreme Court has in-\\nstructed that “[a]n endangerment can only be ‘imminent’ if it\\n‘threaten[s] to occur immediately,’” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485\\n(quoting Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary of English Language\\n1245 (2d ed. 1934)), it qualified that statement when it approv-\\ningly quoted the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the statu-\\ntory term “implies that there must be a threat which is present\\nnow, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until\\nlater.” Id. at 486 (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019).\\nWe take that to mean that the Liebharts must show that there\\nare PCBs currently on the property that have the potential to\\nsubstantially threaten their health at some point in the future\\nif they continue to occupy the premises and prolong their ex-\\nposure. On remand, the district court should reevaluate its ex-\\nclusion of Dr. Carpenter’s assertion regarding PCB safety un-\\nder the standards we have outlined above and determine\\nwhether, if admissible, the report demonstrates that a sub-\\nstantial and imminent threat to the Liebharts’ health may be\\npresent.\\n B. TSCA Likewise Requires No Heightened Showing\\n TSCA authorizes a separate, private cause of action allow-\\ning “any person [to] commence a civil action … against any\\nperson … who is alleged to be in violation of … any rule\\npromulgated under” the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1). The EPA\\npromulgated the PCB regulations in question pursuant to\\nstatutory authority under TSCA, designating PCBs as “haz-\\nardous waste” and controlling their manufacture, use, stor-\\nage, and disposal. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 761. The Liebharts’ TSCA\\nclaim alleged that the defendants violated those regulations,\\nthereby authorizing the district court to “restrain [the] viola-\\ntion.” § 2619(a). Unlike RCRA, which authorizes mandatory\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\ninjunctions to compel remediation of previous violations,\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions to stop ongoing\\nviolations. Id. The defendants argued that there was no longer\\nan ongoing violation, as demolition was complete by the time\\nthe Liebharts filed their claim. 2\\n The purported violation was based on 40 C.F.R. § 761.123,\\nwhich, as we noted above, regulates “spills” of PCB materials\\nconcentrated at levels above fifty ppm. The district court cor-\\nrectly noted that the Liebharts had not shown any evidence\\nthat any PCBs had been “spilled” onto their property (by\\nmeans of dust migration) at that level of concentration, and it\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on that basis.\\n But the district court seems to have overlooked the follow-\\ning sentence in the regulation, which directs that “[t]he con-\\ncentration of PCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concen-\\ntration in the material spilled as opposed to the concentration\\nof the material onto which the PCBs were spilled.” Id. The\\nLiebharts’ complaint seems to have alleged that the concrete\\nfloor of the factory, which contained at least some contami-\\nnated areas above the fifty-ppm threshold, was demolished\\nand “spilled” onto the Liebharts’ property. By the plain text\\nof the regulation, there is no need to show that contaminants\\non the Liebharts’ property are themselves concentrated above\\nfifty ppm so long as the original material that was the source\\nof that spill met the criteria. On remand, the district court may\\nagain determine that there is no ongoing violation, but it must\\n\\n 2 The district court determined that the Liebharts waived this claim\\nby failing to engage the defendants’ argument that there was no “ongoing\\nviolation.” But the court chose to analyze the merits of the claim regardless\\nof waiver and reached its conclusion on an alternative basis. We likewise\\nset aside the issue of waiver to reach the district court’s merits analysis.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 17\\n\\nfirst determine whether the alleged violation comes within\\nthe meaning of § 761.123 in the first place.\\n C. The District Court Should Reconsider the Remaining Issues\\non Remand\\n Now that we have clarified the standard the plaintiffs\\nmust meet, we turn to the remaining procedural issues the\\nLiebharts have asked to us to address.\\n 1. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding\\nWoodyard’s Testimony\\n “The summary-judgment decision here turned [in large\\npart] on the district court’s conclusion that [the] expert testi-\\nmony was inadmissible. Whether the district court applied\\nthe appropriate legal framework for evaluating expert testi-\\nmony is reviewed de novo, but the court’s choice of relevant\\nfactors within that framework and its ultimate conclusion as\\nto admissibility are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Lees v.\\nCarthage College, 714 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 2013). When a dis-\\ntrict court is “[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testi-\\nmony … the trial judge must determine at the outset …\\nwhether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific\\nknowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or\\ndetermine a fact in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,\\n509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). “The trial court must have … latitude\\nin deciding how to test an expert’s reliability.” Kumho Tire Co.,\\nLtd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).\\n The district court was well within its discretion to exclude\\nthe proffered testimony of expert witness Woodyard. Beyond\\nthe problem that the plaintiffs seemed to have waived this is-\\nsue in the district court by failing to engage with the defend-\\nants’ arguments in their motion to strike the testimony,\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nWoodyard’s analysis suffers from a critical flaw that stems\\nfrom the way in which the parties have framed this lawsuit.\\nThe district court briefly noted in its opinion that “both sides\\nassume that none of the defendants can be held liable for any\\nPCB contamination on the Liebharts’ property that occurred\\nbefore the demolition began, so the court will make the same\\nassumption.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *1. That’s a curious\\nchoice. RCRA permits the Liebharts to obtain injunctive relief\\nfrom the owner of the facility for any cognizable contamina-\\ntion, regardless of whether the PCBs migrated onto their\\nproperty before or after the demolition occurred. See 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (authorizing suit against “any person … who\\nhas contributed … to the past or present handling … or dis-\\nposal” of hazardous waste); see also Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486\\n(“RCRA contains no statute of limitations.”).\\n But because the Liebharts restricted their claims to PCBs\\nthat allegedly migrated onto their property via the dust from\\nthe 2015 demolition, they necessarily excluded claims result-\\ning from PCBs that may have gotten onto their property dur-\\ning the previous century. The district court correctly noted\\nthat Woodyard’s expert opinion could not distinguish be-\\ntween these two alternatives, as both sets of contaminants\\noriginated from the same source. There was even evidence\\nshowing that PCBs existed in the soil beneath the Liebharts’\\nasphalt driveway—Woodyard could not explain how that\\nmight have occurred as the result of dust blowing in the wind\\nas opposed to seepage over the course of years before any\\ndemolition occurred.\\n Perhaps the Liebharts decided to frame their claims in this\\nway because they wanted to go after defendants TRC and\\nApollo, who would not be liable for what happened before\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 19\\n\\ndemolition. Or perhaps some element of their state-law\\nclaims, which we have not addressed, required them to con-\\nstrict the scope. They did not explain their reasoning to us (or\\nit seems, to the district court). But the distinction makes it dif-\\nficult for Woodyard to make his case, given that he did not\\n“adequately account[] for obvious alternative explanations.”\\nGopalratnam v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 787 (7th Cir.\\n2017). Viewed in this light, the district court was within its\\ndiscretion to exclude the testimony as unreliable and unhelp-\\nful to the trier of fact. The district court may choose to rethink\\nthat evaluation on remand under the legal standards we out-\\nlined above, but it may well reach the same conclusion.\\n 2. The District Court Should Reconsider Its Denial of Injunctive\\nRelief\\n The district court denied injunctive relief to the Liebharts\\nbecause the defendants had already agreed to a clean-up plan\\nthat had been approved by the Wisconsin DNR. We review\\nthat decision for an abuse of discretion. See AMI Int’l, Inc. v.\\nDatacard Corp. 106 F.3d 1342, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997) (remanding\\ngrant of RCRA injunction).\\n As we mentioned above, RCRA authorizes district courts\\nto issue either mandatory or prohibitory injunctions, while\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions. “[I]t is appro-\\npriate ‘to give great deference to the district court’s decision\\nas to the precise equitable relief necessary in a particular\\ncase.’” Bowes v. Ind. Sec. of State, 837 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (quoting Gjersten v. Bd. Of Election Com’rs for City of Chi-\\ncago, 791 F.2d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1986)). That is especially true\\nwhen a plaintiff requests a mandatory injunction, which “im-\\nposes significant burdens on the defendant and requires care-\\nful consideration of the intrusiveness of the ordered act, as\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nwell as the difficulties that may be encountered in supervising\\nthe enjoined party’s compliance with the court’s order.” Kart-\\nman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir.\\n2011).\\n Considering SPX’s decision to formulate a clean-up plan\\nand obtain approval from the state agency, the district court\\ndetermined that there was no need for separate, federally-su-\\npervised remediation. It reached that conclusion even while\\nassuming that the defendants were in violation of either\\nRCRA or TSCA, despite the fact it found no such violation.\\nOther courts have determined that the existence of a parallel\\nplan of remediation supervised by the state does not neces-\\nsarily prevent a federal district court from granting an injunc-\\ntion if it finds the state agency’s actions to be insufficient to\\nremedy the violation of federal law. See, e.g., Interfaith, 399\\nF.3d at 264–68. On the other hand, the same courts have also\\nupheld denials of injunctions in similar situations when the\\ndistrict court finds that the parallel plan is adequate to the\\ntask. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735\\nF.3d 131, 139–40 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Interfaith). We\\nrecently reached the same conclusion. See LAJIM, LLC v. Gen.\\nElec. Co., No. 18-1522, 2019 WL 1011021, at *4–11 (7th Cir. Mar.\\n4, 2019) (“[T]he district court correctly held that it has discre-\\ntion to award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not re-\\nquired to order relief after a finding of liability,” particularly\\nin light of ongoing relief supervised by a state environmental\\nagency).\\n Here, the district court determined that SPX’s existing\\nplan was sufficient and that the Liebharts had not “iden-\\ntif[ied] any way that SPX’s plan [was] deficient or violate[d]\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 21\\n\\nfederal law.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *7. We agree. Alt-\\nhough the Liebharts point to certain statistical sampling re-\\nquirements outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 761.125 and contend that\\nSPX’s existing plan fails to meet those requirements, the dis-\\ntrict court noted that SPX’s plan includes further sampling of\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ property. It emphasized that “the\\nLiebharts do not otherwise explain why SPX’s proposed sam-\\npling scheme is substantively inadequate.” Liebhart, 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *7. We see no evidence that compels us to contra-\\ndict that factual finding.\\n However, in light of the legal standards we outlined\\nabove, we ask the district court to reconsider its decision to\\ndeny injunctive relief on remand. Because the bar for estab-\\nlishing an imminent and substantial danger is lower than the\\ndistrict court believed when evaluating the request for an in-\\njunction, it would be prudent to reassess whether the DNR-\\napproved plan adequately remedies harms that may come\\nwithin RCRA’s scope. See LAJIM, 2019 WL 1011021 at *6\\n(“[O]nce a court finds a defendant liable for creating a risk of\\nimminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the case\\nthat injunctive relief is warranted. But that is not always the\\ncase.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).\\n 3. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying\\nLeave to Amend the Complaint.\\n We review a denial of leave to amend a complaint for\\nabuse of discretion. Life Plans, Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co.,\\n800 F.3d 343, 357 (7th Cir. 2015). District courts are to “freely\\ngive leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 15(a)(2). “The Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to\\nrequire a district court to allow amendment unless there is a\\ngood reason—futility, undue delay, undue prejudice, or bad\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nfaith—for denying leave to amend.” Life Plans, 800 F.3d at 357\\n(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The district\\ncourt in this case identified two of those grounds as bases for\\ndenial: futility and undue delay. While we disagree with the\\nfutility analysis, we concur with the finding of undue delay\\nand decline to reverse.\\n We begin with the question of futility. Both statutes con-\\ntain advance-notice requirements that citizen plaintiffs must\\nobserve prior to filing RCRA or TSCA suits. They require\\nthose plaintiffs to notify the EPA 60–90 days in advance of fil-\\ning the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2); 15 U.S.C.\\n§ 2619(b)(1)(A). But the district court chose to apply the re-\\nquirements not only to the filing of the complaint, but also to\\nany subsequent amendments that sought to add new RCRA\\nor TSCA counts. Although the Liebharts complied with the\\nrequirements prior to filing their original complaint in April\\n2016, they gave no new notice to the EPA before filing for\\nleave to amend in February 2018. The district court held that,\\nbecause the prior notice did not contain any mention of bur-\\nied PCBs on the SPX property, it was insufficient to alert the\\nEPA to the particular violation the Liebharts sought to include\\nin the amended complaint.\\n The notice provisions serve two purposes. “First, notice al-\\nlows Government agencies to take responsibility for enforc-\\ning environmental regulations, thus obviating the need for\\ncitizen suits. … Second, notice gives the alleged violator ‘an\\nopportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the\\nAct[s] and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit.’”\\nHallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (quoting\\nGwaltney of Smithfield, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 23\\n\\nU.S. 49, 60 (1987)). The district court’s decision to require no-\\ntice for an amendment to a complaint fulfilled neither pur-\\npose. By the time the Liebharts attempted to amend their com-\\nplaint, the EPA had been on notice of alleged PCB contamina-\\ntion at the SPX property for over two years—and it had de-\\nclined to get involved. Moreover, it was unlikely that the de-\\nfendants would resolve the alleged violation to avoid being\\nsued when they were already in the midst of an extended law-\\nsuit with the same plaintiffs. See AM Int’l, 106 F.3d at 1351\\n(“[T]he delay period is designed to allow a [defendant] a pe-\\nriod in which to clean up its act and avoid litigation. [This de-\\nfendant] was clearly not interested in using the delay period\\nto resolve the dispute without going to court.”); see also Dague,\\n935 F.2d at 1351 (“There is no need to maintain a window of\\nopportunity for the government to take the lead enforcement\\nrole … when a citizen, acting as a private attorney general, has\\nalready lawfully assumed the lead role in bringing a … claim\\nagainst the same facility.”) (quoting Dague v. City of Burling-\\nton, 733 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D. Vt. 1990)). When the original notice\\nis “sufficiently specific to inform the alleged violator [and the\\nagency] about what it is doing wrong, so that it will know\\nwhat corrective actions will avert a lawsuit,” Atl. States Legal\\nFound., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir.\\n1994), there is no need to require a second round of advance\\nnotice for an amended complaint in the same litigation.\\n But an error in the futility analysis alone does not neces-\\nsarily constitute an abuse of discretion on the whole. In addi-\\ntion to futility, the district court cited undue delay and preju-\\ndice in its decision to deny leave to amend. “[D]elay by itself\\nis normally an insufficient reason to deny a motion for leave\\nto amend. Delay must be coupled with some other reason.\\nTypically, that reason … is prejudice to the non-moving\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nparty.” Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 793\\n(7th Cir. 2004). The district court cited the Liebharts’ admis-\\nsion that they learned of the possible burial of contaminated\\nconcrete on the SPX property on October 11, 2017 but failed\\nto seek leave to amend their complaint until February 22,\\n2018. During that more than four-month period, the parties\\nsubmitted and briefed their cross-motions for summary judg-\\nment, and by February, trial was only three months away. The\\nLiebharts provided no justification for their delay.\\n In response, the Liebharts contend that there was no un-\\ndue prejudice to the defendants: by the time they filed their\\nmotion, five weeks of discovery still remained. We disagree.\\nWhile the district court’s explanation of prejudice was fairly\\nshort, even if the district court had failed to articulate a find-\\ning of prejudice altogether, we might still “affirm providing\\nthat ‘the prejudice that would result from such amendment\\nwas apparent.’” Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 613 (7th\\nCir. 2002) (quoting Feldman v. Am. Mem’l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d\\n783, 793 (7th Cir. 1999)). In Park, the plaintiff waited six\\nmonths to move for leave to amend a complaint after she\\nknew (or should have known) of the additional alleged viola-\\ntion. Id. Because trial was approaching, we concluded that the\\ndistrict court was well within its discretion to deny leave. Id.;\\nsee also Perrian v. O’Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194–95 (7th Cir. 1992)\\n(“Because substantive amendments shortly before trial serve\\nto defeat the public’s interest in speedy resolution of legal dis-\\nputes, ‘[a] district court judge is entitled, in such circum-\\nstances, to refuse to allow a plaintiff’s amendment.’” (quoting\\nCampbell v. Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co., 893 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir.\\n1990)) (internal citation omitted)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 25\\n\\n On the contrary, in Life Plans, we found no undue delay\\nwhen a plaintiff promptly moved to amend its complaint just\\nten days after learning of the factual basis for its new count\\nduring discovery. 800 F.3d at 358. The Liebharts delayed more\\nthan four months in the same circumstances. Although dis-\\ncovery was ongoing at the time of the Liebharts’ motion, the\\nparties had already briefed their dispositive motions, and the\\ndistrict court was preparing its summary-judgment order that\\nwould ultimately dispose of the case. We therefore cannot say\\nthat denial of leave for undue delay and prejudice was an\\nabuse of the district court’s discretion. Of course, the district\\ncourt may permit an amendment on remand if the interests of\\njustice so require.\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n Although the district court properly exercised its discre-\\ntion on the various evidentiary and procedural issues the\\nplaintiffs have raised, its analysis on the merits was narrower\\nthan the statutes demand. It may reach the same conclusions\\non reconsideration, but the parties should have another op-\\nportunity to litigate whether a substantial and imminent en-\\ndangerment to health exists in this case under the standards\\nwe have outlined. We therefore VACATE the order of the dis-\\ntrict court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent\\nwith this opinion. 3\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 The Liebharts also challenge the taxation of costs against them by the\\n\\nclerk of the district court. Because we vacate the district court’s judgment,\\nwe assume that the imposition of costs is automatically vacated and so do\\nnot reach that issue. The clerk of the district court is free to reassess costs\\non remand as the case proceeds.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4374430/\", \"author_raw\": \"Michael Stephen Kanne\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597177/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: William LIEBHART & Nancy Liebhart, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SPX CORPORATION, TRC Environmental Corporation, & Apollo Dismantling Services, Inc. Defendants-Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\nWILLIAM LIEBHART & NANCY LIEBHART,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n v.\n\nSPX CORPORATION, TRC ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION, &\nAPOLLO DISMANTLING SERVICES, INC.\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 16-cv-700 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n KANNE, Circuit Judge. William and Nancy Liebhart to-\ngether own three houses on the same block in Watertown,\nWisconsin. Besides a few other houses, the rest of the block\nwas previously occupied by an abandoned transformer fac-\ntory, last owned by SPX Corporation. In 2014, SPX demol-\nished the building with the assistance of TRC Environmental\nCorporation and Apollo Dismantling Services (collectively,\n\f2 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\n“the defendants”). The Liebharts allege that dust and debris\ncontaining toxic chemicals migrated onto their properties,\ncontaminating their yards and jeopardizing their health and\nthe health of their tenants.\n The Liebharts sued under federal statutes authorizing pri-\nvate rights of action for environmental contamination. They\nalso brought various state-law claims. Following discovery\nand the submission of expert witness reports, the district\ncourt denied the Liebharts’ motion for partial summary judg-\nment and granted summary judgment to the defendants with\ncosts. Although the district court adequately evaluated the ex-\npert witnesses and did not abuse its discretion in its proce-\ndural decisions, the court set the bar unnecessarily high for\nthe plaintiffs to show a violation of the applicable federal stat-\nutes. For that reason, we vacate the district court’s judgment\nand remand for reconsideration.\n I. BACKGROUND\n The factory dates to the 1920s and was used to manufac-\nture various industrial equipment. Most relevant to our pur-\npose, the factory manufactured power transformers contain-\ning polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a carcinogenic chemi-\ncal banned by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1979.\nSee Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Pro-\ncessing, Distribution in Commerce, and Use Prohibitions, 44\nFed. Reg. 31,514 (May 31, 1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 761).\nThe parties all agree that the facility has not manufactured or\nhandled any items containing PCBs since 1971, and that it\nshut down completely in 2005.\n But even with all the products and manufacturing equip-\nment removed, PCB contaminants remained in the facility. In\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 3\n\n2009, SPX retained TRC and another company (not named as\na defendant in this suit) to study the property and determine\nthe extent and precise location of any PCB contamination.\nThose studies revealed that the concrete floor of the factory\nwas generally contaminated, with concentrated amounts lo-\ncated in specific areas throughout the site.\n Several years went by. In 2014, SPX decided to move ahead\nwith the demolition, retaining Apollo to conduct the work\nand TRC to supervise the project. That November, the defend-\nants timely proposed a self-implementing cleanup plan to the\nEPA, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 761.61(a). The trouble began\nas demolition commenced in January 2015. The Liebharts al-\nlege that Apollo demolished the building recklessly, failing to\nuse appropriate safety methods to control the dust generated\nby demolition equipment. They assert that their properties\nwere covered in dust, and they submitted hundreds of photos\nand videos of dust from the facility blowing toward their\nhomes to support their allegation.\n The Liebharts filed a complaint with the local government\nin February. They also collected a dust-covered sample of\nsnow from their yard and placed it in a mason jar. Soon there-\nafter, a representative of the Wisconsin Department of Natu-\nral Resources (“DNR”) contacted the defendants about the\nLiebharts’ concerns. In April, TRC collected samples of the\nsurface soil (roughly down to eight inches below ground) on\nboth the industrial and residential properties. Sure enough,\nthe properties tested positive for the presence of PCBs. In Au-\ngust, the Liebharts vacated the property on advice of their\nphysician to avoid further exposure to the chemicals. Frus-\ntrated with the lack of action, William Liebhart had the snow\n\f4 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nsample tested for PCBs. Although the sample did, in fact, con-\ntain PCBs, the irregular manner of collection and storage\nspoiled the sample, and the laboratory declined to endorse the\nresults with any confidence.\n In September 2015, SPX submitted a plan to remediate the\ncontamination to the DNR. In turn, the Liebharts sued in fed-\neral district court in October. The complaint sought injunctive\nrelief under both the Resource Conservation and Recovery\nAct (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and the Toxic Substances\nControl Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. In addition, the\nLiebharts brought a host of state-law claims under supple-\nmental jurisdiction, including strict liability, negligence, tres-\npass, nuisance, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.\n During discovery, the Liebharts submitted to further test-\ning for PCBs both in their yard and inside their home. They\nalso underwent blood testing. Although the external surveys\nrevealed a more comprehensive picture of the extent to which\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ properties contained PCBs, the in-\nternal sampling and blood tests were both negative for con-\ntamination. The Liebharts later learned in October 2017 that\nthe defendants allegedly buried some of the concrete remains\non-site rather than removing them to a toxic waste dump as\nrequired by the EPA-approved clean-up plan.\n The parties prepared and submitted the reports of the ex-\npert witnesses who were to testify at trial. Among those, three\nare pertinent to our discussion. First, the Liebharts submitted\na report by John Woodyard, a licensed professional engineer.\nHis report included a description of standard methods used\nwhen demolishing PCB-contaminated buildings and an anal-\nysis of the purported ways in which the defendants deviated\nfrom those practices, thereby causing the contamination of the\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 5\n\nresidences. The Liebharts’ second expert was Dr. David Car-\npenter, a public health physician who opined on ways in\nwhich the Liebharts might have been exposed to PCBs and the\npotential health effects of continuing exposure. He concluded\nthat “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not\nincrease the risk of disease.” Finally, the defendants submit-\nted a report prepared by Dr. Russell Keenan, a toxicologist\nwho analyzed the survey data and determined that it was im-\npossible to determine whether the presence of PCBs on the\nLiebharts’ property was due to the recent demolition or to\nrunoff that occurred over the last several decades.\n In December 2017, the Liebharts moved for partial sum-\nmary judgment on the issue of causation, reserving the issue\nof damages for a jury trial. The defendants cross-moved for\nsummary judgment; they also filed a motion to exclude the\ntestimony of plaintiffs’ experts Woodyard and Carpenter un-\nder Fed. R. Evid. 702. In February 2018, after those motions\nwere fully briefed to the court, the Liebharts sought leave to\namend their complaint. In light of the information they ob-\ntained through discovery regarding the burial of concrete on\nthe property, they intended to allege separate RCRA and\nTSCA violations and seek an enlargement of the proposed in-\njunction to include removal of that material.\n The district court issued its decisions on March 30. First,\nthe court granted in part the defendants’ motion to exclude\nthe plaintiffs’ expert witness reports. The court explained that\nWoodyard’s report was “equivocal” as to the issue of causa-\ntion; it hedged on whether the contaminants came from dem-\nolition or from runoff during the preceding decades. See\nLiebhart v. SPX Corp., No. 16-cv-700-jdp, 2018 WL 1583296 at\n\f6 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\n*3–4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2018). Second, the report “over-\nlook[ed] too much significant evidence” and failed to account\nfor “obvious alternative explanations” in determining the\ncause of the contamination. Id. at *4 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702\nadvisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments). Finally, the\ncourt noted that Woodyard’s report depended on “unreliable\nor uninformative” evidence, including the Liebharts’ defec-\ntive snow sample, while omitting other evidence such as grass\nclippings and a chromatogram that allegedly detected PCBs\non the property. Id. at *4–5. For those reasons, the court ex-\ncluded Woodyard’s report in its entirety. Id. at *5.\n Although the court admitted the vast majority of Dr. Car-\npenter’s report, it struck Carpenter’s conclusion that “there is\nno ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not increase the\nrisk of disease” as unsupported by the medical studies he\ncited. Id. at *5. In doing so, the court pointed to the absence of\nPCBs inside the Liebharts’ home and in their blood, suggest-\ning that the Liebharts had not actually been exposed to PCBs\nand so could not have suffered harm. Id. at 5–6.\n With that expert testimony off the table, the district court\nconcluded that the Liebharts failed to present any admissible\nevidence to support their RCRA and TSCA claims. The re-\nmaining photos and videos certainly showed dust migrating\nonto the Liebharts’ property, but there was no reliable evi-\ndence proving that the dust contained PCBs. Given that any\nPCBs detected in the soil may have been there prior to the\ndemolition, the lack of evidence doomed the Liebharts’ case.\nThe court denied partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs,\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal\nclaims, and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice.\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 7\n\n The district court also denied the Liebharts’ petition for\nleave to amend their complaint on two grounds. First, alt-\nhough the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs discovered\nthe factual basis for the new counts over a year after filing the\ninitial complaint, it also noted that they took an additional\nfour months thereafter to seek leave to amend. During that\nintervening period, the parties had submitted and briefed\ntheir motions for summary judgment, and the trial date was\nfast approaching. It found their petition untimely. Second, the\ndistrict court determined that the new claims were futile un-\nder both statutes' advance-notice requirements.\n The plaintiffs immediately appealed. Several months after\nthe judgment, the clerk of the district court imposed costs on\nthe Liebharts in the amount of $46,320.02. The Liebharts sep-\narately appealed that decision. We consolidated the two ap-\npeals and now consider them together.\n II. ANALYSIS\n The Liebharts raise five issues for our consideration. First,\nthey argue that the district court erred in excluding the opin-\nions of expert witnesses Woodyard in full and Carpenter in\npart. As part of that argument, they allege that the district\ncourt failed to apply the same stringent standard to the de-\nfendants’ expert Keenan. Second, they contend that summary\njudgment was inappropriate because, even absent the testi-\nmony of their expert witnesses, they submitted adequate pho-\ntographic and scientific evidence to state a valid claim under\nRCRA and TSCA. Third, they challenge the district court’s de-\nnial of injunctive relief in light of deficiencies they have iden-\ntified in SPX’s state-approved clean-up plan. Fourth, they ar-\ngue that the district court abused its discretion in denying\n\f8 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nleave to amend their complaint. Finally, they challenge the\nimposition of costs.\n But there’s a larger issue looming in the background. The\ndistrict court’s opinion operates under the assumption that\nRCRA plaintiffs must demonstrate “an imminent and sub-\nstantial danger with evidence of health problems they have\nalready suffered.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *6. Relying\nprimarily on Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C.\n1996), the district court set a high bar for RCRA plaintiffs,\nholding that “it doesn’t follow necessarily that there is an im-\nminent and substantial risk of harm simply because there is\nsome amount of PCBs on the property.” Liebhart 2018 WL\n1583296 at *5. We review that question of law, which was the\nunderlying basis for the award of summary judgment, de\nnovo. Daugherty v. Harrington, 906 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2018).\n A. RCRA Requires Only that Harm “May” Be Imminent\n The question of how much harm a plaintiff must prove to\nmake out a prima facie violation of RCRA has led to much dis-\ncussion among the circuits. We have yet to tackle that issue\nhead on, so the district court necessarily had to look else-\nwhere for guidance. Passed in 1976, “RCRA is a comprehen-\nsive environmental statute that empowers [the] EPA to regu-\nlate hazardous wastes from cradle to grave.” City of Chicago v.\nEnvtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). The statute’s “pri-\nmary purpose … is to reduce the generation of hazardous\nwaste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and dis-\nposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, ‘so as to\nminimize the present and future threat to human health and\nthe environment.’” Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479,\n483 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)).\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 9\n\n Although the EPA has the primary responsibility for en-\nforcing the law, the statute, “like other environmental laws,\n… contains a citizen suit provision, § 6972, which permits pri-\nvate citizens to enforce its provisions in some circumstances.”\nId. at 484. As relevant to this case, the statute provides that\n any person may commence a civil action on his own\n behalf … against any person, … including … any\n past or present owner or operator of a treatment,\n storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or\n who is contributing to the past or present handling,\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any\n solid or hazardous waste which may present an im-\n minent and substantial endangerment to health or\n the environment.\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Notably, Con-\ngress amended the language in 1980 by substituting the\nphrase “may present” for the original 1976 wording “is pre-\nsenting.” Maine People’s All. and Nat. Res. Def. Council v.\nMallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Solid\nWaste Disposal Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–482, § 25, 94 Stat. 2334,\n2348). The section authorizes district courts to grant injunctive\nrelief and “order [a violator] to take such other action as may\nbe necessary” to remediate the endangerment. Id.; see also Me-\nghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (“Under a plain reading of this remedial\nscheme, a private citizen suing under § 6972(a)(1)(B) could\nseek a mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible\nparty to ‘take action’ by attending to the cleanup and proper\ndisposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one\nthat ‘restrains’ a responsible party from further violating\nRCRA.”); Avondale Fed. Sav. Bank v. Amoco Oil Co., 170 F.3d\n692, 694 (7th Cir. 1999).\n\f10 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\n The critical question in this case is how to determine\nwhether alleged contamination “may present an imminent\nand substantial endangerment to health.” § 6972(a)(1)(b). We\ntouched on this question only briefly in Albany Bank & Trust\nCo. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2002).\nThere, we first outlined the elements of a prima facie RCRA\nclaim: “a plaintiff must allege (1) that the defendant has gen-\nerated solid or hazardous waste, (2) that the defendant is con-\ntributing to or has contributed to the handling of this waste,\nand (3) that this waste may present an imminent and substan-\ntial danger to health or the environment.” Id. (citing Cox v.\nCity of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 2001)). We then ob-\nserved, interpreting the final element, that “[i]mminence does\nnot require an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\nharm.” Id. (citing Cox, 256 F.3d at 299). That is the extent of\nour circuit precedent on the “may present” language con-\ntained in § 6972(a)(1)(B).\n But our sister circuits have engaged with this question in\ngreat depth. In the first major case interpreting the provision,\nthe Third Circuit emphasized that the statute “enhanced the\ncourts’ traditional equitable powers by authorizing the issu-\nance of injunctions when there is but a risk of harm, a more\nlenient standard than the traditional requirement of threat-\nened irreparable harm.” United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204,\n211 (3d Cir. 1982). The court found the statutory language\n“unequivocal,” demonstrating that Congress “intended to\nconfer upon the courts the authority to grant affirmative eq-\nuitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate” the risks\nposed by toxic waste. Id. at 213–14.\n In the subsequent decades, several other circuits adopted\nand further developed the same interpretation of § 6972. See\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 11\n\nMallinckrodt, 471 F.3d at 277; Dague v. City of Burlington, 935\nF.2d 1343, 1355–56 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds,\n502 U.S. 1071 (1992); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l,\nInc., 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Waste Indus.,\nInc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument\nthat “[§ 6972] was designed to control pollution only in emer-\ngency situations”); Cox, 256 F.3d at 299–301; Price v. United\nStates Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994); Burlington N.\nand Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1019–22 (10th Cir.\n2007); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1014–\n15 (11th Cir. 2004). We now join those courts and explicitly\nembrace the core content of their interpretation.\n The district court therefore used an incorrect legal stand-\nard to evaluate the Liebharts’ argument that PCBs from the\ndemolition may present an imminent and substantial danger\nto their health and that of their tenants. It did not cite any of\nthe cases we listed above, but instead relied on a single district\ncourt decision from a circuit that has not yet addressed the\nissue. See Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *5 (quoting Foster, 922\nF. Supp. at 662 (“While there can be no question that the levels\nof contamination present at the Site may warrant future re-\nsponse action, the plaintiff cannot establish either a current\nrisk of substantial or serious threatened harm, or some neces-\nsity for action.”)).\n That error undercuts several of the reasons the district\ncourt gave for rejecting the Liebharts’ RCRA claim. For exam-\nple, the district court cursorily adopted a passing statement\nwe made over twenty-five years ago that “[t]he [EPA’s] ac-\ncepted safe level of PCBs in the environment is fifty parts per\nmillion,” id. (quoting Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor\n\f12 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nServ., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1994)), to create a require-\nment that the Liebharts show that PCB contamination on their\nproperty met that threshold. But there is no requirement in\nRCRA for a plaintiff to make “a particular quantitative show-\ning as a sine qua non for liability.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 260; see\nalso Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. Only one circuit has come to an\narguably contrary conclusion. In Price v. United States Navy,\n818 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (S.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d 39 F.3d 1011 (9th\nCir. 1994), the district court required RCRA plaintiffs to show\nthat “the level of contaminants [was] above levels that are con-\nsidered acceptable by the State.” But as the Interfaith court\nnoted, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion affirming the district\ncourt’s judgment did not discuss that requirement. RCRA\ndoes not require that plaintiffs demonstrate contamination\nabove some agency-derived threshold level of concentration.\n399 F.3d at 260–61. It merely requires that they show that con-\ntaminants on the property are seriously dangerous to human\nhealth (or will be, given prolonged exposure over time). See\nCox, 256 F.3d at 299–300 (“an endangerment is ‘substantial’ if\nit is ‘serious’” (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019)).\n That’s especially true when the standard is taken out of\ncontext. The district court relied on Cincinnati Ins. Co. to sup-\nport its contention that contamination below the threshold\nlevel of fifty parts per million (“ppm”) does not qualify as a\nregulatory violation, thereby contradicting Woodyard’s opin-\nion regarding safe levels of PCBs and providing the grounds\nfor excluding it. In that case, we evaluated whether an insur-\nance company was required to indemnify its insured for dam-\nages arising out of PCB contamination at an industrial site.\nThe EPA had identified the insured as potentially liable under\nthe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,\nand Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. In\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 13\n\nthat context, we noted that the contaminated site contained\nPCBs concentrated at levels up to 58,000 ppm, well above the\nEPA’s general regulatory threshold of fifty ppm. 40 F.3d at 148\n(citing 40 C.F.R. § 761.60).\n But that regulation, still in effect today, identifies indus-\ntrial equipment and other wastes contaminated at levels\nabove fifty ppm and requires special procedures for their stor-\nage and disposal. It does not unequivocally state that PCBs\nconcentrated at levels lower than fifty ppm are safe for human\nexposure. Neither Cincinnati Ins. Co. nor the EPA regulation\nstand for the proposition that PCBs concentrated at forty-nine\nppm on residential property do not present a substantial endan-\ngerment to the health of the residents. That is especially ap-\nparent when we consider that the same set of regulations dis-\ntinguishes between low and high-occupancy areas and re-\nquires that, in high-occupancy areas, bulk PCB remediation\nwaste, such as soil, be cleaned up to levels of concentration at\nor below one ppm. § 761.61(a)(4)(i)(A). Section 761.3 confirms\nthat the term “high-occupancy area” includes residences. See\nalso § 761.123 (regulating spills of PCBs concentrated at fifty\nppm or greater but emphasizing that “[t]he concentration of\nPCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concentration in the\nmaterial spilled as opposed to the concentration of PCBs in\nthe material onto which the PCBs were spilled”). “Proof of\ncontamination in excess of [agency] standards may support a\nfinding of liability, and may alone suffice for liability in some\ncases, but its required use is without justification in the stat-\nute.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 261.\n This is not to say that all the plaintiffs must do is to show\nsome bit of soil on their property that tests positive for PCBs\n\f14 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nabove one ppm (or even above the purported lower Wiscon-\nsin DNR standard, which the defendants seem to have\nacknowledged in their state-approved clean-up plan). Of\ncourse, there must be accompanying evidence that establishes\nsome connection between the existing contaminants and\nsome imminent and substantial endangerment to health. 1 But\nthe Liebharts attempted to provide such evidence, and the\ndistrict court held the bar higher than necessary under\nRCRA’s standard. In criticizing expert witness Carpenter’s\nstatement that “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that\ndoes not increase the risk of disease,” the district court re-\njected Carpenter’s citation to studies showing the general\nrisks of PCB exposure because “the Liebharts do not cite any\nevidence that they have been exposed to PCBs.” Liebhart, 2018\nWL 1583296 at *5. Moreover, the district court concluded that\n“[t]he Liebharts do not contend that they can prove an immi-\nnent and substantial danger with evidence of health problems\nthey have already suffered.” Id. at *6.\n As we noted in Albany Bank, “[i]mminence does not re-\nquire an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\n\n\n 1 On appeal, the Liebharts contend that there is no separate require-\nment for expert witness testimony because the photos and videos they\nhave submitted into evidence suffice to prove their RCRA claim. The de-\nfendants push back on that argument, insisting that many of the issues are\nbeyond the competence of lay fact-finders and require the assistance of\nexperts to address. See, e.g., C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827,\n838 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Given the complex nature of this case, … [and w]ith\nno experts to prove causation … the appellants cannot prove their toxic-\ntort case under [state] law.”) Because the district court did not make a fac-\ntual finding as to whether this case is sufficient complex to require expert\ntestimony, and because we remand for reconsideration of a separate legal\nissue, we need not reach that question today.\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 15\n\nharm.” 310 F.3d at 973. Although the Supreme Court has in-\nstructed that “[a]n endangerment can only be ‘imminent’ if it\n‘threaten[s] to occur immediately,’” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485\n(quoting Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary of English Language\n1245 (2d ed. 1934)), it qualified that statement when it approv-\ningly quoted the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the statu-\ntory term “implies that there must be a threat which is present\nnow, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until\nlater.” Id. at 486 (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019).\nWe take that to mean that the Liebharts must show that there\nare PCBs currently on the property that have the potential to\nsubstantially threaten their health at some point in the future\nif they continue to occupy the premises and prolong their ex-\nposure. On remand, the district court should reevaluate its ex-\nclusion of Dr. Carpenter’s assertion regarding PCB safety un-\nder the standards we have outlined above and determine\nwhether, if admissible, the report demonstrates that a sub-\nstantial and imminent threat to the Liebharts’ health may be\npresent.\n B. TSCA Likewise Requires No Heightened Showing\n TSCA authorizes a separate, private cause of action allow-\ning “any person [to] commence a civil action … against any\nperson … who is alleged to be in violation of … any rule\npromulgated under” the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1). The EPA\npromulgated the PCB regulations in question pursuant to\nstatutory authority under TSCA, designating PCBs as “haz-\nardous waste” and controlling their manufacture, use, stor-\nage, and disposal. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 761. The Liebharts’ TSCA\nclaim alleged that the defendants violated those regulations,\nthereby authorizing the district court to “restrain [the] viola-\ntion.” § 2619(a). Unlike RCRA, which authorizes mandatory\n\f16 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\ninjunctions to compel remediation of previous violations,\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions to stop ongoing\nviolations. Id. The defendants argued that there was no longer\nan ongoing violation, as demolition was complete by the time\nthe Liebharts filed their claim. 2\n The purported violation was based on 40 C.F.R. § 761.123,\nwhich, as we noted above, regulates “spills” of PCB materials\nconcentrated at levels above fifty ppm. The district court cor-\nrectly noted that the Liebharts had not shown any evidence\nthat any PCBs had been “spilled” onto their property (by\nmeans of dust migration) at that level of concentration, and it\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on that basis.\n But the district court seems to have overlooked the follow-\ning sentence in the regulation, which directs that “[t]he con-\ncentration of PCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concen-\ntration in the material spilled as opposed to the concentration\nof the material onto which the PCBs were spilled.” Id. The\nLiebharts’ complaint seems to have alleged that the concrete\nfloor of the factory, which contained at least some contami-\nnated areas above the fifty-ppm threshold, was demolished\nand “spilled” onto the Liebharts’ property. By the plain text\nof the regulation, there is no need to show that contaminants\non the Liebharts’ property are themselves concentrated above\nfifty ppm so long as the original material that was the source\nof that spill met the criteria. On remand, the district court may\nagain determine that there is no ongoing violation, but it must\n\n 2 The district court determined that the Liebharts waived this claim\nby failing to engage the defendants’ argument that there was no “ongoing\nviolation.” But the court chose to analyze the merits of the claim regardless\nof waiver and reached its conclusion on an alternative basis. We likewise\nset aside the issue of waiver to reach the district court’s merits analysis.\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 17\n\nfirst determine whether the alleged violation comes within\nthe meaning of § 761.123 in the first place.\n C. The District Court Should Reconsider the Remaining Issues\non Remand\n Now that we have clarified the standard the plaintiffs\nmust meet, we turn to the remaining procedural issues the\nLiebharts have asked to us to address.\n 1. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding\nWoodyard’s Testimony\n “The summary-judgment decision here turned [in large\npart] on the district court’s conclusion that [the] expert testi-\nmony was inadmissible. Whether the district court applied\nthe appropriate legal framework for evaluating expert testi-\nmony is reviewed de novo, but the court’s choice of relevant\nfactors within that framework and its ultimate conclusion as\nto admissibility are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Lees v.\nCarthage College, 714 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 2013). When a dis-\ntrict court is “[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testi-\nmony … the trial judge must determine at the outset …\nwhether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific\nknowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or\ndetermine a fact in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,\n509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). “The trial court must have … latitude\nin deciding how to test an expert’s reliability.” Kumho Tire Co.,\nLtd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).\n The district court was well within its discretion to exclude\nthe proffered testimony of expert witness Woodyard. Beyond\nthe problem that the plaintiffs seemed to have waived this is-\nsue in the district court by failing to engage with the defend-\nants’ arguments in their motion to strike the testimony,\n\f18 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nWoodyard’s analysis suffers from a critical flaw that stems\nfrom the way in which the parties have framed this lawsuit.\nThe district court briefly noted in its opinion that “both sides\nassume that none of the defendants can be held liable for any\nPCB contamination on the Liebharts’ property that occurred\nbefore the demolition began, so the court will make the same\nassumption.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *1. That’s a curious\nchoice. RCRA permits the Liebharts to obtain injunctive relief\nfrom the owner of the facility for any cognizable contamina-\ntion, regardless of whether the PCBs migrated onto their\nproperty before or after the demolition occurred. See 42 U.S.C.\n§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (authorizing suit against “any person … who\nhas contributed … to the past or present handling … or dis-\nposal” of hazardous waste); see also Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486\n(“RCRA contains no statute of limitations.”).\n But because the Liebharts restricted their claims to PCBs\nthat allegedly migrated onto their property via the dust from\nthe 2015 demolition, they necessarily excluded claims result-\ning from PCBs that may have gotten onto their property dur-\ning the previous century. The district court correctly noted\nthat Woodyard’s expert opinion could not distinguish be-\ntween these two alternatives, as both sets of contaminants\noriginated from the same source. There was even evidence\nshowing that PCBs existed in the soil beneath the Liebharts’\nasphalt driveway—Woodyard could not explain how that\nmight have occurred as the result of dust blowing in the wind\nas opposed to seepage over the course of years before any\ndemolition occurred.\n Perhaps the Liebharts decided to frame their claims in this\nway because they wanted to go after defendants TRC and\nApollo, who would not be liable for what happened before\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 19\n\ndemolition. Or perhaps some element of their state-law\nclaims, which we have not addressed, required them to con-\nstrict the scope. They did not explain their reasoning to us (or\nit seems, to the district court). But the distinction makes it dif-\nficult for Woodyard to make his case, given that he did not\n“adequately account[] for obvious alternative explanations.”\nGopalratnam v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 787 (7th Cir.\n2017). Viewed in this light, the district court was within its\ndiscretion to exclude the testimony as unreliable and unhelp-\nful to the trier of fact. The district court may choose to rethink\nthat evaluation on remand under the legal standards we out-\nlined above, but it may well reach the same conclusion.\n 2. The District Court Should Reconsider Its Denial of Injunctive\nRelief\n The district court denied injunctive relief to the Liebharts\nbecause the defendants had already agreed to a clean-up plan\nthat had been approved by the Wisconsin DNR. We review\nthat decision for an abuse of discretion. See AMI Int’l, Inc. v.\nDatacard Corp. 106 F.3d 1342, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997) (remanding\ngrant of RCRA injunction).\n As we mentioned above, RCRA authorizes district courts\nto issue either mandatory or prohibitory injunctions, while\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions. “[I]t is appro-\npriate ‘to give great deference to the district court’s decision\nas to the precise equitable relief necessary in a particular\ncase.’” Bowes v. Ind. Sec. of State, 837 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir.\n2016) (quoting Gjersten v. Bd. Of Election Com’rs for City of Chi-\ncago, 791 F.2d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1986)). That is especially true\nwhen a plaintiff requests a mandatory injunction, which “im-\nposes significant burdens on the defendant and requires care-\nful consideration of the intrusiveness of the ordered act, as\n\f20 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nwell as the difficulties that may be encountered in supervising\nthe enjoined party’s compliance with the court’s order.” Kart-\nman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir.\n2011).\n Considering SPX’s decision to formulate a clean-up plan\nand obtain approval from the state agency, the district court\ndetermined that there was no need for separate, federally-su-\npervised remediation. It reached that conclusion even while\nassuming that the defendants were in violation of either\nRCRA or TSCA, despite the fact it found no such violation.\nOther courts have determined that the existence of a parallel\nplan of remediation supervised by the state does not neces-\nsarily prevent a federal district court from granting an injunc-\ntion if it finds the state agency’s actions to be insufficient to\nremedy the violation of federal law. See, e.g., Interfaith, 399\nF.3d at 264–68. On the other hand, the same courts have also\nupheld denials of injunctions in similar situations when the\ndistrict court finds that the parallel plan is adequate to the\ntask. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735\nF.3d 131, 139–40 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Interfaith). We\nrecently reached the same conclusion. See LAJIM, LLC v. Gen.\nElec. Co., No. 18-1522, 2019 WL 1011021, at *4–11 (7th Cir. Mar.\n4, 2019) (“[T]he district court correctly held that it has discre-\ntion to award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not re-\nquired to order relief after a finding of liability,” particularly\nin light of ongoing relief supervised by a state environmental\nagency).\n Here, the district court determined that SPX’s existing\nplan was sufficient and that the Liebharts had not “iden-\ntif[ied] any way that SPX’s plan [was] deficient or violate[d]\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 21\n\nfederal law.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *7. We agree. Alt-\nhough the Liebharts point to certain statistical sampling re-\nquirements outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 761.125 and contend that\nSPX’s existing plan fails to meet those requirements, the dis-\ntrict court noted that SPX’s plan includes further sampling of\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ property. It emphasized that “the\nLiebharts do not otherwise explain why SPX’s proposed sam-\npling scheme is substantively inadequate.” Liebhart, 2018 WL\n1583296 at *7. We see no evidence that compels us to contra-\ndict that factual finding.\n However, in light of the legal standards we outlined\nabove, we ask the district court to reconsider its decision to\ndeny injunctive relief on remand. Because the bar for estab-\nlishing an imminent and substantial danger is lower than the\ndistrict court believed when evaluating the request for an in-\njunction, it would be prudent to reassess whether the DNR-\napproved plan adequately remedies harms that may come\nwithin RCRA’s scope. See LAJIM, 2019 WL 1011021 at *6\n(“[O]nce a court finds a defendant liable for creating a risk of\nimminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the case\nthat injunctive relief is warranted. But that is not always the\ncase.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).\n 3. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying\nLeave to Amend the Complaint.\n We review a denial of leave to amend a complaint for\nabuse of discretion. Life Plans, Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co.,\n800 F.3d 343, 357 (7th Cir. 2015). District courts are to “freely\ngive leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.\nP. 15(a)(2). “The Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to\nrequire a district court to allow amendment unless there is a\ngood reason—futility, undue delay, undue prejudice, or bad\n\f22 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nfaith—for denying leave to amend.” Life Plans, 800 F.3d at 357\n(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The district\ncourt in this case identified two of those grounds as bases for\ndenial: futility and undue delay. While we disagree with the\nfutility analysis, we concur with the finding of undue delay\nand decline to reverse.\n We begin with the question of futility. Both statutes con-\ntain advance-notice requirements that citizen plaintiffs must\nobserve prior to filing RCRA or TSCA suits. They require\nthose plaintiffs to notify the EPA 60–90 days in advance of fil-\ning the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2); 15 U.S.C.\n§ 2619(b)(1)(A). But the district court chose to apply the re-\nquirements not only to the filing of the complaint, but also to\nany subsequent amendments that sought to add new RCRA\nor TSCA counts. Although the Liebharts complied with the\nrequirements prior to filing their original complaint in April\n2016, they gave no new notice to the EPA before filing for\nleave to amend in February 2018. The district court held that,\nbecause the prior notice did not contain any mention of bur-\nied PCBs on the SPX property, it was insufficient to alert the\nEPA to the particular violation the Liebharts sought to include\nin the amended complaint.\n The notice provisions serve two purposes. “First, notice al-\nlows Government agencies to take responsibility for enforc-\ning environmental regulations, thus obviating the need for\ncitizen suits. … Second, notice gives the alleged violator ‘an\nopportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the\nAct[s] and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit.’”\nHallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (quoting\nGwaltney of Smithfield, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 23\n\nU.S. 49, 60 (1987)). The district court’s decision to require no-\ntice for an amendment to a complaint fulfilled neither pur-\npose. By the time the Liebharts attempted to amend their com-\nplaint, the EPA had been on notice of alleged PCB contamina-\ntion at the SPX property for over two years—and it had de-\nclined to get involved. Moreover, it was unlikely that the de-\nfendants would resolve the alleged violation to avoid being\nsued when they were already in the midst of an extended law-\nsuit with the same plaintiffs. See AM Int’l, 106 F.3d at 1351\n(“[T]he delay period is designed to allow a [defendant] a pe-\nriod in which to clean up its act and avoid litigation. [This de-\nfendant] was clearly not interested in using the delay period\nto resolve the dispute without going to court.”); see also Dague,\n935 F.2d at 1351 (“There is no need to maintain a window of\nopportunity for the government to take the lead enforcement\nrole … when a citizen, acting as a private attorney general, has\nalready lawfully assumed the lead role in bringing a … claim\nagainst the same facility.”) (quoting Dague v. City of Burling-\nton, 733 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D. Vt. 1990)). When the original notice\nis “sufficiently specific to inform the alleged violator [and the\nagency] about what it is doing wrong, so that it will know\nwhat corrective actions will avert a lawsuit,” Atl. States Legal\nFound., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir.\n1994), there is no need to require a second round of advance\nnotice for an amended complaint in the same litigation.\n But an error in the futility analysis alone does not neces-\nsarily constitute an abuse of discretion on the whole. In addi-\ntion to futility, the district court cited undue delay and preju-\ndice in its decision to deny leave to amend. “[D]elay by itself\nis normally an insufficient reason to deny a motion for leave\nto amend. Delay must be coupled with some other reason.\nTypically, that reason … is prejudice to the non-moving\n\f24 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nparty.” Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 793\n(7th Cir. 2004). The district court cited the Liebharts’ admis-\nsion that they learned of the possible burial of contaminated\nconcrete on the SPX property on October 11, 2017 but failed\nto seek leave to amend their complaint until February 22,\n2018. During that more than four-month period, the parties\nsubmitted and briefed their cross-motions for summary judg-\nment, and by February, trial was only three months away. The\nLiebharts provided no justification for their delay.\n In response, the Liebharts contend that there was no un-\ndue prejudice to the defendants: by the time they filed their\nmotion, five weeks of discovery still remained. We disagree.\nWhile the district court’s explanation of prejudice was fairly\nshort, even if the district court had failed to articulate a find-\ning of prejudice altogether, we might still “affirm providing\nthat ‘the prejudice that would result from such amendment\nwas apparent.’” Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 613 (7th\nCir. 2002) (quoting Feldman v. Am. Mem’l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d\n783, 793 (7th Cir. 1999)). In Park, the plaintiff waited six\nmonths to move for leave to amend a complaint after she\nknew (or should have known) of the additional alleged viola-\ntion. Id. Because trial was approaching, we concluded that the\ndistrict court was well within its discretion to deny leave. Id.;\nsee also Perrian v. O’Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194–95 (7th Cir. 1992)\n(“Because substantive amendments shortly before trial serve\nto defeat the public’s interest in speedy resolution of legal dis-\nputes, ‘[a] district court judge is entitled, in such circum-\nstances, to refuse to allow a plaintiff’s amendment.’” (quoting\nCampbell v. Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co., 893 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir.\n1990)) (internal citation omitted)).\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 25\n\n On the contrary, in Life Plans, we found no undue delay\nwhen a plaintiff promptly moved to amend its complaint just\nten days after learning of the factual basis for its new count\nduring discovery. 800 F.3d at 358. The Liebharts delayed more\nthan four months in the same circumstances. Although dis-\ncovery was ongoing at the time of the Liebharts’ motion, the\nparties had already briefed their dispositive motions, and the\ndistrict court was preparing its summary-judgment order that\nwould ultimately dispose of the case. We therefore cannot say\nthat denial of leave for undue delay and prejudice was an\nabuse of the district court’s discretion. Of course, the district\ncourt may permit an amendment on remand if the interests of\njustice so require.\n III. CONCLUSION\n Although the district court properly exercised its discre-\ntion on the various evidentiary and procedural issues the\nplaintiffs have raised, its analysis on the merits was narrower\nthan the statutes demand. It may reach the same conclusions\non reconsideration, but the parties should have another op-\nportunity to litigate whether a substantial and imminent en-\ndangerment to health exists in this case under the standards\nwe have outlined. We therefore VACATE the order of the dis-\ntrict court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent\nwith this opinion. 3\n\n\n\n\n 3 The Liebharts also challenge the taxation of costs against them by the\n\nclerk of the district court. Because we vacate the district court’s judgment,\nwe assume that the imposition of costs is automatically vacated and so do\nnot reach that issue. The clerk of the district court is free to reassess costs\non remand as the case proceeds.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: William LIEBHART & Nancy Liebhart, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SPX CORPORATION, TRC Environmental Corporation, & Apollo Dismantling Services, Inc. Defendants-Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\nWILLIAM LIEBHART & NANCY LIEBHART,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nSPX CORPORATION, TRC ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION, &\\nAPOLLO DISMANTLING SERVICES, INC.\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-700 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n KANNE, Circuit Judge. William and Nancy Liebhart to-\\ngether own three houses on the same block in Watertown,\\nWisconsin. Besides a few other houses, the rest of the block\\nwas previously occupied by an abandoned transformer fac-\\ntory, last owned by SPX Corporation. In 2014, SPX demol-\\nished the building with the assistance of TRC Environmental\\nCorporation and Apollo Dismantling Services (collectively,\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n“the defendants”). The Liebharts allege that dust and debris\\ncontaining toxic chemicals migrated onto their properties,\\ncontaminating their yards and jeopardizing their health and\\nthe health of their tenants.\\n The Liebharts sued under federal statutes authorizing pri-\\nvate rights of action for environmental contamination. They\\nalso brought various state-law claims. Following discovery\\nand the submission of expert witness reports, the district\\ncourt denied the Liebharts’ motion for partial summary judg-\\nment and granted summary judgment to the defendants with\\ncosts. Although the district court adequately evaluated the ex-\\npert witnesses and did not abuse its discretion in its proce-\\ndural decisions, the court set the bar unnecessarily high for\\nthe plaintiffs to show a violation of the applicable federal stat-\\nutes. For that reason, we vacate the district court’s judgment\\nand remand for reconsideration.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n The factory dates to the 1920s and was used to manufac-\\nture various industrial equipment. Most relevant to our pur-\\npose, the factory manufactured power transformers contain-\\ning polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a carcinogenic chemi-\\ncal banned by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1979.\\nSee Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Pro-\\ncessing, Distribution in Commerce, and Use Prohibitions, 44\\nFed. Reg. 31,514 (May 31, 1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 761).\\nThe parties all agree that the facility has not manufactured or\\nhandled any items containing PCBs since 1971, and that it\\nshut down completely in 2005.\\n But even with all the products and manufacturing equip-\\nment removed, PCB contaminants remained in the facility. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 3\\n\\n2009, SPX retained TRC and another company (not named as\\na defendant in this suit) to study the property and determine\\nthe extent and precise location of any PCB contamination.\\nThose studies revealed that the concrete floor of the factory\\nwas generally contaminated, with concentrated amounts lo-\\ncated in specific areas throughout the site.\\n Several years went by. In 2014, SPX decided to move ahead\\nwith the demolition, retaining Apollo to conduct the work\\nand TRC to supervise the project. That November, the defend-\\nants timely proposed a self-implementing cleanup plan to the\\nEPA, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 761.61(a). The trouble began\\nas demolition commenced in January 2015. The Liebharts al-\\nlege that Apollo demolished the building recklessly, failing to\\nuse appropriate safety methods to control the dust generated\\nby demolition equipment. They assert that their properties\\nwere covered in dust, and they submitted hundreds of photos\\nand videos of dust from the facility blowing toward their\\nhomes to support their allegation.\\n The Liebharts filed a complaint with the local government\\nin February. They also collected a dust-covered sample of\\nsnow from their yard and placed it in a mason jar. Soon there-\\nafter, a representative of the Wisconsin Department of Natu-\\nral Resources (“DNR”) contacted the defendants about the\\nLiebharts’ concerns. In April, TRC collected samples of the\\nsurface soil (roughly down to eight inches below ground) on\\nboth the industrial and residential properties. Sure enough,\\nthe properties tested positive for the presence of PCBs. In Au-\\ngust, the Liebharts vacated the property on advice of their\\nphysician to avoid further exposure to the chemicals. Frus-\\ntrated with the lack of action, William Liebhart had the snow\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nsample tested for PCBs. Although the sample did, in fact, con-\\ntain PCBs, the irregular manner of collection and storage\\nspoiled the sample, and the laboratory declined to endorse the\\nresults with any confidence.\\n In September 2015, SPX submitted a plan to remediate the\\ncontamination to the DNR. In turn, the Liebharts sued in fed-\\neral district court in October. The complaint sought injunctive\\nrelief under both the Resource Conservation and Recovery\\nAct (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and the Toxic Substances\\nControl Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. In addition, the\\nLiebharts brought a host of state-law claims under supple-\\nmental jurisdiction, including strict liability, negligence, tres-\\npass, nuisance, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.\\n During discovery, the Liebharts submitted to further test-\\ning for PCBs both in their yard and inside their home. They\\nalso underwent blood testing. Although the external surveys\\nrevealed a more comprehensive picture of the extent to which\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ properties contained PCBs, the in-\\nternal sampling and blood tests were both negative for con-\\ntamination. The Liebharts later learned in October 2017 that\\nthe defendants allegedly buried some of the concrete remains\\non-site rather than removing them to a toxic waste dump as\\nrequired by the EPA-approved clean-up plan.\\n The parties prepared and submitted the reports of the ex-\\npert witnesses who were to testify at trial. Among those, three\\nare pertinent to our discussion. First, the Liebharts submitted\\na report by John Woodyard, a licensed professional engineer.\\nHis report included a description of standard methods used\\nwhen demolishing PCB-contaminated buildings and an anal-\\nysis of the purported ways in which the defendants deviated\\nfrom those practices, thereby causing the contamination of the\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 5\\n\\nresidences. The Liebharts’ second expert was Dr. David Car-\\npenter, a public health physician who opined on ways in\\nwhich the Liebharts might have been exposed to PCBs and the\\npotential health effects of continuing exposure. He concluded\\nthat “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not\\nincrease the risk of disease.” Finally, the defendants submit-\\nted a report prepared by Dr. Russell Keenan, a toxicologist\\nwho analyzed the survey data and determined that it was im-\\npossible to determine whether the presence of PCBs on the\\nLiebharts’ property was due to the recent demolition or to\\nrunoff that occurred over the last several decades.\\n In December 2017, the Liebharts moved for partial sum-\\nmary judgment on the issue of causation, reserving the issue\\nof damages for a jury trial. The defendants cross-moved for\\nsummary judgment; they also filed a motion to exclude the\\ntestimony of plaintiffs’ experts Woodyard and Carpenter un-\\nder Fed. R. Evid. 702. In February 2018, after those motions\\nwere fully briefed to the court, the Liebharts sought leave to\\namend their complaint. In light of the information they ob-\\ntained through discovery regarding the burial of concrete on\\nthe property, they intended to allege separate RCRA and\\nTSCA violations and seek an enlargement of the proposed in-\\njunction to include removal of that material.\\n The district court issued its decisions on March 30. First,\\nthe court granted in part the defendants’ motion to exclude\\nthe plaintiffs’ expert witness reports. The court explained that\\nWoodyard’s report was “equivocal” as to the issue of causa-\\ntion; it hedged on whether the contaminants came from dem-\\nolition or from runoff during the preceding decades. See\\nLiebhart v. SPX Corp., No. 16-cv-700-jdp, 2018 WL 1583296 at\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n*3–4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2018). Second, the report “over-\\nlook[ed] too much significant evidence” and failed to account\\nfor “obvious alternative explanations” in determining the\\ncause of the contamination. Id. at *4 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702\\nadvisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments). Finally, the\\ncourt noted that Woodyard’s report depended on “unreliable\\nor uninformative” evidence, including the Liebharts’ defec-\\ntive snow sample, while omitting other evidence such as grass\\nclippings and a chromatogram that allegedly detected PCBs\\non the property. Id. at *4–5. For those reasons, the court ex-\\ncluded Woodyard’s report in its entirety. Id. at *5.\\n Although the court admitted the vast majority of Dr. Car-\\npenter’s report, it struck Carpenter’s conclusion that “there is\\nno ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not increase the\\nrisk of disease” as unsupported by the medical studies he\\ncited. Id. at *5. In doing so, the court pointed to the absence of\\nPCBs inside the Liebharts’ home and in their blood, suggest-\\ning that the Liebharts had not actually been exposed to PCBs\\nand so could not have suffered harm. Id. at 5–6.\\n With that expert testimony off the table, the district court\\nconcluded that the Liebharts failed to present any admissible\\nevidence to support their RCRA and TSCA claims. The re-\\nmaining photos and videos certainly showed dust migrating\\nonto the Liebharts’ property, but there was no reliable evi-\\ndence proving that the dust contained PCBs. Given that any\\nPCBs detected in the soil may have been there prior to the\\ndemolition, the lack of evidence doomed the Liebharts’ case.\\nThe court denied partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs,\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal\\nclaims, and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 7\\n\\n The district court also denied the Liebharts’ petition for\\nleave to amend their complaint on two grounds. First, alt-\\nhough the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs discovered\\nthe factual basis for the new counts over a year after filing the\\ninitial complaint, it also noted that they took an additional\\nfour months thereafter to seek leave to amend. During that\\nintervening period, the parties had submitted and briefed\\ntheir motions for summary judgment, and the trial date was\\nfast approaching. It found their petition untimely. Second, the\\ndistrict court determined that the new claims were futile un-\\nder both statutes' advance-notice requirements.\\n The plaintiffs immediately appealed. Several months after\\nthe judgment, the clerk of the district court imposed costs on\\nthe Liebharts in the amount of $46,320.02. The Liebharts sep-\\narately appealed that decision. We consolidated the two ap-\\npeals and now consider them together.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n The Liebharts raise five issues for our consideration. First,\\nthey argue that the district court erred in excluding the opin-\\nions of expert witnesses Woodyard in full and Carpenter in\\npart. As part of that argument, they allege that the district\\ncourt failed to apply the same stringent standard to the de-\\nfendants’ expert Keenan. Second, they contend that summary\\njudgment was inappropriate because, even absent the testi-\\nmony of their expert witnesses, they submitted adequate pho-\\ntographic and scientific evidence to state a valid claim under\\nRCRA and TSCA. Third, they challenge the district court’s de-\\nnial of injunctive relief in light of deficiencies they have iden-\\ntified in SPX’s state-approved clean-up plan. Fourth, they ar-\\ngue that the district court abused its discretion in denying\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nleave to amend their complaint. Finally, they challenge the\\nimposition of costs.\\n But there’s a larger issue looming in the background. The\\ndistrict court’s opinion operates under the assumption that\\nRCRA plaintiffs must demonstrate “an imminent and sub-\\nstantial danger with evidence of health problems they have\\nalready suffered.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *6. Relying\\nprimarily on Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C.\\n1996), the district court set a high bar for RCRA plaintiffs,\\nholding that “it doesn’t follow necessarily that there is an im-\\nminent and substantial risk of harm simply because there is\\nsome amount of PCBs on the property.” Liebhart 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *5. We review that question of law, which was the\\nunderlying basis for the award of summary judgment, de\\nnovo. Daugherty v. Harrington, 906 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n A. RCRA Requires Only that Harm “May” Be Imminent\\n The question of how much harm a plaintiff must prove to\\nmake out a prima facie violation of RCRA has led to much dis-\\ncussion among the circuits. We have yet to tackle that issue\\nhead on, so the district court necessarily had to look else-\\nwhere for guidance. Passed in 1976, “RCRA is a comprehen-\\nsive environmental statute that empowers [the] EPA to regu-\\nlate hazardous wastes from cradle to grave.” City of Chicago v.\\nEnvtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). The statute’s “pri-\\nmary purpose … is to reduce the generation of hazardous\\nwaste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and dis-\\nposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, ‘so as to\\nminimize the present and future threat to human health and\\nthe environment.’” Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479,\\n483 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 9\\n\\n Although the EPA has the primary responsibility for en-\\nforcing the law, the statute, “like other environmental laws,\\n… contains a citizen suit provision, § 6972, which permits pri-\\nvate citizens to enforce its provisions in some circumstances.”\\nId. at 484. As relevant to this case, the statute provides that\\n any person may commence a civil action on his own\\n behalf … against any person, … including … any\\n past or present owner or operator of a treatment,\\n storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or\\n who is contributing to the past or present handling,\\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any\\n solid or hazardous waste which may present an im-\\n minent and substantial endangerment to health or\\n the environment.\\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Notably, Con-\\ngress amended the language in 1980 by substituting the\\nphrase “may present” for the original 1976 wording “is pre-\\nsenting.” Maine People’s All. and Nat. Res. Def. Council v.\\nMallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Solid\\nWaste Disposal Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–482, § 25, 94 Stat. 2334,\\n2348). The section authorizes district courts to grant injunctive\\nrelief and “order [a violator] to take such other action as may\\nbe necessary” to remediate the endangerment. Id.; see also Me-\\nghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (“Under a plain reading of this remedial\\nscheme, a private citizen suing under § 6972(a)(1)(B) could\\nseek a mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible\\nparty to ‘take action’ by attending to the cleanup and proper\\ndisposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one\\nthat ‘restrains’ a responsible party from further violating\\nRCRA.”); Avondale Fed. Sav. Bank v. Amoco Oil Co., 170 F.3d\\n692, 694 (7th Cir. 1999).\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n The critical question in this case is how to determine\\nwhether alleged contamination “may present an imminent\\nand substantial endangerment to health.” § 6972(a)(1)(b). We\\ntouched on this question only briefly in Albany Bank & Trust\\nCo. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2002).\\nThere, we first outlined the elements of a prima facie RCRA\\nclaim: “a plaintiff must allege (1) that the defendant has gen-\\nerated solid or hazardous waste, (2) that the defendant is con-\\ntributing to or has contributed to the handling of this waste,\\nand (3) that this waste may present an imminent and substan-\\ntial danger to health or the environment.” Id. (citing Cox v.\\nCity of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 2001)). We then ob-\\nserved, interpreting the final element, that “[i]mminence does\\nnot require an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\nharm.” Id. (citing Cox, 256 F.3d at 299). That is the extent of\\nour circuit precedent on the “may present” language con-\\ntained in § 6972(a)(1)(B).\\n But our sister circuits have engaged with this question in\\ngreat depth. In the first major case interpreting the provision,\\nthe Third Circuit emphasized that the statute “enhanced the\\ncourts’ traditional equitable powers by authorizing the issu-\\nance of injunctions when there is but a risk of harm, a more\\nlenient standard than the traditional requirement of threat-\\nened irreparable harm.” United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204,\\n211 (3d Cir. 1982). The court found the statutory language\\n“unequivocal,” demonstrating that Congress “intended to\\nconfer upon the courts the authority to grant affirmative eq-\\nuitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate” the risks\\nposed by toxic waste. Id. at 213–14.\\n In the subsequent decades, several other circuits adopted\\nand further developed the same interpretation of § 6972. See\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 11\\n\\nMallinckrodt, 471 F.3d at 277; Dague v. City of Burlington, 935\\nF.2d 1343, 1355–56 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds,\\n502 U.S. 1071 (1992); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l,\\nInc., 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Waste Indus.,\\nInc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument\\nthat “[§ 6972] was designed to control pollution only in emer-\\ngency situations”); Cox, 256 F.3d at 299–301; Price v. United\\nStates Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994); Burlington N.\\nand Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1019–22 (10th Cir.\\n2007); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1014–\\n15 (11th Cir. 2004). We now join those courts and explicitly\\nembrace the core content of their interpretation.\\n The district court therefore used an incorrect legal stand-\\nard to evaluate the Liebharts’ argument that PCBs from the\\ndemolition may present an imminent and substantial danger\\nto their health and that of their tenants. It did not cite any of\\nthe cases we listed above, but instead relied on a single district\\ncourt decision from a circuit that has not yet addressed the\\nissue. See Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *5 (quoting Foster, 922\\nF. Supp. at 662 (“While there can be no question that the levels\\nof contamination present at the Site may warrant future re-\\nsponse action, the plaintiff cannot establish either a current\\nrisk of substantial or serious threatened harm, or some neces-\\nsity for action.”)).\\n That error undercuts several of the reasons the district\\ncourt gave for rejecting the Liebharts’ RCRA claim. For exam-\\nple, the district court cursorily adopted a passing statement\\nwe made over twenty-five years ago that “[t]he [EPA’s] ac-\\ncepted safe level of PCBs in the environment is fifty parts per\\nmillion,” id. (quoting Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nServ., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1994)), to create a require-\\nment that the Liebharts show that PCB contamination on their\\nproperty met that threshold. But there is no requirement in\\nRCRA for a plaintiff to make “a particular quantitative show-\\ning as a sine qua non for liability.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 260; see\\nalso Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. Only one circuit has come to an\\narguably contrary conclusion. In Price v. United States Navy,\\n818 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (S.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d 39 F.3d 1011 (9th\\nCir. 1994), the district court required RCRA plaintiffs to show\\nthat “the level of contaminants [was] above levels that are con-\\nsidered acceptable by the State.” But as the Interfaith court\\nnoted, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion affirming the district\\ncourt’s judgment did not discuss that requirement. RCRA\\ndoes not require that plaintiffs demonstrate contamination\\nabove some agency-derived threshold level of concentration.\\n399 F.3d at 260–61. It merely requires that they show that con-\\ntaminants on the property are seriously dangerous to human\\nhealth (or will be, given prolonged exposure over time). See\\nCox, 256 F.3d at 299–300 (“an endangerment is ‘substantial’ if\\nit is ‘serious’” (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019)).\\n That’s especially true when the standard is taken out of\\ncontext. The district court relied on Cincinnati Ins. Co. to sup-\\nport its contention that contamination below the threshold\\nlevel of fifty parts per million (“ppm”) does not qualify as a\\nregulatory violation, thereby contradicting Woodyard’s opin-\\nion regarding safe levels of PCBs and providing the grounds\\nfor excluding it. In that case, we evaluated whether an insur-\\nance company was required to indemnify its insured for dam-\\nages arising out of PCB contamination at an industrial site.\\nThe EPA had identified the insured as potentially liable under\\nthe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,\\nand Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 13\\n\\nthat context, we noted that the contaminated site contained\\nPCBs concentrated at levels up to 58,000 ppm, well above the\\nEPA’s general regulatory threshold of fifty ppm. 40 F.3d at 148\\n(citing 40 C.F.R. § 761.60).\\n But that regulation, still in effect today, identifies indus-\\ntrial equipment and other wastes contaminated at levels\\nabove fifty ppm and requires special procedures for their stor-\\nage and disposal. It does not unequivocally state that PCBs\\nconcentrated at levels lower than fifty ppm are safe for human\\nexposure. Neither Cincinnati Ins. Co. nor the EPA regulation\\nstand for the proposition that PCBs concentrated at forty-nine\\nppm on residential property do not present a substantial endan-\\ngerment to the health of the residents. That is especially ap-\\nparent when we consider that the same set of regulations dis-\\ntinguishes between low and high-occupancy areas and re-\\nquires that, in high-occupancy areas, bulk PCB remediation\\nwaste, such as soil, be cleaned up to levels of concentration at\\nor below one ppm. § 761.61(a)(4)(i)(A). Section 761.3 confirms\\nthat the term “high-occupancy area” includes residences. See\\nalso § 761.123 (regulating spills of PCBs concentrated at fifty\\nppm or greater but emphasizing that “[t]he concentration of\\nPCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concentration in the\\nmaterial spilled as opposed to the concentration of PCBs in\\nthe material onto which the PCBs were spilled”). “Proof of\\ncontamination in excess of [agency] standards may support a\\nfinding of liability, and may alone suffice for liability in some\\ncases, but its required use is without justification in the stat-\\nute.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 261.\\n This is not to say that all the plaintiffs must do is to show\\nsome bit of soil on their property that tests positive for PCBs\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nabove one ppm (or even above the purported lower Wiscon-\\nsin DNR standard, which the defendants seem to have\\nacknowledged in their state-approved clean-up plan). Of\\ncourse, there must be accompanying evidence that establishes\\nsome connection between the existing contaminants and\\nsome imminent and substantial endangerment to health. 1 But\\nthe Liebharts attempted to provide such evidence, and the\\ndistrict court held the bar higher than necessary under\\nRCRA’s standard. In criticizing expert witness Carpenter’s\\nstatement that “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that\\ndoes not increase the risk of disease,” the district court re-\\njected Carpenter’s citation to studies showing the general\\nrisks of PCB exposure because “the Liebharts do not cite any\\nevidence that they have been exposed to PCBs.” Liebhart, 2018\\nWL 1583296 at *5. Moreover, the district court concluded that\\n“[t]he Liebharts do not contend that they can prove an immi-\\nnent and substantial danger with evidence of health problems\\nthey have already suffered.” Id. at *6.\\n As we noted in Albany Bank, “[i]mminence does not re-\\nquire an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\n\\n\\n 1 On appeal, the Liebharts contend that there is no separate require-\\nment for expert witness testimony because the photos and videos they\\nhave submitted into evidence suffice to prove their RCRA claim. The de-\\nfendants push back on that argument, insisting that many of the issues are\\nbeyond the competence of lay fact-finders and require the assistance of\\nexperts to address. See, e.g., C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827,\\n838 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Given the complex nature of this case, … [and w]ith\\nno experts to prove causation … the appellants cannot prove their toxic-\\ntort case under [state] law.”) Because the district court did not make a fac-\\ntual finding as to whether this case is sufficient complex to require expert\\ntestimony, and because we remand for reconsideration of a separate legal\\nissue, we need not reach that question today.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 15\\n\\nharm.” 310 F.3d at 973. Although the Supreme Court has in-\\nstructed that “[a]n endangerment can only be ‘imminent’ if it\\n‘threaten[s] to occur immediately,’” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485\\n(quoting Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary of English Language\\n1245 (2d ed. 1934)), it qualified that statement when it approv-\\ningly quoted the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the statu-\\ntory term “implies that there must be a threat which is present\\nnow, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until\\nlater.” Id. at 486 (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019).\\nWe take that to mean that the Liebharts must show that there\\nare PCBs currently on the property that have the potential to\\nsubstantially threaten their health at some point in the future\\nif they continue to occupy the premises and prolong their ex-\\nposure. On remand, the district court should reevaluate its ex-\\nclusion of Dr. Carpenter’s assertion regarding PCB safety un-\\nder the standards we have outlined above and determine\\nwhether, if admissible, the report demonstrates that a sub-\\nstantial and imminent threat to the Liebharts’ health may be\\npresent.\\n B. TSCA Likewise Requires No Heightened Showing\\n TSCA authorizes a separate, private cause of action allow-\\ning “any person [to] commence a civil action … against any\\nperson … who is alleged to be in violation of … any rule\\npromulgated under” the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1). The EPA\\npromulgated the PCB regulations in question pursuant to\\nstatutory authority under TSCA, designating PCBs as “haz-\\nardous waste” and controlling their manufacture, use, stor-\\nage, and disposal. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 761. The Liebharts’ TSCA\\nclaim alleged that the defendants violated those regulations,\\nthereby authorizing the district court to “restrain [the] viola-\\ntion.” § 2619(a). Unlike RCRA, which authorizes mandatory\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\ninjunctions to compel remediation of previous violations,\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions to stop ongoing\\nviolations. Id. The defendants argued that there was no longer\\nan ongoing violation, as demolition was complete by the time\\nthe Liebharts filed their claim. 2\\n The purported violation was based on 40 C.F.R. § 761.123,\\nwhich, as we noted above, regulates “spills” of PCB materials\\nconcentrated at levels above fifty ppm. The district court cor-\\nrectly noted that the Liebharts had not shown any evidence\\nthat any PCBs had been “spilled” onto their property (by\\nmeans of dust migration) at that level of concentration, and it\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on that basis.\\n But the district court seems to have overlooked the follow-\\ning sentence in the regulation, which directs that “[t]he con-\\ncentration of PCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concen-\\ntration in the material spilled as opposed to the concentration\\nof the material onto which the PCBs were spilled.” Id. The\\nLiebharts’ complaint seems to have alleged that the concrete\\nfloor of the factory, which contained at least some contami-\\nnated areas above the fifty-ppm threshold, was demolished\\nand “spilled” onto the Liebharts’ property. By the plain text\\nof the regulation, there is no need to show that contaminants\\non the Liebharts’ property are themselves concentrated above\\nfifty ppm so long as the original material that was the source\\nof that spill met the criteria. On remand, the district court may\\nagain determine that there is no ongoing violation, but it must\\n\\n 2 The district court determined that the Liebharts waived this claim\\nby failing to engage the defendants’ argument that there was no “ongoing\\nviolation.” But the court chose to analyze the merits of the claim regardless\\nof waiver and reached its conclusion on an alternative basis. We likewise\\nset aside the issue of waiver to reach the district court’s merits analysis.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 17\\n\\nfirst determine whether the alleged violation comes within\\nthe meaning of § 761.123 in the first place.\\n C. The District Court Should Reconsider the Remaining Issues\\non Remand\\n Now that we have clarified the standard the plaintiffs\\nmust meet, we turn to the remaining procedural issues the\\nLiebharts have asked to us to address.\\n 1. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding\\nWoodyard’s Testimony\\n “The summary-judgment decision here turned [in large\\npart] on the district court’s conclusion that [the] expert testi-\\nmony was inadmissible. Whether the district court applied\\nthe appropriate legal framework for evaluating expert testi-\\nmony is reviewed de novo, but the court’s choice of relevant\\nfactors within that framework and its ultimate conclusion as\\nto admissibility are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Lees v.\\nCarthage College, 714 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 2013). When a dis-\\ntrict court is “[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testi-\\nmony … the trial judge must determine at the outset …\\nwhether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific\\nknowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or\\ndetermine a fact in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,\\n509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). “The trial court must have … latitude\\nin deciding how to test an expert’s reliability.” Kumho Tire Co.,\\nLtd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).\\n The district court was well within its discretion to exclude\\nthe proffered testimony of expert witness Woodyard. Beyond\\nthe problem that the plaintiffs seemed to have waived this is-\\nsue in the district court by failing to engage with the defend-\\nants’ arguments in their motion to strike the testimony,\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nWoodyard’s analysis suffers from a critical flaw that stems\\nfrom the way in which the parties have framed this lawsuit.\\nThe district court briefly noted in its opinion that “both sides\\nassume that none of the defendants can be held liable for any\\nPCB contamination on the Liebharts’ property that occurred\\nbefore the demolition began, so the court will make the same\\nassumption.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *1. That’s a curious\\nchoice. RCRA permits the Liebharts to obtain injunctive relief\\nfrom the owner of the facility for any cognizable contamina-\\ntion, regardless of whether the PCBs migrated onto their\\nproperty before or after the demolition occurred. See 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (authorizing suit against “any person … who\\nhas contributed … to the past or present handling … or dis-\\nposal” of hazardous waste); see also Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486\\n(“RCRA contains no statute of limitations.”).\\n But because the Liebharts restricted their claims to PCBs\\nthat allegedly migrated onto their property via the dust from\\nthe 2015 demolition, they necessarily excluded claims result-\\ning from PCBs that may have gotten onto their property dur-\\ning the previous century. The district court correctly noted\\nthat Woodyard’s expert opinion could not distinguish be-\\ntween these two alternatives, as both sets of contaminants\\noriginated from the same source. There was even evidence\\nshowing that PCBs existed in the soil beneath the Liebharts’\\nasphalt driveway—Woodyard could not explain how that\\nmight have occurred as the result of dust blowing in the wind\\nas opposed to seepage over the course of years before any\\ndemolition occurred.\\n Perhaps the Liebharts decided to frame their claims in this\\nway because they wanted to go after defendants TRC and\\nApollo, who would not be liable for what happened before\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 19\\n\\ndemolition. Or perhaps some element of their state-law\\nclaims, which we have not addressed, required them to con-\\nstrict the scope. They did not explain their reasoning to us (or\\nit seems, to the district court). But the distinction makes it dif-\\nficult for Woodyard to make his case, given that he did not\\n“adequately account[] for obvious alternative explanations.”\\nGopalratnam v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 787 (7th Cir.\\n2017). Viewed in this light, the district court was within its\\ndiscretion to exclude the testimony as unreliable and unhelp-\\nful to the trier of fact. The district court may choose to rethink\\nthat evaluation on remand under the legal standards we out-\\nlined above, but it may well reach the same conclusion.\\n 2. The District Court Should Reconsider Its Denial of Injunctive\\nRelief\\n The district court denied injunctive relief to the Liebharts\\nbecause the defendants had already agreed to a clean-up plan\\nthat had been approved by the Wisconsin DNR. We review\\nthat decision for an abuse of discretion. See AMI Int’l, Inc. v.\\nDatacard Corp. 106 F.3d 1342, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997) (remanding\\ngrant of RCRA injunction).\\n As we mentioned above, RCRA authorizes district courts\\nto issue either mandatory or prohibitory injunctions, while\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions. “[I]t is appro-\\npriate ‘to give great deference to the district court’s decision\\nas to the precise equitable relief necessary in a particular\\ncase.’” Bowes v. Ind. Sec. of State, 837 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (quoting Gjersten v. Bd. Of Election Com’rs for City of Chi-\\ncago, 791 F.2d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1986)). That is especially true\\nwhen a plaintiff requests a mandatory injunction, which “im-\\nposes significant burdens on the defendant and requires care-\\nful consideration of the intrusiveness of the ordered act, as\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nwell as the difficulties that may be encountered in supervising\\nthe enjoined party’s compliance with the court’s order.” Kart-\\nman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir.\\n2011).\\n Considering SPX’s decision to formulate a clean-up plan\\nand obtain approval from the state agency, the district court\\ndetermined that there was no need for separate, federally-su-\\npervised remediation. It reached that conclusion even while\\nassuming that the defendants were in violation of either\\nRCRA or TSCA, despite the fact it found no such violation.\\nOther courts have determined that the existence of a parallel\\nplan of remediation supervised by the state does not neces-\\nsarily prevent a federal district court from granting an injunc-\\ntion if it finds the state agency’s actions to be insufficient to\\nremedy the violation of federal law. See, e.g., Interfaith, 399\\nF.3d at 264–68. On the other hand, the same courts have also\\nupheld denials of injunctions in similar situations when the\\ndistrict court finds that the parallel plan is adequate to the\\ntask. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735\\nF.3d 131, 139–40 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Interfaith). We\\nrecently reached the same conclusion. See LAJIM, LLC v. Gen.\\nElec. Co., No. 18-1522, 2019 WL 1011021, at *4–11 (7th Cir. Mar.\\n4, 2019) (“[T]he district court correctly held that it has discre-\\ntion to award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not re-\\nquired to order relief after a finding of liability,” particularly\\nin light of ongoing relief supervised by a state environmental\\nagency).\\n Here, the district court determined that SPX’s existing\\nplan was sufficient and that the Liebharts had not “iden-\\ntif[ied] any way that SPX’s plan [was] deficient or violate[d]\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 21\\n\\nfederal law.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *7. We agree. Alt-\\nhough the Liebharts point to certain statistical sampling re-\\nquirements outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 761.125 and contend that\\nSPX’s existing plan fails to meet those requirements, the dis-\\ntrict court noted that SPX’s plan includes further sampling of\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ property. It emphasized that “the\\nLiebharts do not otherwise explain why SPX’s proposed sam-\\npling scheme is substantively inadequate.” Liebhart, 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *7. We see no evidence that compels us to contra-\\ndict that factual finding.\\n However, in light of the legal standards we outlined\\nabove, we ask the district court to reconsider its decision to\\ndeny injunctive relief on remand. Because the bar for estab-\\nlishing an imminent and substantial danger is lower than the\\ndistrict court believed when evaluating the request for an in-\\njunction, it would be prudent to reassess whether the DNR-\\napproved plan adequately remedies harms that may come\\nwithin RCRA’s scope. See LAJIM, 2019 WL 1011021 at *6\\n(“[O]nce a court finds a defendant liable for creating a risk of\\nimminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the case\\nthat injunctive relief is warranted. But that is not always the\\ncase.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).\\n 3. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying\\nLeave to Amend the Complaint.\\n We review a denial of leave to amend a complaint for\\nabuse of discretion. Life Plans, Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co.,\\n800 F.3d 343, 357 (7th Cir. 2015). District courts are to “freely\\ngive leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 15(a)(2). “The Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to\\nrequire a district court to allow amendment unless there is a\\ngood reason—futility, undue delay, undue prejudice, or bad\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nfaith—for denying leave to amend.” Life Plans, 800 F.3d at 357\\n(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The district\\ncourt in this case identified two of those grounds as bases for\\ndenial: futility and undue delay. While we disagree with the\\nfutility analysis, we concur with the finding of undue delay\\nand decline to reverse.\\n We begin with the question of futility. Both statutes con-\\ntain advance-notice requirements that citizen plaintiffs must\\nobserve prior to filing RCRA or TSCA suits. They require\\nthose plaintiffs to notify the EPA 60–90 days in advance of fil-\\ning the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2); 15 U.S.C.\\n§ 2619(b)(1)(A). But the district court chose to apply the re-\\nquirements not only to the filing of the complaint, but also to\\nany subsequent amendments that sought to add new RCRA\\nor TSCA counts. Although the Liebharts complied with the\\nrequirements prior to filing their original complaint in April\\n2016, they gave no new notice to the EPA before filing for\\nleave to amend in February 2018. The district court held that,\\nbecause the prior notice did not contain any mention of bur-\\nied PCBs on the SPX property, it was insufficient to alert the\\nEPA to the particular violation the Liebharts sought to include\\nin the amended complaint.\\n The notice provisions serve two purposes. “First, notice al-\\nlows Government agencies to take responsibility for enforc-\\ning environmental regulations, thus obviating the need for\\ncitizen suits. … Second, notice gives the alleged violator ‘an\\nopportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the\\nAct[s] and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit.’”\\nHallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (quoting\\nGwaltney of Smithfield, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 23\\n\\nU.S. 49, 60 (1987)). The district court’s decision to require no-\\ntice for an amendment to a complaint fulfilled neither pur-\\npose. By the time the Liebharts attempted to amend their com-\\nplaint, the EPA had been on notice of alleged PCB contamina-\\ntion at the SPX property for over two years—and it had de-\\nclined to get involved. Moreover, it was unlikely that the de-\\nfendants would resolve the alleged violation to avoid being\\nsued when they were already in the midst of an extended law-\\nsuit with the same plaintiffs. See AM Int’l, 106 F.3d at 1351\\n(“[T]he delay period is designed to allow a [defendant] a pe-\\nriod in which to clean up its act and avoid litigation. [This de-\\nfendant] was clearly not interested in using the delay period\\nto resolve the dispute without going to court.”); see also Dague,\\n935 F.2d at 1351 (“There is no need to maintain a window of\\nopportunity for the government to take the lead enforcement\\nrole … when a citizen, acting as a private attorney general, has\\nalready lawfully assumed the lead role in bringing a … claim\\nagainst the same facility.”) (quoting Dague v. City of Burling-\\nton, 733 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D. Vt. 1990)). When the original notice\\nis “sufficiently specific to inform the alleged violator [and the\\nagency] about what it is doing wrong, so that it will know\\nwhat corrective actions will avert a lawsuit,” Atl. States Legal\\nFound., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir.\\n1994), there is no need to require a second round of advance\\nnotice for an amended complaint in the same litigation.\\n But an error in the futility analysis alone does not neces-\\nsarily constitute an abuse of discretion on the whole. In addi-\\ntion to futility, the district court cited undue delay and preju-\\ndice in its decision to deny leave to amend. “[D]elay by itself\\nis normally an insufficient reason to deny a motion for leave\\nto amend. Delay must be coupled with some other reason.\\nTypically, that reason … is prejudice to the non-moving\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nparty.” Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 793\\n(7th Cir. 2004). The district court cited the Liebharts’ admis-\\nsion that they learned of the possible burial of contaminated\\nconcrete on the SPX property on October 11, 2017 but failed\\nto seek leave to amend their complaint until February 22,\\n2018. During that more than four-month period, the parties\\nsubmitted and briefed their cross-motions for summary judg-\\nment, and by February, trial was only three months away. The\\nLiebharts provided no justification for their delay.\\n In response, the Liebharts contend that there was no un-\\ndue prejudice to the defendants: by the time they filed their\\nmotion, five weeks of discovery still remained. We disagree.\\nWhile the district court’s explanation of prejudice was fairly\\nshort, even if the district court had failed to articulate a find-\\ning of prejudice altogether, we might still “affirm providing\\nthat ‘the prejudice that would result from such amendment\\nwas apparent.’” Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 613 (7th\\nCir. 2002) (quoting Feldman v. Am. Mem’l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d\\n783, 793 (7th Cir. 1999)). In Park, the plaintiff waited six\\nmonths to move for leave to amend a complaint after she\\nknew (or should have known) of the additional alleged viola-\\ntion. Id. Because trial was approaching, we concluded that the\\ndistrict court was well within its discretion to deny leave. Id.;\\nsee also Perrian v. O’Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194–95 (7th Cir. 1992)\\n(“Because substantive amendments shortly before trial serve\\nto defeat the public’s interest in speedy resolution of legal dis-\\nputes, ‘[a] district court judge is entitled, in such circum-\\nstances, to refuse to allow a plaintiff’s amendment.’” (quoting\\nCampbell v. Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co., 893 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir.\\n1990)) (internal citation omitted)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 25\\n\\n On the contrary, in Life Plans, we found no undue delay\\nwhen a plaintiff promptly moved to amend its complaint just\\nten days after learning of the factual basis for its new count\\nduring discovery. 800 F.3d at 358. The Liebharts delayed more\\nthan four months in the same circumstances. Although dis-\\ncovery was ongoing at the time of the Liebharts’ motion, the\\nparties had already briefed their dispositive motions, and the\\ndistrict court was preparing its summary-judgment order that\\nwould ultimately dispose of the case. We therefore cannot say\\nthat denial of leave for undue delay and prejudice was an\\nabuse of the district court’s discretion. Of course, the district\\ncourt may permit an amendment on remand if the interests of\\njustice so require.\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n Although the district court properly exercised its discre-\\ntion on the various evidentiary and procedural issues the\\nplaintiffs have raised, its analysis on the merits was narrower\\nthan the statutes demand. It may reach the same conclusions\\non reconsideration, but the parties should have another op-\\nportunity to litigate whether a substantial and imminent en-\\ndangerment to health exists in this case under the standards\\nwe have outlined. We therefore VACATE the order of the dis-\\ntrict court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent\\nwith this opinion. 3\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 The Liebharts also challenge the taxation of costs against them by the\\n\\nclerk of the district court. Because we vacate the district court’s judgment,\\nwe assume that the imposition of costs is automatically vacated and so do\\nnot reach that issue. The clerk of the district court is free to reassess costs\\non remand as the case proceeds.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1165,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4597178,"string":"4,597,178"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1918"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Kanne\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Michael Stephen Kanne\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4374431/\", \"author_raw\": \"Michael Stephen Kanne\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":""},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597178/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1166,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4597289,"string":"4,597,289"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2598"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Michael Stephen Kanne\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\nWILLIAM LIEBHART & NANCY LIEBHART,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nSPX CORPORATION, TRC ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION, &\\nAPOLLO DISMANTLING SERVICES, INC.\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-700 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n KANNE, Circuit Judge. William and Nancy Liebhart to-\\ngether own three houses on the same block in Watertown,\\nWisconsin. Besides a few other houses, the rest of the block\\nwas previously occupied by an abandoned transformer fac-\\ntory, last owned by SPX Corporation. In 2014, SPX demol-\\nished the building with the assistance of TRC Environmental\\nCorporation and Apollo Dismantling Services (collectively,\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n“the defendants”). The Liebharts allege that dust and debris\\ncontaining toxic chemicals migrated onto their properties,\\ncontaminating their yards and jeopardizing their health and\\nthe health of their tenants.\\n The Liebharts sued under federal statutes authorizing pri-\\nvate rights of action for environmental contamination. They\\nalso brought various state-law claims. Following discovery\\nand the submission of expert witness reports, the district\\ncourt denied the Liebharts’ motion for partial summary judg-\\nment and granted summary judgment to the defendants with\\ncosts. Although the district court adequately evaluated the ex-\\npert witnesses and did not abuse its discretion in its proce-\\ndural decisions, the court set the bar unnecessarily high for\\nthe plaintiffs to show a violation of the applicable federal stat-\\nutes. For that reason, we vacate the district court’s judgment\\nand remand for reconsideration.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n The factory dates to the 1920s and was used to manufac-\\nture various industrial equipment. Most relevant to our pur-\\npose, the factory manufactured power transformers contain-\\ning polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a carcinogenic chemi-\\ncal banned by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1979.\\nSee Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Pro-\\ncessing, Distribution in Commerce, and Use Prohibitions, 44\\nFed. Reg. 31,514 (May 31, 1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 761).\\nThe parties all agree that the facility has not manufactured or\\nhandled any items containing PCBs since 1971, and that it\\nshut down completely in 2005.\\n But even with all the products and manufacturing equip-\\nment removed, PCB contaminants remained in the facility. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 3\\n\\n2009, SPX retained TRC and another company (not named as\\na defendant in this suit) to study the property and determine\\nthe extent and precise location of any PCB contamination.\\nThose studies revealed that the concrete floor of the factory\\nwas generally contaminated, with concentrated amounts lo-\\ncated in specific areas throughout the site.\\n Several years went by. In 2014, SPX decided to move ahead\\nwith the demolition, retaining Apollo to conduct the work\\nand TRC to supervise the project. That November, the defend-\\nants timely proposed a self-implementing cleanup plan to the\\nEPA, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 761.61(a). The trouble began\\nas demolition commenced in January 2015. The Liebharts al-\\nlege that Apollo demolished the building recklessly, failing to\\nuse appropriate safety methods to control the dust generated\\nby demolition equipment. They assert that their properties\\nwere covered in dust, and they submitted hundreds of photos\\nand videos of dust from the facility blowing toward their\\nhomes to support their allegation.\\n The Liebharts filed a complaint with the local government\\nin February. They also collected a dust-covered sample of\\nsnow from their yard and placed it in a mason jar. Soon there-\\nafter, a representative of the Wisconsin Department of Natu-\\nral Resources (“DNR”) contacted the defendants about the\\nLiebharts’ concerns. In April, TRC collected samples of the\\nsurface soil (roughly down to eight inches below ground) on\\nboth the industrial and residential properties. Sure enough,\\nthe properties tested positive for the presence of PCBs. In Au-\\ngust, the Liebharts vacated the property on advice of their\\nphysician to avoid further exposure to the chemicals. Frus-\\ntrated with the lack of action, William Liebhart had the snow\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nsample tested for PCBs. Although the sample did, in fact, con-\\ntain PCBs, the irregular manner of collection and storage\\nspoiled the sample, and the laboratory declined to endorse the\\nresults with any confidence.\\n In September 2015, SPX submitted a plan to remediate the\\ncontamination to the DNR. In turn, the Liebharts sued in fed-\\neral district court in October. The complaint sought injunctive\\nrelief under both the Resource Conservation and Recovery\\nAct (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and the Toxic Substances\\nControl Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. In addition, the\\nLiebharts brought a host of state-law claims under supple-\\nmental jurisdiction, including strict liability, negligence, tres-\\npass, nuisance, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.\\n During discovery, the Liebharts submitted to further test-\\ning for PCBs both in their yard and inside their home. They\\nalso underwent blood testing. Although the external surveys\\nrevealed a more comprehensive picture of the extent to which\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ properties contained PCBs, the in-\\nternal sampling and blood tests were both negative for con-\\ntamination. The Liebharts later learned in October 2017 that\\nthe defendants allegedly buried some of the concrete remains\\non-site rather than removing them to a toxic waste dump as\\nrequired by the EPA-approved clean-up plan.\\n The parties prepared and submitted the reports of the ex-\\npert witnesses who were to testify at trial. Among those, three\\nare pertinent to our discussion. First, the Liebharts submitted\\na report by John Woodyard, a licensed professional engineer.\\nHis report included a description of standard methods used\\nwhen demolishing PCB-contaminated buildings and an anal-\\nysis of the purported ways in which the defendants deviated\\nfrom those practices, thereby causing the contamination of the\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 5\\n\\nresidences. The Liebharts’ second expert was Dr. David Car-\\npenter, a public health physician who opined on ways in\\nwhich the Liebharts might have been exposed to PCBs and the\\npotential health effects of continuing exposure. He concluded\\nthat “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not\\nincrease the risk of disease.” Finally, the defendants submit-\\nted a report prepared by Dr. Russell Keenan, a toxicologist\\nwho analyzed the survey data and determined that it was im-\\npossible to determine whether the presence of PCBs on the\\nLiebharts’ property was due to the recent demolition or to\\nrunoff that occurred over the last several decades.\\n In December 2017, the Liebharts moved for partial sum-\\nmary judgment on the issue of causation, reserving the issue\\nof damages for a jury trial. The defendants cross-moved for\\nsummary judgment; they also filed a motion to exclude the\\ntestimony of plaintiffs’ experts Woodyard and Carpenter un-\\nder Fed. R. Evid. 702. In February 2018, after those motions\\nwere fully briefed to the court, the Liebharts sought leave to\\namend their complaint. In light of the information they ob-\\ntained through discovery regarding the burial of concrete on\\nthe property, they intended to allege separate RCRA and\\nTSCA violations and seek an enlargement of the proposed in-\\njunction to include removal of that material.\\n The district court issued its decisions on March 30. First,\\nthe court granted in part the defendants’ motion to exclude\\nthe plaintiffs’ expert witness reports. The court explained that\\nWoodyard’s report was “equivocal” as to the issue of causa-\\ntion; it hedged on whether the contaminants came from dem-\\nolition or from runoff during the preceding decades. See\\nLiebhart v. SPX Corp., No. 16-cv-700-jdp, 2018 WL 1583296 at\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n*3–4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2018). Second, the report “over-\\nlook[ed] too much significant evidence” and failed to account\\nfor “obvious alternative explanations” in determining the\\ncause of the contamination. Id. at *4 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702\\nadvisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments). Finally, the\\ncourt noted that Woodyard’s report depended on “unreliable\\nor uninformative” evidence, including the Liebharts’ defec-\\ntive snow sample, while omitting other evidence such as grass\\nclippings and a chromatogram that allegedly detected PCBs\\non the property. Id. at *4–5. For those reasons, the court ex-\\ncluded Woodyard’s report in its entirety. Id. at *5.\\n Although the court admitted the vast majority of Dr. Car-\\npenter’s report, it struck Carpenter’s conclusion that “there is\\nno ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not increase the\\nrisk of disease” as unsupported by the medical studies he\\ncited. Id. at *5. In doing so, the court pointed to the absence of\\nPCBs inside the Liebharts’ home and in their blood, suggest-\\ning that the Liebharts had not actually been exposed to PCBs\\nand so could not have suffered harm. Id. at 5–6.\\n With that expert testimony off the table, the district court\\nconcluded that the Liebharts failed to present any admissible\\nevidence to support their RCRA and TSCA claims. The re-\\nmaining photos and videos certainly showed dust migrating\\nonto the Liebharts’ property, but there was no reliable evi-\\ndence proving that the dust contained PCBs. Given that any\\nPCBs detected in the soil may have been there prior to the\\ndemolition, the lack of evidence doomed the Liebharts’ case.\\nThe court denied partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs,\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal\\nclaims, and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 7\\n\\n The district court also denied the Liebharts’ petition for\\nleave to amend their complaint on two grounds. First, alt-\\nhough the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs discovered\\nthe factual basis for the new counts over a year after filing the\\ninitial complaint, it also noted that they took an additional\\nfour months thereafter to seek leave to amend. During that\\nintervening period, the parties had submitted and briefed\\ntheir motions for summary judgment, and the trial date was\\nfast approaching. It found their petition untimely. Second, the\\ndistrict court determined that the new claims were futile un-\\nder both statutes' advance-notice requirements.\\n The plaintiffs immediately appealed. Several months after\\nthe judgment, the clerk of the district court imposed costs on\\nthe Liebharts in the amount of $46,320.02. The Liebharts sep-\\narately appealed that decision. We consolidated the two ap-\\npeals and now consider them together.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n The Liebharts raise five issues for our consideration. First,\\nthey argue that the district court erred in excluding the opin-\\nions of expert witnesses Woodyard in full and Carpenter in\\npart. As part of that argument, they allege that the district\\ncourt failed to apply the same stringent standard to the de-\\nfendants’ expert Keenan. Second, they contend that summary\\njudgment was inappropriate because, even absent the testi-\\nmony of their expert witnesses, they submitted adequate pho-\\ntographic and scientific evidence to state a valid claim under\\nRCRA and TSCA. Third, they challenge the district court’s de-\\nnial of injunctive relief in light of deficiencies they have iden-\\ntified in SPX’s state-approved clean-up plan. Fourth, they ar-\\ngue that the district court abused its discretion in denying\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nleave to amend their complaint. Finally, they challenge the\\nimposition of costs.\\n But there’s a larger issue looming in the background. The\\ndistrict court’s opinion operates under the assumption that\\nRCRA plaintiffs must demonstrate “an imminent and sub-\\nstantial danger with evidence of health problems they have\\nalready suffered.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *6. Relying\\nprimarily on Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C.\\n1996), the district court set a high bar for RCRA plaintiffs,\\nholding that “it doesn’t follow necessarily that there is an im-\\nminent and substantial risk of harm simply because there is\\nsome amount of PCBs on the property.” Liebhart 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *5. We review that question of law, which was the\\nunderlying basis for the award of summary judgment, de\\nnovo. Daugherty v. Harrington, 906 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n A. RCRA Requires Only that Harm “May” Be Imminent\\n The question of how much harm a plaintiff must prove to\\nmake out a prima facie violation of RCRA has led to much dis-\\ncussion among the circuits. We have yet to tackle that issue\\nhead on, so the district court necessarily had to look else-\\nwhere for guidance. Passed in 1976, “RCRA is a comprehen-\\nsive environmental statute that empowers [the] EPA to regu-\\nlate hazardous wastes from cradle to grave.” City of Chicago v.\\nEnvtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). The statute’s “pri-\\nmary purpose … is to reduce the generation of hazardous\\nwaste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and dis-\\nposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, ‘so as to\\nminimize the present and future threat to human health and\\nthe environment.’” Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479,\\n483 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 9\\n\\n Although the EPA has the primary responsibility for en-\\nforcing the law, the statute, “like other environmental laws,\\n… contains a citizen suit provision, § 6972, which permits pri-\\nvate citizens to enforce its provisions in some circumstances.”\\nId. at 484. As relevant to this case, the statute provides that\\n any person may commence a civil action on his own\\n behalf … against any person, … including … any\\n past or present owner or operator of a treatment,\\n storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or\\n who is contributing to the past or present handling,\\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any\\n solid or hazardous waste which may present an im-\\n minent and substantial endangerment to health or\\n the environment.\\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Notably, Con-\\ngress amended the language in 1980 by substituting the\\nphrase “may present” for the original 1976 wording “is pre-\\nsenting.” Maine People’s All. and Nat. Res. Def. Council v.\\nMallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Solid\\nWaste Disposal Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–482, § 25, 94 Stat. 2334,\\n2348). The section authorizes district courts to grant injunctive\\nrelief and “order [a violator] to take such other action as may\\nbe necessary” to remediate the endangerment. Id.; see also Me-\\nghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (“Under a plain reading of this remedial\\nscheme, a private citizen suing under § 6972(a)(1)(B) could\\nseek a mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible\\nparty to ‘take action’ by attending to the cleanup and proper\\ndisposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one\\nthat ‘restrains’ a responsible party from further violating\\nRCRA.”); Avondale Fed. Sav. Bank v. Amoco Oil Co., 170 F.3d\\n692, 694 (7th Cir. 1999).\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n The critical question in this case is how to determine\\nwhether alleged contamination “may present an imminent\\nand substantial endangerment to health.” § 6972(a)(1)(b). We\\ntouched on this question only briefly in Albany Bank & Trust\\nCo. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2002).\\nThere, we first outlined the elements of a prima facie RCRA\\nclaim: “a plaintiff must allege (1) that the defendant has gen-\\nerated solid or hazardous waste, (2) that the defendant is con-\\ntributing to or has contributed to the handling of this waste,\\nand (3) that this waste may present an imminent and substan-\\ntial danger to health or the environment.” Id. (citing Cox v.\\nCity of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 2001)). We then ob-\\nserved, interpreting the final element, that “[i]mminence does\\nnot require an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\nharm.” Id. (citing Cox, 256 F.3d at 299). That is the extent of\\nour circuit precedent on the “may present” language con-\\ntained in § 6972(a)(1)(B).\\n But our sister circuits have engaged with this question in\\ngreat depth. In the first major case interpreting the provision,\\nthe Third Circuit emphasized that the statute “enhanced the\\ncourts’ traditional equitable powers by authorizing the issu-\\nance of injunctions when there is but a risk of harm, a more\\nlenient standard than the traditional requirement of threat-\\nened irreparable harm.” United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204,\\n211 (3d Cir. 1982). The court found the statutory language\\n“unequivocal,” demonstrating that Congress “intended to\\nconfer upon the courts the authority to grant affirmative eq-\\nuitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate” the risks\\nposed by toxic waste. Id. at 213–14.\\n In the subsequent decades, several other circuits adopted\\nand further developed the same interpretation of § 6972. See\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 11\\n\\nMallinckrodt, 471 F.3d at 277; Dague v. City of Burlington, 935\\nF.2d 1343, 1355–56 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds,\\n502 U.S. 1071 (1992); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l,\\nInc., 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Waste Indus.,\\nInc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument\\nthat “[§ 6972] was designed to control pollution only in emer-\\ngency situations”); Cox, 256 F.3d at 299–301; Price v. United\\nStates Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994); Burlington N.\\nand Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1019–22 (10th Cir.\\n2007); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1014–\\n15 (11th Cir. 2004). We now join those courts and explicitly\\nembrace the core content of their interpretation.\\n The district court therefore used an incorrect legal stand-\\nard to evaluate the Liebharts’ argument that PCBs from the\\ndemolition may present an imminent and substantial danger\\nto their health and that of their tenants. It did not cite any of\\nthe cases we listed above, but instead relied on a single district\\ncourt decision from a circuit that has not yet addressed the\\nissue. See Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *5 (quoting Foster, 922\\nF. Supp. at 662 (“While there can be no question that the levels\\nof contamination present at the Site may warrant future re-\\nsponse action, the plaintiff cannot establish either a current\\nrisk of substantial or serious threatened harm, or some neces-\\nsity for action.”)).\\n That error undercuts several of the reasons the district\\ncourt gave for rejecting the Liebharts’ RCRA claim. For exam-\\nple, the district court cursorily adopted a passing statement\\nwe made over twenty-five years ago that “[t]he [EPA’s] ac-\\ncepted safe level of PCBs in the environment is fifty parts per\\nmillion,” id. (quoting Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nServ., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1994)), to create a require-\\nment that the Liebharts show that PCB contamination on their\\nproperty met that threshold. But there is no requirement in\\nRCRA for a plaintiff to make “a particular quantitative show-\\ning as a sine qua non for liability.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 260; see\\nalso Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. Only one circuit has come to an\\narguably contrary conclusion. In Price v. United States Navy,\\n818 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (S.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d 39 F.3d 1011 (9th\\nCir. 1994), the district court required RCRA plaintiffs to show\\nthat “the level of contaminants [was] above levels that are con-\\nsidered acceptable by the State.” But as the Interfaith court\\nnoted, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion affirming the district\\ncourt’s judgment did not discuss that requirement. RCRA\\ndoes not require that plaintiffs demonstrate contamination\\nabove some agency-derived threshold level of concentration.\\n399 F.3d at 260–61. It merely requires that they show that con-\\ntaminants on the property are seriously dangerous to human\\nhealth (or will be, given prolonged exposure over time). See\\nCox, 256 F.3d at 299–300 (“an endangerment is ‘substantial’ if\\nit is ‘serious’” (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019)).\\n That’s especially true when the standard is taken out of\\ncontext. The district court relied on Cincinnati Ins. Co. to sup-\\nport its contention that contamination below the threshold\\nlevel of fifty parts per million (“ppm”) does not qualify as a\\nregulatory violation, thereby contradicting Woodyard’s opin-\\nion regarding safe levels of PCBs and providing the grounds\\nfor excluding it. In that case, we evaluated whether an insur-\\nance company was required to indemnify its insured for dam-\\nages arising out of PCB contamination at an industrial site.\\nThe EPA had identified the insured as potentially liable under\\nthe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,\\nand Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 13\\n\\nthat context, we noted that the contaminated site contained\\nPCBs concentrated at levels up to 58,000 ppm, well above the\\nEPA’s general regulatory threshold of fifty ppm. 40 F.3d at 148\\n(citing 40 C.F.R. § 761.60).\\n But that regulation, still in effect today, identifies indus-\\ntrial equipment and other wastes contaminated at levels\\nabove fifty ppm and requires special procedures for their stor-\\nage and disposal. It does not unequivocally state that PCBs\\nconcentrated at levels lower than fifty ppm are safe for human\\nexposure. Neither Cincinnati Ins. Co. nor the EPA regulation\\nstand for the proposition that PCBs concentrated at forty-nine\\nppm on residential property do not present a substantial endan-\\ngerment to the health of the residents. That is especially ap-\\nparent when we consider that the same set of regulations dis-\\ntinguishes between low and high-occupancy areas and re-\\nquires that, in high-occupancy areas, bulk PCB remediation\\nwaste, such as soil, be cleaned up to levels of concentration at\\nor below one ppm. § 761.61(a)(4)(i)(A). Section 761.3 confirms\\nthat the term “high-occupancy area” includes residences. See\\nalso § 761.123 (regulating spills of PCBs concentrated at fifty\\nppm or greater but emphasizing that “[t]he concentration of\\nPCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concentration in the\\nmaterial spilled as opposed to the concentration of PCBs in\\nthe material onto which the PCBs were spilled”). “Proof of\\ncontamination in excess of [agency] standards may support a\\nfinding of liability, and may alone suffice for liability in some\\ncases, but its required use is without justification in the stat-\\nute.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 261.\\n This is not to say that all the plaintiffs must do is to show\\nsome bit of soil on their property that tests positive for PCBs\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nabove one ppm (or even above the purported lower Wiscon-\\nsin DNR standard, which the defendants seem to have\\nacknowledged in their state-approved clean-up plan). Of\\ncourse, there must be accompanying evidence that establishes\\nsome connection between the existing contaminants and\\nsome imminent and substantial endangerment to health. 1 But\\nthe Liebharts attempted to provide such evidence, and the\\ndistrict court held the bar higher than necessary under\\nRCRA’s standard. In criticizing expert witness Carpenter’s\\nstatement that “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that\\ndoes not increase the risk of disease,” the district court re-\\njected Carpenter’s citation to studies showing the general\\nrisks of PCB exposure because “the Liebharts do not cite any\\nevidence that they have been exposed to PCBs.” Liebhart, 2018\\nWL 1583296 at *5. Moreover, the district court concluded that\\n“[t]he Liebharts do not contend that they can prove an immi-\\nnent and substantial danger with evidence of health problems\\nthey have already suffered.” Id. at *6.\\n As we noted in Albany Bank, “[i]mminence does not re-\\nquire an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\n\\n\\n 1 On appeal, the Liebharts contend that there is no separate require-\\nment for expert witness testimony because the photos and videos they\\nhave submitted into evidence suffice to prove their RCRA claim. The de-\\nfendants push back on that argument, insisting that many of the issues are\\nbeyond the competence of lay fact-finders and require the assistance of\\nexperts to address. See, e.g., C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827,\\n838 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Given the complex nature of this case, … [and w]ith\\nno experts to prove causation … the appellants cannot prove their toxic-\\ntort case under [state] law.”) Because the district court did not make a fac-\\ntual finding as to whether this case is sufficient complex to require expert\\ntestimony, and because we remand for reconsideration of a separate legal\\nissue, we need not reach that question today.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 15\\n\\nharm.” 310 F.3d at 973. Although the Supreme Court has in-\\nstructed that “[a]n endangerment can only be ‘imminent’ if it\\n‘threaten[s] to occur immediately,’” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485\\n(quoting Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary of English Language\\n1245 (2d ed. 1934)), it qualified that statement when it approv-\\ningly quoted the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the statu-\\ntory term “implies that there must be a threat which is present\\nnow, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until\\nlater.” Id. at 486 (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019).\\nWe take that to mean that the Liebharts must show that there\\nare PCBs currently on the property that have the potential to\\nsubstantially threaten their health at some point in the future\\nif they continue to occupy the premises and prolong their ex-\\nposure. On remand, the district court should reevaluate its ex-\\nclusion of Dr. Carpenter’s assertion regarding PCB safety un-\\nder the standards we have outlined above and determine\\nwhether, if admissible, the report demonstrates that a sub-\\nstantial and imminent threat to the Liebharts’ health may be\\npresent.\\n B. TSCA Likewise Requires No Heightened Showing\\n TSCA authorizes a separate, private cause of action allow-\\ning “any person [to] commence a civil action … against any\\nperson … who is alleged to be in violation of … any rule\\npromulgated under” the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1). The EPA\\npromulgated the PCB regulations in question pursuant to\\nstatutory authority under TSCA, designating PCBs as “haz-\\nardous waste” and controlling their manufacture, use, stor-\\nage, and disposal. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 761. The Liebharts’ TSCA\\nclaim alleged that the defendants violated those regulations,\\nthereby authorizing the district court to “restrain [the] viola-\\ntion.” § 2619(a). Unlike RCRA, which authorizes mandatory\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\ninjunctions to compel remediation of previous violations,\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions to stop ongoing\\nviolations. Id. The defendants argued that there was no longer\\nan ongoing violation, as demolition was complete by the time\\nthe Liebharts filed their claim. 2\\n The purported violation was based on 40 C.F.R. § 761.123,\\nwhich, as we noted above, regulates “spills” of PCB materials\\nconcentrated at levels above fifty ppm. The district court cor-\\nrectly noted that the Liebharts had not shown any evidence\\nthat any PCBs had been “spilled” onto their property (by\\nmeans of dust migration) at that level of concentration, and it\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on that basis.\\n But the district court seems to have overlooked the follow-\\ning sentence in the regulation, which directs that “[t]he con-\\ncentration of PCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concen-\\ntration in the material spilled as opposed to the concentration\\nof the material onto which the PCBs were spilled.” Id. The\\nLiebharts’ complaint seems to have alleged that the concrete\\nfloor of the factory, which contained at least some contami-\\nnated areas above the fifty-ppm threshold, was demolished\\nand “spilled” onto the Liebharts’ property. By the plain text\\nof the regulation, there is no need to show that contaminants\\non the Liebharts’ property are themselves concentrated above\\nfifty ppm so long as the original material that was the source\\nof that spill met the criteria. On remand, the district court may\\nagain determine that there is no ongoing violation, but it must\\n\\n 2 The district court determined that the Liebharts waived this claim\\nby failing to engage the defendants’ argument that there was no “ongoing\\nviolation.” But the court chose to analyze the merits of the claim regardless\\nof waiver and reached its conclusion on an alternative basis. We likewise\\nset aside the issue of waiver to reach the district court’s merits analysis.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 17\\n\\nfirst determine whether the alleged violation comes within\\nthe meaning of § 761.123 in the first place.\\n C. The District Court Should Reconsider the Remaining Issues\\non Remand\\n Now that we have clarified the standard the plaintiffs\\nmust meet, we turn to the remaining procedural issues the\\nLiebharts have asked to us to address.\\n 1. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding\\nWoodyard’s Testimony\\n “The summary-judgment decision here turned [in large\\npart] on the district court’s conclusion that [the] expert testi-\\nmony was inadmissible. Whether the district court applied\\nthe appropriate legal framework for evaluating expert testi-\\nmony is reviewed de novo, but the court’s choice of relevant\\nfactors within that framework and its ultimate conclusion as\\nto admissibility are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Lees v.\\nCarthage College, 714 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 2013). When a dis-\\ntrict court is “[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testi-\\nmony … the trial judge must determine at the outset …\\nwhether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific\\nknowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or\\ndetermine a fact in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,\\n509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). “The trial court must have … latitude\\nin deciding how to test an expert’s reliability.” Kumho Tire Co.,\\nLtd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).\\n The district court was well within its discretion to exclude\\nthe proffered testimony of expert witness Woodyard. Beyond\\nthe problem that the plaintiffs seemed to have waived this is-\\nsue in the district court by failing to engage with the defend-\\nants’ arguments in their motion to strike the testimony,\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nWoodyard’s analysis suffers from a critical flaw that stems\\nfrom the way in which the parties have framed this lawsuit.\\nThe district court briefly noted in its opinion that “both sides\\nassume that none of the defendants can be held liable for any\\nPCB contamination on the Liebharts’ property that occurred\\nbefore the demolition began, so the court will make the same\\nassumption.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *1. That’s a curious\\nchoice. RCRA permits the Liebharts to obtain injunctive relief\\nfrom the owner of the facility for any cognizable contamina-\\ntion, regardless of whether the PCBs migrated onto their\\nproperty before or after the demolition occurred. See 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (authorizing suit against “any person … who\\nhas contributed … to the past or present handling … or dis-\\nposal” of hazardous waste); see also Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486\\n(“RCRA contains no statute of limitations.”).\\n But because the Liebharts restricted their claims to PCBs\\nthat allegedly migrated onto their property via the dust from\\nthe 2015 demolition, they necessarily excluded claims result-\\ning from PCBs that may have gotten onto their property dur-\\ning the previous century. The district court correctly noted\\nthat Woodyard’s expert opinion could not distinguish be-\\ntween these two alternatives, as both sets of contaminants\\noriginated from the same source. There was even evidence\\nshowing that PCBs existed in the soil beneath the Liebharts’\\nasphalt driveway—Woodyard could not explain how that\\nmight have occurred as the result of dust blowing in the wind\\nas opposed to seepage over the course of years before any\\ndemolition occurred.\\n Perhaps the Liebharts decided to frame their claims in this\\nway because they wanted to go after defendants TRC and\\nApollo, who would not be liable for what happened before\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 19\\n\\ndemolition. Or perhaps some element of their state-law\\nclaims, which we have not addressed, required them to con-\\nstrict the scope. They did not explain their reasoning to us (or\\nit seems, to the district court). But the distinction makes it dif-\\nficult for Woodyard to make his case, given that he did not\\n“adequately account[] for obvious alternative explanations.”\\nGopalratnam v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 787 (7th Cir.\\n2017). Viewed in this light, the district court was within its\\ndiscretion to exclude the testimony as unreliable and unhelp-\\nful to the trier of fact. The district court may choose to rethink\\nthat evaluation on remand under the legal standards we out-\\nlined above, but it may well reach the same conclusion.\\n 2. The District Court Should Reconsider Its Denial of Injunctive\\nRelief\\n The district court denied injunctive relief to the Liebharts\\nbecause the defendants had already agreed to a clean-up plan\\nthat had been approved by the Wisconsin DNR. We review\\nthat decision for an abuse of discretion. See AMI Int’l, Inc. v.\\nDatacard Corp. 106 F.3d 1342, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997) (remanding\\ngrant of RCRA injunction).\\n As we mentioned above, RCRA authorizes district courts\\nto issue either mandatory or prohibitory injunctions, while\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions. “[I]t is appro-\\npriate ‘to give great deference to the district court’s decision\\nas to the precise equitable relief necessary in a particular\\ncase.’” Bowes v. Ind. Sec. of State, 837 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (quoting Gjersten v. Bd. Of Election Com’rs for City of Chi-\\ncago, 791 F.2d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1986)). That is especially true\\nwhen a plaintiff requests a mandatory injunction, which “im-\\nposes significant burdens on the defendant and requires care-\\nful consideration of the intrusiveness of the ordered act, as\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nwell as the difficulties that may be encountered in supervising\\nthe enjoined party’s compliance with the court’s order.” Kart-\\nman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir.\\n2011).\\n Considering SPX’s decision to formulate a clean-up plan\\nand obtain approval from the state agency, the district court\\ndetermined that there was no need for separate, federally-su-\\npervised remediation. It reached that conclusion even while\\nassuming that the defendants were in violation of either\\nRCRA or TSCA, despite the fact it found no such violation.\\nOther courts have determined that the existence of a parallel\\nplan of remediation supervised by the state does not neces-\\nsarily prevent a federal district court from granting an injunc-\\ntion if it finds the state agency’s actions to be insufficient to\\nremedy the violation of federal law. See, e.g., Interfaith, 399\\nF.3d at 264–68. On the other hand, the same courts have also\\nupheld denials of injunctions in similar situations when the\\ndistrict court finds that the parallel plan is adequate to the\\ntask. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735\\nF.3d 131, 139–40 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Interfaith). We\\nrecently reached the same conclusion. See LAJIM, LLC v. Gen.\\nElec. Co., No. 18-1522, 2019 WL 1011021, at *4–11 (7th Cir. Mar.\\n4, 2019) (“[T]he district court correctly held that it has discre-\\ntion to award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not re-\\nquired to order relief after a finding of liability,” particularly\\nin light of ongoing relief supervised by a state environmental\\nagency).\\n Here, the district court determined that SPX’s existing\\nplan was sufficient and that the Liebharts had not “iden-\\ntif[ied] any way that SPX’s plan [was] deficient or violate[d]\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 21\\n\\nfederal law.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *7. We agree. Alt-\\nhough the Liebharts point to certain statistical sampling re-\\nquirements outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 761.125 and contend that\\nSPX’s existing plan fails to meet those requirements, the dis-\\ntrict court noted that SPX’s plan includes further sampling of\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ property. It emphasized that “the\\nLiebharts do not otherwise explain why SPX’s proposed sam-\\npling scheme is substantively inadequate.” Liebhart, 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *7. We see no evidence that compels us to contra-\\ndict that factual finding.\\n However, in light of the legal standards we outlined\\nabove, we ask the district court to reconsider its decision to\\ndeny injunctive relief on remand. Because the bar for estab-\\nlishing an imminent and substantial danger is lower than the\\ndistrict court believed when evaluating the request for an in-\\njunction, it would be prudent to reassess whether the DNR-\\napproved plan adequately remedies harms that may come\\nwithin RCRA’s scope. See LAJIM, 2019 WL 1011021 at *6\\n(“[O]nce a court finds a defendant liable for creating a risk of\\nimminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the case\\nthat injunctive relief is warranted. But that is not always the\\ncase.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).\\n 3. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying\\nLeave to Amend the Complaint.\\n We review a denial of leave to amend a complaint for\\nabuse of discretion. Life Plans, Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co.,\\n800 F.3d 343, 357 (7th Cir. 2015). District courts are to “freely\\ngive leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 15(a)(2). “The Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to\\nrequire a district court to allow amendment unless there is a\\ngood reason—futility, undue delay, undue prejudice, or bad\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nfaith—for denying leave to amend.” Life Plans, 800 F.3d at 357\\n(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The district\\ncourt in this case identified two of those grounds as bases for\\ndenial: futility and undue delay. While we disagree with the\\nfutility analysis, we concur with the finding of undue delay\\nand decline to reverse.\\n We begin with the question of futility. Both statutes con-\\ntain advance-notice requirements that citizen plaintiffs must\\nobserve prior to filing RCRA or TSCA suits. They require\\nthose plaintiffs to notify the EPA 60–90 days in advance of fil-\\ning the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2); 15 U.S.C.\\n§ 2619(b)(1)(A). But the district court chose to apply the re-\\nquirements not only to the filing of the complaint, but also to\\nany subsequent amendments that sought to add new RCRA\\nor TSCA counts. Although the Liebharts complied with the\\nrequirements prior to filing their original complaint in April\\n2016, they gave no new notice to the EPA before filing for\\nleave to amend in February 2018. The district court held that,\\nbecause the prior notice did not contain any mention of bur-\\nied PCBs on the SPX property, it was insufficient to alert the\\nEPA to the particular violation the Liebharts sought to include\\nin the amended complaint.\\n The notice provisions serve two purposes. “First, notice al-\\nlows Government agencies to take responsibility for enforc-\\ning environmental regulations, thus obviating the need for\\ncitizen suits. … Second, notice gives the alleged violator ‘an\\nopportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the\\nAct[s] and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit.’”\\nHallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (quoting\\nGwaltney of Smithfield, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 23\\n\\nU.S. 49, 60 (1987)). The district court’s decision to require no-\\ntice for an amendment to a complaint fulfilled neither pur-\\npose. By the time the Liebharts attempted to amend their com-\\nplaint, the EPA had been on notice of alleged PCB contamina-\\ntion at the SPX property for over two years—and it had de-\\nclined to get involved. Moreover, it was unlikely that the de-\\nfendants would resolve the alleged violation to avoid being\\nsued when they were already in the midst of an extended law-\\nsuit with the same plaintiffs. See AM Int’l, 106 F.3d at 1351\\n(“[T]he delay period is designed to allow a [defendant] a pe-\\nriod in which to clean up its act and avoid litigation. [This de-\\nfendant] was clearly not interested in using the delay period\\nto resolve the dispute without going to court.”); see also Dague,\\n935 F.2d at 1351 (“There is no need to maintain a window of\\nopportunity for the government to take the lead enforcement\\nrole … when a citizen, acting as a private attorney general, has\\nalready lawfully assumed the lead role in bringing a … claim\\nagainst the same facility.”) (quoting Dague v. City of Burling-\\nton, 733 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D. Vt. 1990)). When the original notice\\nis “sufficiently specific to inform the alleged violator [and the\\nagency] about what it is doing wrong, so that it will know\\nwhat corrective actions will avert a lawsuit,” Atl. States Legal\\nFound., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir.\\n1994), there is no need to require a second round of advance\\nnotice for an amended complaint in the same litigation.\\n But an error in the futility analysis alone does not neces-\\nsarily constitute an abuse of discretion on the whole. In addi-\\ntion to futility, the district court cited undue delay and preju-\\ndice in its decision to deny leave to amend. “[D]elay by itself\\nis normally an insufficient reason to deny a motion for leave\\nto amend. Delay must be coupled with some other reason.\\nTypically, that reason … is prejudice to the non-moving\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nparty.” Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 793\\n(7th Cir. 2004). The district court cited the Liebharts’ admis-\\nsion that they learned of the possible burial of contaminated\\nconcrete on the SPX property on October 11, 2017 but failed\\nto seek leave to amend their complaint until February 22,\\n2018. During that more than four-month period, the parties\\nsubmitted and briefed their cross-motions for summary judg-\\nment, and by February, trial was only three months away. The\\nLiebharts provided no justification for their delay.\\n In response, the Liebharts contend that there was no un-\\ndue prejudice to the defendants: by the time they filed their\\nmotion, five weeks of discovery still remained. We disagree.\\nWhile the district court’s explanation of prejudice was fairly\\nshort, even if the district court had failed to articulate a find-\\ning of prejudice altogether, we might still “affirm providing\\nthat ‘the prejudice that would result from such amendment\\nwas apparent.’” Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 613 (7th\\nCir. 2002) (quoting Feldman v. Am. Mem’l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d\\n783, 793 (7th Cir. 1999)). In Park, the plaintiff waited six\\nmonths to move for leave to amend a complaint after she\\nknew (or should have known) of the additional alleged viola-\\ntion. Id. Because trial was approaching, we concluded that the\\ndistrict court was well within its discretion to deny leave. Id.;\\nsee also Perrian v. O’Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194–95 (7th Cir. 1992)\\n(“Because substantive amendments shortly before trial serve\\nto defeat the public’s interest in speedy resolution of legal dis-\\nputes, ‘[a] district court judge is entitled, in such circum-\\nstances, to refuse to allow a plaintiff’s amendment.’” (quoting\\nCampbell v. Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co., 893 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir.\\n1990)) (internal citation omitted)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 25\\n\\n On the contrary, in Life Plans, we found no undue delay\\nwhen a plaintiff promptly moved to amend its complaint just\\nten days after learning of the factual basis for its new count\\nduring discovery. 800 F.3d at 358. The Liebharts delayed more\\nthan four months in the same circumstances. Although dis-\\ncovery was ongoing at the time of the Liebharts’ motion, the\\nparties had already briefed their dispositive motions, and the\\ndistrict court was preparing its summary-judgment order that\\nwould ultimately dispose of the case. We therefore cannot say\\nthat denial of leave for undue delay and prejudice was an\\nabuse of the district court’s discretion. Of course, the district\\ncourt may permit an amendment on remand if the interests of\\njustice so require.\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n Although the district court properly exercised its discre-\\ntion on the various evidentiary and procedural issues the\\nplaintiffs have raised, its analysis on the merits was narrower\\nthan the statutes demand. It may reach the same conclusions\\non reconsideration, but the parties should have another op-\\nportunity to litigate whether a substantial and imminent en-\\ndangerment to health exists in this case under the standards\\nwe have outlined. We therefore VACATE the order of the dis-\\ntrict court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent\\nwith this opinion. 3\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 The Liebharts also challenge the taxation of costs against them by the\\n\\nclerk of the district court. Because we vacate the district court’s judgment,\\nwe assume that the imposition of costs is automatically vacated and so do\\nnot reach that issue. The clerk of the district court is free to reassess costs\\non remand as the case proceeds.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4374542/\", \"author_raw\": \"Michael Stephen Kanne\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597289/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\nWILLIAM LIEBHART & NANCY LIEBHART,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n v.\n\nSPX CORPORATION, TRC ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION, &\nAPOLLO DISMANTLING SERVICES, INC.\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 16-cv-700 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n KANNE, Circuit Judge. William and Nancy Liebhart to-\ngether own three houses on the same block in Watertown,\nWisconsin. Besides a few other houses, the rest of the block\nwas previously occupied by an abandoned transformer fac-\ntory, last owned by SPX Corporation. In 2014, SPX demol-\nished the building with the assistance of TRC Environmental\nCorporation and Apollo Dismantling Services (collectively,\n\f2 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\n“the defendants”). The Liebharts allege that dust and debris\ncontaining toxic chemicals migrated onto their properties,\ncontaminating their yards and jeopardizing their health and\nthe health of their tenants.\n The Liebharts sued under federal statutes authorizing pri-\nvate rights of action for environmental contamination. They\nalso brought various state-law claims. Following discovery\nand the submission of expert witness reports, the district\ncourt denied the Liebharts’ motion for partial summary judg-\nment and granted summary judgment to the defendants with\ncosts. Although the district court adequately evaluated the ex-\npert witnesses and did not abuse its discretion in its proce-\ndural decisions, the court set the bar unnecessarily high for\nthe plaintiffs to show a violation of the applicable federal stat-\nutes. For that reason, we vacate the district court’s judgment\nand remand for reconsideration.\n I. BACKGROUND\n The factory dates to the 1920s and was used to manufac-\nture various industrial equipment. Most relevant to our pur-\npose, the factory manufactured power transformers contain-\ning polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a carcinogenic chemi-\ncal banned by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1979.\nSee Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Pro-\ncessing, Distribution in Commerce, and Use Prohibitions, 44\nFed. Reg. 31,514 (May 31, 1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 761).\nThe parties all agree that the facility has not manufactured or\nhandled any items containing PCBs since 1971, and that it\nshut down completely in 2005.\n But even with all the products and manufacturing equip-\nment removed, PCB contaminants remained in the facility. In\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 3\n\n2009, SPX retained TRC and another company (not named as\na defendant in this suit) to study the property and determine\nthe extent and precise location of any PCB contamination.\nThose studies revealed that the concrete floor of the factory\nwas generally contaminated, with concentrated amounts lo-\ncated in specific areas throughout the site.\n Several years went by. In 2014, SPX decided to move ahead\nwith the demolition, retaining Apollo to conduct the work\nand TRC to supervise the project. That November, the defend-\nants timely proposed a self-implementing cleanup plan to the\nEPA, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 761.61(a). The trouble began\nas demolition commenced in January 2015. The Liebharts al-\nlege that Apollo demolished the building recklessly, failing to\nuse appropriate safety methods to control the dust generated\nby demolition equipment. They assert that their properties\nwere covered in dust, and they submitted hundreds of photos\nand videos of dust from the facility blowing toward their\nhomes to support their allegation.\n The Liebharts filed a complaint with the local government\nin February. They also collected a dust-covered sample of\nsnow from their yard and placed it in a mason jar. Soon there-\nafter, a representative of the Wisconsin Department of Natu-\nral Resources (“DNR”) contacted the defendants about the\nLiebharts’ concerns. In April, TRC collected samples of the\nsurface soil (roughly down to eight inches below ground) on\nboth the industrial and residential properties. Sure enough,\nthe properties tested positive for the presence of PCBs. In Au-\ngust, the Liebharts vacated the property on advice of their\nphysician to avoid further exposure to the chemicals. Frus-\ntrated with the lack of action, William Liebhart had the snow\n\f4 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nsample tested for PCBs. Although the sample did, in fact, con-\ntain PCBs, the irregular manner of collection and storage\nspoiled the sample, and the laboratory declined to endorse the\nresults with any confidence.\n In September 2015, SPX submitted a plan to remediate the\ncontamination to the DNR. In turn, the Liebharts sued in fed-\neral district court in October. The complaint sought injunctive\nrelief under both the Resource Conservation and Recovery\nAct (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and the Toxic Substances\nControl Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. In addition, the\nLiebharts brought a host of state-law claims under supple-\nmental jurisdiction, including strict liability, negligence, tres-\npass, nuisance, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.\n During discovery, the Liebharts submitted to further test-\ning for PCBs both in their yard and inside their home. They\nalso underwent blood testing. Although the external surveys\nrevealed a more comprehensive picture of the extent to which\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ properties contained PCBs, the in-\nternal sampling and blood tests were both negative for con-\ntamination. The Liebharts later learned in October 2017 that\nthe defendants allegedly buried some of the concrete remains\non-site rather than removing them to a toxic waste dump as\nrequired by the EPA-approved clean-up plan.\n The parties prepared and submitted the reports of the ex-\npert witnesses who were to testify at trial. Among those, three\nare pertinent to our discussion. First, the Liebharts submitted\na report by John Woodyard, a licensed professional engineer.\nHis report included a description of standard methods used\nwhen demolishing PCB-contaminated buildings and an anal-\nysis of the purported ways in which the defendants deviated\nfrom those practices, thereby causing the contamination of the\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 5\n\nresidences. The Liebharts’ second expert was Dr. David Car-\npenter, a public health physician who opined on ways in\nwhich the Liebharts might have been exposed to PCBs and the\npotential health effects of continuing exposure. He concluded\nthat “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not\nincrease the risk of disease.” Finally, the defendants submit-\nted a report prepared by Dr. Russell Keenan, a toxicologist\nwho analyzed the survey data and determined that it was im-\npossible to determine whether the presence of PCBs on the\nLiebharts’ property was due to the recent demolition or to\nrunoff that occurred over the last several decades.\n In December 2017, the Liebharts moved for partial sum-\nmary judgment on the issue of causation, reserving the issue\nof damages for a jury trial. The defendants cross-moved for\nsummary judgment; they also filed a motion to exclude the\ntestimony of plaintiffs’ experts Woodyard and Carpenter un-\nder Fed. R. Evid. 702. In February 2018, after those motions\nwere fully briefed to the court, the Liebharts sought leave to\namend their complaint. In light of the information they ob-\ntained through discovery regarding the burial of concrete on\nthe property, they intended to allege separate RCRA and\nTSCA violations and seek an enlargement of the proposed in-\njunction to include removal of that material.\n The district court issued its decisions on March 30. First,\nthe court granted in part the defendants’ motion to exclude\nthe plaintiffs’ expert witness reports. The court explained that\nWoodyard’s report was “equivocal” as to the issue of causa-\ntion; it hedged on whether the contaminants came from dem-\nolition or from runoff during the preceding decades. See\nLiebhart v. SPX Corp., No. 16-cv-700-jdp, 2018 WL 1583296 at\n\f6 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\n*3–4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2018). Second, the report “over-\nlook[ed] too much significant evidence” and failed to account\nfor “obvious alternative explanations” in determining the\ncause of the contamination. Id. at *4 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702\nadvisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments). Finally, the\ncourt noted that Woodyard’s report depended on “unreliable\nor uninformative” evidence, including the Liebharts’ defec-\ntive snow sample, while omitting other evidence such as grass\nclippings and a chromatogram that allegedly detected PCBs\non the property. Id. at *4–5. For those reasons, the court ex-\ncluded Woodyard’s report in its entirety. Id. at *5.\n Although the court admitted the vast majority of Dr. Car-\npenter’s report, it struck Carpenter’s conclusion that “there is\nno ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not increase the\nrisk of disease” as unsupported by the medical studies he\ncited. Id. at *5. In doing so, the court pointed to the absence of\nPCBs inside the Liebharts’ home and in their blood, suggest-\ning that the Liebharts had not actually been exposed to PCBs\nand so could not have suffered harm. Id. at 5–6.\n With that expert testimony off the table, the district court\nconcluded that the Liebharts failed to present any admissible\nevidence to support their RCRA and TSCA claims. The re-\nmaining photos and videos certainly showed dust migrating\nonto the Liebharts’ property, but there was no reliable evi-\ndence proving that the dust contained PCBs. Given that any\nPCBs detected in the soil may have been there prior to the\ndemolition, the lack of evidence doomed the Liebharts’ case.\nThe court denied partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs,\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal\nclaims, and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice.\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 7\n\n The district court also denied the Liebharts’ petition for\nleave to amend their complaint on two grounds. First, alt-\nhough the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs discovered\nthe factual basis for the new counts over a year after filing the\ninitial complaint, it also noted that they took an additional\nfour months thereafter to seek leave to amend. During that\nintervening period, the parties had submitted and briefed\ntheir motions for summary judgment, and the trial date was\nfast approaching. It found their petition untimely. Second, the\ndistrict court determined that the new claims were futile un-\nder both statutes' advance-notice requirements.\n The plaintiffs immediately appealed. Several months after\nthe judgment, the clerk of the district court imposed costs on\nthe Liebharts in the amount of $46,320.02. The Liebharts sep-\narately appealed that decision. We consolidated the two ap-\npeals and now consider them together.\n II. ANALYSIS\n The Liebharts raise five issues for our consideration. First,\nthey argue that the district court erred in excluding the opin-\nions of expert witnesses Woodyard in full and Carpenter in\npart. As part of that argument, they allege that the district\ncourt failed to apply the same stringent standard to the de-\nfendants’ expert Keenan. Second, they contend that summary\njudgment was inappropriate because, even absent the testi-\nmony of their expert witnesses, they submitted adequate pho-\ntographic and scientific evidence to state a valid claim under\nRCRA and TSCA. Third, they challenge the district court’s de-\nnial of injunctive relief in light of deficiencies they have iden-\ntified in SPX’s state-approved clean-up plan. Fourth, they ar-\ngue that the district court abused its discretion in denying\n\f8 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nleave to amend their complaint. Finally, they challenge the\nimposition of costs.\n But there’s a larger issue looming in the background. The\ndistrict court’s opinion operates under the assumption that\nRCRA plaintiffs must demonstrate “an imminent and sub-\nstantial danger with evidence of health problems they have\nalready suffered.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *6. Relying\nprimarily on Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C.\n1996), the district court set a high bar for RCRA plaintiffs,\nholding that “it doesn’t follow necessarily that there is an im-\nminent and substantial risk of harm simply because there is\nsome amount of PCBs on the property.” Liebhart 2018 WL\n1583296 at *5. We review that question of law, which was the\nunderlying basis for the award of summary judgment, de\nnovo. Daugherty v. Harrington, 906 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2018).\n A. RCRA Requires Only that Harm “May” Be Imminent\n The question of how much harm a plaintiff must prove to\nmake out a prima facie violation of RCRA has led to much dis-\ncussion among the circuits. We have yet to tackle that issue\nhead on, so the district court necessarily had to look else-\nwhere for guidance. Passed in 1976, “RCRA is a comprehen-\nsive environmental statute that empowers [the] EPA to regu-\nlate hazardous wastes from cradle to grave.” City of Chicago v.\nEnvtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). The statute’s “pri-\nmary purpose … is to reduce the generation of hazardous\nwaste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and dis-\nposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, ‘so as to\nminimize the present and future threat to human health and\nthe environment.’” Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479,\n483 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)).\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 9\n\n Although the EPA has the primary responsibility for en-\nforcing the law, the statute, “like other environmental laws,\n… contains a citizen suit provision, § 6972, which permits pri-\nvate citizens to enforce its provisions in some circumstances.”\nId. at 484. As relevant to this case, the statute provides that\n any person may commence a civil action on his own\n behalf … against any person, … including … any\n past or present owner or operator of a treatment,\n storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or\n who is contributing to the past or present handling,\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any\n solid or hazardous waste which may present an im-\n minent and substantial endangerment to health or\n the environment.\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Notably, Con-\ngress amended the language in 1980 by substituting the\nphrase “may present” for the original 1976 wording “is pre-\nsenting.” Maine People’s All. and Nat. Res. Def. Council v.\nMallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Solid\nWaste Disposal Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–482, § 25, 94 Stat. 2334,\n2348). The section authorizes district courts to grant injunctive\nrelief and “order [a violator] to take such other action as may\nbe necessary” to remediate the endangerment. Id.; see also Me-\nghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (“Under a plain reading of this remedial\nscheme, a private citizen suing under § 6972(a)(1)(B) could\nseek a mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible\nparty to ‘take action’ by attending to the cleanup and proper\ndisposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one\nthat ‘restrains’ a responsible party from further violating\nRCRA.”); Avondale Fed. Sav. Bank v. Amoco Oil Co., 170 F.3d\n692, 694 (7th Cir. 1999).\n\f10 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\n The critical question in this case is how to determine\nwhether alleged contamination “may present an imminent\nand substantial endangerment to health.” § 6972(a)(1)(b). We\ntouched on this question only briefly in Albany Bank & Trust\nCo. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2002).\nThere, we first outlined the elements of a prima facie RCRA\nclaim: “a plaintiff must allege (1) that the defendant has gen-\nerated solid or hazardous waste, (2) that the defendant is con-\ntributing to or has contributed to the handling of this waste,\nand (3) that this waste may present an imminent and substan-\ntial danger to health or the environment.” Id. (citing Cox v.\nCity of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 2001)). We then ob-\nserved, interpreting the final element, that “[i]mminence does\nnot require an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\nharm.” Id. (citing Cox, 256 F.3d at 299). That is the extent of\nour circuit precedent on the “may present” language con-\ntained in § 6972(a)(1)(B).\n But our sister circuits have engaged with this question in\ngreat depth. In the first major case interpreting the provision,\nthe Third Circuit emphasized that the statute “enhanced the\ncourts’ traditional equitable powers by authorizing the issu-\nance of injunctions when there is but a risk of harm, a more\nlenient standard than the traditional requirement of threat-\nened irreparable harm.” United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204,\n211 (3d Cir. 1982). The court found the statutory language\n“unequivocal,” demonstrating that Congress “intended to\nconfer upon the courts the authority to grant affirmative eq-\nuitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate” the risks\nposed by toxic waste. Id. at 213–14.\n In the subsequent decades, several other circuits adopted\nand further developed the same interpretation of § 6972. See\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 11\n\nMallinckrodt, 471 F.3d at 277; Dague v. City of Burlington, 935\nF.2d 1343, 1355–56 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds,\n502 U.S. 1071 (1992); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l,\nInc., 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Waste Indus.,\nInc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument\nthat “[§ 6972] was designed to control pollution only in emer-\ngency situations”); Cox, 256 F.3d at 299–301; Price v. United\nStates Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994); Burlington N.\nand Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1019–22 (10th Cir.\n2007); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1014–\n15 (11th Cir. 2004). We now join those courts and explicitly\nembrace the core content of their interpretation.\n The district court therefore used an incorrect legal stand-\nard to evaluate the Liebharts’ argument that PCBs from the\ndemolition may present an imminent and substantial danger\nto their health and that of their tenants. It did not cite any of\nthe cases we listed above, but instead relied on a single district\ncourt decision from a circuit that has not yet addressed the\nissue. See Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *5 (quoting Foster, 922\nF. Supp. at 662 (“While there can be no question that the levels\nof contamination present at the Site may warrant future re-\nsponse action, the plaintiff cannot establish either a current\nrisk of substantial or serious threatened harm, or some neces-\nsity for action.”)).\n That error undercuts several of the reasons the district\ncourt gave for rejecting the Liebharts’ RCRA claim. For exam-\nple, the district court cursorily adopted a passing statement\nwe made over twenty-five years ago that “[t]he [EPA’s] ac-\ncepted safe level of PCBs in the environment is fifty parts per\nmillion,” id. (quoting Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor\n\f12 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nServ., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1994)), to create a require-\nment that the Liebharts show that PCB contamination on their\nproperty met that threshold. But there is no requirement in\nRCRA for a plaintiff to make “a particular quantitative show-\ning as a sine qua non for liability.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 260; see\nalso Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. Only one circuit has come to an\narguably contrary conclusion. In Price v. United States Navy,\n818 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (S.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d 39 F.3d 1011 (9th\nCir. 1994), the district court required RCRA plaintiffs to show\nthat “the level of contaminants [was] above levels that are con-\nsidered acceptable by the State.” But as the Interfaith court\nnoted, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion affirming the district\ncourt’s judgment did not discuss that requirement. RCRA\ndoes not require that plaintiffs demonstrate contamination\nabove some agency-derived threshold level of concentration.\n399 F.3d at 260–61. It merely requires that they show that con-\ntaminants on the property are seriously dangerous to human\nhealth (or will be, given prolonged exposure over time). See\nCox, 256 F.3d at 299–300 (“an endangerment is ‘substantial’ if\nit is ‘serious’” (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019)).\n That’s especially true when the standard is taken out of\ncontext. The district court relied on Cincinnati Ins. Co. to sup-\nport its contention that contamination below the threshold\nlevel of fifty parts per million (“ppm”) does not qualify as a\nregulatory violation, thereby contradicting Woodyard’s opin-\nion regarding safe levels of PCBs and providing the grounds\nfor excluding it. In that case, we evaluated whether an insur-\nance company was required to indemnify its insured for dam-\nages arising out of PCB contamination at an industrial site.\nThe EPA had identified the insured as potentially liable under\nthe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,\nand Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. In\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 13\n\nthat context, we noted that the contaminated site contained\nPCBs concentrated at levels up to 58,000 ppm, well above the\nEPA’s general regulatory threshold of fifty ppm. 40 F.3d at 148\n(citing 40 C.F.R. § 761.60).\n But that regulation, still in effect today, identifies indus-\ntrial equipment and other wastes contaminated at levels\nabove fifty ppm and requires special procedures for their stor-\nage and disposal. It does not unequivocally state that PCBs\nconcentrated at levels lower than fifty ppm are safe for human\nexposure. Neither Cincinnati Ins. Co. nor the EPA regulation\nstand for the proposition that PCBs concentrated at forty-nine\nppm on residential property do not present a substantial endan-\ngerment to the health of the residents. That is especially ap-\nparent when we consider that the same set of regulations dis-\ntinguishes between low and high-occupancy areas and re-\nquires that, in high-occupancy areas, bulk PCB remediation\nwaste, such as soil, be cleaned up to levels of concentration at\nor below one ppm. § 761.61(a)(4)(i)(A). Section 761.3 confirms\nthat the term “high-occupancy area” includes residences. See\nalso § 761.123 (regulating spills of PCBs concentrated at fifty\nppm or greater but emphasizing that “[t]he concentration of\nPCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concentration in the\nmaterial spilled as opposed to the concentration of PCBs in\nthe material onto which the PCBs were spilled”). “Proof of\ncontamination in excess of [agency] standards may support a\nfinding of liability, and may alone suffice for liability in some\ncases, but its required use is without justification in the stat-\nute.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 261.\n This is not to say that all the plaintiffs must do is to show\nsome bit of soil on their property that tests positive for PCBs\n\f14 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nabove one ppm (or even above the purported lower Wiscon-\nsin DNR standard, which the defendants seem to have\nacknowledged in their state-approved clean-up plan). Of\ncourse, there must be accompanying evidence that establishes\nsome connection between the existing contaminants and\nsome imminent and substantial endangerment to health. 1 But\nthe Liebharts attempted to provide such evidence, and the\ndistrict court held the bar higher than necessary under\nRCRA’s standard. In criticizing expert witness Carpenter’s\nstatement that “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that\ndoes not increase the risk of disease,” the district court re-\njected Carpenter’s citation to studies showing the general\nrisks of PCB exposure because “the Liebharts do not cite any\nevidence that they have been exposed to PCBs.” Liebhart, 2018\nWL 1583296 at *5. Moreover, the district court concluded that\n“[t]he Liebharts do not contend that they can prove an immi-\nnent and substantial danger with evidence of health problems\nthey have already suffered.” Id. at *6.\n As we noted in Albany Bank, “[i]mminence does not re-\nquire an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\n\n\n 1 On appeal, the Liebharts contend that there is no separate require-\nment for expert witness testimony because the photos and videos they\nhave submitted into evidence suffice to prove their RCRA claim. The de-\nfendants push back on that argument, insisting that many of the issues are\nbeyond the competence of lay fact-finders and require the assistance of\nexperts to address. See, e.g., C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827,\n838 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Given the complex nature of this case, … [and w]ith\nno experts to prove causation … the appellants cannot prove their toxic-\ntort case under [state] law.”) Because the district court did not make a fac-\ntual finding as to whether this case is sufficient complex to require expert\ntestimony, and because we remand for reconsideration of a separate legal\nissue, we need not reach that question today.\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 15\n\nharm.” 310 F.3d at 973. Although the Supreme Court has in-\nstructed that “[a]n endangerment can only be ‘imminent’ if it\n‘threaten[s] to occur immediately,’” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485\n(quoting Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary of English Language\n1245 (2d ed. 1934)), it qualified that statement when it approv-\ningly quoted the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the statu-\ntory term “implies that there must be a threat which is present\nnow, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until\nlater.” Id. at 486 (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019).\nWe take that to mean that the Liebharts must show that there\nare PCBs currently on the property that have the potential to\nsubstantially threaten their health at some point in the future\nif they continue to occupy the premises and prolong their ex-\nposure. On remand, the district court should reevaluate its ex-\nclusion of Dr. Carpenter’s assertion regarding PCB safety un-\nder the standards we have outlined above and determine\nwhether, if admissible, the report demonstrates that a sub-\nstantial and imminent threat to the Liebharts’ health may be\npresent.\n B. TSCA Likewise Requires No Heightened Showing\n TSCA authorizes a separate, private cause of action allow-\ning “any person [to] commence a civil action … against any\nperson … who is alleged to be in violation of … any rule\npromulgated under” the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1). The EPA\npromulgated the PCB regulations in question pursuant to\nstatutory authority under TSCA, designating PCBs as “haz-\nardous waste” and controlling their manufacture, use, stor-\nage, and disposal. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 761. The Liebharts’ TSCA\nclaim alleged that the defendants violated those regulations,\nthereby authorizing the district court to “restrain [the] viola-\ntion.” § 2619(a). Unlike RCRA, which authorizes mandatory\n\f16 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\ninjunctions to compel remediation of previous violations,\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions to stop ongoing\nviolations. Id. The defendants argued that there was no longer\nan ongoing violation, as demolition was complete by the time\nthe Liebharts filed their claim. 2\n The purported violation was based on 40 C.F.R. § 761.123,\nwhich, as we noted above, regulates “spills” of PCB materials\nconcentrated at levels above fifty ppm. The district court cor-\nrectly noted that the Liebharts had not shown any evidence\nthat any PCBs had been “spilled” onto their property (by\nmeans of dust migration) at that level of concentration, and it\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on that basis.\n But the district court seems to have overlooked the follow-\ning sentence in the regulation, which directs that “[t]he con-\ncentration of PCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concen-\ntration in the material spilled as opposed to the concentration\nof the material onto which the PCBs were spilled.” Id. The\nLiebharts’ complaint seems to have alleged that the concrete\nfloor of the factory, which contained at least some contami-\nnated areas above the fifty-ppm threshold, was demolished\nand “spilled” onto the Liebharts’ property. By the plain text\nof the regulation, there is no need to show that contaminants\non the Liebharts’ property are themselves concentrated above\nfifty ppm so long as the original material that was the source\nof that spill met the criteria. On remand, the district court may\nagain determine that there is no ongoing violation, but it must\n\n 2 The district court determined that the Liebharts waived this claim\nby failing to engage the defendants’ argument that there was no “ongoing\nviolation.” But the court chose to analyze the merits of the claim regardless\nof waiver and reached its conclusion on an alternative basis. We likewise\nset aside the issue of waiver to reach the district court’s merits analysis.\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 17\n\nfirst determine whether the alleged violation comes within\nthe meaning of § 761.123 in the first place.\n C. The District Court Should Reconsider the Remaining Issues\non Remand\n Now that we have clarified the standard the plaintiffs\nmust meet, we turn to the remaining procedural issues the\nLiebharts have asked to us to address.\n 1. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding\nWoodyard’s Testimony\n “The summary-judgment decision here turned [in large\npart] on the district court’s conclusion that [the] expert testi-\nmony was inadmissible. Whether the district court applied\nthe appropriate legal framework for evaluating expert testi-\nmony is reviewed de novo, but the court’s choice of relevant\nfactors within that framework and its ultimate conclusion as\nto admissibility are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Lees v.\nCarthage College, 714 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 2013). When a dis-\ntrict court is “[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testi-\nmony … the trial judge must determine at the outset …\nwhether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific\nknowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or\ndetermine a fact in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,\n509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). “The trial court must have … latitude\nin deciding how to test an expert’s reliability.” Kumho Tire Co.,\nLtd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).\n The district court was well within its discretion to exclude\nthe proffered testimony of expert witness Woodyard. Beyond\nthe problem that the plaintiffs seemed to have waived this is-\nsue in the district court by failing to engage with the defend-\nants’ arguments in their motion to strike the testimony,\n\f18 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nWoodyard’s analysis suffers from a critical flaw that stems\nfrom the way in which the parties have framed this lawsuit.\nThe district court briefly noted in its opinion that “both sides\nassume that none of the defendants can be held liable for any\nPCB contamination on the Liebharts’ property that occurred\nbefore the demolition began, so the court will make the same\nassumption.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *1. That’s a curious\nchoice. RCRA permits the Liebharts to obtain injunctive relief\nfrom the owner of the facility for any cognizable contamina-\ntion, regardless of whether the PCBs migrated onto their\nproperty before or after the demolition occurred. See 42 U.S.C.\n§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (authorizing suit against “any person … who\nhas contributed … to the past or present handling … or dis-\nposal” of hazardous waste); see also Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486\n(“RCRA contains no statute of limitations.”).\n But because the Liebharts restricted their claims to PCBs\nthat allegedly migrated onto their property via the dust from\nthe 2015 demolition, they necessarily excluded claims result-\ning from PCBs that may have gotten onto their property dur-\ning the previous century. The district court correctly noted\nthat Woodyard’s expert opinion could not distinguish be-\ntween these two alternatives, as both sets of contaminants\noriginated from the same source. There was even evidence\nshowing that PCBs existed in the soil beneath the Liebharts’\nasphalt driveway—Woodyard could not explain how that\nmight have occurred as the result of dust blowing in the wind\nas opposed to seepage over the course of years before any\ndemolition occurred.\n Perhaps the Liebharts decided to frame their claims in this\nway because they wanted to go after defendants TRC and\nApollo, who would not be liable for what happened before\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 19\n\ndemolition. Or perhaps some element of their state-law\nclaims, which we have not addressed, required them to con-\nstrict the scope. They did not explain their reasoning to us (or\nit seems, to the district court). But the distinction makes it dif-\nficult for Woodyard to make his case, given that he did not\n“adequately account[] for obvious alternative explanations.”\nGopalratnam v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 787 (7th Cir.\n2017). Viewed in this light, the district court was within its\ndiscretion to exclude the testimony as unreliable and unhelp-\nful to the trier of fact. The district court may choose to rethink\nthat evaluation on remand under the legal standards we out-\nlined above, but it may well reach the same conclusion.\n 2. The District Court Should Reconsider Its Denial of Injunctive\nRelief\n The district court denied injunctive relief to the Liebharts\nbecause the defendants had already agreed to a clean-up plan\nthat had been approved by the Wisconsin DNR. We review\nthat decision for an abuse of discretion. See AMI Int’l, Inc. v.\nDatacard Corp. 106 F.3d 1342, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997) (remanding\ngrant of RCRA injunction).\n As we mentioned above, RCRA authorizes district courts\nto issue either mandatory or prohibitory injunctions, while\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions. “[I]t is appro-\npriate ‘to give great deference to the district court’s decision\nas to the precise equitable relief necessary in a particular\ncase.’” Bowes v. Ind. Sec. of State, 837 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir.\n2016) (quoting Gjersten v. Bd. Of Election Com’rs for City of Chi-\ncago, 791 F.2d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1986)). That is especially true\nwhen a plaintiff requests a mandatory injunction, which “im-\nposes significant burdens on the defendant and requires care-\nful consideration of the intrusiveness of the ordered act, as\n\f20 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nwell as the difficulties that may be encountered in supervising\nthe enjoined party’s compliance with the court’s order.” Kart-\nman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir.\n2011).\n Considering SPX’s decision to formulate a clean-up plan\nand obtain approval from the state agency, the district court\ndetermined that there was no need for separate, federally-su-\npervised remediation. It reached that conclusion even while\nassuming that the defendants were in violation of either\nRCRA or TSCA, despite the fact it found no such violation.\nOther courts have determined that the existence of a parallel\nplan of remediation supervised by the state does not neces-\nsarily prevent a federal district court from granting an injunc-\ntion if it finds the state agency’s actions to be insufficient to\nremedy the violation of federal law. See, e.g., Interfaith, 399\nF.3d at 264–68. On the other hand, the same courts have also\nupheld denials of injunctions in similar situations when the\ndistrict court finds that the parallel plan is adequate to the\ntask. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735\nF.3d 131, 139–40 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Interfaith). We\nrecently reached the same conclusion. See LAJIM, LLC v. Gen.\nElec. Co., No. 18-1522, 2019 WL 1011021, at *4–11 (7th Cir. Mar.\n4, 2019) (“[T]he district court correctly held that it has discre-\ntion to award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not re-\nquired to order relief after a finding of liability,” particularly\nin light of ongoing relief supervised by a state environmental\nagency).\n Here, the district court determined that SPX’s existing\nplan was sufficient and that the Liebharts had not “iden-\ntif[ied] any way that SPX’s plan [was] deficient or violate[d]\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 21\n\nfederal law.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *7. We agree. Alt-\nhough the Liebharts point to certain statistical sampling re-\nquirements outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 761.125 and contend that\nSPX’s existing plan fails to meet those requirements, the dis-\ntrict court noted that SPX’s plan includes further sampling of\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ property. It emphasized that “the\nLiebharts do not otherwise explain why SPX’s proposed sam-\npling scheme is substantively inadequate.” Liebhart, 2018 WL\n1583296 at *7. We see no evidence that compels us to contra-\ndict that factual finding.\n However, in light of the legal standards we outlined\nabove, we ask the district court to reconsider its decision to\ndeny injunctive relief on remand. Because the bar for estab-\nlishing an imminent and substantial danger is lower than the\ndistrict court believed when evaluating the request for an in-\njunction, it would be prudent to reassess whether the DNR-\napproved plan adequately remedies harms that may come\nwithin RCRA’s scope. See LAJIM, 2019 WL 1011021 at *6\n(“[O]nce a court finds a defendant liable for creating a risk of\nimminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the case\nthat injunctive relief is warranted. But that is not always the\ncase.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).\n 3. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying\nLeave to Amend the Complaint.\n We review a denial of leave to amend a complaint for\nabuse of discretion. Life Plans, Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co.,\n800 F.3d 343, 357 (7th Cir. 2015). District courts are to “freely\ngive leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.\nP. 15(a)(2). “The Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to\nrequire a district court to allow amendment unless there is a\ngood reason—futility, undue delay, undue prejudice, or bad\n\f22 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nfaith—for denying leave to amend.” Life Plans, 800 F.3d at 357\n(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The district\ncourt in this case identified two of those grounds as bases for\ndenial: futility and undue delay. While we disagree with the\nfutility analysis, we concur with the finding of undue delay\nand decline to reverse.\n We begin with the question of futility. Both statutes con-\ntain advance-notice requirements that citizen plaintiffs must\nobserve prior to filing RCRA or TSCA suits. They require\nthose plaintiffs to notify the EPA 60–90 days in advance of fil-\ning the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2); 15 U.S.C.\n§ 2619(b)(1)(A). But the district court chose to apply the re-\nquirements not only to the filing of the complaint, but also to\nany subsequent amendments that sought to add new RCRA\nor TSCA counts. Although the Liebharts complied with the\nrequirements prior to filing their original complaint in April\n2016, they gave no new notice to the EPA before filing for\nleave to amend in February 2018. The district court held that,\nbecause the prior notice did not contain any mention of bur-\nied PCBs on the SPX property, it was insufficient to alert the\nEPA to the particular violation the Liebharts sought to include\nin the amended complaint.\n The notice provisions serve two purposes. “First, notice al-\nlows Government agencies to take responsibility for enforc-\ning environmental regulations, thus obviating the need for\ncitizen suits. … Second, notice gives the alleged violator ‘an\nopportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the\nAct[s] and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit.’”\nHallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (quoting\nGwaltney of Smithfield, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 23\n\nU.S. 49, 60 (1987)). The district court’s decision to require no-\ntice for an amendment to a complaint fulfilled neither pur-\npose. By the time the Liebharts attempted to amend their com-\nplaint, the EPA had been on notice of alleged PCB contamina-\ntion at the SPX property for over two years—and it had de-\nclined to get involved. Moreover, it was unlikely that the de-\nfendants would resolve the alleged violation to avoid being\nsued when they were already in the midst of an extended law-\nsuit with the same plaintiffs. See AM Int’l, 106 F.3d at 1351\n(“[T]he delay period is designed to allow a [defendant] a pe-\nriod in which to clean up its act and avoid litigation. [This de-\nfendant] was clearly not interested in using the delay period\nto resolve the dispute without going to court.”); see also Dague,\n935 F.2d at 1351 (“There is no need to maintain a window of\nopportunity for the government to take the lead enforcement\nrole … when a citizen, acting as a private attorney general, has\nalready lawfully assumed the lead role in bringing a … claim\nagainst the same facility.”) (quoting Dague v. City of Burling-\nton, 733 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D. Vt. 1990)). When the original notice\nis “sufficiently specific to inform the alleged violator [and the\nagency] about what it is doing wrong, so that it will know\nwhat corrective actions will avert a lawsuit,” Atl. States Legal\nFound., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir.\n1994), there is no need to require a second round of advance\nnotice for an amended complaint in the same litigation.\n But an error in the futility analysis alone does not neces-\nsarily constitute an abuse of discretion on the whole. In addi-\ntion to futility, the district court cited undue delay and preju-\ndice in its decision to deny leave to amend. “[D]elay by itself\nis normally an insufficient reason to deny a motion for leave\nto amend. Delay must be coupled with some other reason.\nTypically, that reason … is prejudice to the non-moving\n\f24 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nparty.” Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 793\n(7th Cir. 2004). The district court cited the Liebharts’ admis-\nsion that they learned of the possible burial of contaminated\nconcrete on the SPX property on October 11, 2017 but failed\nto seek leave to amend their complaint until February 22,\n2018. During that more than four-month period, the parties\nsubmitted and briefed their cross-motions for summary judg-\nment, and by February, trial was only three months away. The\nLiebharts provided no justification for their delay.\n In response, the Liebharts contend that there was no un-\ndue prejudice to the defendants: by the time they filed their\nmotion, five weeks of discovery still remained. We disagree.\nWhile the district court’s explanation of prejudice was fairly\nshort, even if the district court had failed to articulate a find-\ning of prejudice altogether, we might still “affirm providing\nthat ‘the prejudice that would result from such amendment\nwas apparent.’” Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 613 (7th\nCir. 2002) (quoting Feldman v. Am. Mem’l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d\n783, 793 (7th Cir. 1999)). In Park, the plaintiff waited six\nmonths to move for leave to amend a complaint after she\nknew (or should have known) of the additional alleged viola-\ntion. Id. Because trial was approaching, we concluded that the\ndistrict court was well within its discretion to deny leave. Id.;\nsee also Perrian v. O’Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194–95 (7th Cir. 1992)\n(“Because substantive amendments shortly before trial serve\nto defeat the public’s interest in speedy resolution of legal dis-\nputes, ‘[a] district court judge is entitled, in such circum-\nstances, to refuse to allow a plaintiff’s amendment.’” (quoting\nCampbell v. Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co., 893 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir.\n1990)) (internal citation omitted)).\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 25\n\n On the contrary, in Life Plans, we found no undue delay\nwhen a plaintiff promptly moved to amend its complaint just\nten days after learning of the factual basis for its new count\nduring discovery. 800 F.3d at 358. The Liebharts delayed more\nthan four months in the same circumstances. Although dis-\ncovery was ongoing at the time of the Liebharts’ motion, the\nparties had already briefed their dispositive motions, and the\ndistrict court was preparing its summary-judgment order that\nwould ultimately dispose of the case. We therefore cannot say\nthat denial of leave for undue delay and prejudice was an\nabuse of the district court’s discretion. Of course, the district\ncourt may permit an amendment on remand if the interests of\njustice so require.\n III. CONCLUSION\n Although the district court properly exercised its discre-\ntion on the various evidentiary and procedural issues the\nplaintiffs have raised, its analysis on the merits was narrower\nthan the statutes demand. It may reach the same conclusions\non reconsideration, but the parties should have another op-\nportunity to litigate whether a substantial and imminent en-\ndangerment to health exists in this case under the standards\nwe have outlined. We therefore VACATE the order of the dis-\ntrict court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent\nwith this opinion. 3\n\n\n\n\n 3 The Liebharts also challenge the taxation of costs against them by the\n\nclerk of the district court. Because we vacate the district court’s judgment,\nwe assume that the imposition of costs is automatically vacated and so do\nnot reach that issue. The clerk of the district court is free to reassess costs\non remand as the case proceeds.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\nWILLIAM LIEBHART & NANCY LIEBHART,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nSPX CORPORATION, TRC ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION, &\\nAPOLLO DISMANTLING SERVICES, INC.\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-700 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n KANNE, Circuit Judge. William and Nancy Liebhart to-\\ngether own three houses on the same block in Watertown,\\nWisconsin. Besides a few other houses, the rest of the block\\nwas previously occupied by an abandoned transformer fac-\\ntory, last owned by SPX Corporation. In 2014, SPX demol-\\nished the building with the assistance of TRC Environmental\\nCorporation and Apollo Dismantling Services (collectively,\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n“the defendants”). The Liebharts allege that dust and debris\\ncontaining toxic chemicals migrated onto their properties,\\ncontaminating their yards and jeopardizing their health and\\nthe health of their tenants.\\n The Liebharts sued under federal statutes authorizing pri-\\nvate rights of action for environmental contamination. They\\nalso brought various state-law claims. Following discovery\\nand the submission of expert witness reports, the district\\ncourt denied the Liebharts’ motion for partial summary judg-\\nment and granted summary judgment to the defendants with\\ncosts. Although the district court adequately evaluated the ex-\\npert witnesses and did not abuse its discretion in its proce-\\ndural decisions, the court set the bar unnecessarily high for\\nthe plaintiffs to show a violation of the applicable federal stat-\\nutes. For that reason, we vacate the district court’s judgment\\nand remand for reconsideration.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n The factory dates to the 1920s and was used to manufac-\\nture various industrial equipment. Most relevant to our pur-\\npose, the factory manufactured power transformers contain-\\ning polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a carcinogenic chemi-\\ncal banned by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1979.\\nSee Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Pro-\\ncessing, Distribution in Commerce, and Use Prohibitions, 44\\nFed. Reg. 31,514 (May 31, 1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 761).\\nThe parties all agree that the facility has not manufactured or\\nhandled any items containing PCBs since 1971, and that it\\nshut down completely in 2005.\\n But even with all the products and manufacturing equip-\\nment removed, PCB contaminants remained in the facility. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 3\\n\\n2009, SPX retained TRC and another company (not named as\\na defendant in this suit) to study the property and determine\\nthe extent and precise location of any PCB contamination.\\nThose studies revealed that the concrete floor of the factory\\nwas generally contaminated, with concentrated amounts lo-\\ncated in specific areas throughout the site.\\n Several years went by. In 2014, SPX decided to move ahead\\nwith the demolition, retaining Apollo to conduct the work\\nand TRC to supervise the project. That November, the defend-\\nants timely proposed a self-implementing cleanup plan to the\\nEPA, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 761.61(a). The trouble began\\nas demolition commenced in January 2015. The Liebharts al-\\nlege that Apollo demolished the building recklessly, failing to\\nuse appropriate safety methods to control the dust generated\\nby demolition equipment. They assert that their properties\\nwere covered in dust, and they submitted hundreds of photos\\nand videos of dust from the facility blowing toward their\\nhomes to support their allegation.\\n The Liebharts filed a complaint with the local government\\nin February. They also collected a dust-covered sample of\\nsnow from their yard and placed it in a mason jar. Soon there-\\nafter, a representative of the Wisconsin Department of Natu-\\nral Resources (“DNR”) contacted the defendants about the\\nLiebharts’ concerns. In April, TRC collected samples of the\\nsurface soil (roughly down to eight inches below ground) on\\nboth the industrial and residential properties. Sure enough,\\nthe properties tested positive for the presence of PCBs. In Au-\\ngust, the Liebharts vacated the property on advice of their\\nphysician to avoid further exposure to the chemicals. Frus-\\ntrated with the lack of action, William Liebhart had the snow\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nsample tested for PCBs. Although the sample did, in fact, con-\\ntain PCBs, the irregular manner of collection and storage\\nspoiled the sample, and the laboratory declined to endorse the\\nresults with any confidence.\\n In September 2015, SPX submitted a plan to remediate the\\ncontamination to the DNR. In turn, the Liebharts sued in fed-\\neral district court in October. The complaint sought injunctive\\nrelief under both the Resource Conservation and Recovery\\nAct (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and the Toxic Substances\\nControl Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. In addition, the\\nLiebharts brought a host of state-law claims under supple-\\nmental jurisdiction, including strict liability, negligence, tres-\\npass, nuisance, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.\\n During discovery, the Liebharts submitted to further test-\\ning for PCBs both in their yard and inside their home. They\\nalso underwent blood testing. Although the external surveys\\nrevealed a more comprehensive picture of the extent to which\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ properties contained PCBs, the in-\\nternal sampling and blood tests were both negative for con-\\ntamination. The Liebharts later learned in October 2017 that\\nthe defendants allegedly buried some of the concrete remains\\non-site rather than removing them to a toxic waste dump as\\nrequired by the EPA-approved clean-up plan.\\n The parties prepared and submitted the reports of the ex-\\npert witnesses who were to testify at trial. Among those, three\\nare pertinent to our discussion. First, the Liebharts submitted\\na report by John Woodyard, a licensed professional engineer.\\nHis report included a description of standard methods used\\nwhen demolishing PCB-contaminated buildings and an anal-\\nysis of the purported ways in which the defendants deviated\\nfrom those practices, thereby causing the contamination of the\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 5\\n\\nresidences. The Liebharts’ second expert was Dr. David Car-\\npenter, a public health physician who opined on ways in\\nwhich the Liebharts might have been exposed to PCBs and the\\npotential health effects of continuing exposure. He concluded\\nthat “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not\\nincrease the risk of disease.” Finally, the defendants submit-\\nted a report prepared by Dr. Russell Keenan, a toxicologist\\nwho analyzed the survey data and determined that it was im-\\npossible to determine whether the presence of PCBs on the\\nLiebharts’ property was due to the recent demolition or to\\nrunoff that occurred over the last several decades.\\n In December 2017, the Liebharts moved for partial sum-\\nmary judgment on the issue of causation, reserving the issue\\nof damages for a jury trial. The defendants cross-moved for\\nsummary judgment; they also filed a motion to exclude the\\ntestimony of plaintiffs’ experts Woodyard and Carpenter un-\\nder Fed. R. Evid. 702. In February 2018, after those motions\\nwere fully briefed to the court, the Liebharts sought leave to\\namend their complaint. In light of the information they ob-\\ntained through discovery regarding the burial of concrete on\\nthe property, they intended to allege separate RCRA and\\nTSCA violations and seek an enlargement of the proposed in-\\njunction to include removal of that material.\\n The district court issued its decisions on March 30. First,\\nthe court granted in part the defendants’ motion to exclude\\nthe plaintiffs’ expert witness reports. The court explained that\\nWoodyard’s report was “equivocal” as to the issue of causa-\\ntion; it hedged on whether the contaminants came from dem-\\nolition or from runoff during the preceding decades. See\\nLiebhart v. SPX Corp., No. 16-cv-700-jdp, 2018 WL 1583296 at\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n*3–4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2018). Second, the report “over-\\nlook[ed] too much significant evidence” and failed to account\\nfor “obvious alternative explanations” in determining the\\ncause of the contamination. Id. at *4 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702\\nadvisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments). Finally, the\\ncourt noted that Woodyard’s report depended on “unreliable\\nor uninformative” evidence, including the Liebharts’ defec-\\ntive snow sample, while omitting other evidence such as grass\\nclippings and a chromatogram that allegedly detected PCBs\\non the property. Id. at *4–5. For those reasons, the court ex-\\ncluded Woodyard’s report in its entirety. Id. at *5.\\n Although the court admitted the vast majority of Dr. Car-\\npenter’s report, it struck Carpenter’s conclusion that “there is\\nno ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not increase the\\nrisk of disease” as unsupported by the medical studies he\\ncited. Id. at *5. In doing so, the court pointed to the absence of\\nPCBs inside the Liebharts’ home and in their blood, suggest-\\ning that the Liebharts had not actually been exposed to PCBs\\nand so could not have suffered harm. Id. at 5–6.\\n With that expert testimony off the table, the district court\\nconcluded that the Liebharts failed to present any admissible\\nevidence to support their RCRA and TSCA claims. The re-\\nmaining photos and videos certainly showed dust migrating\\nonto the Liebharts’ property, but there was no reliable evi-\\ndence proving that the dust contained PCBs. Given that any\\nPCBs detected in the soil may have been there prior to the\\ndemolition, the lack of evidence doomed the Liebharts’ case.\\nThe court denied partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs,\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal\\nclaims, and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 7\\n\\n The district court also denied the Liebharts’ petition for\\nleave to amend their complaint on two grounds. First, alt-\\nhough the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs discovered\\nthe factual basis for the new counts over a year after filing the\\ninitial complaint, it also noted that they took an additional\\nfour months thereafter to seek leave to amend. During that\\nintervening period, the parties had submitted and briefed\\ntheir motions for summary judgment, and the trial date was\\nfast approaching. It found their petition untimely. Second, the\\ndistrict court determined that the new claims were futile un-\\nder both statutes' advance-notice requirements.\\n The plaintiffs immediately appealed. Several months after\\nthe judgment, the clerk of the district court imposed costs on\\nthe Liebharts in the amount of $46,320.02. The Liebharts sep-\\narately appealed that decision. We consolidated the two ap-\\npeals and now consider them together.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n The Liebharts raise five issues for our consideration. First,\\nthey argue that the district court erred in excluding the opin-\\nions of expert witnesses Woodyard in full and Carpenter in\\npart. As part of that argument, they allege that the district\\ncourt failed to apply the same stringent standard to the de-\\nfendants’ expert Keenan. Second, they contend that summary\\njudgment was inappropriate because, even absent the testi-\\nmony of their expert witnesses, they submitted adequate pho-\\ntographic and scientific evidence to state a valid claim under\\nRCRA and TSCA. Third, they challenge the district court’s de-\\nnial of injunctive relief in light of deficiencies they have iden-\\ntified in SPX’s state-approved clean-up plan. Fourth, they ar-\\ngue that the district court abused its discretion in denying\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nleave to amend their complaint. Finally, they challenge the\\nimposition of costs.\\n But there’s a larger issue looming in the background. The\\ndistrict court’s opinion operates under the assumption that\\nRCRA plaintiffs must demonstrate “an imminent and sub-\\nstantial danger with evidence of health problems they have\\nalready suffered.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *6. Relying\\nprimarily on Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C.\\n1996), the district court set a high bar for RCRA plaintiffs,\\nholding that “it doesn’t follow necessarily that there is an im-\\nminent and substantial risk of harm simply because there is\\nsome amount of PCBs on the property.” Liebhart 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *5. We review that question of law, which was the\\nunderlying basis for the award of summary judgment, de\\nnovo. Daugherty v. Harrington, 906 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n A. RCRA Requires Only that Harm “May” Be Imminent\\n The question of how much harm a plaintiff must prove to\\nmake out a prima facie violation of RCRA has led to much dis-\\ncussion among the circuits. We have yet to tackle that issue\\nhead on, so the district court necessarily had to look else-\\nwhere for guidance. Passed in 1976, “RCRA is a comprehen-\\nsive environmental statute that empowers [the] EPA to regu-\\nlate hazardous wastes from cradle to grave.” City of Chicago v.\\nEnvtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). The statute’s “pri-\\nmary purpose … is to reduce the generation of hazardous\\nwaste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and dis-\\nposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, ‘so as to\\nminimize the present and future threat to human health and\\nthe environment.’” Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479,\\n483 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 9\\n\\n Although the EPA has the primary responsibility for en-\\nforcing the law, the statute, “like other environmental laws,\\n… contains a citizen suit provision, § 6972, which permits pri-\\nvate citizens to enforce its provisions in some circumstances.”\\nId. at 484. As relevant to this case, the statute provides that\\n any person may commence a civil action on his own\\n behalf … against any person, … including … any\\n past or present owner or operator of a treatment,\\n storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or\\n who is contributing to the past or present handling,\\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any\\n solid or hazardous waste which may present an im-\\n minent and substantial endangerment to health or\\n the environment.\\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Notably, Con-\\ngress amended the language in 1980 by substituting the\\nphrase “may present” for the original 1976 wording “is pre-\\nsenting.” Maine People’s All. and Nat. Res. Def. Council v.\\nMallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Solid\\nWaste Disposal Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–482, § 25, 94 Stat. 2334,\\n2348). The section authorizes district courts to grant injunctive\\nrelief and “order [a violator] to take such other action as may\\nbe necessary” to remediate the endangerment. Id.; see also Me-\\nghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (“Under a plain reading of this remedial\\nscheme, a private citizen suing under § 6972(a)(1)(B) could\\nseek a mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible\\nparty to ‘take action’ by attending to the cleanup and proper\\ndisposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one\\nthat ‘restrains’ a responsible party from further violating\\nRCRA.”); Avondale Fed. Sav. Bank v. Amoco Oil Co., 170 F.3d\\n692, 694 (7th Cir. 1999).\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n The critical question in this case is how to determine\\nwhether alleged contamination “may present an imminent\\nand substantial endangerment to health.” § 6972(a)(1)(b). We\\ntouched on this question only briefly in Albany Bank & Trust\\nCo. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2002).\\nThere, we first outlined the elements of a prima facie RCRA\\nclaim: “a plaintiff must allege (1) that the defendant has gen-\\nerated solid or hazardous waste, (2) that the defendant is con-\\ntributing to or has contributed to the handling of this waste,\\nand (3) that this waste may present an imminent and substan-\\ntial danger to health or the environment.” Id. (citing Cox v.\\nCity of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 2001)). We then ob-\\nserved, interpreting the final element, that “[i]mminence does\\nnot require an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\nharm.” Id. (citing Cox, 256 F.3d at 299). That is the extent of\\nour circuit precedent on the “may present” language con-\\ntained in § 6972(a)(1)(B).\\n But our sister circuits have engaged with this question in\\ngreat depth. In the first major case interpreting the provision,\\nthe Third Circuit emphasized that the statute “enhanced the\\ncourts’ traditional equitable powers by authorizing the issu-\\nance of injunctions when there is but a risk of harm, a more\\nlenient standard than the traditional requirement of threat-\\nened irreparable harm.” United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204,\\n211 (3d Cir. 1982). The court found the statutory language\\n“unequivocal,” demonstrating that Congress “intended to\\nconfer upon the courts the authority to grant affirmative eq-\\nuitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate” the risks\\nposed by toxic waste. Id. at 213–14.\\n In the subsequent decades, several other circuits adopted\\nand further developed the same interpretation of § 6972. See\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 11\\n\\nMallinckrodt, 471 F.3d at 277; Dague v. City of Burlington, 935\\nF.2d 1343, 1355–56 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds,\\n502 U.S. 1071 (1992); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l,\\nInc., 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Waste Indus.,\\nInc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument\\nthat “[§ 6972] was designed to control pollution only in emer-\\ngency situations”); Cox, 256 F.3d at 299–301; Price v. United\\nStates Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994); Burlington N.\\nand Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1019–22 (10th Cir.\\n2007); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1014–\\n15 (11th Cir. 2004). We now join those courts and explicitly\\nembrace the core content of their interpretation.\\n The district court therefore used an incorrect legal stand-\\nard to evaluate the Liebharts’ argument that PCBs from the\\ndemolition may present an imminent and substantial danger\\nto their health and that of their tenants. It did not cite any of\\nthe cases we listed above, but instead relied on a single district\\ncourt decision from a circuit that has not yet addressed the\\nissue. See Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *5 (quoting Foster, 922\\nF. Supp. at 662 (“While there can be no question that the levels\\nof contamination present at the Site may warrant future re-\\nsponse action, the plaintiff cannot establish either a current\\nrisk of substantial or serious threatened harm, or some neces-\\nsity for action.”)).\\n That error undercuts several of the reasons the district\\ncourt gave for rejecting the Liebharts’ RCRA claim. For exam-\\nple, the district court cursorily adopted a passing statement\\nwe made over twenty-five years ago that “[t]he [EPA’s] ac-\\ncepted safe level of PCBs in the environment is fifty parts per\\nmillion,” id. (quoting Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nServ., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1994)), to create a require-\\nment that the Liebharts show that PCB contamination on their\\nproperty met that threshold. But there is no requirement in\\nRCRA for a plaintiff to make “a particular quantitative show-\\ning as a sine qua non for liability.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 260; see\\nalso Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. Only one circuit has come to an\\narguably contrary conclusion. In Price v. United States Navy,\\n818 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (S.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d 39 F.3d 1011 (9th\\nCir. 1994), the district court required RCRA plaintiffs to show\\nthat “the level of contaminants [was] above levels that are con-\\nsidered acceptable by the State.” But as the Interfaith court\\nnoted, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion affirming the district\\ncourt’s judgment did not discuss that requirement. RCRA\\ndoes not require that plaintiffs demonstrate contamination\\nabove some agency-derived threshold level of concentration.\\n399 F.3d at 260–61. It merely requires that they show that con-\\ntaminants on the property are seriously dangerous to human\\nhealth (or will be, given prolonged exposure over time). See\\nCox, 256 F.3d at 299–300 (“an endangerment is ‘substantial’ if\\nit is ‘serious’” (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019)).\\n That’s especially true when the standard is taken out of\\ncontext. The district court relied on Cincinnati Ins. Co. to sup-\\nport its contention that contamination below the threshold\\nlevel of fifty parts per million (“ppm”) does not qualify as a\\nregulatory violation, thereby contradicting Woodyard’s opin-\\nion regarding safe levels of PCBs and providing the grounds\\nfor excluding it. In that case, we evaluated whether an insur-\\nance company was required to indemnify its insured for dam-\\nages arising out of PCB contamination at an industrial site.\\nThe EPA had identified the insured as potentially liable under\\nthe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,\\nand Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 13\\n\\nthat context, we noted that the contaminated site contained\\nPCBs concentrated at levels up to 58,000 ppm, well above the\\nEPA’s general regulatory threshold of fifty ppm. 40 F.3d at 148\\n(citing 40 C.F.R. § 761.60).\\n But that regulation, still in effect today, identifies indus-\\ntrial equipment and other wastes contaminated at levels\\nabove fifty ppm and requires special procedures for their stor-\\nage and disposal. It does not unequivocally state that PCBs\\nconcentrated at levels lower than fifty ppm are safe for human\\nexposure. Neither Cincinnati Ins. Co. nor the EPA regulation\\nstand for the proposition that PCBs concentrated at forty-nine\\nppm on residential property do not present a substantial endan-\\ngerment to the health of the residents. That is especially ap-\\nparent when we consider that the same set of regulations dis-\\ntinguishes between low and high-occupancy areas and re-\\nquires that, in high-occupancy areas, bulk PCB remediation\\nwaste, such as soil, be cleaned up to levels of concentration at\\nor below one ppm. § 761.61(a)(4)(i)(A). Section 761.3 confirms\\nthat the term “high-occupancy area” includes residences. See\\nalso § 761.123 (regulating spills of PCBs concentrated at fifty\\nppm or greater but emphasizing that “[t]he concentration of\\nPCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concentration in the\\nmaterial spilled as opposed to the concentration of PCBs in\\nthe material onto which the PCBs were spilled”). “Proof of\\ncontamination in excess of [agency] standards may support a\\nfinding of liability, and may alone suffice for liability in some\\ncases, but its required use is without justification in the stat-\\nute.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 261.\\n This is not to say that all the plaintiffs must do is to show\\nsome bit of soil on their property that tests positive for PCBs\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nabove one ppm (or even above the purported lower Wiscon-\\nsin DNR standard, which the defendants seem to have\\nacknowledged in their state-approved clean-up plan). Of\\ncourse, there must be accompanying evidence that establishes\\nsome connection between the existing contaminants and\\nsome imminent and substantial endangerment to health. 1 But\\nthe Liebharts attempted to provide such evidence, and the\\ndistrict court held the bar higher than necessary under\\nRCRA’s standard. In criticizing expert witness Carpenter’s\\nstatement that “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that\\ndoes not increase the risk of disease,” the district court re-\\njected Carpenter’s citation to studies showing the general\\nrisks of PCB exposure because “the Liebharts do not cite any\\nevidence that they have been exposed to PCBs.” Liebhart, 2018\\nWL 1583296 at *5. Moreover, the district court concluded that\\n“[t]he Liebharts do not contend that they can prove an immi-\\nnent and substantial danger with evidence of health problems\\nthey have already suffered.” Id. at *6.\\n As we noted in Albany Bank, “[i]mminence does not re-\\nquire an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\n\\n\\n 1 On appeal, the Liebharts contend that there is no separate require-\\nment for expert witness testimony because the photos and videos they\\nhave submitted into evidence suffice to prove their RCRA claim. The de-\\nfendants push back on that argument, insisting that many of the issues are\\nbeyond the competence of lay fact-finders and require the assistance of\\nexperts to address. See, e.g., C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827,\\n838 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Given the complex nature of this case, … [and w]ith\\nno experts to prove causation … the appellants cannot prove their toxic-\\ntort case under [state] law.”) Because the district court did not make a fac-\\ntual finding as to whether this case is sufficient complex to require expert\\ntestimony, and because we remand for reconsideration of a separate legal\\nissue, we need not reach that question today.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 15\\n\\nharm.” 310 F.3d at 973. Although the Supreme Court has in-\\nstructed that “[a]n endangerment can only be ‘imminent’ if it\\n‘threaten[s] to occur immediately,’” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485\\n(quoting Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary of English Language\\n1245 (2d ed. 1934)), it qualified that statement when it approv-\\ningly quoted the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the statu-\\ntory term “implies that there must be a threat which is present\\nnow, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until\\nlater.” Id. at 486 (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019).\\nWe take that to mean that the Liebharts must show that there\\nare PCBs currently on the property that have the potential to\\nsubstantially threaten their health at some point in the future\\nif they continue to occupy the premises and prolong their ex-\\nposure. On remand, the district court should reevaluate its ex-\\nclusion of Dr. Carpenter’s assertion regarding PCB safety un-\\nder the standards we have outlined above and determine\\nwhether, if admissible, the report demonstrates that a sub-\\nstantial and imminent threat to the Liebharts’ health may be\\npresent.\\n B. TSCA Likewise Requires No Heightened Showing\\n TSCA authorizes a separate, private cause of action allow-\\ning “any person [to] commence a civil action … against any\\nperson … who is alleged to be in violation of … any rule\\npromulgated under” the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1). The EPA\\npromulgated the PCB regulations in question pursuant to\\nstatutory authority under TSCA, designating PCBs as “haz-\\nardous waste” and controlling their manufacture, use, stor-\\nage, and disposal. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 761. The Liebharts’ TSCA\\nclaim alleged that the defendants violated those regulations,\\nthereby authorizing the district court to “restrain [the] viola-\\ntion.” § 2619(a). Unlike RCRA, which authorizes mandatory\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\ninjunctions to compel remediation of previous violations,\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions to stop ongoing\\nviolations. Id. The defendants argued that there was no longer\\nan ongoing violation, as demolition was complete by the time\\nthe Liebharts filed their claim. 2\\n The purported violation was based on 40 C.F.R. § 761.123,\\nwhich, as we noted above, regulates “spills” of PCB materials\\nconcentrated at levels above fifty ppm. The district court cor-\\nrectly noted that the Liebharts had not shown any evidence\\nthat any PCBs had been “spilled” onto their property (by\\nmeans of dust migration) at that level of concentration, and it\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on that basis.\\n But the district court seems to have overlooked the follow-\\ning sentence in the regulation, which directs that “[t]he con-\\ncentration of PCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concen-\\ntration in the material spilled as opposed to the concentration\\nof the material onto which the PCBs were spilled.” Id. The\\nLiebharts’ complaint seems to have alleged that the concrete\\nfloor of the factory, which contained at least some contami-\\nnated areas above the fifty-ppm threshold, was demolished\\nand “spilled” onto the Liebharts’ property. By the plain text\\nof the regulation, there is no need to show that contaminants\\non the Liebharts’ property are themselves concentrated above\\nfifty ppm so long as the original material that was the source\\nof that spill met the criteria. On remand, the district court may\\nagain determine that there is no ongoing violation, but it must\\n\\n 2 The district court determined that the Liebharts waived this claim\\nby failing to engage the defendants’ argument that there was no “ongoing\\nviolation.” But the court chose to analyze the merits of the claim regardless\\nof waiver and reached its conclusion on an alternative basis. We likewise\\nset aside the issue of waiver to reach the district court’s merits analysis.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 17\\n\\nfirst determine whether the alleged violation comes within\\nthe meaning of § 761.123 in the first place.\\n C. The District Court Should Reconsider the Remaining Issues\\non Remand\\n Now that we have clarified the standard the plaintiffs\\nmust meet, we turn to the remaining procedural issues the\\nLiebharts have asked to us to address.\\n 1. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding\\nWoodyard’s Testimony\\n “The summary-judgment decision here turned [in large\\npart] on the district court’s conclusion that [the] expert testi-\\nmony was inadmissible. Whether the district court applied\\nthe appropriate legal framework for evaluating expert testi-\\nmony is reviewed de novo, but the court’s choice of relevant\\nfactors within that framework and its ultimate conclusion as\\nto admissibility are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Lees v.\\nCarthage College, 714 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 2013). When a dis-\\ntrict court is “[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testi-\\nmony … the trial judge must determine at the outset …\\nwhether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific\\nknowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or\\ndetermine a fact in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,\\n509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). “The trial court must have … latitude\\nin deciding how to test an expert’s reliability.” Kumho Tire Co.,\\nLtd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).\\n The district court was well within its discretion to exclude\\nthe proffered testimony of expert witness Woodyard. Beyond\\nthe problem that the plaintiffs seemed to have waived this is-\\nsue in the district court by failing to engage with the defend-\\nants’ arguments in their motion to strike the testimony,\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nWoodyard’s analysis suffers from a critical flaw that stems\\nfrom the way in which the parties have framed this lawsuit.\\nThe district court briefly noted in its opinion that “both sides\\nassume that none of the defendants can be held liable for any\\nPCB contamination on the Liebharts’ property that occurred\\nbefore the demolition began, so the court will make the same\\nassumption.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *1. That’s a curious\\nchoice. RCRA permits the Liebharts to obtain injunctive relief\\nfrom the owner of the facility for any cognizable contamina-\\ntion, regardless of whether the PCBs migrated onto their\\nproperty before or after the demolition occurred. See 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (authorizing suit against “any person … who\\nhas contributed … to the past or present handling … or dis-\\nposal” of hazardous waste); see also Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486\\n(“RCRA contains no statute of limitations.”).\\n But because the Liebharts restricted their claims to PCBs\\nthat allegedly migrated onto their property via the dust from\\nthe 2015 demolition, they necessarily excluded claims result-\\ning from PCBs that may have gotten onto their property dur-\\ning the previous century. The district court correctly noted\\nthat Woodyard’s expert opinion could not distinguish be-\\ntween these two alternatives, as both sets of contaminants\\noriginated from the same source. There was even evidence\\nshowing that PCBs existed in the soil beneath the Liebharts’\\nasphalt driveway—Woodyard could not explain how that\\nmight have occurred as the result of dust blowing in the wind\\nas opposed to seepage over the course of years before any\\ndemolition occurred.\\n Perhaps the Liebharts decided to frame their claims in this\\nway because they wanted to go after defendants TRC and\\nApollo, who would not be liable for what happened before\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 19\\n\\ndemolition. Or perhaps some element of their state-law\\nclaims, which we have not addressed, required them to con-\\nstrict the scope. They did not explain their reasoning to us (or\\nit seems, to the district court). But the distinction makes it dif-\\nficult for Woodyard to make his case, given that he did not\\n“adequately account[] for obvious alternative explanations.”\\nGopalratnam v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 787 (7th Cir.\\n2017). Viewed in this light, the district court was within its\\ndiscretion to exclude the testimony as unreliable and unhelp-\\nful to the trier of fact. The district court may choose to rethink\\nthat evaluation on remand under the legal standards we out-\\nlined above, but it may well reach the same conclusion.\\n 2. The District Court Should Reconsider Its Denial of Injunctive\\nRelief\\n The district court denied injunctive relief to the Liebharts\\nbecause the defendants had already agreed to a clean-up plan\\nthat had been approved by the Wisconsin DNR. We review\\nthat decision for an abuse of discretion. See AMI Int’l, Inc. v.\\nDatacard Corp. 106 F.3d 1342, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997) (remanding\\ngrant of RCRA injunction).\\n As we mentioned above, RCRA authorizes district courts\\nto issue either mandatory or prohibitory injunctions, while\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions. “[I]t is appro-\\npriate ‘to give great deference to the district court’s decision\\nas to the precise equitable relief necessary in a particular\\ncase.’” Bowes v. Ind. Sec. of State, 837 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (quoting Gjersten v. Bd. Of Election Com’rs for City of Chi-\\ncago, 791 F.2d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1986)). That is especially true\\nwhen a plaintiff requests a mandatory injunction, which “im-\\nposes significant burdens on the defendant and requires care-\\nful consideration of the intrusiveness of the ordered act, as\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nwell as the difficulties that may be encountered in supervising\\nthe enjoined party’s compliance with the court’s order.” Kart-\\nman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir.\\n2011).\\n Considering SPX’s decision to formulate a clean-up plan\\nand obtain approval from the state agency, the district court\\ndetermined that there was no need for separate, federally-su-\\npervised remediation. It reached that conclusion even while\\nassuming that the defendants were in violation of either\\nRCRA or TSCA, despite the fact it found no such violation.\\nOther courts have determined that the existence of a parallel\\nplan of remediation supervised by the state does not neces-\\nsarily prevent a federal district court from granting an injunc-\\ntion if it finds the state agency’s actions to be insufficient to\\nremedy the violation of federal law. See, e.g., Interfaith, 399\\nF.3d at 264–68. On the other hand, the same courts have also\\nupheld denials of injunctions in similar situations when the\\ndistrict court finds that the parallel plan is adequate to the\\ntask. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735\\nF.3d 131, 139–40 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Interfaith). We\\nrecently reached the same conclusion. See LAJIM, LLC v. Gen.\\nElec. Co., No. 18-1522, 2019 WL 1011021, at *4–11 (7th Cir. Mar.\\n4, 2019) (“[T]he district court correctly held that it has discre-\\ntion to award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not re-\\nquired to order relief after a finding of liability,” particularly\\nin light of ongoing relief supervised by a state environmental\\nagency).\\n Here, the district court determined that SPX’s existing\\nplan was sufficient and that the Liebharts had not “iden-\\ntif[ied] any way that SPX’s plan [was] deficient or violate[d]\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 21\\n\\nfederal law.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *7. We agree. Alt-\\nhough the Liebharts point to certain statistical sampling re-\\nquirements outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 761.125 and contend that\\nSPX’s existing plan fails to meet those requirements, the dis-\\ntrict court noted that SPX’s plan includes further sampling of\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ property. It emphasized that “the\\nLiebharts do not otherwise explain why SPX’s proposed sam-\\npling scheme is substantively inadequate.” Liebhart, 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *7. We see no evidence that compels us to contra-\\ndict that factual finding.\\n However, in light of the legal standards we outlined\\nabove, we ask the district court to reconsider its decision to\\ndeny injunctive relief on remand. Because the bar for estab-\\nlishing an imminent and substantial danger is lower than the\\ndistrict court believed when evaluating the request for an in-\\njunction, it would be prudent to reassess whether the DNR-\\napproved plan adequately remedies harms that may come\\nwithin RCRA’s scope. See LAJIM, 2019 WL 1011021 at *6\\n(“[O]nce a court finds a defendant liable for creating a risk of\\nimminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the case\\nthat injunctive relief is warranted. But that is not always the\\ncase.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).\\n 3. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying\\nLeave to Amend the Complaint.\\n We review a denial of leave to amend a complaint for\\nabuse of discretion. Life Plans, Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co.,\\n800 F.3d 343, 357 (7th Cir. 2015). District courts are to “freely\\ngive leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 15(a)(2). “The Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to\\nrequire a district court to allow amendment unless there is a\\ngood reason—futility, undue delay, undue prejudice, or bad\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nfaith—for denying leave to amend.” Life Plans, 800 F.3d at 357\\n(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The district\\ncourt in this case identified two of those grounds as bases for\\ndenial: futility and undue delay. While we disagree with the\\nfutility analysis, we concur with the finding of undue delay\\nand decline to reverse.\\n We begin with the question of futility. Both statutes con-\\ntain advance-notice requirements that citizen plaintiffs must\\nobserve prior to filing RCRA or TSCA suits. They require\\nthose plaintiffs to notify the EPA 60–90 days in advance of fil-\\ning the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2); 15 U.S.C.\\n§ 2619(b)(1)(A). But the district court chose to apply the re-\\nquirements not only to the filing of the complaint, but also to\\nany subsequent amendments that sought to add new RCRA\\nor TSCA counts. Although the Liebharts complied with the\\nrequirements prior to filing their original complaint in April\\n2016, they gave no new notice to the EPA before filing for\\nleave to amend in February 2018. The district court held that,\\nbecause the prior notice did not contain any mention of bur-\\nied PCBs on the SPX property, it was insufficient to alert the\\nEPA to the particular violation the Liebharts sought to include\\nin the amended complaint.\\n The notice provisions serve two purposes. “First, notice al-\\nlows Government agencies to take responsibility for enforc-\\ning environmental regulations, thus obviating the need for\\ncitizen suits. … Second, notice gives the alleged violator ‘an\\nopportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the\\nAct[s] and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit.’”\\nHallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (quoting\\nGwaltney of Smithfield, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 23\\n\\nU.S. 49, 60 (1987)). The district court’s decision to require no-\\ntice for an amendment to a complaint fulfilled neither pur-\\npose. By the time the Liebharts attempted to amend their com-\\nplaint, the EPA had been on notice of alleged PCB contamina-\\ntion at the SPX property for over two years—and it had de-\\nclined to get involved. Moreover, it was unlikely that the de-\\nfendants would resolve the alleged violation to avoid being\\nsued when they were already in the midst of an extended law-\\nsuit with the same plaintiffs. See AM Int’l, 106 F.3d at 1351\\n(“[T]he delay period is designed to allow a [defendant] a pe-\\nriod in which to clean up its act and avoid litigation. [This de-\\nfendant] was clearly not interested in using the delay period\\nto resolve the dispute without going to court.”); see also Dague,\\n935 F.2d at 1351 (“There is no need to maintain a window of\\nopportunity for the government to take the lead enforcement\\nrole … when a citizen, acting as a private attorney general, has\\nalready lawfully assumed the lead role in bringing a … claim\\nagainst the same facility.”) (quoting Dague v. City of Burling-\\nton, 733 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D. Vt. 1990)). When the original notice\\nis “sufficiently specific to inform the alleged violator [and the\\nagency] about what it is doing wrong, so that it will know\\nwhat corrective actions will avert a lawsuit,” Atl. States Legal\\nFound., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir.\\n1994), there is no need to require a second round of advance\\nnotice for an amended complaint in the same litigation.\\n But an error in the futility analysis alone does not neces-\\nsarily constitute an abuse of discretion on the whole. In addi-\\ntion to futility, the district court cited undue delay and preju-\\ndice in its decision to deny leave to amend. “[D]elay by itself\\nis normally an insufficient reason to deny a motion for leave\\nto amend. Delay must be coupled with some other reason.\\nTypically, that reason … is prejudice to the non-moving\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nparty.” Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 793\\n(7th Cir. 2004). The district court cited the Liebharts’ admis-\\nsion that they learned of the possible burial of contaminated\\nconcrete on the SPX property on October 11, 2017 but failed\\nto seek leave to amend their complaint until February 22,\\n2018. During that more than four-month period, the parties\\nsubmitted and briefed their cross-motions for summary judg-\\nment, and by February, trial was only three months away. The\\nLiebharts provided no justification for their delay.\\n In response, the Liebharts contend that there was no un-\\ndue prejudice to the defendants: by the time they filed their\\nmotion, five weeks of discovery still remained. We disagree.\\nWhile the district court’s explanation of prejudice was fairly\\nshort, even if the district court had failed to articulate a find-\\ning of prejudice altogether, we might still “affirm providing\\nthat ‘the prejudice that would result from such amendment\\nwas apparent.’” Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 613 (7th\\nCir. 2002) (quoting Feldman v. Am. Mem’l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d\\n783, 793 (7th Cir. 1999)). In Park, the plaintiff waited six\\nmonths to move for leave to amend a complaint after she\\nknew (or should have known) of the additional alleged viola-\\ntion. Id. Because trial was approaching, we concluded that the\\ndistrict court was well within its discretion to deny leave. Id.;\\nsee also Perrian v. O’Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194–95 (7th Cir. 1992)\\n(“Because substantive amendments shortly before trial serve\\nto defeat the public’s interest in speedy resolution of legal dis-\\nputes, ‘[a] district court judge is entitled, in such circum-\\nstances, to refuse to allow a plaintiff’s amendment.’” (quoting\\nCampbell v. Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co., 893 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir.\\n1990)) (internal citation omitted)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 25\\n\\n On the contrary, in Life Plans, we found no undue delay\\nwhen a plaintiff promptly moved to amend its complaint just\\nten days after learning of the factual basis for its new count\\nduring discovery. 800 F.3d at 358. The Liebharts delayed more\\nthan four months in the same circumstances. Although dis-\\ncovery was ongoing at the time of the Liebharts’ motion, the\\nparties had already briefed their dispositive motions, and the\\ndistrict court was preparing its summary-judgment order that\\nwould ultimately dispose of the case. We therefore cannot say\\nthat denial of leave for undue delay and prejudice was an\\nabuse of the district court’s discretion. Of course, the district\\ncourt may permit an amendment on remand if the interests of\\njustice so require.\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n Although the district court properly exercised its discre-\\ntion on the various evidentiary and procedural issues the\\nplaintiffs have raised, its analysis on the merits was narrower\\nthan the statutes demand. It may reach the same conclusions\\non reconsideration, but the parties should have another op-\\nportunity to litigate whether a substantial and imminent en-\\ndangerment to health exists in this case under the standards\\nwe have outlined. We therefore VACATE the order of the dis-\\ntrict court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent\\nwith this opinion. 3\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 The Liebharts also challenge the taxation of costs against them by the\\n\\nclerk of the district court. Because we vacate the district court’s judgment,\\nwe assume that the imposition of costs is automatically vacated and so do\\nnot reach that issue. The clerk of the district court is free to reassess costs\\non remand as the case proceeds.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1167,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4597290,"string":"4,597,290"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Jesus Salgado"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2194"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐2194 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nJESUS SALGADO, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 16‐cr‐00394‐2 — John Robert Blakey, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 4, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Jesus Salgado pleaded guilty to con‐\\nspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. At sentenc‐\\ning, over Salgado’s objection, the district court applied an ag‐\\ngravating role enhancement and calculated the Guidelines \\nrange to be 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. The court sen‐\\ntenced Salgado below that range, to 192 months’ imprison‐\\nment. It explained, however, that even if it were wrong on the \\n\\f2 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\nenhancement’s application, it would have imposed the same \\nsentence. Salgado appeals, challenging the district court’s ap‐\\nplication of the aggravating role enhancement and the sub‐\\nstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm. \\n I. Background \\n Beginning in 2015 or earlier, Salgado conspired with Lo‐\\nrenzo Salgado (his father), Ruby Joy Buenaventura, Jose Luis \\nRivera, Jr., and others to distribute heroin. As part of the con‐\\nspiracy, Salgado used a stash house in Bensenville, Illinois to \\nreceive and store narcotics. Salgado’s father, who lived in \\nMexico, was the leader of the drug trafficking organization. \\n Salgado was arrested in August 2016, after which a federal \\ngrand jury indicted him on several heroin‐related charges. See \\n21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Salgado pleaded guilty to conspir‐\\nacy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. Before sentenc‐\\ning, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investi‐\\ngation Report (“PSR”), relying on, among other things, the \\ngovernment’s version of events, Rivera’s grand jury testi‐\\nmony, and statements from a DEA Special Agent. \\n The PSR recommended an aggravating role enhancement \\nunder § 3B1.1(b), reasoning that Salgado, though subordinate \\nto his father, “directed and controlled” Buenaventura and Ri‐\\nvera and was the Chicago‐based leader of the conspiracy. Sal‐\\ngado objected to the enhancement in a presentencing memo‐\\nrandum and also at sentencing on the primary basis that his \\nfather ran the drug organization. According to Salgado, he \\nhad “no decision making authority, acted solely at the direc‐\\ntion of [his father] … did not arrange the importation of the \\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 3\\n\\ndrugs, and did not set any of the price or quantity terms.” Sal‐\\ngado argued that the government had failed to prove other‐\\nwise by a preponderance of the evidence. \\n At sentencing, the district court asked the parties if they \\nhad any corrections to the PSR. Both parties said no. The dis‐\\ntrict court heard argument on the disputed enhancement un‐\\nder § 3B1.1(b), which provides for a three‐level enhancement \\nif the defendant “was a manager or supervisor (but not an or‐\\nganizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or \\nmore participants … .” The court applied the enhancement, \\nexplaining that based on the “undisputed portions of the fac‐\\ntual record” there were at least five participants to the con‐\\nspiracy, and that Salgado’s “role as the supervisor is clear \\nfrom the materials that are not disputed.” The court did not \\nidentify any evidence in the record, nor did it make any spe‐\\ncific factual findings to support the enhancement. With the \\nenhancement applied, the district court calculated the Guide‐\\nlines range as 210 to 262 months in prison. \\n The court then heard argument on the appropriate sen‐\\ntence. Seeking a statutory minimum sentence of 120 months, \\nSalgado argued that his family, especially his father, pres‐\\nsured him into criminal activity. He also argued that the \\nGuidelines overstated his criminal history and role in the of‐\\nfense. For its part, the government emphasized the serious‐\\nness of the offense and disputed that the Guidelines over‐\\nstated Salgado’s criminal history or role in the offense. \\n The court discussed the § 3553 factors in detail. In impos‐\\ning sentence, the court initially explained that even if it erred \\nin applying the § 3B1.1(b) aggravating role enhancement, the \\nsentence would have been the same: \\n\\f4 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\n The court has considered the factors under 3553 to fashion \\n a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to \\n accomplish the purposes of sentencing. And having consid‐\\n ered those factors, the sentence I am about to impose would \\n be the same even if the guidelines were a little bit different. \\n Counsel’s made a variety of arguments regarding the calcu‐\\n lation. He’s made some arguments by way of 3553 factors, \\n other guideline objections, certainly in particular the … ag‐\\n gravating role. The Court has considered those arguments. \\n And while the aggravating role objection was overruled \\n and I believe the application was appropriate in this case, \\n the arguments made by your counsel were considered and \\n are reflected in the 3553 factors. So even if the guideline cal‐\\n culation was different, even if I made a mistake in the cal‐\\n culation with respect to the aggravating role, the guideline \\n sentence is going to not control the sentence here. What’s \\n going to control is the 3553 factors. So even if that calcula‐\\n tion should have been different, the ultimate sentence is go‐\\n ing to be the same either. \\nThe court touched on this point later in the hearing: \\n I’ve also considered your role in the offense. The enhance‐\\n ment was appropriate but not all defendants who are enti‐\\n tled or should have that enhancement are created equally \\n and your counsel made a lot of good arguments in that re‐\\n gard and I’ve considered them in fashioning a sentence un‐\\n der 3553 … . And while … I believe … the enhancement was \\n appropriately applied, that’s what 3553 is to for, to fashion \\n an individual sentence and that’s what I’ve tried to do. \\n The court explained its sentencing rationale, discussing \\nboth mitigating and aggravating factors in detail. Afterwards, \\nthe court asked defense counsel if it had considered all \\n“primary arguments in mitigation.” Counsel responded: \\n“You have, your Honor.” The court then imposed a below‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 5\\n\\nGuidelines sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment. The court \\nasked if either party wanted “any further elaboration of [its] \\nreasons under 3553.” Defense counsel responded: “No, your \\nHonor.” \\n II. Discussion \\n Salgado argues that the district court erred in applying the \\naggravating role enhancement and in not adequately consid‐\\nering all of his mitigation arguments. He also challenges the \\nsubstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We take these ar‐\\nguments in turn. \\nA. Procedural Reasonableness \\n We review procedural challenges to sentences de novo. \\nUnited States v. Griffith, 913 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2019). Our \\ntask is to “ensure that the district court committed no signifi‐\\ncant procedural error, such as incorrectly calculating the \\nguidelines range, failing to consider the section 3553(a) fac‐\\ntors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or \\nfailing to explain adequately the chosen sentence.” Id. (citing \\nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). \\n 1. Aggravating Role Enhancement \\n Salgado first argues that the district court failed to make \\nsufficient factual findings to support the enhancement. We \\nagree. Despite Salgado’s objection to the enhancement—\\ndetailed in a presentencing memorandum and argued at \\nsentencing—the district court made no factual findings to \\nsupport the enhancement. Instead, it vaguely referenced \\nsupposedly undisputed record items to support its decision \\nto apply the enhancement. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\n This is a problem, both because the district court’s cursory \\napplication of the enhancement precludes meaningful judicial \\nreview and because Salgado did, in fact, dispute the salient \\nfacts, including the extent of his supervision of others, the \\ngrand jury testimony of Rivera, and the role that his father \\nplayed. As we have said before, “it is not our role to justify a \\nsentence that lacks a sufficient explanation with our best \\nguess for why the court imposed the sentence that it did.” \\nUnited States v. Titus, 821 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n The district court’s procedural error, however, was harm‐\\nless under the circumstances. See United States v. Clark, 906 \\nF.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d \\n660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009). While we need not determine whether \\nthe enhancement in fact applies, the district court unambigu‐\\nously stated, with specific detail, that it would have—and \\nwhy it would have—imposed the same sentence under \\n§ 3553, even if it had erred in applying the enhancement. 560 \\nF.3d at 667; see also United States v. Shelton, 905 F.3d 1026, 1032 \\n(7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Rabiu, 721 F.3d 467, 471 (7th \\nCir. 2013). Put another way, whether or not the enhancement \\nshould have applied, the district court’s detailed explanation \\nmakes a remand pointless. \\n Salgado nevertheless argues that if the enhancement does \\nnot apply, the district court’s 192‐month sentence would be \\nabove, not below, the applicable Guideline range, making it \\ndifficult for this court to find harmless error. But the district \\ncourt provided the sort of detailed analysis under § 3553 that \\nwould sustain an above‐Guidelines sentence. And we rejected \\nthis type of reasoning in Abbas, where under similar circum‐\\nstances we found harmless error in light of the district court’s \\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 7\\n\\nunambiguous statements and its “detailed explanation for the \\nparallel result.” Abbas, 560 F.3d at 665–68. \\n 2. Mitigation Arguments \\n Salgado also argues that the district court procedurally \\nerred by failing to consider all of his mitigation arguments. \\nSalgado has waived this challenge. The district court, follow‐\\ning United States v. Garcia‐Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. \\n2013), asked defense counsel if it considered all of counsel’s \\nmitigation arguments, to which counsel responded affirma‐\\ntively. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court likewise \\nasked if counsel had “any legal objection to the sentence I \\nhave proposed or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\\nsons under 3553 both as to the term of imprisonment, the con‐\\ndition or terms of supervised release, or any other aspect of \\nthe sentencing.” Defense counsel responded in the negative. \\nThe challenge is thus waived.1 United States v. Tartareanu, 884 \\nF.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2018). \\nB. Substantive Reasonableness \\n Finally, Salgado challenges the substantive reasonable‐\\nness of his sentence, an issue we review for abuse of discre‐\\ntion. See United States v. Thompson, 864 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. \\n2017). In doing so, “we take into account that the sentencing \\n\\n \\n 1 \\n Regardless, Salgado forfeited his arguments by not objecting at sen‐\\ntencing, leaving us to review for plain error, which did not occur here. \\nUnited States v. Pankow, 884 F.3d 785, 791 (7th Cir. 2018). The district court \\nacknowledged and gave meaningful consideration to Salgado’s mitiga‐\\ntion arguments and the § 3553 factors. See United States v. Bustos, 912 F.3d \\n1059, 1063–64 (7th Cir. 2019). \\n \\n\\f8 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\njudge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their im‐\\nport under section 3553(a) in the individual case.” United \\nStates v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quo‐\\ntation marks and citation omitted). \\n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in im‐\\nposing a sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment, which is sub‐\\nstantively reasonable in light of the § 3553 factors. This is true \\nregardless of whether the sentence falls above, within or be‐\\nlow the Guideline range. See Abbas, 560 F.3d at 668. Like in \\nAbbas, the district court gave meaningful and thorough con‐\\nsideration to the pertinent factors to fashion a sentence that \\nmeets the statutory purpose of sentencing. The district court \\nconsidered multiple factors, including the seriousness and na‐\\nture of the offense and the family pressures that contributed \\nto Salgado’s participation in his father’s criminal enterprise. \\nAlthough Salgado may disagree with the district court’s \\nweighing of these factors, neither he nor the record offer any \\nsound reason to disturb the district court’s judgment. \\n III. Conclusion \\n We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4374543/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597290/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Jesus Salgado\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐2194 \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \n v. \n\nJESUS SALGADO, \n Defendant‐Appellant. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \n No. 16‐cr‐00394‐2 — John Robert Blakey, Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 4, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, \nCircuit Judges. \n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Jesus Salgado pleaded guilty to con‐\nspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. At sentenc‐\ning, over Salgado’s objection, the district court applied an ag‐\ngravating role enhancement and calculated the Guidelines \nrange to be 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. The court sen‐\ntenced Salgado below that range, to 192 months’ imprison‐\nment. It explained, however, that even if it were wrong on the \n\f2 No. 18‐2194 \n\nenhancement’s application, it would have imposed the same \nsentence. Salgado appeals, challenging the district court’s ap‐\nplication of the aggravating role enhancement and the sub‐\nstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm. \n I. Background \n Beginning in 2015 or earlier, Salgado conspired with Lo‐\nrenzo Salgado (his father), Ruby Joy Buenaventura, Jose Luis \nRivera, Jr., and others to distribute heroin. As part of the con‐\nspiracy, Salgado used a stash house in Bensenville, Illinois to \nreceive and store narcotics. Salgado’s father, who lived in \nMexico, was the leader of the drug trafficking organization. \n Salgado was arrested in August 2016, after which a federal \ngrand jury indicted him on several heroin‐related charges. See \n21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Salgado pleaded guilty to conspir‐\nacy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. Before sentenc‐\ning, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investi‐\ngation Report (“PSR”), relying on, among other things, the \ngovernment’s version of events, Rivera’s grand jury testi‐\nmony, and statements from a DEA Special Agent. \n The PSR recommended an aggravating role enhancement \nunder § 3B1.1(b), reasoning that Salgado, though subordinate \nto his father, “directed and controlled” Buenaventura and Ri‐\nvera and was the Chicago‐based leader of the conspiracy. Sal‐\ngado objected to the enhancement in a presentencing memo‐\nrandum and also at sentencing on the primary basis that his \nfather ran the drug organization. According to Salgado, he \nhad “no decision making authority, acted solely at the direc‐\ntion of [his father] … did not arrange the importation of the \n\fNo. 18‐2194 3\n\ndrugs, and did not set any of the price or quantity terms.” Sal‐\ngado argued that the government had failed to prove other‐\nwise by a preponderance of the evidence. \n At sentencing, the district court asked the parties if they \nhad any corrections to the PSR. Both parties said no. The dis‐\ntrict court heard argument on the disputed enhancement un‐\nder § 3B1.1(b), which provides for a three‐level enhancement \nif the defendant “was a manager or supervisor (but not an or‐\nganizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or \nmore participants … .” The court applied the enhancement, \nexplaining that based on the “undisputed portions of the fac‐\ntual record” there were at least five participants to the con‐\nspiracy, and that Salgado’s “role as the supervisor is clear \nfrom the materials that are not disputed.” The court did not \nidentify any evidence in the record, nor did it make any spe‐\ncific factual findings to support the enhancement. With the \nenhancement applied, the district court calculated the Guide‐\nlines range as 210 to 262 months in prison. \n The court then heard argument on the appropriate sen‐\ntence. Seeking a statutory minimum sentence of 120 months, \nSalgado argued that his family, especially his father, pres‐\nsured him into criminal activity. He also argued that the \nGuidelines overstated his criminal history and role in the of‐\nfense. For its part, the government emphasized the serious‐\nness of the offense and disputed that the Guidelines over‐\nstated Salgado’s criminal history or role in the offense. \n The court discussed the § 3553 factors in detail. In impos‐\ning sentence, the court initially explained that even if it erred \nin applying the § 3B1.1(b) aggravating role enhancement, the \nsentence would have been the same: \n\f4 No. 18‐2194 \n\n The court has considered the factors under 3553 to fashion \n a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to \n accomplish the purposes of sentencing. And having consid‐\n ered those factors, the sentence I am about to impose would \n be the same even if the guidelines were a little bit different. \n Counsel’s made a variety of arguments regarding the calcu‐\n lation. He’s made some arguments by way of 3553 factors, \n other guideline objections, certainly in particular the … ag‐\n gravating role. The Court has considered those arguments. \n And while the aggravating role objection was overruled \n and I believe the application was appropriate in this case, \n the arguments made by your counsel were considered and \n are reflected in the 3553 factors. So even if the guideline cal‐\n culation was different, even if I made a mistake in the cal‐\n culation with respect to the aggravating role, the guideline \n sentence is going to not control the sentence here. What’s \n going to control is the 3553 factors. So even if that calcula‐\n tion should have been different, the ultimate sentence is go‐\n ing to be the same either. \nThe court touched on this point later in the hearing: \n I’ve also considered your role in the offense. The enhance‐\n ment was appropriate but not all defendants who are enti‐\n tled or should have that enhancement are created equally \n and your counsel made a lot of good arguments in that re‐\n gard and I’ve considered them in fashioning a sentence un‐\n der 3553 … . And while … I believe … the enhancement was \n appropriately applied, that’s what 3553 is to for, to fashion \n an individual sentence and that’s what I’ve tried to do. \n The court explained its sentencing rationale, discussing \nboth mitigating and aggravating factors in detail. Afterwards, \nthe court asked defense counsel if it had considered all \n“primary arguments in mitigation.” Counsel responded: \n“You have, your Honor.” The court then imposed a below‐\n\fNo. 18‐2194 5\n\nGuidelines sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment. The court \nasked if either party wanted “any further elaboration of [its] \nreasons under 3553.” Defense counsel responded: “No, your \nHonor.” \n II. Discussion \n Salgado argues that the district court erred in applying the \naggravating role enhancement and in not adequately consid‐\nering all of his mitigation arguments. He also challenges the \nsubstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We take these ar‐\nguments in turn. \nA. Procedural Reasonableness \n We review procedural challenges to sentences de novo. \nUnited States v. Griffith, 913 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2019). Our \ntask is to “ensure that the district court committed no signifi‐\ncant procedural error, such as incorrectly calculating the \nguidelines range, failing to consider the section 3553(a) fac‐\ntors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or \nfailing to explain adequately the chosen sentence.” Id. (citing \nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). \n 1. Aggravating Role Enhancement \n Salgado first argues that the district court failed to make \nsufficient factual findings to support the enhancement. We \nagree. Despite Salgado’s objection to the enhancement—\ndetailed in a presentencing memorandum and argued at \nsentencing—the district court made no factual findings to \nsupport the enhancement. Instead, it vaguely referenced \nsupposedly undisputed record items to support its decision \nto apply the enhancement. \n\f6 No. 18‐2194 \n\n This is a problem, both because the district court’s cursory \napplication of the enhancement precludes meaningful judicial \nreview and because Salgado did, in fact, dispute the salient \nfacts, including the extent of his supervision of others, the \ngrand jury testimony of Rivera, and the role that his father \nplayed. As we have said before, “it is not our role to justify a \nsentence that lacks a sufficient explanation with our best \nguess for why the court imposed the sentence that it did.” \nUnited States v. Titus, 821 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2016). \n The district court’s procedural error, however, was harm‐\nless under the circumstances. See United States v. Clark, 906 \nF.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d \n660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009). While we need not determine whether \nthe enhancement in fact applies, the district court unambigu‐\nously stated, with specific detail, that it would have—and \nwhy it would have—imposed the same sentence under \n§ 3553, even if it had erred in applying the enhancement. 560 \nF.3d at 667; see also United States v. Shelton, 905 F.3d 1026, 1032 \n(7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Rabiu, 721 F.3d 467, 471 (7th \nCir. 2013). Put another way, whether or not the enhancement \nshould have applied, the district court’s detailed explanation \nmakes a remand pointless. \n Salgado nevertheless argues that if the enhancement does \nnot apply, the district court’s 192‐month sentence would be \nabove, not below, the applicable Guideline range, making it \ndifficult for this court to find harmless error. But the district \ncourt provided the sort of detailed analysis under § 3553 that \nwould sustain an above‐Guidelines sentence. And we rejected \nthis type of reasoning in Abbas, where under similar circum‐\nstances we found harmless error in light of the district court’s \n\fNo. 18‐2194 7\n\nunambiguous statements and its “detailed explanation for the \nparallel result.” Abbas, 560 F.3d at 665–68. \n 2. Mitigation Arguments \n Salgado also argues that the district court procedurally \nerred by failing to consider all of his mitigation arguments. \nSalgado has waived this challenge. The district court, follow‐\ning United States v. Garcia‐Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. \n2013), asked defense counsel if it considered all of counsel’s \nmitigation arguments, to which counsel responded affirma‐\ntively. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court likewise \nasked if counsel had “any legal objection to the sentence I \nhave proposed or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\nsons under 3553 both as to the term of imprisonment, the con‐\ndition or terms of supervised release, or any other aspect of \nthe sentencing.” Defense counsel responded in the negative. \nThe challenge is thus waived.1 United States v. Tartareanu, 884 \nF.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2018). \nB. Substantive Reasonableness \n Finally, Salgado challenges the substantive reasonable‐\nness of his sentence, an issue we review for abuse of discre‐\ntion. See United States v. Thompson, 864 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. \n2017). In doing so, “we take into account that the sentencing \n\n \n 1 \n Regardless, Salgado forfeited his arguments by not objecting at sen‐\ntencing, leaving us to review for plain error, which did not occur here. \nUnited States v. Pankow, 884 F.3d 785, 791 (7th Cir. 2018). The district court \nacknowledged and gave meaningful consideration to Salgado’s mitiga‐\ntion arguments and the § 3553 factors. See United States v. Bustos, 912 F.3d \n1059, 1063–64 (7th Cir. 2019). \n \n\f8 No. 18‐2194 \n\njudge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their im‐\nport under section 3553(a) in the individual case.” United \nStates v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quo‐\ntation marks and citation omitted). \n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in im‐\nposing a sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment, which is sub‐\nstantively reasonable in light of the § 3553 factors. This is true \nregardless of whether the sentence falls above, within or be‐\nlow the Guideline range. See Abbas, 560 F.3d at 668. Like in \nAbbas, the district court gave meaningful and thorough con‐\nsideration to the pertinent factors to fashion a sentence that \nmeets the statutory purpose of sentencing. The district court \nconsidered multiple factors, including the seriousness and na‐\nture of the offense and the family pressures that contributed \nto Salgado’s participation in his father’s criminal enterprise. \nAlthough Salgado may disagree with the district court’s \nweighing of these factors, neither he nor the record offer any \nsound reason to disturb the district court’s judgment. \n III. Conclusion \n We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Jesus Salgado\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐2194 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nJESUS SALGADO, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 16‐cr‐00394‐2 — John Robert Blakey, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 4, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Jesus Salgado pleaded guilty to con‐\\nspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. At sentenc‐\\ning, over Salgado’s objection, the district court applied an ag‐\\ngravating role enhancement and calculated the Guidelines \\nrange to be 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. The court sen‐\\ntenced Salgado below that range, to 192 months’ imprison‐\\nment. It explained, however, that even if it were wrong on the \\n\\f2 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\nenhancement’s application, it would have imposed the same \\nsentence. Salgado appeals, challenging the district court’s ap‐\\nplication of the aggravating role enhancement and the sub‐\\nstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm. \\n I. Background \\n Beginning in 2015 or earlier, Salgado conspired with Lo‐\\nrenzo Salgado (his father), Ruby Joy Buenaventura, Jose Luis \\nRivera, Jr., and others to distribute heroin. As part of the con‐\\nspiracy, Salgado used a stash house in Bensenville, Illinois to \\nreceive and store narcotics. Salgado’s father, who lived in \\nMexico, was the leader of the drug trafficking organization. \\n Salgado was arrested in August 2016, after which a federal \\ngrand jury indicted him on several heroin‐related charges. See \\n21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Salgado pleaded guilty to conspir‐\\nacy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. Before sentenc‐\\ning, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investi‐\\ngation Report (“PSR”), relying on, among other things, the \\ngovernment’s version of events, Rivera’s grand jury testi‐\\nmony, and statements from a DEA Special Agent. \\n The PSR recommended an aggravating role enhancement \\nunder § 3B1.1(b), reasoning that Salgado, though subordinate \\nto his father, “directed and controlled” Buenaventura and Ri‐\\nvera and was the Chicago‐based leader of the conspiracy. Sal‐\\ngado objected to the enhancement in a presentencing memo‐\\nrandum and also at sentencing on the primary basis that his \\nfather ran the drug organization. According to Salgado, he \\nhad “no decision making authority, acted solely at the direc‐\\ntion of [his father] … did not arrange the importation of the \\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 3\\n\\ndrugs, and did not set any of the price or quantity terms.” Sal‐\\ngado argued that the government had failed to prove other‐\\nwise by a preponderance of the evidence. \\n At sentencing, the district court asked the parties if they \\nhad any corrections to the PSR. Both parties said no. The dis‐\\ntrict court heard argument on the disputed enhancement un‐\\nder § 3B1.1(b), which provides for a three‐level enhancement \\nif the defendant “was a manager or supervisor (but not an or‐\\nganizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or \\nmore participants … .” The court applied the enhancement, \\nexplaining that based on the “undisputed portions of the fac‐\\ntual record” there were at least five participants to the con‐\\nspiracy, and that Salgado’s “role as the supervisor is clear \\nfrom the materials that are not disputed.” The court did not \\nidentify any evidence in the record, nor did it make any spe‐\\ncific factual findings to support the enhancement. With the \\nenhancement applied, the district court calculated the Guide‐\\nlines range as 210 to 262 months in prison. \\n The court then heard argument on the appropriate sen‐\\ntence. Seeking a statutory minimum sentence of 120 months, \\nSalgado argued that his family, especially his father, pres‐\\nsured him into criminal activity. He also argued that the \\nGuidelines overstated his criminal history and role in the of‐\\nfense. For its part, the government emphasized the serious‐\\nness of the offense and disputed that the Guidelines over‐\\nstated Salgado’s criminal history or role in the offense. \\n The court discussed the § 3553 factors in detail. In impos‐\\ning sentence, the court initially explained that even if it erred \\nin applying the § 3B1.1(b) aggravating role enhancement, the \\nsentence would have been the same: \\n\\f4 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\n The court has considered the factors under 3553 to fashion \\n a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to \\n accomplish the purposes of sentencing. And having consid‐\\n ered those factors, the sentence I am about to impose would \\n be the same even if the guidelines were a little bit different. \\n Counsel’s made a variety of arguments regarding the calcu‐\\n lation. He’s made some arguments by way of 3553 factors, \\n other guideline objections, certainly in particular the … ag‐\\n gravating role. The Court has considered those arguments. \\n And while the aggravating role objection was overruled \\n and I believe the application was appropriate in this case, \\n the arguments made by your counsel were considered and \\n are reflected in the 3553 factors. So even if the guideline cal‐\\n culation was different, even if I made a mistake in the cal‐\\n culation with respect to the aggravating role, the guideline \\n sentence is going to not control the sentence here. What’s \\n going to control is the 3553 factors. So even if that calcula‐\\n tion should have been different, the ultimate sentence is go‐\\n ing to be the same either. \\nThe court touched on this point later in the hearing: \\n I’ve also considered your role in the offense. The enhance‐\\n ment was appropriate but not all defendants who are enti‐\\n tled or should have that enhancement are created equally \\n and your counsel made a lot of good arguments in that re‐\\n gard and I’ve considered them in fashioning a sentence un‐\\n der 3553 … . And while … I believe … the enhancement was \\n appropriately applied, that’s what 3553 is to for, to fashion \\n an individual sentence and that’s what I’ve tried to do. \\n The court explained its sentencing rationale, discussing \\nboth mitigating and aggravating factors in detail. Afterwards, \\nthe court asked defense counsel if it had considered all \\n“primary arguments in mitigation.” Counsel responded: \\n“You have, your Honor.” The court then imposed a below‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 5\\n\\nGuidelines sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment. The court \\nasked if either party wanted “any further elaboration of [its] \\nreasons under 3553.” Defense counsel responded: “No, your \\nHonor.” \\n II. Discussion \\n Salgado argues that the district court erred in applying the \\naggravating role enhancement and in not adequately consid‐\\nering all of his mitigation arguments. He also challenges the \\nsubstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We take these ar‐\\nguments in turn. \\nA. Procedural Reasonableness \\n We review procedural challenges to sentences de novo. \\nUnited States v. Griffith, 913 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2019). Our \\ntask is to “ensure that the district court committed no signifi‐\\ncant procedural error, such as incorrectly calculating the \\nguidelines range, failing to consider the section 3553(a) fac‐\\ntors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or \\nfailing to explain adequately the chosen sentence.” Id. (citing \\nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). \\n 1. Aggravating Role Enhancement \\n Salgado first argues that the district court failed to make \\nsufficient factual findings to support the enhancement. We \\nagree. Despite Salgado’s objection to the enhancement—\\ndetailed in a presentencing memorandum and argued at \\nsentencing—the district court made no factual findings to \\nsupport the enhancement. Instead, it vaguely referenced \\nsupposedly undisputed record items to support its decision \\nto apply the enhancement. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\n This is a problem, both because the district court’s cursory \\napplication of the enhancement precludes meaningful judicial \\nreview and because Salgado did, in fact, dispute the salient \\nfacts, including the extent of his supervision of others, the \\ngrand jury testimony of Rivera, and the role that his father \\nplayed. As we have said before, “it is not our role to justify a \\nsentence that lacks a sufficient explanation with our best \\nguess for why the court imposed the sentence that it did.” \\nUnited States v. Titus, 821 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n The district court’s procedural error, however, was harm‐\\nless under the circumstances. See United States v. Clark, 906 \\nF.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d \\n660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009). While we need not determine whether \\nthe enhancement in fact applies, the district court unambigu‐\\nously stated, with specific detail, that it would have—and \\nwhy it would have—imposed the same sentence under \\n§ 3553, even if it had erred in applying the enhancement. 560 \\nF.3d at 667; see also United States v. Shelton, 905 F.3d 1026, 1032 \\n(7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Rabiu, 721 F.3d 467, 471 (7th \\nCir. 2013). Put another way, whether or not the enhancement \\nshould have applied, the district court’s detailed explanation \\nmakes a remand pointless. \\n Salgado nevertheless argues that if the enhancement does \\nnot apply, the district court’s 192‐month sentence would be \\nabove, not below, the applicable Guideline range, making it \\ndifficult for this court to find harmless error. But the district \\ncourt provided the sort of detailed analysis under § 3553 that \\nwould sustain an above‐Guidelines sentence. And we rejected \\nthis type of reasoning in Abbas, where under similar circum‐\\nstances we found harmless error in light of the district court’s \\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 7\\n\\nunambiguous statements and its “detailed explanation for the \\nparallel result.” Abbas, 560 F.3d at 665–68. \\n 2. Mitigation Arguments \\n Salgado also argues that the district court procedurally \\nerred by failing to consider all of his mitigation arguments. \\nSalgado has waived this challenge. The district court, follow‐\\ning United States v. Garcia‐Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. \\n2013), asked defense counsel if it considered all of counsel’s \\nmitigation arguments, to which counsel responded affirma‐\\ntively. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court likewise \\nasked if counsel had “any legal objection to the sentence I \\nhave proposed or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\\nsons under 3553 both as to the term of imprisonment, the con‐\\ndition or terms of supervised release, or any other aspect of \\nthe sentencing.” Defense counsel responded in the negative. \\nThe challenge is thus waived.1 United States v. Tartareanu, 884 \\nF.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2018). \\nB. Substantive Reasonableness \\n Finally, Salgado challenges the substantive reasonable‐\\nness of his sentence, an issue we review for abuse of discre‐\\ntion. See United States v. Thompson, 864 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. \\n2017). In doing so, “we take into account that the sentencing \\n\\n \\n 1 \\n Regardless, Salgado forfeited his arguments by not objecting at sen‐\\ntencing, leaving us to review for plain error, which did not occur here. \\nUnited States v. Pankow, 884 F.3d 785, 791 (7th Cir. 2018). The district court \\nacknowledged and gave meaningful consideration to Salgado’s mitiga‐\\ntion arguments and the § 3553 factors. See United States v. Bustos, 912 F.3d \\n1059, 1063–64 (7th Cir. 2019). \\n \\n\\f8 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\njudge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their im‐\\nport under section 3553(a) in the individual case.” United \\nStates v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quo‐\\ntation marks and citation omitted). \\n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in im‐\\nposing a sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment, which is sub‐\\nstantively reasonable in light of the § 3553 factors. This is true \\nregardless of whether the sentence falls above, within or be‐\\nlow the Guideline range. See Abbas, 560 F.3d at 668. Like in \\nAbbas, the district court gave meaningful and thorough con‐\\nsideration to the pertinent factors to fashion a sentence that \\nmeets the statutory purpose of sentencing. The district court \\nconsidered multiple factors, including the seriousness and na‐\\nture of the offense and the family pressures that contributed \\nto Salgado’s participation in his father’s criminal enterprise. \\nAlthough Salgado may disagree with the district court’s \\nweighing of these factors, neither he nor the record offer any \\nsound reason to disturb the district court’s judgment. \\n III. Conclusion \\n We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1168,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4597307,"string":"4,597,307"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2598"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Michael Stephen Kanne\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\nWILLIAM LIEBHART & NANCY LIEBHART,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nSPX CORPORATION, TRC ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION, &\\nAPOLLO DISMANTLING SERVICES, INC.\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-700 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n KANNE, Circuit Judge. William and Nancy Liebhart to-\\ngether own three houses on the same block in Watertown,\\nWisconsin. Besides a few other houses, the rest of the block\\nwas previously occupied by an abandoned transformer fac-\\ntory, last owned by SPX Corporation. In 2014, SPX demol-\\nished the building with the assistance of TRC Environmental\\nCorporation and Apollo Dismantling Services (collectively,\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n“the defendants”). The Liebharts allege that dust and debris\\ncontaining toxic chemicals migrated onto their properties,\\ncontaminating their yards and jeopardizing their health and\\nthe health of their tenants.\\n The Liebharts sued under federal statutes authorizing pri-\\nvate rights of action for environmental contamination. They\\nalso brought various state-law claims. Following discovery\\nand the submission of expert witness reports, the district\\ncourt denied the Liebharts’ motion for partial summary judg-\\nment and granted summary judgment to the defendants with\\ncosts. Although the district court adequately evaluated the ex-\\npert witnesses and did not abuse its discretion in its proce-\\ndural decisions, the court set the bar unnecessarily high for\\nthe plaintiffs to show a violation of the applicable federal stat-\\nutes. For that reason, we vacate the district court’s judgment\\nand remand for reconsideration.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n The factory dates to the 1920s and was used to manufac-\\nture various industrial equipment. Most relevant to our pur-\\npose, the factory manufactured power transformers contain-\\ning polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a carcinogenic chemi-\\ncal banned by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1979.\\nSee Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Pro-\\ncessing, Distribution in Commerce, and Use Prohibitions, 44\\nFed. Reg. 31,514 (May 31, 1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 761).\\nThe parties all agree that the facility has not manufactured or\\nhandled any items containing PCBs since 1971, and that it\\nshut down completely in 2005.\\n But even with all the products and manufacturing equip-\\nment removed, PCB contaminants remained in the facility. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 3\\n\\n2009, SPX retained TRC and another company (not named as\\na defendant in this suit) to study the property and determine\\nthe extent and precise location of any PCB contamination.\\nThose studies revealed that the concrete floor of the factory\\nwas generally contaminated, with concentrated amounts lo-\\ncated in specific areas throughout the site.\\n Several years went by. In 2014, SPX decided to move ahead\\nwith the demolition, retaining Apollo to conduct the work\\nand TRC to supervise the project. That November, the defend-\\nants timely proposed a self-implementing cleanup plan to the\\nEPA, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 761.61(a). The trouble began\\nas demolition commenced in January 2015. The Liebharts al-\\nlege that Apollo demolished the building recklessly, failing to\\nuse appropriate safety methods to control the dust generated\\nby demolition equipment. They assert that their properties\\nwere covered in dust, and they submitted hundreds of photos\\nand videos of dust from the facility blowing toward their\\nhomes to support their allegation.\\n The Liebharts filed a complaint with the local government\\nin February. They also collected a dust-covered sample of\\nsnow from their yard and placed it in a mason jar. Soon there-\\nafter, a representative of the Wisconsin Department of Natu-\\nral Resources (“DNR”) contacted the defendants about the\\nLiebharts’ concerns. In April, TRC collected samples of the\\nsurface soil (roughly down to eight inches below ground) on\\nboth the industrial and residential properties. Sure enough,\\nthe properties tested positive for the presence of PCBs. In Au-\\ngust, the Liebharts vacated the property on advice of their\\nphysician to avoid further exposure to the chemicals. Frus-\\ntrated with the lack of action, William Liebhart had the snow\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nsample tested for PCBs. Although the sample did, in fact, con-\\ntain PCBs, the irregular manner of collection and storage\\nspoiled the sample, and the laboratory declined to endorse the\\nresults with any confidence.\\n In September 2015, SPX submitted a plan to remediate the\\ncontamination to the DNR. In turn, the Liebharts sued in fed-\\neral district court in October. The complaint sought injunctive\\nrelief under both the Resource Conservation and Recovery\\nAct (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and the Toxic Substances\\nControl Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. In addition, the\\nLiebharts brought a host of state-law claims under supple-\\nmental jurisdiction, including strict liability, negligence, tres-\\npass, nuisance, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.\\n During discovery, the Liebharts submitted to further test-\\ning for PCBs both in their yard and inside their home. They\\nalso underwent blood testing. Although the external surveys\\nrevealed a more comprehensive picture of the extent to which\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ properties contained PCBs, the in-\\nternal sampling and blood tests were both negative for con-\\ntamination. The Liebharts later learned in October 2017 that\\nthe defendants allegedly buried some of the concrete remains\\non-site rather than removing them to a toxic waste dump as\\nrequired by the EPA-approved clean-up plan.\\n The parties prepared and submitted the reports of the ex-\\npert witnesses who were to testify at trial. Among those, three\\nare pertinent to our discussion. First, the Liebharts submitted\\na report by John Woodyard, a licensed professional engineer.\\nHis report included a description of standard methods used\\nwhen demolishing PCB-contaminated buildings and an anal-\\nysis of the purported ways in which the defendants deviated\\nfrom those practices, thereby causing the contamination of the\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 5\\n\\nresidences. The Liebharts’ second expert was Dr. David Car-\\npenter, a public health physician who opined on ways in\\nwhich the Liebharts might have been exposed to PCBs and the\\npotential health effects of continuing exposure. He concluded\\nthat “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not\\nincrease the risk of disease.” Finally, the defendants submit-\\nted a report prepared by Dr. Russell Keenan, a toxicologist\\nwho analyzed the survey data and determined that it was im-\\npossible to determine whether the presence of PCBs on the\\nLiebharts’ property was due to the recent demolition or to\\nrunoff that occurred over the last several decades.\\n In December 2017, the Liebharts moved for partial sum-\\nmary judgment on the issue of causation, reserving the issue\\nof damages for a jury trial. The defendants cross-moved for\\nsummary judgment; they also filed a motion to exclude the\\ntestimony of plaintiffs’ experts Woodyard and Carpenter un-\\nder Fed. R. Evid. 702. In February 2018, after those motions\\nwere fully briefed to the court, the Liebharts sought leave to\\namend their complaint. In light of the information they ob-\\ntained through discovery regarding the burial of concrete on\\nthe property, they intended to allege separate RCRA and\\nTSCA violations and seek an enlargement of the proposed in-\\njunction to include removal of that material.\\n The district court issued its decisions on March 30. First,\\nthe court granted in part the defendants’ motion to exclude\\nthe plaintiffs’ expert witness reports. The court explained that\\nWoodyard’s report was “equivocal” as to the issue of causa-\\ntion; it hedged on whether the contaminants came from dem-\\nolition or from runoff during the preceding decades. See\\nLiebhart v. SPX Corp., No. 16-cv-700-jdp, 2018 WL 1583296 at\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n*3–4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2018). Second, the report “over-\\nlook[ed] too much significant evidence” and failed to account\\nfor “obvious alternative explanations” in determining the\\ncause of the contamination. Id. at *4 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702\\nadvisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments). Finally, the\\ncourt noted that Woodyard’s report depended on “unreliable\\nor uninformative” evidence, including the Liebharts’ defec-\\ntive snow sample, while omitting other evidence such as grass\\nclippings and a chromatogram that allegedly detected PCBs\\non the property. Id. at *4–5. For those reasons, the court ex-\\ncluded Woodyard’s report in its entirety. Id. at *5.\\n Although the court admitted the vast majority of Dr. Car-\\npenter’s report, it struck Carpenter’s conclusion that “there is\\nno ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not increase the\\nrisk of disease” as unsupported by the medical studies he\\ncited. Id. at *5. In doing so, the court pointed to the absence of\\nPCBs inside the Liebharts’ home and in their blood, suggest-\\ning that the Liebharts had not actually been exposed to PCBs\\nand so could not have suffered harm. Id. at 5–6.\\n With that expert testimony off the table, the district court\\nconcluded that the Liebharts failed to present any admissible\\nevidence to support their RCRA and TSCA claims. The re-\\nmaining photos and videos certainly showed dust migrating\\nonto the Liebharts’ property, but there was no reliable evi-\\ndence proving that the dust contained PCBs. Given that any\\nPCBs detected in the soil may have been there prior to the\\ndemolition, the lack of evidence doomed the Liebharts’ case.\\nThe court denied partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs,\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal\\nclaims, and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 7\\n\\n The district court also denied the Liebharts’ petition for\\nleave to amend their complaint on two grounds. First, alt-\\nhough the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs discovered\\nthe factual basis for the new counts over a year after filing the\\ninitial complaint, it also noted that they took an additional\\nfour months thereafter to seek leave to amend. During that\\nintervening period, the parties had submitted and briefed\\ntheir motions for summary judgment, and the trial date was\\nfast approaching. It found their petition untimely. Second, the\\ndistrict court determined that the new claims were futile un-\\nder both statutes' advance-notice requirements.\\n The plaintiffs immediately appealed. Several months after\\nthe judgment, the clerk of the district court imposed costs on\\nthe Liebharts in the amount of $46,320.02. The Liebharts sep-\\narately appealed that decision. We consolidated the two ap-\\npeals and now consider them together.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n The Liebharts raise five issues for our consideration. First,\\nthey argue that the district court erred in excluding the opin-\\nions of expert witnesses Woodyard in full and Carpenter in\\npart. As part of that argument, they allege that the district\\ncourt failed to apply the same stringent standard to the de-\\nfendants’ expert Keenan. Second, they contend that summary\\njudgment was inappropriate because, even absent the testi-\\nmony of their expert witnesses, they submitted adequate pho-\\ntographic and scientific evidence to state a valid claim under\\nRCRA and TSCA. Third, they challenge the district court’s de-\\nnial of injunctive relief in light of deficiencies they have iden-\\ntified in SPX’s state-approved clean-up plan. Fourth, they ar-\\ngue that the district court abused its discretion in denying\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nleave to amend their complaint. Finally, they challenge the\\nimposition of costs.\\n But there’s a larger issue looming in the background. The\\ndistrict court’s opinion operates under the assumption that\\nRCRA plaintiffs must demonstrate “an imminent and sub-\\nstantial danger with evidence of health problems they have\\nalready suffered.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *6. Relying\\nprimarily on Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C.\\n1996), the district court set a high bar for RCRA plaintiffs,\\nholding that “it doesn’t follow necessarily that there is an im-\\nminent and substantial risk of harm simply because there is\\nsome amount of PCBs on the property.” Liebhart 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *5. We review that question of law, which was the\\nunderlying basis for the award of summary judgment, de\\nnovo. Daugherty v. Harrington, 906 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n A. RCRA Requires Only that Harm “May” Be Imminent\\n The question of how much harm a plaintiff must prove to\\nmake out a prima facie violation of RCRA has led to much dis-\\ncussion among the circuits. We have yet to tackle that issue\\nhead on, so the district court necessarily had to look else-\\nwhere for guidance. Passed in 1976, “RCRA is a comprehen-\\nsive environmental statute that empowers [the] EPA to regu-\\nlate hazardous wastes from cradle to grave.” City of Chicago v.\\nEnvtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). The statute’s “pri-\\nmary purpose … is to reduce the generation of hazardous\\nwaste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and dis-\\nposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, ‘so as to\\nminimize the present and future threat to human health and\\nthe environment.’” Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479,\\n483 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 9\\n\\n Although the EPA has the primary responsibility for en-\\nforcing the law, the statute, “like other environmental laws,\\n… contains a citizen suit provision, § 6972, which permits pri-\\nvate citizens to enforce its provisions in some circumstances.”\\nId. at 484. As relevant to this case, the statute provides that\\n any person may commence a civil action on his own\\n behalf … against any person, … including … any\\n past or present owner or operator of a treatment,\\n storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or\\n who is contributing to the past or present handling,\\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any\\n solid or hazardous waste which may present an im-\\n minent and substantial endangerment to health or\\n the environment.\\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Notably, Con-\\ngress amended the language in 1980 by substituting the\\nphrase “may present” for the original 1976 wording “is pre-\\nsenting.” Maine People’s All. and Nat. Res. Def. Council v.\\nMallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Solid\\nWaste Disposal Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–482, § 25, 94 Stat. 2334,\\n2348). The section authorizes district courts to grant injunctive\\nrelief and “order [a violator] to take such other action as may\\nbe necessary” to remediate the endangerment. Id.; see also Me-\\nghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (“Under a plain reading of this remedial\\nscheme, a private citizen suing under § 6972(a)(1)(B) could\\nseek a mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible\\nparty to ‘take action’ by attending to the cleanup and proper\\ndisposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one\\nthat ‘restrains’ a responsible party from further violating\\nRCRA.”); Avondale Fed. Sav. Bank v. Amoco Oil Co., 170 F.3d\\n692, 694 (7th Cir. 1999).\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n The critical question in this case is how to determine\\nwhether alleged contamination “may present an imminent\\nand substantial endangerment to health.” § 6972(a)(1)(b). We\\ntouched on this question only briefly in Albany Bank & Trust\\nCo. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2002).\\nThere, we first outlined the elements of a prima facie RCRA\\nclaim: “a plaintiff must allege (1) that the defendant has gen-\\nerated solid or hazardous waste, (2) that the defendant is con-\\ntributing to or has contributed to the handling of this waste,\\nand (3) that this waste may present an imminent and substan-\\ntial danger to health or the environment.” Id. (citing Cox v.\\nCity of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 2001)). We then ob-\\nserved, interpreting the final element, that “[i]mminence does\\nnot require an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\nharm.” Id. (citing Cox, 256 F.3d at 299). That is the extent of\\nour circuit precedent on the “may present” language con-\\ntained in § 6972(a)(1)(B).\\n But our sister circuits have engaged with this question in\\ngreat depth. In the first major case interpreting the provision,\\nthe Third Circuit emphasized that the statute “enhanced the\\ncourts’ traditional equitable powers by authorizing the issu-\\nance of injunctions when there is but a risk of harm, a more\\nlenient standard than the traditional requirement of threat-\\nened irreparable harm.” United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204,\\n211 (3d Cir. 1982). The court found the statutory language\\n“unequivocal,” demonstrating that Congress “intended to\\nconfer upon the courts the authority to grant affirmative eq-\\nuitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate” the risks\\nposed by toxic waste. Id. at 213–14.\\n In the subsequent decades, several other circuits adopted\\nand further developed the same interpretation of § 6972. See\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 11\\n\\nMallinckrodt, 471 F.3d at 277; Dague v. City of Burlington, 935\\nF.2d 1343, 1355–56 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds,\\n502 U.S. 1071 (1992); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l,\\nInc., 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Waste Indus.,\\nInc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument\\nthat “[§ 6972] was designed to control pollution only in emer-\\ngency situations”); Cox, 256 F.3d at 299–301; Price v. United\\nStates Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994); Burlington N.\\nand Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1019–22 (10th Cir.\\n2007); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1014–\\n15 (11th Cir. 2004). We now join those courts and explicitly\\nembrace the core content of their interpretation.\\n The district court therefore used an incorrect legal stand-\\nard to evaluate the Liebharts’ argument that PCBs from the\\ndemolition may present an imminent and substantial danger\\nto their health and that of their tenants. It did not cite any of\\nthe cases we listed above, but instead relied on a single district\\ncourt decision from a circuit that has not yet addressed the\\nissue. See Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *5 (quoting Foster, 922\\nF. Supp. at 662 (“While there can be no question that the levels\\nof contamination present at the Site may warrant future re-\\nsponse action, the plaintiff cannot establish either a current\\nrisk of substantial or serious threatened harm, or some neces-\\nsity for action.”)).\\n That error undercuts several of the reasons the district\\ncourt gave for rejecting the Liebharts’ RCRA claim. For exam-\\nple, the district court cursorily adopted a passing statement\\nwe made over twenty-five years ago that “[t]he [EPA’s] ac-\\ncepted safe level of PCBs in the environment is fifty parts per\\nmillion,” id. (quoting Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nServ., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1994)), to create a require-\\nment that the Liebharts show that PCB contamination on their\\nproperty met that threshold. But there is no requirement in\\nRCRA for a plaintiff to make “a particular quantitative show-\\ning as a sine qua non for liability.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 260; see\\nalso Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. Only one circuit has come to an\\narguably contrary conclusion. In Price v. United States Navy,\\n818 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (S.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d 39 F.3d 1011 (9th\\nCir. 1994), the district court required RCRA plaintiffs to show\\nthat “the level of contaminants [was] above levels that are con-\\nsidered acceptable by the State.” But as the Interfaith court\\nnoted, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion affirming the district\\ncourt’s judgment did not discuss that requirement. RCRA\\ndoes not require that plaintiffs demonstrate contamination\\nabove some agency-derived threshold level of concentration.\\n399 F.3d at 260–61. It merely requires that they show that con-\\ntaminants on the property are seriously dangerous to human\\nhealth (or will be, given prolonged exposure over time). See\\nCox, 256 F.3d at 299–300 (“an endangerment is ‘substantial’ if\\nit is ‘serious’” (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019)).\\n That’s especially true when the standard is taken out of\\ncontext. The district court relied on Cincinnati Ins. Co. to sup-\\nport its contention that contamination below the threshold\\nlevel of fifty parts per million (“ppm”) does not qualify as a\\nregulatory violation, thereby contradicting Woodyard’s opin-\\nion regarding safe levels of PCBs and providing the grounds\\nfor excluding it. In that case, we evaluated whether an insur-\\nance company was required to indemnify its insured for dam-\\nages arising out of PCB contamination at an industrial site.\\nThe EPA had identified the insured as potentially liable under\\nthe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,\\nand Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 13\\n\\nthat context, we noted that the contaminated site contained\\nPCBs concentrated at levels up to 58,000 ppm, well above the\\nEPA’s general regulatory threshold of fifty ppm. 40 F.3d at 148\\n(citing 40 C.F.R. § 761.60).\\n But that regulation, still in effect today, identifies indus-\\ntrial equipment and other wastes contaminated at levels\\nabove fifty ppm and requires special procedures for their stor-\\nage and disposal. It does not unequivocally state that PCBs\\nconcentrated at levels lower than fifty ppm are safe for human\\nexposure. Neither Cincinnati Ins. Co. nor the EPA regulation\\nstand for the proposition that PCBs concentrated at forty-nine\\nppm on residential property do not present a substantial endan-\\ngerment to the health of the residents. That is especially ap-\\nparent when we consider that the same set of regulations dis-\\ntinguishes between low and high-occupancy areas and re-\\nquires that, in high-occupancy areas, bulk PCB remediation\\nwaste, such as soil, be cleaned up to levels of concentration at\\nor below one ppm. § 761.61(a)(4)(i)(A). Section 761.3 confirms\\nthat the term “high-occupancy area” includes residences. See\\nalso § 761.123 (regulating spills of PCBs concentrated at fifty\\nppm or greater but emphasizing that “[t]he concentration of\\nPCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concentration in the\\nmaterial spilled as opposed to the concentration of PCBs in\\nthe material onto which the PCBs were spilled”). “Proof of\\ncontamination in excess of [agency] standards may support a\\nfinding of liability, and may alone suffice for liability in some\\ncases, but its required use is without justification in the stat-\\nute.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 261.\\n This is not to say that all the plaintiffs must do is to show\\nsome bit of soil on their property that tests positive for PCBs\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nabove one ppm (or even above the purported lower Wiscon-\\nsin DNR standard, which the defendants seem to have\\nacknowledged in their state-approved clean-up plan). Of\\ncourse, there must be accompanying evidence that establishes\\nsome connection between the existing contaminants and\\nsome imminent and substantial endangerment to health. 1 But\\nthe Liebharts attempted to provide such evidence, and the\\ndistrict court held the bar higher than necessary under\\nRCRA’s standard. In criticizing expert witness Carpenter’s\\nstatement that “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that\\ndoes not increase the risk of disease,” the district court re-\\njected Carpenter’s citation to studies showing the general\\nrisks of PCB exposure because “the Liebharts do not cite any\\nevidence that they have been exposed to PCBs.” Liebhart, 2018\\nWL 1583296 at *5. Moreover, the district court concluded that\\n“[t]he Liebharts do not contend that they can prove an immi-\\nnent and substantial danger with evidence of health problems\\nthey have already suffered.” Id. at *6.\\n As we noted in Albany Bank, “[i]mminence does not re-\\nquire an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\n\\n\\n 1 On appeal, the Liebharts contend that there is no separate require-\\nment for expert witness testimony because the photos and videos they\\nhave submitted into evidence suffice to prove their RCRA claim. The de-\\nfendants push back on that argument, insisting that many of the issues are\\nbeyond the competence of lay fact-finders and require the assistance of\\nexperts to address. See, e.g., C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827,\\n838 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Given the complex nature of this case, … [and w]ith\\nno experts to prove causation … the appellants cannot prove their toxic-\\ntort case under [state] law.”) Because the district court did not make a fac-\\ntual finding as to whether this case is sufficient complex to require expert\\ntestimony, and because we remand for reconsideration of a separate legal\\nissue, we need not reach that question today.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 15\\n\\nharm.” 310 F.3d at 973. Although the Supreme Court has in-\\nstructed that “[a]n endangerment can only be ‘imminent’ if it\\n‘threaten[s] to occur immediately,’” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485\\n(quoting Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary of English Language\\n1245 (2d ed. 1934)), it qualified that statement when it approv-\\ningly quoted the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the statu-\\ntory term “implies that there must be a threat which is present\\nnow, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until\\nlater.” Id. at 486 (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019).\\nWe take that to mean that the Liebharts must show that there\\nare PCBs currently on the property that have the potential to\\nsubstantially threaten their health at some point in the future\\nif they continue to occupy the premises and prolong their ex-\\nposure. On remand, the district court should reevaluate its ex-\\nclusion of Dr. Carpenter’s assertion regarding PCB safety un-\\nder the standards we have outlined above and determine\\nwhether, if admissible, the report demonstrates that a sub-\\nstantial and imminent threat to the Liebharts’ health may be\\npresent.\\n B. TSCA Likewise Requires No Heightened Showing\\n TSCA authorizes a separate, private cause of action allow-\\ning “any person [to] commence a civil action … against any\\nperson … who is alleged to be in violation of … any rule\\npromulgated under” the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1). The EPA\\npromulgated the PCB regulations in question pursuant to\\nstatutory authority under TSCA, designating PCBs as “haz-\\nardous waste” and controlling their manufacture, use, stor-\\nage, and disposal. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 761. The Liebharts’ TSCA\\nclaim alleged that the defendants violated those regulations,\\nthereby authorizing the district court to “restrain [the] viola-\\ntion.” § 2619(a). Unlike RCRA, which authorizes mandatory\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\ninjunctions to compel remediation of previous violations,\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions to stop ongoing\\nviolations. Id. The defendants argued that there was no longer\\nan ongoing violation, as demolition was complete by the time\\nthe Liebharts filed their claim. 2\\n The purported violation was based on 40 C.F.R. § 761.123,\\nwhich, as we noted above, regulates “spills” of PCB materials\\nconcentrated at levels above fifty ppm. The district court cor-\\nrectly noted that the Liebharts had not shown any evidence\\nthat any PCBs had been “spilled” onto their property (by\\nmeans of dust migration) at that level of concentration, and it\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on that basis.\\n But the district court seems to have overlooked the follow-\\ning sentence in the regulation, which directs that “[t]he con-\\ncentration of PCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concen-\\ntration in the material spilled as opposed to the concentration\\nof the material onto which the PCBs were spilled.” Id. The\\nLiebharts’ complaint seems to have alleged that the concrete\\nfloor of the factory, which contained at least some contami-\\nnated areas above the fifty-ppm threshold, was demolished\\nand “spilled” onto the Liebharts’ property. By the plain text\\nof the regulation, there is no need to show that contaminants\\non the Liebharts’ property are themselves concentrated above\\nfifty ppm so long as the original material that was the source\\nof that spill met the criteria. On remand, the district court may\\nagain determine that there is no ongoing violation, but it must\\n\\n 2 The district court determined that the Liebharts waived this claim\\nby failing to engage the defendants’ argument that there was no “ongoing\\nviolation.” But the court chose to analyze the merits of the claim regardless\\nof waiver and reached its conclusion on an alternative basis. We likewise\\nset aside the issue of waiver to reach the district court’s merits analysis.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 17\\n\\nfirst determine whether the alleged violation comes within\\nthe meaning of § 761.123 in the first place.\\n C. The District Court Should Reconsider the Remaining Issues\\non Remand\\n Now that we have clarified the standard the plaintiffs\\nmust meet, we turn to the remaining procedural issues the\\nLiebharts have asked to us to address.\\n 1. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding\\nWoodyard’s Testimony\\n “The summary-judgment decision here turned [in large\\npart] on the district court’s conclusion that [the] expert testi-\\nmony was inadmissible. Whether the district court applied\\nthe appropriate legal framework for evaluating expert testi-\\nmony is reviewed de novo, but the court’s choice of relevant\\nfactors within that framework and its ultimate conclusion as\\nto admissibility are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Lees v.\\nCarthage College, 714 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 2013). When a dis-\\ntrict court is “[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testi-\\nmony … the trial judge must determine at the outset …\\nwhether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific\\nknowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or\\ndetermine a fact in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,\\n509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). “The trial court must have … latitude\\nin deciding how to test an expert’s reliability.” Kumho Tire Co.,\\nLtd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).\\n The district court was well within its discretion to exclude\\nthe proffered testimony of expert witness Woodyard. Beyond\\nthe problem that the plaintiffs seemed to have waived this is-\\nsue in the district court by failing to engage with the defend-\\nants’ arguments in their motion to strike the testimony,\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nWoodyard’s analysis suffers from a critical flaw that stems\\nfrom the way in which the parties have framed this lawsuit.\\nThe district court briefly noted in its opinion that “both sides\\nassume that none of the defendants can be held liable for any\\nPCB contamination on the Liebharts’ property that occurred\\nbefore the demolition began, so the court will make the same\\nassumption.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *1. That’s a curious\\nchoice. RCRA permits the Liebharts to obtain injunctive relief\\nfrom the owner of the facility for any cognizable contamina-\\ntion, regardless of whether the PCBs migrated onto their\\nproperty before or after the demolition occurred. See 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (authorizing suit against “any person … who\\nhas contributed … to the past or present handling … or dis-\\nposal” of hazardous waste); see also Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486\\n(“RCRA contains no statute of limitations.”).\\n But because the Liebharts restricted their claims to PCBs\\nthat allegedly migrated onto their property via the dust from\\nthe 2015 demolition, they necessarily excluded claims result-\\ning from PCBs that may have gotten onto their property dur-\\ning the previous century. The district court correctly noted\\nthat Woodyard’s expert opinion could not distinguish be-\\ntween these two alternatives, as both sets of contaminants\\noriginated from the same source. There was even evidence\\nshowing that PCBs existed in the soil beneath the Liebharts’\\nasphalt driveway—Woodyard could not explain how that\\nmight have occurred as the result of dust blowing in the wind\\nas opposed to seepage over the course of years before any\\ndemolition occurred.\\n Perhaps the Liebharts decided to frame their claims in this\\nway because they wanted to go after defendants TRC and\\nApollo, who would not be liable for what happened before\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 19\\n\\ndemolition. Or perhaps some element of their state-law\\nclaims, which we have not addressed, required them to con-\\nstrict the scope. They did not explain their reasoning to us (or\\nit seems, to the district court). But the distinction makes it dif-\\nficult for Woodyard to make his case, given that he did not\\n“adequately account[] for obvious alternative explanations.”\\nGopalratnam v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 787 (7th Cir.\\n2017). Viewed in this light, the district court was within its\\ndiscretion to exclude the testimony as unreliable and unhelp-\\nful to the trier of fact. The district court may choose to rethink\\nthat evaluation on remand under the legal standards we out-\\nlined above, but it may well reach the same conclusion.\\n 2. The District Court Should Reconsider Its Denial of Injunctive\\nRelief\\n The district court denied injunctive relief to the Liebharts\\nbecause the defendants had already agreed to a clean-up plan\\nthat had been approved by the Wisconsin DNR. We review\\nthat decision for an abuse of discretion. See AMI Int’l, Inc. v.\\nDatacard Corp. 106 F.3d 1342, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997) (remanding\\ngrant of RCRA injunction).\\n As we mentioned above, RCRA authorizes district courts\\nto issue either mandatory or prohibitory injunctions, while\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions. “[I]t is appro-\\npriate ‘to give great deference to the district court’s decision\\nas to the precise equitable relief necessary in a particular\\ncase.’” Bowes v. Ind. Sec. of State, 837 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (quoting Gjersten v. Bd. Of Election Com’rs for City of Chi-\\ncago, 791 F.2d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1986)). That is especially true\\nwhen a plaintiff requests a mandatory injunction, which “im-\\nposes significant burdens on the defendant and requires care-\\nful consideration of the intrusiveness of the ordered act, as\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nwell as the difficulties that may be encountered in supervising\\nthe enjoined party’s compliance with the court’s order.” Kart-\\nman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir.\\n2011).\\n Considering SPX’s decision to formulate a clean-up plan\\nand obtain approval from the state agency, the district court\\ndetermined that there was no need for separate, federally-su-\\npervised remediation. It reached that conclusion even while\\nassuming that the defendants were in violation of either\\nRCRA or TSCA, despite the fact it found no such violation.\\nOther courts have determined that the existence of a parallel\\nplan of remediation supervised by the state does not neces-\\nsarily prevent a federal district court from granting an injunc-\\ntion if it finds the state agency’s actions to be insufficient to\\nremedy the violation of federal law. See, e.g., Interfaith, 399\\nF.3d at 264–68. On the other hand, the same courts have also\\nupheld denials of injunctions in similar situations when the\\ndistrict court finds that the parallel plan is adequate to the\\ntask. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735\\nF.3d 131, 139–40 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Interfaith). We\\nrecently reached the same conclusion. See LAJIM, LLC v. Gen.\\nElec. Co., No. 18-1522, 2019 WL 1011021, at *4–11 (7th Cir. Mar.\\n4, 2019) (“[T]he district court correctly held that it has discre-\\ntion to award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not re-\\nquired to order relief after a finding of liability,” particularly\\nin light of ongoing relief supervised by a state environmental\\nagency).\\n Here, the district court determined that SPX’s existing\\nplan was sufficient and that the Liebharts had not “iden-\\ntif[ied] any way that SPX’s plan [was] deficient or violate[d]\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 21\\n\\nfederal law.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *7. We agree. Alt-\\nhough the Liebharts point to certain statistical sampling re-\\nquirements outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 761.125 and contend that\\nSPX’s existing plan fails to meet those requirements, the dis-\\ntrict court noted that SPX’s plan includes further sampling of\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ property. It emphasized that “the\\nLiebharts do not otherwise explain why SPX’s proposed sam-\\npling scheme is substantively inadequate.” Liebhart, 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *7. We see no evidence that compels us to contra-\\ndict that factual finding.\\n However, in light of the legal standards we outlined\\nabove, we ask the district court to reconsider its decision to\\ndeny injunctive relief on remand. Because the bar for estab-\\nlishing an imminent and substantial danger is lower than the\\ndistrict court believed when evaluating the request for an in-\\njunction, it would be prudent to reassess whether the DNR-\\napproved plan adequately remedies harms that may come\\nwithin RCRA’s scope. See LAJIM, 2019 WL 1011021 at *6\\n(“[O]nce a court finds a defendant liable for creating a risk of\\nimminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the case\\nthat injunctive relief is warranted. But that is not always the\\ncase.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).\\n 3. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying\\nLeave to Amend the Complaint.\\n We review a denial of leave to amend a complaint for\\nabuse of discretion. Life Plans, Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co.,\\n800 F.3d 343, 357 (7th Cir. 2015). District courts are to “freely\\ngive leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 15(a)(2). “The Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to\\nrequire a district court to allow amendment unless there is a\\ngood reason—futility, undue delay, undue prejudice, or bad\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nfaith—for denying leave to amend.” Life Plans, 800 F.3d at 357\\n(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The district\\ncourt in this case identified two of those grounds as bases for\\ndenial: futility and undue delay. While we disagree with the\\nfutility analysis, we concur with the finding of undue delay\\nand decline to reverse.\\n We begin with the question of futility. Both statutes con-\\ntain advance-notice requirements that citizen plaintiffs must\\nobserve prior to filing RCRA or TSCA suits. They require\\nthose plaintiffs to notify the EPA 60–90 days in advance of fil-\\ning the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2); 15 U.S.C.\\n§ 2619(b)(1)(A). But the district court chose to apply the re-\\nquirements not only to the filing of the complaint, but also to\\nany subsequent amendments that sought to add new RCRA\\nor TSCA counts. Although the Liebharts complied with the\\nrequirements prior to filing their original complaint in April\\n2016, they gave no new notice to the EPA before filing for\\nleave to amend in February 2018. The district court held that,\\nbecause the prior notice did not contain any mention of bur-\\nied PCBs on the SPX property, it was insufficient to alert the\\nEPA to the particular violation the Liebharts sought to include\\nin the amended complaint.\\n The notice provisions serve two purposes. “First, notice al-\\nlows Government agencies to take responsibility for enforc-\\ning environmental regulations, thus obviating the need for\\ncitizen suits. … Second, notice gives the alleged violator ‘an\\nopportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the\\nAct[s] and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit.’”\\nHallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (quoting\\nGwaltney of Smithfield, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 23\\n\\nU.S. 49, 60 (1987)). The district court’s decision to require no-\\ntice for an amendment to a complaint fulfilled neither pur-\\npose. By the time the Liebharts attempted to amend their com-\\nplaint, the EPA had been on notice of alleged PCB contamina-\\ntion at the SPX property for over two years—and it had de-\\nclined to get involved. Moreover, it was unlikely that the de-\\nfendants would resolve the alleged violation to avoid being\\nsued when they were already in the midst of an extended law-\\nsuit with the same plaintiffs. See AM Int’l, 106 F.3d at 1351\\n(“[T]he delay period is designed to allow a [defendant] a pe-\\nriod in which to clean up its act and avoid litigation. [This de-\\nfendant] was clearly not interested in using the delay period\\nto resolve the dispute without going to court.”); see also Dague,\\n935 F.2d at 1351 (“There is no need to maintain a window of\\nopportunity for the government to take the lead enforcement\\nrole … when a citizen, acting as a private attorney general, has\\nalready lawfully assumed the lead role in bringing a … claim\\nagainst the same facility.”) (quoting Dague v. City of Burling-\\nton, 733 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D. Vt. 1990)). When the original notice\\nis “sufficiently specific to inform the alleged violator [and the\\nagency] about what it is doing wrong, so that it will know\\nwhat corrective actions will avert a lawsuit,” Atl. States Legal\\nFound., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir.\\n1994), there is no need to require a second round of advance\\nnotice for an amended complaint in the same litigation.\\n But an error in the futility analysis alone does not neces-\\nsarily constitute an abuse of discretion on the whole. In addi-\\ntion to futility, the district court cited undue delay and preju-\\ndice in its decision to deny leave to amend. “[D]elay by itself\\nis normally an insufficient reason to deny a motion for leave\\nto amend. Delay must be coupled with some other reason.\\nTypically, that reason … is prejudice to the non-moving\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nparty.” Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 793\\n(7th Cir. 2004). The district court cited the Liebharts’ admis-\\nsion that they learned of the possible burial of contaminated\\nconcrete on the SPX property on October 11, 2017 but failed\\nto seek leave to amend their complaint until February 22,\\n2018. During that more than four-month period, the parties\\nsubmitted and briefed their cross-motions for summary judg-\\nment, and by February, trial was only three months away. The\\nLiebharts provided no justification for their delay.\\n In response, the Liebharts contend that there was no un-\\ndue prejudice to the defendants: by the time they filed their\\nmotion, five weeks of discovery still remained. We disagree.\\nWhile the district court’s explanation of prejudice was fairly\\nshort, even if the district court had failed to articulate a find-\\ning of prejudice altogether, we might still “affirm providing\\nthat ‘the prejudice that would result from such amendment\\nwas apparent.’” Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 613 (7th\\nCir. 2002) (quoting Feldman v. Am. Mem’l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d\\n783, 793 (7th Cir. 1999)). In Park, the plaintiff waited six\\nmonths to move for leave to amend a complaint after she\\nknew (or should have known) of the additional alleged viola-\\ntion. Id. Because trial was approaching, we concluded that the\\ndistrict court was well within its discretion to deny leave. Id.;\\nsee also Perrian v. O’Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194–95 (7th Cir. 1992)\\n(“Because substantive amendments shortly before trial serve\\nto defeat the public’s interest in speedy resolution of legal dis-\\nputes, ‘[a] district court judge is entitled, in such circum-\\nstances, to refuse to allow a plaintiff’s amendment.’” (quoting\\nCampbell v. Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co., 893 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir.\\n1990)) (internal citation omitted)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 25\\n\\n On the contrary, in Life Plans, we found no undue delay\\nwhen a plaintiff promptly moved to amend its complaint just\\nten days after learning of the factual basis for its new count\\nduring discovery. 800 F.3d at 358. The Liebharts delayed more\\nthan four months in the same circumstances. Although dis-\\ncovery was ongoing at the time of the Liebharts’ motion, the\\nparties had already briefed their dispositive motions, and the\\ndistrict court was preparing its summary-judgment order that\\nwould ultimately dispose of the case. We therefore cannot say\\nthat denial of leave for undue delay and prejudice was an\\nabuse of the district court’s discretion. Of course, the district\\ncourt may permit an amendment on remand if the interests of\\njustice so require.\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n Although the district court properly exercised its discre-\\ntion on the various evidentiary and procedural issues the\\nplaintiffs have raised, its analysis on the merits was narrower\\nthan the statutes demand. It may reach the same conclusions\\non reconsideration, but the parties should have another op-\\nportunity to litigate whether a substantial and imminent en-\\ndangerment to health exists in this case under the standards\\nwe have outlined. We therefore VACATE the order of the dis-\\ntrict court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent\\nwith this opinion. 3\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 The Liebharts also challenge the taxation of costs against them by the\\n\\nclerk of the district court. Because we vacate the district court’s judgment,\\nwe assume that the imposition of costs is automatically vacated and so do\\nnot reach that issue. The clerk of the district court is free to reassess costs\\non remand as the case proceeds.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4374560/\", \"author_raw\": \"Michael Stephen Kanne\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597307/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\nWILLIAM LIEBHART & NANCY LIEBHART,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n v.\n\nSPX CORPORATION, TRC ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION, &\nAPOLLO DISMANTLING SERVICES, INC.\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 16-cv-700 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n KANNE, Circuit Judge. William and Nancy Liebhart to-\ngether own three houses on the same block in Watertown,\nWisconsin. Besides a few other houses, the rest of the block\nwas previously occupied by an abandoned transformer fac-\ntory, last owned by SPX Corporation. In 2014, SPX demol-\nished the building with the assistance of TRC Environmental\nCorporation and Apollo Dismantling Services (collectively,\n\f2 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\n“the defendants”). The Liebharts allege that dust and debris\ncontaining toxic chemicals migrated onto their properties,\ncontaminating their yards and jeopardizing their health and\nthe health of their tenants.\n The Liebharts sued under federal statutes authorizing pri-\nvate rights of action for environmental contamination. They\nalso brought various state-law claims. Following discovery\nand the submission of expert witness reports, the district\ncourt denied the Liebharts’ motion for partial summary judg-\nment and granted summary judgment to the defendants with\ncosts. Although the district court adequately evaluated the ex-\npert witnesses and did not abuse its discretion in its proce-\ndural decisions, the court set the bar unnecessarily high for\nthe plaintiffs to show a violation of the applicable federal stat-\nutes. For that reason, we vacate the district court’s judgment\nand remand for reconsideration.\n I. BACKGROUND\n The factory dates to the 1920s and was used to manufac-\nture various industrial equipment. Most relevant to our pur-\npose, the factory manufactured power transformers contain-\ning polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a carcinogenic chemi-\ncal banned by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1979.\nSee Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Pro-\ncessing, Distribution in Commerce, and Use Prohibitions, 44\nFed. Reg. 31,514 (May 31, 1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 761).\nThe parties all agree that the facility has not manufactured or\nhandled any items containing PCBs since 1971, and that it\nshut down completely in 2005.\n But even with all the products and manufacturing equip-\nment removed, PCB contaminants remained in the facility. In\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 3\n\n2009, SPX retained TRC and another company (not named as\na defendant in this suit) to study the property and determine\nthe extent and precise location of any PCB contamination.\nThose studies revealed that the concrete floor of the factory\nwas generally contaminated, with concentrated amounts lo-\ncated in specific areas throughout the site.\n Several years went by. In 2014, SPX decided to move ahead\nwith the demolition, retaining Apollo to conduct the work\nand TRC to supervise the project. That November, the defend-\nants timely proposed a self-implementing cleanup plan to the\nEPA, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 761.61(a). The trouble began\nas demolition commenced in January 2015. The Liebharts al-\nlege that Apollo demolished the building recklessly, failing to\nuse appropriate safety methods to control the dust generated\nby demolition equipment. They assert that their properties\nwere covered in dust, and they submitted hundreds of photos\nand videos of dust from the facility blowing toward their\nhomes to support their allegation.\n The Liebharts filed a complaint with the local government\nin February. They also collected a dust-covered sample of\nsnow from their yard and placed it in a mason jar. Soon there-\nafter, a representative of the Wisconsin Department of Natu-\nral Resources (“DNR”) contacted the defendants about the\nLiebharts’ concerns. In April, TRC collected samples of the\nsurface soil (roughly down to eight inches below ground) on\nboth the industrial and residential properties. Sure enough,\nthe properties tested positive for the presence of PCBs. In Au-\ngust, the Liebharts vacated the property on advice of their\nphysician to avoid further exposure to the chemicals. Frus-\ntrated with the lack of action, William Liebhart had the snow\n\f4 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nsample tested for PCBs. Although the sample did, in fact, con-\ntain PCBs, the irregular manner of collection and storage\nspoiled the sample, and the laboratory declined to endorse the\nresults with any confidence.\n In September 2015, SPX submitted a plan to remediate the\ncontamination to the DNR. In turn, the Liebharts sued in fed-\neral district court in October. The complaint sought injunctive\nrelief under both the Resource Conservation and Recovery\nAct (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and the Toxic Substances\nControl Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. In addition, the\nLiebharts brought a host of state-law claims under supple-\nmental jurisdiction, including strict liability, negligence, tres-\npass, nuisance, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.\n During discovery, the Liebharts submitted to further test-\ning for PCBs both in their yard and inside their home. They\nalso underwent blood testing. Although the external surveys\nrevealed a more comprehensive picture of the extent to which\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ properties contained PCBs, the in-\nternal sampling and blood tests were both negative for con-\ntamination. The Liebharts later learned in October 2017 that\nthe defendants allegedly buried some of the concrete remains\non-site rather than removing them to a toxic waste dump as\nrequired by the EPA-approved clean-up plan.\n The parties prepared and submitted the reports of the ex-\npert witnesses who were to testify at trial. Among those, three\nare pertinent to our discussion. First, the Liebharts submitted\na report by John Woodyard, a licensed professional engineer.\nHis report included a description of standard methods used\nwhen demolishing PCB-contaminated buildings and an anal-\nysis of the purported ways in which the defendants deviated\nfrom those practices, thereby causing the contamination of the\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 5\n\nresidences. The Liebharts’ second expert was Dr. David Car-\npenter, a public health physician who opined on ways in\nwhich the Liebharts might have been exposed to PCBs and the\npotential health effects of continuing exposure. He concluded\nthat “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not\nincrease the risk of disease.” Finally, the defendants submit-\nted a report prepared by Dr. Russell Keenan, a toxicologist\nwho analyzed the survey data and determined that it was im-\npossible to determine whether the presence of PCBs on the\nLiebharts’ property was due to the recent demolition or to\nrunoff that occurred over the last several decades.\n In December 2017, the Liebharts moved for partial sum-\nmary judgment on the issue of causation, reserving the issue\nof damages for a jury trial. The defendants cross-moved for\nsummary judgment; they also filed a motion to exclude the\ntestimony of plaintiffs’ experts Woodyard and Carpenter un-\nder Fed. R. Evid. 702. In February 2018, after those motions\nwere fully briefed to the court, the Liebharts sought leave to\namend their complaint. In light of the information they ob-\ntained through discovery regarding the burial of concrete on\nthe property, they intended to allege separate RCRA and\nTSCA violations and seek an enlargement of the proposed in-\njunction to include removal of that material.\n The district court issued its decisions on March 30. First,\nthe court granted in part the defendants’ motion to exclude\nthe plaintiffs’ expert witness reports. The court explained that\nWoodyard’s report was “equivocal” as to the issue of causa-\ntion; it hedged on whether the contaminants came from dem-\nolition or from runoff during the preceding decades. See\nLiebhart v. SPX Corp., No. 16-cv-700-jdp, 2018 WL 1583296 at\n\f6 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\n*3–4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2018). Second, the report “over-\nlook[ed] too much significant evidence” and failed to account\nfor “obvious alternative explanations” in determining the\ncause of the contamination. Id. at *4 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702\nadvisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments). Finally, the\ncourt noted that Woodyard’s report depended on “unreliable\nor uninformative” evidence, including the Liebharts’ defec-\ntive snow sample, while omitting other evidence such as grass\nclippings and a chromatogram that allegedly detected PCBs\non the property. Id. at *4–5. For those reasons, the court ex-\ncluded Woodyard’s report in its entirety. Id. at *5.\n Although the court admitted the vast majority of Dr. Car-\npenter’s report, it struck Carpenter’s conclusion that “there is\nno ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not increase the\nrisk of disease” as unsupported by the medical studies he\ncited. Id. at *5. In doing so, the court pointed to the absence of\nPCBs inside the Liebharts’ home and in their blood, suggest-\ning that the Liebharts had not actually been exposed to PCBs\nand so could not have suffered harm. Id. at 5–6.\n With that expert testimony off the table, the district court\nconcluded that the Liebharts failed to present any admissible\nevidence to support their RCRA and TSCA claims. The re-\nmaining photos and videos certainly showed dust migrating\nonto the Liebharts’ property, but there was no reliable evi-\ndence proving that the dust contained PCBs. Given that any\nPCBs detected in the soil may have been there prior to the\ndemolition, the lack of evidence doomed the Liebharts’ case.\nThe court denied partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs,\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal\nclaims, and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice.\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 7\n\n The district court also denied the Liebharts’ petition for\nleave to amend their complaint on two grounds. First, alt-\nhough the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs discovered\nthe factual basis for the new counts over a year after filing the\ninitial complaint, it also noted that they took an additional\nfour months thereafter to seek leave to amend. During that\nintervening period, the parties had submitted and briefed\ntheir motions for summary judgment, and the trial date was\nfast approaching. It found their petition untimely. Second, the\ndistrict court determined that the new claims were futile un-\nder both statutes' advance-notice requirements.\n The plaintiffs immediately appealed. Several months after\nthe judgment, the clerk of the district court imposed costs on\nthe Liebharts in the amount of $46,320.02. The Liebharts sep-\narately appealed that decision. We consolidated the two ap-\npeals and now consider them together.\n II. ANALYSIS\n The Liebharts raise five issues for our consideration. First,\nthey argue that the district court erred in excluding the opin-\nions of expert witnesses Woodyard in full and Carpenter in\npart. As part of that argument, they allege that the district\ncourt failed to apply the same stringent standard to the de-\nfendants’ expert Keenan. Second, they contend that summary\njudgment was inappropriate because, even absent the testi-\nmony of their expert witnesses, they submitted adequate pho-\ntographic and scientific evidence to state a valid claim under\nRCRA and TSCA. Third, they challenge the district court’s de-\nnial of injunctive relief in light of deficiencies they have iden-\ntified in SPX’s state-approved clean-up plan. Fourth, they ar-\ngue that the district court abused its discretion in denying\n\f8 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nleave to amend their complaint. Finally, they challenge the\nimposition of costs.\n But there’s a larger issue looming in the background. The\ndistrict court’s opinion operates under the assumption that\nRCRA plaintiffs must demonstrate “an imminent and sub-\nstantial danger with evidence of health problems they have\nalready suffered.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *6. Relying\nprimarily on Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C.\n1996), the district court set a high bar for RCRA plaintiffs,\nholding that “it doesn’t follow necessarily that there is an im-\nminent and substantial risk of harm simply because there is\nsome amount of PCBs on the property.” Liebhart 2018 WL\n1583296 at *5. We review that question of law, which was the\nunderlying basis for the award of summary judgment, de\nnovo. Daugherty v. Harrington, 906 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2018).\n A. RCRA Requires Only that Harm “May” Be Imminent\n The question of how much harm a plaintiff must prove to\nmake out a prima facie violation of RCRA has led to much dis-\ncussion among the circuits. We have yet to tackle that issue\nhead on, so the district court necessarily had to look else-\nwhere for guidance. Passed in 1976, “RCRA is a comprehen-\nsive environmental statute that empowers [the] EPA to regu-\nlate hazardous wastes from cradle to grave.” City of Chicago v.\nEnvtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). The statute’s “pri-\nmary purpose … is to reduce the generation of hazardous\nwaste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and dis-\nposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, ‘so as to\nminimize the present and future threat to human health and\nthe environment.’” Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479,\n483 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)).\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 9\n\n Although the EPA has the primary responsibility for en-\nforcing the law, the statute, “like other environmental laws,\n… contains a citizen suit provision, § 6972, which permits pri-\nvate citizens to enforce its provisions in some circumstances.”\nId. at 484. As relevant to this case, the statute provides that\n any person may commence a civil action on his own\n behalf … against any person, … including … any\n past or present owner or operator of a treatment,\n storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or\n who is contributing to the past or present handling,\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any\n solid or hazardous waste which may present an im-\n minent and substantial endangerment to health or\n the environment.\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Notably, Con-\ngress amended the language in 1980 by substituting the\nphrase “may present” for the original 1976 wording “is pre-\nsenting.” Maine People’s All. and Nat. Res. Def. Council v.\nMallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Solid\nWaste Disposal Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–482, § 25, 94 Stat. 2334,\n2348). The section authorizes district courts to grant injunctive\nrelief and “order [a violator] to take such other action as may\nbe necessary” to remediate the endangerment. Id.; see also Me-\nghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (“Under a plain reading of this remedial\nscheme, a private citizen suing under § 6972(a)(1)(B) could\nseek a mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible\nparty to ‘take action’ by attending to the cleanup and proper\ndisposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one\nthat ‘restrains’ a responsible party from further violating\nRCRA.”); Avondale Fed. Sav. Bank v. Amoco Oil Co., 170 F.3d\n692, 694 (7th Cir. 1999).\n\f10 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\n The critical question in this case is how to determine\nwhether alleged contamination “may present an imminent\nand substantial endangerment to health.” § 6972(a)(1)(b). We\ntouched on this question only briefly in Albany Bank & Trust\nCo. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2002).\nThere, we first outlined the elements of a prima facie RCRA\nclaim: “a plaintiff must allege (1) that the defendant has gen-\nerated solid or hazardous waste, (2) that the defendant is con-\ntributing to or has contributed to the handling of this waste,\nand (3) that this waste may present an imminent and substan-\ntial danger to health or the environment.” Id. (citing Cox v.\nCity of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 2001)). We then ob-\nserved, interpreting the final element, that “[i]mminence does\nnot require an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\nharm.” Id. (citing Cox, 256 F.3d at 299). That is the extent of\nour circuit precedent on the “may present” language con-\ntained in § 6972(a)(1)(B).\n But our sister circuits have engaged with this question in\ngreat depth. In the first major case interpreting the provision,\nthe Third Circuit emphasized that the statute “enhanced the\ncourts’ traditional equitable powers by authorizing the issu-\nance of injunctions when there is but a risk of harm, a more\nlenient standard than the traditional requirement of threat-\nened irreparable harm.” United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204,\n211 (3d Cir. 1982). The court found the statutory language\n“unequivocal,” demonstrating that Congress “intended to\nconfer upon the courts the authority to grant affirmative eq-\nuitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate” the risks\nposed by toxic waste. Id. at 213–14.\n In the subsequent decades, several other circuits adopted\nand further developed the same interpretation of § 6972. See\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 11\n\nMallinckrodt, 471 F.3d at 277; Dague v. City of Burlington, 935\nF.2d 1343, 1355–56 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds,\n502 U.S. 1071 (1992); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l,\nInc., 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Waste Indus.,\nInc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument\nthat “[§ 6972] was designed to control pollution only in emer-\ngency situations”); Cox, 256 F.3d at 299–301; Price v. United\nStates Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994); Burlington N.\nand Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1019–22 (10th Cir.\n2007); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1014–\n15 (11th Cir. 2004). We now join those courts and explicitly\nembrace the core content of their interpretation.\n The district court therefore used an incorrect legal stand-\nard to evaluate the Liebharts’ argument that PCBs from the\ndemolition may present an imminent and substantial danger\nto their health and that of their tenants. It did not cite any of\nthe cases we listed above, but instead relied on a single district\ncourt decision from a circuit that has not yet addressed the\nissue. See Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *5 (quoting Foster, 922\nF. Supp. at 662 (“While there can be no question that the levels\nof contamination present at the Site may warrant future re-\nsponse action, the plaintiff cannot establish either a current\nrisk of substantial or serious threatened harm, or some neces-\nsity for action.”)).\n That error undercuts several of the reasons the district\ncourt gave for rejecting the Liebharts’ RCRA claim. For exam-\nple, the district court cursorily adopted a passing statement\nwe made over twenty-five years ago that “[t]he [EPA’s] ac-\ncepted safe level of PCBs in the environment is fifty parts per\nmillion,” id. (quoting Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor\n\f12 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nServ., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1994)), to create a require-\nment that the Liebharts show that PCB contamination on their\nproperty met that threshold. But there is no requirement in\nRCRA for a plaintiff to make “a particular quantitative show-\ning as a sine qua non for liability.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 260; see\nalso Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. Only one circuit has come to an\narguably contrary conclusion. In Price v. United States Navy,\n818 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (S.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d 39 F.3d 1011 (9th\nCir. 1994), the district court required RCRA plaintiffs to show\nthat “the level of contaminants [was] above levels that are con-\nsidered acceptable by the State.” But as the Interfaith court\nnoted, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion affirming the district\ncourt’s judgment did not discuss that requirement. RCRA\ndoes not require that plaintiffs demonstrate contamination\nabove some agency-derived threshold level of concentration.\n399 F.3d at 260–61. It merely requires that they show that con-\ntaminants on the property are seriously dangerous to human\nhealth (or will be, given prolonged exposure over time). See\nCox, 256 F.3d at 299–300 (“an endangerment is ‘substantial’ if\nit is ‘serious’” (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019)).\n That’s especially true when the standard is taken out of\ncontext. The district court relied on Cincinnati Ins. Co. to sup-\nport its contention that contamination below the threshold\nlevel of fifty parts per million (“ppm”) does not qualify as a\nregulatory violation, thereby contradicting Woodyard’s opin-\nion regarding safe levels of PCBs and providing the grounds\nfor excluding it. In that case, we evaluated whether an insur-\nance company was required to indemnify its insured for dam-\nages arising out of PCB contamination at an industrial site.\nThe EPA had identified the insured as potentially liable under\nthe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,\nand Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. In\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 13\n\nthat context, we noted that the contaminated site contained\nPCBs concentrated at levels up to 58,000 ppm, well above the\nEPA’s general regulatory threshold of fifty ppm. 40 F.3d at 148\n(citing 40 C.F.R. § 761.60).\n But that regulation, still in effect today, identifies indus-\ntrial equipment and other wastes contaminated at levels\nabove fifty ppm and requires special procedures for their stor-\nage and disposal. It does not unequivocally state that PCBs\nconcentrated at levels lower than fifty ppm are safe for human\nexposure. Neither Cincinnati Ins. Co. nor the EPA regulation\nstand for the proposition that PCBs concentrated at forty-nine\nppm on residential property do not present a substantial endan-\ngerment to the health of the residents. That is especially ap-\nparent when we consider that the same set of regulations dis-\ntinguishes between low and high-occupancy areas and re-\nquires that, in high-occupancy areas, bulk PCB remediation\nwaste, such as soil, be cleaned up to levels of concentration at\nor below one ppm. § 761.61(a)(4)(i)(A). Section 761.3 confirms\nthat the term “high-occupancy area” includes residences. See\nalso § 761.123 (regulating spills of PCBs concentrated at fifty\nppm or greater but emphasizing that “[t]he concentration of\nPCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concentration in the\nmaterial spilled as opposed to the concentration of PCBs in\nthe material onto which the PCBs were spilled”). “Proof of\ncontamination in excess of [agency] standards may support a\nfinding of liability, and may alone suffice for liability in some\ncases, but its required use is without justification in the stat-\nute.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 261.\n This is not to say that all the plaintiffs must do is to show\nsome bit of soil on their property that tests positive for PCBs\n\f14 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nabove one ppm (or even above the purported lower Wiscon-\nsin DNR standard, which the defendants seem to have\nacknowledged in their state-approved clean-up plan). Of\ncourse, there must be accompanying evidence that establishes\nsome connection between the existing contaminants and\nsome imminent and substantial endangerment to health. 1 But\nthe Liebharts attempted to provide such evidence, and the\ndistrict court held the bar higher than necessary under\nRCRA’s standard. In criticizing expert witness Carpenter’s\nstatement that “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that\ndoes not increase the risk of disease,” the district court re-\njected Carpenter’s citation to studies showing the general\nrisks of PCB exposure because “the Liebharts do not cite any\nevidence that they have been exposed to PCBs.” Liebhart, 2018\nWL 1583296 at *5. Moreover, the district court concluded that\n“[t]he Liebharts do not contend that they can prove an immi-\nnent and substantial danger with evidence of health problems\nthey have already suffered.” Id. at *6.\n As we noted in Albany Bank, “[i]mminence does not re-\nquire an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\n\n\n 1 On appeal, the Liebharts contend that there is no separate require-\nment for expert witness testimony because the photos and videos they\nhave submitted into evidence suffice to prove their RCRA claim. The de-\nfendants push back on that argument, insisting that many of the issues are\nbeyond the competence of lay fact-finders and require the assistance of\nexperts to address. See, e.g., C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827,\n838 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Given the complex nature of this case, … [and w]ith\nno experts to prove causation … the appellants cannot prove their toxic-\ntort case under [state] law.”) Because the district court did not make a fac-\ntual finding as to whether this case is sufficient complex to require expert\ntestimony, and because we remand for reconsideration of a separate legal\nissue, we need not reach that question today.\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 15\n\nharm.” 310 F.3d at 973. Although the Supreme Court has in-\nstructed that “[a]n endangerment can only be ‘imminent’ if it\n‘threaten[s] to occur immediately,’” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485\n(quoting Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary of English Language\n1245 (2d ed. 1934)), it qualified that statement when it approv-\ningly quoted the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the statu-\ntory term “implies that there must be a threat which is present\nnow, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until\nlater.” Id. at 486 (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019).\nWe take that to mean that the Liebharts must show that there\nare PCBs currently on the property that have the potential to\nsubstantially threaten their health at some point in the future\nif they continue to occupy the premises and prolong their ex-\nposure. On remand, the district court should reevaluate its ex-\nclusion of Dr. Carpenter’s assertion regarding PCB safety un-\nder the standards we have outlined above and determine\nwhether, if admissible, the report demonstrates that a sub-\nstantial and imminent threat to the Liebharts’ health may be\npresent.\n B. TSCA Likewise Requires No Heightened Showing\n TSCA authorizes a separate, private cause of action allow-\ning “any person [to] commence a civil action … against any\nperson … who is alleged to be in violation of … any rule\npromulgated under” the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1). The EPA\npromulgated the PCB regulations in question pursuant to\nstatutory authority under TSCA, designating PCBs as “haz-\nardous waste” and controlling their manufacture, use, stor-\nage, and disposal. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 761. The Liebharts’ TSCA\nclaim alleged that the defendants violated those regulations,\nthereby authorizing the district court to “restrain [the] viola-\ntion.” § 2619(a). Unlike RCRA, which authorizes mandatory\n\f16 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\ninjunctions to compel remediation of previous violations,\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions to stop ongoing\nviolations. Id. The defendants argued that there was no longer\nan ongoing violation, as demolition was complete by the time\nthe Liebharts filed their claim. 2\n The purported violation was based on 40 C.F.R. § 761.123,\nwhich, as we noted above, regulates “spills” of PCB materials\nconcentrated at levels above fifty ppm. The district court cor-\nrectly noted that the Liebharts had not shown any evidence\nthat any PCBs had been “spilled” onto their property (by\nmeans of dust migration) at that level of concentration, and it\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on that basis.\n But the district court seems to have overlooked the follow-\ning sentence in the regulation, which directs that “[t]he con-\ncentration of PCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concen-\ntration in the material spilled as opposed to the concentration\nof the material onto which the PCBs were spilled.” Id. The\nLiebharts’ complaint seems to have alleged that the concrete\nfloor of the factory, which contained at least some contami-\nnated areas above the fifty-ppm threshold, was demolished\nand “spilled” onto the Liebharts’ property. By the plain text\nof the regulation, there is no need to show that contaminants\non the Liebharts’ property are themselves concentrated above\nfifty ppm so long as the original material that was the source\nof that spill met the criteria. On remand, the district court may\nagain determine that there is no ongoing violation, but it must\n\n 2 The district court determined that the Liebharts waived this claim\nby failing to engage the defendants’ argument that there was no “ongoing\nviolation.” But the court chose to analyze the merits of the claim regardless\nof waiver and reached its conclusion on an alternative basis. We likewise\nset aside the issue of waiver to reach the district court’s merits analysis.\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 17\n\nfirst determine whether the alleged violation comes within\nthe meaning of § 761.123 in the first place.\n C. The District Court Should Reconsider the Remaining Issues\non Remand\n Now that we have clarified the standard the plaintiffs\nmust meet, we turn to the remaining procedural issues the\nLiebharts have asked to us to address.\n 1. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding\nWoodyard’s Testimony\n “The summary-judgment decision here turned [in large\npart] on the district court’s conclusion that [the] expert testi-\nmony was inadmissible. Whether the district court applied\nthe appropriate legal framework for evaluating expert testi-\nmony is reviewed de novo, but the court’s choice of relevant\nfactors within that framework and its ultimate conclusion as\nto admissibility are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Lees v.\nCarthage College, 714 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 2013). When a dis-\ntrict court is “[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testi-\nmony … the trial judge must determine at the outset …\nwhether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific\nknowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or\ndetermine a fact in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,\n509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). “The trial court must have … latitude\nin deciding how to test an expert’s reliability.” Kumho Tire Co.,\nLtd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).\n The district court was well within its discretion to exclude\nthe proffered testimony of expert witness Woodyard. Beyond\nthe problem that the plaintiffs seemed to have waived this is-\nsue in the district court by failing to engage with the defend-\nants’ arguments in their motion to strike the testimony,\n\f18 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nWoodyard’s analysis suffers from a critical flaw that stems\nfrom the way in which the parties have framed this lawsuit.\nThe district court briefly noted in its opinion that “both sides\nassume that none of the defendants can be held liable for any\nPCB contamination on the Liebharts’ property that occurred\nbefore the demolition began, so the court will make the same\nassumption.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *1. That’s a curious\nchoice. RCRA permits the Liebharts to obtain injunctive relief\nfrom the owner of the facility for any cognizable contamina-\ntion, regardless of whether the PCBs migrated onto their\nproperty before or after the demolition occurred. See 42 U.S.C.\n§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (authorizing suit against “any person … who\nhas contributed … to the past or present handling … or dis-\nposal” of hazardous waste); see also Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486\n(“RCRA contains no statute of limitations.”).\n But because the Liebharts restricted their claims to PCBs\nthat allegedly migrated onto their property via the dust from\nthe 2015 demolition, they necessarily excluded claims result-\ning from PCBs that may have gotten onto their property dur-\ning the previous century. The district court correctly noted\nthat Woodyard’s expert opinion could not distinguish be-\ntween these two alternatives, as both sets of contaminants\noriginated from the same source. There was even evidence\nshowing that PCBs existed in the soil beneath the Liebharts’\nasphalt driveway—Woodyard could not explain how that\nmight have occurred as the result of dust blowing in the wind\nas opposed to seepage over the course of years before any\ndemolition occurred.\n Perhaps the Liebharts decided to frame their claims in this\nway because they wanted to go after defendants TRC and\nApollo, who would not be liable for what happened before\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 19\n\ndemolition. Or perhaps some element of their state-law\nclaims, which we have not addressed, required them to con-\nstrict the scope. They did not explain their reasoning to us (or\nit seems, to the district court). But the distinction makes it dif-\nficult for Woodyard to make his case, given that he did not\n“adequately account[] for obvious alternative explanations.”\nGopalratnam v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 787 (7th Cir.\n2017). Viewed in this light, the district court was within its\ndiscretion to exclude the testimony as unreliable and unhelp-\nful to the trier of fact. The district court may choose to rethink\nthat evaluation on remand under the legal standards we out-\nlined above, but it may well reach the same conclusion.\n 2. The District Court Should Reconsider Its Denial of Injunctive\nRelief\n The district court denied injunctive relief to the Liebharts\nbecause the defendants had already agreed to a clean-up plan\nthat had been approved by the Wisconsin DNR. We review\nthat decision for an abuse of discretion. See AMI Int’l, Inc. v.\nDatacard Corp. 106 F.3d 1342, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997) (remanding\ngrant of RCRA injunction).\n As we mentioned above, RCRA authorizes district courts\nto issue either mandatory or prohibitory injunctions, while\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions. “[I]t is appro-\npriate ‘to give great deference to the district court’s decision\nas to the precise equitable relief necessary in a particular\ncase.’” Bowes v. Ind. Sec. of State, 837 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir.\n2016) (quoting Gjersten v. Bd. Of Election Com’rs for City of Chi-\ncago, 791 F.2d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1986)). That is especially true\nwhen a plaintiff requests a mandatory injunction, which “im-\nposes significant burdens on the defendant and requires care-\nful consideration of the intrusiveness of the ordered act, as\n\f20 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nwell as the difficulties that may be encountered in supervising\nthe enjoined party’s compliance with the court’s order.” Kart-\nman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir.\n2011).\n Considering SPX’s decision to formulate a clean-up plan\nand obtain approval from the state agency, the district court\ndetermined that there was no need for separate, federally-su-\npervised remediation. It reached that conclusion even while\nassuming that the defendants were in violation of either\nRCRA or TSCA, despite the fact it found no such violation.\nOther courts have determined that the existence of a parallel\nplan of remediation supervised by the state does not neces-\nsarily prevent a federal district court from granting an injunc-\ntion if it finds the state agency’s actions to be insufficient to\nremedy the violation of federal law. See, e.g., Interfaith, 399\nF.3d at 264–68. On the other hand, the same courts have also\nupheld denials of injunctions in similar situations when the\ndistrict court finds that the parallel plan is adequate to the\ntask. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735\nF.3d 131, 139–40 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Interfaith). We\nrecently reached the same conclusion. See LAJIM, LLC v. Gen.\nElec. Co., No. 18-1522, 2019 WL 1011021, at *4–11 (7th Cir. Mar.\n4, 2019) (“[T]he district court correctly held that it has discre-\ntion to award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not re-\nquired to order relief after a finding of liability,” particularly\nin light of ongoing relief supervised by a state environmental\nagency).\n Here, the district court determined that SPX’s existing\nplan was sufficient and that the Liebharts had not “iden-\ntif[ied] any way that SPX’s plan [was] deficient or violate[d]\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 21\n\nfederal law.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *7. We agree. Alt-\nhough the Liebharts point to certain statistical sampling re-\nquirements outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 761.125 and contend that\nSPX’s existing plan fails to meet those requirements, the dis-\ntrict court noted that SPX’s plan includes further sampling of\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ property. It emphasized that “the\nLiebharts do not otherwise explain why SPX’s proposed sam-\npling scheme is substantively inadequate.” Liebhart, 2018 WL\n1583296 at *7. We see no evidence that compels us to contra-\ndict that factual finding.\n However, in light of the legal standards we outlined\nabove, we ask the district court to reconsider its decision to\ndeny injunctive relief on remand. Because the bar for estab-\nlishing an imminent and substantial danger is lower than the\ndistrict court believed when evaluating the request for an in-\njunction, it would be prudent to reassess whether the DNR-\napproved plan adequately remedies harms that may come\nwithin RCRA’s scope. See LAJIM, 2019 WL 1011021 at *6\n(“[O]nce a court finds a defendant liable for creating a risk of\nimminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the case\nthat injunctive relief is warranted. But that is not always the\ncase.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).\n 3. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying\nLeave to Amend the Complaint.\n We review a denial of leave to amend a complaint for\nabuse of discretion. Life Plans, Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co.,\n800 F.3d 343, 357 (7th Cir. 2015). District courts are to “freely\ngive leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.\nP. 15(a)(2). “The Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to\nrequire a district court to allow amendment unless there is a\ngood reason—futility, undue delay, undue prejudice, or bad\n\f22 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nfaith—for denying leave to amend.” Life Plans, 800 F.3d at 357\n(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The district\ncourt in this case identified two of those grounds as bases for\ndenial: futility and undue delay. While we disagree with the\nfutility analysis, we concur with the finding of undue delay\nand decline to reverse.\n We begin with the question of futility. Both statutes con-\ntain advance-notice requirements that citizen plaintiffs must\nobserve prior to filing RCRA or TSCA suits. They require\nthose plaintiffs to notify the EPA 60–90 days in advance of fil-\ning the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2); 15 U.S.C.\n§ 2619(b)(1)(A). But the district court chose to apply the re-\nquirements not only to the filing of the complaint, but also to\nany subsequent amendments that sought to add new RCRA\nor TSCA counts. Although the Liebharts complied with the\nrequirements prior to filing their original complaint in April\n2016, they gave no new notice to the EPA before filing for\nleave to amend in February 2018. The district court held that,\nbecause the prior notice did not contain any mention of bur-\nied PCBs on the SPX property, it was insufficient to alert the\nEPA to the particular violation the Liebharts sought to include\nin the amended complaint.\n The notice provisions serve two purposes. “First, notice al-\nlows Government agencies to take responsibility for enforc-\ning environmental regulations, thus obviating the need for\ncitizen suits. … Second, notice gives the alleged violator ‘an\nopportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the\nAct[s] and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit.’”\nHallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (quoting\nGwaltney of Smithfield, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 23\n\nU.S. 49, 60 (1987)). The district court’s decision to require no-\ntice for an amendment to a complaint fulfilled neither pur-\npose. By the time the Liebharts attempted to amend their com-\nplaint, the EPA had been on notice of alleged PCB contamina-\ntion at the SPX property for over two years—and it had de-\nclined to get involved. Moreover, it was unlikely that the de-\nfendants would resolve the alleged violation to avoid being\nsued when they were already in the midst of an extended law-\nsuit with the same plaintiffs. See AM Int’l, 106 F.3d at 1351\n(“[T]he delay period is designed to allow a [defendant] a pe-\nriod in which to clean up its act and avoid litigation. [This de-\nfendant] was clearly not interested in using the delay period\nto resolve the dispute without going to court.”); see also Dague,\n935 F.2d at 1351 (“There is no need to maintain a window of\nopportunity for the government to take the lead enforcement\nrole … when a citizen, acting as a private attorney general, has\nalready lawfully assumed the lead role in bringing a … claim\nagainst the same facility.”) (quoting Dague v. City of Burling-\nton, 733 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D. Vt. 1990)). When the original notice\nis “sufficiently specific to inform the alleged violator [and the\nagency] about what it is doing wrong, so that it will know\nwhat corrective actions will avert a lawsuit,” Atl. States Legal\nFound., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir.\n1994), there is no need to require a second round of advance\nnotice for an amended complaint in the same litigation.\n But an error in the futility analysis alone does not neces-\nsarily constitute an abuse of discretion on the whole. In addi-\ntion to futility, the district court cited undue delay and preju-\ndice in its decision to deny leave to amend. “[D]elay by itself\nis normally an insufficient reason to deny a motion for leave\nto amend. Delay must be coupled with some other reason.\nTypically, that reason … is prejudice to the non-moving\n\f24 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nparty.” Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 793\n(7th Cir. 2004). The district court cited the Liebharts’ admis-\nsion that they learned of the possible burial of contaminated\nconcrete on the SPX property on October 11, 2017 but failed\nto seek leave to amend their complaint until February 22,\n2018. During that more than four-month period, the parties\nsubmitted and briefed their cross-motions for summary judg-\nment, and by February, trial was only three months away. The\nLiebharts provided no justification for their delay.\n In response, the Liebharts contend that there was no un-\ndue prejudice to the defendants: by the time they filed their\nmotion, five weeks of discovery still remained. We disagree.\nWhile the district court’s explanation of prejudice was fairly\nshort, even if the district court had failed to articulate a find-\ning of prejudice altogether, we might still “affirm providing\nthat ‘the prejudice that would result from such amendment\nwas apparent.’” Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 613 (7th\nCir. 2002) (quoting Feldman v. Am. Mem’l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d\n783, 793 (7th Cir. 1999)). In Park, the plaintiff waited six\nmonths to move for leave to amend a complaint after she\nknew (or should have known) of the additional alleged viola-\ntion. Id. Because trial was approaching, we concluded that the\ndistrict court was well within its discretion to deny leave. Id.;\nsee also Perrian v. O’Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194–95 (7th Cir. 1992)\n(“Because substantive amendments shortly before trial serve\nto defeat the public’s interest in speedy resolution of legal dis-\nputes, ‘[a] district court judge is entitled, in such circum-\nstances, to refuse to allow a plaintiff’s amendment.’” (quoting\nCampbell v. Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co., 893 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir.\n1990)) (internal citation omitted)).\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 25\n\n On the contrary, in Life Plans, we found no undue delay\nwhen a plaintiff promptly moved to amend its complaint just\nten days after learning of the factual basis for its new count\nduring discovery. 800 F.3d at 358. The Liebharts delayed more\nthan four months in the same circumstances. Although dis-\ncovery was ongoing at the time of the Liebharts’ motion, the\nparties had already briefed their dispositive motions, and the\ndistrict court was preparing its summary-judgment order that\nwould ultimately dispose of the case. We therefore cannot say\nthat denial of leave for undue delay and prejudice was an\nabuse of the district court’s discretion. Of course, the district\ncourt may permit an amendment on remand if the interests of\njustice so require.\n III. CONCLUSION\n Although the district court properly exercised its discre-\ntion on the various evidentiary and procedural issues the\nplaintiffs have raised, its analysis on the merits was narrower\nthan the statutes demand. It may reach the same conclusions\non reconsideration, but the parties should have another op-\nportunity to litigate whether a substantial and imminent en-\ndangerment to health exists in this case under the standards\nwe have outlined. We therefore VACATE the order of the dis-\ntrict court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent\nwith this opinion. 3\n\n\n\n\n 3 The Liebharts also challenge the taxation of costs against them by the\n\nclerk of the district court. Because we vacate the district court’s judgment,\nwe assume that the imposition of costs is automatically vacated and so do\nnot reach that issue. The clerk of the district court is free to reassess costs\non remand as the case proceeds.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\nWILLIAM LIEBHART & NANCY LIEBHART,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nSPX CORPORATION, TRC ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION, &\\nAPOLLO DISMANTLING SERVICES, INC.\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-700 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n KANNE, Circuit Judge. William and Nancy Liebhart to-\\ngether own three houses on the same block in Watertown,\\nWisconsin. Besides a few other houses, the rest of the block\\nwas previously occupied by an abandoned transformer fac-\\ntory, last owned by SPX Corporation. In 2014, SPX demol-\\nished the building with the assistance of TRC Environmental\\nCorporation and Apollo Dismantling Services (collectively,\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n“the defendants”). The Liebharts allege that dust and debris\\ncontaining toxic chemicals migrated onto their properties,\\ncontaminating their yards and jeopardizing their health and\\nthe health of their tenants.\\n The Liebharts sued under federal statutes authorizing pri-\\nvate rights of action for environmental contamination. They\\nalso brought various state-law claims. Following discovery\\nand the submission of expert witness reports, the district\\ncourt denied the Liebharts’ motion for partial summary judg-\\nment and granted summary judgment to the defendants with\\ncosts. Although the district court adequately evaluated the ex-\\npert witnesses and did not abuse its discretion in its proce-\\ndural decisions, the court set the bar unnecessarily high for\\nthe plaintiffs to show a violation of the applicable federal stat-\\nutes. For that reason, we vacate the district court’s judgment\\nand remand for reconsideration.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n The factory dates to the 1920s and was used to manufac-\\nture various industrial equipment. Most relevant to our pur-\\npose, the factory manufactured power transformers contain-\\ning polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a carcinogenic chemi-\\ncal banned by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1979.\\nSee Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Pro-\\ncessing, Distribution in Commerce, and Use Prohibitions, 44\\nFed. Reg. 31,514 (May 31, 1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 761).\\nThe parties all agree that the facility has not manufactured or\\nhandled any items containing PCBs since 1971, and that it\\nshut down completely in 2005.\\n But even with all the products and manufacturing equip-\\nment removed, PCB contaminants remained in the facility. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 3\\n\\n2009, SPX retained TRC and another company (not named as\\na defendant in this suit) to study the property and determine\\nthe extent and precise location of any PCB contamination.\\nThose studies revealed that the concrete floor of the factory\\nwas generally contaminated, with concentrated amounts lo-\\ncated in specific areas throughout the site.\\n Several years went by. In 2014, SPX decided to move ahead\\nwith the demolition, retaining Apollo to conduct the work\\nand TRC to supervise the project. That November, the defend-\\nants timely proposed a self-implementing cleanup plan to the\\nEPA, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 761.61(a). The trouble began\\nas demolition commenced in January 2015. The Liebharts al-\\nlege that Apollo demolished the building recklessly, failing to\\nuse appropriate safety methods to control the dust generated\\nby demolition equipment. They assert that their properties\\nwere covered in dust, and they submitted hundreds of photos\\nand videos of dust from the facility blowing toward their\\nhomes to support their allegation.\\n The Liebharts filed a complaint with the local government\\nin February. They also collected a dust-covered sample of\\nsnow from their yard and placed it in a mason jar. Soon there-\\nafter, a representative of the Wisconsin Department of Natu-\\nral Resources (“DNR”) contacted the defendants about the\\nLiebharts’ concerns. In April, TRC collected samples of the\\nsurface soil (roughly down to eight inches below ground) on\\nboth the industrial and residential properties. Sure enough,\\nthe properties tested positive for the presence of PCBs. In Au-\\ngust, the Liebharts vacated the property on advice of their\\nphysician to avoid further exposure to the chemicals. Frus-\\ntrated with the lack of action, William Liebhart had the snow\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nsample tested for PCBs. Although the sample did, in fact, con-\\ntain PCBs, the irregular manner of collection and storage\\nspoiled the sample, and the laboratory declined to endorse the\\nresults with any confidence.\\n In September 2015, SPX submitted a plan to remediate the\\ncontamination to the DNR. In turn, the Liebharts sued in fed-\\neral district court in October. The complaint sought injunctive\\nrelief under both the Resource Conservation and Recovery\\nAct (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and the Toxic Substances\\nControl Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. In addition, the\\nLiebharts brought a host of state-law claims under supple-\\nmental jurisdiction, including strict liability, negligence, tres-\\npass, nuisance, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.\\n During discovery, the Liebharts submitted to further test-\\ning for PCBs both in their yard and inside their home. They\\nalso underwent blood testing. Although the external surveys\\nrevealed a more comprehensive picture of the extent to which\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ properties contained PCBs, the in-\\nternal sampling and blood tests were both negative for con-\\ntamination. The Liebharts later learned in October 2017 that\\nthe defendants allegedly buried some of the concrete remains\\non-site rather than removing them to a toxic waste dump as\\nrequired by the EPA-approved clean-up plan.\\n The parties prepared and submitted the reports of the ex-\\npert witnesses who were to testify at trial. Among those, three\\nare pertinent to our discussion. First, the Liebharts submitted\\na report by John Woodyard, a licensed professional engineer.\\nHis report included a description of standard methods used\\nwhen demolishing PCB-contaminated buildings and an anal-\\nysis of the purported ways in which the defendants deviated\\nfrom those practices, thereby causing the contamination of the\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 5\\n\\nresidences. The Liebharts’ second expert was Dr. David Car-\\npenter, a public health physician who opined on ways in\\nwhich the Liebharts might have been exposed to PCBs and the\\npotential health effects of continuing exposure. He concluded\\nthat “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not\\nincrease the risk of disease.” Finally, the defendants submit-\\nted a report prepared by Dr. Russell Keenan, a toxicologist\\nwho analyzed the survey data and determined that it was im-\\npossible to determine whether the presence of PCBs on the\\nLiebharts’ property was due to the recent demolition or to\\nrunoff that occurred over the last several decades.\\n In December 2017, the Liebharts moved for partial sum-\\nmary judgment on the issue of causation, reserving the issue\\nof damages for a jury trial. The defendants cross-moved for\\nsummary judgment; they also filed a motion to exclude the\\ntestimony of plaintiffs’ experts Woodyard and Carpenter un-\\nder Fed. R. Evid. 702. In February 2018, after those motions\\nwere fully briefed to the court, the Liebharts sought leave to\\namend their complaint. In light of the information they ob-\\ntained through discovery regarding the burial of concrete on\\nthe property, they intended to allege separate RCRA and\\nTSCA violations and seek an enlargement of the proposed in-\\njunction to include removal of that material.\\n The district court issued its decisions on March 30. First,\\nthe court granted in part the defendants’ motion to exclude\\nthe plaintiffs’ expert witness reports. The court explained that\\nWoodyard’s report was “equivocal” as to the issue of causa-\\ntion; it hedged on whether the contaminants came from dem-\\nolition or from runoff during the preceding decades. See\\nLiebhart v. SPX Corp., No. 16-cv-700-jdp, 2018 WL 1583296 at\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n*3–4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2018). Second, the report “over-\\nlook[ed] too much significant evidence” and failed to account\\nfor “obvious alternative explanations” in determining the\\ncause of the contamination. Id. at *4 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702\\nadvisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments). Finally, the\\ncourt noted that Woodyard’s report depended on “unreliable\\nor uninformative” evidence, including the Liebharts’ defec-\\ntive snow sample, while omitting other evidence such as grass\\nclippings and a chromatogram that allegedly detected PCBs\\non the property. Id. at *4–5. For those reasons, the court ex-\\ncluded Woodyard’s report in its entirety. Id. at *5.\\n Although the court admitted the vast majority of Dr. Car-\\npenter’s report, it struck Carpenter’s conclusion that “there is\\nno ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not increase the\\nrisk of disease” as unsupported by the medical studies he\\ncited. Id. at *5. In doing so, the court pointed to the absence of\\nPCBs inside the Liebharts’ home and in their blood, suggest-\\ning that the Liebharts had not actually been exposed to PCBs\\nand so could not have suffered harm. Id. at 5–6.\\n With that expert testimony off the table, the district court\\nconcluded that the Liebharts failed to present any admissible\\nevidence to support their RCRA and TSCA claims. The re-\\nmaining photos and videos certainly showed dust migrating\\nonto the Liebharts’ property, but there was no reliable evi-\\ndence proving that the dust contained PCBs. Given that any\\nPCBs detected in the soil may have been there prior to the\\ndemolition, the lack of evidence doomed the Liebharts’ case.\\nThe court denied partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs,\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal\\nclaims, and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 7\\n\\n The district court also denied the Liebharts’ petition for\\nleave to amend their complaint on two grounds. First, alt-\\nhough the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs discovered\\nthe factual basis for the new counts over a year after filing the\\ninitial complaint, it also noted that they took an additional\\nfour months thereafter to seek leave to amend. During that\\nintervening period, the parties had submitted and briefed\\ntheir motions for summary judgment, and the trial date was\\nfast approaching. It found their petition untimely. Second, the\\ndistrict court determined that the new claims were futile un-\\nder both statutes' advance-notice requirements.\\n The plaintiffs immediately appealed. Several months after\\nthe judgment, the clerk of the district court imposed costs on\\nthe Liebharts in the amount of $46,320.02. The Liebharts sep-\\narately appealed that decision. We consolidated the two ap-\\npeals and now consider them together.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n The Liebharts raise five issues for our consideration. First,\\nthey argue that the district court erred in excluding the opin-\\nions of expert witnesses Woodyard in full and Carpenter in\\npart. As part of that argument, they allege that the district\\ncourt failed to apply the same stringent standard to the de-\\nfendants’ expert Keenan. Second, they contend that summary\\njudgment was inappropriate because, even absent the testi-\\nmony of their expert witnesses, they submitted adequate pho-\\ntographic and scientific evidence to state a valid claim under\\nRCRA and TSCA. Third, they challenge the district court’s de-\\nnial of injunctive relief in light of deficiencies they have iden-\\ntified in SPX’s state-approved clean-up plan. Fourth, they ar-\\ngue that the district court abused its discretion in denying\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nleave to amend their complaint. Finally, they challenge the\\nimposition of costs.\\n But there’s a larger issue looming in the background. The\\ndistrict court’s opinion operates under the assumption that\\nRCRA plaintiffs must demonstrate “an imminent and sub-\\nstantial danger with evidence of health problems they have\\nalready suffered.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *6. Relying\\nprimarily on Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C.\\n1996), the district court set a high bar for RCRA plaintiffs,\\nholding that “it doesn’t follow necessarily that there is an im-\\nminent and substantial risk of harm simply because there is\\nsome amount of PCBs on the property.” Liebhart 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *5. We review that question of law, which was the\\nunderlying basis for the award of summary judgment, de\\nnovo. Daugherty v. Harrington, 906 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n A. RCRA Requires Only that Harm “May” Be Imminent\\n The question of how much harm a plaintiff must prove to\\nmake out a prima facie violation of RCRA has led to much dis-\\ncussion among the circuits. We have yet to tackle that issue\\nhead on, so the district court necessarily had to look else-\\nwhere for guidance. Passed in 1976, “RCRA is a comprehen-\\nsive environmental statute that empowers [the] EPA to regu-\\nlate hazardous wastes from cradle to grave.” City of Chicago v.\\nEnvtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). The statute’s “pri-\\nmary purpose … is to reduce the generation of hazardous\\nwaste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and dis-\\nposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, ‘so as to\\nminimize the present and future threat to human health and\\nthe environment.’” Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479,\\n483 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 9\\n\\n Although the EPA has the primary responsibility for en-\\nforcing the law, the statute, “like other environmental laws,\\n… contains a citizen suit provision, § 6972, which permits pri-\\nvate citizens to enforce its provisions in some circumstances.”\\nId. at 484. As relevant to this case, the statute provides that\\n any person may commence a civil action on his own\\n behalf … against any person, … including … any\\n past or present owner or operator of a treatment,\\n storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or\\n who is contributing to the past or present handling,\\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any\\n solid or hazardous waste which may present an im-\\n minent and substantial endangerment to health or\\n the environment.\\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Notably, Con-\\ngress amended the language in 1980 by substituting the\\nphrase “may present” for the original 1976 wording “is pre-\\nsenting.” Maine People’s All. and Nat. Res. Def. Council v.\\nMallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Solid\\nWaste Disposal Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–482, § 25, 94 Stat. 2334,\\n2348). The section authorizes district courts to grant injunctive\\nrelief and “order [a violator] to take such other action as may\\nbe necessary” to remediate the endangerment. Id.; see also Me-\\nghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (“Under a plain reading of this remedial\\nscheme, a private citizen suing under § 6972(a)(1)(B) could\\nseek a mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible\\nparty to ‘take action’ by attending to the cleanup and proper\\ndisposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one\\nthat ‘restrains’ a responsible party from further violating\\nRCRA.”); Avondale Fed. Sav. Bank v. Amoco Oil Co., 170 F.3d\\n692, 694 (7th Cir. 1999).\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n The critical question in this case is how to determine\\nwhether alleged contamination “may present an imminent\\nand substantial endangerment to health.” § 6972(a)(1)(b). We\\ntouched on this question only briefly in Albany Bank & Trust\\nCo. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2002).\\nThere, we first outlined the elements of a prima facie RCRA\\nclaim: “a plaintiff must allege (1) that the defendant has gen-\\nerated solid or hazardous waste, (2) that the defendant is con-\\ntributing to or has contributed to the handling of this waste,\\nand (3) that this waste may present an imminent and substan-\\ntial danger to health or the environment.” Id. (citing Cox v.\\nCity of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 2001)). We then ob-\\nserved, interpreting the final element, that “[i]mminence does\\nnot require an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\nharm.” Id. (citing Cox, 256 F.3d at 299). That is the extent of\\nour circuit precedent on the “may present” language con-\\ntained in § 6972(a)(1)(B).\\n But our sister circuits have engaged with this question in\\ngreat depth. In the first major case interpreting the provision,\\nthe Third Circuit emphasized that the statute “enhanced the\\ncourts’ traditional equitable powers by authorizing the issu-\\nance of injunctions when there is but a risk of harm, a more\\nlenient standard than the traditional requirement of threat-\\nened irreparable harm.” United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204,\\n211 (3d Cir. 1982). The court found the statutory language\\n“unequivocal,” demonstrating that Congress “intended to\\nconfer upon the courts the authority to grant affirmative eq-\\nuitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate” the risks\\nposed by toxic waste. Id. at 213–14.\\n In the subsequent decades, several other circuits adopted\\nand further developed the same interpretation of § 6972. See\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 11\\n\\nMallinckrodt, 471 F.3d at 277; Dague v. City of Burlington, 935\\nF.2d 1343, 1355–56 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds,\\n502 U.S. 1071 (1992); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l,\\nInc., 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Waste Indus.,\\nInc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument\\nthat “[§ 6972] was designed to control pollution only in emer-\\ngency situations”); Cox, 256 F.3d at 299–301; Price v. United\\nStates Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994); Burlington N.\\nand Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1019–22 (10th Cir.\\n2007); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1014–\\n15 (11th Cir. 2004). We now join those courts and explicitly\\nembrace the core content of their interpretation.\\n The district court therefore used an incorrect legal stand-\\nard to evaluate the Liebharts’ argument that PCBs from the\\ndemolition may present an imminent and substantial danger\\nto their health and that of their tenants. It did not cite any of\\nthe cases we listed above, but instead relied on a single district\\ncourt decision from a circuit that has not yet addressed the\\nissue. See Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *5 (quoting Foster, 922\\nF. Supp. at 662 (“While there can be no question that the levels\\nof contamination present at the Site may warrant future re-\\nsponse action, the plaintiff cannot establish either a current\\nrisk of substantial or serious threatened harm, or some neces-\\nsity for action.”)).\\n That error undercuts several of the reasons the district\\ncourt gave for rejecting the Liebharts’ RCRA claim. For exam-\\nple, the district court cursorily adopted a passing statement\\nwe made over twenty-five years ago that “[t]he [EPA’s] ac-\\ncepted safe level of PCBs in the environment is fifty parts per\\nmillion,” id. (quoting Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nServ., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1994)), to create a require-\\nment that the Liebharts show that PCB contamination on their\\nproperty met that threshold. But there is no requirement in\\nRCRA for a plaintiff to make “a particular quantitative show-\\ning as a sine qua non for liability.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 260; see\\nalso Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. Only one circuit has come to an\\narguably contrary conclusion. In Price v. United States Navy,\\n818 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (S.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d 39 F.3d 1011 (9th\\nCir. 1994), the district court required RCRA plaintiffs to show\\nthat “the level of contaminants [was] above levels that are con-\\nsidered acceptable by the State.” But as the Interfaith court\\nnoted, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion affirming the district\\ncourt’s judgment did not discuss that requirement. RCRA\\ndoes not require that plaintiffs demonstrate contamination\\nabove some agency-derived threshold level of concentration.\\n399 F.3d at 260–61. It merely requires that they show that con-\\ntaminants on the property are seriously dangerous to human\\nhealth (or will be, given prolonged exposure over time). See\\nCox, 256 F.3d at 299–300 (“an endangerment is ‘substantial’ if\\nit is ‘serious’” (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019)).\\n That’s especially true when the standard is taken out of\\ncontext. The district court relied on Cincinnati Ins. Co. to sup-\\nport its contention that contamination below the threshold\\nlevel of fifty parts per million (“ppm”) does not qualify as a\\nregulatory violation, thereby contradicting Woodyard’s opin-\\nion regarding safe levels of PCBs and providing the grounds\\nfor excluding it. In that case, we evaluated whether an insur-\\nance company was required to indemnify its insured for dam-\\nages arising out of PCB contamination at an industrial site.\\nThe EPA had identified the insured as potentially liable under\\nthe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,\\nand Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 13\\n\\nthat context, we noted that the contaminated site contained\\nPCBs concentrated at levels up to 58,000 ppm, well above the\\nEPA’s general regulatory threshold of fifty ppm. 40 F.3d at 148\\n(citing 40 C.F.R. § 761.60).\\n But that regulation, still in effect today, identifies indus-\\ntrial equipment and other wastes contaminated at levels\\nabove fifty ppm and requires special procedures for their stor-\\nage and disposal. It does not unequivocally state that PCBs\\nconcentrated at levels lower than fifty ppm are safe for human\\nexposure. Neither Cincinnati Ins. Co. nor the EPA regulation\\nstand for the proposition that PCBs concentrated at forty-nine\\nppm on residential property do not present a substantial endan-\\ngerment to the health of the residents. That is especially ap-\\nparent when we consider that the same set of regulations dis-\\ntinguishes between low and high-occupancy areas and re-\\nquires that, in high-occupancy areas, bulk PCB remediation\\nwaste, such as soil, be cleaned up to levels of concentration at\\nor below one ppm. § 761.61(a)(4)(i)(A). Section 761.3 confirms\\nthat the term “high-occupancy area” includes residences. See\\nalso § 761.123 (regulating spills of PCBs concentrated at fifty\\nppm or greater but emphasizing that “[t]he concentration of\\nPCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concentration in the\\nmaterial spilled as opposed to the concentration of PCBs in\\nthe material onto which the PCBs were spilled”). “Proof of\\ncontamination in excess of [agency] standards may support a\\nfinding of liability, and may alone suffice for liability in some\\ncases, but its required use is without justification in the stat-\\nute.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 261.\\n This is not to say that all the plaintiffs must do is to show\\nsome bit of soil on their property that tests positive for PCBs\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nabove one ppm (or even above the purported lower Wiscon-\\nsin DNR standard, which the defendants seem to have\\nacknowledged in their state-approved clean-up plan). Of\\ncourse, there must be accompanying evidence that establishes\\nsome connection between the existing contaminants and\\nsome imminent and substantial endangerment to health. 1 But\\nthe Liebharts attempted to provide such evidence, and the\\ndistrict court held the bar higher than necessary under\\nRCRA’s standard. In criticizing expert witness Carpenter’s\\nstatement that “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that\\ndoes not increase the risk of disease,” the district court re-\\njected Carpenter’s citation to studies showing the general\\nrisks of PCB exposure because “the Liebharts do not cite any\\nevidence that they have been exposed to PCBs.” Liebhart, 2018\\nWL 1583296 at *5. Moreover, the district court concluded that\\n“[t]he Liebharts do not contend that they can prove an immi-\\nnent and substantial danger with evidence of health problems\\nthey have already suffered.” Id. at *6.\\n As we noted in Albany Bank, “[i]mminence does not re-\\nquire an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\n\\n\\n 1 On appeal, the Liebharts contend that there is no separate require-\\nment for expert witness testimony because the photos and videos they\\nhave submitted into evidence suffice to prove their RCRA claim. The de-\\nfendants push back on that argument, insisting that many of the issues are\\nbeyond the competence of lay fact-finders and require the assistance of\\nexperts to address. See, e.g., C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827,\\n838 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Given the complex nature of this case, … [and w]ith\\nno experts to prove causation … the appellants cannot prove their toxic-\\ntort case under [state] law.”) Because the district court did not make a fac-\\ntual finding as to whether this case is sufficient complex to require expert\\ntestimony, and because we remand for reconsideration of a separate legal\\nissue, we need not reach that question today.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 15\\n\\nharm.” 310 F.3d at 973. Although the Supreme Court has in-\\nstructed that “[a]n endangerment can only be ‘imminent’ if it\\n‘threaten[s] to occur immediately,’” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485\\n(quoting Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary of English Language\\n1245 (2d ed. 1934)), it qualified that statement when it approv-\\ningly quoted the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the statu-\\ntory term “implies that there must be a threat which is present\\nnow, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until\\nlater.” Id. at 486 (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019).\\nWe take that to mean that the Liebharts must show that there\\nare PCBs currently on the property that have the potential to\\nsubstantially threaten their health at some point in the future\\nif they continue to occupy the premises and prolong their ex-\\nposure. On remand, the district court should reevaluate its ex-\\nclusion of Dr. Carpenter’s assertion regarding PCB safety un-\\nder the standards we have outlined above and determine\\nwhether, if admissible, the report demonstrates that a sub-\\nstantial and imminent threat to the Liebharts’ health may be\\npresent.\\n B. TSCA Likewise Requires No Heightened Showing\\n TSCA authorizes a separate, private cause of action allow-\\ning “any person [to] commence a civil action … against any\\nperson … who is alleged to be in violation of … any rule\\npromulgated under” the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1). The EPA\\npromulgated the PCB regulations in question pursuant to\\nstatutory authority under TSCA, designating PCBs as “haz-\\nardous waste” and controlling their manufacture, use, stor-\\nage, and disposal. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 761. The Liebharts’ TSCA\\nclaim alleged that the defendants violated those regulations,\\nthereby authorizing the district court to “restrain [the] viola-\\ntion.” § 2619(a). Unlike RCRA, which authorizes mandatory\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\ninjunctions to compel remediation of previous violations,\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions to stop ongoing\\nviolations. Id. The defendants argued that there was no longer\\nan ongoing violation, as demolition was complete by the time\\nthe Liebharts filed their claim. 2\\n The purported violation was based on 40 C.F.R. § 761.123,\\nwhich, as we noted above, regulates “spills” of PCB materials\\nconcentrated at levels above fifty ppm. The district court cor-\\nrectly noted that the Liebharts had not shown any evidence\\nthat any PCBs had been “spilled” onto their property (by\\nmeans of dust migration) at that level of concentration, and it\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on that basis.\\n But the district court seems to have overlooked the follow-\\ning sentence in the regulation, which directs that “[t]he con-\\ncentration of PCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concen-\\ntration in the material spilled as opposed to the concentration\\nof the material onto which the PCBs were spilled.” Id. The\\nLiebharts’ complaint seems to have alleged that the concrete\\nfloor of the factory, which contained at least some contami-\\nnated areas above the fifty-ppm threshold, was demolished\\nand “spilled” onto the Liebharts’ property. By the plain text\\nof the regulation, there is no need to show that contaminants\\non the Liebharts’ property are themselves concentrated above\\nfifty ppm so long as the original material that was the source\\nof that spill met the criteria. On remand, the district court may\\nagain determine that there is no ongoing violation, but it must\\n\\n 2 The district court determined that the Liebharts waived this claim\\nby failing to engage the defendants’ argument that there was no “ongoing\\nviolation.” But the court chose to analyze the merits of the claim regardless\\nof waiver and reached its conclusion on an alternative basis. We likewise\\nset aside the issue of waiver to reach the district court’s merits analysis.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 17\\n\\nfirst determine whether the alleged violation comes within\\nthe meaning of § 761.123 in the first place.\\n C. The District Court Should Reconsider the Remaining Issues\\non Remand\\n Now that we have clarified the standard the plaintiffs\\nmust meet, we turn to the remaining procedural issues the\\nLiebharts have asked to us to address.\\n 1. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding\\nWoodyard’s Testimony\\n “The summary-judgment decision here turned [in large\\npart] on the district court’s conclusion that [the] expert testi-\\nmony was inadmissible. Whether the district court applied\\nthe appropriate legal framework for evaluating expert testi-\\nmony is reviewed de novo, but the court’s choice of relevant\\nfactors within that framework and its ultimate conclusion as\\nto admissibility are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Lees v.\\nCarthage College, 714 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 2013). When a dis-\\ntrict court is “[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testi-\\nmony … the trial judge must determine at the outset …\\nwhether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific\\nknowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or\\ndetermine a fact in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,\\n509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). “The trial court must have … latitude\\nin deciding how to test an expert’s reliability.” Kumho Tire Co.,\\nLtd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).\\n The district court was well within its discretion to exclude\\nthe proffered testimony of expert witness Woodyard. Beyond\\nthe problem that the plaintiffs seemed to have waived this is-\\nsue in the district court by failing to engage with the defend-\\nants’ arguments in their motion to strike the testimony,\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nWoodyard’s analysis suffers from a critical flaw that stems\\nfrom the way in which the parties have framed this lawsuit.\\nThe district court briefly noted in its opinion that “both sides\\nassume that none of the defendants can be held liable for any\\nPCB contamination on the Liebharts’ property that occurred\\nbefore the demolition began, so the court will make the same\\nassumption.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *1. That’s a curious\\nchoice. RCRA permits the Liebharts to obtain injunctive relief\\nfrom the owner of the facility for any cognizable contamina-\\ntion, regardless of whether the PCBs migrated onto their\\nproperty before or after the demolition occurred. See 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (authorizing suit against “any person … who\\nhas contributed … to the past or present handling … or dis-\\nposal” of hazardous waste); see also Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486\\n(“RCRA contains no statute of limitations.”).\\n But because the Liebharts restricted their claims to PCBs\\nthat allegedly migrated onto their property via the dust from\\nthe 2015 demolition, they necessarily excluded claims result-\\ning from PCBs that may have gotten onto their property dur-\\ning the previous century. The district court correctly noted\\nthat Woodyard’s expert opinion could not distinguish be-\\ntween these two alternatives, as both sets of contaminants\\noriginated from the same source. There was even evidence\\nshowing that PCBs existed in the soil beneath the Liebharts’\\nasphalt driveway—Woodyard could not explain how that\\nmight have occurred as the result of dust blowing in the wind\\nas opposed to seepage over the course of years before any\\ndemolition occurred.\\n Perhaps the Liebharts decided to frame their claims in this\\nway because they wanted to go after defendants TRC and\\nApollo, who would not be liable for what happened before\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 19\\n\\ndemolition. Or perhaps some element of their state-law\\nclaims, which we have not addressed, required them to con-\\nstrict the scope. They did not explain their reasoning to us (or\\nit seems, to the district court). But the distinction makes it dif-\\nficult for Woodyard to make his case, given that he did not\\n“adequately account[] for obvious alternative explanations.”\\nGopalratnam v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 787 (7th Cir.\\n2017). Viewed in this light, the district court was within its\\ndiscretion to exclude the testimony as unreliable and unhelp-\\nful to the trier of fact. The district court may choose to rethink\\nthat evaluation on remand under the legal standards we out-\\nlined above, but it may well reach the same conclusion.\\n 2. The District Court Should Reconsider Its Denial of Injunctive\\nRelief\\n The district court denied injunctive relief to the Liebharts\\nbecause the defendants had already agreed to a clean-up plan\\nthat had been approved by the Wisconsin DNR. We review\\nthat decision for an abuse of discretion. See AMI Int’l, Inc. v.\\nDatacard Corp. 106 F.3d 1342, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997) (remanding\\ngrant of RCRA injunction).\\n As we mentioned above, RCRA authorizes district courts\\nto issue either mandatory or prohibitory injunctions, while\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions. “[I]t is appro-\\npriate ‘to give great deference to the district court’s decision\\nas to the precise equitable relief necessary in a particular\\ncase.’” Bowes v. Ind. Sec. of State, 837 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (quoting Gjersten v. Bd. Of Election Com’rs for City of Chi-\\ncago, 791 F.2d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1986)). That is especially true\\nwhen a plaintiff requests a mandatory injunction, which “im-\\nposes significant burdens on the defendant and requires care-\\nful consideration of the intrusiveness of the ordered act, as\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nwell as the difficulties that may be encountered in supervising\\nthe enjoined party’s compliance with the court’s order.” Kart-\\nman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir.\\n2011).\\n Considering SPX’s decision to formulate a clean-up plan\\nand obtain approval from the state agency, the district court\\ndetermined that there was no need for separate, federally-su-\\npervised remediation. It reached that conclusion even while\\nassuming that the defendants were in violation of either\\nRCRA or TSCA, despite the fact it found no such violation.\\nOther courts have determined that the existence of a parallel\\nplan of remediation supervised by the state does not neces-\\nsarily prevent a federal district court from granting an injunc-\\ntion if it finds the state agency’s actions to be insufficient to\\nremedy the violation of federal law. See, e.g., Interfaith, 399\\nF.3d at 264–68. On the other hand, the same courts have also\\nupheld denials of injunctions in similar situations when the\\ndistrict court finds that the parallel plan is adequate to the\\ntask. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735\\nF.3d 131, 139–40 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Interfaith). We\\nrecently reached the same conclusion. See LAJIM, LLC v. Gen.\\nElec. Co., No. 18-1522, 2019 WL 1011021, at *4–11 (7th Cir. Mar.\\n4, 2019) (“[T]he district court correctly held that it has discre-\\ntion to award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not re-\\nquired to order relief after a finding of liability,” particularly\\nin light of ongoing relief supervised by a state environmental\\nagency).\\n Here, the district court determined that SPX’s existing\\nplan was sufficient and that the Liebharts had not “iden-\\ntif[ied] any way that SPX’s plan [was] deficient or violate[d]\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 21\\n\\nfederal law.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *7. We agree. Alt-\\nhough the Liebharts point to certain statistical sampling re-\\nquirements outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 761.125 and contend that\\nSPX’s existing plan fails to meet those requirements, the dis-\\ntrict court noted that SPX’s plan includes further sampling of\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ property. It emphasized that “the\\nLiebharts do not otherwise explain why SPX’s proposed sam-\\npling scheme is substantively inadequate.” Liebhart, 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *7. We see no evidence that compels us to contra-\\ndict that factual finding.\\n However, in light of the legal standards we outlined\\nabove, we ask the district court to reconsider its decision to\\ndeny injunctive relief on remand. Because the bar for estab-\\nlishing an imminent and substantial danger is lower than the\\ndistrict court believed when evaluating the request for an in-\\njunction, it would be prudent to reassess whether the DNR-\\napproved plan adequately remedies harms that may come\\nwithin RCRA’s scope. See LAJIM, 2019 WL 1011021 at *6\\n(“[O]nce a court finds a defendant liable for creating a risk of\\nimminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the case\\nthat injunctive relief is warranted. But that is not always the\\ncase.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).\\n 3. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying\\nLeave to Amend the Complaint.\\n We review a denial of leave to amend a complaint for\\nabuse of discretion. Life Plans, Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co.,\\n800 F.3d 343, 357 (7th Cir. 2015). District courts are to “freely\\ngive leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 15(a)(2). “The Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to\\nrequire a district court to allow amendment unless there is a\\ngood reason—futility, undue delay, undue prejudice, or bad\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nfaith—for denying leave to amend.” Life Plans, 800 F.3d at 357\\n(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The district\\ncourt in this case identified two of those grounds as bases for\\ndenial: futility and undue delay. While we disagree with the\\nfutility analysis, we concur with the finding of undue delay\\nand decline to reverse.\\n We begin with the question of futility. Both statutes con-\\ntain advance-notice requirements that citizen plaintiffs must\\nobserve prior to filing RCRA or TSCA suits. They require\\nthose plaintiffs to notify the EPA 60–90 days in advance of fil-\\ning the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2); 15 U.S.C.\\n§ 2619(b)(1)(A). But the district court chose to apply the re-\\nquirements not only to the filing of the complaint, but also to\\nany subsequent amendments that sought to add new RCRA\\nor TSCA counts. Although the Liebharts complied with the\\nrequirements prior to filing their original complaint in April\\n2016, they gave no new notice to the EPA before filing for\\nleave to amend in February 2018. The district court held that,\\nbecause the prior notice did not contain any mention of bur-\\nied PCBs on the SPX property, it was insufficient to alert the\\nEPA to the particular violation the Liebharts sought to include\\nin the amended complaint.\\n The notice provisions serve two purposes. “First, notice al-\\nlows Government agencies to take responsibility for enforc-\\ning environmental regulations, thus obviating the need for\\ncitizen suits. … Second, notice gives the alleged violator ‘an\\nopportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the\\nAct[s] and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit.’”\\nHallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (quoting\\nGwaltney of Smithfield, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 23\\n\\nU.S. 49, 60 (1987)). The district court’s decision to require no-\\ntice for an amendment to a complaint fulfilled neither pur-\\npose. By the time the Liebharts attempted to amend their com-\\nplaint, the EPA had been on notice of alleged PCB contamina-\\ntion at the SPX property for over two years—and it had de-\\nclined to get involved. Moreover, it was unlikely that the de-\\nfendants would resolve the alleged violation to avoid being\\nsued when they were already in the midst of an extended law-\\nsuit with the same plaintiffs. See AM Int’l, 106 F.3d at 1351\\n(“[T]he delay period is designed to allow a [defendant] a pe-\\nriod in which to clean up its act and avoid litigation. [This de-\\nfendant] was clearly not interested in using the delay period\\nto resolve the dispute without going to court.”); see also Dague,\\n935 F.2d at 1351 (“There is no need to maintain a window of\\nopportunity for the government to take the lead enforcement\\nrole … when a citizen, acting as a private attorney general, has\\nalready lawfully assumed the lead role in bringing a … claim\\nagainst the same facility.”) (quoting Dague v. City of Burling-\\nton, 733 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D. Vt. 1990)). When the original notice\\nis “sufficiently specific to inform the alleged violator [and the\\nagency] about what it is doing wrong, so that it will know\\nwhat corrective actions will avert a lawsuit,” Atl. States Legal\\nFound., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir.\\n1994), there is no need to require a second round of advance\\nnotice for an amended complaint in the same litigation.\\n But an error in the futility analysis alone does not neces-\\nsarily constitute an abuse of discretion on the whole. In addi-\\ntion to futility, the district court cited undue delay and preju-\\ndice in its decision to deny leave to amend. “[D]elay by itself\\nis normally an insufficient reason to deny a motion for leave\\nto amend. Delay must be coupled with some other reason.\\nTypically, that reason … is prejudice to the non-moving\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nparty.” Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 793\\n(7th Cir. 2004). The district court cited the Liebharts’ admis-\\nsion that they learned of the possible burial of contaminated\\nconcrete on the SPX property on October 11, 2017 but failed\\nto seek leave to amend their complaint until February 22,\\n2018. During that more than four-month period, the parties\\nsubmitted and briefed their cross-motions for summary judg-\\nment, and by February, trial was only three months away. The\\nLiebharts provided no justification for their delay.\\n In response, the Liebharts contend that there was no un-\\ndue prejudice to the defendants: by the time they filed their\\nmotion, five weeks of discovery still remained. We disagree.\\nWhile the district court’s explanation of prejudice was fairly\\nshort, even if the district court had failed to articulate a find-\\ning of prejudice altogether, we might still “affirm providing\\nthat ‘the prejudice that would result from such amendment\\nwas apparent.’” Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 613 (7th\\nCir. 2002) (quoting Feldman v. Am. Mem’l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d\\n783, 793 (7th Cir. 1999)). In Park, the plaintiff waited six\\nmonths to move for leave to amend a complaint after she\\nknew (or should have known) of the additional alleged viola-\\ntion. Id. Because trial was approaching, we concluded that the\\ndistrict court was well within its discretion to deny leave. Id.;\\nsee also Perrian v. O’Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194–95 (7th Cir. 1992)\\n(“Because substantive amendments shortly before trial serve\\nto defeat the public’s interest in speedy resolution of legal dis-\\nputes, ‘[a] district court judge is entitled, in such circum-\\nstances, to refuse to allow a plaintiff’s amendment.’” (quoting\\nCampbell v. Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co., 893 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir.\\n1990)) (internal citation omitted)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 25\\n\\n On the contrary, in Life Plans, we found no undue delay\\nwhen a plaintiff promptly moved to amend its complaint just\\nten days after learning of the factual basis for its new count\\nduring discovery. 800 F.3d at 358. The Liebharts delayed more\\nthan four months in the same circumstances. Although dis-\\ncovery was ongoing at the time of the Liebharts’ motion, the\\nparties had already briefed their dispositive motions, and the\\ndistrict court was preparing its summary-judgment order that\\nwould ultimately dispose of the case. We therefore cannot say\\nthat denial of leave for undue delay and prejudice was an\\nabuse of the district court’s discretion. Of course, the district\\ncourt may permit an amendment on remand if the interests of\\njustice so require.\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n Although the district court properly exercised its discre-\\ntion on the various evidentiary and procedural issues the\\nplaintiffs have raised, its analysis on the merits was narrower\\nthan the statutes demand. It may reach the same conclusions\\non reconsideration, but the parties should have another op-\\nportunity to litigate whether a substantial and imminent en-\\ndangerment to health exists in this case under the standards\\nwe have outlined. We therefore VACATE the order of the dis-\\ntrict court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent\\nwith this opinion. 3\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 The Liebharts also challenge the taxation of costs against them by the\\n\\nclerk of the district court. Because we vacate the district court’s judgment,\\nwe assume that the imposition of costs is automatically vacated and so do\\nnot reach that issue. The clerk of the district court is free to reassess costs\\non remand as the case proceeds.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1169,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4597308,"string":"4,597,308"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Steve Briggins"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1921"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐1921 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nSTEVE BRIGGINS, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 1:17‐cr‐00243‐1 — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. In 2017 Steve Briggins was con‐\\nvicted of robbing multiple banks over several months. This \\nwas not Briggins’s first foray into bank robbery. Eighteen \\nyears earlier, in 1999, Briggins was convicted of and sentenced \\nfor ten bank robberies he committed over a span of a few \\nmonths. When the district court sentenced Briggins for the \\n2017 robberies, it accounted for the 1999 robberies in calculat‐\\ning his criminal history points under the Sentencing \\n\\f2 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\nGuidelines. Briggins now appeals, contending that the district \\ncourt, when determining his advisory sentencing range, im‐\\nproperly determined his criminal history category by impos‐\\ning too many criminal history points for the 1999 robberies. \\nSeeing no error, we affirm. \\n I \\n Briggins pleaded guilty in 2017 to committing multiple \\nbank robberies. At sentencing a primary focus became \\nBriggins’s criminal history and, more specifically, how many \\ncriminal history points should be assessed for the ten bank \\nrobberies he was convicted of in 1999 and for which he was \\nsentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment. The number of points \\nto be added for the 1999 robberies depended on whether the \\nprior 84‐month term reflected one sentence (for all ten \\nrobberies) or multiple concurrent sentences (for the ten \\nseparate robberies). Briggins urged the former—if the 84‐\\nmonth term reflected one sentence, it would yield fewer \\ncriminal history points and thus a lower advisory guidelines \\nrange. \\n The district court’s determination of Briggins’s criminal \\nhistory points tracked the Sentencing Guidelines analysis of‐\\nfered by the probation office. In its presentence investigation \\nreport, the probation office concluded that Briggins received \\nten concurrent sentences—one for each of the ten bank rob‐\\nberies. So, too, did the probation office recognize that the cal‐\\nculation of Briggins’s criminal history points needed to ac‐\\ncount for the threefold reality that he was charged with all ten \\nrobberies in the same indictment, pleaded guilty to each of \\nthose robberies in the same proceeding, and faced sentencing \\nfor all ten on the same day. All of this had ramifications for \\nthe proper criminal history calculation. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 3\\n\\n In the end, the probation office recommended that \\nBriggins receive six criminal history points for the 1999 bank \\nrobberies. These six points captured all ten robberies and \\ncame from an application of two provisions within § 4A1.1 of \\nthe guidelines. The first three of those points came from \\n§ 4A1.1(a), which requires sentencing courts to “[a]dd 3 \\npoints for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one \\nyear and one month.” And the other three points came from \\na provision, § 4A1.1(e), that applies where, as here, a \\ndefendant is convicted of multiple offenses charged in the \\nsame indictment or receives multiple sentences on the same \\nday. In this way, § 4A1.1(e) accounts for the circumstance of \\nmultiple convictions and sentences. \\n We can put the point in even plainer terms. A defendant \\nsentenced to more than 13 months’ imprisonment following a \\nfelony conviction ordinarily receives three criminal history \\npoints for that offense at a later sentencing. See U.S.S.G. \\n§ 4A1.1(a). By this logic, it may seem that a defendant like \\nBriggins convicted of and sentenced for ten separate robberies \\nshould receive 30 criminal history points—three for each \\nconviction. The guidelines do not work that way, though, in \\nsituations like the ones present here. Where the prior \\nsentences “resulted from offenses contained in the same \\ncharging instrument” or were “imposed on the same day,” \\nthe Sentencing Commission limited the number of criminal \\nhistory points assigned to those sentences. Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2). \\nThe first sentence still receives three points (consistent with \\nthe ordinary rule), but the remaining sentences are subject to \\na capping rule: § 4A1.1(e) assigns one criminal history point \\nfor each additional sentence resulting from a conviction of a \\ncrime of violence but limits the maximum number of \\nadditional points to three. \\n\\f4 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\n The probation office applied this capping rule when calcu‐\\nlating Briggins’s criminal history points here. It began with \\nthe ten sentences Briggins received for the ten 1999 robberies \\nand assigned three points to the first of those sentences under \\n§ 4A1.1(a) because the sentence exceeded 13 months. From \\nthere the probation office recognized that, because the ten \\nsentences came from the same indictment and were imposed \\non the same day, the limitations of § 4A1.1(e) applied. Apply‐\\ning § 4A1.1(e) meant that only three additional points were \\nallowed for Briggins’s remaining nine robberies. The math \\nfrom there was simple: Briggins received a total of six criminal \\nhistory points for the ten 1999 robberies. \\n At the sentencing hearing for the 2017 robberies, the \\ndistrict court agreed with and adopted the probation office’s \\nanalysis of Briggins’s criminal history. The resulting advisory \\nguidelines range for Briggins’s 2017 bank robberies was 77 to \\n96 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed a \\nsentence of 96 months. \\n II \\n On appeal Briggins renews his challenge to the district \\ncourt’s calculation of the criminal history points assigned to \\nhis 1999 bank robberies. He does so by attacking a key factual \\npremise upon which the district court based its determination \\nthat the prior robberies warranted a total of six criminal his‐\\ntory points. As Briggins sees the 1999 proceeding, he received \\nnot ten concurrent sentences, but rather one sentence of 84 \\nmonths for all ten robberies. On this view, he contends he \\nshould have received only three criminal history points for \\nthe single term of 84 months he received for the 1999 rob‐\\nberies, and thus there was no need for the district court to ever \\nget into how the guidelines treat multiple sentences. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 5\\n\\n Resolving whether Briggins received multiple concurrent \\nsentences or one sentence for his ten bank robberies requires \\nus to review the 1999 sentencing hearing in some detail. The \\nbeginning point is recognizing that Briggins pleaded guilty to \\ncommitting ten separate bank robberies, each of which had \\nbeen charged as a separate count in the underlying indict‐\\nment. At the 1999 sentencing hearing, the district court stated \\nthat it was sentencing Briggins “to a term of 84 months.” In \\ndoing so, the court emphasized that Briggins deserved to be \\npunished for each robbery—he should not, as the sentencing \\njudge put it, receive any “group discounts” for having com‐\\nmitted ten separate robberies. The district court’s written \\njudgment reflected that Briggins pleaded guilty to ten counts \\nthat resulted in “a total term of 84 months.” Nowhere in the \\nwritten judgment did the court indicate whether the 84‐\\nmonth term reflected concurrent sentences. \\n Briggins latches onto the district court’s use of the phrase \\n“a term” of imprisonment to argue that he received a single, \\nlump‐sum term of 84 months for the ten robberies. He does \\nnot dispute that he pleaded guilty to ten separate robberies, \\nbut rather underscores that he was sentenced to “a term” of \\n84 months—a single term, not multiple terms or concurrent \\nterms. And this single sentence, Briggins continues, is wholly \\naccounted for by the three criminal history points added un‐\\nder § 4A1.1(a); there was no basis for assigning additional \\ncriminal history points under § 4A1.1(e) or any other provi‐\\nsion of the guidelines. The upshot of Briggins’s argument is \\nthat it was not even necessary for the district court to reach \\n§ 4A1.1(e) because multiple sentences were not in play in the \\nfirst place. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\n We disagree. Briggins’s insistence that he received only \\none sentence because the district court announced “a term” of \\nimprisonment ignores the substance and full context of what \\ntranspired at his 1999 sentencing hearing. The transcript \\nshows that the district court intended to punish each robbery \\nseparately, for there is no other way to understand the sen‐\\ntencing judge’s comments that Briggins was not entitled to \\n“any type of group discounts” or “a two‐for‐one sale or a ten‐\\nfor‐one sale.” \\n The district judge made other statements at sentencing to \\ndrive home that Briggins deserved to be punished for each of \\nthe ten robberies. At one point, for example, the judge \\nexplained that, if Briggins had committed just one bank \\nrobbery, he would “probably be looking at three to five years \\neasily,” and that “any judge could sentence [him] to 30 years \\nand say, well, it’s three years for each of the bank robberies.” \\nThe district judge further observed that, even if he sentenced \\nBriggins to just “one year for every one of the bank robberies,” \\nhe would face a total of ten years. But the court was quick to \\nrecognize that a sentence along those lines would be well \\noutside the then‐mandatory guidelines range of 63 to 78 \\nmonths. So the district court instead applied an upward \\ndeparture, reasoning that the ten robberies conducted over a \\nshort period of time presented an “unusual circumstance” \\nthat was not adequately taken into consideration by the \\nguidelines. The 1999 sentencing ended with the district court \\nimposing a sentence of 84 months. \\n A broader point deserves underscoring. Accepting \\nBriggins’s position would require us to conclude that the \\ndistrict court sentenced him to 84 months for one of the ten \\n1999 bank robberies but to no time for the other nine. But any \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 7\\n\\nview like that neither accounts for what the district judge said \\nat sentencing—that Briggins would not receive a break \\nbecause he committed multiple bank robberies—nor the \\nreality that the court was obligated to sentence him on each of \\nthe ten separate bank robberies to which he pleaded guilty. \\nWe also cannot overlook that the district court imposed a \\nspecial assessment of $100 for each of the ten robberies for a \\ntotal of $1,000—yet another indicator that the district judge \\nunderstood the ten robberies as resulting in separate \\nconvictions warranting separate sentences. The only other \\ninterpretation, which makes even less sense, is that the 84‐\\nmonth sentence reflected the sum total of ten consecutive \\nsentences of 8.4 months each. Not only would a sentence like \\nthat—less than one year for a bank robbery—bear little \\nrelationship to the applicable guidelines range, but it would \\nalso require us to assume the district judge (who uttered not \\na word about consecutive sentences) intended to impose ten \\nsmall but consecutive sentences. \\n Our conclusion that the district court imposed ten \\nconcurrent sentences for the 1999 robberies aligns squarely \\nwith the presumption that sentences imposed in a multiple‐\\ncount case run concurrently with one another. See U.S.S.G. \\n§ 5G1.2(c) (explaining that “[i]f the sentence imposed on the \\ncount carrying the highest statutory maximum is adequate to \\nachieve the total punishment, then the sentences on all counts \\nshall run concurrently”). Indeed, the Sentencing \\nCommission’s accompanying commentary (in effect at the \\ntime of the 1999 sentencing and now) clarifies that, in a \\nmultiple‐count case, the total punishment is to be imposed on \\neach count and the sentences on all counts are to run \\nconcurrently. See id. § 5G1.2 & cmt; see also id. § 5G1.2 & cmt. \\n(effective Nov. 1, 1998). Congress incorporated this same \\n\\f8 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\npresumption of concurrence into the statutory provision \\ngoverning the imposition of multiple sentences for a \\ndefendant convicted of a federal offense. See 18 U.S.C. \\n§ 3584(a). \\n We decline to interpret Briggins’s 1999 sentence in a way \\nthat contravenes not only this presumption of concurrence, \\nbut also the sentencing judge’s clear statements that he in‐\\ntended to hold Briggins accountable for each robbery. The \\nmost accurate reading of Briggins’s 1999 sentence—the read‐\\ning fairest to the record—is that “a term of 84 months” re‐\\nflected multiple concurrent sentences. \\n Briggins urges a contrary conclusion by pointing to prior \\ndecisions where courts have concluded that “a term” refers to \\none sentence or, at the very least, creates enough ambiguity \\nabout what sentence a defendant received to warrant resen‐\\ntencing. In United States v. Eskridge, for example, the question \\nwas whether the district court had imposed one term or two \\nconcurrent terms of supervised release for the defendant’s \\ntwo convictions. 445 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2006). After exam‐\\nining the sentencing transcript, we held that the defendant \\nwas entitled to resentencing for supervised release violations \\nbecause the district judge, in sentencing the defendant to “a \\nterm of 26 months,” in no way clarified (in the judgment or \\notherwise) whether he had sentenced the defendant to one or \\ntwo terms of supervised release. See id. at 935. And we added \\nthat “if the order accurately reflects the judge’s decision, how‐\\never mistaken, to impose just a single term, it cannot be cor‐\\nrected.” Id. at 934. \\n The circumstances here are different. The statements the \\ndistrict judge made immediately before sentencing Briggins \\nfor the 1999 robberies do not leave room for an interpretation \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 9\\n\\nthat the court may have decided—however mistakenly—to \\nimpose a single term of imprisonment. To the contrary, the \\ndistrict judge’s statements made clear that he intended to hold \\nBriggins accountable for each of the ten robbery convictions. \\nAt the time, moreover, the guidelines required the court to \\nsentence Briggins on each count of conviction, with the pre‐\\nsumption that such sentences would run concurrently. \\n On this record, we conclude that the district court in 1999 \\nimposed multiple sentences for Briggins’s ten robbery convic‐\\ntions. At Briggins’s sentencing for the 2017 convictions, the \\ndistrict court thus properly assessed six criminal history \\npoints for Briggins’s 1999 sentences—three criminal history \\npoints under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a) for one sentence, and three \\nadditional points for the remaining nine sentences under \\nU.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e). \\n Accordingly, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4374561/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597308/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Steve Briggins\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐1921 \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \n v. \n\nSTEVE BRIGGINS, \n Defendant‐Appellant. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \n No. 1:17‐cr‐00243‐1 — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. In 2017 Steve Briggins was con‐\nvicted of robbing multiple banks over several months. This \nwas not Briggins’s first foray into bank robbery. Eighteen \nyears earlier, in 1999, Briggins was convicted of and sentenced \nfor ten bank robberies he committed over a span of a few \nmonths. When the district court sentenced Briggins for the \n2017 robberies, it accounted for the 1999 robberies in calculat‐\ning his criminal history points under the Sentencing \n\f2 No. 18‐1921 \n\nGuidelines. Briggins now appeals, contending that the district \ncourt, when determining his advisory sentencing range, im‐\nproperly determined his criminal history category by impos‐\ning too many criminal history points for the 1999 robberies. \nSeeing no error, we affirm. \n I \n Briggins pleaded guilty in 2017 to committing multiple \nbank robberies. At sentencing a primary focus became \nBriggins’s criminal history and, more specifically, how many \ncriminal history points should be assessed for the ten bank \nrobberies he was convicted of in 1999 and for which he was \nsentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment. The number of points \nto be added for the 1999 robberies depended on whether the \nprior 84‐month term reflected one sentence (for all ten \nrobberies) or multiple concurrent sentences (for the ten \nseparate robberies). Briggins urged the former—if the 84‐\nmonth term reflected one sentence, it would yield fewer \ncriminal history points and thus a lower advisory guidelines \nrange. \n The district court’s determination of Briggins’s criminal \nhistory points tracked the Sentencing Guidelines analysis of‐\nfered by the probation office. In its presentence investigation \nreport, the probation office concluded that Briggins received \nten concurrent sentences—one for each of the ten bank rob‐\nberies. So, too, did the probation office recognize that the cal‐\nculation of Briggins’s criminal history points needed to ac‐\ncount for the threefold reality that he was charged with all ten \nrobberies in the same indictment, pleaded guilty to each of \nthose robberies in the same proceeding, and faced sentencing \nfor all ten on the same day. All of this had ramifications for \nthe proper criminal history calculation. \n\fNo. 18‐1921 3\n\n In the end, the probation office recommended that \nBriggins receive six criminal history points for the 1999 bank \nrobberies. These six points captured all ten robberies and \ncame from an application of two provisions within § 4A1.1 of \nthe guidelines. The first three of those points came from \n§ 4A1.1(a), which requires sentencing courts to “[a]dd 3 \npoints for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one \nyear and one month.” And the other three points came from \na provision, § 4A1.1(e), that applies where, as here, a \ndefendant is convicted of multiple offenses charged in the \nsame indictment or receives multiple sentences on the same \nday. In this way, § 4A1.1(e) accounts for the circumstance of \nmultiple convictions and sentences. \n We can put the point in even plainer terms. A defendant \nsentenced to more than 13 months’ imprisonment following a \nfelony conviction ordinarily receives three criminal history \npoints for that offense at a later sentencing. See U.S.S.G. \n§ 4A1.1(a). By this logic, it may seem that a defendant like \nBriggins convicted of and sentenced for ten separate robberies \nshould receive 30 criminal history points—three for each \nconviction. The guidelines do not work that way, though, in \nsituations like the ones present here. Where the prior \nsentences “resulted from offenses contained in the same \ncharging instrument” or were “imposed on the same day,” \nthe Sentencing Commission limited the number of criminal \nhistory points assigned to those sentences. Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2). \nThe first sentence still receives three points (consistent with \nthe ordinary rule), but the remaining sentences are subject to \na capping rule: § 4A1.1(e) assigns one criminal history point \nfor each additional sentence resulting from a conviction of a \ncrime of violence but limits the maximum number of \nadditional points to three. \n\f4 No. 18‐1921 \n\n The probation office applied this capping rule when calcu‐\nlating Briggins’s criminal history points here. It began with \nthe ten sentences Briggins received for the ten 1999 robberies \nand assigned three points to the first of those sentences under \n§ 4A1.1(a) because the sentence exceeded 13 months. From \nthere the probation office recognized that, because the ten \nsentences came from the same indictment and were imposed \non the same day, the limitations of § 4A1.1(e) applied. Apply‐\ning § 4A1.1(e) meant that only three additional points were \nallowed for Briggins’s remaining nine robberies. The math \nfrom there was simple: Briggins received a total of six criminal \nhistory points for the ten 1999 robberies. \n At the sentencing hearing for the 2017 robberies, the \ndistrict court agreed with and adopted the probation office’s \nanalysis of Briggins’s criminal history. The resulting advisory \nguidelines range for Briggins’s 2017 bank robberies was 77 to \n96 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed a \nsentence of 96 months. \n II \n On appeal Briggins renews his challenge to the district \ncourt’s calculation of the criminal history points assigned to \nhis 1999 bank robberies. He does so by attacking a key factual \npremise upon which the district court based its determination \nthat the prior robberies warranted a total of six criminal his‐\ntory points. As Briggins sees the 1999 proceeding, he received \nnot ten concurrent sentences, but rather one sentence of 84 \nmonths for all ten robberies. On this view, he contends he \nshould have received only three criminal history points for \nthe single term of 84 months he received for the 1999 rob‐\nberies, and thus there was no need for the district court to ever \nget into how the guidelines treat multiple sentences. \n\fNo. 18‐1921 5\n\n Resolving whether Briggins received multiple concurrent \nsentences or one sentence for his ten bank robberies requires \nus to review the 1999 sentencing hearing in some detail. The \nbeginning point is recognizing that Briggins pleaded guilty to \ncommitting ten separate bank robberies, each of which had \nbeen charged as a separate count in the underlying indict‐\nment. At the 1999 sentencing hearing, the district court stated \nthat it was sentencing Briggins “to a term of 84 months.” In \ndoing so, the court emphasized that Briggins deserved to be \npunished for each robbery—he should not, as the sentencing \njudge put it, receive any “group discounts” for having com‐\nmitted ten separate robberies. The district court’s written \njudgment reflected that Briggins pleaded guilty to ten counts \nthat resulted in “a total term of 84 months.” Nowhere in the \nwritten judgment did the court indicate whether the 84‐\nmonth term reflected concurrent sentences. \n Briggins latches onto the district court’s use of the phrase \n“a term” of imprisonment to argue that he received a single, \nlump‐sum term of 84 months for the ten robberies. He does \nnot dispute that he pleaded guilty to ten separate robberies, \nbut rather underscores that he was sentenced to “a term” of \n84 months—a single term, not multiple terms or concurrent \nterms. And this single sentence, Briggins continues, is wholly \naccounted for by the three criminal history points added un‐\nder § 4A1.1(a); there was no basis for assigning additional \ncriminal history points under § 4A1.1(e) or any other provi‐\nsion of the guidelines. The upshot of Briggins’s argument is \nthat it was not even necessary for the district court to reach \n§ 4A1.1(e) because multiple sentences were not in play in the \nfirst place. \n\f6 No. 18‐1921 \n\n We disagree. Briggins’s insistence that he received only \none sentence because the district court announced “a term” of \nimprisonment ignores the substance and full context of what \ntranspired at his 1999 sentencing hearing. The transcript \nshows that the district court intended to punish each robbery \nseparately, for there is no other way to understand the sen‐\ntencing judge’s comments that Briggins was not entitled to \n“any type of group discounts” or “a two‐for‐one sale or a ten‐\nfor‐one sale.” \n The district judge made other statements at sentencing to \ndrive home that Briggins deserved to be punished for each of \nthe ten robberies. At one point, for example, the judge \nexplained that, if Briggins had committed just one bank \nrobbery, he would “probably be looking at three to five years \neasily,” and that “any judge could sentence [him] to 30 years \nand say, well, it’s three years for each of the bank robberies.” \nThe district judge further observed that, even if he sentenced \nBriggins to just “one year for every one of the bank robberies,” \nhe would face a total of ten years. But the court was quick to \nrecognize that a sentence along those lines would be well \noutside the then‐mandatory guidelines range of 63 to 78 \nmonths. So the district court instead applied an upward \ndeparture, reasoning that the ten robberies conducted over a \nshort period of time presented an “unusual circumstance” \nthat was not adequately taken into consideration by the \nguidelines. The 1999 sentencing ended with the district court \nimposing a sentence of 84 months. \n A broader point deserves underscoring. Accepting \nBriggins’s position would require us to conclude that the \ndistrict court sentenced him to 84 months for one of the ten \n1999 bank robberies but to no time for the other nine. But any \n\fNo. 18‐1921 7\n\nview like that neither accounts for what the district judge said \nat sentencing—that Briggins would not receive a break \nbecause he committed multiple bank robberies—nor the \nreality that the court was obligated to sentence him on each of \nthe ten separate bank robberies to which he pleaded guilty. \nWe also cannot overlook that the district court imposed a \nspecial assessment of $100 for each of the ten robberies for a \ntotal of $1,000—yet another indicator that the district judge \nunderstood the ten robberies as resulting in separate \nconvictions warranting separate sentences. The only other \ninterpretation, which makes even less sense, is that the 84‐\nmonth sentence reflected the sum total of ten consecutive \nsentences of 8.4 months each. Not only would a sentence like \nthat—less than one year for a bank robbery—bear little \nrelationship to the applicable guidelines range, but it would \nalso require us to assume the district judge (who uttered not \na word about consecutive sentences) intended to impose ten \nsmall but consecutive sentences. \n Our conclusion that the district court imposed ten \nconcurrent sentences for the 1999 robberies aligns squarely \nwith the presumption that sentences imposed in a multiple‐\ncount case run concurrently with one another. See U.S.S.G. \n§ 5G1.2(c) (explaining that “[i]f the sentence imposed on the \ncount carrying the highest statutory maximum is adequate to \nachieve the total punishment, then the sentences on all counts \nshall run concurrently”). Indeed, the Sentencing \nCommission’s accompanying commentary (in effect at the \ntime of the 1999 sentencing and now) clarifies that, in a \nmultiple‐count case, the total punishment is to be imposed on \neach count and the sentences on all counts are to run \nconcurrently. See id. § 5G1.2 & cmt; see also id. § 5G1.2 & cmt. \n(effective Nov. 1, 1998). Congress incorporated this same \n\f8 No. 18‐1921 \n\npresumption of concurrence into the statutory provision \ngoverning the imposition of multiple sentences for a \ndefendant convicted of a federal offense. See 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3584(a). \n We decline to interpret Briggins’s 1999 sentence in a way \nthat contravenes not only this presumption of concurrence, \nbut also the sentencing judge’s clear statements that he in‐\ntended to hold Briggins accountable for each robbery. The \nmost accurate reading of Briggins’s 1999 sentence—the read‐\ning fairest to the record—is that “a term of 84 months” re‐\nflected multiple concurrent sentences. \n Briggins urges a contrary conclusion by pointing to prior \ndecisions where courts have concluded that “a term” refers to \none sentence or, at the very least, creates enough ambiguity \nabout what sentence a defendant received to warrant resen‐\ntencing. In United States v. Eskridge, for example, the question \nwas whether the district court had imposed one term or two \nconcurrent terms of supervised release for the defendant’s \ntwo convictions. 445 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2006). After exam‐\nining the sentencing transcript, we held that the defendant \nwas entitled to resentencing for supervised release violations \nbecause the district judge, in sentencing the defendant to “a \nterm of 26 months,” in no way clarified (in the judgment or \notherwise) whether he had sentenced the defendant to one or \ntwo terms of supervised release. See id. at 935. And we added \nthat “if the order accurately reflects the judge’s decision, how‐\never mistaken, to impose just a single term, it cannot be cor‐\nrected.” Id. at 934. \n The circumstances here are different. The statements the \ndistrict judge made immediately before sentencing Briggins \nfor the 1999 robberies do not leave room for an interpretation \n\fNo. 18‐1921 9\n\nthat the court may have decided—however mistakenly—to \nimpose a single term of imprisonment. To the contrary, the \ndistrict judge’s statements made clear that he intended to hold \nBriggins accountable for each of the ten robbery convictions. \nAt the time, moreover, the guidelines required the court to \nsentence Briggins on each count of conviction, with the pre‐\nsumption that such sentences would run concurrently. \n On this record, we conclude that the district court in 1999 \nimposed multiple sentences for Briggins’s ten robbery convic‐\ntions. At Briggins’s sentencing for the 2017 convictions, the \ndistrict court thus properly assessed six criminal history \npoints for Briggins’s 1999 sentences—three criminal history \npoints under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a) for one sentence, and three \nadditional points for the remaining nine sentences under \nU.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e). \n Accordingly, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Steve Briggins\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐1921 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nSTEVE BRIGGINS, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 1:17‐cr‐00243‐1 — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. In 2017 Steve Briggins was con‐\\nvicted of robbing multiple banks over several months. This \\nwas not Briggins’s first foray into bank robbery. Eighteen \\nyears earlier, in 1999, Briggins was convicted of and sentenced \\nfor ten bank robberies he committed over a span of a few \\nmonths. When the district court sentenced Briggins for the \\n2017 robberies, it accounted for the 1999 robberies in calculat‐\\ning his criminal history points under the Sentencing \\n\\f2 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\nGuidelines. Briggins now appeals, contending that the district \\ncourt, when determining his advisory sentencing range, im‐\\nproperly determined his criminal history category by impos‐\\ning too many criminal history points for the 1999 robberies. \\nSeeing no error, we affirm. \\n I \\n Briggins pleaded guilty in 2017 to committing multiple \\nbank robberies. At sentencing a primary focus became \\nBriggins’s criminal history and, more specifically, how many \\ncriminal history points should be assessed for the ten bank \\nrobberies he was convicted of in 1999 and for which he was \\nsentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment. The number of points \\nto be added for the 1999 robberies depended on whether the \\nprior 84‐month term reflected one sentence (for all ten \\nrobberies) or multiple concurrent sentences (for the ten \\nseparate robberies). Briggins urged the former—if the 84‐\\nmonth term reflected one sentence, it would yield fewer \\ncriminal history points and thus a lower advisory guidelines \\nrange. \\n The district court’s determination of Briggins’s criminal \\nhistory points tracked the Sentencing Guidelines analysis of‐\\nfered by the probation office. In its presentence investigation \\nreport, the probation office concluded that Briggins received \\nten concurrent sentences—one for each of the ten bank rob‐\\nberies. So, too, did the probation office recognize that the cal‐\\nculation of Briggins’s criminal history points needed to ac‐\\ncount for the threefold reality that he was charged with all ten \\nrobberies in the same indictment, pleaded guilty to each of \\nthose robberies in the same proceeding, and faced sentencing \\nfor all ten on the same day. All of this had ramifications for \\nthe proper criminal history calculation. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 3\\n\\n In the end, the probation office recommended that \\nBriggins receive six criminal history points for the 1999 bank \\nrobberies. These six points captured all ten robberies and \\ncame from an application of two provisions within § 4A1.1 of \\nthe guidelines. The first three of those points came from \\n§ 4A1.1(a), which requires sentencing courts to “[a]dd 3 \\npoints for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one \\nyear and one month.” And the other three points came from \\na provision, § 4A1.1(e), that applies where, as here, a \\ndefendant is convicted of multiple offenses charged in the \\nsame indictment or receives multiple sentences on the same \\nday. In this way, § 4A1.1(e) accounts for the circumstance of \\nmultiple convictions and sentences. \\n We can put the point in even plainer terms. A defendant \\nsentenced to more than 13 months’ imprisonment following a \\nfelony conviction ordinarily receives three criminal history \\npoints for that offense at a later sentencing. See U.S.S.G. \\n§ 4A1.1(a). By this logic, it may seem that a defendant like \\nBriggins convicted of and sentenced for ten separate robberies \\nshould receive 30 criminal history points—three for each \\nconviction. The guidelines do not work that way, though, in \\nsituations like the ones present here. Where the prior \\nsentences “resulted from offenses contained in the same \\ncharging instrument” or were “imposed on the same day,” \\nthe Sentencing Commission limited the number of criminal \\nhistory points assigned to those sentences. Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2). \\nThe first sentence still receives three points (consistent with \\nthe ordinary rule), but the remaining sentences are subject to \\na capping rule: § 4A1.1(e) assigns one criminal history point \\nfor each additional sentence resulting from a conviction of a \\ncrime of violence but limits the maximum number of \\nadditional points to three. \\n\\f4 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\n The probation office applied this capping rule when calcu‐\\nlating Briggins’s criminal history points here. It began with \\nthe ten sentences Briggins received for the ten 1999 robberies \\nand assigned three points to the first of those sentences under \\n§ 4A1.1(a) because the sentence exceeded 13 months. From \\nthere the probation office recognized that, because the ten \\nsentences came from the same indictment and were imposed \\non the same day, the limitations of § 4A1.1(e) applied. Apply‐\\ning § 4A1.1(e) meant that only three additional points were \\nallowed for Briggins’s remaining nine robberies. The math \\nfrom there was simple: Briggins received a total of six criminal \\nhistory points for the ten 1999 robberies. \\n At the sentencing hearing for the 2017 robberies, the \\ndistrict court agreed with and adopted the probation office’s \\nanalysis of Briggins’s criminal history. The resulting advisory \\nguidelines range for Briggins’s 2017 bank robberies was 77 to \\n96 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed a \\nsentence of 96 months. \\n II \\n On appeal Briggins renews his challenge to the district \\ncourt’s calculation of the criminal history points assigned to \\nhis 1999 bank robberies. He does so by attacking a key factual \\npremise upon which the district court based its determination \\nthat the prior robberies warranted a total of six criminal his‐\\ntory points. As Briggins sees the 1999 proceeding, he received \\nnot ten concurrent sentences, but rather one sentence of 84 \\nmonths for all ten robberies. On this view, he contends he \\nshould have received only three criminal history points for \\nthe single term of 84 months he received for the 1999 rob‐\\nberies, and thus there was no need for the district court to ever \\nget into how the guidelines treat multiple sentences. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 5\\n\\n Resolving whether Briggins received multiple concurrent \\nsentences or one sentence for his ten bank robberies requires \\nus to review the 1999 sentencing hearing in some detail. The \\nbeginning point is recognizing that Briggins pleaded guilty to \\ncommitting ten separate bank robberies, each of which had \\nbeen charged as a separate count in the underlying indict‐\\nment. At the 1999 sentencing hearing, the district court stated \\nthat it was sentencing Briggins “to a term of 84 months.” In \\ndoing so, the court emphasized that Briggins deserved to be \\npunished for each robbery—he should not, as the sentencing \\njudge put it, receive any “group discounts” for having com‐\\nmitted ten separate robberies. The district court’s written \\njudgment reflected that Briggins pleaded guilty to ten counts \\nthat resulted in “a total term of 84 months.” Nowhere in the \\nwritten judgment did the court indicate whether the 84‐\\nmonth term reflected concurrent sentences. \\n Briggins latches onto the district court’s use of the phrase \\n“a term” of imprisonment to argue that he received a single, \\nlump‐sum term of 84 months for the ten robberies. He does \\nnot dispute that he pleaded guilty to ten separate robberies, \\nbut rather underscores that he was sentenced to “a term” of \\n84 months—a single term, not multiple terms or concurrent \\nterms. And this single sentence, Briggins continues, is wholly \\naccounted for by the three criminal history points added un‐\\nder § 4A1.1(a); there was no basis for assigning additional \\ncriminal history points under § 4A1.1(e) or any other provi‐\\nsion of the guidelines. The upshot of Briggins’s argument is \\nthat it was not even necessary for the district court to reach \\n§ 4A1.1(e) because multiple sentences were not in play in the \\nfirst place. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\n We disagree. Briggins’s insistence that he received only \\none sentence because the district court announced “a term” of \\nimprisonment ignores the substance and full context of what \\ntranspired at his 1999 sentencing hearing. The transcript \\nshows that the district court intended to punish each robbery \\nseparately, for there is no other way to understand the sen‐\\ntencing judge’s comments that Briggins was not entitled to \\n“any type of group discounts” or “a two‐for‐one sale or a ten‐\\nfor‐one sale.” \\n The district judge made other statements at sentencing to \\ndrive home that Briggins deserved to be punished for each of \\nthe ten robberies. At one point, for example, the judge \\nexplained that, if Briggins had committed just one bank \\nrobbery, he would “probably be looking at three to five years \\neasily,” and that “any judge could sentence [him] to 30 years \\nand say, well, it’s three years for each of the bank robberies.” \\nThe district judge further observed that, even if he sentenced \\nBriggins to just “one year for every one of the bank robberies,” \\nhe would face a total of ten years. But the court was quick to \\nrecognize that a sentence along those lines would be well \\noutside the then‐mandatory guidelines range of 63 to 78 \\nmonths. So the district court instead applied an upward \\ndeparture, reasoning that the ten robberies conducted over a \\nshort period of time presented an “unusual circumstance” \\nthat was not adequately taken into consideration by the \\nguidelines. The 1999 sentencing ended with the district court \\nimposing a sentence of 84 months. \\n A broader point deserves underscoring. Accepting \\nBriggins’s position would require us to conclude that the \\ndistrict court sentenced him to 84 months for one of the ten \\n1999 bank robberies but to no time for the other nine. But any \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 7\\n\\nview like that neither accounts for what the district judge said \\nat sentencing—that Briggins would not receive a break \\nbecause he committed multiple bank robberies—nor the \\nreality that the court was obligated to sentence him on each of \\nthe ten separate bank robberies to which he pleaded guilty. \\nWe also cannot overlook that the district court imposed a \\nspecial assessment of $100 for each of the ten robberies for a \\ntotal of $1,000—yet another indicator that the district judge \\nunderstood the ten robberies as resulting in separate \\nconvictions warranting separate sentences. The only other \\ninterpretation, which makes even less sense, is that the 84‐\\nmonth sentence reflected the sum total of ten consecutive \\nsentences of 8.4 months each. Not only would a sentence like \\nthat—less than one year for a bank robbery—bear little \\nrelationship to the applicable guidelines range, but it would \\nalso require us to assume the district judge (who uttered not \\na word about consecutive sentences) intended to impose ten \\nsmall but consecutive sentences. \\n Our conclusion that the district court imposed ten \\nconcurrent sentences for the 1999 robberies aligns squarely \\nwith the presumption that sentences imposed in a multiple‐\\ncount case run concurrently with one another. See U.S.S.G. \\n§ 5G1.2(c) (explaining that “[i]f the sentence imposed on the \\ncount carrying the highest statutory maximum is adequate to \\nachieve the total punishment, then the sentences on all counts \\nshall run concurrently”). Indeed, the Sentencing \\nCommission’s accompanying commentary (in effect at the \\ntime of the 1999 sentencing and now) clarifies that, in a \\nmultiple‐count case, the total punishment is to be imposed on \\neach count and the sentences on all counts are to run \\nconcurrently. See id. § 5G1.2 & cmt; see also id. § 5G1.2 & cmt. \\n(effective Nov. 1, 1998). Congress incorporated this same \\n\\f8 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\npresumption of concurrence into the statutory provision \\ngoverning the imposition of multiple sentences for a \\ndefendant convicted of a federal offense. See 18 U.S.C. \\n§ 3584(a). \\n We decline to interpret Briggins’s 1999 sentence in a way \\nthat contravenes not only this presumption of concurrence, \\nbut also the sentencing judge’s clear statements that he in‐\\ntended to hold Briggins accountable for each robbery. The \\nmost accurate reading of Briggins’s 1999 sentence—the read‐\\ning fairest to the record—is that “a term of 84 months” re‐\\nflected multiple concurrent sentences. \\n Briggins urges a contrary conclusion by pointing to prior \\ndecisions where courts have concluded that “a term” refers to \\none sentence or, at the very least, creates enough ambiguity \\nabout what sentence a defendant received to warrant resen‐\\ntencing. In United States v. Eskridge, for example, the question \\nwas whether the district court had imposed one term or two \\nconcurrent terms of supervised release for the defendant’s \\ntwo convictions. 445 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2006). After exam‐\\nining the sentencing transcript, we held that the defendant \\nwas entitled to resentencing for supervised release violations \\nbecause the district judge, in sentencing the defendant to “a \\nterm of 26 months,” in no way clarified (in the judgment or \\notherwise) whether he had sentenced the defendant to one or \\ntwo terms of supervised release. See id. at 935. And we added \\nthat “if the order accurately reflects the judge’s decision, how‐\\never mistaken, to impose just a single term, it cannot be cor‐\\nrected.” Id. at 934. \\n The circumstances here are different. The statements the \\ndistrict judge made immediately before sentencing Briggins \\nfor the 1999 robberies do not leave room for an interpretation \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 9\\n\\nthat the court may have decided—however mistakenly—to \\nimpose a single term of imprisonment. To the contrary, the \\ndistrict judge’s statements made clear that he intended to hold \\nBriggins accountable for each of the ten robbery convictions. \\nAt the time, moreover, the guidelines required the court to \\nsentence Briggins on each count of conviction, with the pre‐\\nsumption that such sentences would run concurrently. \\n On this record, we conclude that the district court in 1999 \\nimposed multiple sentences for Briggins’s ten robbery convic‐\\ntions. At Briggins’s sentencing for the 2017 convictions, the \\ndistrict court thus properly assessed six criminal history \\npoints for Briggins’s 1999 sentences—three criminal history \\npoints under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a) for one sentence, and three \\nadditional points for the remaining nine sentences under \\nU.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e). \\n Accordingly, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1170,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4597309,"string":"4,597,309"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Jesus Salgado"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2194"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐2194 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nJESUS SALGADO, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 16‐cr‐00394‐2 — John Robert Blakey, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 4, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Jesus Salgado pleaded guilty to con‐\\nspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. At sentenc‐\\ning, over Salgado’s objection, the district court applied an ag‐\\ngravating role enhancement and calculated the Guidelines \\nrange to be 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. The court sen‐\\ntenced Salgado below that range, to 192 months’ imprison‐\\nment. It explained, however, that even if it were wrong on the \\n\\f2 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\nenhancement’s application, it would have imposed the same \\nsentence. Salgado appeals, challenging the district court’s ap‐\\nplication of the aggravating role enhancement and the sub‐\\nstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm. \\n I. Background \\n Beginning in 2015 or earlier, Salgado conspired with Lo‐\\nrenzo Salgado (his father), Ruby Joy Buenaventura, Jose Luis \\nRivera, Jr., and others to distribute heroin. As part of the con‐\\nspiracy, Salgado used a stash house in Bensenville, Illinois to \\nreceive and store narcotics. Salgado’s father, who lived in \\nMexico, was the leader of the drug trafficking organization. \\n Salgado was arrested in August 2016, after which a federal \\ngrand jury indicted him on several heroin‐related charges. See \\n21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Salgado pleaded guilty to conspir‐\\nacy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. Before sentenc‐\\ning, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investi‐\\ngation Report (“PSR”), relying on, among other things, the \\ngovernment’s version of events, Rivera’s grand jury testi‐\\nmony, and statements from a DEA Special Agent. \\n The PSR recommended an aggravating role enhancement \\nunder § 3B1.1(b), reasoning that Salgado, though subordinate \\nto his father, “directed and controlled” Buenaventura and Ri‐\\nvera and was the Chicago‐based leader of the conspiracy. Sal‐\\ngado objected to the enhancement in a presentencing memo‐\\nrandum and also at sentencing on the primary basis that his \\nfather ran the drug organization. According to Salgado, he \\nhad “no decision making authority, acted solely at the direc‐\\ntion of [his father] … did not arrange the importation of the \\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 3\\n\\ndrugs, and did not set any of the price or quantity terms.” Sal‐\\ngado argued that the government had failed to prove other‐\\nwise by a preponderance of the evidence. \\n At sentencing, the district court asked the parties if they \\nhad any corrections to the PSR. Both parties said no. The dis‐\\ntrict court heard argument on the disputed enhancement un‐\\nder § 3B1.1(b), which provides for a three‐level enhancement \\nif the defendant “was a manager or supervisor (but not an or‐\\nganizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or \\nmore participants … .” The court applied the enhancement, \\nexplaining that based on the “undisputed portions of the fac‐\\ntual record” there were at least five participants to the con‐\\nspiracy, and that Salgado’s “role as the supervisor is clear \\nfrom the materials that are not disputed.” The court did not \\nidentify any evidence in the record, nor did it make any spe‐\\ncific factual findings to support the enhancement. With the \\nenhancement applied, the district court calculated the Guide‐\\nlines range as 210 to 262 months in prison. \\n The court then heard argument on the appropriate sen‐\\ntence. Seeking a statutory minimum sentence of 120 months, \\nSalgado argued that his family, especially his father, pres‐\\nsured him into criminal activity. He also argued that the \\nGuidelines overstated his criminal history and role in the of‐\\nfense. For its part, the government emphasized the serious‐\\nness of the offense and disputed that the Guidelines over‐\\nstated Salgado’s criminal history or role in the offense. \\n The court discussed the § 3553 factors in detail. In impos‐\\ning sentence, the court initially explained that even if it erred \\nin applying the § 3B1.1(b) aggravating role enhancement, the \\nsentence would have been the same: \\n\\f4 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\n The court has considered the factors under 3553 to fashion \\n a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to \\n accomplish the purposes of sentencing. And having consid‐\\n ered those factors, the sentence I am about to impose would \\n be the same even if the guidelines were a little bit different. \\n Counsel’s made a variety of arguments regarding the calcu‐\\n lation. He’s made some arguments by way of 3553 factors, \\n other guideline objections, certainly in particular the … ag‐\\n gravating role. The Court has considered those arguments. \\n And while the aggravating role objection was overruled \\n and I believe the application was appropriate in this case, \\n the arguments made by your counsel were considered and \\n are reflected in the 3553 factors. So even if the guideline cal‐\\n culation was different, even if I made a mistake in the cal‐\\n culation with respect to the aggravating role, the guideline \\n sentence is going to not control the sentence here. What’s \\n going to control is the 3553 factors. So even if that calcula‐\\n tion should have been different, the ultimate sentence is go‐\\n ing to be the same either. \\nThe court touched on this point later in the hearing: \\n I’ve also considered your role in the offense. The enhance‐\\n ment was appropriate but not all defendants who are enti‐\\n tled or should have that enhancement are created equally \\n and your counsel made a lot of good arguments in that re‐\\n gard and I’ve considered them in fashioning a sentence un‐\\n der 3553 … . And while … I believe … the enhancement was \\n appropriately applied, that’s what 3553 is to for, to fashion \\n an individual sentence and that’s what I’ve tried to do. \\n The court explained its sentencing rationale, discussing \\nboth mitigating and aggravating factors in detail. Afterwards, \\nthe court asked defense counsel if it had considered all \\n“primary arguments in mitigation.” Counsel responded: \\n“You have, your Honor.” The court then imposed a below‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 5\\n\\nGuidelines sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment. The court \\nasked if either party wanted “any further elaboration of [its] \\nreasons under 3553.” Defense counsel responded: “No, your \\nHonor.” \\n II. Discussion \\n Salgado argues that the district court erred in applying the \\naggravating role enhancement and in not adequately consid‐\\nering all of his mitigation arguments. He also challenges the \\nsubstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We take these ar‐\\nguments in turn. \\nA. Procedural Reasonableness \\n We review procedural challenges to sentences de novo. \\nUnited States v. Griffith, 913 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2019). Our \\ntask is to “ensure that the district court committed no signifi‐\\ncant procedural error, such as incorrectly calculating the \\nguidelines range, failing to consider the section 3553(a) fac‐\\ntors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or \\nfailing to explain adequately the chosen sentence.” Id. (citing \\nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). \\n 1. Aggravating Role Enhancement \\n Salgado first argues that the district court failed to make \\nsufficient factual findings to support the enhancement. We \\nagree. Despite Salgado’s objection to the enhancement—\\ndetailed in a presentencing memorandum and argued at \\nsentencing—the district court made no factual findings to \\nsupport the enhancement. Instead, it vaguely referenced \\nsupposedly undisputed record items to support its decision \\nto apply the enhancement. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\n This is a problem, both because the district court’s cursory \\napplication of the enhancement precludes meaningful judicial \\nreview and because Salgado did, in fact, dispute the salient \\nfacts, including the extent of his supervision of others, the \\ngrand jury testimony of Rivera, and the role that his father \\nplayed. As we have said before, “it is not our role to justify a \\nsentence that lacks a sufficient explanation with our best \\nguess for why the court imposed the sentence that it did.” \\nUnited States v. Titus, 821 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n The district court’s procedural error, however, was harm‐\\nless under the circumstances. See United States v. Clark, 906 \\nF.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d \\n660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009). While we need not determine whether \\nthe enhancement in fact applies, the district court unambigu‐\\nously stated, with specific detail, that it would have—and \\nwhy it would have—imposed the same sentence under \\n§ 3553, even if it had erred in applying the enhancement. 560 \\nF.3d at 667; see also United States v. Shelton, 905 F.3d 1026, 1032 \\n(7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Rabiu, 721 F.3d 467, 471 (7th \\nCir. 2013). Put another way, whether or not the enhancement \\nshould have applied, the district court’s detailed explanation \\nmakes a remand pointless. \\n Salgado nevertheless argues that if the enhancement does \\nnot apply, the district court’s 192‐month sentence would be \\nabove, not below, the applicable Guideline range, making it \\ndifficult for this court to find harmless error. But the district \\ncourt provided the sort of detailed analysis under § 3553 that \\nwould sustain an above‐Guidelines sentence. And we rejected \\nthis type of reasoning in Abbas, where under similar circum‐\\nstances we found harmless error in light of the district court’s \\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 7\\n\\nunambiguous statements and its “detailed explanation for the \\nparallel result.” Abbas, 560 F.3d at 665–68. \\n 2. Mitigation Arguments \\n Salgado also argues that the district court procedurally \\nerred by failing to consider all of his mitigation arguments. \\nSalgado has waived this challenge. The district court, follow‐\\ning United States v. Garcia‐Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. \\n2013), asked defense counsel if it considered all of counsel’s \\nmitigation arguments, to which counsel responded affirma‐\\ntively. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court likewise \\nasked if counsel had “any legal objection to the sentence I \\nhave proposed or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\\nsons under 3553 both as to the term of imprisonment, the con‐\\ndition or terms of supervised release, or any other aspect of \\nthe sentencing.” Defense counsel responded in the negative. \\nThe challenge is thus waived.1 United States v. Tartareanu, 884 \\nF.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2018). \\nB. Substantive Reasonableness \\n Finally, Salgado challenges the substantive reasonable‐\\nness of his sentence, an issue we review for abuse of discre‐\\ntion. See United States v. Thompson, 864 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. \\n2017). In doing so, “we take into account that the sentencing \\n\\n \\n 1 \\n Regardless, Salgado forfeited his arguments by not objecting at sen‐\\ntencing, leaving us to review for plain error, which did not occur here. \\nUnited States v. Pankow, 884 F.3d 785, 791 (7th Cir. 2018). The district court \\nacknowledged and gave meaningful consideration to Salgado’s mitiga‐\\ntion arguments and the § 3553 factors. See United States v. Bustos, 912 F.3d \\n1059, 1063–64 (7th Cir. 2019). \\n \\n\\f8 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\njudge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their im‐\\nport under section 3553(a) in the individual case.” United \\nStates v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quo‐\\ntation marks and citation omitted). \\n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in im‐\\nposing a sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment, which is sub‐\\nstantively reasonable in light of the § 3553 factors. This is true \\nregardless of whether the sentence falls above, within or be‐\\nlow the Guideline range. See Abbas, 560 F.3d at 668. Like in \\nAbbas, the district court gave meaningful and thorough con‐\\nsideration to the pertinent factors to fashion a sentence that \\nmeets the statutory purpose of sentencing. The district court \\nconsidered multiple factors, including the seriousness and na‐\\nture of the offense and the family pressures that contributed \\nto Salgado’s participation in his father’s criminal enterprise. \\nAlthough Salgado may disagree with the district court’s \\nweighing of these factors, neither he nor the record offer any \\nsound reason to disturb the district court’s judgment. \\n III. Conclusion \\n We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4374562/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597309/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Jesus Salgado\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐2194 \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \n v. \n\nJESUS SALGADO, \n Defendant‐Appellant. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \n No. 16‐cr‐00394‐2 — John Robert Blakey, Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 4, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, \nCircuit Judges. \n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Jesus Salgado pleaded guilty to con‐\nspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. At sentenc‐\ning, over Salgado’s objection, the district court applied an ag‐\ngravating role enhancement and calculated the Guidelines \nrange to be 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. The court sen‐\ntenced Salgado below that range, to 192 months’ imprison‐\nment. It explained, however, that even if it were wrong on the \n\f2 No. 18‐2194 \n\nenhancement’s application, it would have imposed the same \nsentence. Salgado appeals, challenging the district court’s ap‐\nplication of the aggravating role enhancement and the sub‐\nstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm. \n I. Background \n Beginning in 2015 or earlier, Salgado conspired with Lo‐\nrenzo Salgado (his father), Ruby Joy Buenaventura, Jose Luis \nRivera, Jr., and others to distribute heroin. As part of the con‐\nspiracy, Salgado used a stash house in Bensenville, Illinois to \nreceive and store narcotics. Salgado’s father, who lived in \nMexico, was the leader of the drug trafficking organization. \n Salgado was arrested in August 2016, after which a federal \ngrand jury indicted him on several heroin‐related charges. See \n21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Salgado pleaded guilty to conspir‐\nacy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. Before sentenc‐\ning, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investi‐\ngation Report (“PSR”), relying on, among other things, the \ngovernment’s version of events, Rivera’s grand jury testi‐\nmony, and statements from a DEA Special Agent. \n The PSR recommended an aggravating role enhancement \nunder § 3B1.1(b), reasoning that Salgado, though subordinate \nto his father, “directed and controlled” Buenaventura and Ri‐\nvera and was the Chicago‐based leader of the conspiracy. Sal‐\ngado objected to the enhancement in a presentencing memo‐\nrandum and also at sentencing on the primary basis that his \nfather ran the drug organization. According to Salgado, he \nhad “no decision making authority, acted solely at the direc‐\ntion of [his father] … did not arrange the importation of the \n\fNo. 18‐2194 3\n\ndrugs, and did not set any of the price or quantity terms.” Sal‐\ngado argued that the government had failed to prove other‐\nwise by a preponderance of the evidence. \n At sentencing, the district court asked the parties if they \nhad any corrections to the PSR. Both parties said no. The dis‐\ntrict court heard argument on the disputed enhancement un‐\nder § 3B1.1(b), which provides for a three‐level enhancement \nif the defendant “was a manager or supervisor (but not an or‐\nganizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or \nmore participants … .” The court applied the enhancement, \nexplaining that based on the “undisputed portions of the fac‐\ntual record” there were at least five participants to the con‐\nspiracy, and that Salgado’s “role as the supervisor is clear \nfrom the materials that are not disputed.” The court did not \nidentify any evidence in the record, nor did it make any spe‐\ncific factual findings to support the enhancement. With the \nenhancement applied, the district court calculated the Guide‐\nlines range as 210 to 262 months in prison. \n The court then heard argument on the appropriate sen‐\ntence. Seeking a statutory minimum sentence of 120 months, \nSalgado argued that his family, especially his father, pres‐\nsured him into criminal activity. He also argued that the \nGuidelines overstated his criminal history and role in the of‐\nfense. For its part, the government emphasized the serious‐\nness of the offense and disputed that the Guidelines over‐\nstated Salgado’s criminal history or role in the offense. \n The court discussed the § 3553 factors in detail. In impos‐\ning sentence, the court initially explained that even if it erred \nin applying the § 3B1.1(b) aggravating role enhancement, the \nsentence would have been the same: \n\f4 No. 18‐2194 \n\n The court has considered the factors under 3553 to fashion \n a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to \n accomplish the purposes of sentencing. And having consid‐\n ered those factors, the sentence I am about to impose would \n be the same even if the guidelines were a little bit different. \n Counsel’s made a variety of arguments regarding the calcu‐\n lation. He’s made some arguments by way of 3553 factors, \n other guideline objections, certainly in particular the … ag‐\n gravating role. The Court has considered those arguments. \n And while the aggravating role objection was overruled \n and I believe the application was appropriate in this case, \n the arguments made by your counsel were considered and \n are reflected in the 3553 factors. So even if the guideline cal‐\n culation was different, even if I made a mistake in the cal‐\n culation with respect to the aggravating role, the guideline \n sentence is going to not control the sentence here. What’s \n going to control is the 3553 factors. So even if that calcula‐\n tion should have been different, the ultimate sentence is go‐\n ing to be the same either. \nThe court touched on this point later in the hearing: \n I’ve also considered your role in the offense. The enhance‐\n ment was appropriate but not all defendants who are enti‐\n tled or should have that enhancement are created equally \n and your counsel made a lot of good arguments in that re‐\n gard and I’ve considered them in fashioning a sentence un‐\n der 3553 … . And while … I believe … the enhancement was \n appropriately applied, that’s what 3553 is to for, to fashion \n an individual sentence and that’s what I’ve tried to do. \n The court explained its sentencing rationale, discussing \nboth mitigating and aggravating factors in detail. Afterwards, \nthe court asked defense counsel if it had considered all \n“primary arguments in mitigation.” Counsel responded: \n“You have, your Honor.” The court then imposed a below‐\n\fNo. 18‐2194 5\n\nGuidelines sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment. The court \nasked if either party wanted “any further elaboration of [its] \nreasons under 3553.” Defense counsel responded: “No, your \nHonor.” \n II. Discussion \n Salgado argues that the district court erred in applying the \naggravating role enhancement and in not adequately consid‐\nering all of his mitigation arguments. He also challenges the \nsubstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We take these ar‐\nguments in turn. \nA. Procedural Reasonableness \n We review procedural challenges to sentences de novo. \nUnited States v. Griffith, 913 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2019). Our \ntask is to “ensure that the district court committed no signifi‐\ncant procedural error, such as incorrectly calculating the \nguidelines range, failing to consider the section 3553(a) fac‐\ntors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or \nfailing to explain adequately the chosen sentence.” Id. (citing \nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). \n 1. Aggravating Role Enhancement \n Salgado first argues that the district court failed to make \nsufficient factual findings to support the enhancement. We \nagree. Despite Salgado’s objection to the enhancement—\ndetailed in a presentencing memorandum and argued at \nsentencing—the district court made no factual findings to \nsupport the enhancement. Instead, it vaguely referenced \nsupposedly undisputed record items to support its decision \nto apply the enhancement. \n\f6 No. 18‐2194 \n\n This is a problem, both because the district court’s cursory \napplication of the enhancement precludes meaningful judicial \nreview and because Salgado did, in fact, dispute the salient \nfacts, including the extent of his supervision of others, the \ngrand jury testimony of Rivera, and the role that his father \nplayed. As we have said before, “it is not our role to justify a \nsentence that lacks a sufficient explanation with our best \nguess for why the court imposed the sentence that it did.” \nUnited States v. Titus, 821 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2016). \n The district court’s procedural error, however, was harm‐\nless under the circumstances. See United States v. Clark, 906 \nF.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d \n660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009). While we need not determine whether \nthe enhancement in fact applies, the district court unambigu‐\nously stated, with specific detail, that it would have—and \nwhy it would have—imposed the same sentence under \n§ 3553, even if it had erred in applying the enhancement. 560 \nF.3d at 667; see also United States v. Shelton, 905 F.3d 1026, 1032 \n(7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Rabiu, 721 F.3d 467, 471 (7th \nCir. 2013). Put another way, whether or not the enhancement \nshould have applied, the district court’s detailed explanation \nmakes a remand pointless. \n Salgado nevertheless argues that if the enhancement does \nnot apply, the district court’s 192‐month sentence would be \nabove, not below, the applicable Guideline range, making it \ndifficult for this court to find harmless error. But the district \ncourt provided the sort of detailed analysis under § 3553 that \nwould sustain an above‐Guidelines sentence. And we rejected \nthis type of reasoning in Abbas, where under similar circum‐\nstances we found harmless error in light of the district court’s \n\fNo. 18‐2194 7\n\nunambiguous statements and its “detailed explanation for the \nparallel result.” Abbas, 560 F.3d at 665–68. \n 2. Mitigation Arguments \n Salgado also argues that the district court procedurally \nerred by failing to consider all of his mitigation arguments. \nSalgado has waived this challenge. The district court, follow‐\ning United States v. Garcia‐Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. \n2013), asked defense counsel if it considered all of counsel’s \nmitigation arguments, to which counsel responded affirma‐\ntively. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court likewise \nasked if counsel had “any legal objection to the sentence I \nhave proposed or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\nsons under 3553 both as to the term of imprisonment, the con‐\ndition or terms of supervised release, or any other aspect of \nthe sentencing.” Defense counsel responded in the negative. \nThe challenge is thus waived.1 United States v. Tartareanu, 884 \nF.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2018). \nB. Substantive Reasonableness \n Finally, Salgado challenges the substantive reasonable‐\nness of his sentence, an issue we review for abuse of discre‐\ntion. See United States v. Thompson, 864 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. \n2017). In doing so, “we take into account that the sentencing \n\n \n 1 \n Regardless, Salgado forfeited his arguments by not objecting at sen‐\ntencing, leaving us to review for plain error, which did not occur here. \nUnited States v. Pankow, 884 F.3d 785, 791 (7th Cir. 2018). The district court \nacknowledged and gave meaningful consideration to Salgado’s mitiga‐\ntion arguments and the § 3553 factors. See United States v. Bustos, 912 F.3d \n1059, 1063–64 (7th Cir. 2019). \n \n\f8 No. 18‐2194 \n\njudge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their im‐\nport under section 3553(a) in the individual case.” United \nStates v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quo‐\ntation marks and citation omitted). \n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in im‐\nposing a sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment, which is sub‐\nstantively reasonable in light of the § 3553 factors. This is true \nregardless of whether the sentence falls above, within or be‐\nlow the Guideline range. See Abbas, 560 F.3d at 668. Like in \nAbbas, the district court gave meaningful and thorough con‐\nsideration to the pertinent factors to fashion a sentence that \nmeets the statutory purpose of sentencing. The district court \nconsidered multiple factors, including the seriousness and na‐\nture of the offense and the family pressures that contributed \nto Salgado’s participation in his father’s criminal enterprise. \nAlthough Salgado may disagree with the district court’s \nweighing of these factors, neither he nor the record offer any \nsound reason to disturb the district court’s judgment. \n III. Conclusion \n We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Jesus Salgado\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐2194 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nJESUS SALGADO, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 16‐cr‐00394‐2 — John Robert Blakey, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 4, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Jesus Salgado pleaded guilty to con‐\\nspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. At sentenc‐\\ning, over Salgado’s objection, the district court applied an ag‐\\ngravating role enhancement and calculated the Guidelines \\nrange to be 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. The court sen‐\\ntenced Salgado below that range, to 192 months’ imprison‐\\nment. It explained, however, that even if it were wrong on the \\n\\f2 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\nenhancement’s application, it would have imposed the same \\nsentence. Salgado appeals, challenging the district court’s ap‐\\nplication of the aggravating role enhancement and the sub‐\\nstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm. \\n I. Background \\n Beginning in 2015 or earlier, Salgado conspired with Lo‐\\nrenzo Salgado (his father), Ruby Joy Buenaventura, Jose Luis \\nRivera, Jr., and others to distribute heroin. As part of the con‐\\nspiracy, Salgado used a stash house in Bensenville, Illinois to \\nreceive and store narcotics. Salgado’s father, who lived in \\nMexico, was the leader of the drug trafficking organization. \\n Salgado was arrested in August 2016, after which a federal \\ngrand jury indicted him on several heroin‐related charges. See \\n21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Salgado pleaded guilty to conspir‐\\nacy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. Before sentenc‐\\ning, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investi‐\\ngation Report (“PSR”), relying on, among other things, the \\ngovernment’s version of events, Rivera’s grand jury testi‐\\nmony, and statements from a DEA Special Agent. \\n The PSR recommended an aggravating role enhancement \\nunder § 3B1.1(b), reasoning that Salgado, though subordinate \\nto his father, “directed and controlled” Buenaventura and Ri‐\\nvera and was the Chicago‐based leader of the conspiracy. Sal‐\\ngado objected to the enhancement in a presentencing memo‐\\nrandum and also at sentencing on the primary basis that his \\nfather ran the drug organization. According to Salgado, he \\nhad “no decision making authority, acted solely at the direc‐\\ntion of [his father] … did not arrange the importation of the \\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 3\\n\\ndrugs, and did not set any of the price or quantity terms.” Sal‐\\ngado argued that the government had failed to prove other‐\\nwise by a preponderance of the evidence. \\n At sentencing, the district court asked the parties if they \\nhad any corrections to the PSR. Both parties said no. The dis‐\\ntrict court heard argument on the disputed enhancement un‐\\nder § 3B1.1(b), which provides for a three‐level enhancement \\nif the defendant “was a manager or supervisor (but not an or‐\\nganizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or \\nmore participants … .” The court applied the enhancement, \\nexplaining that based on the “undisputed portions of the fac‐\\ntual record” there were at least five participants to the con‐\\nspiracy, and that Salgado’s “role as the supervisor is clear \\nfrom the materials that are not disputed.” The court did not \\nidentify any evidence in the record, nor did it make any spe‐\\ncific factual findings to support the enhancement. With the \\nenhancement applied, the district court calculated the Guide‐\\nlines range as 210 to 262 months in prison. \\n The court then heard argument on the appropriate sen‐\\ntence. Seeking a statutory minimum sentence of 120 months, \\nSalgado argued that his family, especially his father, pres‐\\nsured him into criminal activity. He also argued that the \\nGuidelines overstated his criminal history and role in the of‐\\nfense. For its part, the government emphasized the serious‐\\nness of the offense and disputed that the Guidelines over‐\\nstated Salgado’s criminal history or role in the offense. \\n The court discussed the § 3553 factors in detail. In impos‐\\ning sentence, the court initially explained that even if it erred \\nin applying the § 3B1.1(b) aggravating role enhancement, the \\nsentence would have been the same: \\n\\f4 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\n The court has considered the factors under 3553 to fashion \\n a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to \\n accomplish the purposes of sentencing. And having consid‐\\n ered those factors, the sentence I am about to impose would \\n be the same even if the guidelines were a little bit different. \\n Counsel’s made a variety of arguments regarding the calcu‐\\n lation. He’s made some arguments by way of 3553 factors, \\n other guideline objections, certainly in particular the … ag‐\\n gravating role. The Court has considered those arguments. \\n And while the aggravating role objection was overruled \\n and I believe the application was appropriate in this case, \\n the arguments made by your counsel were considered and \\n are reflected in the 3553 factors. So even if the guideline cal‐\\n culation was different, even if I made a mistake in the cal‐\\n culation with respect to the aggravating role, the guideline \\n sentence is going to not control the sentence here. What’s \\n going to control is the 3553 factors. So even if that calcula‐\\n tion should have been different, the ultimate sentence is go‐\\n ing to be the same either. \\nThe court touched on this point later in the hearing: \\n I’ve also considered your role in the offense. The enhance‐\\n ment was appropriate but not all defendants who are enti‐\\n tled or should have that enhancement are created equally \\n and your counsel made a lot of good arguments in that re‐\\n gard and I’ve considered them in fashioning a sentence un‐\\n der 3553 … . And while … I believe … the enhancement was \\n appropriately applied, that’s what 3553 is to for, to fashion \\n an individual sentence and that’s what I’ve tried to do. \\n The court explained its sentencing rationale, discussing \\nboth mitigating and aggravating factors in detail. Afterwards, \\nthe court asked defense counsel if it had considered all \\n“primary arguments in mitigation.” Counsel responded: \\n“You have, your Honor.” The court then imposed a below‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 5\\n\\nGuidelines sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment. The court \\nasked if either party wanted “any further elaboration of [its] \\nreasons under 3553.” Defense counsel responded: “No, your \\nHonor.” \\n II. Discussion \\n Salgado argues that the district court erred in applying the \\naggravating role enhancement and in not adequately consid‐\\nering all of his mitigation arguments. He also challenges the \\nsubstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We take these ar‐\\nguments in turn. \\nA. Procedural Reasonableness \\n We review procedural challenges to sentences de novo. \\nUnited States v. Griffith, 913 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2019). Our \\ntask is to “ensure that the district court committed no signifi‐\\ncant procedural error, such as incorrectly calculating the \\nguidelines range, failing to consider the section 3553(a) fac‐\\ntors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or \\nfailing to explain adequately the chosen sentence.” Id. (citing \\nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). \\n 1. Aggravating Role Enhancement \\n Salgado first argues that the district court failed to make \\nsufficient factual findings to support the enhancement. We \\nagree. Despite Salgado’s objection to the enhancement—\\ndetailed in a presentencing memorandum and argued at \\nsentencing—the district court made no factual findings to \\nsupport the enhancement. Instead, it vaguely referenced \\nsupposedly undisputed record items to support its decision \\nto apply the enhancement. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\n This is a problem, both because the district court’s cursory \\napplication of the enhancement precludes meaningful judicial \\nreview and because Salgado did, in fact, dispute the salient \\nfacts, including the extent of his supervision of others, the \\ngrand jury testimony of Rivera, and the role that his father \\nplayed. As we have said before, “it is not our role to justify a \\nsentence that lacks a sufficient explanation with our best \\nguess for why the court imposed the sentence that it did.” \\nUnited States v. Titus, 821 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n The district court’s procedural error, however, was harm‐\\nless under the circumstances. See United States v. Clark, 906 \\nF.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d \\n660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009). While we need not determine whether \\nthe enhancement in fact applies, the district court unambigu‐\\nously stated, with specific detail, that it would have—and \\nwhy it would have—imposed the same sentence under \\n§ 3553, even if it had erred in applying the enhancement. 560 \\nF.3d at 667; see also United States v. Shelton, 905 F.3d 1026, 1032 \\n(7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Rabiu, 721 F.3d 467, 471 (7th \\nCir. 2013). Put another way, whether or not the enhancement \\nshould have applied, the district court’s detailed explanation \\nmakes a remand pointless. \\n Salgado nevertheless argues that if the enhancement does \\nnot apply, the district court’s 192‐month sentence would be \\nabove, not below, the applicable Guideline range, making it \\ndifficult for this court to find harmless error. But the district \\ncourt provided the sort of detailed analysis under § 3553 that \\nwould sustain an above‐Guidelines sentence. And we rejected \\nthis type of reasoning in Abbas, where under similar circum‐\\nstances we found harmless error in light of the district court’s \\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 7\\n\\nunambiguous statements and its “detailed explanation for the \\nparallel result.” Abbas, 560 F.3d at 665–68. \\n 2. Mitigation Arguments \\n Salgado also argues that the district court procedurally \\nerred by failing to consider all of his mitigation arguments. \\nSalgado has waived this challenge. The district court, follow‐\\ning United States v. Garcia‐Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. \\n2013), asked defense counsel if it considered all of counsel’s \\nmitigation arguments, to which counsel responded affirma‐\\ntively. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court likewise \\nasked if counsel had “any legal objection to the sentence I \\nhave proposed or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\\nsons under 3553 both as to the term of imprisonment, the con‐\\ndition or terms of supervised release, or any other aspect of \\nthe sentencing.” Defense counsel responded in the negative. \\nThe challenge is thus waived.1 United States v. Tartareanu, 884 \\nF.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2018). \\nB. Substantive Reasonableness \\n Finally, Salgado challenges the substantive reasonable‐\\nness of his sentence, an issue we review for abuse of discre‐\\ntion. See United States v. Thompson, 864 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. \\n2017). In doing so, “we take into account that the sentencing \\n\\n \\n 1 \\n Regardless, Salgado forfeited his arguments by not objecting at sen‐\\ntencing, leaving us to review for plain error, which did not occur here. \\nUnited States v. Pankow, 884 F.3d 785, 791 (7th Cir. 2018). The district court \\nacknowledged and gave meaningful consideration to Salgado’s mitiga‐\\ntion arguments and the § 3553 factors. See United States v. Bustos, 912 F.3d \\n1059, 1063–64 (7th Cir. 2019). \\n \\n\\f8 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\njudge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their im‐\\nport under section 3553(a) in the individual case.” United \\nStates v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quo‐\\ntation marks and citation omitted). \\n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in im‐\\nposing a sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment, which is sub‐\\nstantively reasonable in light of the § 3553 factors. This is true \\nregardless of whether the sentence falls above, within or be‐\\nlow the Guideline range. See Abbas, 560 F.3d at 668. Like in \\nAbbas, the district court gave meaningful and thorough con‐\\nsideration to the pertinent factors to fashion a sentence that \\nmeets the statutory purpose of sentencing. The district court \\nconsidered multiple factors, including the seriousness and na‐\\nture of the offense and the family pressures that contributed \\nto Salgado’s participation in his father’s criminal enterprise. \\nAlthough Salgado may disagree with the district court’s \\nweighing of these factors, neither he nor the record offer any \\nsound reason to disturb the district court’s judgment. \\n III. Conclusion \\n We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1171,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4597311,"string":"4,597,311"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Anthony SANSONE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Megan J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General of the United States, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Anthony Sansone v. Megan Brennan"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3534 & 17-3632"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Kanne, Rovner, Barrett\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-3534 & No. 17-3632\\nANTHONY SANSONE,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General of the United States,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:13-cv-03415 — Milton I. Shadur, Judge,\\n and Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Tony Sansone, who is confined to\\na wheelchair, needs a parking place with room to deploy his\\nvan’s wheelchair ramp. For years, the Postal Service, his\\nemployer, provided him one. But in 2011, it took that spot\\naway and failed to provide him with a suitable replacement.\\nSansone then retired and sued the Service under the\\nRehabilitation Act for failing to accommodate his disability.\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nA jury returned a verdict in his favor and Sansone recovered\\ncompensatory damages, as well as back and front pay.\\n The Service asks us to vacate the district court’s judgment\\nbecause of two jury instructions: one about an employee’s\\nobligation to cooperate with his employer in identifying a\\nreasonable accommodation and the other about how the jury\\nshould evaluate the Service’s expert witness. We hold that the\\ndistrict court did not err with respect to the former, but its\\ninstruction about the expert was both wrong and prejudicial.\\nThe Service also appeals the district court’s award of back and\\nfront pay, but it forfeited that argument by failing to raise it\\nbelow.\\n I.\\n Anthony Sansone began his thirty-year career at the Postal\\nService in 1981. He was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in\\n1991, and, 8 years later, the disease put him in a wheelchair.\\nThe Service gave him a reserved space near the loading docks,\\nwhere there was room to deploy his van’s wheelchair ramp.\\nThat arrangement lasted until 2011, when the plant manager,\\nRuby Branch, asked Sansone to stop parking there.\\n Sansone was greatly upset by Branch’s decision. He\\nviewed it as arbitrary; Branch told him that it was driven by\\nsafety concerns. She offered Sansone two other options: to\\npark in one of the handicapped spots in front of the building\\nor her own reserved space in the back of the building. Neither\\nmet his needs. Branch’s reserved space, like most of the\\nhandicapped spots, didn’t provide enough room to deploy\\nhis van’s passenger-side ramp, and the few handicapped\\nspots that had enough room were usually taken. In addition,\\nthe spots in the back of the building (like Branch’s spot)\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 3\\n\\nwould require him to travel in his wheelchair along a busy\\ntruck route in the dark. So with the permission of his direct\\nsupervisor, Chuck von Rhein, Sansone continued to park in\\nhis usual place while waiting for a solution to the problem.\\n Two weeks later, Sansone emailed the maintenance\\nmanager, LaShawn Jacobs, for an update on his parking\\nsituation. Jacobs reiterated what Branch had said before: that\\nSansone must park in one of the proposed spaces. Sansone\\nthen sought help from Stephen Grieser, chair of the Postal\\nService district’s Reasonable Accommodation Committee,\\nwho told Sansone that he would start the process of\\nidentifying a reasonable accommodation for him.\\n A few days later, Branch noticed Sansone’s van parked\\nnear the loading docks. She told Jacobs to inform Sansone that\\nhe should move it or risk having it towed. When Jacobs\\nrelayed the message, Sansone panicked, started to experience\\nchest pain, and left work. He worried that if his van had been\\ntowed, he would have been stranded at work because he\\nneeded the van to load his wheelchair. The next day he went\\nto see a doctor because he was still experiencing panic attacks.\\nThe doctor recommended that he stay home until the\\nsituation was rectified and prescribed medication to help him\\ndeal with the stress.\\n After another two weeks passed, Grieser sent Sansone a\\nletter asking him to provide medical information about his\\n“condition and the specific limitations that it imposes” so that\\nhe could address Sansone’s parking situation. The letter\\nexacerbated Sansone’s frustration because in his view, it\\nsought information that the Service already knew—that he\\nhad multiple sclerosis and was confined to a wheelchair.\\nSansone did not provide Grieser with the redundant medical\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\ninformation. Instead, he asked von Rhein, his supervisor, to\\ntell Grieser to stop pursuing the parking issue because by that\\npoint, the stress of the situation had rendered Sansone unable\\nto go back to work at the Service no matter where he parked.\\nHe filed for disability retirement, which the Office of\\nPersonnel Management granted.\\n Sansone then sued the Service under the Rehabilitation\\nAct, 29 U.S.C. § 791, et seq., for constructive discharge and\\nfailure to accommodate. The district court granted the\\nService’s summary judgment motion on the constructive\\ndischarge claim, but it denied both parties’ motions for\\nsummary judgment on the failure to accommodate claim. The\\ncase proceeded to trial, and Sansone won $300,000 in\\ncompensatory damages.\\n After the verdict came in, the district court addressed\\nSansone’s equitable claim for back and front pay. It awarded\\nhim $828,774—an amount covering the period between the\\ndate of his termination and January 20, 2023, the date on\\nwhich he would have retired.\\n The Service presses three arguments on appeal, one\\nrelated to the merits of Sansone’s “failure to accommodate”\\nclaim and the other two related to damages.\\n II.\\n To succeed on his failure to accommodate claim under 29\\nU.S.C. § 794, Sansone had to prove that (1) he was a qualified\\nindividual with a disability, (2) the Service was aware of his\\ndisability, and (3) the Service failed to reasonably\\naccommodate his disability. King v. City of Madison, 550 F.3d\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 5\\n\\n598, 600 (7th Cir. 2008). 1 Relevant to—and sometimes\\ndeterminative of—the third element is the employer and\\nemployee’s respective cooperation “in an interactive process\\nto determine a reasonable accommodation.” Baert v. Euclid\\nBeverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 1998). The Service\\ncontends that the district court erroneously instructed the jury\\nabout the consequences of an employee’s failure to cooperate\\nin this “interactive process.”\\n Some background on this “interactive process” is\\nnecessary to understand the Service’s objection to the jury\\ninstruction. While the “interactive process” is important, it is\\na means for identifying a reasonable accommodation rather\\nthan an end in itself. Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d\\n1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 1997). And because the process is not an\\nend in itself, an employer cannot be liable solely for refusing\\nto take part in it. For example, “[f]ailure to engage in this\\n‘interactive process’ cannot give rise to a claim for relief … if\\nthe employer can show that no reasonable accommodation\\nwas possible.” Hansen v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir.\\n2000). Nor will it give rise to a claim against an employer who\\nreasonably accommodated the employee. Rehling v. City of\\nChicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The ADA seeks\\nto ensure that qualified individuals are accommodated in the\\nworkplace, not to punish employers who, despite their failure\\nto engage in an interactive process, have made reasonable\\naccommodations.”). But when a reasonable accommodation\\nwas possible and the employer did not offer it, the third\\n\\n\\n1\\n “[T]o determine whether the Rehabilitation Act has been violated in the\\nemployment context, we refer to the provisions and standards of the\\n[Americans with Disabilities Act].” Jackson v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806,\\n810–11 (7th Cir. 2005); see 29 U.S.C. § 794(d).\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nelement of a “failure to accommodate” claim turns on the\\n“interactive process” requirement. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &\\nCo., 417 F.3d 789, 805 (7th Cir. 2005). In that event,\\n“responsibility will lie with the party that caused the\\nbreakdown.” Id. at 805. According to the Service, this is where\\nthe district court went awry.\\n The Service insists that the court erroneously instructed\\nthe jury that it could render a verdict for Sansone even if he\\nwas at fault for the breakdown of the interactive process. Over\\nthe Service’s objection, the court instructed the jury as\\nfollows:\\n Once an employer is aware of the employee’s\\n disability and an accommodation has been\\n requested, the employer must discuss with the\\n employee whether there is a reasonable\\n accommodation that will permit him to perform\\n his job. Both the employer and the employee\\n must cooperate in the interactive process in\\n good faith. Neither party can win this case\\n solely because the other did not cooperate in\\n that process in the way that the party believed\\n appropriate, but you may consider whether a\\n party cooperated in that process when deciding\\n whether a reasonable accommodation existed.\\nThe Service argues that telling the jury that “neither party can\\nwin this case solely because the other did not cooperate” is\\ninconsistent with Sears, which says that “when an employer\\ntakes an active, good-faith role in the interactive process, it\\nwill not be liable if the employee refuses to participate or\\nwithholds essential information.” 417 F.3d at 806.\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 7\\n\\n The Service’s argument distorts the jury instruction by\\nfocusing exclusively on the opening few words of a longer\\nsentence. Read out of context, the cherry-picked words state\\nthat the jury cannot treat one party’s failure to cooperate as\\noutcome-determinative. That is inconsistent with Sears. Read\\nin context, however, they make a different and entirely\\nuncontroversial point: that the jury cannot evaluate the\\nsufficiency of one party’s cooperation according to the\\nexpectations of the other. (“Neither party can win solely\\nbecause the other did not cooperate in that process in the way\\nthat the party believed appropriate … .” (emphasis added)). In\\nother words, the Service’s belief that Sansone did not\\ncooperate did not mean that he did not cooperate—and vice\\nversa. That is plainly correct.\\n In sum, the Service would have a point if the court had\\ntold the jury that Sansone could win even if he shut down the\\ninteractive process. Unfortunately for the Service, however,\\nthat is not what the court said.\\n III.\\n The Service’s next argument concerns its expert witness,\\nDr. Diana Goldstein, who offered an opinion on the cause of\\nSansone’s emotional distress, an issue relevant to\\ncompensatory damages. On cross-examination, Sansone’s\\nlawyer asked Goldstein if she had read the Service’s brief in\\nsupport of its summary judgment motion in the course of\\npreparing her report. She said that she had, and Sansone’s\\nlawyer pressed: “To get your understanding of the facts you\\nread the Postal Service’s Statement of Material Facts in\\nsupport of its motion for summary judgment, correct?”\\nGoldstein replied:\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\n I wouldn’t agree with that statement. I would\\n say that it helps me understand the story, but I\\n get my facts about what Mr. Sansone is claiming\\n in turn—by way of emotional distress and\\n changes in physical symptoms by meeting with\\n him, by reviewing objective records, et cetera.\\n But I do like to have context and so I always\\n review the records just to get a sense of what the\\n whole story is.\\nShe added that as part of that context, she had also read\\nSansone’s complaint, his answers to interrogatories, and his\\ndeposition. Sansone’s lawyer asked whether she had read the\\nbrief opposing the Service’s motion for summary judgment or\\nthe district court’s decision denying the motion, and\\nGoldstein said that she had not.\\n Shortly thereafter, Goldstein responded to a question\\nabout whether she had read the deposition of plant manager\\nRuby Branch by explaining that, although she had, she did\\nnot view it “as relevant to [her] role in assessing Mr. Sansone’s\\nemotional distress claim.” The court interjected: “Wait just a\\nminute. But you thought that the brief in support of a motion\\nfor summary judgment which was denied, that was relevant\\nto your opinion?” When Goldstein answered, “I always read\\nthose,” the court interrupted, “I am not asking what you\\nalways do. I am asking, in this case you felt that that is\\nrelevant to your rendition of an opinion, a lawyer’s argument\\nin connection with this case which was unsuccessful.”\\nGoldstein replied, “No. I just like to know what is going on\\nwith the case.” The court later admonished counsel that\\ngiving Goldstein the summary judgment motion was a “flat-\\nout violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 703.”\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 9\\n\\n The court hammered that position home in its jury\\ninstructions. In evaluating Goldstein’s opinion, it told the\\njurors that they should keep in mind that\\n [S]he had been provided by counsel for the\\n Postal Service with a copy of the Postal Service’s\\n argument that had been made earlier in the case\\n in support of an unsuccessful motion to prevent\\n the case from going to trial on the premise that\\n there were no genuine issues of material fact\\n that called for consideration by a jury. That is a\\n document that presents the Postal Service’s\\n version of the facts and of the legal arguments\\n that they sought to support that motion. It was\\n inappropriate for that information to be\\n provided to the opinion witness. And that\\n inappropriateness was amplified by the failure\\n of the Postal Service’s counsel to provide her\\n with the successful argument that had been\\n made by Sansone’s lawyer in opposition to the\\n motion and, more importantly, by the failure of\\n Postal Service’s counsel to provide her with the\\n Court’s opinion that rejected the motion.\\n It should be added, though, that Sansone’s\\n counsel is also at fault. Why? For not having\\n raised the matter before this Court well in\\n advance of trial because the teaching of the\\n Supreme Court is that the trial judge serves as\\n what they call the gatekeeper in ruling on\\n whether it is or is not proper for any specific\\n proposed opinion witness to be allowed to\\n present his or her testimony to a fact-finding\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\n jury for its consideration. And that matter came\\n before you, just as it came before me, solely at\\n the end of the case.\\n Now with all of that said, you may consider\\n what has been set forth in this instruction that I\\n have composed in explaining the determination\\n called for in the first paragraph of the\\n instruction, that is, give the testimony of each of\\n the witnesses whatever weight you think it\\n deserves, considering the reasons for the\\n opinion, the witness’ qualifications and all of\\n the other evidence in the case.\\nThe Service contends that this instruction erroneously invited\\nthe jury to disregard Goldstein’s opinion.\\n The Service is right. Contrary to the court’s belief, the\\nService did not commit a “flat-out violation of Federal Rule of\\nEvidence 703” by giving Goldstein its summary judgment\\nmotion. Rule 703 does not govern the information that experts\\ncan have; it governs the information on which they can base\\ntheir opinions. It allows experts to rely on inadmissible facts\\nor data in forming an opinion so long as “experts in the\\nparticular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts\\nor data in forming an opinion on the subject.” FED. R. EVID.\\n703.\\n If Goldstein had relied on the summary judgment motion\\nin forming her opinion, the court would have had to\\ndetermine whether experts in her field “reasonably rely” on\\nsummary judgment motions in assessing someone’s\\nemotional distress—and presumably they don’t. But\\nGoldstein expressly stated that she did not rely on the\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 11\\n\\nsummary judgment motion in forming her opinion. She read\\nthe summary judgment motion—along with Sansone’s\\ncomplaint and answers to interrogatories—solely to get\\ncontext about the case. She based her opinion on the facts that\\nshe got from Sansone and his medical records. So long as\\nthose are the kinds of facts and data on which experts in her\\nfield reasonably rely—and presumably they are—her opinion\\nsatisfied Rule 703. Any suggestion that Goldstein was biased\\nin favor of the Service could be explored on cross—as Sansone\\nwas doing before the court seized sua sponte on the illusory\\nRule 703 issue.\\n The district court thus erred when it told the jury that the\\nService had acted inappropriately by giving Goldstein the\\nsummary judgment motion and suggesting that it would\\nhave excluded her testimony had it learned about the issue\\nearlier. Even so, “a new trial is required only if the flawed\\ninstruction could have confused or misled the jury causing\\nprejudice to the complaining party.” Doornbos v. City of\\nChicago, 868 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2017). Sansone says that the\\nService was not prejudiced because Goldstein testified that\\nshe didn’t rely on the summary judgment motion, the court\\npermitted the jury to consider her testimony, and the\\ninstruction emphasized that Sansone was also to blame for\\nnot raising the issue earlier.\\n None of those things blunted the effect of the district\\ncourt’s erroneous instruction, which all but told the jury that\\nit shouldn’t trust anything that Goldstein had said. This not\\nonly misled the jury but also invaded the jury’s function in\\nassessing witness credibility. See Stollings v. Ryobi Tech., Inc.,\\n725 F.3d 753, 765 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that although the\\ndistrict court serves as gatekeeper, “[t]he jury must still be\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nallowed to play its essential role as the arbiter of the weight\\nand credibility of expert testimony”). At the very least, the\\ninstruction left the jury unsure what to make of Goldstein’s\\ntestimony. See Rapold v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 718 F.3d 602, 609 (7th\\nCir. 2013) (explaining that a party is prejudiced by jury\\ninstructions when the “jury was likely to be misled or\\nconfused” by them); Miller v. Neathery, 52 F.3d 634, 639 (7th\\nCir. 1995) (“Under these circumstances, it would be\\nimprudent for us to determine that the lack of sufficient\\nguidance in the instructions did not contribute significantly\\nto the jury’s conclusion.”).\\n The prejudice was particularly acute given what had\\nhappened earlier in the trial. See Susan Wakeen Doll Co., Inc. v.\\nAshton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 452 (7th Cir. 2001) (“An\\nerroneous jury instruction could not prejudice [a party] unless\\nconsidering the instructions as a whole, along with all of the\\nevidence and arguments, the jury was misinformed about the\\napplicable law.”). The court interrupted the cross-\\nexamination of Goldstein to admonish her, expressing\\nincredulity that she had read the summary judgment motion.\\nSee United States v. El-Bey, 873 F.3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir. 2017)\\n(explaining that a trial judge has great influence on the jury\\nand that any statement made about a witness carries great\\nweight). The instructions therefore invited the jury to act on\\nthe skepticism that the court had already sowed.\\n In short, the instruction was erroneous and prejudicial.\\nBut because Goldstein’s testimony went solely to\\ncompensatory damages, we remand for a new trial on that\\nissue only. See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d\\n1081, 1166 (7th Cir. 1983).\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 13\\n\\n IV.\\n The Service’s final argument is that the court erred by\\nawarding Sansone equitable relief in the form of back and\\nfront pay for the time after he retired. It contends that\\nconstructive discharge is required for equitable relief; because\\nSansone was never actively or constructively discharged, it\\nsays, he does not qualify.\\n Sansone argues that the Service waived this argument by\\nfailing to raise it below. What he means to say, however, is\\nthat the Service forfeited this argument. See Hamer v.\\nNeighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 n.1 (2017)\\n(“The terms waiver and forfeiture—although often used\\ninterchangeably by jurists and litigants—are not\\nsynonymous.”). Waiver is intentionally abandoning a known\\nright. United States v. Seals, 813 F.3d 1038, 1044–45 (7th Cir.\\n2016). Forfeiture occurs when a party fails to make an\\nargument because of accident or neglect. Id. at 1045. That’s\\nwhat Sansone says that the Service did here.\\n The Service insists that it raised this argument—that\\nSansone failed to prove actual or constructive discharge and\\nthus could not receive back or front pay—in its damages brief\\nto the district court. This is wishful thinking. The damages\\nbrief focused on two things: (1) errors that the court made\\nbased on the evidence at trial and (2) why Sansone’s award\\nshould be offset by his retirement benefits. And the sole legal\\ncitation in the entire brief went to the offset issue. Indeed, only\\none sentence in the analysis section of its brief mentioned that\\nSansone chose to retire. Read in isolation, that reference might\\ngesture toward a lack of actual or constructive discharge—but\\nthe rest of that sentence continued the brief’s focus on\\noffsetting damages with Sansone’s retirement benefits. The\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nvery best we can say—and it is a stretch—is that the Service\\nraised the “general issue” in its damages brief. Avoiding\\nforfeiture requires more. See Domka v. Portage Cty., Wis., 523\\nF.3d 776, 783 n.11 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that a party cannot\\nraise an issue for the first time on appeal when it raised only\\nthe “general issue” below).\\n ***\\n We VACATE the judgment and REMAND for a new trial\\non the damages issue. We AFFIRM it with respect to the\\nService’s liability, the award of back and front pay, and the\\naward of attorneys’ fees and expenses. 2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n2\\n Because we affirm the judgment as to the Service’s liability, Sansone remains\\nentitled to attorneys’ fees and expenses. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-\\n5(k); cf. Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health\\nand Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (“In designating those parties\\neligible for an award of litigation costs, Congress employed the term ‘prevailing\\nparty,’ a legal term of art. Black’s Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999) defines\\n‘prevailing party’ as ‘[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless\\nof the amount of damages awarded.’” (alteration in original))\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4374564/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597311/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Anthony SANSONE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Megan J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General of the United States, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3534 & No. 17-3632\nANTHONY SANSONE,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nMEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General of the United States,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:13-cv-03415 — Milton I. Shadur, Judge,\n and Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Tony Sansone, who is confined to\na wheelchair, needs a parking place with room to deploy his\nvan’s wheelchair ramp. For years, the Postal Service, his\nemployer, provided him one. But in 2011, it took that spot\naway and failed to provide him with a suitable replacement.\nSansone then retired and sued the Service under the\nRehabilitation Act for failing to accommodate his disability.\n\f2 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\nA jury returned a verdict in his favor and Sansone recovered\ncompensatory damages, as well as back and front pay.\n The Service asks us to vacate the district court’s judgment\nbecause of two jury instructions: one about an employee’s\nobligation to cooperate with his employer in identifying a\nreasonable accommodation and the other about how the jury\nshould evaluate the Service’s expert witness. We hold that the\ndistrict court did not err with respect to the former, but its\ninstruction about the expert was both wrong and prejudicial.\nThe Service also appeals the district court’s award of back and\nfront pay, but it forfeited that argument by failing to raise it\nbelow.\n I.\n Anthony Sansone began his thirty-year career at the Postal\nService in 1981. He was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in\n1991, and, 8 years later, the disease put him in a wheelchair.\nThe Service gave him a reserved space near the loading docks,\nwhere there was room to deploy his van’s wheelchair ramp.\nThat arrangement lasted until 2011, when the plant manager,\nRuby Branch, asked Sansone to stop parking there.\n Sansone was greatly upset by Branch’s decision. He\nviewed it as arbitrary; Branch told him that it was driven by\nsafety concerns. She offered Sansone two other options: to\npark in one of the handicapped spots in front of the building\nor her own reserved space in the back of the building. Neither\nmet his needs. Branch’s reserved space, like most of the\nhandicapped spots, didn’t provide enough room to deploy\nhis van’s passenger-side ramp, and the few handicapped\nspots that had enough room were usually taken. In addition,\nthe spots in the back of the building (like Branch’s spot)\n\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 3\n\nwould require him to travel in his wheelchair along a busy\ntruck route in the dark. So with the permission of his direct\nsupervisor, Chuck von Rhein, Sansone continued to park in\nhis usual place while waiting for a solution to the problem.\n Two weeks later, Sansone emailed the maintenance\nmanager, LaShawn Jacobs, for an update on his parking\nsituation. Jacobs reiterated what Branch had said before: that\nSansone must park in one of the proposed spaces. Sansone\nthen sought help from Stephen Grieser, chair of the Postal\nService district’s Reasonable Accommodation Committee,\nwho told Sansone that he would start the process of\nidentifying a reasonable accommodation for him.\n A few days later, Branch noticed Sansone’s van parked\nnear the loading docks. She told Jacobs to inform Sansone that\nhe should move it or risk having it towed. When Jacobs\nrelayed the message, Sansone panicked, started to experience\nchest pain, and left work. He worried that if his van had been\ntowed, he would have been stranded at work because he\nneeded the van to load his wheelchair. The next day he went\nto see a doctor because he was still experiencing panic attacks.\nThe doctor recommended that he stay home until the\nsituation was rectified and prescribed medication to help him\ndeal with the stress.\n After another two weeks passed, Grieser sent Sansone a\nletter asking him to provide medical information about his\n“condition and the specific limitations that it imposes” so that\nhe could address Sansone’s parking situation. The letter\nexacerbated Sansone’s frustration because in his view, it\nsought information that the Service already knew—that he\nhad multiple sclerosis and was confined to a wheelchair.\nSansone did not provide Grieser with the redundant medical\n\f4 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\ninformation. Instead, he asked von Rhein, his supervisor, to\ntell Grieser to stop pursuing the parking issue because by that\npoint, the stress of the situation had rendered Sansone unable\nto go back to work at the Service no matter where he parked.\nHe filed for disability retirement, which the Office of\nPersonnel Management granted.\n Sansone then sued the Service under the Rehabilitation\nAct, 29 U.S.C. § 791, et seq., for constructive discharge and\nfailure to accommodate. The district court granted the\nService’s summary judgment motion on the constructive\ndischarge claim, but it denied both parties’ motions for\nsummary judgment on the failure to accommodate claim. The\ncase proceeded to trial, and Sansone won $300,000 in\ncompensatory damages.\n After the verdict came in, the district court addressed\nSansone’s equitable claim for back and front pay. It awarded\nhim $828,774—an amount covering the period between the\ndate of his termination and January 20, 2023, the date on\nwhich he would have retired.\n The Service presses three arguments on appeal, one\nrelated to the merits of Sansone’s “failure to accommodate”\nclaim and the other two related to damages.\n II.\n To succeed on his failure to accommodate claim under 29\nU.S.C. § 794, Sansone had to prove that (1) he was a qualified\nindividual with a disability, (2) the Service was aware of his\ndisability, and (3) the Service failed to reasonably\naccommodate his disability. King v. City of Madison, 550 F.3d\n\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 5\n\n598, 600 (7th Cir. 2008). 1 Relevant to—and sometimes\ndeterminative of—the third element is the employer and\nemployee’s respective cooperation “in an interactive process\nto determine a reasonable accommodation.” Baert v. Euclid\nBeverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 1998). The Service\ncontends that the district court erroneously instructed the jury\nabout the consequences of an employee’s failure to cooperate\nin this “interactive process.”\n Some background on this “interactive process” is\nnecessary to understand the Service’s objection to the jury\ninstruction. While the “interactive process” is important, it is\na means for identifying a reasonable accommodation rather\nthan an end in itself. Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d\n1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 1997). And because the process is not an\nend in itself, an employer cannot be liable solely for refusing\nto take part in it. For example, “[f]ailure to engage in this\n‘interactive process’ cannot give rise to a claim for relief … if\nthe employer can show that no reasonable accommodation\nwas possible.” Hansen v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir.\n2000). Nor will it give rise to a claim against an employer who\nreasonably accommodated the employee. Rehling v. City of\nChicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The ADA seeks\nto ensure that qualified individuals are accommodated in the\nworkplace, not to punish employers who, despite their failure\nto engage in an interactive process, have made reasonable\naccommodations.”). But when a reasonable accommodation\nwas possible and the employer did not offer it, the third\n\n\n1\n “[T]o determine whether the Rehabilitation Act has been violated in the\nemployment context, we refer to the provisions and standards of the\n[Americans with Disabilities Act].” Jackson v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806,\n810–11 (7th Cir. 2005); see 29 U.S.C. § 794(d).\n\f6 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\nelement of a “failure to accommodate” claim turns on the\n“interactive process” requirement. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &\nCo., 417 F.3d 789, 805 (7th Cir. 2005). In that event,\n“responsibility will lie with the party that caused the\nbreakdown.” Id. at 805. According to the Service, this is where\nthe district court went awry.\n The Service insists that the court erroneously instructed\nthe jury that it could render a verdict for Sansone even if he\nwas at fault for the breakdown of the interactive process. Over\nthe Service’s objection, the court instructed the jury as\nfollows:\n Once an employer is aware of the employee’s\n disability and an accommodation has been\n requested, the employer must discuss with the\n employee whether there is a reasonable\n accommodation that will permit him to perform\n his job. Both the employer and the employee\n must cooperate in the interactive process in\n good faith. Neither party can win this case\n solely because the other did not cooperate in\n that process in the way that the party believed\n appropriate, but you may consider whether a\n party cooperated in that process when deciding\n whether a reasonable accommodation existed.\nThe Service argues that telling the jury that “neither party can\nwin this case solely because the other did not cooperate” is\ninconsistent with Sears, which says that “when an employer\ntakes an active, good-faith role in the interactive process, it\nwill not be liable if the employee refuses to participate or\nwithholds essential information.” 417 F.3d at 806.\n\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 7\n\n The Service’s argument distorts the jury instruction by\nfocusing exclusively on the opening few words of a longer\nsentence. Read out of context, the cherry-picked words state\nthat the jury cannot treat one party’s failure to cooperate as\noutcome-determinative. That is inconsistent with Sears. Read\nin context, however, they make a different and entirely\nuncontroversial point: that the jury cannot evaluate the\nsufficiency of one party’s cooperation according to the\nexpectations of the other. (“Neither party can win solely\nbecause the other did not cooperate in that process in the way\nthat the party believed appropriate … .” (emphasis added)). In\nother words, the Service’s belief that Sansone did not\ncooperate did not mean that he did not cooperate—and vice\nversa. That is plainly correct.\n In sum, the Service would have a point if the court had\ntold the jury that Sansone could win even if he shut down the\ninteractive process. Unfortunately for the Service, however,\nthat is not what the court said.\n III.\n The Service’s next argument concerns its expert witness,\nDr. Diana Goldstein, who offered an opinion on the cause of\nSansone’s emotional distress, an issue relevant to\ncompensatory damages. On cross-examination, Sansone’s\nlawyer asked Goldstein if she had read the Service’s brief in\nsupport of its summary judgment motion in the course of\npreparing her report. She said that she had, and Sansone’s\nlawyer pressed: “To get your understanding of the facts you\nread the Postal Service’s Statement of Material Facts in\nsupport of its motion for summary judgment, correct?”\nGoldstein replied:\n\f8 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\n I wouldn’t agree with that statement. I would\n say that it helps me understand the story, but I\n get my facts about what Mr. Sansone is claiming\n in turn—by way of emotional distress and\n changes in physical symptoms by meeting with\n him, by reviewing objective records, et cetera.\n But I do like to have context and so I always\n review the records just to get a sense of what the\n whole story is.\nShe added that as part of that context, she had also read\nSansone’s complaint, his answers to interrogatories, and his\ndeposition. Sansone’s lawyer asked whether she had read the\nbrief opposing the Service’s motion for summary judgment or\nthe district court’s decision denying the motion, and\nGoldstein said that she had not.\n Shortly thereafter, Goldstein responded to a question\nabout whether she had read the deposition of plant manager\nRuby Branch by explaining that, although she had, she did\nnot view it “as relevant to [her] role in assessing Mr. Sansone’s\nemotional distress claim.” The court interjected: “Wait just a\nminute. But you thought that the brief in support of a motion\nfor summary judgment which was denied, that was relevant\nto your opinion?” When Goldstein answered, “I always read\nthose,” the court interrupted, “I am not asking what you\nalways do. I am asking, in this case you felt that that is\nrelevant to your rendition of an opinion, a lawyer’s argument\nin connection with this case which was unsuccessful.”\nGoldstein replied, “No. I just like to know what is going on\nwith the case.” The court later admonished counsel that\ngiving Goldstein the summary judgment motion was a “flat-\nout violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 703.”\n\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 9\n\n The court hammered that position home in its jury\ninstructions. In evaluating Goldstein’s opinion, it told the\njurors that they should keep in mind that\n [S]he had been provided by counsel for the\n Postal Service with a copy of the Postal Service’s\n argument that had been made earlier in the case\n in support of an unsuccessful motion to prevent\n the case from going to trial on the premise that\n there were no genuine issues of material fact\n that called for consideration by a jury. That is a\n document that presents the Postal Service’s\n version of the facts and of the legal arguments\n that they sought to support that motion. It was\n inappropriate for that information to be\n provided to the opinion witness. And that\n inappropriateness was amplified by the failure\n of the Postal Service’s counsel to provide her\n with the successful argument that had been\n made by Sansone’s lawyer in opposition to the\n motion and, more importantly, by the failure of\n Postal Service’s counsel to provide her with the\n Court’s opinion that rejected the motion.\n It should be added, though, that Sansone’s\n counsel is also at fault. Why? For not having\n raised the matter before this Court well in\n advance of trial because the teaching of the\n Supreme Court is that the trial judge serves as\n what they call the gatekeeper in ruling on\n whether it is or is not proper for any specific\n proposed opinion witness to be allowed to\n present his or her testimony to a fact-finding\n\f10 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\n jury for its consideration. And that matter came\n before you, just as it came before me, solely at\n the end of the case.\n Now with all of that said, you may consider\n what has been set forth in this instruction that I\n have composed in explaining the determination\n called for in the first paragraph of the\n instruction, that is, give the testimony of each of\n the witnesses whatever weight you think it\n deserves, considering the reasons for the\n opinion, the witness’ qualifications and all of\n the other evidence in the case.\nThe Service contends that this instruction erroneously invited\nthe jury to disregard Goldstein’s opinion.\n The Service is right. Contrary to the court’s belief, the\nService did not commit a “flat-out violation of Federal Rule of\nEvidence 703” by giving Goldstein its summary judgment\nmotion. Rule 703 does not govern the information that experts\ncan have; it governs the information on which they can base\ntheir opinions. It allows experts to rely on inadmissible facts\nor data in forming an opinion so long as “experts in the\nparticular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts\nor data in forming an opinion on the subject.” FED. R. EVID.\n703.\n If Goldstein had relied on the summary judgment motion\nin forming her opinion, the court would have had to\ndetermine whether experts in her field “reasonably rely” on\nsummary judgment motions in assessing someone’s\nemotional distress—and presumably they don’t. But\nGoldstein expressly stated that she did not rely on the\n\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 11\n\nsummary judgment motion in forming her opinion. She read\nthe summary judgment motion—along with Sansone’s\ncomplaint and answers to interrogatories—solely to get\ncontext about the case. She based her opinion on the facts that\nshe got from Sansone and his medical records. So long as\nthose are the kinds of facts and data on which experts in her\nfield reasonably rely—and presumably they are—her opinion\nsatisfied Rule 703. Any suggestion that Goldstein was biased\nin favor of the Service could be explored on cross—as Sansone\nwas doing before the court seized sua sponte on the illusory\nRule 703 issue.\n The district court thus erred when it told the jury that the\nService had acted inappropriately by giving Goldstein the\nsummary judgment motion and suggesting that it would\nhave excluded her testimony had it learned about the issue\nearlier. Even so, “a new trial is required only if the flawed\ninstruction could have confused or misled the jury causing\nprejudice to the complaining party.” Doornbos v. City of\nChicago, 868 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2017). Sansone says that the\nService was not prejudiced because Goldstein testified that\nshe didn’t rely on the summary judgment motion, the court\npermitted the jury to consider her testimony, and the\ninstruction emphasized that Sansone was also to blame for\nnot raising the issue earlier.\n None of those things blunted the effect of the district\ncourt’s erroneous instruction, which all but told the jury that\nit shouldn’t trust anything that Goldstein had said. This not\nonly misled the jury but also invaded the jury’s function in\nassessing witness credibility. See Stollings v. Ryobi Tech., Inc.,\n725 F.3d 753, 765 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that although the\ndistrict court serves as gatekeeper, “[t]he jury must still be\n\f12 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\nallowed to play its essential role as the arbiter of the weight\nand credibility of expert testimony”). At the very least, the\ninstruction left the jury unsure what to make of Goldstein’s\ntestimony. See Rapold v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 718 F.3d 602, 609 (7th\nCir. 2013) (explaining that a party is prejudiced by jury\ninstructions when the “jury was likely to be misled or\nconfused” by them); Miller v. Neathery, 52 F.3d 634, 639 (7th\nCir. 1995) (“Under these circumstances, it would be\nimprudent for us to determine that the lack of sufficient\nguidance in the instructions did not contribute significantly\nto the jury’s conclusion.”).\n The prejudice was particularly acute given what had\nhappened earlier in the trial. See Susan Wakeen Doll Co., Inc. v.\nAshton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 452 (7th Cir. 2001) (“An\nerroneous jury instruction could not prejudice [a party] unless\nconsidering the instructions as a whole, along with all of the\nevidence and arguments, the jury was misinformed about the\napplicable law.”). The court interrupted the cross-\nexamination of Goldstein to admonish her, expressing\nincredulity that she had read the summary judgment motion.\nSee United States v. El-Bey, 873 F.3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir. 2017)\n(explaining that a trial judge has great influence on the jury\nand that any statement made about a witness carries great\nweight). The instructions therefore invited the jury to act on\nthe skepticism that the court had already sowed.\n In short, the instruction was erroneous and prejudicial.\nBut because Goldstein’s testimony went solely to\ncompensatory damages, we remand for a new trial on that\nissue only. See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d\n1081, 1166 (7th Cir. 1983).\n\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 13\n\n IV.\n The Service’s final argument is that the court erred by\nawarding Sansone equitable relief in the form of back and\nfront pay for the time after he retired. It contends that\nconstructive discharge is required for equitable relief; because\nSansone was never actively or constructively discharged, it\nsays, he does not qualify.\n Sansone argues that the Service waived this argument by\nfailing to raise it below. What he means to say, however, is\nthat the Service forfeited this argument. See Hamer v.\nNeighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 n.1 (2017)\n(“The terms waiver and forfeiture—although often used\ninterchangeably by jurists and litigants—are not\nsynonymous.”). Waiver is intentionally abandoning a known\nright. United States v. Seals, 813 F.3d 1038, 1044–45 (7th Cir.\n2016). Forfeiture occurs when a party fails to make an\nargument because of accident or neglect. Id. at 1045. That’s\nwhat Sansone says that the Service did here.\n The Service insists that it raised this argument—that\nSansone failed to prove actual or constructive discharge and\nthus could not receive back or front pay—in its damages brief\nto the district court. This is wishful thinking. The damages\nbrief focused on two things: (1) errors that the court made\nbased on the evidence at trial and (2) why Sansone’s award\nshould be offset by his retirement benefits. And the sole legal\ncitation in the entire brief went to the offset issue. Indeed, only\none sentence in the analysis section of its brief mentioned that\nSansone chose to retire. Read in isolation, that reference might\ngesture toward a lack of actual or constructive discharge—but\nthe rest of that sentence continued the brief’s focus on\noffsetting damages with Sansone’s retirement benefits. The\n\f14 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\nvery best we can say—and it is a stretch—is that the Service\nraised the “general issue” in its damages brief. Avoiding\nforfeiture requires more. See Domka v. Portage Cty., Wis., 523\nF.3d 776, 783 n.11 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that a party cannot\nraise an issue for the first time on appeal when it raised only\nthe “general issue” below).\n ***\n We VACATE the judgment and REMAND for a new trial\non the damages issue. We AFFIRM it with respect to the\nService’s liability, the award of back and front pay, and the\naward of attorneys’ fees and expenses. 2\n\n\n\n\n2\n Because we affirm the judgment as to the Service’s liability, Sansone remains\nentitled to attorneys’ fees and expenses. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-\n5(k); cf. Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health\nand Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (“In designating those parties\neligible for an award of litigation costs, Congress employed the term ‘prevailing\nparty,’ a legal term of art. Black’s Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999) defines\n‘prevailing party’ as ‘[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless\nof the amount of damages awarded.’” (alteration in original))\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Anthony SANSONE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Megan J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General of the United States, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-3534 & No. 17-3632\\nANTHONY SANSONE,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General of the United States,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:13-cv-03415 — Milton I. Shadur, Judge,\\n and Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Tony Sansone, who is confined to\\na wheelchair, needs a parking place with room to deploy his\\nvan’s wheelchair ramp. For years, the Postal Service, his\\nemployer, provided him one. But in 2011, it took that spot\\naway and failed to provide him with a suitable replacement.\\nSansone then retired and sued the Service under the\\nRehabilitation Act for failing to accommodate his disability.\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nA jury returned a verdict in his favor and Sansone recovered\\ncompensatory damages, as well as back and front pay.\\n The Service asks us to vacate the district court’s judgment\\nbecause of two jury instructions: one about an employee’s\\nobligation to cooperate with his employer in identifying a\\nreasonable accommodation and the other about how the jury\\nshould evaluate the Service’s expert witness. We hold that the\\ndistrict court did not err with respect to the former, but its\\ninstruction about the expert was both wrong and prejudicial.\\nThe Service also appeals the district court’s award of back and\\nfront pay, but it forfeited that argument by failing to raise it\\nbelow.\\n I.\\n Anthony Sansone began his thirty-year career at the Postal\\nService in 1981. He was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in\\n1991, and, 8 years later, the disease put him in a wheelchair.\\nThe Service gave him a reserved space near the loading docks,\\nwhere there was room to deploy his van’s wheelchair ramp.\\nThat arrangement lasted until 2011, when the plant manager,\\nRuby Branch, asked Sansone to stop parking there.\\n Sansone was greatly upset by Branch’s decision. He\\nviewed it as arbitrary; Branch told him that it was driven by\\nsafety concerns. She offered Sansone two other options: to\\npark in one of the handicapped spots in front of the building\\nor her own reserved space in the back of the building. Neither\\nmet his needs. Branch’s reserved space, like most of the\\nhandicapped spots, didn’t provide enough room to deploy\\nhis van’s passenger-side ramp, and the few handicapped\\nspots that had enough room were usually taken. In addition,\\nthe spots in the back of the building (like Branch’s spot)\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 3\\n\\nwould require him to travel in his wheelchair along a busy\\ntruck route in the dark. So with the permission of his direct\\nsupervisor, Chuck von Rhein, Sansone continued to park in\\nhis usual place while waiting for a solution to the problem.\\n Two weeks later, Sansone emailed the maintenance\\nmanager, LaShawn Jacobs, for an update on his parking\\nsituation. Jacobs reiterated what Branch had said before: that\\nSansone must park in one of the proposed spaces. Sansone\\nthen sought help from Stephen Grieser, chair of the Postal\\nService district’s Reasonable Accommodation Committee,\\nwho told Sansone that he would start the process of\\nidentifying a reasonable accommodation for him.\\n A few days later, Branch noticed Sansone’s van parked\\nnear the loading docks. She told Jacobs to inform Sansone that\\nhe should move it or risk having it towed. When Jacobs\\nrelayed the message, Sansone panicked, started to experience\\nchest pain, and left work. He worried that if his van had been\\ntowed, he would have been stranded at work because he\\nneeded the van to load his wheelchair. The next day he went\\nto see a doctor because he was still experiencing panic attacks.\\nThe doctor recommended that he stay home until the\\nsituation was rectified and prescribed medication to help him\\ndeal with the stress.\\n After another two weeks passed, Grieser sent Sansone a\\nletter asking him to provide medical information about his\\n“condition and the specific limitations that it imposes” so that\\nhe could address Sansone’s parking situation. The letter\\nexacerbated Sansone’s frustration because in his view, it\\nsought information that the Service already knew—that he\\nhad multiple sclerosis and was confined to a wheelchair.\\nSansone did not provide Grieser with the redundant medical\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\ninformation. Instead, he asked von Rhein, his supervisor, to\\ntell Grieser to stop pursuing the parking issue because by that\\npoint, the stress of the situation had rendered Sansone unable\\nto go back to work at the Service no matter where he parked.\\nHe filed for disability retirement, which the Office of\\nPersonnel Management granted.\\n Sansone then sued the Service under the Rehabilitation\\nAct, 29 U.S.C. § 791, et seq., for constructive discharge and\\nfailure to accommodate. The district court granted the\\nService’s summary judgment motion on the constructive\\ndischarge claim, but it denied both parties’ motions for\\nsummary judgment on the failure to accommodate claim. The\\ncase proceeded to trial, and Sansone won $300,000 in\\ncompensatory damages.\\n After the verdict came in, the district court addressed\\nSansone’s equitable claim for back and front pay. It awarded\\nhim $828,774—an amount covering the period between the\\ndate of his termination and January 20, 2023, the date on\\nwhich he would have retired.\\n The Service presses three arguments on appeal, one\\nrelated to the merits of Sansone’s “failure to accommodate”\\nclaim and the other two related to damages.\\n II.\\n To succeed on his failure to accommodate claim under 29\\nU.S.C. § 794, Sansone had to prove that (1) he was a qualified\\nindividual with a disability, (2) the Service was aware of his\\ndisability, and (3) the Service failed to reasonably\\naccommodate his disability. King v. City of Madison, 550 F.3d\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 5\\n\\n598, 600 (7th Cir. 2008). 1 Relevant to—and sometimes\\ndeterminative of—the third element is the employer and\\nemployee’s respective cooperation “in an interactive process\\nto determine a reasonable accommodation.” Baert v. Euclid\\nBeverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 1998). The Service\\ncontends that the district court erroneously instructed the jury\\nabout the consequences of an employee’s failure to cooperate\\nin this “interactive process.”\\n Some background on this “interactive process” is\\nnecessary to understand the Service’s objection to the jury\\ninstruction. While the “interactive process” is important, it is\\na means for identifying a reasonable accommodation rather\\nthan an end in itself. Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d\\n1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 1997). And because the process is not an\\nend in itself, an employer cannot be liable solely for refusing\\nto take part in it. For example, “[f]ailure to engage in this\\n‘interactive process’ cannot give rise to a claim for relief … if\\nthe employer can show that no reasonable accommodation\\nwas possible.” Hansen v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir.\\n2000). Nor will it give rise to a claim against an employer who\\nreasonably accommodated the employee. Rehling v. City of\\nChicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The ADA seeks\\nto ensure that qualified individuals are accommodated in the\\nworkplace, not to punish employers who, despite their failure\\nto engage in an interactive process, have made reasonable\\naccommodations.”). But when a reasonable accommodation\\nwas possible and the employer did not offer it, the third\\n\\n\\n1\\n “[T]o determine whether the Rehabilitation Act has been violated in the\\nemployment context, we refer to the provisions and standards of the\\n[Americans with Disabilities Act].” Jackson v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806,\\n810–11 (7th Cir. 2005); see 29 U.S.C. § 794(d).\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nelement of a “failure to accommodate” claim turns on the\\n“interactive process” requirement. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &\\nCo., 417 F.3d 789, 805 (7th Cir. 2005). In that event,\\n“responsibility will lie with the party that caused the\\nbreakdown.” Id. at 805. According to the Service, this is where\\nthe district court went awry.\\n The Service insists that the court erroneously instructed\\nthe jury that it could render a verdict for Sansone even if he\\nwas at fault for the breakdown of the interactive process. Over\\nthe Service’s objection, the court instructed the jury as\\nfollows:\\n Once an employer is aware of the employee’s\\n disability and an accommodation has been\\n requested, the employer must discuss with the\\n employee whether there is a reasonable\\n accommodation that will permit him to perform\\n his job. Both the employer and the employee\\n must cooperate in the interactive process in\\n good faith. Neither party can win this case\\n solely because the other did not cooperate in\\n that process in the way that the party believed\\n appropriate, but you may consider whether a\\n party cooperated in that process when deciding\\n whether a reasonable accommodation existed.\\nThe Service argues that telling the jury that “neither party can\\nwin this case solely because the other did not cooperate” is\\ninconsistent with Sears, which says that “when an employer\\ntakes an active, good-faith role in the interactive process, it\\nwill not be liable if the employee refuses to participate or\\nwithholds essential information.” 417 F.3d at 806.\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 7\\n\\n The Service’s argument distorts the jury instruction by\\nfocusing exclusively on the opening few words of a longer\\nsentence. Read out of context, the cherry-picked words state\\nthat the jury cannot treat one party’s failure to cooperate as\\noutcome-determinative. That is inconsistent with Sears. Read\\nin context, however, they make a different and entirely\\nuncontroversial point: that the jury cannot evaluate the\\nsufficiency of one party’s cooperation according to the\\nexpectations of the other. (“Neither party can win solely\\nbecause the other did not cooperate in that process in the way\\nthat the party believed appropriate … .” (emphasis added)). In\\nother words, the Service’s belief that Sansone did not\\ncooperate did not mean that he did not cooperate—and vice\\nversa. That is plainly correct.\\n In sum, the Service would have a point if the court had\\ntold the jury that Sansone could win even if he shut down the\\ninteractive process. Unfortunately for the Service, however,\\nthat is not what the court said.\\n III.\\n The Service’s next argument concerns its expert witness,\\nDr. Diana Goldstein, who offered an opinion on the cause of\\nSansone’s emotional distress, an issue relevant to\\ncompensatory damages. On cross-examination, Sansone’s\\nlawyer asked Goldstein if she had read the Service’s brief in\\nsupport of its summary judgment motion in the course of\\npreparing her report. She said that she had, and Sansone’s\\nlawyer pressed: “To get your understanding of the facts you\\nread the Postal Service’s Statement of Material Facts in\\nsupport of its motion for summary judgment, correct?”\\nGoldstein replied:\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\n I wouldn’t agree with that statement. I would\\n say that it helps me understand the story, but I\\n get my facts about what Mr. Sansone is claiming\\n in turn—by way of emotional distress and\\n changes in physical symptoms by meeting with\\n him, by reviewing objective records, et cetera.\\n But I do like to have context and so I always\\n review the records just to get a sense of what the\\n whole story is.\\nShe added that as part of that context, she had also read\\nSansone’s complaint, his answers to interrogatories, and his\\ndeposition. Sansone’s lawyer asked whether she had read the\\nbrief opposing the Service’s motion for summary judgment or\\nthe district court’s decision denying the motion, and\\nGoldstein said that she had not.\\n Shortly thereafter, Goldstein responded to a question\\nabout whether she had read the deposition of plant manager\\nRuby Branch by explaining that, although she had, she did\\nnot view it “as relevant to [her] role in assessing Mr. Sansone’s\\nemotional distress claim.” The court interjected: “Wait just a\\nminute. But you thought that the brief in support of a motion\\nfor summary judgment which was denied, that was relevant\\nto your opinion?” When Goldstein answered, “I always read\\nthose,” the court interrupted, “I am not asking what you\\nalways do. I am asking, in this case you felt that that is\\nrelevant to your rendition of an opinion, a lawyer’s argument\\nin connection with this case which was unsuccessful.”\\nGoldstein replied, “No. I just like to know what is going on\\nwith the case.” The court later admonished counsel that\\ngiving Goldstein the summary judgment motion was a “flat-\\nout violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 703.”\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 9\\n\\n The court hammered that position home in its jury\\ninstructions. In evaluating Goldstein’s opinion, it told the\\njurors that they should keep in mind that\\n [S]he had been provided by counsel for the\\n Postal Service with a copy of the Postal Service’s\\n argument that had been made earlier in the case\\n in support of an unsuccessful motion to prevent\\n the case from going to trial on the premise that\\n there were no genuine issues of material fact\\n that called for consideration by a jury. That is a\\n document that presents the Postal Service’s\\n version of the facts and of the legal arguments\\n that they sought to support that motion. It was\\n inappropriate for that information to be\\n provided to the opinion witness. And that\\n inappropriateness was amplified by the failure\\n of the Postal Service’s counsel to provide her\\n with the successful argument that had been\\n made by Sansone’s lawyer in opposition to the\\n motion and, more importantly, by the failure of\\n Postal Service’s counsel to provide her with the\\n Court’s opinion that rejected the motion.\\n It should be added, though, that Sansone’s\\n counsel is also at fault. Why? For not having\\n raised the matter before this Court well in\\n advance of trial because the teaching of the\\n Supreme Court is that the trial judge serves as\\n what they call the gatekeeper in ruling on\\n whether it is or is not proper for any specific\\n proposed opinion witness to be allowed to\\n present his or her testimony to a fact-finding\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\n jury for its consideration. And that matter came\\n before you, just as it came before me, solely at\\n the end of the case.\\n Now with all of that said, you may consider\\n what has been set forth in this instruction that I\\n have composed in explaining the determination\\n called for in the first paragraph of the\\n instruction, that is, give the testimony of each of\\n the witnesses whatever weight you think it\\n deserves, considering the reasons for the\\n opinion, the witness’ qualifications and all of\\n the other evidence in the case.\\nThe Service contends that this instruction erroneously invited\\nthe jury to disregard Goldstein’s opinion.\\n The Service is right. Contrary to the court’s belief, the\\nService did not commit a “flat-out violation of Federal Rule of\\nEvidence 703” by giving Goldstein its summary judgment\\nmotion. Rule 703 does not govern the information that experts\\ncan have; it governs the information on which they can base\\ntheir opinions. It allows experts to rely on inadmissible facts\\nor data in forming an opinion so long as “experts in the\\nparticular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts\\nor data in forming an opinion on the subject.” FED. R. EVID.\\n703.\\n If Goldstein had relied on the summary judgment motion\\nin forming her opinion, the court would have had to\\ndetermine whether experts in her field “reasonably rely” on\\nsummary judgment motions in assessing someone’s\\nemotional distress—and presumably they don’t. But\\nGoldstein expressly stated that she did not rely on the\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 11\\n\\nsummary judgment motion in forming her opinion. She read\\nthe summary judgment motion—along with Sansone’s\\ncomplaint and answers to interrogatories—solely to get\\ncontext about the case. She based her opinion on the facts that\\nshe got from Sansone and his medical records. So long as\\nthose are the kinds of facts and data on which experts in her\\nfield reasonably rely—and presumably they are—her opinion\\nsatisfied Rule 703. Any suggestion that Goldstein was biased\\nin favor of the Service could be explored on cross—as Sansone\\nwas doing before the court seized sua sponte on the illusory\\nRule 703 issue.\\n The district court thus erred when it told the jury that the\\nService had acted inappropriately by giving Goldstein the\\nsummary judgment motion and suggesting that it would\\nhave excluded her testimony had it learned about the issue\\nearlier. Even so, “a new trial is required only if the flawed\\ninstruction could have confused or misled the jury causing\\nprejudice to the complaining party.” Doornbos v. City of\\nChicago, 868 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2017). Sansone says that the\\nService was not prejudiced because Goldstein testified that\\nshe didn’t rely on the summary judgment motion, the court\\npermitted the jury to consider her testimony, and the\\ninstruction emphasized that Sansone was also to blame for\\nnot raising the issue earlier.\\n None of those things blunted the effect of the district\\ncourt’s erroneous instruction, which all but told the jury that\\nit shouldn’t trust anything that Goldstein had said. This not\\nonly misled the jury but also invaded the jury’s function in\\nassessing witness credibility. See Stollings v. Ryobi Tech., Inc.,\\n725 F.3d 753, 765 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that although the\\ndistrict court serves as gatekeeper, “[t]he jury must still be\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nallowed to play its essential role as the arbiter of the weight\\nand credibility of expert testimony”). At the very least, the\\ninstruction left the jury unsure what to make of Goldstein’s\\ntestimony. See Rapold v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 718 F.3d 602, 609 (7th\\nCir. 2013) (explaining that a party is prejudiced by jury\\ninstructions when the “jury was likely to be misled or\\nconfused” by them); Miller v. Neathery, 52 F.3d 634, 639 (7th\\nCir. 1995) (“Under these circumstances, it would be\\nimprudent for us to determine that the lack of sufficient\\nguidance in the instructions did not contribute significantly\\nto the jury’s conclusion.”).\\n The prejudice was particularly acute given what had\\nhappened earlier in the trial. See Susan Wakeen Doll Co., Inc. v.\\nAshton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 452 (7th Cir. 2001) (“An\\nerroneous jury instruction could not prejudice [a party] unless\\nconsidering the instructions as a whole, along with all of the\\nevidence and arguments, the jury was misinformed about the\\napplicable law.”). The court interrupted the cross-\\nexamination of Goldstein to admonish her, expressing\\nincredulity that she had read the summary judgment motion.\\nSee United States v. El-Bey, 873 F.3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir. 2017)\\n(explaining that a trial judge has great influence on the jury\\nand that any statement made about a witness carries great\\nweight). The instructions therefore invited the jury to act on\\nthe skepticism that the court had already sowed.\\n In short, the instruction was erroneous and prejudicial.\\nBut because Goldstein’s testimony went solely to\\ncompensatory damages, we remand for a new trial on that\\nissue only. See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d\\n1081, 1166 (7th Cir. 1983).\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 13\\n\\n IV.\\n The Service’s final argument is that the court erred by\\nawarding Sansone equitable relief in the form of back and\\nfront pay for the time after he retired. It contends that\\nconstructive discharge is required for equitable relief; because\\nSansone was never actively or constructively discharged, it\\nsays, he does not qualify.\\n Sansone argues that the Service waived this argument by\\nfailing to raise it below. What he means to say, however, is\\nthat the Service forfeited this argument. See Hamer v.\\nNeighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 n.1 (2017)\\n(“The terms waiver and forfeiture—although often used\\ninterchangeably by jurists and litigants—are not\\nsynonymous.”). Waiver is intentionally abandoning a known\\nright. United States v. Seals, 813 F.3d 1038, 1044–45 (7th Cir.\\n2016). Forfeiture occurs when a party fails to make an\\nargument because of accident or neglect. Id. at 1045. That’s\\nwhat Sansone says that the Service did here.\\n The Service insists that it raised this argument—that\\nSansone failed to prove actual or constructive discharge and\\nthus could not receive back or front pay—in its damages brief\\nto the district court. This is wishful thinking. The damages\\nbrief focused on two things: (1) errors that the court made\\nbased on the evidence at trial and (2) why Sansone’s award\\nshould be offset by his retirement benefits. And the sole legal\\ncitation in the entire brief went to the offset issue. Indeed, only\\none sentence in the analysis section of its brief mentioned that\\nSansone chose to retire. Read in isolation, that reference might\\ngesture toward a lack of actual or constructive discharge—but\\nthe rest of that sentence continued the brief’s focus on\\noffsetting damages with Sansone’s retirement benefits. The\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nvery best we can say—and it is a stretch—is that the Service\\nraised the “general issue” in its damages brief. Avoiding\\nforfeiture requires more. See Domka v. Portage Cty., Wis., 523\\nF.3d 776, 783 n.11 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that a party cannot\\nraise an issue for the first time on appeal when it raised only\\nthe “general issue” below).\\n ***\\n We VACATE the judgment and REMAND for a new trial\\non the damages issue. We AFFIRM it with respect to the\\nService’s liability, the award of back and front pay, and the\\naward of attorneys’ fees and expenses. 2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n2\\n Because we affirm the judgment as to the Service’s liability, Sansone remains\\nentitled to attorneys’ fees and expenses. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-\\n5(k); cf. Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health\\nand Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (“In designating those parties\\neligible for an award of litigation costs, Congress employed the term ‘prevailing\\nparty,’ a legal term of art. Black’s Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999) defines\\n‘prevailing party’ as ‘[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless\\nof the amount of damages awarded.’” (alteration in original))\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1172,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4597314,"string":"4,597,314"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2598"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Michael Stephen Kanne\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\nWILLIAM LIEBHART & NANCY LIEBHART,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nSPX CORPORATION, TRC ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION, &\\nAPOLLO DISMANTLING SERVICES, INC.\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-700 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n KANNE, Circuit Judge. William and Nancy Liebhart to-\\ngether own three houses on the same block in Watertown,\\nWisconsin. Besides a few other houses, the rest of the block\\nwas previously occupied by an abandoned transformer fac-\\ntory, last owned by SPX Corporation. In 2014, SPX demol-\\nished the building with the assistance of TRC Environmental\\nCorporation and Apollo Dismantling Services (collectively,\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n“the defendants”). The Liebharts allege that dust and debris\\ncontaining toxic chemicals migrated onto their properties,\\ncontaminating their yards and jeopardizing their health and\\nthe health of their tenants.\\n The Liebharts sued under federal statutes authorizing pri-\\nvate rights of action for environmental contamination. They\\nalso brought various state-law claims. Following discovery\\nand the submission of expert witness reports, the district\\ncourt denied the Liebharts’ motion for partial summary judg-\\nment and granted summary judgment to the defendants with\\ncosts. Although the district court adequately evaluated the ex-\\npert witnesses and did not abuse its discretion in its proce-\\ndural decisions, the court set the bar unnecessarily high for\\nȱěȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ\\nutes. For that reason, we vacate the district court’s judgment\\nand remand for reconsideration.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n The factory dates to the 1920s and was used to manufac-\\nture various industrial equipment. Most relevant to our pur-\\npose, the factory manufactured power transformers contain-\\ning polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a carcinogenic chemi-\\ncal banned by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1979.\\nSee Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Pro-\\ncessing, Distribution in Commerce, and Use Prohibitions, 44\\nFǯȱ\\u0014ǯȱřŗǰśŗŚȱǻ\\u000f¢ȱřŗǰȱŗşŝşǼȱǻęȱȱŚŖȱ\\u0005ǯ\\bǯ\\u0014ǯȱpt. 761).\\nThe parties all agree that the facility has not manufactured or\\nhandled any items containing PCBs since 1971, and that it\\nshut down completely in 2005.\\n But even with all the products and manufacturing equip-\\nment removed, PCB contaminants remained in the facility. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 3\\n\\n2009, SPX retained TRC and another company (not named as\\na defendant in this suit) to study the property and determine\\nthe extent and precise location of any PCB contamination.\\n\\u0016ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱ\\nwas generally contaminated, with concentrated amounts lo-\\ncatȱȱęȱȱȱȱǯ\\n Several years went by. In 2014, SPX decided to move ahead\\nwith the demolition, retaining Apollo to conduct the work\\nand TRC to supervise the project. That November, the defend-\\nants timely proposed a self-implementing cleanup plan to the\\nEPA, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 761.61(a). The trouble began\\nas demolition commenced in January 2015. The Liebharts al-\\nlege that Apollo demolished the building recklessly, failing to\\nuse appropriate safety methods to control the dust generated\\nby demolition equipment. They assert that their properties\\n ȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱĴȱȱof photos\\nand videos of dust from the facility blowing toward their\\nhomes to support their allegation.\\n \\u0016ȱ\\u000eȱęȱȱȱ th the local government\\nin February. They also collected a dust-covered sample of\\nsnow from their yard and placed it in a mason jar. Soon there-\\nafter, a representative of the Wisconsin Department of Natu-\\nral Resources (“DNR”) contacted the defendants about the\\nLiebharts’ concerns. In April, TRC collected samples of the\\nsurface soil (roughly down to eight inches below ground) on\\nboth the industrial and residential properties. Sure enough,\\nthe properties tested positive for the presence of PCBs. In Au-\\ngust, the Liebharts vacated the property on advice of their\\nphysician to avoid further exposure to the chemicals. Frus-\\ntrated with the lack of action, William Liebhart had the snow\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nsample tested for PCBs. Although the sample did, in fact, con-\\ntain PCBs, the irregular manner of collection and storage\\nspoiled the sample, and the laboratory declined to endorse the\\nȱ ȱ¢ȱęǯ\\n In September 2015ǰȱ\\u0015\\u0012\\u001aȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\ncontamination to the DNR. In turn, the Liebharts sued in fed-\\neral district court in October. The complaint sought injunctive\\nrelief under both the Resource Conservation and Recovery\\nAct (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and the Toxic Substances\\nControl Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. In addition, the\\nLiebharts brought a host of state-law claims under supple-\\nmental jurisdiction, including strict liability, negligence, tres-\\nǰȱǰȱȱȱĚȱȱȱǯ\\n During discoveryǰȱȱ\\u000eȱĴȱȱȱȬ\\ning for PCBs both in their yard and inside their home. They\\nalso underwent blood testing. Although the external surveys\\nrevealed a more comprehensive picture of the extent to which\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ properties contained PCBs, the in-\\nternal sampling and blood tests were both negative for con-\\ntamination. The Liebharts later learned in October 2017 that\\nthe defendants allegedly buried some of the concrete remains\\non-site rather than removing them to a toxic waste dump as\\nrequired by the EPA-approved clean-up plan.\\n The parties prepared and Ĵȱȱȱȱȱ¡Ȭ\\npert witnesses who were to testify at trial. Among those, three\\nȱȱȱȱǯȱ\\bǰȱȱ\\u000eȱĴȱ\\na report by John Woodyard, a licensed professional engineer.\\nHis report included a description of standard methods used\\nwhen demolishing PCB-contaminated buildings and an anal-\\nysis of the purported ways in which the defendants deviated\\nfrom those practices, thereby causing the contamination of the\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 5\\n\\nresidences. The Liebharts’ second expert was Dr. David Car-\\npenter, a public health physician who opined on ways in\\nwhich the Liebharts might have been exposed to PCBs and the\\nȱȱěȱȱȱ¡ǯȱ\\nȱȱ\\nthat “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not\\nincrease the risk of disease.” Finally, the defendants submit-\\nted a report prepared by Dr. Russell Keenan, a toxicologist\\nwho analyzed the survey data and determined that it was im-\\npossible to determine whether the presence of PCBs on the\\nLiebharts’ property was due to the recent demolition or to\\něȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ.\\n In December 2017, the Liebharts moved for partial sum-\\nmary judgment on the issue of causation, reserving the issue\\nof damages for a jury trial. The defendants cross-moved for\\nsummary judgmentDzȱ¢ȱȱęȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ\\n¢ȱȱě’ experts Woodyard and Carpenter un-\\nder Fed. R. Evid. 702. In February 2018, after those motions\\nwere fully briefed to the court, the Liebharts sought leave to\\namend their complaint. In light of the information they ob-\\ntained through discovery regarding the burial of concrete on\\nthe property, they intended to allege separate RCRA and\\nTSCA violations and seek an enlargement of the proposed in-\\njunction to include removal of that material.\\n The district court issued its decisions on March 30. First,\\nthe court granted in part the defendants’ motion to exclude\\nthe ě’ expert witness reports. The court explained that\\nWoodyard’s report was “equivocal” as to the issue of causa-\\ntion; it hedged on whether the contaminants came from dem-\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ See\\nLiebhart v. SPX Corp., No. 16-cv-700-jdp, 2018 WL 1583296 at\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n*3–4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2018). Second, the report “over-\\nlook[ed] tȱȱęȱ” and failed to account\\nfor “obvious alternative explanations” in determining the\\ncause of the contamination. Id. at *4 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702\\n¢ȱĴ’s note to 2000 amendments). Finally, the\\ncourt noted that Woodyard’s report depended on “unreliable\\nor uninformative” evidence, including the Liebharts’ defec-\\nȱ ȱǰȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nclippings and a chromatogram that allegedly detected PCBs\\non the property. Id. at *4–5. For those reasons, the court ex-\\ncluded Woodyard’s report in its entirety. Id. at *5.\\n \\u0003ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ\\u0006ǯȱ\\u0005Ȭ\\npenter’s report, it struck Carpenter’s conclusion that “there is\\nno ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not increase the\\nrisk of disease” as unsupported by the medical studies he\\ncited. Id. at *5. In doing so, the court pointed to the absence of\\nPCBs inside the Liebharts’ home and in their blood, suggest-\\ning that the Liebharts had not actually been exposed to PCBs\\nȱȱȱȱȱěȱǯȱId. at 5–6.\\n \\u0019ȱȱ¡ȱ¢ȱěȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ\\nconcluded that the Liebharts failed to present any admissible\\nevidence to support their RCRA and TSCA claims. The re-\\nmaining photos and videos certainly showed dust migrating\\nonto the Liebharts’ property, but there was no reliable evi-\\ndence proving that the dust contained PCBs. Given that any\\nPCBs detected in the soil may have been there prior to the\\ndemolition, the lack of evidence doomed the Liebharts’ case.\\n\\u0016ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱě,\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal\\nclaims, and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 7\\n\\n The district court also denied the Liebharts’ petition for\\nleave to amend their complaint on two grounds. First, alt-\\nȱȱȱ ȱȱȱěȱȱ\\nthe factual basis for the new counts over a year ȱęȱȱ\\ninitial complaint, it also noted that they took an additional\\nfour months thereafter to seek leave to amend. During that\\nȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ\\ntheir motions for summary judgment, and the trial date was\\nfast approaching. It found their petition untimely. Second, the\\ndistrict court determined that the new claims were futile un-\\nder both statutes' advance-notice requirements.\\n The ěȱ¢ȱ. Several months after\\nthe judgment, the clerk of the district court imposed costs on\\nthe Liebharts in the amount of $46,320.02. The Liebharts sep-\\narately appealed that decision. We consolidated the two ap-\\npeals and now consider them together.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n The \\u000eȱȱęȱȱȱȱǯȱ\\bǰȱ\\nthey argue that the district court erred in excluding the opin-\\nions of expert witnesses Woodyard in full and Carpenter in\\npart. As part of that argument, they allege that the district\\ncourt failed to apply the same stringent standard to the de-\\nfendants’ expert Keenan. Second, they contend that summary\\njudgment was inappropriate because, even absent the testi-\\n¢ȱȱȱ¡ȱ ǰȱ¢ȱĴȱȱȬ\\nȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nRCRA and TSCA. Third, they challenge the district court’s de-\\nȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ¢ have iden-\\nęȱȱ\\u0015\\u0012\\u001a’s state-approved clean-up plan. Fourth, they ar-\\ngue that the district court abused its discretion in denying\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nleave to amend their complaint. Finally, they challenge the\\nimposition of costs.\\n But there’s a larger issue looming in the background. The\\ndistrict court’s opinion operates under the assumption that\\n\\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱ ěs must demonstrate “an imminent and sub-\\nstantial danger with evidence of health problems they have\\n¢ȱ ěǯ” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *6. Relying\\nprimarily on Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C.\\nŗşşŜǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ \\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱ ěǰȱ\\nholding that “it doesn’t follow necessarily that there is an im-\\nminent and substantial risk of harm simply because there is\\nsome amount of PCBs on the property.” Liebhart 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *5. We review that question of law, which was the\\nunderlying basis for the award of summary judgment, de\\nnovo. Daugherty v. Harrington, 906 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n A. RCRA Requires Only that Harm “May” Be Imminent\\n \\u0016ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱ\\nmake out a prima facie violation of RCRA has led to much dis-\\ncussion among the circuits. We have yet to tackle that issue\\nhead on, so the district court necessarily had to look else-\\nwhere for guidance. Passed in 1976, “RCRA is a comprehen-\\nsive environmental statute that empowers [the] EPA to regu-\\nlate hazardous wastes from cradle to grave.” City of Chicago v.\\nEnvtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). The statute’s “pri-\\nmary purpose … is to reduce the generation of hazardous\\nwaste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and dis-\\nposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, ‘so as to\\nminimize the present and future threat to human health and\\nthe environment.’” Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479,\\n483 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 9\\n\\n Although the EPA has the primary responsibility for en-\\nforcing the law, the statute, “like other environmental laws,\\n… contains a citizen suit provision, § 6972, which permits pri-\\nvate citizens to enforce its provisions in some circumstances.”\\nId. at 484. As relevant to this case, the statute provides that\\n any person may commence a civil action on his own\\n behalf … against any person, … including … any\\n past or present owner or operator of a treatment,\\n storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or\\n who is contributing to the past or present handling,\\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any\\n solid or hazardous waste which may present an im-\\n minent and substantial endangerment to health or\\n the environment.\\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Notably, Con-\\ngress amended the language in 1980 by substituting the\\nphrase “may present” for the original 1976 wording “is pre-\\nsenting.” Maine People’s All. and Nat. Res. Def. Council v.\\nMallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Solid\\nWaste Disposal Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–482, § 25, 94 Stat. 2334,\\n2348). The section authorizes district courts to grant injunctive\\nrelief and “order [a violator] to take such other action as may\\nbe necessary” to remediate the endangerment. Id.; see also Me-\\nghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (“Under a plain reading of this remedial\\nscheme, a private citizen suing under § 6972(a)(1)(B) could\\nseek a mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible\\nparty to ‘take action’ ¢ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\ndisposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one\\nthat ‘restrains’ a responsible party from further violating\\nRCRA.”); Avondale Fed. Sav. Bank v. Amoco Oil Co., 170 F.3d\\n692, 694 (7th Cir. 1999).\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n The critical question in this case is how to determine\\nwhether alleged contamination “may present an imminent\\nand substantial endangerment to health.” § 6972(a)(1)(b). We\\ntouched on this question only brĚ¢ȱȱAlbany Bank & Trust\\nCo. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2002).\\n\\u0016ǰȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ prima facie RCRA\\nclaim: “a ěȱȱȱǻŗǼȱȱȱȱȱȬ\\nerated solid or hazardous waste, (2) that the defendant is con-\\ntributing to or has contributed to the handling of this waste,\\nand (3) that this waste may present an imminent and substan-\\ntial danger to health or the environment.” Id. (citing Cox v.\\nCity of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 2001)). We then ob-\\nǰȱȱȱęȱǰȱȱ“[i]mminence does\\nnot require an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\nharm.” Id. (citing Cox, 256 F.3d at 299). That is the extent of\\nour circuit precedent on the “may present” language con-\\ntained in § 6972(a)(1)(B).\\n But our sister circuits have engaged with this question in\\nȱǯȱ\\u000bȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ\\nthe Third Circuit emphasized that the statute “enhanced the\\ncourts’ traditional equitable powers by authorizing the issu-\\nance of injunctions when there is but a risk of harm, a more\\nlenient standard than the traditional requirement of threat-\\nened irreparable harm.” United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204,\\n211 (3d Cir. 1982). The court found the statutory language\\n“unequivocal,” demonstrating that Congress “intended to\\nȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĜȱȬ\\nuitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate” the risks\\nposed by toxic waste. Id. at 213–14.\\n In the subsequent decades, several other circuits adopted\\nand further developed the same interpretation of § 6972. See\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 11\\n\\nMallinckrodt, 471 F.3d at 277; Dague v. City of Burlington, 935\\nF.2d 1343, 1355–56 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds,\\n502 U.S. 1071 (1992); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l,\\nInc., 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Waste Indus.,\\nInc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument\\nthat “[§ 6972] was designed to control pollution only in emer-\\ngency situations”); Cox, 256 F.3d at 299–301; Price v. United\\nStates Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994); Burlington N.\\nand Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1019–22 (10th Cir.\\n2007); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1014–\\n15 (11th Cir. 2004). We now join those courts and explicitly\\nembrace the core content of their interpretation.\\n The district court therefore used an incorrect legal stand-\\nard to evaluate the Liebharts’ argument that PCBs from the\\ndemolition may present an imminent and substantial danger\\nto their health and that of their tenants. It did not cite any of\\nthe cases we listed above, but instead relied on a single district\\ncourt decision from a circuit that has not yet addressed the\\nissue. See Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *5 (quoting Foster, 922\\nF. Supp. at 662 (“While there can be no question that the levels\\nof contamination present at the Site may warrant future re-\\nȱ ǰȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ\\nrisk of substantial or serious threatened harm, or some neces-\\nsity for action.”)).\\n That error undercuts several of the reasons the district\\ncourt gave for rejecting the Liebharts’ RCRA claim. For exam-\\nple, the district court cursorily adopted a passing statement\\nwe made over twenty-ę years ago that “[t]he [EPA’s] ac-\\ncepted safe level of PCBs in the ȱȱę¢ȱȱȱ\\nmillion,” id. (quoting Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nServ., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1994)), to create a require-\\nment that the Liebharts show that PCB contamination on their\\nproperty met that threshold. But there is no requirement in\\n\\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱȱȱěȱȱȱ“a particular quantitative show-\\ning as a sine qua non for liability.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 260; see\\nalso Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. Only one circuit has come to an\\narguably contrary conclusion. In Price v. United States Navy,\\n818 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (S.D. Cal. 1992), ě’d 39 F.3d 1011 (9th\\n\\u0005ǯȱŗşşŚǼǰȱȱȱȱȱ\\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱěȱȱ ȱ\\nthat “the level of contaminants [was] above levels that are con-\\nsidered acceptable by the State.” But as the Interfaith court\\nnoted, the Ninth Circuit’ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ\\ncourt’s judgment did not discuss that requirement. RCRA\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěs demonstrate contamination\\nabove some agency-derived threshold level of concentration.\\n399 F.3d at 260–61. It merely requires that they show that con-\\ntaminants on the property are seriously dangerous to human\\nhealth (or will be, given prolonged exposure over time). See\\nCox, 256 F.3d at 299–300 (“an endangerment is ‘substantial’ if\\nit is ‘serious’” (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019)).\\n That’s especially true when the standard is taken out of\\ncontext. The district court relied on Cincinnati Ins. Co. to sup-\\nport its contention that contamination below the threshold\\nȱȱę¢ȱȱȱȱ(“ppm”) does not qualify as a\\nregulatory violation, thereby contradicting Woodyard’s opin-\\nion regarding safe levels of PCBs and providing the grounds\\nfor excluding it. In that case, we evaluated whether an insur-\\nance company was required to indemnify its insured for dam-\\nages arising out of PCB contamination at an industrial site.\\n\\u0016ȱ\\u0007\\u0012\\u0003ȱȱęȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ\\nthe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,\\nand Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 13\\n\\nthat context, we noted that the contaminated site contained\\nPCBs concentrated at levels up to 58,000 ppm, well above the\\nEPA’ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱę¢ȱǯȱŚŖȱF.3d at 148\\n(citing 40 C.F.R. § 761.60).\\n \\u0004ȱ ȱ ǰȱȱȱěȱ¢ǰȱęȱ Ȭ\\ntrial equipment and other wastes contaminated at levels\\nabove ę¢ȱppm and requires special procedures for their stor-\\nage and disposal. It does not unequivocally state that PCBs\\nȱȱȱ ȱȱę¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nexposure. Neither Cincinnati Ins. Co. nor the EPA regulation\\nstand for the proposition that PCBs concentrated at forty-nine\\nppm on residential property do not present a substantial endan-\\ngerment to the health of the residents. That is especially ap-\\nparent when we consider that the same set of regulations dis-\\ntinguishes between low and high-occupancy areas and re-\\nquires that, in high-occupancy areas, bulk PCB remediation\\nwaste, such as soil, be cleaned up to levels of concentration at\\nor below one ppm. § 761.61(a)(4)(i)(A). Section ŝŜŗǯřȱęȱ\\nthat the term “high-occupancy area” includes residences. See\\nalso § ŝŜŗǯŗŘřȱǻȱȱȱ\\u0012\\u0005\\u0004ȱȱȱę¢ȱ\\nppm or greater but emphasizing that “[t]he concentration of\\nPCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concentration in the\\nmaterial spilled as opposed to the concentration of PCBs in\\nthe material onto which the PCBs were spilled”). “Proof of\\ncontamination in excess of [agency] standards may support a\\nęȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱĜȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ\\nǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱȬ\\nute.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 261.\\n This is not to say that ȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱshow\\nsome bit of soil on their property that tests positive for PCBs\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nabove one ppm (or even above the purported lower Wiscon-\\nsin DNR standard, which the defendants seem to have\\nacknowledged in their state-approved clean-up plan). Of\\ncourse, there must be accompanying evidence that establishes\\nsome connection between the existing contaminants and\\nsome imminent and substantial endangerment to health. 1 But\\nȱ \\u000eȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ\\ndistrict court held the bar higher than necessary under\\nRCRA’s standard. In criticizing expert witness Carpenter’s\\nstatement that “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that\\ndoes not increase the risk of disease,” the district court re-\\njected Carpenter’s citation to studies showing the general\\nrisks of PCB exposure because “the Liebharts do not cite any\\nevidence that they have been exposed to PCBs.” Liebhart, 2018\\nWL 1583296 at *5. Moreover, the district court concluded that\\n“[t]he Liebharts do not contend that they can prove an immi-\\nnent and substantial danger with evidence of health problems\\n¢ȱȱ¢ȱěǯ” Id. at *6.\\n As we noted in Albany Bank, “[i]mminence does not re-\\nquire an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\n\\n\\n 1 On appeal, the Liebharts contend that there is no separate require-\\nment for expert witness testimony because the photos and videos they\\nhave submitted into evidence suffice to prove their RCRA claim. The de-\\nfendants push back on that argument, insisting that many of the issues are\\nbeyond the competence of lay fact-finders and require the assistance of\\nexperts to address. See, e.g., C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827,\\n838 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Given the complex nature of this case, … [and w]ith\\nno experts to prove causation … the appellants cannot prove their toxic-\\ntort case under [state] law.”) Because the district court did not make a fac-\\ntual finding as to whether this case is sufficient complex to require expert\\ntestimony, and because we remand for reconsideration of a separate legal\\nissue, we need not reach that question today.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 15\\n\\nharm.” 310 F.3d at 973. Although the Supreme Court has in-\\nstructed that “[a]n endangerment can only be ‘imminent’ if it\\n‘threaten[s] to occur immediately,’” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485\\n(quoting Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary of English Language\\nŗŘŚśȱǻŘȱǯȱŗşřŚǼǼǰȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱȬ\\ningly quoted the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the statu-\\ntory term “implies that there must be a threat which is present\\nnow, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until\\nlater.” Id. at 486 (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019).\\nWe take that to mean that the Liebharts must show that there\\nare PCBs currently on the property that have the potential to\\nsubstantially threaten their health at some point in the future\\nif they continue to occupy the premises and prolong their ex-\\nposure. On remand, the district court should reevaluate its ex-\\nclusion of Dr. Carpenter’s assertion regarding PCB safety un-\\nder the standards we have outlined above and determine\\nwhether, if admissible, the report demonstrates that a sub-\\nstantial and imminent threat to the Liebharts’ health may be\\npresent.\\n B. TSCA Likewise Requires No Heightened Showing\\n TSCA authorizes a separate, private cause of action allow-\\ning “any person [to] commence a civil action … against any\\nperson … who is alleged to be in violation of … any rule\\npromulgated under” the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1). The EPA\\npromulgated the PCB regulations in question pursuant to\\nstatutory authority under TSCA, designating PCBs as “haz-\\nardous waste” and controlling their manufacture, use, stor-\\nage, and disposal. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 761. The Liebharts’ TSCA\\nclaim alleged that the defendants violated those regulations,\\nthereby authorizing the district court to “restrain [the] viola-\\ntion.” § 2619(a). Unlike RCRA, which authorizes mandatory\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\ninjunctions to compel remediation of previous violations,\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions to stop ongoing\\nviolations. Id. The defendants argued that there was no longer\\nan ongoing violation, as demolition was complete by the time\\nȱ\\u000eȱęȱȱǯ 2\\n The purported violation was based on 40 C.F.R. § 761.123,\\nwhich, as we noted above, regulates “spills” of PCB materials\\nȱȱȱȱę¢ȱǯȱ\\u0016 district court cor-\\nrectly noted that the Liebharts had not shown any evidence\\nthat any PCBs had been “spilled” onto their property (by\\nmeans of dust migration) at that level of concentration, and it\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on that basis.\\n But the district court seems to have overlooked the follow-\\ning sentence in the regulation, which directs that “[t]he con-\\ncentration of PCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concen-\\ntration in the material spilled as opposed to the concentration\\nof the material onto which the PCBs were spilled.” Id. The\\nLiebharts’ complaint seems to have alleged that the concrete\\nĚȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȬ\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ę¢-ppm threshold, was demolished\\nand “spilled” onto the Liebharts’ property. By the plain text\\nof the regulation, there is no need to show that contaminants\\non the Liebharts’ property are themselves concentrated above\\nę¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ\\nof that spill met the criteria. On remand, the district court may\\nagain determine that there is no ongoing violation, but it must\\n\\n 2 The district court determined that the Liebharts waived this claim\\nby failing to engage the defendants’ argument that there was no “ongoing\\nviolation.” But the court chose to analyze the merits of the claim regardless\\nof waiver and reached its conclusion on an alternative basis. We likewise\\nset aside the issue of waiver to reach the district court’s merits analysis.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 17\\n\\nęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ\\nthe meaning of § 761.123 ȱȱęȱ.\\n C. The District Court Should Reconsider the Remaining Issues\\non Remand\\n \\u0010 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ standard ȱ ěȱ\\nmust meet, we turn to the remaining procedural issues the\\nLiebharts have asked to us to address.\\n 1. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding\\nWoodyard’s Testimony\\n “The summary-judgment decision here turned [in large\\npart] on the district court’s conclusion that [the] expert testi-\\nmony was inadmissible. Whether the district court applied\\nthe appropriate legal framework for evaluating expert testi-\\nmony is reviewed de novo, but the court’s choice of relevant\\nfactors within that framework and its ultimate conclusion as\\nto admissibility are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Lees v.\\nCarthage College, 714 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 2013). When a dis-\\ntrict court is “[Ǿȱ ȱȱěȱȱ¡ȱęȱȬ\\nmony … the trial judge must determine at the outset …\\n ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǻŗǼȱ ęȱ\\nknowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or\\ndetermine a fact in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,\\n509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). “The trial court must have … latitude\\nin deciding how to test an expert’s reliability.” Kumho Tire Co.,\\nLtd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).\\n The district court was well within its discretion to exclude\\nthe ěȱ¢ȱȱ¡ȱ ȱ\\u0019¢ǯȱ\\u0004¢ȱ\\nȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȬ\\nsue in the district court by failing to engage with the defend-\\nants’ arguments in their motion to strike the testimony,\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nWoodyard’s analysis sěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ě ȱ ȱ ȱ\\nfrom the way in which the parties have framed this lawsuit.\\n\\u0016ȱȱȱĚ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ“both sides\\nassume that none of the defendants can be held liable for any\\nPCB contamination on the Liebharts’ property that occurred\\nbefore the demolition began, so the court will make the same\\nassumption.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *1. That’s a curious\\nchoice. RCRA permits the Liebharts to obtain injunctive relief\\nfrom the owner of the facility for any cognizable contamina-\\ntion, regardless of whether the PCBs migrated onto their\\nproperty before or after the demolition occurred. See 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (authorizing suit against “any person … who\\nhas contributed … to the past or present handling … or dis-\\nposal” of hazardous waste); see also Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486\\n(“RCRA contains no statute of limitations.”).\\n But because the Liebharts restricted their claims to PCBs\\nthat allegedly migrated onto their property via the dust from\\nthe 2015 demolition, they necessarily excluded claims result-\\ning from PCBs that may ȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱȬ\\ning the previous century. The district court correctly noted\\nthat Woodyard’s expert opinion could not distinguish be-\\ntween these two alternatives, as both sets of contaminants\\noriginated from the same source. There was even evidence\\nshowing that PCBs existed in the soil beneath the Liebharts’\\nasphalt driveway—Woodyard could not explain how that\\nmight have occurred as the result of dust blowing in the wind\\nas opposed to seepage over the course of years before any\\ndemolition occurred.\\n Perhaps the Liebharts decided to frame their claims in this\\nway because they wanted to go after defendants TRC and\\nApollo, who would not be liable for what happened before\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 19\\n\\ndemolition. Or perhaps some element of their state-law\\nclaims, which we have not addressed, required them to con-\\nstrict the scope. They did not explain their reasoning to us (or\\nit seems, to the district court). But the distinction makes it dif-\\nęȱȱ\\u0019¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\n“adequately account[] for obvious alternative explanations.”\\n\\tȱǯȱ\\n Ĵ-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 787 (7th Cir.\\n2017). Viewed in this light, the district court was within its\\ndiscretion to exclude the testimony as unreliable and unhelp-\\nful to the trier of fact. The district court may choose to rethink\\nthat evaluation on remand under the legal standards we out-\\nlined above, but it may well reach the same conclusion.\\n 2. The District Court Should Reconsider Its Denial of Injunctive\\nRelief\\n The district court denied injunctive relief to the Liebharts\\nbecause the defendants had already agreed to a clean-up plan\\nthat had been approved by the Wisconsin DNR. We review\\nthat decision for an abuse of discretion. See AMI Int’l, Inc. v.\\nDatacard Corp. 106 F.3d 1342, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997) (remanding\\ngrant of RCRA injunction).\\n As we mentioned above, RCRA authorizes district courts\\nto issue either mandatory or prohibitory injunctions, while\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions. “[I]t is appro-\\npriate ‘to give great deference to the district court’s decision\\nas to the precise equitable relief necessary in a particular\\ncase.’” Bowes v. Ind. Sec. of State, 837 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (quoting Gjersten v. Bd. Of Election Com’rs for City of Chi-\\ncago, 791 F.2d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1986)). That is especially true\\n ȱȱěȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ ȱ“im-\\nȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ\\nful consideration of the intrusiveness of the ordered act, as\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n ȱȱȱĜȱȱ¢ȱȱȱin supervising\\nthe enjoined party’s compliance with the court’s order.” Kart-\\nman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir.\\n2011).\\n Considering SPX’s decision to formulate a clean-up plan\\nand obtain approval from the state agency, the district court\\ndetermined that there was no need for separate, federally-su-\\npervised remediation. It reached that conclusion even while\\nassuming that the defendants were in violation of either\\nRCRA or TSCA, despite the fact it found no such violation.\\nOther courts have determined that the existence of a parallel\\nplan of remediation supervised by the state does not neces-\\nsarily prevent a federal district court from granting an injunc-\\nȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢’ȱȱȱȱĜȱȱ\\nremedy the violation of federal law. See, e.g., Interfaith, 399\\nF.3d at 264–68. On the other hand, the same courts have also\\nupheld denials of injunctions in similar situations when the\\nȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ\\ntask. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735\\nF.3d 131, 139–40 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Interfaith). We\\nrecently reached the same conclusion. See LAJIM, LLC v. Gen.\\nElec. Co., No. 18-1522, 2019 WL 1011021, at *4–11 (7th Cir. Mar.\\n4, 2019) (“[T]he district court correctly held that it has discre-\\ntion to award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not re-\\nȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱ¢ǰ” particularly\\nin light of ongoing relief supervised by a state environmental\\nagency).\\n Here, the district court determined that SPX’s existing\\nȱ ȱ Ĝ and that the Liebharts had not “iden-\\ntif[ied] any way that SPX’ȱȱǽ ǾȱęȱȱǽǾȱ\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 21\\n\\nfederal law.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *7. We agree. Alt-\\nhough the Liebharts point to certain statistical sampling re-\\nquirements outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 761.125 and contend that\\nSPX’s existing plan fails to meet those requirements, the dis-\\ntrict court noted that SPX’s plan includes further sampling of\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ property. It emphasized that “the\\nLiebharts do not otherwise explain why SPX’s proposed sam-\\npling scheme is substantively inadequate.” Liebhart, 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *7. We see no evidence that compels us to contra-\\nȱȱȱęǯ\\n However, in light of the legal standards we outlined\\nabove, we ask the district court to reconsider its decision to\\ndeny injunctive relief on remand. Because the bar for estab-\\nlishing an imminent and substantial danger is lower than the\\ndistrict court believed when evaluating the request for an in-\\njunction, it would be prudent to reassess whether the DNR-\\napproved plan adequately remedies harms that may come\\nwithin RCRA’s scope. See LAJIM, 2019 WL 1011021 at *6\\n(“[\\u0011Ǿȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nimminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the case\\nthat injunctive relief is warranted. But that is not always the\\ncase.”) ǻȱȱȱȱĴǼǯ\\n 3. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying\\nLeave to Amend the Complaint.\\n We review a denial of leave to amend a complaint for\\nabuse of discretion. Life Plans, Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co.,\\n800 F.3d 343, 357 (7th Cir. 2015). District courts are to “freely\\ngive leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 15(a)(2). “The Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to\\nrequire a district court to allow amendment unless there is a\\ngood reason—futility, undue delay, undue prejudice, or bad\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nfaith—for denying leave to amend.” Life Plans, 800 F.3d at 357\\n(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The district\\nȱȱȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\ndenial: futility and undue delay. While we disagree with the\\n¢ȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱ\\nand decline to reverse.\\n We begin with the question of futility. Both statutes con-\\ntain advance-ȱȱȱ£ȱěȱȱ\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ \\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱ ȱ \\u0016\\u0015\\u0005\\u0003ȱ ǯȱ \\u0016¢ȱ ȱ\\nȱěȱȱ¢ȱȱ\\u0007\\u0012\\u0003ȱ60–90 ¢ȱȱȱȱęȬ\\ning the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2); 15 U.S.C.\\n§ 2619(b)(1)(A). But the district court chose to apply the re-\\nȱȱ¢ȱȱȱęȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ\\nany subsequent amendments that sought to add new RCRA\\nor TSCA counts. Although the Liebharts complied with the\\nȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ\\u0003ȱ\\n2016, they gave no new notice to the EPA before ęȱ ȱ\\nleave to amend in February 2018. The district court held that,\\nbecause the prior notice did not contain any mention of bur-\\nȱ\\u0012\\u0005\\u0004ȱȱȱ\\u0015\\u0012\\u001aȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱĜȱȱȱȱ\\nEPA to the particular violation the Liebharts sought to include\\nin the amended complaint.\\n The notice provisions serve two purposes. “First, notice al-\\nlows Government agencies to take responsibility for enforc-\\ning environmental regulations, thus obviating the need for\\ncitizen suits. … Second, notice gives the alleged violator ‘an\\nopportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the\\nAct[s] and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit.’”\\nHallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (quoting\\n\\t ¢ȱ ȱ \\u0015ęǰȱ\\u000bǯȱ ǯȱ\\u0005ȱ\\u0004¢ȱ \\bǯǰȱ\\u000bǯ, 484\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 23\\n\\nU.S. 49, 60 (1987)). The district court’s decision to require no-\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ pur-\\nposeǯȱ\\u0004¢ȱȱȱȱ\\u000eȱĴȱȱȱȱȬ\\nplaint, the EPA had been on notice of alleged PCB contamina-\\ntion at the SPX property for over two years—and it had de-\\nclined to get involved. Moreover, it was unlikely that the de-\\nfendants would resolve the alleged violation to avoid being\\nsued when they were already in the midst of an extended law-\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěǯȱ See AM Int’l, 106 F.3d at 1351\\n(“[T]he delay period is designed to allow a [defendant] a pe-\\nriod in which to clean up its act and avoid litigation. [This de-\\nfendant] was clearly not interested in using the delay period\\nto resolve the dispute without going to court.”); see also Dague,\\n935 F.2d at 1351 (“There is no need to maintain a window of\\nopportunity for the government to take the lead enforcement\\nrole … ȱȱ£ǰȱȱȱȱȱĴ¢ȱǰȱȱ\\nalready lawfully assumed the lead role in bringing a … claim\\nagainst the same facility.”) (quoting Dague v. City of Burling-\\nton, 733 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D. Vt. 1990)). When the original notice\\nis “Ĝ¢ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱǽȱȱ\\nagency] about what it is doing wrong, so that it will know\\nwhat corrective actions will avert a lawsuit,” Atl. States Legal\\nFound., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir.\\n1994), there is no need to require a second round of advance\\nnotice for an amended complaint in the same litigation.\\n But an error in the futility analysis alone does not neces-\\nsarily constitute an abuse of discretion on the whole. In addi-\\ntion to futility, the district court cited undue delay and preju-\\ndice in its decision to deny leave to amend. “[D]elay by itself\\nȱ¢ȱȱĜȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ\\nto amend. Delay must be coupled with some other reason.\\nTypically, that reason … is prejudice to the non-moving\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nparty.” Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 793\\n(7th Cir. 2004). The district court cited the Liebharts’ admis-\\nsion that they learned of the possible burial of contaminated\\nconcrete on the SPX property on October 11, 2017 but failed\\nto seek leave to amend their complaint until February 22,\\n2018. During that more than four-month period, the parties\\nĴȱȱȱȱ-motions for summary judg-\\nment, and by February, trial was only three months away. The\\n\\u000eȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ǯ\\n In response, the Liebharts contend that there was no un-\\nȱȱȱȱDZȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱęȱȱ\\nǰȱęȱ of discovery still remained. We disagree.\\nWhile the district court’s explanation of prejudice was fairly\\nshort, even if the district court had failed ȱȱȱęȬ\\ning of prejudice altogether, we might still “Ĝȱȱ\\nthat ‘the prejudice that would result from such amendment\\nwas apparent.’” Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 613 (7th\\nCir. 2002) (quoting Feldman v. Am. Mem’l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d\\n783, 793 (7th Cir. 1999)). In Parkǰȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ¡ȱ\\nmonths to move for leave to amend a complaint after she\\nknew (or should have known) of the additional alleged viola-\\ntion. Id. Because trial was approaching, we concluded that the\\ndistrict court was well within its discretion to deny leave. Id.;\\nsee also Perrian v. O’Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194–95 (7th Cir. 1992)\\n(“Because substantive amendments shortly before trial serve\\nto defeat the public’s interest in speedy resolution of legal dis-\\nputes, ‘[a] district court judge is entitled, in such circum-\\nǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱě’s amendment.’” (quoting\\nCampbell v. Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co., 893 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir.\\n1990)) ǻȱȱĴǼ).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 25\\n\\n On the contrary, in Life Plans, we found no undue delay\\n ȱȱěȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nten days after learning of the factual basis for its new count\\nduring discovery. 800 F.3d at 358. The Liebharts delayed more\\nthan four months in the same circumstances. Although dis-\\ncovery was ongoing at the time of the Liebharts’ motion, the\\nparties had already briefed their dispositive motions, and the\\ndistrict court was preparing its summary-judgment order that\\nwould ultimately dispose of the case. We therefore cannot say\\nthat denial of leave for undue delay and prejudice was an\\nabuse of the district court’s discretion. Of course, the district\\ncourt may permit an amendment on remand if the interests of\\njustice so require.\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n Although the district court properly exercised its discre-\\ntion on the various evidentiary and procedural issues the\\něȱȱaised, its analysis on the merits was narrower\\nthan the statutes demand. It may reach the same conclusions\\non reconsideration, but the parties should have another op-\\nportunity to litigate whether a substantial and imminent en-\\ndangerment to health exists in this case under the standards\\nwe have outlined. We therefore VACATE the order of the dis-\\ntrict court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent\\nwith this opinion. 3\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 The Liebharts also challenge the taxation of costs against them by the\\n\\nclerk of the district court. Because we vacate the district court’s judgment,\\nwe assume that the imposition of costs is automatically vacated and so do\\nnot reach that issue. The clerk of the district court is free to reassess costs\\non remand as the case proceeds.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4374567/\", \"author_raw\": \"Michael Stephen Kanne\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597314/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\nWILLIAM LIEBHART & NANCY LIEBHART,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n v.\n\nSPX CORPORATION, TRC ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION, &\nAPOLLO DISMANTLING SERVICES, INC.\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 16-cv-700 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n KANNE, Circuit Judge. William and Nancy Liebhart to-\ngether own three houses on the same block in Watertown,\nWisconsin. Besides a few other houses, the rest of the block\nwas previously occupied by an abandoned transformer fac-\ntory, last owned by SPX Corporation. In 2014, SPX demol-\nished the building with the assistance of TRC Environmental\nCorporation and Apollo Dismantling Services (collectively,\n\f2 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\n“the defendants”). The Liebharts allege that dust and debris\ncontaining toxic chemicals migrated onto their properties,\ncontaminating their yards and jeopardizing their health and\nthe health of their tenants.\n The Liebharts sued under federal statutes authorizing pri-\nvate rights of action for environmental contamination. They\nalso brought various state-law claims. Following discovery\nand the submission of expert witness reports, the district\ncourt denied the Liebharts’ motion for partial summary judg-\nment and granted summary judgment to the defendants with\ncosts. Although the district court adequately evaluated the ex-\npert witnesses and did not abuse its discretion in its proce-\ndural decisions, the court set the bar unnecessarily high for\nȱěȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ\nutes. For that reason, we vacate the district court’s judgment\nand remand for reconsideration.\n I. BACKGROUND\n The factory dates to the 1920s and was used to manufac-\nture various industrial equipment. Most relevant to our pur-\npose, the factory manufactured power transformers contain-\ning polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a carcinogenic chemi-\ncal banned by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1979.\nSee Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Pro-\ncessing, Distribution in Commerce, and Use Prohibitions, 44\nFǯȱ\u0014ǯȱřŗǰśŗŚȱǻ\u000f¢ȱřŗǰȱŗşŝşǼȱǻęȱȱŚŖȱ\u0005ǯ\bǯ\u0014ǯȱpt. 761).\nThe parties all agree that the facility has not manufactured or\nhandled any items containing PCBs since 1971, and that it\nshut down completely in 2005.\n But even with all the products and manufacturing equip-\nment removed, PCB contaminants remained in the facility. In\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 3\n\n2009, SPX retained TRC and another company (not named as\na defendant in this suit) to study the property and determine\nthe extent and precise location of any PCB contamination.\n\u0016ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱ\nwas generally contaminated, with concentrated amounts lo-\ncatȱȱęȱȱȱȱǯ\n Several years went by. In 2014, SPX decided to move ahead\nwith the demolition, retaining Apollo to conduct the work\nand TRC to supervise the project. That November, the defend-\nants timely proposed a self-implementing cleanup plan to the\nEPA, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 761.61(a). The trouble began\nas demolition commenced in January 2015. The Liebharts al-\nlege that Apollo demolished the building recklessly, failing to\nuse appropriate safety methods to control the dust generated\nby demolition equipment. They assert that their properties\n ȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱĴȱȱof photos\nand videos of dust from the facility blowing toward their\nhomes to support their allegation.\n \u0016ȱ\u000eȱęȱȱȱ th the local government\nin February. They also collected a dust-covered sample of\nsnow from their yard and placed it in a mason jar. Soon there-\nafter, a representative of the Wisconsin Department of Natu-\nral Resources (“DNR”) contacted the defendants about the\nLiebharts’ concerns. In April, TRC collected samples of the\nsurface soil (roughly down to eight inches below ground) on\nboth the industrial and residential properties. Sure enough,\nthe properties tested positive for the presence of PCBs. In Au-\ngust, the Liebharts vacated the property on advice of their\nphysician to avoid further exposure to the chemicals. Frus-\ntrated with the lack of action, William Liebhart had the snow\n\f4 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nsample tested for PCBs. Although the sample did, in fact, con-\ntain PCBs, the irregular manner of collection and storage\nspoiled the sample, and the laboratory declined to endorse the\nȱ ȱ¢ȱęǯ\n In September 2015ǰȱ\u0015\u0012\u001aȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ\ncontamination to the DNR. In turn, the Liebharts sued in fed-\neral district court in October. The complaint sought injunctive\nrelief under both the Resource Conservation and Recovery\nAct (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and the Toxic Substances\nControl Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. In addition, the\nLiebharts brought a host of state-law claims under supple-\nmental jurisdiction, including strict liability, negligence, tres-\nǰȱǰȱȱȱĚȱȱȱǯ\n During discoveryǰȱȱ\u000eȱĴȱȱȱȬ\ning for PCBs both in their yard and inside their home. They\nalso underwent blood testing. Although the external surveys\nrevealed a more comprehensive picture of the extent to which\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ properties contained PCBs, the in-\nternal sampling and blood tests were both negative for con-\ntamination. The Liebharts later learned in October 2017 that\nthe defendants allegedly buried some of the concrete remains\non-site rather than removing them to a toxic waste dump as\nrequired by the EPA-approved clean-up plan.\n The parties prepared and Ĵȱȱȱȱȱ¡Ȭ\npert witnesses who were to testify at trial. Among those, three\nȱȱȱȱǯȱ\bǰȱȱ\u000eȱĴȱ\na report by John Woodyard, a licensed professional engineer.\nHis report included a description of standard methods used\nwhen demolishing PCB-contaminated buildings and an anal-\nysis of the purported ways in which the defendants deviated\nfrom those practices, thereby causing the contamination of the\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 5\n\nresidences. The Liebharts’ second expert was Dr. David Car-\npenter, a public health physician who opined on ways in\nwhich the Liebharts might have been exposed to PCBs and the\nȱȱěȱȱȱ¡ǯȱ\nȱȱ\nthat “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not\nincrease the risk of disease.” Finally, the defendants submit-\nted a report prepared by Dr. Russell Keenan, a toxicologist\nwho analyzed the survey data and determined that it was im-\npossible to determine whether the presence of PCBs on the\nLiebharts’ property was due to the recent demolition or to\něȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ.\n In December 2017, the Liebharts moved for partial sum-\nmary judgment on the issue of causation, reserving the issue\nof damages for a jury trial. The defendants cross-moved for\nsummary judgmentDzȱ¢ȱȱęȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ\n¢ȱȱě’ experts Woodyard and Carpenter un-\nder Fed. R. Evid. 702. In February 2018, after those motions\nwere fully briefed to the court, the Liebharts sought leave to\namend their complaint. In light of the information they ob-\ntained through discovery regarding the burial of concrete on\nthe property, they intended to allege separate RCRA and\nTSCA violations and seek an enlargement of the proposed in-\njunction to include removal of that material.\n The district court issued its decisions on March 30. First,\nthe court granted in part the defendants’ motion to exclude\nthe ě’ expert witness reports. The court explained that\nWoodyard’s report was “equivocal” as to the issue of causa-\ntion; it hedged on whether the contaminants came from dem-\nȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ See\nLiebhart v. SPX Corp., No. 16-cv-700-jdp, 2018 WL 1583296 at\n\f6 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\n*3–4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2018). Second, the report “over-\nlook[ed] tȱȱęȱ” and failed to account\nfor “obvious alternative explanations” in determining the\ncause of the contamination. Id. at *4 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702\n¢ȱĴ’s note to 2000 amendments). Finally, the\ncourt noted that Woodyard’s report depended on “unreliable\nor uninformative” evidence, including the Liebharts’ defec-\nȱ ȱǰȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ\nclippings and a chromatogram that allegedly detected PCBs\non the property. Id. at *4–5. For those reasons, the court ex-\ncluded Woodyard’s report in its entirety. Id. at *5.\n \u0003ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ\u0006ǯȱ\u0005Ȭ\npenter’s report, it struck Carpenter’s conclusion that “there is\nno ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not increase the\nrisk of disease” as unsupported by the medical studies he\ncited. Id. at *5. In doing so, the court pointed to the absence of\nPCBs inside the Liebharts’ home and in their blood, suggest-\ning that the Liebharts had not actually been exposed to PCBs\nȱȱȱȱȱěȱǯȱId. at 5–6.\n \u0019ȱȱ¡ȱ¢ȱěȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ\nconcluded that the Liebharts failed to present any admissible\nevidence to support their RCRA and TSCA claims. The re-\nmaining photos and videos certainly showed dust migrating\nonto the Liebharts’ property, but there was no reliable evi-\ndence proving that the dust contained PCBs. Given that any\nPCBs detected in the soil may have been there prior to the\ndemolition, the lack of evidence doomed the Liebharts’ case.\n\u0016ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱě,\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal\nclaims, and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice.\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 7\n\n The district court also denied the Liebharts’ petition for\nleave to amend their complaint on two grounds. First, alt-\nȱȱȱ ȱȱȱěȱȱ\nthe factual basis for the new counts over a year ȱęȱȱ\ninitial complaint, it also noted that they took an additional\nfour months thereafter to seek leave to amend. During that\nȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ\ntheir motions for summary judgment, and the trial date was\nfast approaching. It found their petition untimely. Second, the\ndistrict court determined that the new claims were futile un-\nder both statutes' advance-notice requirements.\n The ěȱ¢ȱ. Several months after\nthe judgment, the clerk of the district court imposed costs on\nthe Liebharts in the amount of $46,320.02. The Liebharts sep-\narately appealed that decision. We consolidated the two ap-\npeals and now consider them together.\n II. ANALYSIS\n The \u000eȱȱęȱȱȱȱǯȱ\bǰȱ\nthey argue that the district court erred in excluding the opin-\nions of expert witnesses Woodyard in full and Carpenter in\npart. As part of that argument, they allege that the district\ncourt failed to apply the same stringent standard to the de-\nfendants’ expert Keenan. Second, they contend that summary\njudgment was inappropriate because, even absent the testi-\n¢ȱȱȱ¡ȱ ǰȱ¢ȱĴȱȱȬ\nȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\nRCRA and TSCA. Third, they challenge the district court’s de-\nȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ¢ have iden-\nęȱȱ\u0015\u0012\u001a’s state-approved clean-up plan. Fourth, they ar-\ngue that the district court abused its discretion in denying\n\f8 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nleave to amend their complaint. Finally, they challenge the\nimposition of costs.\n But there’s a larger issue looming in the background. The\ndistrict court’s opinion operates under the assumption that\n\u0014\u0005\u0014\u0003ȱ ěs must demonstrate “an imminent and sub-\nstantial danger with evidence of health problems they have\n¢ȱ ěǯ” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *6. Relying\nprimarily on Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C.\nŗşşŜǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ \u0014\u0005\u0014\u0003ȱ ěǰȱ\nholding that “it doesn’t follow necessarily that there is an im-\nminent and substantial risk of harm simply because there is\nsome amount of PCBs on the property.” Liebhart 2018 WL\n1583296 at *5. We review that question of law, which was the\nunderlying basis for the award of summary judgment, de\nnovo. Daugherty v. Harrington, 906 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2018).\n A. RCRA Requires Only that Harm “May” Be Imminent\n \u0016ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱ\nmake out a prima facie violation of RCRA has led to much dis-\ncussion among the circuits. We have yet to tackle that issue\nhead on, so the district court necessarily had to look else-\nwhere for guidance. Passed in 1976, “RCRA is a comprehen-\nsive environmental statute that empowers [the] EPA to regu-\nlate hazardous wastes from cradle to grave.” City of Chicago v.\nEnvtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). The statute’s “pri-\nmary purpose … is to reduce the generation of hazardous\nwaste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and dis-\nposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, ‘so as to\nminimize the present and future threat to human health and\nthe environment.’” Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479,\n483 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)).\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 9\n\n Although the EPA has the primary responsibility for en-\nforcing the law, the statute, “like other environmental laws,\n… contains a citizen suit provision, § 6972, which permits pri-\nvate citizens to enforce its provisions in some circumstances.”\nId. at 484. As relevant to this case, the statute provides that\n any person may commence a civil action on his own\n behalf … against any person, … including … any\n past or present owner or operator of a treatment,\n storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or\n who is contributing to the past or present handling,\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any\n solid or hazardous waste which may present an im-\n minent and substantial endangerment to health or\n the environment.\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Notably, Con-\ngress amended the language in 1980 by substituting the\nphrase “may present” for the original 1976 wording “is pre-\nsenting.” Maine People’s All. and Nat. Res. Def. Council v.\nMallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Solid\nWaste Disposal Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–482, § 25, 94 Stat. 2334,\n2348). The section authorizes district courts to grant injunctive\nrelief and “order [a violator] to take such other action as may\nbe necessary” to remediate the endangerment. Id.; see also Me-\nghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (“Under a plain reading of this remedial\nscheme, a private citizen suing under § 6972(a)(1)(B) could\nseek a mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible\nparty to ‘take action’ ¢ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ\ndisposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one\nthat ‘restrains’ a responsible party from further violating\nRCRA.”); Avondale Fed. Sav. Bank v. Amoco Oil Co., 170 F.3d\n692, 694 (7th Cir. 1999).\n\f10 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\n The critical question in this case is how to determine\nwhether alleged contamination “may present an imminent\nand substantial endangerment to health.” § 6972(a)(1)(b). We\ntouched on this question only brĚ¢ȱȱAlbany Bank & Trust\nCo. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2002).\n\u0016ǰȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ prima facie RCRA\nclaim: “a ěȱȱȱǻŗǼȱȱȱȱȱȬ\nerated solid or hazardous waste, (2) that the defendant is con-\ntributing to or has contributed to the handling of this waste,\nand (3) that this waste may present an imminent and substan-\ntial danger to health or the environment.” Id. (citing Cox v.\nCity of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 2001)). We then ob-\nǰȱȱȱęȱǰȱȱ“[i]mminence does\nnot require an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\nharm.” Id. (citing Cox, 256 F.3d at 299). That is the extent of\nour circuit precedent on the “may present” language con-\ntained in § 6972(a)(1)(B).\n But our sister circuits have engaged with this question in\nȱǯȱ\u000bȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ\nthe Third Circuit emphasized that the statute “enhanced the\ncourts’ traditional equitable powers by authorizing the issu-\nance of injunctions when there is but a risk of harm, a more\nlenient standard than the traditional requirement of threat-\nened irreparable harm.” United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204,\n211 (3d Cir. 1982). The court found the statutory language\n“unequivocal,” demonstrating that Congress “intended to\nȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĜȱȬ\nuitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate” the risks\nposed by toxic waste. Id. at 213–14.\n In the subsequent decades, several other circuits adopted\nand further developed the same interpretation of § 6972. See\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 11\n\nMallinckrodt, 471 F.3d at 277; Dague v. City of Burlington, 935\nF.2d 1343, 1355–56 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds,\n502 U.S. 1071 (1992); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l,\nInc., 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Waste Indus.,\nInc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument\nthat “[§ 6972] was designed to control pollution only in emer-\ngency situations”); Cox, 256 F.3d at 299–301; Price v. United\nStates Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994); Burlington N.\nand Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1019–22 (10th Cir.\n2007); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1014–\n15 (11th Cir. 2004). We now join those courts and explicitly\nembrace the core content of their interpretation.\n The district court therefore used an incorrect legal stand-\nard to evaluate the Liebharts’ argument that PCBs from the\ndemolition may present an imminent and substantial danger\nto their health and that of their tenants. It did not cite any of\nthe cases we listed above, but instead relied on a single district\ncourt decision from a circuit that has not yet addressed the\nissue. See Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *5 (quoting Foster, 922\nF. Supp. at 662 (“While there can be no question that the levels\nof contamination present at the Site may warrant future re-\nȱ ǰȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ\nrisk of substantial or serious threatened harm, or some neces-\nsity for action.”)).\n That error undercuts several of the reasons the district\ncourt gave for rejecting the Liebharts’ RCRA claim. For exam-\nple, the district court cursorily adopted a passing statement\nwe made over twenty-ę years ago that “[t]he [EPA’s] ac-\ncepted safe level of PCBs in the ȱȱę¢ȱȱȱ\nmillion,” id. (quoting Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor\n\f12 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nServ., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1994)), to create a require-\nment that the Liebharts show that PCB contamination on their\nproperty met that threshold. But there is no requirement in\n\u0014\u0005\u0014\u0003ȱȱȱěȱȱȱ“a particular quantitative show-\ning as a sine qua non for liability.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 260; see\nalso Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. Only one circuit has come to an\narguably contrary conclusion. In Price v. United States Navy,\n818 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (S.D. Cal. 1992), ě’d 39 F.3d 1011 (9th\n\u0005ǯȱŗşşŚǼǰȱȱȱȱȱ\u0014\u0005\u0014\u0003ȱěȱȱ ȱ\nthat “the level of contaminants [was] above levels that are con-\nsidered acceptable by the State.” But as the Interfaith court\nnoted, the Ninth Circuit’ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ\ncourt’s judgment did not discuss that requirement. RCRA\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěs demonstrate contamination\nabove some agency-derived threshold level of concentration.\n399 F.3d at 260–61. It merely requires that they show that con-\ntaminants on the property are seriously dangerous to human\nhealth (or will be, given prolonged exposure over time). See\nCox, 256 F.3d at 299–300 (“an endangerment is ‘substantial’ if\nit is ‘serious’” (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019)).\n That’s especially true when the standard is taken out of\ncontext. The district court relied on Cincinnati Ins. Co. to sup-\nport its contention that contamination below the threshold\nȱȱę¢ȱȱȱȱ(“ppm”) does not qualify as a\nregulatory violation, thereby contradicting Woodyard’s opin-\nion regarding safe levels of PCBs and providing the grounds\nfor excluding it. In that case, we evaluated whether an insur-\nance company was required to indemnify its insured for dam-\nages arising out of PCB contamination at an industrial site.\n\u0016ȱ\u0007\u0012\u0003ȱȱęȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ\nthe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,\nand Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. In\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 13\n\nthat context, we noted that the contaminated site contained\nPCBs concentrated at levels up to 58,000 ppm, well above the\nEPA’ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱę¢ȱǯȱŚŖȱF.3d at 148\n(citing 40 C.F.R. § 761.60).\n \u0004ȱ ȱ ǰȱȱȱěȱ¢ǰȱęȱ Ȭ\ntrial equipment and other wastes contaminated at levels\nabove ę¢ȱppm and requires special procedures for their stor-\nage and disposal. It does not unequivocally state that PCBs\nȱȱȱ ȱȱę¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ\nexposure. Neither Cincinnati Ins. Co. nor the EPA regulation\nstand for the proposition that PCBs concentrated at forty-nine\nppm on residential property do not present a substantial endan-\ngerment to the health of the residents. That is especially ap-\nparent when we consider that the same set of regulations dis-\ntinguishes between low and high-occupancy areas and re-\nquires that, in high-occupancy areas, bulk PCB remediation\nwaste, such as soil, be cleaned up to levels of concentration at\nor below one ppm. § 761.61(a)(4)(i)(A). Section ŝŜŗǯřȱęȱ\nthat the term “high-occupancy area” includes residences. See\nalso § ŝŜŗǯŗŘřȱǻȱȱȱ\u0012\u0005\u0004ȱȱȱę¢ȱ\nppm or greater but emphasizing that “[t]he concentration of\nPCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concentration in the\nmaterial spilled as opposed to the concentration of PCBs in\nthe material onto which the PCBs were spilled”). “Proof of\ncontamination in excess of [agency] standards may support a\nęȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱĜȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ\nǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱȬ\nute.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 261.\n This is not to say that ȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱshow\nsome bit of soil on their property that tests positive for PCBs\n\f14 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nabove one ppm (or even above the purported lower Wiscon-\nsin DNR standard, which the defendants seem to have\nacknowledged in their state-approved clean-up plan). Of\ncourse, there must be accompanying evidence that establishes\nsome connection between the existing contaminants and\nsome imminent and substantial endangerment to health. 1 But\nȱ \u000eȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ\ndistrict court held the bar higher than necessary under\nRCRA’s standard. In criticizing expert witness Carpenter’s\nstatement that “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that\ndoes not increase the risk of disease,” the district court re-\njected Carpenter’s citation to studies showing the general\nrisks of PCB exposure because “the Liebharts do not cite any\nevidence that they have been exposed to PCBs.” Liebhart, 2018\nWL 1583296 at *5. Moreover, the district court concluded that\n“[t]he Liebharts do not contend that they can prove an immi-\nnent and substantial danger with evidence of health problems\n¢ȱȱ¢ȱěǯ” Id. at *6.\n As we noted in Albany Bank, “[i]mminence does not re-\nquire an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\n\n\n 1 On appeal, the Liebharts contend that there is no separate require-\nment for expert witness testimony because the photos and videos they\nhave submitted into evidence suffice to prove their RCRA claim. The de-\nfendants push back on that argument, insisting that many of the issues are\nbeyond the competence of lay fact-finders and require the assistance of\nexperts to address. See, e.g., C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827,\n838 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Given the complex nature of this case, … [and w]ith\nno experts to prove causation … the appellants cannot prove their toxic-\ntort case under [state] law.”) Because the district court did not make a fac-\ntual finding as to whether this case is sufficient complex to require expert\ntestimony, and because we remand for reconsideration of a separate legal\nissue, we need not reach that question today.\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 15\n\nharm.” 310 F.3d at 973. Although the Supreme Court has in-\nstructed that “[a]n endangerment can only be ‘imminent’ if it\n‘threaten[s] to occur immediately,’” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485\n(quoting Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary of English Language\nŗŘŚśȱǻŘȱǯȱŗşřŚǼǼǰȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱȬ\ningly quoted the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the statu-\ntory term “implies that there must be a threat which is present\nnow, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until\nlater.” Id. at 486 (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019).\nWe take that to mean that the Liebharts must show that there\nare PCBs currently on the property that have the potential to\nsubstantially threaten their health at some point in the future\nif they continue to occupy the premises and prolong their ex-\nposure. On remand, the district court should reevaluate its ex-\nclusion of Dr. Carpenter’s assertion regarding PCB safety un-\nder the standards we have outlined above and determine\nwhether, if admissible, the report demonstrates that a sub-\nstantial and imminent threat to the Liebharts’ health may be\npresent.\n B. TSCA Likewise Requires No Heightened Showing\n TSCA authorizes a separate, private cause of action allow-\ning “any person [to] commence a civil action … against any\nperson … who is alleged to be in violation of … any rule\npromulgated under” the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1). The EPA\npromulgated the PCB regulations in question pursuant to\nstatutory authority under TSCA, designating PCBs as “haz-\nardous waste” and controlling their manufacture, use, stor-\nage, and disposal. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 761. The Liebharts’ TSCA\nclaim alleged that the defendants violated those regulations,\nthereby authorizing the district court to “restrain [the] viola-\ntion.” § 2619(a). Unlike RCRA, which authorizes mandatory\n\f16 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\ninjunctions to compel remediation of previous violations,\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions to stop ongoing\nviolations. Id. The defendants argued that there was no longer\nan ongoing violation, as demolition was complete by the time\nȱ\u000eȱęȱȱǯ 2\n The purported violation was based on 40 C.F.R. § 761.123,\nwhich, as we noted above, regulates “spills” of PCB materials\nȱȱȱȱę¢ȱǯȱ\u0016 district court cor-\nrectly noted that the Liebharts had not shown any evidence\nthat any PCBs had been “spilled” onto their property (by\nmeans of dust migration) at that level of concentration, and it\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on that basis.\n But the district court seems to have overlooked the follow-\ning sentence in the regulation, which directs that “[t]he con-\ncentration of PCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concen-\ntration in the material spilled as opposed to the concentration\nof the material onto which the PCBs were spilled.” Id. The\nLiebharts’ complaint seems to have alleged that the concrete\nĚȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȬ\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ę¢-ppm threshold, was demolished\nand “spilled” onto the Liebharts’ property. By the plain text\nof the regulation, there is no need to show that contaminants\non the Liebharts’ property are themselves concentrated above\nę¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ\nof that spill met the criteria. On remand, the district court may\nagain determine that there is no ongoing violation, but it must\n\n 2 The district court determined that the Liebharts waived this claim\nby failing to engage the defendants’ argument that there was no “ongoing\nviolation.” But the court chose to analyze the merits of the claim regardless\nof waiver and reached its conclusion on an alternative basis. We likewise\nset aside the issue of waiver to reach the district court’s merits analysis.\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 17\n\nęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ\nthe meaning of § 761.123 ȱȱęȱ.\n C. The District Court Should Reconsider the Remaining Issues\non Remand\n \u0010 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ standard ȱ ěȱ\nmust meet, we turn to the remaining procedural issues the\nLiebharts have asked to us to address.\n 1. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding\nWoodyard’s Testimony\n “The summary-judgment decision here turned [in large\npart] on the district court’s conclusion that [the] expert testi-\nmony was inadmissible. Whether the district court applied\nthe appropriate legal framework for evaluating expert testi-\nmony is reviewed de novo, but the court’s choice of relevant\nfactors within that framework and its ultimate conclusion as\nto admissibility are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Lees v.\nCarthage College, 714 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 2013). When a dis-\ntrict court is “[Ǿȱ ȱȱěȱȱ¡ȱęȱȬ\nmony … the trial judge must determine at the outset …\n ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǻŗǼȱ ęȱ\nknowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or\ndetermine a fact in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,\n509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). “The trial court must have … latitude\nin deciding how to test an expert’s reliability.” Kumho Tire Co.,\nLtd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).\n The district court was well within its discretion to exclude\nthe ěȱ¢ȱȱ¡ȱ ȱ\u0019¢ǯȱ\u0004¢ȱ\nȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȬ\nsue in the district court by failing to engage with the defend-\nants’ arguments in their motion to strike the testimony,\n\f18 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nWoodyard’s analysis sěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ě ȱ ȱ ȱ\nfrom the way in which the parties have framed this lawsuit.\n\u0016ȱȱȱĚ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ“both sides\nassume that none of the defendants can be held liable for any\nPCB contamination on the Liebharts’ property that occurred\nbefore the demolition began, so the court will make the same\nassumption.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *1. That’s a curious\nchoice. RCRA permits the Liebharts to obtain injunctive relief\nfrom the owner of the facility for any cognizable contamina-\ntion, regardless of whether the PCBs migrated onto their\nproperty before or after the demolition occurred. See 42 U.S.C.\n§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (authorizing suit against “any person … who\nhas contributed … to the past or present handling … or dis-\nposal” of hazardous waste); see also Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486\n(“RCRA contains no statute of limitations.”).\n But because the Liebharts restricted their claims to PCBs\nthat allegedly migrated onto their property via the dust from\nthe 2015 demolition, they necessarily excluded claims result-\ning from PCBs that may ȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱȬ\ning the previous century. The district court correctly noted\nthat Woodyard’s expert opinion could not distinguish be-\ntween these two alternatives, as both sets of contaminants\noriginated from the same source. There was even evidence\nshowing that PCBs existed in the soil beneath the Liebharts’\nasphalt driveway—Woodyard could not explain how that\nmight have occurred as the result of dust blowing in the wind\nas opposed to seepage over the course of years before any\ndemolition occurred.\n Perhaps the Liebharts decided to frame their claims in this\nway because they wanted to go after defendants TRC and\nApollo, who would not be liable for what happened before\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 19\n\ndemolition. Or perhaps some element of their state-law\nclaims, which we have not addressed, required them to con-\nstrict the scope. They did not explain their reasoning to us (or\nit seems, to the district court). But the distinction makes it dif-\nęȱȱ\u0019¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ\n“adequately account[] for obvious alternative explanations.”\n\tȱǯȱ\n Ĵ-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 787 (7th Cir.\n2017). Viewed in this light, the district court was within its\ndiscretion to exclude the testimony as unreliable and unhelp-\nful to the trier of fact. The district court may choose to rethink\nthat evaluation on remand under the legal standards we out-\nlined above, but it may well reach the same conclusion.\n 2. The District Court Should Reconsider Its Denial of Injunctive\nRelief\n The district court denied injunctive relief to the Liebharts\nbecause the defendants had already agreed to a clean-up plan\nthat had been approved by the Wisconsin DNR. We review\nthat decision for an abuse of discretion. See AMI Int’l, Inc. v.\nDatacard Corp. 106 F.3d 1342, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997) (remanding\ngrant of RCRA injunction).\n As we mentioned above, RCRA authorizes district courts\nto issue either mandatory or prohibitory injunctions, while\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions. “[I]t is appro-\npriate ‘to give great deference to the district court’s decision\nas to the precise equitable relief necessary in a particular\ncase.’” Bowes v. Ind. Sec. of State, 837 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir.\n2016) (quoting Gjersten v. Bd. Of Election Com’rs for City of Chi-\ncago, 791 F.2d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1986)). That is especially true\n ȱȱěȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ ȱ“im-\nȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ\nful consideration of the intrusiveness of the ordered act, as\n\f20 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\n ȱȱȱĜȱȱ¢ȱȱȱin supervising\nthe enjoined party’s compliance with the court’s order.” Kart-\nman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir.\n2011).\n Considering SPX’s decision to formulate a clean-up plan\nand obtain approval from the state agency, the district court\ndetermined that there was no need for separate, federally-su-\npervised remediation. It reached that conclusion even while\nassuming that the defendants were in violation of either\nRCRA or TSCA, despite the fact it found no such violation.\nOther courts have determined that the existence of a parallel\nplan of remediation supervised by the state does not neces-\nsarily prevent a federal district court from granting an injunc-\nȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢’ȱȱȱȱĜȱȱ\nremedy the violation of federal law. See, e.g., Interfaith, 399\nF.3d at 264–68. On the other hand, the same courts have also\nupheld denials of injunctions in similar situations when the\nȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ\ntask. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735\nF.3d 131, 139–40 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Interfaith). We\nrecently reached the same conclusion. See LAJIM, LLC v. Gen.\nElec. Co., No. 18-1522, 2019 WL 1011021, at *4–11 (7th Cir. Mar.\n4, 2019) (“[T]he district court correctly held that it has discre-\ntion to award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not re-\nȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱ¢ǰ” particularly\nin light of ongoing relief supervised by a state environmental\nagency).\n Here, the district court determined that SPX’s existing\nȱ ȱ Ĝ and that the Liebharts had not “iden-\ntif[ied] any way that SPX’ȱȱǽ ǾȱęȱȱǽǾȱ\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 21\n\nfederal law.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *7. We agree. Alt-\nhough the Liebharts point to certain statistical sampling re-\nquirements outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 761.125 and contend that\nSPX’s existing plan fails to meet those requirements, the dis-\ntrict court noted that SPX’s plan includes further sampling of\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ property. It emphasized that “the\nLiebharts do not otherwise explain why SPX’s proposed sam-\npling scheme is substantively inadequate.” Liebhart, 2018 WL\n1583296 at *7. We see no evidence that compels us to contra-\nȱȱȱęǯ\n However, in light of the legal standards we outlined\nabove, we ask the district court to reconsider its decision to\ndeny injunctive relief on remand. Because the bar for estab-\nlishing an imminent and substantial danger is lower than the\ndistrict court believed when evaluating the request for an in-\njunction, it would be prudent to reassess whether the DNR-\napproved plan adequately remedies harms that may come\nwithin RCRA’s scope. See LAJIM, 2019 WL 1011021 at *6\n(“[\u0011Ǿȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\nimminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the case\nthat injunctive relief is warranted. But that is not always the\ncase.”) ǻȱȱȱȱĴǼǯ\n 3. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying\nLeave to Amend the Complaint.\n We review a denial of leave to amend a complaint for\nabuse of discretion. Life Plans, Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co.,\n800 F.3d 343, 357 (7th Cir. 2015). District courts are to “freely\ngive leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.\nP. 15(a)(2). “The Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to\nrequire a district court to allow amendment unless there is a\ngood reason—futility, undue delay, undue prejudice, or bad\n\f22 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nfaith—for denying leave to amend.” Life Plans, 800 F.3d at 357\n(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The district\nȱȱȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\ndenial: futility and undue delay. While we disagree with the\n¢ȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱ\nand decline to reverse.\n We begin with the question of futility. Both statutes con-\ntain advance-ȱȱȱ£ȱěȱȱ\nȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ \u0014\u0005\u0014\u0003ȱ ȱ \u0016\u0015\u0005\u0003ȱ ǯȱ \u0016¢ȱ ȱ\nȱěȱȱ¢ȱȱ\u0007\u0012\u0003ȱ60–90 ¢ȱȱȱȱęȬ\ning the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2); 15 U.S.C.\n§ 2619(b)(1)(A). But the district court chose to apply the re-\nȱȱ¢ȱȱȱęȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ\nany subsequent amendments that sought to add new RCRA\nor TSCA counts. Although the Liebharts complied with the\nȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ\u0003ȱ\n2016, they gave no new notice to the EPA before ęȱ ȱ\nleave to amend in February 2018. The district court held that,\nbecause the prior notice did not contain any mention of bur-\nȱ\u0012\u0005\u0004ȱȱȱ\u0015\u0012\u001aȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱĜȱȱȱȱ\nEPA to the particular violation the Liebharts sought to include\nin the amended complaint.\n The notice provisions serve two purposes. “First, notice al-\nlows Government agencies to take responsibility for enforc-\ning environmental regulations, thus obviating the need for\ncitizen suits. … Second, notice gives the alleged violator ‘an\nopportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the\nAct[s] and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit.’”\nHallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (quoting\n\t ¢ȱ ȱ \u0015ęǰȱ\u000bǯȱ ǯȱ\u0005ȱ\u0004¢ȱ \bǯǰȱ\u000bǯ, 484\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 23\n\nU.S. 49, 60 (1987)). The district court’s decision to require no-\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ pur-\nposeǯȱ\u0004¢ȱȱȱȱ\u000eȱĴȱȱȱȱȬ\nplaint, the EPA had been on notice of alleged PCB contamina-\ntion at the SPX property for over two years—and it had de-\nclined to get involved. Moreover, it was unlikely that the de-\nfendants would resolve the alleged violation to avoid being\nsued when they were already in the midst of an extended law-\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěǯȱ See AM Int’l, 106 F.3d at 1351\n(“[T]he delay period is designed to allow a [defendant] a pe-\nriod in which to clean up its act and avoid litigation. [This de-\nfendant] was clearly not interested in using the delay period\nto resolve the dispute without going to court.”); see also Dague,\n935 F.2d at 1351 (“There is no need to maintain a window of\nopportunity for the government to take the lead enforcement\nrole … ȱȱ£ǰȱȱȱȱȱĴ¢ȱǰȱȱ\nalready lawfully assumed the lead role in bringing a … claim\nagainst the same facility.”) (quoting Dague v. City of Burling-\nton, 733 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D. Vt. 1990)). When the original notice\nis “Ĝ¢ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱǽȱȱ\nagency] about what it is doing wrong, so that it will know\nwhat corrective actions will avert a lawsuit,” Atl. States Legal\nFound., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir.\n1994), there is no need to require a second round of advance\nnotice for an amended complaint in the same litigation.\n But an error in the futility analysis alone does not neces-\nsarily constitute an abuse of discretion on the whole. In addi-\ntion to futility, the district court cited undue delay and preju-\ndice in its decision to deny leave to amend. “[D]elay by itself\nȱ¢ȱȱĜȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ\nto amend. Delay must be coupled with some other reason.\nTypically, that reason … is prejudice to the non-moving\n\f24 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nparty.” Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 793\n(7th Cir. 2004). The district court cited the Liebharts’ admis-\nsion that they learned of the possible burial of contaminated\nconcrete on the SPX property on October 11, 2017 but failed\nto seek leave to amend their complaint until February 22,\n2018. During that more than four-month period, the parties\nĴȱȱȱȱ-motions for summary judg-\nment, and by February, trial was only three months away. The\n\u000eȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ǯ\n In response, the Liebharts contend that there was no un-\nȱȱȱȱDZȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱęȱȱ\nǰȱęȱ of discovery still remained. We disagree.\nWhile the district court’s explanation of prejudice was fairly\nshort, even if the district court had failed ȱȱȱęȬ\ning of prejudice altogether, we might still “Ĝȱȱ\nthat ‘the prejudice that would result from such amendment\nwas apparent.’” Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 613 (7th\nCir. 2002) (quoting Feldman v. Am. Mem’l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d\n783, 793 (7th Cir. 1999)). In Parkǰȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ¡ȱ\nmonths to move for leave to amend a complaint after she\nknew (or should have known) of the additional alleged viola-\ntion. Id. Because trial was approaching, we concluded that the\ndistrict court was well within its discretion to deny leave. Id.;\nsee also Perrian v. O’Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194–95 (7th Cir. 1992)\n(“Because substantive amendments shortly before trial serve\nto defeat the public’s interest in speedy resolution of legal dis-\nputes, ‘[a] district court judge is entitled, in such circum-\nǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱě’s amendment.’” (quoting\nCampbell v. Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co., 893 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir.\n1990)) ǻȱȱĴǼ).\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 25\n\n On the contrary, in Life Plans, we found no undue delay\n ȱȱěȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\nten days after learning of the factual basis for its new count\nduring discovery. 800 F.3d at 358. The Liebharts delayed more\nthan four months in the same circumstances. Although dis-\ncovery was ongoing at the time of the Liebharts’ motion, the\nparties had already briefed their dispositive motions, and the\ndistrict court was preparing its summary-judgment order that\nwould ultimately dispose of the case. We therefore cannot say\nthat denial of leave for undue delay and prejudice was an\nabuse of the district court’s discretion. Of course, the district\ncourt may permit an amendment on remand if the interests of\njustice so require.\n III. CONCLUSION\n Although the district court properly exercised its discre-\ntion on the various evidentiary and procedural issues the\něȱȱaised, its analysis on the merits was narrower\nthan the statutes demand. It may reach the same conclusions\non reconsideration, but the parties should have another op-\nportunity to litigate whether a substantial and imminent en-\ndangerment to health exists in this case under the standards\nwe have outlined. We therefore VACATE the order of the dis-\ntrict court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent\nwith this opinion. 3\n\n\n\n\n 3 The Liebharts also challenge the taxation of costs against them by the\n\nclerk of the district court. Because we vacate the district court’s judgment,\nwe assume that the imposition of costs is automatically vacated and so do\nnot reach that issue. The clerk of the district court is free to reassess costs\non remand as the case proceeds.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\nWILLIAM LIEBHART & NANCY LIEBHART,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nSPX CORPORATION, TRC ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION, &\\nAPOLLO DISMANTLING SERVICES, INC.\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-700 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n KANNE, Circuit Judge. William and Nancy Liebhart to-\\ngether own three houses on the same block in Watertown,\\nWisconsin. Besides a few other houses, the rest of the block\\nwas previously occupied by an abandoned transformer fac-\\ntory, last owned by SPX Corporation. In 2014, SPX demol-\\nished the building with the assistance of TRC Environmental\\nCorporation and Apollo Dismantling Services (collectively,\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n“the defendants”). The Liebharts allege that dust and debris\\ncontaining toxic chemicals migrated onto their properties,\\ncontaminating their yards and jeopardizing their health and\\nthe health of their tenants.\\n The Liebharts sued under federal statutes authorizing pri-\\nvate rights of action for environmental contamination. They\\nalso brought various state-law claims. Following discovery\\nand the submission of expert witness reports, the district\\ncourt denied the Liebharts’ motion for partial summary judg-\\nment and granted summary judgment to the defendants with\\ncosts. Although the district court adequately evaluated the ex-\\npert witnesses and did not abuse its discretion in its proce-\\ndural decisions, the court set the bar unnecessarily high for\\nȱěȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ\\nutes. For that reason, we vacate the district court’s judgment\\nand remand for reconsideration.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n The factory dates to the 1920s and was used to manufac-\\nture various industrial equipment. Most relevant to our pur-\\npose, the factory manufactured power transformers contain-\\ning polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a carcinogenic chemi-\\ncal banned by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1979.\\nSee Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Pro-\\ncessing, Distribution in Commerce, and Use Prohibitions, 44\\nFǯȱ\\u0014ǯȱřŗǰśŗŚȱǻ\\u000f¢ȱřŗǰȱŗşŝşǼȱǻęȱȱŚŖȱ\\u0005ǯ\\bǯ\\u0014ǯȱpt. 761).\\nThe parties all agree that the facility has not manufactured or\\nhandled any items containing PCBs since 1971, and that it\\nshut down completely in 2005.\\n But even with all the products and manufacturing equip-\\nment removed, PCB contaminants remained in the facility. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 3\\n\\n2009, SPX retained TRC and another company (not named as\\na defendant in this suit) to study the property and determine\\nthe extent and precise location of any PCB contamination.\\n\\u0016ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱ\\nwas generally contaminated, with concentrated amounts lo-\\ncatȱȱęȱȱȱȱǯ\\n Several years went by. In 2014, SPX decided to move ahead\\nwith the demolition, retaining Apollo to conduct the work\\nand TRC to supervise the project. That November, the defend-\\nants timely proposed a self-implementing cleanup plan to the\\nEPA, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 761.61(a). The trouble began\\nas demolition commenced in January 2015. The Liebharts al-\\nlege that Apollo demolished the building recklessly, failing to\\nuse appropriate safety methods to control the dust generated\\nby demolition equipment. They assert that their properties\\n ȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱĴȱȱof photos\\nand videos of dust from the facility blowing toward their\\nhomes to support their allegation.\\n \\u0016ȱ\\u000eȱęȱȱȱ th the local government\\nin February. They also collected a dust-covered sample of\\nsnow from their yard and placed it in a mason jar. Soon there-\\nafter, a representative of the Wisconsin Department of Natu-\\nral Resources (“DNR”) contacted the defendants about the\\nLiebharts’ concerns. In April, TRC collected samples of the\\nsurface soil (roughly down to eight inches below ground) on\\nboth the industrial and residential properties. Sure enough,\\nthe properties tested positive for the presence of PCBs. In Au-\\ngust, the Liebharts vacated the property on advice of their\\nphysician to avoid further exposure to the chemicals. Frus-\\ntrated with the lack of action, William Liebhart had the snow\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nsample tested for PCBs. Although the sample did, in fact, con-\\ntain PCBs, the irregular manner of collection and storage\\nspoiled the sample, and the laboratory declined to endorse the\\nȱ ȱ¢ȱęǯ\\n In September 2015ǰȱ\\u0015\\u0012\\u001aȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\ncontamination to the DNR. In turn, the Liebharts sued in fed-\\neral district court in October. The complaint sought injunctive\\nrelief under both the Resource Conservation and Recovery\\nAct (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and the Toxic Substances\\nControl Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. In addition, the\\nLiebharts brought a host of state-law claims under supple-\\nmental jurisdiction, including strict liability, negligence, tres-\\nǰȱǰȱȱȱĚȱȱȱǯ\\n During discoveryǰȱȱ\\u000eȱĴȱȱȱȬ\\ning for PCBs both in their yard and inside their home. They\\nalso underwent blood testing. Although the external surveys\\nrevealed a more comprehensive picture of the extent to which\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ properties contained PCBs, the in-\\nternal sampling and blood tests were both negative for con-\\ntamination. The Liebharts later learned in October 2017 that\\nthe defendants allegedly buried some of the concrete remains\\non-site rather than removing them to a toxic waste dump as\\nrequired by the EPA-approved clean-up plan.\\n The parties prepared and Ĵȱȱȱȱȱ¡Ȭ\\npert witnesses who were to testify at trial. Among those, three\\nȱȱȱȱǯȱ\\bǰȱȱ\\u000eȱĴȱ\\na report by John Woodyard, a licensed professional engineer.\\nHis report included a description of standard methods used\\nwhen demolishing PCB-contaminated buildings and an anal-\\nysis of the purported ways in which the defendants deviated\\nfrom those practices, thereby causing the contamination of the\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 5\\n\\nresidences. The Liebharts’ second expert was Dr. David Car-\\npenter, a public health physician who opined on ways in\\nwhich the Liebharts might have been exposed to PCBs and the\\nȱȱěȱȱȱ¡ǯȱ\\nȱȱ\\nthat “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not\\nincrease the risk of disease.” Finally, the defendants submit-\\nted a report prepared by Dr. Russell Keenan, a toxicologist\\nwho analyzed the survey data and determined that it was im-\\npossible to determine whether the presence of PCBs on the\\nLiebharts’ property was due to the recent demolition or to\\něȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ.\\n In December 2017, the Liebharts moved for partial sum-\\nmary judgment on the issue of causation, reserving the issue\\nof damages for a jury trial. The defendants cross-moved for\\nsummary judgmentDzȱ¢ȱȱęȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ\\n¢ȱȱě’ experts Woodyard and Carpenter un-\\nder Fed. R. Evid. 702. In February 2018, after those motions\\nwere fully briefed to the court, the Liebharts sought leave to\\namend their complaint. In light of the information they ob-\\ntained through discovery regarding the burial of concrete on\\nthe property, they intended to allege separate RCRA and\\nTSCA violations and seek an enlargement of the proposed in-\\njunction to include removal of that material.\\n The district court issued its decisions on March 30. First,\\nthe court granted in part the defendants’ motion to exclude\\nthe ě’ expert witness reports. The court explained that\\nWoodyard’s report was “equivocal” as to the issue of causa-\\ntion; it hedged on whether the contaminants came from dem-\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ See\\nLiebhart v. SPX Corp., No. 16-cv-700-jdp, 2018 WL 1583296 at\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n*3–4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2018). Second, the report “over-\\nlook[ed] tȱȱęȱ” and failed to account\\nfor “obvious alternative explanations” in determining the\\ncause of the contamination. Id. at *4 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702\\n¢ȱĴ’s note to 2000 amendments). Finally, the\\ncourt noted that Woodyard’s report depended on “unreliable\\nor uninformative” evidence, including the Liebharts’ defec-\\nȱ ȱǰȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nclippings and a chromatogram that allegedly detected PCBs\\non the property. Id. at *4–5. For those reasons, the court ex-\\ncluded Woodyard’s report in its entirety. Id. at *5.\\n \\u0003ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ\\u0006ǯȱ\\u0005Ȭ\\npenter’s report, it struck Carpenter’s conclusion that “there is\\nno ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not increase the\\nrisk of disease” as unsupported by the medical studies he\\ncited. Id. at *5. In doing so, the court pointed to the absence of\\nPCBs inside the Liebharts’ home and in their blood, suggest-\\ning that the Liebharts had not actually been exposed to PCBs\\nȱȱȱȱȱěȱǯȱId. at 5–6.\\n \\u0019ȱȱ¡ȱ¢ȱěȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ\\nconcluded that the Liebharts failed to present any admissible\\nevidence to support their RCRA and TSCA claims. The re-\\nmaining photos and videos certainly showed dust migrating\\nonto the Liebharts’ property, but there was no reliable evi-\\ndence proving that the dust contained PCBs. Given that any\\nPCBs detected in the soil may have been there prior to the\\ndemolition, the lack of evidence doomed the Liebharts’ case.\\n\\u0016ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱě,\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal\\nclaims, and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 7\\n\\n The district court also denied the Liebharts’ petition for\\nleave to amend their complaint on two grounds. First, alt-\\nȱȱȱ ȱȱȱěȱȱ\\nthe factual basis for the new counts over a year ȱęȱȱ\\ninitial complaint, it also noted that they took an additional\\nfour months thereafter to seek leave to amend. During that\\nȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ\\ntheir motions for summary judgment, and the trial date was\\nfast approaching. It found their petition untimely. Second, the\\ndistrict court determined that the new claims were futile un-\\nder both statutes' advance-notice requirements.\\n The ěȱ¢ȱ. Several months after\\nthe judgment, the clerk of the district court imposed costs on\\nthe Liebharts in the amount of $46,320.02. The Liebharts sep-\\narately appealed that decision. We consolidated the two ap-\\npeals and now consider them together.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n The \\u000eȱȱęȱȱȱȱǯȱ\\bǰȱ\\nthey argue that the district court erred in excluding the opin-\\nions of expert witnesses Woodyard in full and Carpenter in\\npart. As part of that argument, they allege that the district\\ncourt failed to apply the same stringent standard to the de-\\nfendants’ expert Keenan. Second, they contend that summary\\njudgment was inappropriate because, even absent the testi-\\n¢ȱȱȱ¡ȱ ǰȱ¢ȱĴȱȱȬ\\nȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nRCRA and TSCA. Third, they challenge the district court’s de-\\nȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ¢ have iden-\\nęȱȱ\\u0015\\u0012\\u001a’s state-approved clean-up plan. Fourth, they ar-\\ngue that the district court abused its discretion in denying\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nleave to amend their complaint. Finally, they challenge the\\nimposition of costs.\\n But there’s a larger issue looming in the background. The\\ndistrict court’s opinion operates under the assumption that\\n\\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱ ěs must demonstrate “an imminent and sub-\\nstantial danger with evidence of health problems they have\\n¢ȱ ěǯ” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *6. Relying\\nprimarily on Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C.\\nŗşşŜǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ \\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱ ěǰȱ\\nholding that “it doesn’t follow necessarily that there is an im-\\nminent and substantial risk of harm simply because there is\\nsome amount of PCBs on the property.” Liebhart 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *5. We review that question of law, which was the\\nunderlying basis for the award of summary judgment, de\\nnovo. Daugherty v. Harrington, 906 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n A. RCRA Requires Only that Harm “May” Be Imminent\\n \\u0016ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱ\\nmake out a prima facie violation of RCRA has led to much dis-\\ncussion among the circuits. We have yet to tackle that issue\\nhead on, so the district court necessarily had to look else-\\nwhere for guidance. Passed in 1976, “RCRA is a comprehen-\\nsive environmental statute that empowers [the] EPA to regu-\\nlate hazardous wastes from cradle to grave.” City of Chicago v.\\nEnvtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). The statute’s “pri-\\nmary purpose … is to reduce the generation of hazardous\\nwaste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and dis-\\nposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, ‘so as to\\nminimize the present and future threat to human health and\\nthe environment.’” Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479,\\n483 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 9\\n\\n Although the EPA has the primary responsibility for en-\\nforcing the law, the statute, “like other environmental laws,\\n… contains a citizen suit provision, § 6972, which permits pri-\\nvate citizens to enforce its provisions in some circumstances.”\\nId. at 484. As relevant to this case, the statute provides that\\n any person may commence a civil action on his own\\n behalf … against any person, … including … any\\n past or present owner or operator of a treatment,\\n storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or\\n who is contributing to the past or present handling,\\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any\\n solid or hazardous waste which may present an im-\\n minent and substantial endangerment to health or\\n the environment.\\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Notably, Con-\\ngress amended the language in 1980 by substituting the\\nphrase “may present” for the original 1976 wording “is pre-\\nsenting.” Maine People’s All. and Nat. Res. Def. Council v.\\nMallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Solid\\nWaste Disposal Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–482, § 25, 94 Stat. 2334,\\n2348). The section authorizes district courts to grant injunctive\\nrelief and “order [a violator] to take such other action as may\\nbe necessary” to remediate the endangerment. Id.; see also Me-\\nghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (“Under a plain reading of this remedial\\nscheme, a private citizen suing under § 6972(a)(1)(B) could\\nseek a mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible\\nparty to ‘take action’ ¢ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\ndisposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one\\nthat ‘restrains’ a responsible party from further violating\\nRCRA.”); Avondale Fed. Sav. Bank v. Amoco Oil Co., 170 F.3d\\n692, 694 (7th Cir. 1999).\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n The critical question in this case is how to determine\\nwhether alleged contamination “may present an imminent\\nand substantial endangerment to health.” § 6972(a)(1)(b). We\\ntouched on this question only brĚ¢ȱȱAlbany Bank & Trust\\nCo. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2002).\\n\\u0016ǰȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ prima facie RCRA\\nclaim: “a ěȱȱȱǻŗǼȱȱȱȱȱȬ\\nerated solid or hazardous waste, (2) that the defendant is con-\\ntributing to or has contributed to the handling of this waste,\\nand (3) that this waste may present an imminent and substan-\\ntial danger to health or the environment.” Id. (citing Cox v.\\nCity of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 2001)). We then ob-\\nǰȱȱȱęȱǰȱȱ“[i]mminence does\\nnot require an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\nharm.” Id. (citing Cox, 256 F.3d at 299). That is the extent of\\nour circuit precedent on the “may present” language con-\\ntained in § 6972(a)(1)(B).\\n But our sister circuits have engaged with this question in\\nȱǯȱ\\u000bȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ\\nthe Third Circuit emphasized that the statute “enhanced the\\ncourts’ traditional equitable powers by authorizing the issu-\\nance of injunctions when there is but a risk of harm, a more\\nlenient standard than the traditional requirement of threat-\\nened irreparable harm.” United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204,\\n211 (3d Cir. 1982). The court found the statutory language\\n“unequivocal,” demonstrating that Congress “intended to\\nȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĜȱȬ\\nuitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate” the risks\\nposed by toxic waste. Id. at 213–14.\\n In the subsequent decades, several other circuits adopted\\nand further developed the same interpretation of § 6972. See\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 11\\n\\nMallinckrodt, 471 F.3d at 277; Dague v. City of Burlington, 935\\nF.2d 1343, 1355–56 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds,\\n502 U.S. 1071 (1992); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l,\\nInc., 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Waste Indus.,\\nInc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument\\nthat “[§ 6972] was designed to control pollution only in emer-\\ngency situations”); Cox, 256 F.3d at 299–301; Price v. United\\nStates Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994); Burlington N.\\nand Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1019–22 (10th Cir.\\n2007); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1014–\\n15 (11th Cir. 2004). We now join those courts and explicitly\\nembrace the core content of their interpretation.\\n The district court therefore used an incorrect legal stand-\\nard to evaluate the Liebharts’ argument that PCBs from the\\ndemolition may present an imminent and substantial danger\\nto their health and that of their tenants. It did not cite any of\\nthe cases we listed above, but instead relied on a single district\\ncourt decision from a circuit that has not yet addressed the\\nissue. See Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *5 (quoting Foster, 922\\nF. Supp. at 662 (“While there can be no question that the levels\\nof contamination present at the Site may warrant future re-\\nȱ ǰȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ\\nrisk of substantial or serious threatened harm, or some neces-\\nsity for action.”)).\\n That error undercuts several of the reasons the district\\ncourt gave for rejecting the Liebharts’ RCRA claim. For exam-\\nple, the district court cursorily adopted a passing statement\\nwe made over twenty-ę years ago that “[t]he [EPA’s] ac-\\ncepted safe level of PCBs in the ȱȱę¢ȱȱȱ\\nmillion,” id. (quoting Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nServ., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1994)), to create a require-\\nment that the Liebharts show that PCB contamination on their\\nproperty met that threshold. But there is no requirement in\\n\\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱȱȱěȱȱȱ“a particular quantitative show-\\ning as a sine qua non for liability.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 260; see\\nalso Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. Only one circuit has come to an\\narguably contrary conclusion. In Price v. United States Navy,\\n818 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (S.D. Cal. 1992), ě’d 39 F.3d 1011 (9th\\n\\u0005ǯȱŗşşŚǼǰȱȱȱȱȱ\\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱěȱȱ ȱ\\nthat “the level of contaminants [was] above levels that are con-\\nsidered acceptable by the State.” But as the Interfaith court\\nnoted, the Ninth Circuit’ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ\\ncourt’s judgment did not discuss that requirement. RCRA\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěs demonstrate contamination\\nabove some agency-derived threshold level of concentration.\\n399 F.3d at 260–61. It merely requires that they show that con-\\ntaminants on the property are seriously dangerous to human\\nhealth (or will be, given prolonged exposure over time). See\\nCox, 256 F.3d at 299–300 (“an endangerment is ‘substantial’ if\\nit is ‘serious’” (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019)).\\n That’s especially true when the standard is taken out of\\ncontext. The district court relied on Cincinnati Ins. Co. to sup-\\nport its contention that contamination below the threshold\\nȱȱę¢ȱȱȱȱ(“ppm”) does not qualify as a\\nregulatory violation, thereby contradicting Woodyard’s opin-\\nion regarding safe levels of PCBs and providing the grounds\\nfor excluding it. In that case, we evaluated whether an insur-\\nance company was required to indemnify its insured for dam-\\nages arising out of PCB contamination at an industrial site.\\n\\u0016ȱ\\u0007\\u0012\\u0003ȱȱęȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ\\nthe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,\\nand Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 13\\n\\nthat context, we noted that the contaminated site contained\\nPCBs concentrated at levels up to 58,000 ppm, well above the\\nEPA’ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱę¢ȱǯȱŚŖȱF.3d at 148\\n(citing 40 C.F.R. § 761.60).\\n \\u0004ȱ ȱ ǰȱȱȱěȱ¢ǰȱęȱ Ȭ\\ntrial equipment and other wastes contaminated at levels\\nabove ę¢ȱppm and requires special procedures for their stor-\\nage and disposal. It does not unequivocally state that PCBs\\nȱȱȱ ȱȱę¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nexposure. Neither Cincinnati Ins. Co. nor the EPA regulation\\nstand for the proposition that PCBs concentrated at forty-nine\\nppm on residential property do not present a substantial endan-\\ngerment to the health of the residents. That is especially ap-\\nparent when we consider that the same set of regulations dis-\\ntinguishes between low and high-occupancy areas and re-\\nquires that, in high-occupancy areas, bulk PCB remediation\\nwaste, such as soil, be cleaned up to levels of concentration at\\nor below one ppm. § 761.61(a)(4)(i)(A). Section ŝŜŗǯřȱęȱ\\nthat the term “high-occupancy area” includes residences. See\\nalso § ŝŜŗǯŗŘřȱǻȱȱȱ\\u0012\\u0005\\u0004ȱȱȱę¢ȱ\\nppm or greater but emphasizing that “[t]he concentration of\\nPCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concentration in the\\nmaterial spilled as opposed to the concentration of PCBs in\\nthe material onto which the PCBs were spilled”). “Proof of\\ncontamination in excess of [agency] standards may support a\\nęȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱĜȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ\\nǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱȬ\\nute.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 261.\\n This is not to say that ȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱshow\\nsome bit of soil on their property that tests positive for PCBs\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nabove one ppm (or even above the purported lower Wiscon-\\nsin DNR standard, which the defendants seem to have\\nacknowledged in their state-approved clean-up plan). Of\\ncourse, there must be accompanying evidence that establishes\\nsome connection between the existing contaminants and\\nsome imminent and substantial endangerment to health. 1 But\\nȱ \\u000eȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ\\ndistrict court held the bar higher than necessary under\\nRCRA’s standard. In criticizing expert witness Carpenter’s\\nstatement that “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that\\ndoes not increase the risk of disease,” the district court re-\\njected Carpenter’s citation to studies showing the general\\nrisks of PCB exposure because “the Liebharts do not cite any\\nevidence that they have been exposed to PCBs.” Liebhart, 2018\\nWL 1583296 at *5. Moreover, the district court concluded that\\n“[t]he Liebharts do not contend that they can prove an immi-\\nnent and substantial danger with evidence of health problems\\n¢ȱȱ¢ȱěǯ” Id. at *6.\\n As we noted in Albany Bank, “[i]mminence does not re-\\nquire an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\n\\n\\n 1 On appeal, the Liebharts contend that there is no separate require-\\nment for expert witness testimony because the photos and videos they\\nhave submitted into evidence suffice to prove their RCRA claim. The de-\\nfendants push back on that argument, insisting that many of the issues are\\nbeyond the competence of lay fact-finders and require the assistance of\\nexperts to address. See, e.g., C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827,\\n838 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Given the complex nature of this case, … [and w]ith\\nno experts to prove causation … the appellants cannot prove their toxic-\\ntort case under [state] law.”) Because the district court did not make a fac-\\ntual finding as to whether this case is sufficient complex to require expert\\ntestimony, and because we remand for reconsideration of a separate legal\\nissue, we need not reach that question today.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 15\\n\\nharm.” 310 F.3d at 973. Although the Supreme Court has in-\\nstructed that “[a]n endangerment can only be ‘imminent’ if it\\n‘threaten[s] to occur immediately,’” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485\\n(quoting Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary of English Language\\nŗŘŚśȱǻŘȱǯȱŗşřŚǼǼǰȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱȬ\\ningly quoted the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the statu-\\ntory term “implies that there must be a threat which is present\\nnow, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until\\nlater.” Id. at 486 (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019).\\nWe take that to mean that the Liebharts must show that there\\nare PCBs currently on the property that have the potential to\\nsubstantially threaten their health at some point in the future\\nif they continue to occupy the premises and prolong their ex-\\nposure. On remand, the district court should reevaluate its ex-\\nclusion of Dr. Carpenter’s assertion regarding PCB safety un-\\nder the standards we have outlined above and determine\\nwhether, if admissible, the report demonstrates that a sub-\\nstantial and imminent threat to the Liebharts’ health may be\\npresent.\\n B. TSCA Likewise Requires No Heightened Showing\\n TSCA authorizes a separate, private cause of action allow-\\ning “any person [to] commence a civil action … against any\\nperson … who is alleged to be in violation of … any rule\\npromulgated under” the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1). The EPA\\npromulgated the PCB regulations in question pursuant to\\nstatutory authority under TSCA, designating PCBs as “haz-\\nardous waste” and controlling their manufacture, use, stor-\\nage, and disposal. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 761. The Liebharts’ TSCA\\nclaim alleged that the defendants violated those regulations,\\nthereby authorizing the district court to “restrain [the] viola-\\ntion.” § 2619(a). Unlike RCRA, which authorizes mandatory\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\ninjunctions to compel remediation of previous violations,\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions to stop ongoing\\nviolations. Id. The defendants argued that there was no longer\\nan ongoing violation, as demolition was complete by the time\\nȱ\\u000eȱęȱȱǯ 2\\n The purported violation was based on 40 C.F.R. § 761.123,\\nwhich, as we noted above, regulates “spills” of PCB materials\\nȱȱȱȱę¢ȱǯȱ\\u0016 district court cor-\\nrectly noted that the Liebharts had not shown any evidence\\nthat any PCBs had been “spilled” onto their property (by\\nmeans of dust migration) at that level of concentration, and it\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on that basis.\\n But the district court seems to have overlooked the follow-\\ning sentence in the regulation, which directs that “[t]he con-\\ncentration of PCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concen-\\ntration in the material spilled as opposed to the concentration\\nof the material onto which the PCBs were spilled.” Id. The\\nLiebharts’ complaint seems to have alleged that the concrete\\nĚȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȬ\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ę¢-ppm threshold, was demolished\\nand “spilled” onto the Liebharts’ property. By the plain text\\nof the regulation, there is no need to show that contaminants\\non the Liebharts’ property are themselves concentrated above\\nę¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ\\nof that spill met the criteria. On remand, the district court may\\nagain determine that there is no ongoing violation, but it must\\n\\n 2 The district court determined that the Liebharts waived this claim\\nby failing to engage the defendants’ argument that there was no “ongoing\\nviolation.” But the court chose to analyze the merits of the claim regardless\\nof waiver and reached its conclusion on an alternative basis. We likewise\\nset aside the issue of waiver to reach the district court’s merits analysis.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 17\\n\\nęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ\\nthe meaning of § 761.123 ȱȱęȱ.\\n C. The District Court Should Reconsider the Remaining Issues\\non Remand\\n \\u0010 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ standard ȱ ěȱ\\nmust meet, we turn to the remaining procedural issues the\\nLiebharts have asked to us to address.\\n 1. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding\\nWoodyard’s Testimony\\n “The summary-judgment decision here turned [in large\\npart] on the district court’s conclusion that [the] expert testi-\\nmony was inadmissible. Whether the district court applied\\nthe appropriate legal framework for evaluating expert testi-\\nmony is reviewed de novo, but the court’s choice of relevant\\nfactors within that framework and its ultimate conclusion as\\nto admissibility are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Lees v.\\nCarthage College, 714 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 2013). When a dis-\\ntrict court is “[Ǿȱ ȱȱěȱȱ¡ȱęȱȬ\\nmony … the trial judge must determine at the outset …\\n ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǻŗǼȱ ęȱ\\nknowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or\\ndetermine a fact in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,\\n509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). “The trial court must have … latitude\\nin deciding how to test an expert’s reliability.” Kumho Tire Co.,\\nLtd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).\\n The district court was well within its discretion to exclude\\nthe ěȱ¢ȱȱ¡ȱ ȱ\\u0019¢ǯȱ\\u0004¢ȱ\\nȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȬ\\nsue in the district court by failing to engage with the defend-\\nants’ arguments in their motion to strike the testimony,\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nWoodyard’s analysis sěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ě ȱ ȱ ȱ\\nfrom the way in which the parties have framed this lawsuit.\\n\\u0016ȱȱȱĚ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ“both sides\\nassume that none of the defendants can be held liable for any\\nPCB contamination on the Liebharts’ property that occurred\\nbefore the demolition began, so the court will make the same\\nassumption.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *1. That’s a curious\\nchoice. RCRA permits the Liebharts to obtain injunctive relief\\nfrom the owner of the facility for any cognizable contamina-\\ntion, regardless of whether the PCBs migrated onto their\\nproperty before or after the demolition occurred. See 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (authorizing suit against “any person … who\\nhas contributed … to the past or present handling … or dis-\\nposal” of hazardous waste); see also Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486\\n(“RCRA contains no statute of limitations.”).\\n But because the Liebharts restricted their claims to PCBs\\nthat allegedly migrated onto their property via the dust from\\nthe 2015 demolition, they necessarily excluded claims result-\\ning from PCBs that may ȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱȬ\\ning the previous century. The district court correctly noted\\nthat Woodyard’s expert opinion could not distinguish be-\\ntween these two alternatives, as both sets of contaminants\\noriginated from the same source. There was even evidence\\nshowing that PCBs existed in the soil beneath the Liebharts’\\nasphalt driveway—Woodyard could not explain how that\\nmight have occurred as the result of dust blowing in the wind\\nas opposed to seepage over the course of years before any\\ndemolition occurred.\\n Perhaps the Liebharts decided to frame their claims in this\\nway because they wanted to go after defendants TRC and\\nApollo, who would not be liable for what happened before\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 19\\n\\ndemolition. Or perhaps some element of their state-law\\nclaims, which we have not addressed, required them to con-\\nstrict the scope. They did not explain their reasoning to us (or\\nit seems, to the district court). But the distinction makes it dif-\\nęȱȱ\\u0019¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\n“adequately account[] for obvious alternative explanations.”\\n\\tȱǯȱ\\n Ĵ-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 787 (7th Cir.\\n2017). Viewed in this light, the district court was within its\\ndiscretion to exclude the testimony as unreliable and unhelp-\\nful to the trier of fact. The district court may choose to rethink\\nthat evaluation on remand under the legal standards we out-\\nlined above, but it may well reach the same conclusion.\\n 2. The District Court Should Reconsider Its Denial of Injunctive\\nRelief\\n The district court denied injunctive relief to the Liebharts\\nbecause the defendants had already agreed to a clean-up plan\\nthat had been approved by the Wisconsin DNR. We review\\nthat decision for an abuse of discretion. See AMI Int’l, Inc. v.\\nDatacard Corp. 106 F.3d 1342, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997) (remanding\\ngrant of RCRA injunction).\\n As we mentioned above, RCRA authorizes district courts\\nto issue either mandatory or prohibitory injunctions, while\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions. “[I]t is appro-\\npriate ‘to give great deference to the district court’s decision\\nas to the precise equitable relief necessary in a particular\\ncase.’” Bowes v. Ind. Sec. of State, 837 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (quoting Gjersten v. Bd. Of Election Com’rs for City of Chi-\\ncago, 791 F.2d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1986)). That is especially true\\n ȱȱěȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ ȱ“im-\\nȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ\\nful consideration of the intrusiveness of the ordered act, as\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n ȱȱȱĜȱȱ¢ȱȱȱin supervising\\nthe enjoined party’s compliance with the court’s order.” Kart-\\nman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir.\\n2011).\\n Considering SPX’s decision to formulate a clean-up plan\\nand obtain approval from the state agency, the district court\\ndetermined that there was no need for separate, federally-su-\\npervised remediation. It reached that conclusion even while\\nassuming that the defendants were in violation of either\\nRCRA or TSCA, despite the fact it found no such violation.\\nOther courts have determined that the existence of a parallel\\nplan of remediation supervised by the state does not neces-\\nsarily prevent a federal district court from granting an injunc-\\nȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢’ȱȱȱȱĜȱȱ\\nremedy the violation of federal law. See, e.g., Interfaith, 399\\nF.3d at 264–68. On the other hand, the same courts have also\\nupheld denials of injunctions in similar situations when the\\nȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ\\ntask. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735\\nF.3d 131, 139–40 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Interfaith). We\\nrecently reached the same conclusion. See LAJIM, LLC v. Gen.\\nElec. Co., No. 18-1522, 2019 WL 1011021, at *4–11 (7th Cir. Mar.\\n4, 2019) (“[T]he district court correctly held that it has discre-\\ntion to award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not re-\\nȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱ¢ǰ” particularly\\nin light of ongoing relief supervised by a state environmental\\nagency).\\n Here, the district court determined that SPX’s existing\\nȱ ȱ Ĝ and that the Liebharts had not “iden-\\ntif[ied] any way that SPX’ȱȱǽ ǾȱęȱȱǽǾȱ\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 21\\n\\nfederal law.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *7. We agree. Alt-\\nhough the Liebharts point to certain statistical sampling re-\\nquirements outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 761.125 and contend that\\nSPX’s existing plan fails to meet those requirements, the dis-\\ntrict court noted that SPX’s plan includes further sampling of\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ property. It emphasized that “the\\nLiebharts do not otherwise explain why SPX’s proposed sam-\\npling scheme is substantively inadequate.” Liebhart, 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *7. We see no evidence that compels us to contra-\\nȱȱȱęǯ\\n However, in light of the legal standards we outlined\\nabove, we ask the district court to reconsider its decision to\\ndeny injunctive relief on remand. Because the bar for estab-\\nlishing an imminent and substantial danger is lower than the\\ndistrict court believed when evaluating the request for an in-\\njunction, it would be prudent to reassess whether the DNR-\\napproved plan adequately remedies harms that may come\\nwithin RCRA’s scope. See LAJIM, 2019 WL 1011021 at *6\\n(“[\\u0011Ǿȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nimminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the case\\nthat injunctive relief is warranted. But that is not always the\\ncase.”) ǻȱȱȱȱĴǼǯ\\n 3. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying\\nLeave to Amend the Complaint.\\n We review a denial of leave to amend a complaint for\\nabuse of discretion. Life Plans, Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co.,\\n800 F.3d 343, 357 (7th Cir. 2015). District courts are to “freely\\ngive leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 15(a)(2). “The Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to\\nrequire a district court to allow amendment unless there is a\\ngood reason—futility, undue delay, undue prejudice, or bad\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nfaith—for denying leave to amend.” Life Plans, 800 F.3d at 357\\n(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The district\\nȱȱȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\ndenial: futility and undue delay. While we disagree with the\\n¢ȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱ\\nand decline to reverse.\\n We begin with the question of futility. Both statutes con-\\ntain advance-ȱȱȱ£ȱěȱȱ\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ \\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱ ȱ \\u0016\\u0015\\u0005\\u0003ȱ ǯȱ \\u0016¢ȱ ȱ\\nȱěȱȱ¢ȱȱ\\u0007\\u0012\\u0003ȱ60–90 ¢ȱȱȱȱęȬ\\ning the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2); 15 U.S.C.\\n§ 2619(b)(1)(A). But the district court chose to apply the re-\\nȱȱ¢ȱȱȱęȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ\\nany subsequent amendments that sought to add new RCRA\\nor TSCA counts. Although the Liebharts complied with the\\nȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ\\u0003ȱ\\n2016, they gave no new notice to the EPA before ęȱ ȱ\\nleave to amend in February 2018. The district court held that,\\nbecause the prior notice did not contain any mention of bur-\\nȱ\\u0012\\u0005\\u0004ȱȱȱ\\u0015\\u0012\\u001aȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱĜȱȱȱȱ\\nEPA to the particular violation the Liebharts sought to include\\nin the amended complaint.\\n The notice provisions serve two purposes. “First, notice al-\\nlows Government agencies to take responsibility for enforc-\\ning environmental regulations, thus obviating the need for\\ncitizen suits. … Second, notice gives the alleged violator ‘an\\nopportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the\\nAct[s] and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit.’”\\nHallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (quoting\\n\\t ¢ȱ ȱ \\u0015ęǰȱ\\u000bǯȱ ǯȱ\\u0005ȱ\\u0004¢ȱ \\bǯǰȱ\\u000bǯ, 484\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 23\\n\\nU.S. 49, 60 (1987)). The district court’s decision to require no-\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ pur-\\nposeǯȱ\\u0004¢ȱȱȱȱ\\u000eȱĴȱȱȱȱȬ\\nplaint, the EPA had been on notice of alleged PCB contamina-\\ntion at the SPX property for over two years—and it had de-\\nclined to get involved. Moreover, it was unlikely that the de-\\nfendants would resolve the alleged violation to avoid being\\nsued when they were already in the midst of an extended law-\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěǯȱ See AM Int’l, 106 F.3d at 1351\\n(“[T]he delay period is designed to allow a [defendant] a pe-\\nriod in which to clean up its act and avoid litigation. [This de-\\nfendant] was clearly not interested in using the delay period\\nto resolve the dispute without going to court.”); see also Dague,\\n935 F.2d at 1351 (“There is no need to maintain a window of\\nopportunity for the government to take the lead enforcement\\nrole … ȱȱ£ǰȱȱȱȱȱĴ¢ȱǰȱȱ\\nalready lawfully assumed the lead role in bringing a … claim\\nagainst the same facility.”) (quoting Dague v. City of Burling-\\nton, 733 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D. Vt. 1990)). When the original notice\\nis “Ĝ¢ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱǽȱȱ\\nagency] about what it is doing wrong, so that it will know\\nwhat corrective actions will avert a lawsuit,” Atl. States Legal\\nFound., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir.\\n1994), there is no need to require a second round of advance\\nnotice for an amended complaint in the same litigation.\\n But an error in the futility analysis alone does not neces-\\nsarily constitute an abuse of discretion on the whole. In addi-\\ntion to futility, the district court cited undue delay and preju-\\ndice in its decision to deny leave to amend. “[D]elay by itself\\nȱ¢ȱȱĜȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ\\nto amend. Delay must be coupled with some other reason.\\nTypically, that reason … is prejudice to the non-moving\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nparty.” Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 793\\n(7th Cir. 2004). The district court cited the Liebharts’ admis-\\nsion that they learned of the possible burial of contaminated\\nconcrete on the SPX property on October 11, 2017 but failed\\nto seek leave to amend their complaint until February 22,\\n2018. During that more than four-month period, the parties\\nĴȱȱȱȱ-motions for summary judg-\\nment, and by February, trial was only three months away. The\\n\\u000eȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ǯ\\n In response, the Liebharts contend that there was no un-\\nȱȱȱȱDZȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱęȱȱ\\nǰȱęȱ of discovery still remained. We disagree.\\nWhile the district court’s explanation of prejudice was fairly\\nshort, even if the district court had failed ȱȱȱęȬ\\ning of prejudice altogether, we might still “Ĝȱȱ\\nthat ‘the prejudice that would result from such amendment\\nwas apparent.’” Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 613 (7th\\nCir. 2002) (quoting Feldman v. Am. Mem’l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d\\n783, 793 (7th Cir. 1999)). In Parkǰȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ¡ȱ\\nmonths to move for leave to amend a complaint after she\\nknew (or should have known) of the additional alleged viola-\\ntion. Id. Because trial was approaching, we concluded that the\\ndistrict court was well within its discretion to deny leave. Id.;\\nsee also Perrian v. O’Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194–95 (7th Cir. 1992)\\n(“Because substantive amendments shortly before trial serve\\nto defeat the public’s interest in speedy resolution of legal dis-\\nputes, ‘[a] district court judge is entitled, in such circum-\\nǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱě’s amendment.’” (quoting\\nCampbell v. Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co., 893 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir.\\n1990)) ǻȱȱĴǼ).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 25\\n\\n On the contrary, in Life Plans, we found no undue delay\\n ȱȱěȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nten days after learning of the factual basis for its new count\\nduring discovery. 800 F.3d at 358. The Liebharts delayed more\\nthan four months in the same circumstances. Although dis-\\ncovery was ongoing at the time of the Liebharts’ motion, the\\nparties had already briefed their dispositive motions, and the\\ndistrict court was preparing its summary-judgment order that\\nwould ultimately dispose of the case. We therefore cannot say\\nthat denial of leave for undue delay and prejudice was an\\nabuse of the district court’s discretion. Of course, the district\\ncourt may permit an amendment on remand if the interests of\\njustice so require.\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n Although the district court properly exercised its discre-\\ntion on the various evidentiary and procedural issues the\\něȱȱaised, its analysis on the merits was narrower\\nthan the statutes demand. It may reach the same conclusions\\non reconsideration, but the parties should have another op-\\nportunity to litigate whether a substantial and imminent en-\\ndangerment to health exists in this case under the standards\\nwe have outlined. We therefore VACATE the order of the dis-\\ntrict court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent\\nwith this opinion. 3\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 The Liebharts also challenge the taxation of costs against them by the\\n\\nclerk of the district court. Because we vacate the district court’s judgment,\\nwe assume that the imposition of costs is automatically vacated and so do\\nnot reach that issue. The clerk of the district court is free to reassess costs\\non remand as the case proceeds.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1173,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4597315,"string":"4,597,315"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Steve Briggins"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1921"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐1921 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nSTEVE BRIGGINS, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 1:17‐cr‐00243‐1 — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. In 2017 Steve Briggins was con‐\\nvicted of robbing multiple banks over several months. This \\nwas not Briggins’s first foray into bank robbery. Eighteen \\nyears earlier, in 1999, Briggins was convicted of and sentenced \\nfor ten bank robberies he committed over a span of a few \\nmonths. When the district court sentenced Briggins for the \\n2017 robberies, it accounted for the 1999 robberies in calculat‐\\ning his criminal history points under the Sentencing \\n\\f2 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\nGuidelines. Briggins now appeals, contending that the district \\ncourt, when determining his advisory sentencing range, im‐\\nproperly determined his criminal history category by impos‐\\ning too many criminal history points for the 1999 robberies. \\nSeeing no error, we affirm. \\n I \\n Briggins pleaded guilty in 2017 to committing multiple \\nbank robberies. At sentencing a primary focus became \\nBriggins’s criminal history and, more specifically, how many \\ncriminal history points should be assessed for the ten bank \\nrobberies he was convicted of in 1999 and for which he was \\nsentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment. The number of points \\nto be added for the 1999 robberies depended on whether the \\nprior 84‐month term reflected one sentence (for all ten \\nrobberies) or multiple concurrent sentences (for the ten \\nseparate robberies). Briggins urged the former—if the 84‐\\nmonth term reflected one sentence, it would yield fewer \\ncriminal history points and thus a lower advisory guidelines \\nrange. \\n The district court’s determination of Briggins’s criminal \\nhistory points tracked the Sentencing Guidelines analysis of‐\\nfered by the probation office. In its presentence investigation \\nreport, the probation office concluded that Briggins received \\nten concurrent sentences—one for each of the ten bank rob‐\\nberies. So, too, did the probation office recognize that the cal‐\\nculation of Briggins’s criminal history points needed to ac‐\\ncount for the threefold reality that he was charged with all ten \\nrobberies in the same indictment, pleaded guilty to each of \\nthose robberies in the same proceeding, and faced sentencing \\nfor all ten on the same day. All of this had ramifications for \\nthe proper criminal history calculation. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 3\\n\\n In the end, the probation office recommended that \\nBriggins receive six criminal history points for the 1999 bank \\nrobberies. These six points captured all ten robberies and \\ncame from an application of two provisions within § 4A1.1 of \\nthe guidelines. The first three of those points came from \\n§ 4A1.1(a), which requires sentencing courts to “[a]dd 3 \\npoints for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one \\nyear and one month.” And the other three points came from \\na provision, § 4A1.1(e), that applies where, as here, a \\ndefendant is convicted of multiple offenses charged in the \\nsame indictment or receives multiple sentences on the same \\nday. In this way, § 4A1.1(e) accounts for the circumstance of \\nmultiple convictions and sentences. \\n We can put the point in even plainer terms. A defendant \\nsentenced to more than 13 months’ imprisonment following a \\nfelony conviction ordinarily receives three criminal history \\npoints for that offense at a later sentencing. See U.S.S.G. \\n§ 4A1.1(a). By this logic, it may seem that a defendant like \\nBriggins convicted of and sentenced for ten separate robberies \\nshould receive 30 criminal history points—three for each \\nconviction. The guidelines do not work that way, though, in \\nsituations like the ones present here. Where the prior \\nsentences “resulted from offenses contained in the same \\ncharging instrument” or were “imposed on the same day,” \\nthe Sentencing Commission limited the number of criminal \\nhistory points assigned to those sentences. Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2). \\nThe first sentence still receives three points (consistent with \\nthe ordinary rule), but the remaining sentences are subject to \\na capping rule: § 4A1.1(e) assigns one criminal history point \\nfor each additional sentence resulting from a conviction of a \\ncrime of violence but limits the maximum number of \\nadditional points to three. \\n\\f4 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\n The probation office applied this capping rule when calcu‐\\nlating Briggins’s criminal history points here. It began with \\nthe ten sentences Briggins received for the ten 1999 robberies \\nand assigned three points to the first of those sentences under \\n§ 4A1.1(a) because the sentence exceeded 13 months. From \\nthere the probation office recognized that, because the ten \\nsentences came from the same indictment and were imposed \\non the same day, the limitations of § 4A1.1(e) applied. Apply‐\\ning § 4A1.1(e) meant that only three additional points were \\nallowed for Briggins’s remaining nine robberies. The math \\nfrom there was simple: Briggins received a total of six criminal \\nhistory points for the ten 1999 robberies. \\n At the sentencing hearing for the 2017 robberies, the \\ndistrict court agreed with and adopted the probation office’s \\nanalysis of Briggins’s criminal history. The resulting advisory \\nguidelines range for Briggins’s 2017 bank robberies was 77 to \\n96 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed a \\nsentence of 96 months. \\n II \\n On appeal Briggins renews his challenge to the district \\ncourt’s calculation of the criminal history points assigned to \\nhis 1999 bank robberies. He does so by attacking a key factual \\npremise upon which the district court based its determination \\nthat the prior robberies warranted a total of six criminal his‐\\ntory points. As Briggins sees the 1999 proceeding, he received \\nnot ten concurrent sentences, but rather one sentence of 84 \\nmonths for all ten robberies. On this view, he contends he \\nshould have received only three criminal history points for \\nthe single term of 84 months he received for the 1999 rob‐\\nberies, and thus there was no need for the district court to ever \\nget into how the guidelines treat multiple sentences. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 5\\n\\n Resolving whether Briggins received multiple concurrent \\nsentences or one sentence for his ten bank robberies requires \\nus to review the 1999 sentencing hearing in some detail. The \\nbeginning point is recognizing that Briggins pleaded guilty to \\ncommitting ten separate bank robberies, each of which had \\nbeen charged as a separate count in the underlying indict‐\\nment. At the 1999 sentencing hearing, the district court stated \\nthat it was sentencing Briggins “to a term of 84 months.” In \\ndoing so, the court emphasized that Briggins deserved to be \\npunished for each robbery—he should not, as the sentencing \\njudge put it, receive any “group discounts” for having com‐\\nmitted ten separate robberies. The district court’s written \\njudgment reflected that Briggins pleaded guilty to ten counts \\nthat resulted in “a total term of 84 months.” Nowhere in the \\nwritten judgment did the court indicate whether the 84‐\\nmonth term reflected concurrent sentences. \\n Briggins latches onto the district court’s use of the phrase \\n“a term” of imprisonment to argue that he received a single, \\nlump‐sum term of 84 months for the ten robberies. He does \\nnot dispute that he pleaded guilty to ten separate robberies, \\nbut rather underscores that he was sentenced to “a term” of \\n84 months—a single term, not multiple terms or concurrent \\nterms. And this single sentence, Briggins continues, is wholly \\naccounted for by the three criminal history points added un‐\\nder § 4A1.1(a); there was no basis for assigning additional \\ncriminal history points under § 4A1.1(e) or any other provi‐\\nsion of the guidelines. The upshot of Briggins’s argument is \\nthat it was not even necessary for the district court to reach \\n§ 4A1.1(e) because multiple sentences were not in play in the \\nfirst place. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\n We disagree. Briggins’s insistence that he received only \\none sentence because the district court announced “a term” of \\nimprisonment ignores the substance and full context of what \\ntranspired at his 1999 sentencing hearing. The transcript \\nshows that the district court intended to punish each robbery \\nseparately, for there is no other way to understand the sen‐\\ntencing judge’s comments that Briggins was not entitled to \\n“any type of group discounts” or “a two‐for‐one sale or a ten‐\\nfor‐one sale.” \\n The district judge made other statements at sentencing to \\ndrive home that Briggins deserved to be punished for each of \\nthe ten robberies. At one point, for example, the judge \\nexplained that, if Briggins had committed just one bank \\nrobbery, he would “probably be looking at three to five years \\neasily,” and that “any judge could sentence [him] to 30 years \\nand say, well, it’s three years for each of the bank robberies.” \\nThe district judge further observed that, even if he sentenced \\nBriggins to just “one year for every one of the bank robberies,” \\nhe would face a total of ten years. But the court was quick to \\nrecognize that a sentence along those lines would be well \\noutside the then‐mandatory guidelines range of 63 to 78 \\nmonths. So the district court instead applied an upward \\ndeparture, reasoning that the ten robberies conducted over a \\nshort period of time presented an “unusual circumstance” \\nthat was not adequately taken into consideration by the \\nguidelines. The 1999 sentencing ended with the district court \\nimposing a sentence of 84 months. \\n A broader point deserves underscoring. Accepting \\nBriggins’s position would require us to conclude that the \\ndistrict court sentenced him to 84 months for one of the ten \\n1999 bank robberies but to no time for the other nine. But any \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 7\\n\\nview like that neither accounts for what the district judge said \\nat sentencing—that Briggins would not receive a break \\nbecause he committed multiple bank robberies—nor the \\nreality that the court was obligated to sentence him on each of \\nthe ten separate bank robberies to which he pleaded guilty. \\nWe also cannot overlook that the district court imposed a \\nspecial assessment of $100 for each of the ten robberies for a \\ntotal of $1,000—yet another indicator that the district judge \\nunderstood the ten robberies as resulting in separate \\nconvictions warranting separate sentences. The only other \\ninterpretation, which makes even less sense, is that the 84‐\\nmonth sentence reflected the sum total of ten consecutive \\nsentences of 8.4 months each. Not only would a sentence like \\nthat—less than one year for a bank robbery—bear little \\nrelationship to the applicable guidelines range, but it would \\nalso require us to assume the district judge (who uttered not \\na word about consecutive sentences) intended to impose ten \\nsmall but consecutive sentences. \\n Our conclusion that the district court imposed ten \\nconcurrent sentences for the 1999 robberies aligns squarely \\nwith the presumption that sentences imposed in a multiple‐\\ncount case run concurrently with one another. See U.S.S.G. \\n§ 5G1.2(c) (explaining that “[i]f the sentence imposed on the \\ncount carrying the highest statutory maximum is adequate to \\nachieve the total punishment, then the sentences on all counts \\nshall run concurrently”). Indeed, the Sentencing \\nCommission’s accompanying commentary (in effect at the \\ntime of the 1999 sentencing and now) clarifies that, in a \\nmultiple‐count case, the total punishment is to be imposed on \\neach count and the sentences on all counts are to run \\nconcurrently. See id. § 5G1.2 & cmt; see also id. § 5G1.2 & cmt. \\n(effective Nov. 1, 1998). Congress incorporated this same \\n\\f8 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\npresumption of concurrence into the statutory provision \\ngoverning the imposition of multiple sentences for a \\ndefendant convicted of a federal offense. See 18 U.S.C. \\n§ 3584(a). \\n We decline to interpret Briggins’s 1999 sentence in a way \\nthat contravenes not only this presumption of concurrence, \\nbut also the sentencing judge’s clear statements that he in‐\\ntended to hold Briggins accountable for each robbery. The \\nmost accurate reading of Briggins’s 1999 sentence—the read‐\\ning fairest to the record—is that “a term of 84 months” re‐\\nflected multiple concurrent sentences. \\n Briggins urges a contrary conclusion by pointing to prior \\ndecisions where courts have concluded that “a term” refers to \\none sentence or, at the very least, creates enough ambiguity \\nabout what sentence a defendant received to warrant resen‐\\ntencing. In United States v. Eskridge, for example, the question \\nwas whether the district court had imposed one term or two \\nconcurrent terms of supervised release for the defendant’s \\ntwo convictions. 445 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2006). After exam‐\\nining the sentencing transcript, we held that the defendant \\nwas entitled to resentencing for supervised release violations \\nbecause the district judge, in sentencing the defendant to “a \\nterm of 26 months,” in no way clarified (in the judgment or \\notherwise) whether he had sentenced the defendant to one or \\ntwo terms of supervised release. See id. at 935. And we added \\nthat “if the order accurately reflects the judge’s decision, how‐\\never mistaken, to impose just a single term, it cannot be cor‐\\nrected.” Id. at 934. \\n The circumstances here are different. The statements the \\ndistrict judge made immediately before sentencing Briggins \\nfor the 1999 robberies do not leave room for an interpretation \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 9\\n\\nthat the court may have decided—however mistakenly—to \\nimpose a single term of imprisonment. To the contrary, the \\ndistrict judge’s statements made clear that he intended to hold \\nBriggins accountable for each of the ten robbery convictions. \\nAt the time, moreover, the guidelines required the court to \\nsentence Briggins on each count of conviction, with the pre‐\\nsumption that such sentences would run concurrently. \\n On this record, we conclude that the district court in 1999 \\nimposed multiple sentences for Briggins’s ten robbery convic‐\\ntions. At Briggins’s sentencing for the 2017 convictions, the \\ndistrict court thus properly assessed six criminal history \\npoints for Briggins’s 1999 sentences—three criminal history \\npoints under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a) for one sentence, and three \\nadditional points for the remaining nine sentences under \\nU.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e). \\n Accordingly, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4374568/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597315/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Steve Briggins\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐1921 \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \n v. \n\nSTEVE BRIGGINS, \n Defendant‐Appellant. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \n No. 1:17‐cr‐00243‐1 — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. In 2017 Steve Briggins was con‐\nvicted of robbing multiple banks over several months. This \nwas not Briggins’s first foray into bank robbery. Eighteen \nyears earlier, in 1999, Briggins was convicted of and sentenced \nfor ten bank robberies he committed over a span of a few \nmonths. When the district court sentenced Briggins for the \n2017 robberies, it accounted for the 1999 robberies in calculat‐\ning his criminal history points under the Sentencing \n\f2 No. 18‐1921 \n\nGuidelines. Briggins now appeals, contending that the district \ncourt, when determining his advisory sentencing range, im‐\nproperly determined his criminal history category by impos‐\ning too many criminal history points for the 1999 robberies. \nSeeing no error, we affirm. \n I \n Briggins pleaded guilty in 2017 to committing multiple \nbank robberies. At sentencing a primary focus became \nBriggins’s criminal history and, more specifically, how many \ncriminal history points should be assessed for the ten bank \nrobberies he was convicted of in 1999 and for which he was \nsentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment. The number of points \nto be added for the 1999 robberies depended on whether the \nprior 84‐month term reflected one sentence (for all ten \nrobberies) or multiple concurrent sentences (for the ten \nseparate robberies). Briggins urged the former—if the 84‐\nmonth term reflected one sentence, it would yield fewer \ncriminal history points and thus a lower advisory guidelines \nrange. \n The district court’s determination of Briggins’s criminal \nhistory points tracked the Sentencing Guidelines analysis of‐\nfered by the probation office. In its presentence investigation \nreport, the probation office concluded that Briggins received \nten concurrent sentences—one for each of the ten bank rob‐\nberies. So, too, did the probation office recognize that the cal‐\nculation of Briggins’s criminal history points needed to ac‐\ncount for the threefold reality that he was charged with all ten \nrobberies in the same indictment, pleaded guilty to each of \nthose robberies in the same proceeding, and faced sentencing \nfor all ten on the same day. All of this had ramifications for \nthe proper criminal history calculation. \n\fNo. 18‐1921 3\n\n In the end, the probation office recommended that \nBriggins receive six criminal history points for the 1999 bank \nrobberies. These six points captured all ten robberies and \ncame from an application of two provisions within § 4A1.1 of \nthe guidelines. The first three of those points came from \n§ 4A1.1(a), which requires sentencing courts to “[a]dd 3 \npoints for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one \nyear and one month.” And the other three points came from \na provision, § 4A1.1(e), that applies where, as here, a \ndefendant is convicted of multiple offenses charged in the \nsame indictment or receives multiple sentences on the same \nday. In this way, § 4A1.1(e) accounts for the circumstance of \nmultiple convictions and sentences. \n We can put the point in even plainer terms. A defendant \nsentenced to more than 13 months’ imprisonment following a \nfelony conviction ordinarily receives three criminal history \npoints for that offense at a later sentencing. See U.S.S.G. \n§ 4A1.1(a). By this logic, it may seem that a defendant like \nBriggins convicted of and sentenced for ten separate robberies \nshould receive 30 criminal history points—three for each \nconviction. The guidelines do not work that way, though, in \nsituations like the ones present here. Where the prior \nsentences “resulted from offenses contained in the same \ncharging instrument” or were “imposed on the same day,” \nthe Sentencing Commission limited the number of criminal \nhistory points assigned to those sentences. Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2). \nThe first sentence still receives three points (consistent with \nthe ordinary rule), but the remaining sentences are subject to \na capping rule: § 4A1.1(e) assigns one criminal history point \nfor each additional sentence resulting from a conviction of a \ncrime of violence but limits the maximum number of \nadditional points to three. \n\f4 No. 18‐1921 \n\n The probation office applied this capping rule when calcu‐\nlating Briggins’s criminal history points here. It began with \nthe ten sentences Briggins received for the ten 1999 robberies \nand assigned three points to the first of those sentences under \n§ 4A1.1(a) because the sentence exceeded 13 months. From \nthere the probation office recognized that, because the ten \nsentences came from the same indictment and were imposed \non the same day, the limitations of § 4A1.1(e) applied. Apply‐\ning § 4A1.1(e) meant that only three additional points were \nallowed for Briggins’s remaining nine robberies. The math \nfrom there was simple: Briggins received a total of six criminal \nhistory points for the ten 1999 robberies. \n At the sentencing hearing for the 2017 robberies, the \ndistrict court agreed with and adopted the probation office’s \nanalysis of Briggins’s criminal history. The resulting advisory \nguidelines range for Briggins’s 2017 bank robberies was 77 to \n96 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed a \nsentence of 96 months. \n II \n On appeal Briggins renews his challenge to the district \ncourt’s calculation of the criminal history points assigned to \nhis 1999 bank robberies. He does so by attacking a key factual \npremise upon which the district court based its determination \nthat the prior robberies warranted a total of six criminal his‐\ntory points. As Briggins sees the 1999 proceeding, he received \nnot ten concurrent sentences, but rather one sentence of 84 \nmonths for all ten robberies. On this view, he contends he \nshould have received only three criminal history points for \nthe single term of 84 months he received for the 1999 rob‐\nberies, and thus there was no need for the district court to ever \nget into how the guidelines treat multiple sentences. \n\fNo. 18‐1921 5\n\n Resolving whether Briggins received multiple concurrent \nsentences or one sentence for his ten bank robberies requires \nus to review the 1999 sentencing hearing in some detail. The \nbeginning point is recognizing that Briggins pleaded guilty to \ncommitting ten separate bank robberies, each of which had \nbeen charged as a separate count in the underlying indict‐\nment. At the 1999 sentencing hearing, the district court stated \nthat it was sentencing Briggins “to a term of 84 months.” In \ndoing so, the court emphasized that Briggins deserved to be \npunished for each robbery—he should not, as the sentencing \njudge put it, receive any “group discounts” for having com‐\nmitted ten separate robberies. The district court’s written \njudgment reflected that Briggins pleaded guilty to ten counts \nthat resulted in “a total term of 84 months.” Nowhere in the \nwritten judgment did the court indicate whether the 84‐\nmonth term reflected concurrent sentences. \n Briggins latches onto the district court’s use of the phrase \n“a term” of imprisonment to argue that he received a single, \nlump‐sum term of 84 months for the ten robberies. He does \nnot dispute that he pleaded guilty to ten separate robberies, \nbut rather underscores that he was sentenced to “a term” of \n84 months—a single term, not multiple terms or concurrent \nterms. And this single sentence, Briggins continues, is wholly \naccounted for by the three criminal history points added un‐\nder § 4A1.1(a); there was no basis for assigning additional \ncriminal history points under § 4A1.1(e) or any other provi‐\nsion of the guidelines. The upshot of Briggins’s argument is \nthat it was not even necessary for the district court to reach \n§ 4A1.1(e) because multiple sentences were not in play in the \nfirst place. \n\f6 No. 18‐1921 \n\n We disagree. Briggins’s insistence that he received only \none sentence because the district court announced “a term” of \nimprisonment ignores the substance and full context of what \ntranspired at his 1999 sentencing hearing. The transcript \nshows that the district court intended to punish each robbery \nseparately, for there is no other way to understand the sen‐\ntencing judge’s comments that Briggins was not entitled to \n“any type of group discounts” or “a two‐for‐one sale or a ten‐\nfor‐one sale.” \n The district judge made other statements at sentencing to \ndrive home that Briggins deserved to be punished for each of \nthe ten robberies. At one point, for example, the judge \nexplained that, if Briggins had committed just one bank \nrobbery, he would “probably be looking at three to five years \neasily,” and that “any judge could sentence [him] to 30 years \nand say, well, it’s three years for each of the bank robberies.” \nThe district judge further observed that, even if he sentenced \nBriggins to just “one year for every one of the bank robberies,” \nhe would face a total of ten years. But the court was quick to \nrecognize that a sentence along those lines would be well \noutside the then‐mandatory guidelines range of 63 to 78 \nmonths. So the district court instead applied an upward \ndeparture, reasoning that the ten robberies conducted over a \nshort period of time presented an “unusual circumstance” \nthat was not adequately taken into consideration by the \nguidelines. The 1999 sentencing ended with the district court \nimposing a sentence of 84 months. \n A broader point deserves underscoring. Accepting \nBriggins’s position would require us to conclude that the \ndistrict court sentenced him to 84 months for one of the ten \n1999 bank robberies but to no time for the other nine. But any \n\fNo. 18‐1921 7\n\nview like that neither accounts for what the district judge said \nat sentencing—that Briggins would not receive a break \nbecause he committed multiple bank robberies—nor the \nreality that the court was obligated to sentence him on each of \nthe ten separate bank robberies to which he pleaded guilty. \nWe also cannot overlook that the district court imposed a \nspecial assessment of $100 for each of the ten robberies for a \ntotal of $1,000—yet another indicator that the district judge \nunderstood the ten robberies as resulting in separate \nconvictions warranting separate sentences. The only other \ninterpretation, which makes even less sense, is that the 84‐\nmonth sentence reflected the sum total of ten consecutive \nsentences of 8.4 months each. Not only would a sentence like \nthat—less than one year for a bank robbery—bear little \nrelationship to the applicable guidelines range, but it would \nalso require us to assume the district judge (who uttered not \na word about consecutive sentences) intended to impose ten \nsmall but consecutive sentences. \n Our conclusion that the district court imposed ten \nconcurrent sentences for the 1999 robberies aligns squarely \nwith the presumption that sentences imposed in a multiple‐\ncount case run concurrently with one another. See U.S.S.G. \n§ 5G1.2(c) (explaining that “[i]f the sentence imposed on the \ncount carrying the highest statutory maximum is adequate to \nachieve the total punishment, then the sentences on all counts \nshall run concurrently”). Indeed, the Sentencing \nCommission’s accompanying commentary (in effect at the \ntime of the 1999 sentencing and now) clarifies that, in a \nmultiple‐count case, the total punishment is to be imposed on \neach count and the sentences on all counts are to run \nconcurrently. See id. § 5G1.2 & cmt; see also id. § 5G1.2 & cmt. \n(effective Nov. 1, 1998). Congress incorporated this same \n\f8 No. 18‐1921 \n\npresumption of concurrence into the statutory provision \ngoverning the imposition of multiple sentences for a \ndefendant convicted of a federal offense. See 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3584(a). \n We decline to interpret Briggins’s 1999 sentence in a way \nthat contravenes not only this presumption of concurrence, \nbut also the sentencing judge’s clear statements that he in‐\ntended to hold Briggins accountable for each robbery. The \nmost accurate reading of Briggins’s 1999 sentence—the read‐\ning fairest to the record—is that “a term of 84 months” re‐\nflected multiple concurrent sentences. \n Briggins urges a contrary conclusion by pointing to prior \ndecisions where courts have concluded that “a term” refers to \none sentence or, at the very least, creates enough ambiguity \nabout what sentence a defendant received to warrant resen‐\ntencing. In United States v. Eskridge, for example, the question \nwas whether the district court had imposed one term or two \nconcurrent terms of supervised release for the defendant’s \ntwo convictions. 445 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2006). After exam‐\nining the sentencing transcript, we held that the defendant \nwas entitled to resentencing for supervised release violations \nbecause the district judge, in sentencing the defendant to “a \nterm of 26 months,” in no way clarified (in the judgment or \notherwise) whether he had sentenced the defendant to one or \ntwo terms of supervised release. See id. at 935. And we added \nthat “if the order accurately reflects the judge’s decision, how‐\never mistaken, to impose just a single term, it cannot be cor‐\nrected.” Id. at 934. \n The circumstances here are different. The statements the \ndistrict judge made immediately before sentencing Briggins \nfor the 1999 robberies do not leave room for an interpretation \n\fNo. 18‐1921 9\n\nthat the court may have decided—however mistakenly—to \nimpose a single term of imprisonment. To the contrary, the \ndistrict judge’s statements made clear that he intended to hold \nBriggins accountable for each of the ten robbery convictions. \nAt the time, moreover, the guidelines required the court to \nsentence Briggins on each count of conviction, with the pre‐\nsumption that such sentences would run concurrently. \n On this record, we conclude that the district court in 1999 \nimposed multiple sentences for Briggins’s ten robbery convic‐\ntions. At Briggins’s sentencing for the 2017 convictions, the \ndistrict court thus properly assessed six criminal history \npoints for Briggins’s 1999 sentences—three criminal history \npoints under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a) for one sentence, and three \nadditional points for the remaining nine sentences under \nU.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e). \n Accordingly, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Steve Briggins\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐1921 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nSTEVE BRIGGINS, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 1:17‐cr‐00243‐1 — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. In 2017 Steve Briggins was con‐\\nvicted of robbing multiple banks over several months. This \\nwas not Briggins’s first foray into bank robbery. Eighteen \\nyears earlier, in 1999, Briggins was convicted of and sentenced \\nfor ten bank robberies he committed over a span of a few \\nmonths. When the district court sentenced Briggins for the \\n2017 robberies, it accounted for the 1999 robberies in calculat‐\\ning his criminal history points under the Sentencing \\n\\f2 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\nGuidelines. Briggins now appeals, contending that the district \\ncourt, when determining his advisory sentencing range, im‐\\nproperly determined his criminal history category by impos‐\\ning too many criminal history points for the 1999 robberies. \\nSeeing no error, we affirm. \\n I \\n Briggins pleaded guilty in 2017 to committing multiple \\nbank robberies. At sentencing a primary focus became \\nBriggins’s criminal history and, more specifically, how many \\ncriminal history points should be assessed for the ten bank \\nrobberies he was convicted of in 1999 and for which he was \\nsentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment. The number of points \\nto be added for the 1999 robberies depended on whether the \\nprior 84‐month term reflected one sentence (for all ten \\nrobberies) or multiple concurrent sentences (for the ten \\nseparate robberies). Briggins urged the former—if the 84‐\\nmonth term reflected one sentence, it would yield fewer \\ncriminal history points and thus a lower advisory guidelines \\nrange. \\n The district court’s determination of Briggins’s criminal \\nhistory points tracked the Sentencing Guidelines analysis of‐\\nfered by the probation office. In its presentence investigation \\nreport, the probation office concluded that Briggins received \\nten concurrent sentences—one for each of the ten bank rob‐\\nberies. So, too, did the probation office recognize that the cal‐\\nculation of Briggins’s criminal history points needed to ac‐\\ncount for the threefold reality that he was charged with all ten \\nrobberies in the same indictment, pleaded guilty to each of \\nthose robberies in the same proceeding, and faced sentencing \\nfor all ten on the same day. All of this had ramifications for \\nthe proper criminal history calculation. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 3\\n\\n In the end, the probation office recommended that \\nBriggins receive six criminal history points for the 1999 bank \\nrobberies. These six points captured all ten robberies and \\ncame from an application of two provisions within § 4A1.1 of \\nthe guidelines. The first three of those points came from \\n§ 4A1.1(a), which requires sentencing courts to “[a]dd 3 \\npoints for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one \\nyear and one month.” And the other three points came from \\na provision, § 4A1.1(e), that applies where, as here, a \\ndefendant is convicted of multiple offenses charged in the \\nsame indictment or receives multiple sentences on the same \\nday. In this way, § 4A1.1(e) accounts for the circumstance of \\nmultiple convictions and sentences. \\n We can put the point in even plainer terms. A defendant \\nsentenced to more than 13 months’ imprisonment following a \\nfelony conviction ordinarily receives three criminal history \\npoints for that offense at a later sentencing. See U.S.S.G. \\n§ 4A1.1(a). By this logic, it may seem that a defendant like \\nBriggins convicted of and sentenced for ten separate robberies \\nshould receive 30 criminal history points—three for each \\nconviction. The guidelines do not work that way, though, in \\nsituations like the ones present here. Where the prior \\nsentences “resulted from offenses contained in the same \\ncharging instrument” or were “imposed on the same day,” \\nthe Sentencing Commission limited the number of criminal \\nhistory points assigned to those sentences. Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2). \\nThe first sentence still receives three points (consistent with \\nthe ordinary rule), but the remaining sentences are subject to \\na capping rule: § 4A1.1(e) assigns one criminal history point \\nfor each additional sentence resulting from a conviction of a \\ncrime of violence but limits the maximum number of \\nadditional points to three. \\n\\f4 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\n The probation office applied this capping rule when calcu‐\\nlating Briggins’s criminal history points here. It began with \\nthe ten sentences Briggins received for the ten 1999 robberies \\nand assigned three points to the first of those sentences under \\n§ 4A1.1(a) because the sentence exceeded 13 months. From \\nthere the probation office recognized that, because the ten \\nsentences came from the same indictment and were imposed \\non the same day, the limitations of § 4A1.1(e) applied. Apply‐\\ning § 4A1.1(e) meant that only three additional points were \\nallowed for Briggins’s remaining nine robberies. The math \\nfrom there was simple: Briggins received a total of six criminal \\nhistory points for the ten 1999 robberies. \\n At the sentencing hearing for the 2017 robberies, the \\ndistrict court agreed with and adopted the probation office’s \\nanalysis of Briggins’s criminal history. The resulting advisory \\nguidelines range for Briggins’s 2017 bank robberies was 77 to \\n96 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed a \\nsentence of 96 months. \\n II \\n On appeal Briggins renews his challenge to the district \\ncourt’s calculation of the criminal history points assigned to \\nhis 1999 bank robberies. He does so by attacking a key factual \\npremise upon which the district court based its determination \\nthat the prior robberies warranted a total of six criminal his‐\\ntory points. As Briggins sees the 1999 proceeding, he received \\nnot ten concurrent sentences, but rather one sentence of 84 \\nmonths for all ten robberies. On this view, he contends he \\nshould have received only three criminal history points for \\nthe single term of 84 months he received for the 1999 rob‐\\nberies, and thus there was no need for the district court to ever \\nget into how the guidelines treat multiple sentences. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 5\\n\\n Resolving whether Briggins received multiple concurrent \\nsentences or one sentence for his ten bank robberies requires \\nus to review the 1999 sentencing hearing in some detail. The \\nbeginning point is recognizing that Briggins pleaded guilty to \\ncommitting ten separate bank robberies, each of which had \\nbeen charged as a separate count in the underlying indict‐\\nment. At the 1999 sentencing hearing, the district court stated \\nthat it was sentencing Briggins “to a term of 84 months.” In \\ndoing so, the court emphasized that Briggins deserved to be \\npunished for each robbery—he should not, as the sentencing \\njudge put it, receive any “group discounts” for having com‐\\nmitted ten separate robberies. The district court’s written \\njudgment reflected that Briggins pleaded guilty to ten counts \\nthat resulted in “a total term of 84 months.” Nowhere in the \\nwritten judgment did the court indicate whether the 84‐\\nmonth term reflected concurrent sentences. \\n Briggins latches onto the district court’s use of the phrase \\n“a term” of imprisonment to argue that he received a single, \\nlump‐sum term of 84 months for the ten robberies. He does \\nnot dispute that he pleaded guilty to ten separate robberies, \\nbut rather underscores that he was sentenced to “a term” of \\n84 months—a single term, not multiple terms or concurrent \\nterms. And this single sentence, Briggins continues, is wholly \\naccounted for by the three criminal history points added un‐\\nder § 4A1.1(a); there was no basis for assigning additional \\ncriminal history points under § 4A1.1(e) or any other provi‐\\nsion of the guidelines. The upshot of Briggins’s argument is \\nthat it was not even necessary for the district court to reach \\n§ 4A1.1(e) because multiple sentences were not in play in the \\nfirst place. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\n We disagree. Briggins’s insistence that he received only \\none sentence because the district court announced “a term” of \\nimprisonment ignores the substance and full context of what \\ntranspired at his 1999 sentencing hearing. The transcript \\nshows that the district court intended to punish each robbery \\nseparately, for there is no other way to understand the sen‐\\ntencing judge’s comments that Briggins was not entitled to \\n“any type of group discounts” or “a two‐for‐one sale or a ten‐\\nfor‐one sale.” \\n The district judge made other statements at sentencing to \\ndrive home that Briggins deserved to be punished for each of \\nthe ten robberies. At one point, for example, the judge \\nexplained that, if Briggins had committed just one bank \\nrobbery, he would “probably be looking at three to five years \\neasily,” and that “any judge could sentence [him] to 30 years \\nand say, well, it’s three years for each of the bank robberies.” \\nThe district judge further observed that, even if he sentenced \\nBriggins to just “one year for every one of the bank robberies,” \\nhe would face a total of ten years. But the court was quick to \\nrecognize that a sentence along those lines would be well \\noutside the then‐mandatory guidelines range of 63 to 78 \\nmonths. So the district court instead applied an upward \\ndeparture, reasoning that the ten robberies conducted over a \\nshort period of time presented an “unusual circumstance” \\nthat was not adequately taken into consideration by the \\nguidelines. The 1999 sentencing ended with the district court \\nimposing a sentence of 84 months. \\n A broader point deserves underscoring. Accepting \\nBriggins’s position would require us to conclude that the \\ndistrict court sentenced him to 84 months for one of the ten \\n1999 bank robberies but to no time for the other nine. But any \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 7\\n\\nview like that neither accounts for what the district judge said \\nat sentencing—that Briggins would not receive a break \\nbecause he committed multiple bank robberies—nor the \\nreality that the court was obligated to sentence him on each of \\nthe ten separate bank robberies to which he pleaded guilty. \\nWe also cannot overlook that the district court imposed a \\nspecial assessment of $100 for each of the ten robberies for a \\ntotal of $1,000—yet another indicator that the district judge \\nunderstood the ten robberies as resulting in separate \\nconvictions warranting separate sentences. The only other \\ninterpretation, which makes even less sense, is that the 84‐\\nmonth sentence reflected the sum total of ten consecutive \\nsentences of 8.4 months each. Not only would a sentence like \\nthat—less than one year for a bank robbery—bear little \\nrelationship to the applicable guidelines range, but it would \\nalso require us to assume the district judge (who uttered not \\na word about consecutive sentences) intended to impose ten \\nsmall but consecutive sentences. \\n Our conclusion that the district court imposed ten \\nconcurrent sentences for the 1999 robberies aligns squarely \\nwith the presumption that sentences imposed in a multiple‐\\ncount case run concurrently with one another. See U.S.S.G. \\n§ 5G1.2(c) (explaining that “[i]f the sentence imposed on the \\ncount carrying the highest statutory maximum is adequate to \\nachieve the total punishment, then the sentences on all counts \\nshall run concurrently”). Indeed, the Sentencing \\nCommission’s accompanying commentary (in effect at the \\ntime of the 1999 sentencing and now) clarifies that, in a \\nmultiple‐count case, the total punishment is to be imposed on \\neach count and the sentences on all counts are to run \\nconcurrently. See id. § 5G1.2 & cmt; see also id. § 5G1.2 & cmt. \\n(effective Nov. 1, 1998). Congress incorporated this same \\n\\f8 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\npresumption of concurrence into the statutory provision \\ngoverning the imposition of multiple sentences for a \\ndefendant convicted of a federal offense. See 18 U.S.C. \\n§ 3584(a). \\n We decline to interpret Briggins’s 1999 sentence in a way \\nthat contravenes not only this presumption of concurrence, \\nbut also the sentencing judge’s clear statements that he in‐\\ntended to hold Briggins accountable for each robbery. The \\nmost accurate reading of Briggins’s 1999 sentence—the read‐\\ning fairest to the record—is that “a term of 84 months” re‐\\nflected multiple concurrent sentences. \\n Briggins urges a contrary conclusion by pointing to prior \\ndecisions where courts have concluded that “a term” refers to \\none sentence or, at the very least, creates enough ambiguity \\nabout what sentence a defendant received to warrant resen‐\\ntencing. In United States v. Eskridge, for example, the question \\nwas whether the district court had imposed one term or two \\nconcurrent terms of supervised release for the defendant’s \\ntwo convictions. 445 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2006). After exam‐\\nining the sentencing transcript, we held that the defendant \\nwas entitled to resentencing for supervised release violations \\nbecause the district judge, in sentencing the defendant to “a \\nterm of 26 months,” in no way clarified (in the judgment or \\notherwise) whether he had sentenced the defendant to one or \\ntwo terms of supervised release. See id. at 935. And we added \\nthat “if the order accurately reflects the judge’s decision, how‐\\never mistaken, to impose just a single term, it cannot be cor‐\\nrected.” Id. at 934. \\n The circumstances here are different. The statements the \\ndistrict judge made immediately before sentencing Briggins \\nfor the 1999 robberies do not leave room for an interpretation \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 9\\n\\nthat the court may have decided—however mistakenly—to \\nimpose a single term of imprisonment. To the contrary, the \\ndistrict judge’s statements made clear that he intended to hold \\nBriggins accountable for each of the ten robbery convictions. \\nAt the time, moreover, the guidelines required the court to \\nsentence Briggins on each count of conviction, with the pre‐\\nsumption that such sentences would run concurrently. \\n On this record, we conclude that the district court in 1999 \\nimposed multiple sentences for Briggins’s ten robbery convic‐\\ntions. At Briggins’s sentencing for the 2017 convictions, the \\ndistrict court thus properly assessed six criminal history \\npoints for Briggins’s 1999 sentences—three criminal history \\npoints under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a) for one sentence, and three \\nadditional points for the remaining nine sentences under \\nU.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e). \\n Accordingly, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1174,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4597316,"string":"4,597,316"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Jesus Salgado"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2194"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐2194 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nJESUS SALGADO, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 16‐cr‐00394‐2 — John Robert Blakey, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 4, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Jesus Salgado pleaded guilty to con‐\\nspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. At sentenc‐\\ning, over Salgado’s objection, the district court applied an ag‐\\ngravating role enhancement and calculated the Guidelines \\nrange to be 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. The court sen‐\\ntenced Salgado below that range, to 192 months’ imprison‐\\nment. It explained, however, that even if it were wrong on the \\n\\f2 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\nenhancement’s application, it would have imposed the same \\nsentence. Salgado appeals, challenging the district court’s ap‐\\nplication of the aggravating role enhancement and the sub‐\\nstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm. \\n I. Background \\n Beginning in 2015 or earlier, Salgado conspired with Lo‐\\nrenzo Salgado (his father), Ruby Joy Buenaventura, Jose Luis \\nRivera, Jr., and others to distribute heroin. As part of the con‐\\nspiracy, Salgado used a stash house in Bensenville, Illinois to \\nreceive and store narcotics. Salgado’s father, who lived in \\nMexico, was the leader of the drug trafficking organization. \\n Salgado was arrested in August 2016, after which a federal \\ngrand jury indicted him on several heroin‐related charges. See \\n21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Salgado pleaded guilty to conspir‐\\nacy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. Before sentenc‐\\ning, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investi‐\\ngation Report (“PSR”), relying on, among other things, the \\ngovernment’s version of events, Rivera’s grand jury testi‐\\nmony, and statements from a DEA Special Agent. \\n The PSR recommended an aggravating role enhancement \\nunder § 3B1.1(b), reasoning that Salgado, though subordinate \\nto his father, “directed and controlled” Buenaventura and Ri‐\\nvera and was the Chicago‐based leader of the conspiracy. Sal‐\\ngado objected to the enhancement in a presentencing memo‐\\nrandum and also at sentencing on the primary basis that his \\nfather ran the drug organization. According to Salgado, he \\nhad “no decision making authority, acted solely at the direc‐\\ntion of [his father] … did not arrange the importation of the \\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 3\\n\\ndrugs, and did not set any of the price or quantity terms.” Sal‐\\ngado argued that the government had failed to prove other‐\\nwise by a preponderance of the evidence. \\n At sentencing, the district court asked the parties if they \\nhad any corrections to the PSR. Both parties said no. The dis‐\\ntrict court heard argument on the disputed enhancement un‐\\nder § 3B1.1(b), which provides for a three‐level enhancement \\nif the defendant “was a manager or supervisor (but not an or‐\\nganizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or \\nmore participants … .” The court applied the enhancement, \\nexplaining that based on the “undisputed portions of the fac‐\\ntual record” there were at least five participants to the con‐\\nspiracy, and that Salgado’s “role as the supervisor is clear \\nfrom the materials that are not disputed.” The court did not \\nidentify any evidence in the record, nor did it make any spe‐\\ncific factual findings to support the enhancement. With the \\nenhancement applied, the district court calculated the Guide‐\\nlines range as 210 to 262 months in prison. \\n The court then heard argument on the appropriate sen‐\\ntence. Seeking a statutory minimum sentence of 120 months, \\nSalgado argued that his family, especially his father, pres‐\\nsured him into criminal activity. He also argued that the \\nGuidelines overstated his criminal history and role in the of‐\\nfense. For its part, the government emphasized the serious‐\\nness of the offense and disputed that the Guidelines over‐\\nstated Salgado’s criminal history or role in the offense. \\n The court discussed the § 3553 factors in detail. In impos‐\\ning sentence, the court initially explained that even if it erred \\nin applying the § 3B1.1(b) aggravating role enhancement, the \\nsentence would have been the same: \\n\\f4 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\n The court has considered the factors under 3553 to fashion \\n a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to \\n accomplish the purposes of sentencing. And having consid‐\\n ered those factors, the sentence I am about to impose would \\n be the same even if the guidelines were a little bit different. \\n Counsel’s made a variety of arguments regarding the calcu‐\\n lation. He’s made some arguments by way of 3553 factors, \\n other guideline objections, certainly in particular the … ag‐\\n gravating role. The Court has considered those arguments. \\n And while the aggravating role objection was overruled \\n and I believe the application was appropriate in this case, \\n the arguments made by your counsel were considered and \\n are reflected in the 3553 factors. So even if the guideline cal‐\\n culation was different, even if I made a mistake in the cal‐\\n culation with respect to the aggravating role, the guideline \\n sentence is going to not control the sentence here. What’s \\n going to control is the 3553 factors. So even if that calcula‐\\n tion should have been different, the ultimate sentence is go‐\\n ing to be the same either. \\nThe court touched on this point later in the hearing: \\n I’ve also considered your role in the offense. The enhance‐\\n ment was appropriate but not all defendants who are enti‐\\n tled or should have that enhancement are created equally \\n and your counsel made a lot of good arguments in that re‐\\n gard and I’ve considered them in fashioning a sentence un‐\\n der 3553 … . And while … I believe … the enhancement was \\n appropriately applied, that’s what 3553 is to for, to fashion \\n an individual sentence and that’s what I’ve tried to do. \\n The court explained its sentencing rationale, discussing \\nboth mitigating and aggravating factors in detail. Afterwards, \\nthe court asked defense counsel if it had considered all \\n“primary arguments in mitigation.” Counsel responded: \\n“You have, your Honor.” The court then imposed a below‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 5\\n\\nGuidelines sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment. The court \\nasked if either party wanted “any further elaboration of [its] \\nreasons under 3553.” Defense counsel responded: “No, your \\nHonor.” \\n II. Discussion \\n Salgado argues that the district court erred in applying the \\naggravating role enhancement and in not adequately consid‐\\nering all of his mitigation arguments. He also challenges the \\nsubstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We take these ar‐\\nguments in turn. \\nA. Procedural Reasonableness \\n We review procedural challenges to sentences de novo. \\nUnited States v. Griffith, 913 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2019). Our \\ntask is to “ensure that the district court committed no signifi‐\\ncant procedural error, such as incorrectly calculating the \\nguidelines range, failing to consider the section 3553(a) fac‐\\ntors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or \\nfailing to explain adequately the chosen sentence.” Id. (citing \\nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). \\n 1. Aggravating Role Enhancement \\n Salgado first argues that the district court failed to make \\nsufficient factual findings to support the enhancement. We \\nagree. Despite Salgado’s objection to the enhancement—\\ndetailed in a presentencing memorandum and argued at \\nsentencing—the district court made no factual findings to \\nsupport the enhancement. Instead, it vaguely referenced \\nsupposedly undisputed record items to support its decision \\nto apply the enhancement. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\n This is a problem, both because the district court’s cursory \\napplication of the enhancement precludes meaningful judicial \\nreview and because Salgado did, in fact, dispute the salient \\nfacts, including the extent of his supervision of others, the \\ngrand jury testimony of Rivera, and the role that his father \\nplayed. As we have said before, “it is not our role to justify a \\nsentence that lacks a sufficient explanation with our best \\nguess for why the court imposed the sentence that it did.” \\nUnited States v. Titus, 821 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n The district court’s procedural error, however, was harm‐\\nless under the circumstances. See United States v. Clark, 906 \\nF.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d \\n660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009). While we need not determine whether \\nthe enhancement in fact applies, the district court unambigu‐\\nously stated, with specific detail, that it would have—and \\nwhy it would have—imposed the same sentence under \\n§ 3553, even if it had erred in applying the enhancement. 560 \\nF.3d at 667; see also United States v. Shelton, 905 F.3d 1026, 1032 \\n(7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Rabiu, 721 F.3d 467, 471 (7th \\nCir. 2013). Put another way, whether or not the enhancement \\nshould have applied, the district court’s detailed explanation \\nmakes a remand pointless. \\n Salgado nevertheless argues that if the enhancement does \\nnot apply, the district court’s 192‐month sentence would be \\nabove, not below, the applicable Guideline range, making it \\ndifficult for this court to find harmless error. But the district \\ncourt provided the sort of detailed analysis under § 3553 that \\nwould sustain an above‐Guidelines sentence. And we rejected \\nthis type of reasoning in Abbas, where under similar circum‐\\nstances we found harmless error in light of the district court’s \\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 7\\n\\nunambiguous statements and its “detailed explanation for the \\nparallel result.” Abbas, 560 F.3d at 665–68. \\n 2. Mitigation Arguments \\n Salgado also argues that the district court procedurally \\nerred by failing to consider all of his mitigation arguments. \\nSalgado has waived this challenge. The district court, follow‐\\ning United States v. Garcia‐Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. \\n2013), asked defense counsel if it considered all of counsel’s \\nmitigation arguments, to which counsel responded affirma‐\\ntively. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court likewise \\nasked if counsel had “any legal objection to the sentence I \\nhave proposed or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\\nsons under 3553 both as to the term of imprisonment, the con‐\\ndition or terms of supervised release, or any other aspect of \\nthe sentencing.” Defense counsel responded in the negative. \\nThe challenge is thus waived.1 United States v. Tartareanu, 884 \\nF.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2018). \\nB. Substantive Reasonableness \\n Finally, Salgado challenges the substantive reasonable‐\\nness of his sentence, an issue we review for abuse of discre‐\\ntion. See United States v. Thompson, 864 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. \\n2017). In doing so, “we take into account that the sentencing \\n\\n \\n 1 \\n Regardless, Salgado forfeited his arguments by not objecting at sen‐\\ntencing, leaving us to review for plain error, which did not occur here. \\nUnited States v. Pankow, 884 F.3d 785, 791 (7th Cir. 2018). The district court \\nacknowledged and gave meaningful consideration to Salgado’s mitiga‐\\ntion arguments and the § 3553 factors. See United States v. Bustos, 912 F.3d \\n1059, 1063–64 (7th Cir. 2019). \\n \\n\\f8 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\njudge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their im‐\\nport under section 3553(a) in the individual case.” United \\nStates v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quo‐\\ntation marks and citation omitted). \\n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in im‐\\nposing a sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment, which is sub‐\\nstantively reasonable in light of the § 3553 factors. This is true \\nregardless of whether the sentence falls above, within or be‐\\nlow the Guideline range. See Abbas, 560 F.3d at 668. Like in \\nAbbas, the district court gave meaningful and thorough con‐\\nsideration to the pertinent factors to fashion a sentence that \\nmeets the statutory purpose of sentencing. The district court \\nconsidered multiple factors, including the seriousness and na‐\\nture of the offense and the family pressures that contributed \\nto Salgado’s participation in his father’s criminal enterprise. \\nAlthough Salgado may disagree with the district court’s \\nweighing of these factors, neither he nor the record offer any \\nsound reason to disturb the district court’s judgment. \\n III. Conclusion \\n We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4374569/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597316/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Jesus Salgado\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐2194 \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \n v. \n\nJESUS SALGADO, \n Defendant‐Appellant. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \n No. 16‐cr‐00394‐2 — John Robert Blakey, Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 4, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, \nCircuit Judges. \n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Jesus Salgado pleaded guilty to con‐\nspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. At sentenc‐\ning, over Salgado’s objection, the district court applied an ag‐\ngravating role enhancement and calculated the Guidelines \nrange to be 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. The court sen‐\ntenced Salgado below that range, to 192 months’ imprison‐\nment. It explained, however, that even if it were wrong on the \n\f2 No. 18‐2194 \n\nenhancement’s application, it would have imposed the same \nsentence. Salgado appeals, challenging the district court’s ap‐\nplication of the aggravating role enhancement and the sub‐\nstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm. \n I. Background \n Beginning in 2015 or earlier, Salgado conspired with Lo‐\nrenzo Salgado (his father), Ruby Joy Buenaventura, Jose Luis \nRivera, Jr., and others to distribute heroin. As part of the con‐\nspiracy, Salgado used a stash house in Bensenville, Illinois to \nreceive and store narcotics. Salgado’s father, who lived in \nMexico, was the leader of the drug trafficking organization. \n Salgado was arrested in August 2016, after which a federal \ngrand jury indicted him on several heroin‐related charges. See \n21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Salgado pleaded guilty to conspir‐\nacy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. Before sentenc‐\ning, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investi‐\ngation Report (“PSR”), relying on, among other things, the \ngovernment’s version of events, Rivera’s grand jury testi‐\nmony, and statements from a DEA Special Agent. \n The PSR recommended an aggravating role enhancement \nunder § 3B1.1(b), reasoning that Salgado, though subordinate \nto his father, “directed and controlled” Buenaventura and Ri‐\nvera and was the Chicago‐based leader of the conspiracy. Sal‐\ngado objected to the enhancement in a presentencing memo‐\nrandum and also at sentencing on the primary basis that his \nfather ran the drug organization. According to Salgado, he \nhad “no decision making authority, acted solely at the direc‐\ntion of [his father] … did not arrange the importation of the \n\fNo. 18‐2194 3\n\ndrugs, and did not set any of the price or quantity terms.” Sal‐\ngado argued that the government had failed to prove other‐\nwise by a preponderance of the evidence. \n At sentencing, the district court asked the parties if they \nhad any corrections to the PSR. Both parties said no. The dis‐\ntrict court heard argument on the disputed enhancement un‐\nder § 3B1.1(b), which provides for a three‐level enhancement \nif the defendant “was a manager or supervisor (but not an or‐\nganizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or \nmore participants … .” The court applied the enhancement, \nexplaining that based on the “undisputed portions of the fac‐\ntual record” there were at least five participants to the con‐\nspiracy, and that Salgado’s “role as the supervisor is clear \nfrom the materials that are not disputed.” The court did not \nidentify any evidence in the record, nor did it make any spe‐\ncific factual findings to support the enhancement. With the \nenhancement applied, the district court calculated the Guide‐\nlines range as 210 to 262 months in prison. \n The court then heard argument on the appropriate sen‐\ntence. Seeking a statutory minimum sentence of 120 months, \nSalgado argued that his family, especially his father, pres‐\nsured him into criminal activity. He also argued that the \nGuidelines overstated his criminal history and role in the of‐\nfense. For its part, the government emphasized the serious‐\nness of the offense and disputed that the Guidelines over‐\nstated Salgado’s criminal history or role in the offense. \n The court discussed the § 3553 factors in detail. In impos‐\ning sentence, the court initially explained that even if it erred \nin applying the § 3B1.1(b) aggravating role enhancement, the \nsentence would have been the same: \n\f4 No. 18‐2194 \n\n The court has considered the factors under 3553 to fashion \n a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to \n accomplish the purposes of sentencing. And having consid‐\n ered those factors, the sentence I am about to impose would \n be the same even if the guidelines were a little bit different. \n Counsel’s made a variety of arguments regarding the calcu‐\n lation. He’s made some arguments by way of 3553 factors, \n other guideline objections, certainly in particular the … ag‐\n gravating role. The Court has considered those arguments. \n And while the aggravating role objection was overruled \n and I believe the application was appropriate in this case, \n the arguments made by your counsel were considered and \n are reflected in the 3553 factors. So even if the guideline cal‐\n culation was different, even if I made a mistake in the cal‐\n culation with respect to the aggravating role, the guideline \n sentence is going to not control the sentence here. What’s \n going to control is the 3553 factors. So even if that calcula‐\n tion should have been different, the ultimate sentence is go‐\n ing to be the same either. \nThe court touched on this point later in the hearing: \n I’ve also considered your role in the offense. The enhance‐\n ment was appropriate but not all defendants who are enti‐\n tled or should have that enhancement are created equally \n and your counsel made a lot of good arguments in that re‐\n gard and I’ve considered them in fashioning a sentence un‐\n der 3553 … . And while … I believe … the enhancement was \n appropriately applied, that’s what 3553 is to for, to fashion \n an individual sentence and that’s what I’ve tried to do. \n The court explained its sentencing rationale, discussing \nboth mitigating and aggravating factors in detail. Afterwards, \nthe court asked defense counsel if it had considered all \n“primary arguments in mitigation.” Counsel responded: \n“You have, your Honor.” The court then imposed a below‐\n\fNo. 18‐2194 5\n\nGuidelines sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment. The court \nasked if either party wanted “any further elaboration of [its] \nreasons under 3553.” Defense counsel responded: “No, your \nHonor.” \n II. Discussion \n Salgado argues that the district court erred in applying the \naggravating role enhancement and in not adequately consid‐\nering all of his mitigation arguments. He also challenges the \nsubstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We take these ar‐\nguments in turn. \nA. Procedural Reasonableness \n We review procedural challenges to sentences de novo. \nUnited States v. Griffith, 913 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2019). Our \ntask is to “ensure that the district court committed no signifi‐\ncant procedural error, such as incorrectly calculating the \nguidelines range, failing to consider the section 3553(a) fac‐\ntors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or \nfailing to explain adequately the chosen sentence.” Id. (citing \nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). \n 1. Aggravating Role Enhancement \n Salgado first argues that the district court failed to make \nsufficient factual findings to support the enhancement. We \nagree. Despite Salgado’s objection to the enhancement—\ndetailed in a presentencing memorandum and argued at \nsentencing—the district court made no factual findings to \nsupport the enhancement. Instead, it vaguely referenced \nsupposedly undisputed record items to support its decision \nto apply the enhancement. \n\f6 No. 18‐2194 \n\n This is a problem, both because the district court’s cursory \napplication of the enhancement precludes meaningful judicial \nreview and because Salgado did, in fact, dispute the salient \nfacts, including the extent of his supervision of others, the \ngrand jury testimony of Rivera, and the role that his father \nplayed. As we have said before, “it is not our role to justify a \nsentence that lacks a sufficient explanation with our best \nguess for why the court imposed the sentence that it did.” \nUnited States v. Titus, 821 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2016). \n The district court’s procedural error, however, was harm‐\nless under the circumstances. See United States v. Clark, 906 \nF.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d \n660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009). While we need not determine whether \nthe enhancement in fact applies, the district court unambigu‐\nously stated, with specific detail, that it would have—and \nwhy it would have—imposed the same sentence under \n§ 3553, even if it had erred in applying the enhancement. 560 \nF.3d at 667; see also United States v. Shelton, 905 F.3d 1026, 1032 \n(7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Rabiu, 721 F.3d 467, 471 (7th \nCir. 2013). Put another way, whether or not the enhancement \nshould have applied, the district court’s detailed explanation \nmakes a remand pointless. \n Salgado nevertheless argues that if the enhancement does \nnot apply, the district court’s 192‐month sentence would be \nabove, not below, the applicable Guideline range, making it \ndifficult for this court to find harmless error. But the district \ncourt provided the sort of detailed analysis under § 3553 that \nwould sustain an above‐Guidelines sentence. And we rejected \nthis type of reasoning in Abbas, where under similar circum‐\nstances we found harmless error in light of the district court’s \n\fNo. 18‐2194 7\n\nunambiguous statements and its “detailed explanation for the \nparallel result.” Abbas, 560 F.3d at 665–68. \n 2. Mitigation Arguments \n Salgado also argues that the district court procedurally \nerred by failing to consider all of his mitigation arguments. \nSalgado has waived this challenge. The district court, follow‐\ning United States v. Garcia‐Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. \n2013), asked defense counsel if it considered all of counsel’s \nmitigation arguments, to which counsel responded affirma‐\ntively. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court likewise \nasked if counsel had “any legal objection to the sentence I \nhave proposed or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\nsons under 3553 both as to the term of imprisonment, the con‐\ndition or terms of supervised release, or any other aspect of \nthe sentencing.” Defense counsel responded in the negative. \nThe challenge is thus waived.1 United States v. Tartareanu, 884 \nF.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2018). \nB. Substantive Reasonableness \n Finally, Salgado challenges the substantive reasonable‐\nness of his sentence, an issue we review for abuse of discre‐\ntion. See United States v. Thompson, 864 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. \n2017). In doing so, “we take into account that the sentencing \n\n \n 1 \n Regardless, Salgado forfeited his arguments by not objecting at sen‐\ntencing, leaving us to review for plain error, which did not occur here. \nUnited States v. Pankow, 884 F.3d 785, 791 (7th Cir. 2018). The district court \nacknowledged and gave meaningful consideration to Salgado’s mitiga‐\ntion arguments and the § 3553 factors. See United States v. Bustos, 912 F.3d \n1059, 1063–64 (7th Cir. 2019). \n \n\f8 No. 18‐2194 \n\njudge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their im‐\nport under section 3553(a) in the individual case.” United \nStates v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quo‐\ntation marks and citation omitted). \n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in im‐\nposing a sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment, which is sub‐\nstantively reasonable in light of the § 3553 factors. This is true \nregardless of whether the sentence falls above, within or be‐\nlow the Guideline range. See Abbas, 560 F.3d at 668. Like in \nAbbas, the district court gave meaningful and thorough con‐\nsideration to the pertinent factors to fashion a sentence that \nmeets the statutory purpose of sentencing. The district court \nconsidered multiple factors, including the seriousness and na‐\nture of the offense and the family pressures that contributed \nto Salgado’s participation in his father’s criminal enterprise. \nAlthough Salgado may disagree with the district court’s \nweighing of these factors, neither he nor the record offer any \nsound reason to disturb the district court’s judgment. \n III. Conclusion \n We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Jesus Salgado\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐2194 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nJESUS SALGADO, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 16‐cr‐00394‐2 — John Robert Blakey, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 4, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Jesus Salgado pleaded guilty to con‐\\nspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. At sentenc‐\\ning, over Salgado’s objection, the district court applied an ag‐\\ngravating role enhancement and calculated the Guidelines \\nrange to be 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. The court sen‐\\ntenced Salgado below that range, to 192 months’ imprison‐\\nment. It explained, however, that even if it were wrong on the \\n\\f2 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\nenhancement’s application, it would have imposed the same \\nsentence. Salgado appeals, challenging the district court’s ap‐\\nplication of the aggravating role enhancement and the sub‐\\nstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm. \\n I. Background \\n Beginning in 2015 or earlier, Salgado conspired with Lo‐\\nrenzo Salgado (his father), Ruby Joy Buenaventura, Jose Luis \\nRivera, Jr., and others to distribute heroin. As part of the con‐\\nspiracy, Salgado used a stash house in Bensenville, Illinois to \\nreceive and store narcotics. Salgado’s father, who lived in \\nMexico, was the leader of the drug trafficking organization. \\n Salgado was arrested in August 2016, after which a federal \\ngrand jury indicted him on several heroin‐related charges. See \\n21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Salgado pleaded guilty to conspir‐\\nacy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. Before sentenc‐\\ning, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investi‐\\ngation Report (“PSR”), relying on, among other things, the \\ngovernment’s version of events, Rivera’s grand jury testi‐\\nmony, and statements from a DEA Special Agent. \\n The PSR recommended an aggravating role enhancement \\nunder § 3B1.1(b), reasoning that Salgado, though subordinate \\nto his father, “directed and controlled” Buenaventura and Ri‐\\nvera and was the Chicago‐based leader of the conspiracy. Sal‐\\ngado objected to the enhancement in a presentencing memo‐\\nrandum and also at sentencing on the primary basis that his \\nfather ran the drug organization. According to Salgado, he \\nhad “no decision making authority, acted solely at the direc‐\\ntion of [his father] … did not arrange the importation of the \\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 3\\n\\ndrugs, and did not set any of the price or quantity terms.” Sal‐\\ngado argued that the government had failed to prove other‐\\nwise by a preponderance of the evidence. \\n At sentencing, the district court asked the parties if they \\nhad any corrections to the PSR. Both parties said no. The dis‐\\ntrict court heard argument on the disputed enhancement un‐\\nder § 3B1.1(b), which provides for a three‐level enhancement \\nif the defendant “was a manager or supervisor (but not an or‐\\nganizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or \\nmore participants … .” The court applied the enhancement, \\nexplaining that based on the “undisputed portions of the fac‐\\ntual record” there were at least five participants to the con‐\\nspiracy, and that Salgado’s “role as the supervisor is clear \\nfrom the materials that are not disputed.” The court did not \\nidentify any evidence in the record, nor did it make any spe‐\\ncific factual findings to support the enhancement. With the \\nenhancement applied, the district court calculated the Guide‐\\nlines range as 210 to 262 months in prison. \\n The court then heard argument on the appropriate sen‐\\ntence. Seeking a statutory minimum sentence of 120 months, \\nSalgado argued that his family, especially his father, pres‐\\nsured him into criminal activity. He also argued that the \\nGuidelines overstated his criminal history and role in the of‐\\nfense. For its part, the government emphasized the serious‐\\nness of the offense and disputed that the Guidelines over‐\\nstated Salgado’s criminal history or role in the offense. \\n The court discussed the § 3553 factors in detail. In impos‐\\ning sentence, the court initially explained that even if it erred \\nin applying the § 3B1.1(b) aggravating role enhancement, the \\nsentence would have been the same: \\n\\f4 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\n The court has considered the factors under 3553 to fashion \\n a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to \\n accomplish the purposes of sentencing. And having consid‐\\n ered those factors, the sentence I am about to impose would \\n be the same even if the guidelines were a little bit different. \\n Counsel’s made a variety of arguments regarding the calcu‐\\n lation. He’s made some arguments by way of 3553 factors, \\n other guideline objections, certainly in particular the … ag‐\\n gravating role. The Court has considered those arguments. \\n And while the aggravating role objection was overruled \\n and I believe the application was appropriate in this case, \\n the arguments made by your counsel were considered and \\n are reflected in the 3553 factors. So even if the guideline cal‐\\n culation was different, even if I made a mistake in the cal‐\\n culation with respect to the aggravating role, the guideline \\n sentence is going to not control the sentence here. What’s \\n going to control is the 3553 factors. So even if that calcula‐\\n tion should have been different, the ultimate sentence is go‐\\n ing to be the same either. \\nThe court touched on this point later in the hearing: \\n I’ve also considered your role in the offense. The enhance‐\\n ment was appropriate but not all defendants who are enti‐\\n tled or should have that enhancement are created equally \\n and your counsel made a lot of good arguments in that re‐\\n gard and I’ve considered them in fashioning a sentence un‐\\n der 3553 … . And while … I believe … the enhancement was \\n appropriately applied, that’s what 3553 is to for, to fashion \\n an individual sentence and that’s what I’ve tried to do. \\n The court explained its sentencing rationale, discussing \\nboth mitigating and aggravating factors in detail. Afterwards, \\nthe court asked defense counsel if it had considered all \\n“primary arguments in mitigation.” Counsel responded: \\n“You have, your Honor.” The court then imposed a below‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 5\\n\\nGuidelines sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment. The court \\nasked if either party wanted “any further elaboration of [its] \\nreasons under 3553.” Defense counsel responded: “No, your \\nHonor.” \\n II. Discussion \\n Salgado argues that the district court erred in applying the \\naggravating role enhancement and in not adequately consid‐\\nering all of his mitigation arguments. He also challenges the \\nsubstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We take these ar‐\\nguments in turn. \\nA. Procedural Reasonableness \\n We review procedural challenges to sentences de novo. \\nUnited States v. Griffith, 913 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2019). Our \\ntask is to “ensure that the district court committed no signifi‐\\ncant procedural error, such as incorrectly calculating the \\nguidelines range, failing to consider the section 3553(a) fac‐\\ntors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or \\nfailing to explain adequately the chosen sentence.” Id. (citing \\nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). \\n 1. Aggravating Role Enhancement \\n Salgado first argues that the district court failed to make \\nsufficient factual findings to support the enhancement. We \\nagree. Despite Salgado’s objection to the enhancement—\\ndetailed in a presentencing memorandum and argued at \\nsentencing—the district court made no factual findings to \\nsupport the enhancement. Instead, it vaguely referenced \\nsupposedly undisputed record items to support its decision \\nto apply the enhancement. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\n This is a problem, both because the district court’s cursory \\napplication of the enhancement precludes meaningful judicial \\nreview and because Salgado did, in fact, dispute the salient \\nfacts, including the extent of his supervision of others, the \\ngrand jury testimony of Rivera, and the role that his father \\nplayed. As we have said before, “it is not our role to justify a \\nsentence that lacks a sufficient explanation with our best \\nguess for why the court imposed the sentence that it did.” \\nUnited States v. Titus, 821 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n The district court’s procedural error, however, was harm‐\\nless under the circumstances. See United States v. Clark, 906 \\nF.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d \\n660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009). While we need not determine whether \\nthe enhancement in fact applies, the district court unambigu‐\\nously stated, with specific detail, that it would have—and \\nwhy it would have—imposed the same sentence under \\n§ 3553, even if it had erred in applying the enhancement. 560 \\nF.3d at 667; see also United States v. Shelton, 905 F.3d 1026, 1032 \\n(7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Rabiu, 721 F.3d 467, 471 (7th \\nCir. 2013). Put another way, whether or not the enhancement \\nshould have applied, the district court’s detailed explanation \\nmakes a remand pointless. \\n Salgado nevertheless argues that if the enhancement does \\nnot apply, the district court’s 192‐month sentence would be \\nabove, not below, the applicable Guideline range, making it \\ndifficult for this court to find harmless error. But the district \\ncourt provided the sort of detailed analysis under § 3553 that \\nwould sustain an above‐Guidelines sentence. And we rejected \\nthis type of reasoning in Abbas, where under similar circum‐\\nstances we found harmless error in light of the district court’s \\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 7\\n\\nunambiguous statements and its “detailed explanation for the \\nparallel result.” Abbas, 560 F.3d at 665–68. \\n 2. Mitigation Arguments \\n Salgado also argues that the district court procedurally \\nerred by failing to consider all of his mitigation arguments. \\nSalgado has waived this challenge. The district court, follow‐\\ning United States v. Garcia‐Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. \\n2013), asked defense counsel if it considered all of counsel’s \\nmitigation arguments, to which counsel responded affirma‐\\ntively. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court likewise \\nasked if counsel had “any legal objection to the sentence I \\nhave proposed or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\\nsons under 3553 both as to the term of imprisonment, the con‐\\ndition or terms of supervised release, or any other aspect of \\nthe sentencing.” Defense counsel responded in the negative. \\nThe challenge is thus waived.1 United States v. Tartareanu, 884 \\nF.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2018). \\nB. Substantive Reasonableness \\n Finally, Salgado challenges the substantive reasonable‐\\nness of his sentence, an issue we review for abuse of discre‐\\ntion. See United States v. Thompson, 864 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. \\n2017). In doing so, “we take into account that the sentencing \\n\\n \\n 1 \\n Regardless, Salgado forfeited his arguments by not objecting at sen‐\\ntencing, leaving us to review for plain error, which did not occur here. \\nUnited States v. Pankow, 884 F.3d 785, 791 (7th Cir. 2018). The district court \\nacknowledged and gave meaningful consideration to Salgado’s mitiga‐\\ntion arguments and the § 3553 factors. See United States v. Bustos, 912 F.3d \\n1059, 1063–64 (7th Cir. 2019). \\n \\n\\f8 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\njudge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their im‐\\nport under section 3553(a) in the individual case.” United \\nStates v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quo‐\\ntation marks and citation omitted). \\n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in im‐\\nposing a sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment, which is sub‐\\nstantively reasonable in light of the § 3553 factors. This is true \\nregardless of whether the sentence falls above, within or be‐\\nlow the Guideline range. See Abbas, 560 F.3d at 668. Like in \\nAbbas, the district court gave meaningful and thorough con‐\\nsideration to the pertinent factors to fashion a sentence that \\nmeets the statutory purpose of sentencing. The district court \\nconsidered multiple factors, including the seriousness and na‐\\nture of the offense and the family pressures that contributed \\nto Salgado’s participation in his father’s criminal enterprise. \\nAlthough Salgado may disagree with the district court’s \\nweighing of these factors, neither he nor the record offer any \\nsound reason to disturb the district court’s judgment. \\n III. Conclusion \\n We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1175,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4597320,"string":"4,597,320"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Anthony Sansone v. Megan Brennan"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3632"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-3534 & No. 17-3632\\nANTHONY SANSONE,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General of the United States,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:13-cv-03415 — Milton I. Shadur, Judge,\\n and Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Tony Sansone, who is confined to\\na wheelchair, needs a parking place with room to deploy his\\nvan’s wheelchair ramp. For years, the Postal Service, his\\nemployer, provided him one. But in 2011, it took that spot\\naway and failed to provide him with a suitable replacement.\\nSansone then retired and sued the Service under the\\nRehabilitation Act for failing to accommodate his disability.\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nA jury returned a verdict in his favor and Sansone recovered\\ncompensatory damages, as well as back and front pay.\\n The Service asks us to vacate the district court’s judgment\\nbecause of two jury instructions: one about an employee’s\\nobligation to cooperate with his employer in identifying a\\nreasonable accommodation and the other about how the jury\\nshould evaluate the Service’s expert witness. We hold that the\\ndistrict court did not err with respect to the former, but its\\ninstruction about the expert was both wrong and prejudicial.\\nThe Service also appeals the district court’s award of back and\\nfront pay, but it forfeited that argument by failing to raise it\\nbelow.\\n I.\\n Anthony Sansone began his thirty-year career at the Postal\\nService in 1981. He was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in\\n1991, and, 8 years later, the disease put him in a wheelchair.\\nThe Service gave him a reserved space near the loading docks,\\nwhere there was room to deploy his van’s wheelchair ramp.\\nThat arrangement lasted until 2011, when the plant manager,\\nRuby Branch, asked Sansone to stop parking there.\\n Sansone was greatly upset by Branch’s decision. He\\nviewed it as arbitrary; Branch told him that it was driven by\\nsafety concerns. She offered Sansone two other options: to\\npark in one of the handicapped spots in front of the building\\nor her own reserved space in the back of the building. Neither\\nmet his needs. Branch’s reserved space, like most of the\\nhandicapped spots, didn’t provide enough room to deploy\\nhis van’s passenger-side ramp, and the few handicapped\\nspots that had enough room were usually taken. In addition,\\nthe spots in the back of the building (like Branch’s spot)\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 3\\n\\nwould require him to travel in his wheelchair along a busy\\ntruck route in the dark. So with the permission of his direct\\nsupervisor, Chuck von Rhein, Sansone continued to park in\\nhis usual place while waiting for a solution to the problem.\\n Two weeks later, Sansone emailed the maintenance\\nmanager, LaShawn Jacobs, for an update on his parking\\nsituation. Jacobs reiterated what Branch had said before: that\\nSansone must park in one of the proposed spaces. Sansone\\nthen sought help from Stephen Grieser, chair of the Postal\\nService district’s Reasonable Accommodation Committee,\\nwho told Sansone that he would start the process of\\nidentifying a reasonable accommodation for him.\\n A few days later, Branch noticed Sansone’s van parked\\nnear the loading docks. She told Jacobs to inform Sansone that\\nhe should move it or risk having it towed. When Jacobs\\nrelayed the message, Sansone panicked, started to experience\\nchest pain, and left work. He worried that if his van had been\\ntowed, he would have been stranded at work because he\\nneeded the van to load his wheelchair. The next day he went\\nto see a doctor because he was still experiencing panic attacks.\\nThe doctor recommended that he stay home until the\\nsituation was rectified and prescribed medication to help him\\ndeal with the stress.\\n After another two weeks passed, Grieser sent Sansone a\\nletter asking him to provide medical information about his\\n“condition and the specific limitations that it imposes” so that\\nhe could address Sansone’s parking situation. The letter\\nexacerbated Sansone’s frustration because in his view, it\\nsought information that the Service already knew—that he\\nhad multiple sclerosis and was confined to a wheelchair.\\nSansone did not provide Grieser with the redundant medical\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\ninformation. Instead, he asked von Rhein, his supervisor, to\\ntell Grieser to stop pursuing the parking issue because by that\\npoint, the stress of the situation had rendered Sansone unable\\nto go back to work at the Service no matter where he parked.\\nHe filed for disability retirement, which the Office of\\nPersonnel Management granted.\\n Sansone then sued the Service under the Rehabilitation\\nAct, 29 U.S.C. § 791, et seq., for constructive discharge and\\nfailure to accommodate. The district court granted the\\nService’s summary judgment motion on the constructive\\ndischarge claim, but it denied both parties’ motions for\\nsummary judgment on the failure to accommodate claim. The\\ncase proceeded to trial, and Sansone won $300,000 in\\ncompensatory damages.\\n After the verdict came in, the district court addressed\\nSansone’s equitable claim for back and front pay. It awarded\\nhim $828,774—an amount covering the period between the\\ndate of his termination and January 20, 2023, the date on\\nwhich he would have retired.\\n The Service presses three arguments on appeal, one\\nrelated to the merits of Sansone’s “failure to accommodate”\\nclaim and the other two related to damages.\\n II.\\n To succeed on his failure to accommodate claim under 29\\nU.S.C. § 794, Sansone had to prove that (1) he was a qualified\\nindividual with a disability, (2) the Service was aware of his\\ndisability, and (3) the Service failed to reasonably\\naccommodate his disability. King v. City of Madison, 550 F.3d\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 5\\n\\n598, 600 (7th Cir. 2008). 1 Relevant to—and sometimes\\ndeterminative of—the third element is the employer and\\nemployee’s respective cooperation “in an interactive process\\nto determine a reasonable accommodation.” Baert v. Euclid\\nBeverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 1998). The Service\\ncontends that the district court erroneously instructed the jury\\nabout the consequences of an employee’s failure to cooperate\\nin this “interactive process.”\\n Some background on this “interactive process” is\\nnecessary to understand the Service’s objection to the jury\\ninstruction. While the “interactive process” is important, it is\\na means for identifying a reasonable accommodation rather\\nthan an end in itself. Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d\\n1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 1997). And because the process is not an\\nend in itself, an employer cannot be liable solely for refusing\\nto take part in it. For example, “[f]ailure to engage in this\\n‘interactive process’ cannot give rise to a claim for relief … if\\nthe employer can show that no reasonable accommodation\\nwas possible.” Hansen v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir.\\n2000). Nor will it give rise to a claim against an employer who\\nreasonably accommodated the employee. Rehling v. City of\\nChicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The ADA seeks\\nto ensure that qualified individuals are accommodated in the\\nworkplace, not to punish employers who, despite their failure\\nto engage in an interactive process, have made reasonable\\naccommodations.”). But when a reasonable accommodation\\nwas possible and the employer did not offer it, the third\\n\\n\\n1\\n “[T]o determine whether the Rehabilitation Act has been violated in the\\nemployment context, we refer to the provisions and standards of the\\n[Americans with Disabilities Act].” Jackson v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806,\\n810–11 (7th Cir. 2005); see 29 U.S.C. § 794(d).\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nelement of a “failure to accommodate” claim turns on the\\n“interactive process” requirement. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &\\nCo., 417 F.3d 789, 805 (7th Cir. 2005). In that event,\\n“responsibility will lie with the party that caused the\\nbreakdown.” Id. at 805. According to the Service, this is where\\nthe district court went awry.\\n The Service insists that the court erroneously instructed\\nthe jury that it could render a verdict for Sansone even if he\\nwas at fault for the breakdown of the interactive process. Over\\nthe Service’s objection, the court instructed the jury as\\nfollows:\\n Once an employer is aware of the employee’s\\n disability and an accommodation has been\\n requested, the employer must discuss with the\\n employee whether there is a reasonable\\n accommodation that will permit him to perform\\n his job. Both the employer and the employee\\n must cooperate in the interactive process in\\n good faith. Neither party can win this case\\n solely because the other did not cooperate in\\n that process in the way that the party believed\\n appropriate, but you may consider whether a\\n party cooperated in that process when deciding\\n whether a reasonable accommodation existed.\\nThe Service argues that telling the jury that “neither party can\\nwin this case solely because the other did not cooperate” is\\ninconsistent with Sears, which says that “when an employer\\ntakes an active, good-faith role in the interactive process, it\\nwill not be liable if the employee refuses to participate or\\nwithholds essential information.” 417 F.3d at 806.\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 7\\n\\n The Service’s argument distorts the jury instruction by\\nfocusing exclusively on the opening few words of a longer\\nsentence. Read out of context, the cherry-picked words state\\nthat the jury cannot treat one party’s failure to cooperate as\\noutcome-determinative. That is inconsistent with Sears. Read\\nin context, however, they make a different and entirely\\nuncontroversial point: that the jury cannot evaluate the\\nsufficiency of one party’s cooperation according to the\\nexpectations of the other. (“Neither party can win solely\\nbecause the other did not cooperate in that process in the way\\nthat the party believed appropriate … .” (emphasis added)). In\\nother words, the Service’s belief that Sansone did not\\ncooperate did not mean that he did not cooperate—and vice\\nversa. That is plainly correct.\\n In sum, the Service would have a point if the court had\\ntold the jury that Sansone could win even if he shut down the\\ninteractive process. Unfortunately for the Service, however,\\nthat is not what the court said.\\n III.\\n The Service’s next argument concerns its expert witness,\\nDr. Diana Goldstein, who offered an opinion on the cause of\\nSansone’s emotional distress, an issue relevant to\\ncompensatory damages. On cross-examination, Sansone’s\\nlawyer asked Goldstein if she had read the Service’s brief in\\nsupport of its summary judgment motion in the course of\\npreparing her report. She said that she had, and Sansone’s\\nlawyer pressed: “To get your understanding of the facts you\\nread the Postal Service’s Statement of Material Facts in\\nsupport of its motion for summary judgment, correct?”\\nGoldstein replied:\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\n I wouldn’t agree with that statement. I would\\n say that it helps me understand the story, but I\\n get my facts about what Mr. Sansone is claiming\\n in turn—by way of emotional distress and\\n changes in physical symptoms by meeting with\\n him, by reviewing objective records, et cetera.\\n But I do like to have context and so I always\\n review the records just to get a sense of what the\\n whole story is.\\nShe added that as part of that context, she had also read\\nSansone’s complaint, his answers to interrogatories, and his\\ndeposition. Sansone’s lawyer asked whether she had read the\\nbrief opposing the Service’s motion for summary judgment or\\nthe district court’s decision denying the motion, and\\nGoldstein said that she had not.\\n Shortly thereafter, Goldstein responded to a question\\nabout whether she had read the deposition of plant manager\\nRuby Branch by explaining that, although she had, she did\\nnot view it “as relevant to [her] role in assessing Mr. Sansone’s\\nemotional distress claim.” The court interjected: “Wait just a\\nminute. But you thought that the brief in support of a motion\\nfor summary judgment which was denied, that was relevant\\nto your opinion?” When Goldstein answered, “I always read\\nthose,” the court interrupted, “I am not asking what you\\nalways do. I am asking, in this case you felt that that is\\nrelevant to your rendition of an opinion, a lawyer’s argument\\nin connection with this case which was unsuccessful.”\\nGoldstein replied, “No. I just like to know what is going on\\nwith the case.” The court later admonished counsel that\\ngiving Goldstein the summary judgment motion was a “flat-\\nout violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 703.”\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 9\\n\\n The court hammered that position home in its jury\\ninstructions. In evaluating Goldstein’s opinion, it told the\\njurors that they should keep in mind that\\n [S]he had been provided by counsel for the\\n Postal Service with a copy of the Postal Service’s\\n argument that had been made earlier in the case\\n in support of an unsuccessful motion to prevent\\n the case from going to trial on the premise that\\n there were no genuine issues of material fact\\n that called for consideration by a jury. That is a\\n document that presents the Postal Service’s\\n version of the facts and of the legal arguments\\n that they sought to support that motion. It was\\n inappropriate for that information to be\\n provided to the opinion witness. And that\\n inappropriateness was amplified by the failure\\n of the Postal Service’s counsel to provide her\\n with the successful argument that had been\\n made by Sansone’s lawyer in opposition to the\\n motion and, more importantly, by the failure of\\n Postal Service’s counsel to provide her with the\\n Court’s opinion that rejected the motion.\\n It should be added, though, that Sansone’s\\n counsel is also at fault. Why? For not having\\n raised the matter before this Court well in\\n advance of trial because the teaching of the\\n Supreme Court is that the trial judge serves as\\n what they call the gatekeeper in ruling on\\n whether it is or is not proper for any specific\\n proposed opinion witness to be allowed to\\n present his or her testimony to a fact-finding\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\n jury for its consideration. And that matter came\\n before you, just as it came before me, solely at\\n the end of the case.\\n Now with all of that said, you may consider\\n what has been set forth in this instruction that I\\n have composed in explaining the determination\\n called for in the first paragraph of the\\n instruction, that is, give the testimony of each of\\n the witnesses whatever weight you think it\\n deserves, considering the reasons for the\\n opinion, the witness’ qualifications and all of\\n the other evidence in the case.\\nThe Service contends that this instruction erroneously invited\\nthe jury to disregard Goldstein’s opinion.\\n The Service is right. Contrary to the court’s belief, the\\nService did not commit a “flat-out violation of Federal Rule of\\nEvidence 703” by giving Goldstein its summary judgment\\nmotion. Rule 703 does not govern the information that experts\\ncan have; it governs the information on which they can base\\ntheir opinions. It allows experts to rely on inadmissible facts\\nor data in forming an opinion so long as “experts in the\\nparticular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts\\nor data in forming an opinion on the subject.” FED. R. EVID.\\n703.\\n If Goldstein had relied on the summary judgment motion\\nin forming her opinion, the court would have had to\\ndetermine whether experts in her field “reasonably rely” on\\nsummary judgment motions in assessing someone’s\\nemotional distress—and presumably they don’t. But\\nGoldstein expressly stated that she did not rely on the\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 11\\n\\nsummary judgment motion in forming her opinion. She read\\nthe summary judgment motion—along with Sansone’s\\ncomplaint and answers to interrogatories—solely to get\\ncontext about the case. She based her opinion on the facts that\\nshe got from Sansone and his medical records. So long as\\nthose are the kinds of facts and data on which experts in her\\nfield reasonably rely—and presumably they are—her opinion\\nsatisfied Rule 703. Any suggestion that Goldstein was biased\\nin favor of the Service could be explored on cross—as Sansone\\nwas doing before the court seized sua sponte on the illusory\\nRule 703 issue.\\n The district court thus erred when it told the jury that the\\nService had acted inappropriately by giving Goldstein the\\nsummary judgment motion and suggesting that it would\\nhave excluded her testimony had it learned about the issue\\nearlier. Even so, “a new trial is required only if the flawed\\ninstruction could have confused or misled the jury causing\\nprejudice to the complaining party.” Doornbos v. City of\\nChicago, 868 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2017). Sansone says that the\\nService was not prejudiced because Goldstein testified that\\nshe didn’t rely on the summary judgment motion, the court\\npermitted the jury to consider her testimony, and the\\ninstruction emphasized that Sansone was also to blame for\\nnot raising the issue earlier.\\n None of those things blunted the effect of the district\\ncourt’s erroneous instruction, which all but told the jury that\\nit shouldn’t trust anything that Goldstein had said. This not\\nonly misled the jury but also invaded the jury’s function in\\nassessing witness credibility. See Stollings v. Ryobi Tech., Inc.,\\n725 F.3d 753, 765 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that although the\\ndistrict court serves as gatekeeper, “[t]he jury must still be\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nallowed to play its essential role as the arbiter of the weight\\nand credibility of expert testimony”). At the very least, the\\ninstruction left the jury unsure what to make of Goldstein’s\\ntestimony. See Rapold v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 718 F.3d 602, 609 (7th\\nCir. 2013) (explaining that a party is prejudiced by jury\\ninstructions when the “jury was likely to be misled or\\nconfused” by them); Miller v. Neathery, 52 F.3d 634, 639 (7th\\nCir. 1995) (“Under these circumstances, it would be\\nimprudent for us to determine that the lack of sufficient\\nguidance in the instructions did not contribute significantly\\nto the jury’s conclusion.”).\\n The prejudice was particularly acute given what had\\nhappened earlier in the trial. See Susan Wakeen Doll Co., Inc. v.\\nAshton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 452 (7th Cir. 2001) (“An\\nerroneous jury instruction could not prejudice [a party] unless\\nconsidering the instructions as a whole, along with all of the\\nevidence and arguments, the jury was misinformed about the\\napplicable law.”). The court interrupted the cross-\\nexamination of Goldstein to admonish her, expressing\\nincredulity that she had read the summary judgment motion.\\nSee United States v. El-Bey, 873 F.3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir. 2017)\\n(explaining that a trial judge has great influence on the jury\\nand that any statement made about a witness carries great\\nweight). The instructions therefore invited the jury to act on\\nthe skepticism that the court had already sowed.\\n In short, the instruction was erroneous and prejudicial.\\nBut because Goldstein’s testimony went solely to\\ncompensatory damages, we remand for a new trial on that\\nissue only. See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d\\n1081, 1166 (7th Cir. 1983).\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 13\\n\\n IV.\\n The Service’s final argument is that the court erred by\\nawarding Sansone equitable relief in the form of back and\\nfront pay for the time after he retired. It contends that\\nconstructive discharge is required for equitable relief; because\\nSansone was never actively or constructively discharged, it\\nsays, he does not qualify.\\n Sansone argues that the Service waived this argument by\\nfailing to raise it below. What he means to say, however, is\\nthat the Service forfeited this argument. See Hamer v.\\nNeighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 n.1 (2017)\\n(“The terms waiver and forfeiture—although often used\\ninterchangeably by jurists and litigants—are not\\nsynonymous.”). Waiver is intentionally abandoning a known\\nright. United States v. Seals, 813 F.3d 1038, 1044–45 (7th Cir.\\n2016). Forfeiture occurs when a party fails to make an\\nargument because of accident or neglect. Id. at 1045. That’s\\nwhat Sansone says that the Service did here.\\n The Service insists that it raised this argument—that\\nSansone failed to prove actual or constructive discharge and\\nthus could not receive back or front pay—in its damages brief\\nto the district court. This is wishful thinking. The damages\\nbrief focused on two things: (1) errors that the court made\\nbased on the evidence at trial and (2) why Sansone’s award\\nshould be offset by his retirement benefits. And the sole legal\\ncitation in the entire brief went to the offset issue. Indeed, only\\none sentence in the analysis section of its brief mentioned that\\nSansone chose to retire. Read in isolation, that reference might\\ngesture toward a lack of actual or constructive discharge—but\\nthe rest of that sentence continued the brief’s focus on\\noffsetting damages with Sansone’s retirement benefits. The\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nvery best we can say—and it is a stretch—is that the Service\\nraised the “general issue” in its damages brief. Avoiding\\nforfeiture requires more. See Domka v. Portage Cty., Wis., 523\\nF.3d 776, 783 n.11 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that a party cannot\\nraise an issue for the first time on appeal when it raised only\\nthe “general issue” below).\\n ***\\n We VACATE the judgment and REMAND for a new trial\\non the damages issue. We AFFIRM it with respect to the\\nService’s liability, the award of back and front pay, and the\\naward of attorneys’ fees and expenses. 2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n2\\n Because we affirm the judgment as to the Service’s liability, Sansone remains\\nentitled to attorneys’ fees and expenses. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-\\n5(k); cf. Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health\\nand Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (“In designating those parties\\neligible for an award of litigation costs, Congress employed the term ‘prevailing\\nparty,’ a legal term of art. Black’s Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999) defines\\n‘prevailing party’ as ‘[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless\\nof the amount of damages awarded.’” (alteration in original))\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4374573/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597320/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Anthony Sansone v. Megan Brennan\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3534 & No. 17-3632\nANTHONY SANSONE,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nMEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General of the United States,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:13-cv-03415 — Milton I. Shadur, Judge,\n and Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Tony Sansone, who is confined to\na wheelchair, needs a parking place with room to deploy his\nvan’s wheelchair ramp. For years, the Postal Service, his\nemployer, provided him one. But in 2011, it took that spot\naway and failed to provide him with a suitable replacement.\nSansone then retired and sued the Service under the\nRehabilitation Act for failing to accommodate his disability.\n\f2 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\nA jury returned a verdict in his favor and Sansone recovered\ncompensatory damages, as well as back and front pay.\n The Service asks us to vacate the district court’s judgment\nbecause of two jury instructions: one about an employee’s\nobligation to cooperate with his employer in identifying a\nreasonable accommodation and the other about how the jury\nshould evaluate the Service’s expert witness. We hold that the\ndistrict court did not err with respect to the former, but its\ninstruction about the expert was both wrong and prejudicial.\nThe Service also appeals the district court’s award of back and\nfront pay, but it forfeited that argument by failing to raise it\nbelow.\n I.\n Anthony Sansone began his thirty-year career at the Postal\nService in 1981. He was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in\n1991, and, 8 years later, the disease put him in a wheelchair.\nThe Service gave him a reserved space near the loading docks,\nwhere there was room to deploy his van’s wheelchair ramp.\nThat arrangement lasted until 2011, when the plant manager,\nRuby Branch, asked Sansone to stop parking there.\n Sansone was greatly upset by Branch’s decision. He\nviewed it as arbitrary; Branch told him that it was driven by\nsafety concerns. She offered Sansone two other options: to\npark in one of the handicapped spots in front of the building\nor her own reserved space in the back of the building. Neither\nmet his needs. Branch’s reserved space, like most of the\nhandicapped spots, didn’t provide enough room to deploy\nhis van’s passenger-side ramp, and the few handicapped\nspots that had enough room were usually taken. In addition,\nthe spots in the back of the building (like Branch’s spot)\n\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 3\n\nwould require him to travel in his wheelchair along a busy\ntruck route in the dark. So with the permission of his direct\nsupervisor, Chuck von Rhein, Sansone continued to park in\nhis usual place while waiting for a solution to the problem.\n Two weeks later, Sansone emailed the maintenance\nmanager, LaShawn Jacobs, for an update on his parking\nsituation. Jacobs reiterated what Branch had said before: that\nSansone must park in one of the proposed spaces. Sansone\nthen sought help from Stephen Grieser, chair of the Postal\nService district’s Reasonable Accommodation Committee,\nwho told Sansone that he would start the process of\nidentifying a reasonable accommodation for him.\n A few days later, Branch noticed Sansone’s van parked\nnear the loading docks. She told Jacobs to inform Sansone that\nhe should move it or risk having it towed. When Jacobs\nrelayed the message, Sansone panicked, started to experience\nchest pain, and left work. He worried that if his van had been\ntowed, he would have been stranded at work because he\nneeded the van to load his wheelchair. The next day he went\nto see a doctor because he was still experiencing panic attacks.\nThe doctor recommended that he stay home until the\nsituation was rectified and prescribed medication to help him\ndeal with the stress.\n After another two weeks passed, Grieser sent Sansone a\nletter asking him to provide medical information about his\n“condition and the specific limitations that it imposes” so that\nhe could address Sansone’s parking situation. The letter\nexacerbated Sansone’s frustration because in his view, it\nsought information that the Service already knew—that he\nhad multiple sclerosis and was confined to a wheelchair.\nSansone did not provide Grieser with the redundant medical\n\f4 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\ninformation. Instead, he asked von Rhein, his supervisor, to\ntell Grieser to stop pursuing the parking issue because by that\npoint, the stress of the situation had rendered Sansone unable\nto go back to work at the Service no matter where he parked.\nHe filed for disability retirement, which the Office of\nPersonnel Management granted.\n Sansone then sued the Service under the Rehabilitation\nAct, 29 U.S.C. § 791, et seq., for constructive discharge and\nfailure to accommodate. The district court granted the\nService’s summary judgment motion on the constructive\ndischarge claim, but it denied both parties’ motions for\nsummary judgment on the failure to accommodate claim. The\ncase proceeded to trial, and Sansone won $300,000 in\ncompensatory damages.\n After the verdict came in, the district court addressed\nSansone’s equitable claim for back and front pay. It awarded\nhim $828,774—an amount covering the period between the\ndate of his termination and January 20, 2023, the date on\nwhich he would have retired.\n The Service presses three arguments on appeal, one\nrelated to the merits of Sansone’s “failure to accommodate”\nclaim and the other two related to damages.\n II.\n To succeed on his failure to accommodate claim under 29\nU.S.C. § 794, Sansone had to prove that (1) he was a qualified\nindividual with a disability, (2) the Service was aware of his\ndisability, and (3) the Service failed to reasonably\naccommodate his disability. King v. City of Madison, 550 F.3d\n\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 5\n\n598, 600 (7th Cir. 2008). 1 Relevant to—and sometimes\ndeterminative of—the third element is the employer and\nemployee’s respective cooperation “in an interactive process\nto determine a reasonable accommodation.” Baert v. Euclid\nBeverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 1998). The Service\ncontends that the district court erroneously instructed the jury\nabout the consequences of an employee’s failure to cooperate\nin this “interactive process.”\n Some background on this “interactive process” is\nnecessary to understand the Service’s objection to the jury\ninstruction. While the “interactive process” is important, it is\na means for identifying a reasonable accommodation rather\nthan an end in itself. Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d\n1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 1997). And because the process is not an\nend in itself, an employer cannot be liable solely for refusing\nto take part in it. For example, “[f]ailure to engage in this\n‘interactive process’ cannot give rise to a claim for relief … if\nthe employer can show that no reasonable accommodation\nwas possible.” Hansen v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir.\n2000). Nor will it give rise to a claim against an employer who\nreasonably accommodated the employee. Rehling v. City of\nChicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The ADA seeks\nto ensure that qualified individuals are accommodated in the\nworkplace, not to punish employers who, despite their failure\nto engage in an interactive process, have made reasonable\naccommodations.”). But when a reasonable accommodation\nwas possible and the employer did not offer it, the third\n\n\n1\n “[T]o determine whether the Rehabilitation Act has been violated in the\nemployment context, we refer to the provisions and standards of the\n[Americans with Disabilities Act].” Jackson v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806,\n810–11 (7th Cir. 2005); see 29 U.S.C. § 794(d).\n\f6 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\nelement of a “failure to accommodate” claim turns on the\n“interactive process” requirement. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &\nCo., 417 F.3d 789, 805 (7th Cir. 2005). In that event,\n“responsibility will lie with the party that caused the\nbreakdown.” Id. at 805. According to the Service, this is where\nthe district court went awry.\n The Service insists that the court erroneously instructed\nthe jury that it could render a verdict for Sansone even if he\nwas at fault for the breakdown of the interactive process. Over\nthe Service’s objection, the court instructed the jury as\nfollows:\n Once an employer is aware of the employee’s\n disability and an accommodation has been\n requested, the employer must discuss with the\n employee whether there is a reasonable\n accommodation that will permit him to perform\n his job. Both the employer and the employee\n must cooperate in the interactive process in\n good faith. Neither party can win this case\n solely because the other did not cooperate in\n that process in the way that the party believed\n appropriate, but you may consider whether a\n party cooperated in that process when deciding\n whether a reasonable accommodation existed.\nThe Service argues that telling the jury that “neither party can\nwin this case solely because the other did not cooperate” is\ninconsistent with Sears, which says that “when an employer\ntakes an active, good-faith role in the interactive process, it\nwill not be liable if the employee refuses to participate or\nwithholds essential information.” 417 F.3d at 806.\n\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 7\n\n The Service’s argument distorts the jury instruction by\nfocusing exclusively on the opening few words of a longer\nsentence. Read out of context, the cherry-picked words state\nthat the jury cannot treat one party’s failure to cooperate as\noutcome-determinative. That is inconsistent with Sears. Read\nin context, however, they make a different and entirely\nuncontroversial point: that the jury cannot evaluate the\nsufficiency of one party’s cooperation according to the\nexpectations of the other. (“Neither party can win solely\nbecause the other did not cooperate in that process in the way\nthat the party believed appropriate … .” (emphasis added)). In\nother words, the Service’s belief that Sansone did not\ncooperate did not mean that he did not cooperate—and vice\nversa. That is plainly correct.\n In sum, the Service would have a point if the court had\ntold the jury that Sansone could win even if he shut down the\ninteractive process. Unfortunately for the Service, however,\nthat is not what the court said.\n III.\n The Service’s next argument concerns its expert witness,\nDr. Diana Goldstein, who offered an opinion on the cause of\nSansone’s emotional distress, an issue relevant to\ncompensatory damages. On cross-examination, Sansone’s\nlawyer asked Goldstein if she had read the Service’s brief in\nsupport of its summary judgment motion in the course of\npreparing her report. She said that she had, and Sansone’s\nlawyer pressed: “To get your understanding of the facts you\nread the Postal Service’s Statement of Material Facts in\nsupport of its motion for summary judgment, correct?”\nGoldstein replied:\n\f8 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\n I wouldn’t agree with that statement. I would\n say that it helps me understand the story, but I\n get my facts about what Mr. Sansone is claiming\n in turn—by way of emotional distress and\n changes in physical symptoms by meeting with\n him, by reviewing objective records, et cetera.\n But I do like to have context and so I always\n review the records just to get a sense of what the\n whole story is.\nShe added that as part of that context, she had also read\nSansone’s complaint, his answers to interrogatories, and his\ndeposition. Sansone’s lawyer asked whether she had read the\nbrief opposing the Service’s motion for summary judgment or\nthe district court’s decision denying the motion, and\nGoldstein said that she had not.\n Shortly thereafter, Goldstein responded to a question\nabout whether she had read the deposition of plant manager\nRuby Branch by explaining that, although she had, she did\nnot view it “as relevant to [her] role in assessing Mr. Sansone’s\nemotional distress claim.” The court interjected: “Wait just a\nminute. But you thought that the brief in support of a motion\nfor summary judgment which was denied, that was relevant\nto your opinion?” When Goldstein answered, “I always read\nthose,” the court interrupted, “I am not asking what you\nalways do. I am asking, in this case you felt that that is\nrelevant to your rendition of an opinion, a lawyer’s argument\nin connection with this case which was unsuccessful.”\nGoldstein replied, “No. I just like to know what is going on\nwith the case.” The court later admonished counsel that\ngiving Goldstein the summary judgment motion was a “flat-\nout violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 703.”\n\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 9\n\n The court hammered that position home in its jury\ninstructions. In evaluating Goldstein’s opinion, it told the\njurors that they should keep in mind that\n [S]he had been provided by counsel for the\n Postal Service with a copy of the Postal Service’s\n argument that had been made earlier in the case\n in support of an unsuccessful motion to prevent\n the case from going to trial on the premise that\n there were no genuine issues of material fact\n that called for consideration by a jury. That is a\n document that presents the Postal Service’s\n version of the facts and of the legal arguments\n that they sought to support that motion. It was\n inappropriate for that information to be\n provided to the opinion witness. And that\n inappropriateness was amplified by the failure\n of the Postal Service’s counsel to provide her\n with the successful argument that had been\n made by Sansone’s lawyer in opposition to the\n motion and, more importantly, by the failure of\n Postal Service’s counsel to provide her with the\n Court’s opinion that rejected the motion.\n It should be added, though, that Sansone’s\n counsel is also at fault. Why? For not having\n raised the matter before this Court well in\n advance of trial because the teaching of the\n Supreme Court is that the trial judge serves as\n what they call the gatekeeper in ruling on\n whether it is or is not proper for any specific\n proposed opinion witness to be allowed to\n present his or her testimony to a fact-finding\n\f10 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\n jury for its consideration. And that matter came\n before you, just as it came before me, solely at\n the end of the case.\n Now with all of that said, you may consider\n what has been set forth in this instruction that I\n have composed in explaining the determination\n called for in the first paragraph of the\n instruction, that is, give the testimony of each of\n the witnesses whatever weight you think it\n deserves, considering the reasons for the\n opinion, the witness’ qualifications and all of\n the other evidence in the case.\nThe Service contends that this instruction erroneously invited\nthe jury to disregard Goldstein’s opinion.\n The Service is right. Contrary to the court’s belief, the\nService did not commit a “flat-out violation of Federal Rule of\nEvidence 703” by giving Goldstein its summary judgment\nmotion. Rule 703 does not govern the information that experts\ncan have; it governs the information on which they can base\ntheir opinions. It allows experts to rely on inadmissible facts\nor data in forming an opinion so long as “experts in the\nparticular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts\nor data in forming an opinion on the subject.” FED. R. EVID.\n703.\n If Goldstein had relied on the summary judgment motion\nin forming her opinion, the court would have had to\ndetermine whether experts in her field “reasonably rely” on\nsummary judgment motions in assessing someone’s\nemotional distress—and presumably they don’t. But\nGoldstein expressly stated that she did not rely on the\n\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 11\n\nsummary judgment motion in forming her opinion. She read\nthe summary judgment motion—along with Sansone’s\ncomplaint and answers to interrogatories—solely to get\ncontext about the case. She based her opinion on the facts that\nshe got from Sansone and his medical records. So long as\nthose are the kinds of facts and data on which experts in her\nfield reasonably rely—and presumably they are—her opinion\nsatisfied Rule 703. Any suggestion that Goldstein was biased\nin favor of the Service could be explored on cross—as Sansone\nwas doing before the court seized sua sponte on the illusory\nRule 703 issue.\n The district court thus erred when it told the jury that the\nService had acted inappropriately by giving Goldstein the\nsummary judgment motion and suggesting that it would\nhave excluded her testimony had it learned about the issue\nearlier. Even so, “a new trial is required only if the flawed\ninstruction could have confused or misled the jury causing\nprejudice to the complaining party.” Doornbos v. City of\nChicago, 868 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2017). Sansone says that the\nService was not prejudiced because Goldstein testified that\nshe didn’t rely on the summary judgment motion, the court\npermitted the jury to consider her testimony, and the\ninstruction emphasized that Sansone was also to blame for\nnot raising the issue earlier.\n None of those things blunted the effect of the district\ncourt’s erroneous instruction, which all but told the jury that\nit shouldn’t trust anything that Goldstein had said. This not\nonly misled the jury but also invaded the jury’s function in\nassessing witness credibility. See Stollings v. Ryobi Tech., Inc.,\n725 F.3d 753, 765 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that although the\ndistrict court serves as gatekeeper, “[t]he jury must still be\n\f12 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\nallowed to play its essential role as the arbiter of the weight\nand credibility of expert testimony”). At the very least, the\ninstruction left the jury unsure what to make of Goldstein’s\ntestimony. See Rapold v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 718 F.3d 602, 609 (7th\nCir. 2013) (explaining that a party is prejudiced by jury\ninstructions when the “jury was likely to be misled or\nconfused” by them); Miller v. Neathery, 52 F.3d 634, 639 (7th\nCir. 1995) (“Under these circumstances, it would be\nimprudent for us to determine that the lack of sufficient\nguidance in the instructions did not contribute significantly\nto the jury’s conclusion.”).\n The prejudice was particularly acute given what had\nhappened earlier in the trial. See Susan Wakeen Doll Co., Inc. v.\nAshton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 452 (7th Cir. 2001) (“An\nerroneous jury instruction could not prejudice [a party] unless\nconsidering the instructions as a whole, along with all of the\nevidence and arguments, the jury was misinformed about the\napplicable law.”). The court interrupted the cross-\nexamination of Goldstein to admonish her, expressing\nincredulity that she had read the summary judgment motion.\nSee United States v. El-Bey, 873 F.3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir. 2017)\n(explaining that a trial judge has great influence on the jury\nand that any statement made about a witness carries great\nweight). The instructions therefore invited the jury to act on\nthe skepticism that the court had already sowed.\n In short, the instruction was erroneous and prejudicial.\nBut because Goldstein’s testimony went solely to\ncompensatory damages, we remand for a new trial on that\nissue only. See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d\n1081, 1166 (7th Cir. 1983).\n\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 13\n\n IV.\n The Service’s final argument is that the court erred by\nawarding Sansone equitable relief in the form of back and\nfront pay for the time after he retired. It contends that\nconstructive discharge is required for equitable relief; because\nSansone was never actively or constructively discharged, it\nsays, he does not qualify.\n Sansone argues that the Service waived this argument by\nfailing to raise it below. What he means to say, however, is\nthat the Service forfeited this argument. See Hamer v.\nNeighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 n.1 (2017)\n(“The terms waiver and forfeiture—although often used\ninterchangeably by jurists and litigants—are not\nsynonymous.”). Waiver is intentionally abandoning a known\nright. United States v. Seals, 813 F.3d 1038, 1044–45 (7th Cir.\n2016). Forfeiture occurs when a party fails to make an\nargument because of accident or neglect. Id. at 1045. That’s\nwhat Sansone says that the Service did here.\n The Service insists that it raised this argument—that\nSansone failed to prove actual or constructive discharge and\nthus could not receive back or front pay—in its damages brief\nto the district court. This is wishful thinking. The damages\nbrief focused on two things: (1) errors that the court made\nbased on the evidence at trial and (2) why Sansone’s award\nshould be offset by his retirement benefits. And the sole legal\ncitation in the entire brief went to the offset issue. Indeed, only\none sentence in the analysis section of its brief mentioned that\nSansone chose to retire. Read in isolation, that reference might\ngesture toward a lack of actual or constructive discharge—but\nthe rest of that sentence continued the brief’s focus on\noffsetting damages with Sansone’s retirement benefits. The\n\f14 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\nvery best we can say—and it is a stretch—is that the Service\nraised the “general issue” in its damages brief. Avoiding\nforfeiture requires more. See Domka v. Portage Cty., Wis., 523\nF.3d 776, 783 n.11 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that a party cannot\nraise an issue for the first time on appeal when it raised only\nthe “general issue” below).\n ***\n We VACATE the judgment and REMAND for a new trial\non the damages issue. We AFFIRM it with respect to the\nService’s liability, the award of back and front pay, and the\naward of attorneys’ fees and expenses. 2\n\n\n\n\n2\n Because we affirm the judgment as to the Service’s liability, Sansone remains\nentitled to attorneys’ fees and expenses. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-\n5(k); cf. Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health\nand Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (“In designating those parties\neligible for an award of litigation costs, Congress employed the term ‘prevailing\nparty,’ a legal term of art. Black’s Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999) defines\n‘prevailing party’ as ‘[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless\nof the amount of damages awarded.’” (alteration in original))\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Anthony Sansone v. Megan Brennan\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-3534 & No. 17-3632\\nANTHONY SANSONE,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General of the United States,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:13-cv-03415 — Milton I. Shadur, Judge,\\n and Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Tony Sansone, who is confined to\\na wheelchair, needs a parking place with room to deploy his\\nvan’s wheelchair ramp. For years, the Postal Service, his\\nemployer, provided him one. But in 2011, it took that spot\\naway and failed to provide him with a suitable replacement.\\nSansone then retired and sued the Service under the\\nRehabilitation Act for failing to accommodate his disability.\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nA jury returned a verdict in his favor and Sansone recovered\\ncompensatory damages, as well as back and front pay.\\n The Service asks us to vacate the district court’s judgment\\nbecause of two jury instructions: one about an employee’s\\nobligation to cooperate with his employer in identifying a\\nreasonable accommodation and the other about how the jury\\nshould evaluate the Service’s expert witness. We hold that the\\ndistrict court did not err with respect to the former, but its\\ninstruction about the expert was both wrong and prejudicial.\\nThe Service also appeals the district court’s award of back and\\nfront pay, but it forfeited that argument by failing to raise it\\nbelow.\\n I.\\n Anthony Sansone began his thirty-year career at the Postal\\nService in 1981. He was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in\\n1991, and, 8 years later, the disease put him in a wheelchair.\\nThe Service gave him a reserved space near the loading docks,\\nwhere there was room to deploy his van’s wheelchair ramp.\\nThat arrangement lasted until 2011, when the plant manager,\\nRuby Branch, asked Sansone to stop parking there.\\n Sansone was greatly upset by Branch’s decision. He\\nviewed it as arbitrary; Branch told him that it was driven by\\nsafety concerns. She offered Sansone two other options: to\\npark in one of the handicapped spots in front of the building\\nor her own reserved space in the back of the building. Neither\\nmet his needs. Branch’s reserved space, like most of the\\nhandicapped spots, didn’t provide enough room to deploy\\nhis van’s passenger-side ramp, and the few handicapped\\nspots that had enough room were usually taken. In addition,\\nthe spots in the back of the building (like Branch’s spot)\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 3\\n\\nwould require him to travel in his wheelchair along a busy\\ntruck route in the dark. So with the permission of his direct\\nsupervisor, Chuck von Rhein, Sansone continued to park in\\nhis usual place while waiting for a solution to the problem.\\n Two weeks later, Sansone emailed the maintenance\\nmanager, LaShawn Jacobs, for an update on his parking\\nsituation. Jacobs reiterated what Branch had said before: that\\nSansone must park in one of the proposed spaces. Sansone\\nthen sought help from Stephen Grieser, chair of the Postal\\nService district’s Reasonable Accommodation Committee,\\nwho told Sansone that he would start the process of\\nidentifying a reasonable accommodation for him.\\n A few days later, Branch noticed Sansone’s van parked\\nnear the loading docks. She told Jacobs to inform Sansone that\\nhe should move it or risk having it towed. When Jacobs\\nrelayed the message, Sansone panicked, started to experience\\nchest pain, and left work. He worried that if his van had been\\ntowed, he would have been stranded at work because he\\nneeded the van to load his wheelchair. The next day he went\\nto see a doctor because he was still experiencing panic attacks.\\nThe doctor recommended that he stay home until the\\nsituation was rectified and prescribed medication to help him\\ndeal with the stress.\\n After another two weeks passed, Grieser sent Sansone a\\nletter asking him to provide medical information about his\\n“condition and the specific limitations that it imposes” so that\\nhe could address Sansone’s parking situation. The letter\\nexacerbated Sansone’s frustration because in his view, it\\nsought information that the Service already knew—that he\\nhad multiple sclerosis and was confined to a wheelchair.\\nSansone did not provide Grieser with the redundant medical\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\ninformation. Instead, he asked von Rhein, his supervisor, to\\ntell Grieser to stop pursuing the parking issue because by that\\npoint, the stress of the situation had rendered Sansone unable\\nto go back to work at the Service no matter where he parked.\\nHe filed for disability retirement, which the Office of\\nPersonnel Management granted.\\n Sansone then sued the Service under the Rehabilitation\\nAct, 29 U.S.C. § 791, et seq., for constructive discharge and\\nfailure to accommodate. The district court granted the\\nService’s summary judgment motion on the constructive\\ndischarge claim, but it denied both parties’ motions for\\nsummary judgment on the failure to accommodate claim. The\\ncase proceeded to trial, and Sansone won $300,000 in\\ncompensatory damages.\\n After the verdict came in, the district court addressed\\nSansone’s equitable claim for back and front pay. It awarded\\nhim $828,774—an amount covering the period between the\\ndate of his termination and January 20, 2023, the date on\\nwhich he would have retired.\\n The Service presses three arguments on appeal, one\\nrelated to the merits of Sansone’s “failure to accommodate”\\nclaim and the other two related to damages.\\n II.\\n To succeed on his failure to accommodate claim under 29\\nU.S.C. § 794, Sansone had to prove that (1) he was a qualified\\nindividual with a disability, (2) the Service was aware of his\\ndisability, and (3) the Service failed to reasonably\\naccommodate his disability. King v. City of Madison, 550 F.3d\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 5\\n\\n598, 600 (7th Cir. 2008). 1 Relevant to—and sometimes\\ndeterminative of—the third element is the employer and\\nemployee’s respective cooperation “in an interactive process\\nto determine a reasonable accommodation.” Baert v. Euclid\\nBeverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 1998). The Service\\ncontends that the district court erroneously instructed the jury\\nabout the consequences of an employee’s failure to cooperate\\nin this “interactive process.”\\n Some background on this “interactive process” is\\nnecessary to understand the Service’s objection to the jury\\ninstruction. While the “interactive process” is important, it is\\na means for identifying a reasonable accommodation rather\\nthan an end in itself. Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d\\n1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 1997). And because the process is not an\\nend in itself, an employer cannot be liable solely for refusing\\nto take part in it. For example, “[f]ailure to engage in this\\n‘interactive process’ cannot give rise to a claim for relief … if\\nthe employer can show that no reasonable accommodation\\nwas possible.” Hansen v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir.\\n2000). Nor will it give rise to a claim against an employer who\\nreasonably accommodated the employee. Rehling v. City of\\nChicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The ADA seeks\\nto ensure that qualified individuals are accommodated in the\\nworkplace, not to punish employers who, despite their failure\\nto engage in an interactive process, have made reasonable\\naccommodations.”). But when a reasonable accommodation\\nwas possible and the employer did not offer it, the third\\n\\n\\n1\\n “[T]o determine whether the Rehabilitation Act has been violated in the\\nemployment context, we refer to the provisions and standards of the\\n[Americans with Disabilities Act].” Jackson v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806,\\n810–11 (7th Cir. 2005); see 29 U.S.C. § 794(d).\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nelement of a “failure to accommodate” claim turns on the\\n“interactive process” requirement. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &\\nCo., 417 F.3d 789, 805 (7th Cir. 2005). In that event,\\n“responsibility will lie with the party that caused the\\nbreakdown.” Id. at 805. According to the Service, this is where\\nthe district court went awry.\\n The Service insists that the court erroneously instructed\\nthe jury that it could render a verdict for Sansone even if he\\nwas at fault for the breakdown of the interactive process. Over\\nthe Service’s objection, the court instructed the jury as\\nfollows:\\n Once an employer is aware of the employee’s\\n disability and an accommodation has been\\n requested, the employer must discuss with the\\n employee whether there is a reasonable\\n accommodation that will permit him to perform\\n his job. Both the employer and the employee\\n must cooperate in the interactive process in\\n good faith. Neither party can win this case\\n solely because the other did not cooperate in\\n that process in the way that the party believed\\n appropriate, but you may consider whether a\\n party cooperated in that process when deciding\\n whether a reasonable accommodation existed.\\nThe Service argues that telling the jury that “neither party can\\nwin this case solely because the other did not cooperate” is\\ninconsistent with Sears, which says that “when an employer\\ntakes an active, good-faith role in the interactive process, it\\nwill not be liable if the employee refuses to participate or\\nwithholds essential information.” 417 F.3d at 806.\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 7\\n\\n The Service’s argument distorts the jury instruction by\\nfocusing exclusively on the opening few words of a longer\\nsentence. Read out of context, the cherry-picked words state\\nthat the jury cannot treat one party’s failure to cooperate as\\noutcome-determinative. That is inconsistent with Sears. Read\\nin context, however, they make a different and entirely\\nuncontroversial point: that the jury cannot evaluate the\\nsufficiency of one party’s cooperation according to the\\nexpectations of the other. (“Neither party can win solely\\nbecause the other did not cooperate in that process in the way\\nthat the party believed appropriate … .” (emphasis added)). In\\nother words, the Service’s belief that Sansone did not\\ncooperate did not mean that he did not cooperate—and vice\\nversa. That is plainly correct.\\n In sum, the Service would have a point if the court had\\ntold the jury that Sansone could win even if he shut down the\\ninteractive process. Unfortunately for the Service, however,\\nthat is not what the court said.\\n III.\\n The Service’s next argument concerns its expert witness,\\nDr. Diana Goldstein, who offered an opinion on the cause of\\nSansone’s emotional distress, an issue relevant to\\ncompensatory damages. On cross-examination, Sansone’s\\nlawyer asked Goldstein if she had read the Service’s brief in\\nsupport of its summary judgment motion in the course of\\npreparing her report. She said that she had, and Sansone’s\\nlawyer pressed: “To get your understanding of the facts you\\nread the Postal Service’s Statement of Material Facts in\\nsupport of its motion for summary judgment, correct?”\\nGoldstein replied:\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\n I wouldn’t agree with that statement. I would\\n say that it helps me understand the story, but I\\n get my facts about what Mr. Sansone is claiming\\n in turn—by way of emotional distress and\\n changes in physical symptoms by meeting with\\n him, by reviewing objective records, et cetera.\\n But I do like to have context and so I always\\n review the records just to get a sense of what the\\n whole story is.\\nShe added that as part of that context, she had also read\\nSansone’s complaint, his answers to interrogatories, and his\\ndeposition. Sansone’s lawyer asked whether she had read the\\nbrief opposing the Service’s motion for summary judgment or\\nthe district court’s decision denying the motion, and\\nGoldstein said that she had not.\\n Shortly thereafter, Goldstein responded to a question\\nabout whether she had read the deposition of plant manager\\nRuby Branch by explaining that, although she had, she did\\nnot view it “as relevant to [her] role in assessing Mr. Sansone’s\\nemotional distress claim.” The court interjected: “Wait just a\\nminute. But you thought that the brief in support of a motion\\nfor summary judgment which was denied, that was relevant\\nto your opinion?” When Goldstein answered, “I always read\\nthose,” the court interrupted, “I am not asking what you\\nalways do. I am asking, in this case you felt that that is\\nrelevant to your rendition of an opinion, a lawyer’s argument\\nin connection with this case which was unsuccessful.”\\nGoldstein replied, “No. I just like to know what is going on\\nwith the case.” The court later admonished counsel that\\ngiving Goldstein the summary judgment motion was a “flat-\\nout violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 703.”\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 9\\n\\n The court hammered that position home in its jury\\ninstructions. In evaluating Goldstein’s opinion, it told the\\njurors that they should keep in mind that\\n [S]he had been provided by counsel for the\\n Postal Service with a copy of the Postal Service’s\\n argument that had been made earlier in the case\\n in support of an unsuccessful motion to prevent\\n the case from going to trial on the premise that\\n there were no genuine issues of material fact\\n that called for consideration by a jury. That is a\\n document that presents the Postal Service’s\\n version of the facts and of the legal arguments\\n that they sought to support that motion. It was\\n inappropriate for that information to be\\n provided to the opinion witness. And that\\n inappropriateness was amplified by the failure\\n of the Postal Service’s counsel to provide her\\n with the successful argument that had been\\n made by Sansone’s lawyer in opposition to the\\n motion and, more importantly, by the failure of\\n Postal Service’s counsel to provide her with the\\n Court’s opinion that rejected the motion.\\n It should be added, though, that Sansone’s\\n counsel is also at fault. Why? For not having\\n raised the matter before this Court well in\\n advance of trial because the teaching of the\\n Supreme Court is that the trial judge serves as\\n what they call the gatekeeper in ruling on\\n whether it is or is not proper for any specific\\n proposed opinion witness to be allowed to\\n present his or her testimony to a fact-finding\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\n jury for its consideration. And that matter came\\n before you, just as it came before me, solely at\\n the end of the case.\\n Now with all of that said, you may consider\\n what has been set forth in this instruction that I\\n have composed in explaining the determination\\n called for in the first paragraph of the\\n instruction, that is, give the testimony of each of\\n the witnesses whatever weight you think it\\n deserves, considering the reasons for the\\n opinion, the witness’ qualifications and all of\\n the other evidence in the case.\\nThe Service contends that this instruction erroneously invited\\nthe jury to disregard Goldstein’s opinion.\\n The Service is right. Contrary to the court’s belief, the\\nService did not commit a “flat-out violation of Federal Rule of\\nEvidence 703” by giving Goldstein its summary judgment\\nmotion. Rule 703 does not govern the information that experts\\ncan have; it governs the information on which they can base\\ntheir opinions. It allows experts to rely on inadmissible facts\\nor data in forming an opinion so long as “experts in the\\nparticular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts\\nor data in forming an opinion on the subject.” FED. R. EVID.\\n703.\\n If Goldstein had relied on the summary judgment motion\\nin forming her opinion, the court would have had to\\ndetermine whether experts in her field “reasonably rely” on\\nsummary judgment motions in assessing someone’s\\nemotional distress—and presumably they don’t. But\\nGoldstein expressly stated that she did not rely on the\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 11\\n\\nsummary judgment motion in forming her opinion. She read\\nthe summary judgment motion—along with Sansone’s\\ncomplaint and answers to interrogatories—solely to get\\ncontext about the case. She based her opinion on the facts that\\nshe got from Sansone and his medical records. So long as\\nthose are the kinds of facts and data on which experts in her\\nfield reasonably rely—and presumably they are—her opinion\\nsatisfied Rule 703. Any suggestion that Goldstein was biased\\nin favor of the Service could be explored on cross—as Sansone\\nwas doing before the court seized sua sponte on the illusory\\nRule 703 issue.\\n The district court thus erred when it told the jury that the\\nService had acted inappropriately by giving Goldstein the\\nsummary judgment motion and suggesting that it would\\nhave excluded her testimony had it learned about the issue\\nearlier. Even so, “a new trial is required only if the flawed\\ninstruction could have confused or misled the jury causing\\nprejudice to the complaining party.” Doornbos v. City of\\nChicago, 868 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2017). Sansone says that the\\nService was not prejudiced because Goldstein testified that\\nshe didn’t rely on the summary judgment motion, the court\\npermitted the jury to consider her testimony, and the\\ninstruction emphasized that Sansone was also to blame for\\nnot raising the issue earlier.\\n None of those things blunted the effect of the district\\ncourt’s erroneous instruction, which all but told the jury that\\nit shouldn’t trust anything that Goldstein had said. This not\\nonly misled the jury but also invaded the jury’s function in\\nassessing witness credibility. See Stollings v. Ryobi Tech., Inc.,\\n725 F.3d 753, 765 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that although the\\ndistrict court serves as gatekeeper, “[t]he jury must still be\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nallowed to play its essential role as the arbiter of the weight\\nand credibility of expert testimony”). At the very least, the\\ninstruction left the jury unsure what to make of Goldstein’s\\ntestimony. See Rapold v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 718 F.3d 602, 609 (7th\\nCir. 2013) (explaining that a party is prejudiced by jury\\ninstructions when the “jury was likely to be misled or\\nconfused” by them); Miller v. Neathery, 52 F.3d 634, 639 (7th\\nCir. 1995) (“Under these circumstances, it would be\\nimprudent for us to determine that the lack of sufficient\\nguidance in the instructions did not contribute significantly\\nto the jury’s conclusion.”).\\n The prejudice was particularly acute given what had\\nhappened earlier in the trial. See Susan Wakeen Doll Co., Inc. v.\\nAshton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 452 (7th Cir. 2001) (“An\\nerroneous jury instruction could not prejudice [a party] unless\\nconsidering the instructions as a whole, along with all of the\\nevidence and arguments, the jury was misinformed about the\\napplicable law.”). The court interrupted the cross-\\nexamination of Goldstein to admonish her, expressing\\nincredulity that she had read the summary judgment motion.\\nSee United States v. El-Bey, 873 F.3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir. 2017)\\n(explaining that a trial judge has great influence on the jury\\nand that any statement made about a witness carries great\\nweight). The instructions therefore invited the jury to act on\\nthe skepticism that the court had already sowed.\\n In short, the instruction was erroneous and prejudicial.\\nBut because Goldstein’s testimony went solely to\\ncompensatory damages, we remand for a new trial on that\\nissue only. See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d\\n1081, 1166 (7th Cir. 1983).\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 13\\n\\n IV.\\n The Service’s final argument is that the court erred by\\nawarding Sansone equitable relief in the form of back and\\nfront pay for the time after he retired. It contends that\\nconstructive discharge is required for equitable relief; because\\nSansone was never actively or constructively discharged, it\\nsays, he does not qualify.\\n Sansone argues that the Service waived this argument by\\nfailing to raise it below. What he means to say, however, is\\nthat the Service forfeited this argument. See Hamer v.\\nNeighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 n.1 (2017)\\n(“The terms waiver and forfeiture—although often used\\ninterchangeably by jurists and litigants—are not\\nsynonymous.”). Waiver is intentionally abandoning a known\\nright. United States v. Seals, 813 F.3d 1038, 1044–45 (7th Cir.\\n2016). Forfeiture occurs when a party fails to make an\\nargument because of accident or neglect. Id. at 1045. That’s\\nwhat Sansone says that the Service did here.\\n The Service insists that it raised this argument—that\\nSansone failed to prove actual or constructive discharge and\\nthus could not receive back or front pay—in its damages brief\\nto the district court. This is wishful thinking. The damages\\nbrief focused on two things: (1) errors that the court made\\nbased on the evidence at trial and (2) why Sansone’s award\\nshould be offset by his retirement benefits. And the sole legal\\ncitation in the entire brief went to the offset issue. Indeed, only\\none sentence in the analysis section of its brief mentioned that\\nSansone chose to retire. Read in isolation, that reference might\\ngesture toward a lack of actual or constructive discharge—but\\nthe rest of that sentence continued the brief’s focus on\\noffsetting damages with Sansone’s retirement benefits. The\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nvery best we can say—and it is a stretch—is that the Service\\nraised the “general issue” in its damages brief. Avoiding\\nforfeiture requires more. See Domka v. Portage Cty., Wis., 523\\nF.3d 776, 783 n.11 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that a party cannot\\nraise an issue for the first time on appeal when it raised only\\nthe “general issue” below).\\n ***\\n We VACATE the judgment and REMAND for a new trial\\non the damages issue. We AFFIRM it with respect to the\\nService’s liability, the award of back and front pay, and the\\naward of attorneys’ fees and expenses. 2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n2\\n Because we affirm the judgment as to the Service’s liability, Sansone remains\\nentitled to attorneys’ fees and expenses. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-\\n5(k); cf. Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health\\nand Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (“In designating those parties\\neligible for an award of litigation costs, Congress employed the term ‘prevailing\\nparty,’ a legal term of art. Black’s Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999) defines\\n‘prevailing party’ as ‘[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless\\nof the amount of damages awarded.’” (alteration in original))\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1176,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4597350,"string":"4,597,350"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2598"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Michael Stephen Kanne\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\nWILLIAM LIEBHART & NANCY LIEBHART,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nSPX CORPORATION, TRC ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION, &\\nAPOLLO DISMANTLING SERVICES, INC.\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-700 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n KANNE, Circuit Judge. William and Nancy Liebhart to-\\ngether own three houses on the same block in Watertown,\\nWisconsin. Besides a few other houses, the rest of the block\\nwas previously occupied by an abandoned transformer fac-\\ntory, last owned by SPX Corporation. In 2014, SPX demol-\\nished the building with the assistance of TRC Environmental\\nCorporation and Apollo Dismantling Services (collectively,\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n“the defendants”). The Liebharts allege that dust and debris\\ncontaining toxic chemicals migrated onto their properties,\\ncontaminating their yards and jeopardizing their health and\\nthe health of their tenants.\\n The Liebharts sued under federal statutes authorizing pri-\\nvate rights of action for environmental contamination. They\\nalso brought various state-law claims. Following discovery\\nand the submission of expert witness reports, the district\\ncourt denied the Liebharts’ motion for partial summary judg-\\nment and granted summary judgment to the defendants with\\ncosts. Although the district court adequately evaluated the ex-\\npert witnesses and did not abuse its discretion in its proce-\\ndural decisions, the court set the bar unnecessarily high for\\nȱěȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ\\nutes. For that reason, we vacate the district court’s judgment\\nand remand for reconsideration.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n The factory dates to the 1920s and was used to manufac-\\nture various industrial equipment. Most relevant to our pur-\\npose, the factory manufactured power transformers contain-\\ning polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a carcinogenic chemi-\\ncal banned by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1979.\\nSee Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Pro-\\ncessing, Distribution in Commerce, and Use Prohibitions, 44\\nFǯȱ\\u0014ǯȱřŗǰśŗŚȱǻ\\u000f¢ȱřŗǰȱŗşŝşǼȱǻęȱȱŚŖȱ\\u0005ǯ\\bǯ\\u0014ǯȱpt. 761).\\nThe parties all agree that the facility has not manufactured or\\nhandled any items containing PCBs since 1971, and that it\\nshut down completely in 2005.\\n But even with all the products and manufacturing equip-\\nment removed, PCB contaminants remained in the facility. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 3\\n\\n2009, SPX retained TRC and another company (not named as\\na defendant in this suit) to study the property and determine\\nthe extent and precise location of any PCB contamination.\\n\\u0016ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱ\\nwas generally contaminated, with concentrated amounts lo-\\ncatȱȱęȱȱȱȱǯ\\n Several years went by. In 2014, SPX decided to move ahead\\nwith the demolition, retaining Apollo to conduct the work\\nand TRC to supervise the project. That November, the defend-\\nants timely proposed a self-implementing cleanup plan to the\\nEPA, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 761.61(a). The trouble began\\nas demolition commenced in January 2015. The Liebharts al-\\nlege that Apollo demolished the building recklessly, failing to\\nuse appropriate safety methods to control the dust generated\\nby demolition equipment. They assert that their properties\\n ȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱĴȱȱof photos\\nand videos of dust from the facility blowing toward their\\nhomes to support their allegation.\\n \\u0016ȱ\\u000eȱęȱȱȱ th the local government\\nin February. They also collected a dust-covered sample of\\nsnow from their yard and placed it in a mason jar. Soon there-\\nafter, a representative of the Wisconsin Department of Natu-\\nral Resources (“DNR”) contacted the defendants about the\\nLiebharts’ concerns. In April, TRC collected samples of the\\nsurface soil (roughly down to eight inches below ground) on\\nboth the industrial and residential properties. Sure enough,\\nthe properties tested positive for the presence of PCBs. In Au-\\ngust, the Liebharts vacated the property on advice of their\\nphysician to avoid further exposure to the chemicals. Frus-\\ntrated with the lack of action, William Liebhart had the snow\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nsample tested for PCBs. Although the sample did, in fact, con-\\ntain PCBs, the irregular manner of collection and storage\\nspoiled the sample, and the laboratory declined to endorse the\\nȱ ȱ¢ȱęǯ\\n In September 2015ǰȱ\\u0015\\u0012\\u001aȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\ncontamination to the DNR. In turn, the Liebharts sued in fed-\\neral district court in October. The complaint sought injunctive\\nrelief under both the Resource Conservation and Recovery\\nAct (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and the Toxic Substances\\nControl Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. In addition, the\\nLiebharts brought a host of state-law claims under supple-\\nmental jurisdiction, including strict liability, negligence, tres-\\nǰȱǰȱȱȱĚȱȱȱǯ\\n During discoveryǰȱȱ\\u000eȱĴȱȱȱȬ\\ning for PCBs both in their yard and inside their home. They\\nalso underwent blood testing. Although the external surveys\\nrevealed a more comprehensive picture of the extent to which\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ properties contained PCBs, the in-\\nternal sampling and blood tests were both negative for con-\\ntamination. The Liebharts later learned in October 2017 that\\nthe defendants allegedly buried some of the concrete remains\\non-site rather than removing them to a toxic waste dump as\\nrequired by the EPA-approved clean-up plan.\\n The parties prepared and Ĵȱȱȱȱȱ¡Ȭ\\npert witnesses who were to testify at trial. Among those, three\\nȱȱȱȱǯȱ\\bǰȱȱ\\u000eȱĴȱ\\na report by John Woodyard, a licensed professional engineer.\\nHis report included a description of standard methods used\\nwhen demolishing PCB-contaminated buildings and an anal-\\nysis of the purported ways in which the defendants deviated\\nfrom those practices, thereby causing the contamination of the\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 5\\n\\nresidences. The Liebharts’ second expert was Dr. David Car-\\npenter, a public health physician who opined on ways in\\nwhich the Liebharts might have been exposed to PCBs and the\\nȱȱěȱȱȱ¡ǯȱ\\nȱȱ\\nthat “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not\\nincrease the risk of disease.” Finally, the defendants submit-\\nted a report prepared by Dr. Russell Keenan, a toxicologist\\nwho analyzed the survey data and determined that it was im-\\npossible to determine whether the presence of PCBs on the\\nLiebharts’ property was due to the recent demolition or to\\něȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ.\\n In December 2017, the Liebharts moved for partial sum-\\nmary judgment on the issue of causation, reserving the issue\\nof damages for a jury trial. The defendants cross-moved for\\nsummary judgmentDzȱ¢ȱȱęȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ\\n¢ȱȱě’ experts Woodyard and Carpenter un-\\nder Fed. R. Evid. 702. In February 2018, after those motions\\nwere fully briefed to the court, the Liebharts sought leave to\\namend their complaint. In light of the information they ob-\\ntained through discovery regarding the burial of concrete on\\nthe property, they intended to allege separate RCRA and\\nTSCA violations and seek an enlargement of the proposed in-\\njunction to include removal of that material.\\n The district court issued its decisions on March 30. First,\\nthe court granted in part the defendants’ motion to exclude\\nthe ě’ expert witness reports. The court explained that\\nWoodyard’s report was “equivocal” as to the issue of causa-\\ntion; it hedged on whether the contaminants came from dem-\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ See\\nLiebhart v. SPX Corp., No. 16-cv-700-jdp, 2018 WL 1583296 at\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n*3–4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2018). Second, the report “over-\\nlook[ed] tȱȱęȱ” and failed to account\\nfor “obvious alternative explanations” in determining the\\ncause of the contamination. Id. at *4 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702\\n¢ȱĴ’s note to 2000 amendments). Finally, the\\ncourt noted that Woodyard’s report depended on “unreliable\\nor uninformative” evidence, including the Liebharts’ defec-\\nȱ ȱǰȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nclippings and a chromatogram that allegedly detected PCBs\\non the property. Id. at *4–5. For those reasons, the court ex-\\ncluded Woodyard’s report in its entirety. Id. at *5.\\n \\u0003ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ\\u0006ǯȱ\\u0005Ȭ\\npenter’s report, it struck Carpenter’s conclusion that “there is\\nno ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not increase the\\nrisk of disease” as unsupported by the medical studies he\\ncited. Id. at *5. In doing so, the court pointed to the absence of\\nPCBs inside the Liebharts’ home and in their blood, suggest-\\ning that the Liebharts had not actually been exposed to PCBs\\nȱȱȱȱȱěȱǯȱId. at 5–6.\\n \\u0019ȱȱ¡ȱ¢ȱěȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ\\nconcluded that the Liebharts failed to present any admissible\\nevidence to support their RCRA and TSCA claims. The re-\\nmaining photos and videos certainly showed dust migrating\\nonto the Liebharts’ property, but there was no reliable evi-\\ndence proving that the dust contained PCBs. Given that any\\nPCBs detected in the soil may have been there prior to the\\ndemolition, the lack of evidence doomed the Liebharts’ case.\\n\\u0016ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱě,\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal\\nclaims, and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 7\\n\\n The district court also denied the Liebharts’ petition for\\nleave to amend their complaint on two grounds. First, alt-\\nȱȱȱ ȱȱȱěȱȱ\\nthe factual basis for the new counts over a year ȱęȱȱ\\ninitial complaint, it also noted that they took an additional\\nfour months thereafter to seek leave to amend. During that\\nȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ\\ntheir motions for summary judgment, and the trial date was\\nfast approaching. It found their petition untimely. Second, the\\ndistrict court determined that the new claims were futile un-\\nder both statutes' advance-notice requirements.\\n The ěȱ¢ȱ. Several months after\\nthe judgment, the clerk of the district court imposed costs on\\nthe Liebharts in the amount of $46,320.02. The Liebharts sep-\\narately appealed that decision. We consolidated the two ap-\\npeals and now consider them together.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n The \\u000eȱȱęȱȱȱȱǯȱ\\bǰȱ\\nthey argue that the district court erred in excluding the opin-\\nions of expert witnesses Woodyard in full and Carpenter in\\npart. As part of that argument, they allege that the district\\ncourt failed to apply the same stringent standard to the de-\\nfendants’ expert Keenan. Second, they contend that summary\\njudgment was inappropriate because, even absent the testi-\\n¢ȱȱȱ¡ȱ ǰȱ¢ȱĴȱȱȬ\\nȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nRCRA and TSCA. Third, they challenge the district court’s de-\\nȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ¢ have iden-\\nęȱȱ\\u0015\\u0012\\u001a’s state-approved clean-up plan. Fourth, they ar-\\ngue that the district court abused its discretion in denying\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nleave to amend their complaint. Finally, they challenge the\\nimposition of costs.\\n But there’s a larger issue looming in the background. The\\ndistrict court’s opinion operates under the assumption that\\n\\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱ ěs must demonstrate “an imminent and sub-\\nstantial danger with evidence of health problems they have\\n¢ȱ ěǯ” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *6. Relying\\nprimarily on Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C.\\nŗşşŜǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ \\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱ ěǰȱ\\nholding that “it doesn’t follow necessarily that there is an im-\\nminent and substantial risk of harm simply because there is\\nsome amount of PCBs on the property.” Liebhart 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *5. We review that question of law, which was the\\nunderlying basis for the award of summary judgment, de\\nnovo. Daugherty v. Harrington, 906 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n A. RCRA Requires Only that Harm “May” Be Imminent\\n \\u0016ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱ\\nmake out a prima facie violation of RCRA has led to much dis-\\ncussion among the circuits. We have yet to tackle that issue\\nhead on, so the district court necessarily had to look else-\\nwhere for guidance. Passed in 1976, “RCRA is a comprehen-\\nsive environmental statute that empowers [the] EPA to regu-\\nlate hazardous wastes from cradle to grave.” City of Chicago v.\\nEnvtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). The statute’s “pri-\\nmary purpose … is to reduce the generation of hazardous\\nwaste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and dis-\\nposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, ‘so as to\\nminimize the present and future threat to human health and\\nthe environment.’” Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479,\\n483 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 9\\n\\n Although the EPA has the primary responsibility for en-\\nforcing the law, the statute, “like other environmental laws,\\n… contains a citizen suit provision, § 6972, which permits pri-\\nvate citizens to enforce its provisions in some circumstances.”\\nId. at 484. As relevant to this case, the statute provides that\\n any person may commence a civil action on his own\\n behalf … against any person, … including … any\\n past or present owner or operator of a treatment,\\n storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or\\n who is contributing to the past or present handling,\\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any\\n solid or hazardous waste which may present an im-\\n minent and substantial endangerment to health or\\n the environment.\\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Notably, Con-\\ngress amended the language in 1980 by substituting the\\nphrase “may present” for the original 1976 wording “is pre-\\nsenting.” Maine People’s All. and Nat. Res. Def. Council v.\\nMallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Solid\\nWaste Disposal Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–482, § 25, 94 Stat. 2334,\\n2348). The section authorizes district courts to grant injunctive\\nrelief and “order [a violator] to take such other action as may\\nbe necessary” to remediate the endangerment. Id.; see also Me-\\nghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (“Under a plain reading of this remedial\\nscheme, a private citizen suing under § 6972(a)(1)(B) could\\nseek a mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible\\nparty to ‘take action’ ¢ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\ndisposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one\\nthat ‘restrains’ a responsible party from further violating\\nRCRA.”); Avondale Fed. Sav. Bank v. Amoco Oil Co., 170 F.3d\\n692, 694 (7th Cir. 1999).\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n The critical question in this case is how to determine\\nwhether alleged contamination “may present an imminent\\nand substantial endangerment to health.” § 6972(a)(1)(b). We\\ntouched on this question only brĚ¢ȱȱAlbany Bank & Trust\\nCo. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2002).\\n\\u0016ǰȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ prima facie RCRA\\nclaim: “a ěȱȱȱǻŗǼȱȱȱȱȱȬ\\nerated solid or hazardous waste, (2) that the defendant is con-\\ntributing to or has contributed to the handling of this waste,\\nand (3) that this waste may present an imminent and substan-\\ntial danger to health or the environment.” Id. (citing Cox v.\\nCity of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 2001)). We then ob-\\nǰȱȱȱęȱǰȱȱ“[i]mminence does\\nnot require an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\nharm.” Id. (citing Cox, 256 F.3d at 299). That is the extent of\\nour circuit precedent on the “may present” language con-\\ntained in § 6972(a)(1)(B).\\n But our sister circuits have engaged with this question in\\nȱǯȱ\\u000bȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ\\nthe Third Circuit emphasized that the statute “enhanced the\\ncourts’ traditional equitable powers by authorizing the issu-\\nance of injunctions when there is but a risk of harm, a more\\nlenient standard than the traditional requirement of threat-\\nened irreparable harm.” United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204,\\n211 (3d Cir. 1982). The court found the statutory language\\n“unequivocal,” demonstrating that Congress “intended to\\nȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĜȱȬ\\nuitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate” the risks\\nposed by toxic waste. Id. at 213–14.\\n In the subsequent decades, several other circuits adopted\\nand further developed the same interpretation of § 6972. See\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 11\\n\\nMallinckrodt, 471 F.3d at 277; Dague v. City of Burlington, 935\\nF.2d 1343, 1355–56 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds,\\n502 U.S. 1071 (1992); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l,\\nInc., 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Waste Indus.,\\nInc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument\\nthat “[§ 6972] was designed to control pollution only in emer-\\ngency situations”); Cox, 256 F.3d at 299–301; Price v. United\\nStates Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994); Burlington N.\\nand Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1019–22 (10th Cir.\\n2007); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1014–\\n15 (11th Cir. 2004). We now join those courts and explicitly\\nembrace the core content of their interpretation.\\n The district court therefore used an incorrect legal stand-\\nard to evaluate the Liebharts’ argument that PCBs from the\\ndemolition may present an imminent and substantial danger\\nto their health and that of their tenants. It did not cite any of\\nthe cases we listed above, but instead relied on a single district\\ncourt decision from a circuit that has not yet addressed the\\nissue. See Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *5 (quoting Foster, 922\\nF. Supp. at 662 (“While there can be no question that the levels\\nof contamination present at the Site may warrant future re-\\nȱ ǰȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ\\nrisk of substantial or serious threatened harm, or some neces-\\nsity for action.”)).\\n That error undercuts several of the reasons the district\\ncourt gave for rejecting the Liebharts’ RCRA claim. For exam-\\nple, the district court cursorily adopted a passing statement\\nwe made over twenty-ę years ago that “[t]he [EPA’s] ac-\\ncepted safe level of PCBs in the ȱȱę¢ȱȱȱ\\nmillion,” id. (quoting Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nServ., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1994)), to create a require-\\nment that the Liebharts show that PCB contamination on their\\nproperty met that threshold. But there is no requirement in\\n\\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱȱȱěȱȱȱ“a particular quantitative show-\\ning as a sine qua non for liability.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 260; see\\nalso Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. Only one circuit has come to an\\narguably contrary conclusion. In Price v. United States Navy,\\n818 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (S.D. Cal. 1992), ě’d 39 F.3d 1011 (9th\\n\\u0005ǯȱŗşşŚǼǰȱȱȱȱȱ\\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱěȱȱ ȱ\\nthat “the level of contaminants [was] above levels that are con-\\nsidered acceptable by the State.” But as the Interfaith court\\nnoted, the Ninth Circuit’ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ\\ncourt’s judgment did not discuss that requirement. RCRA\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěs demonstrate contamination\\nabove some agency-derived threshold level of concentration.\\n399 F.3d at 260–61. It merely requires that they show that con-\\ntaminants on the property are seriously dangerous to human\\nhealth (or will be, given prolonged exposure over time). See\\nCox, 256 F.3d at 299–300 (“an endangerment is ‘substantial’ if\\nit is ‘serious’” (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019)).\\n That’s especially true when the standard is taken out of\\ncontext. The district court relied on Cincinnati Ins. Co. to sup-\\nport its contention that contamination below the threshold\\nȱȱę¢ȱȱȱȱ(“ppm”) does not qualify as a\\nregulatory violation, thereby contradicting Woodyard’s opin-\\nion regarding safe levels of PCBs and providing the grounds\\nfor excluding it. In that case, we evaluated whether an insur-\\nance company was required to indemnify its insured for dam-\\nages arising out of PCB contamination at an industrial site.\\n\\u0016ȱ\\u0007\\u0012\\u0003ȱȱęȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ\\nthe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,\\nand Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 13\\n\\nthat context, we noted that the contaminated site contained\\nPCBs concentrated at levels up to 58,000 ppm, well above the\\nEPA’ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱę¢ȱǯȱŚŖȱF.3d at 148\\n(citing 40 C.F.R. § 761.60).\\n \\u0004ȱ ȱ ǰȱȱȱěȱ¢ǰȱęȱ Ȭ\\ntrial equipment and other wastes contaminated at levels\\nabove ę¢ȱppm and requires special procedures for their stor-\\nage and disposal. It does not unequivocally state that PCBs\\nȱȱȱ ȱȱę¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nexposure. Neither Cincinnati Ins. Co. nor the EPA regulation\\nstand for the proposition that PCBs concentrated at forty-nine\\nppm on residential property do not present a substantial endan-\\ngerment to the health of the residents. That is especially ap-\\nparent when we consider that the same set of regulations dis-\\ntinguishes between low and high-occupancy areas and re-\\nquires that, in high-occupancy areas, bulk PCB remediation\\nwaste, such as soil, be cleaned up to levels of concentration at\\nor below one ppm. § 761.61(a)(4)(i)(A). Section ŝŜŗǯřȱęȱ\\nthat the term “high-occupancy area” includes residences. See\\nalso § ŝŜŗǯŗŘřȱǻȱȱȱ\\u0012\\u0005\\u0004ȱȱȱę¢ȱ\\nppm or greater but emphasizing that “[t]he concentration of\\nPCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concentration in the\\nmaterial spilled as opposed to the concentration of PCBs in\\nthe material onto which the PCBs were spilled”). “Proof of\\ncontamination in excess of [agency] standards may support a\\nęȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱĜȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ\\nǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱȬ\\nute.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 261.\\n This is not to say that ȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱshow\\nsome bit of soil on their property that tests positive for PCBs\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nabove one ppm (or even above the purported lower Wiscon-\\nsin DNR standard, which the defendants seem to have\\nacknowledged in their state-approved clean-up plan). Of\\ncourse, there must be accompanying evidence that establishes\\nsome connection between the existing contaminants and\\nsome imminent and substantial endangerment to health. 1 But\\nȱ \\u000eȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ\\ndistrict court held the bar higher than necessary under\\nRCRA’s standard. In criticizing expert witness Carpenter’s\\nstatement that “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that\\ndoes not increase the risk of disease,” the district court re-\\njected Carpenter’s citation to studies showing the general\\nrisks of PCB exposure because “the Liebharts do not cite any\\nevidence that they have been exposed to PCBs.” Liebhart, 2018\\nWL 1583296 at *5. Moreover, the district court concluded that\\n“[t]he Liebharts do not contend that they can prove an immi-\\nnent and substantial danger with evidence of health problems\\n¢ȱȱ¢ȱěǯ” Id. at *6.\\n As we noted in Albany Bank, “[i]mminence does not re-\\nquire an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\n\\n\\n 1 On appeal, the Liebharts contend that there is no separate require-\\nment for expert witness testimony because the photos and videos they\\nhave submitted into evidence suffice to prove their RCRA claim. The de-\\nfendants push back on that argument, insisting that many of the issues are\\nbeyond the competence of lay fact-finders and require the assistance of\\nexperts to address. See, e.g., C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827,\\n838 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Given the complex nature of this case, … [and w]ith\\nno experts to prove causation … the appellants cannot prove their toxic-\\ntort case under [state] law.”) Because the district court did not make a fac-\\ntual finding as to whether this case is sufficient complex to require expert\\ntestimony, and because we remand for reconsideration of a separate legal\\nissue, we need not reach that question today.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 15\\n\\nharm.” 310 F.3d at 973. Although the Supreme Court has in-\\nstructed that “[a]n endangerment can only be ‘imminent’ if it\\n‘threaten[s] to occur immediately,’” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485\\n(quoting Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary of English Language\\nŗŘŚśȱǻŘȱǯȱŗşřŚǼǼǰȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱȬ\\ningly quoted the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the statu-\\ntory term “implies that there must be a threat which is present\\nnow, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until\\nlater.” Id. at 486 (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019).\\nWe take that to mean that the Liebharts must show that there\\nare PCBs currently on the property that have the potential to\\nsubstantially threaten their health at some point in the future\\nif they continue to occupy the premises and prolong their ex-\\nposure. On remand, the district court should reevaluate its ex-\\nclusion of Dr. Carpenter’s assertion regarding PCB safety un-\\nder the standards we have outlined above and determine\\nwhether, if admissible, the report demonstrates that a sub-\\nstantial and imminent threat to the Liebharts’ health may be\\npresent.\\n B. TSCA Likewise Requires No Heightened Showing\\n TSCA authorizes a separate, private cause of action allow-\\ning “any person [to] commence a civil action … against any\\nperson … who is alleged to be in violation of … any rule\\npromulgated under” the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1). The EPA\\npromulgated the PCB regulations in question pursuant to\\nstatutory authority under TSCA, designating PCBs as “haz-\\nardous waste” and controlling their manufacture, use, stor-\\nage, and disposal. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 761. The Liebharts’ TSCA\\nclaim alleged that the defendants violated those regulations,\\nthereby authorizing the district court to “restrain [the] viola-\\ntion.” § 2619(a). Unlike RCRA, which authorizes mandatory\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\ninjunctions to compel remediation of previous violations,\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions to stop ongoing\\nviolations. Id. The defendants argued that there was no longer\\nan ongoing violation, as demolition was complete by the time\\nȱ\\u000eȱęȱȱǯ 2\\n The purported violation was based on 40 C.F.R. § 761.123,\\nwhich, as we noted above, regulates “spills” of PCB materials\\nȱȱȱȱę¢ȱǯȱ\\u0016 district court cor-\\nrectly noted that the Liebharts had not shown any evidence\\nthat any PCBs had been “spilled” onto their property (by\\nmeans of dust migration) at that level of concentration, and it\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on that basis.\\n But the district court seems to have overlooked the follow-\\ning sentence in the regulation, which directs that “[t]he con-\\ncentration of PCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concen-\\ntration in the material spilled as opposed to the concentration\\nof the material onto which the PCBs were spilled.” Id. The\\nLiebharts’ complaint seems to have alleged that the concrete\\nĚȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȬ\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ę¢-ppm threshold, was demolished\\nand “spilled” onto the Liebharts’ property. By the plain text\\nof the regulation, there is no need to show that contaminants\\non the Liebharts’ property are themselves concentrated above\\nę¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ\\nof that spill met the criteria. On remand, the district court may\\nagain determine that there is no ongoing violation, but it must\\n\\n 2 The district court determined that the Liebharts waived this claim\\nby failing to engage the defendants’ argument that there was no “ongoing\\nviolation.” But the court chose to analyze the merits of the claim regardless\\nof waiver and reached its conclusion on an alternative basis. We likewise\\nset aside the issue of waiver to reach the district court’s merits analysis.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 17\\n\\nęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ\\nthe meaning of § 761.123 ȱȱęȱ.\\n C. The District Court Should Reconsider the Remaining Issues\\non Remand\\n \\u0010 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ standard ȱ ěȱ\\nmust meet, we turn to the remaining procedural issues the\\nLiebharts have asked to us to address.\\n 1. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding\\nWoodyard’s Testimony\\n “The summary-judgment decision here turned [in large\\npart] on the district court’s conclusion that [the] expert testi-\\nmony was inadmissible. Whether the district court applied\\nthe appropriate legal framework for evaluating expert testi-\\nmony is reviewed de novo, but the court’s choice of relevant\\nfactors within that framework and its ultimate conclusion as\\nto admissibility are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Lees v.\\nCarthage College, 714 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 2013). When a dis-\\ntrict court is “[Ǿȱ ȱȱěȱȱ¡ȱęȱȬ\\nmony … the trial judge must determine at the outset …\\n ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǻŗǼȱ ęȱ\\nknowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or\\ndetermine a fact in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,\\n509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). “The trial court must have … latitude\\nin deciding how to test an expert’s reliability.” Kumho Tire Co.,\\nLtd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).\\n The district court was well within its discretion to exclude\\nthe ěȱ¢ȱȱ¡ȱ ȱ\\u0019¢ǯȱ\\u0004¢ȱ\\nȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȬ\\nsue in the district court by failing to engage with the defend-\\nants’ arguments in their motion to strike the testimony,\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nWoodyard’s analysis sěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ě ȱ ȱ ȱ\\nfrom the way in which the parties have framed this lawsuit.\\n\\u0016ȱȱȱĚ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ“both sides\\nassume that none of the defendants can be held liable for any\\nPCB contamination on the Liebharts’ property that occurred\\nbefore the demolition began, so the court will make the same\\nassumption.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *1. That’s a curious\\nchoice. RCRA permits the Liebharts to obtain injunctive relief\\nfrom the owner of the facility for any cognizable contamina-\\ntion, regardless of whether the PCBs migrated onto their\\nproperty before or after the demolition occurred. See 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (authorizing suit against “any person … who\\nhas contributed … to the past or present handling … or dis-\\nposal” of hazardous waste); see also Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486\\n(“RCRA contains no statute of limitations.”).\\n But because the Liebharts restricted their claims to PCBs\\nthat allegedly migrated onto their property via the dust from\\nthe 2015 demolition, they necessarily excluded claims result-\\ning from PCBs that may ȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱȬ\\ning the previous century. The district court correctly noted\\nthat Woodyard’s expert opinion could not distinguish be-\\ntween these two alternatives, as both sets of contaminants\\noriginated from the same source. There was even evidence\\nshowing that PCBs existed in the soil beneath the Liebharts’\\nasphalt driveway—Woodyard could not explain how that\\nmight have occurred as the result of dust blowing in the wind\\nas opposed to seepage over the course of years before any\\ndemolition occurred.\\n Perhaps the Liebharts decided to frame their claims in this\\nway because they wanted to go after defendants TRC and\\nApollo, who would not be liable for what happened before\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 19\\n\\ndemolition. Or perhaps some element of their state-law\\nclaims, which we have not addressed, required them to con-\\nstrict the scope. They did not explain their reasoning to us (or\\nit seems, to the district court). But the distinction makes it dif-\\nęȱȱ\\u0019¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\n“adequately account[] for obvious alternative explanations.”\\n\\tȱǯȱ\\n Ĵ-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 787 (7th Cir.\\n2017). Viewed in this light, the district court was within its\\ndiscretion to exclude the testimony as unreliable and unhelp-\\nful to the trier of fact. The district court may choose to rethink\\nthat evaluation on remand under the legal standards we out-\\nlined above, but it may well reach the same conclusion.\\n 2. The District Court Should Reconsider Its Denial of Injunctive\\nRelief\\n The district court denied injunctive relief to the Liebharts\\nbecause the defendants had already agreed to a clean-up plan\\nthat had been approved by the Wisconsin DNR. We review\\nthat decision for an abuse of discretion. See AMI Int’l, Inc. v.\\nDatacard Corp. 106 F.3d 1342, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997) (remanding\\ngrant of RCRA injunction).\\n As we mentioned above, RCRA authorizes district courts\\nto issue either mandatory or prohibitory injunctions, while\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions. “[I]t is appro-\\npriate ‘to give great deference to the district court’s decision\\nas to the precise equitable relief necessary in a particular\\ncase.’” Bowes v. Ind. Sec. of State, 837 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (quoting Gjersten v. Bd. Of Election Com’rs for City of Chi-\\ncago, 791 F.2d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1986)). That is especially true\\n ȱȱěȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ ȱ“im-\\nȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ\\nful consideration of the intrusiveness of the ordered act, as\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n ȱȱȱĜȱȱ¢ȱȱȱin supervising\\nthe enjoined party’s compliance with the court’s order.” Kart-\\nman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir.\\n2011).\\n Considering SPX’s decision to formulate a clean-up plan\\nand obtain approval from the state agency, the district court\\ndetermined that there was no need for separate, federally-su-\\npervised remediation. It reached that conclusion even while\\nassuming that the defendants were in violation of either\\nRCRA or TSCA, despite the fact it found no such violation.\\nOther courts have determined that the existence of a parallel\\nplan of remediation supervised by the state does not neces-\\nsarily prevent a federal district court from granting an injunc-\\nȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢’ȱȱȱȱĜȱȱ\\nremedy the violation of federal law. See, e.g., Interfaith, 399\\nF.3d at 264–68. On the other hand, the same courts have also\\nupheld denials of injunctions in similar situations when the\\nȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ\\ntask. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735\\nF.3d 131, 139–40 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Interfaith). We\\nrecently reached the same conclusion. See LAJIM, LLC v. Gen.\\nElec. Co., No. 18-1522, 2019 WL 1011021, at *4–11 (7th Cir. Mar.\\n4, 2019) (“[T]he district court correctly held that it has discre-\\ntion to award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not re-\\nȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱ¢ǰ” particularly\\nin light of ongoing relief supervised by a state environmental\\nagency).\\n Here, the district court determined that SPX’s existing\\nȱ ȱ Ĝ and that the Liebharts had not “iden-\\ntif[ied] any way that SPX’ȱȱǽ ǾȱęȱȱǽǾȱ\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 21\\n\\nfederal law.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *7. We agree. Alt-\\nhough the Liebharts point to certain statistical sampling re-\\nquirements outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 761.125 and contend that\\nSPX’s existing plan fails to meet those requirements, the dis-\\ntrict court noted that SPX’s plan includes further sampling of\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ property. It emphasized that “the\\nLiebharts do not otherwise explain why SPX’s proposed sam-\\npling scheme is substantively inadequate.” Liebhart, 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *7. We see no evidence that compels us to contra-\\nȱȱȱęǯ\\n However, in light of the legal standards we outlined\\nabove, we ask the district court to reconsider its decision to\\ndeny injunctive relief on remand. Because the bar for estab-\\nlishing an imminent and substantial danger is lower than the\\ndistrict court believed when evaluating the request for an in-\\njunction, it would be prudent to reassess whether the DNR-\\napproved plan adequately remedies harms that may come\\nwithin RCRA’s scope. See LAJIM, 2019 WL 1011021 at *6\\n(“[\\u0011Ǿȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nimminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the case\\nthat injunctive relief is warranted. But that is not always the\\ncase.”) ǻȱȱȱȱĴǼǯ\\n 3. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying\\nLeave to Amend the Complaint.\\n We review a denial of leave to amend a complaint for\\nabuse of discretion. Life Plans, Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co.,\\n800 F.3d 343, 357 (7th Cir. 2015). District courts are to “freely\\ngive leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 15(a)(2). “The Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to\\nrequire a district court to allow amendment unless there is a\\ngood reason—futility, undue delay, undue prejudice, or bad\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nfaith—for denying leave to amend.” Life Plans, 800 F.3d at 357\\n(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The district\\nȱȱȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\ndenial: futility and undue delay. While we disagree with the\\n¢ȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱ\\nand decline to reverse.\\n We begin with the question of futility. Both statutes con-\\ntain advance-ȱȱȱ£ȱěȱȱ\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ \\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱ ȱ \\u0016\\u0015\\u0005\\u0003ȱ ǯȱ \\u0016¢ȱ ȱ\\nȱěȱȱ¢ȱȱ\\u0007\\u0012\\u0003ȱ60–90 ¢ȱȱȱȱęȬ\\ning the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2); 15 U.S.C.\\n§ 2619(b)(1)(A). But the district court chose to apply the re-\\nȱȱ¢ȱȱȱęȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ\\nany subsequent amendments that sought to add new RCRA\\nor TSCA counts. Although the Liebharts complied with the\\nȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ\\u0003ȱ\\n2016, they gave no new notice to the EPA before ęȱ ȱ\\nleave to amend in February 2018. The district court held that,\\nbecause the prior notice did not contain any mention of bur-\\nȱ\\u0012\\u0005\\u0004ȱȱȱ\\u0015\\u0012\\u001aȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱĜȱȱȱȱ\\nEPA to the particular violation the Liebharts sought to include\\nin the amended complaint.\\n The notice provisions serve two purposes. “First, notice al-\\nlows Government agencies to take responsibility for enforc-\\ning environmental regulations, thus obviating the need for\\ncitizen suits. … Second, notice gives the alleged violator ‘an\\nopportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the\\nAct[s] and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit.’”\\nHallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (quoting\\n\\t ¢ȱ ȱ \\u0015ęǰȱ\\u000bǯȱ ǯȱ\\u0005ȱ\\u0004¢ȱ \\bǯǰȱ\\u000bǯ, 484\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 23\\n\\nU.S. 49, 60 (1987)). The district court’s decision to require no-\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ pur-\\nposeǯȱ\\u0004¢ȱȱȱȱ\\u000eȱĴȱȱȱȱȬ\\nplaint, the EPA had been on notice of alleged PCB contamina-\\ntion at the SPX property for over two years—and it had de-\\nclined to get involved. Moreover, it was unlikely that the de-\\nfendants would resolve the alleged violation to avoid being\\nsued when they were already in the midst of an extended law-\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěǯȱ See AM Int’l, 106 F.3d at 1351\\n(“[T]he delay period is designed to allow a [defendant] a pe-\\nriod in which to clean up its act and avoid litigation. [This de-\\nfendant] was clearly not interested in using the delay period\\nto resolve the dispute without going to court.”); see also Dague,\\n935 F.2d at 1351 (“There is no need to maintain a window of\\nopportunity for the government to take the lead enforcement\\nrole … ȱȱ£ǰȱȱȱȱȱĴ¢ȱǰȱȱ\\nalready lawfully assumed the lead role in bringing a … claim\\nagainst the same facility.”) (quoting Dague v. City of Burling-\\nton, 733 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D. Vt. 1990)). When the original notice\\nis “Ĝ¢ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱǽȱȱ\\nagency] about what it is doing wrong, so that it will know\\nwhat corrective actions will avert a lawsuit,” Atl. States Legal\\nFound., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir.\\n1994), there is no need to require a second round of advance\\nnotice for an amended complaint in the same litigation.\\n But an error in the futility analysis alone does not neces-\\nsarily constitute an abuse of discretion on the whole. In addi-\\ntion to futility, the district court cited undue delay and preju-\\ndice in its decision to deny leave to amend. “[D]elay by itself\\nȱ¢ȱȱĜȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ\\nto amend. Delay must be coupled with some other reason.\\nTypically, that reason … is prejudice to the non-moving\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nparty.” Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 793\\n(7th Cir. 2004). The district court cited the Liebharts’ admis-\\nsion that they learned of the possible burial of contaminated\\nconcrete on the SPX property on October 11, 2017 but failed\\nto seek leave to amend their complaint until February 22,\\n2018. During that more than four-month period, the parties\\nĴȱȱȱȱ-motions for summary judg-\\nment, and by February, trial was only three months away. The\\n\\u000eȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ǯ\\n In response, the Liebharts contend that there was no un-\\nȱȱȱȱDZȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱęȱȱ\\nǰȱęȱ of discovery still remained. We disagree.\\nWhile the district court’s explanation of prejudice was fairly\\nshort, even if the district court had failed ȱȱȱęȬ\\ning of prejudice altogether, we might still “Ĝȱȱ\\nthat ‘the prejudice that would result from such amendment\\nwas apparent.’” Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 613 (7th\\nCir. 2002) (quoting Feldman v. Am. Mem’l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d\\n783, 793 (7th Cir. 1999)). In Parkǰȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ¡ȱ\\nmonths to move for leave to amend a complaint after she\\nknew (or should have known) of the additional alleged viola-\\ntion. Id. Because trial was approaching, we concluded that the\\ndistrict court was well within its discretion to deny leave. Id.;\\nsee also Perrian v. O’Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194–95 (7th Cir. 1992)\\n(“Because substantive amendments shortly before trial serve\\nto defeat the public’s interest in speedy resolution of legal dis-\\nputes, ‘[a] district court judge is entitled, in such circum-\\nǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱě’s amendment.’” (quoting\\nCampbell v. Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co., 893 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir.\\n1990)) ǻȱȱĴǼ).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 25\\n\\n On the contrary, in Life Plans, we found no undue delay\\n ȱȱěȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nten days after learning of the factual basis for its new count\\nduring discovery. 800 F.3d at 358. The Liebharts delayed more\\nthan four months in the same circumstances. Although dis-\\ncovery was ongoing at the time of the Liebharts’ motion, the\\nparties had already briefed their dispositive motions, and the\\ndistrict court was preparing its summary-judgment order that\\nwould ultimately dispose of the case. We therefore cannot say\\nthat denial of leave for undue delay and prejudice was an\\nabuse of the district court’s discretion. Of course, the district\\ncourt may permit an amendment on remand if the interests of\\njustice so require.\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n Although the district court properly exercised its discre-\\ntion on the various evidentiary and procedural issues the\\něȱȱaised, its analysis on the merits was narrower\\nthan the statutes demand. It may reach the same conclusions\\non reconsideration, but the parties should have another op-\\nportunity to litigate whether a substantial and imminent en-\\ndangerment to health exists in this case under the standards\\nwe have outlined. We therefore VACATE the order of the dis-\\ntrict court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent\\nwith this opinion. 3\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 The Liebharts also challenge the taxation of costs against them by the\\n\\nclerk of the district court. Because we vacate the district court’s judgment,\\nwe assume that the imposition of costs is automatically vacated and so do\\nnot reach that issue. The clerk of the district court is free to reassess costs\\non remand as the case proceeds.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4374603/\", \"author_raw\": \"Michael Stephen Kanne\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597350/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\nWILLIAM LIEBHART & NANCY LIEBHART,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n v.\n\nSPX CORPORATION, TRC ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION, &\nAPOLLO DISMANTLING SERVICES, INC.\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 16-cv-700 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n KANNE, Circuit Judge. William and Nancy Liebhart to-\ngether own three houses on the same block in Watertown,\nWisconsin. Besides a few other houses, the rest of the block\nwas previously occupied by an abandoned transformer fac-\ntory, last owned by SPX Corporation. In 2014, SPX demol-\nished the building with the assistance of TRC Environmental\nCorporation and Apollo Dismantling Services (collectively,\n\f2 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\n“the defendants”). The Liebharts allege that dust and debris\ncontaining toxic chemicals migrated onto their properties,\ncontaminating their yards and jeopardizing their health and\nthe health of their tenants.\n The Liebharts sued under federal statutes authorizing pri-\nvate rights of action for environmental contamination. They\nalso brought various state-law claims. Following discovery\nand the submission of expert witness reports, the district\ncourt denied the Liebharts’ motion for partial summary judg-\nment and granted summary judgment to the defendants with\ncosts. Although the district court adequately evaluated the ex-\npert witnesses and did not abuse its discretion in its proce-\ndural decisions, the court set the bar unnecessarily high for\nȱěȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ\nutes. For that reason, we vacate the district court’s judgment\nand remand for reconsideration.\n I. BACKGROUND\n The factory dates to the 1920s and was used to manufac-\nture various industrial equipment. Most relevant to our pur-\npose, the factory manufactured power transformers contain-\ning polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a carcinogenic chemi-\ncal banned by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1979.\nSee Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Pro-\ncessing, Distribution in Commerce, and Use Prohibitions, 44\nFǯȱ\u0014ǯȱřŗǰśŗŚȱǻ\u000f¢ȱřŗǰȱŗşŝşǼȱǻęȱȱŚŖȱ\u0005ǯ\bǯ\u0014ǯȱpt. 761).\nThe parties all agree that the facility has not manufactured or\nhandled any items containing PCBs since 1971, and that it\nshut down completely in 2005.\n But even with all the products and manufacturing equip-\nment removed, PCB contaminants remained in the facility. In\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 3\n\n2009, SPX retained TRC and another company (not named as\na defendant in this suit) to study the property and determine\nthe extent and precise location of any PCB contamination.\n\u0016ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱ\nwas generally contaminated, with concentrated amounts lo-\ncatȱȱęȱȱȱȱǯ\n Several years went by. In 2014, SPX decided to move ahead\nwith the demolition, retaining Apollo to conduct the work\nand TRC to supervise the project. That November, the defend-\nants timely proposed a self-implementing cleanup plan to the\nEPA, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 761.61(a). The trouble began\nas demolition commenced in January 2015. The Liebharts al-\nlege that Apollo demolished the building recklessly, failing to\nuse appropriate safety methods to control the dust generated\nby demolition equipment. They assert that their properties\n ȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱĴȱȱof photos\nand videos of dust from the facility blowing toward their\nhomes to support their allegation.\n \u0016ȱ\u000eȱęȱȱȱ th the local government\nin February. They also collected a dust-covered sample of\nsnow from their yard and placed it in a mason jar. Soon there-\nafter, a representative of the Wisconsin Department of Natu-\nral Resources (“DNR”) contacted the defendants about the\nLiebharts’ concerns. In April, TRC collected samples of the\nsurface soil (roughly down to eight inches below ground) on\nboth the industrial and residential properties. Sure enough,\nthe properties tested positive for the presence of PCBs. In Au-\ngust, the Liebharts vacated the property on advice of their\nphysician to avoid further exposure to the chemicals. Frus-\ntrated with the lack of action, William Liebhart had the snow\n\f4 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nsample tested for PCBs. Although the sample did, in fact, con-\ntain PCBs, the irregular manner of collection and storage\nspoiled the sample, and the laboratory declined to endorse the\nȱ ȱ¢ȱęǯ\n In September 2015ǰȱ\u0015\u0012\u001aȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ\ncontamination to the DNR. In turn, the Liebharts sued in fed-\neral district court in October. The complaint sought injunctive\nrelief under both the Resource Conservation and Recovery\nAct (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and the Toxic Substances\nControl Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. In addition, the\nLiebharts brought a host of state-law claims under supple-\nmental jurisdiction, including strict liability, negligence, tres-\nǰȱǰȱȱȱĚȱȱȱǯ\n During discoveryǰȱȱ\u000eȱĴȱȱȱȬ\ning for PCBs both in their yard and inside their home. They\nalso underwent blood testing. Although the external surveys\nrevealed a more comprehensive picture of the extent to which\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ properties contained PCBs, the in-\nternal sampling and blood tests were both negative for con-\ntamination. The Liebharts later learned in October 2017 that\nthe defendants allegedly buried some of the concrete remains\non-site rather than removing them to a toxic waste dump as\nrequired by the EPA-approved clean-up plan.\n The parties prepared and Ĵȱȱȱȱȱ¡Ȭ\npert witnesses who were to testify at trial. Among those, three\nȱȱȱȱǯȱ\bǰȱȱ\u000eȱĴȱ\na report by John Woodyard, a licensed professional engineer.\nHis report included a description of standard methods used\nwhen demolishing PCB-contaminated buildings and an anal-\nysis of the purported ways in which the defendants deviated\nfrom those practices, thereby causing the contamination of the\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 5\n\nresidences. The Liebharts’ second expert was Dr. David Car-\npenter, a public health physician who opined on ways in\nwhich the Liebharts might have been exposed to PCBs and the\nȱȱěȱȱȱ¡ǯȱ\nȱȱ\nthat “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not\nincrease the risk of disease.” Finally, the defendants submit-\nted a report prepared by Dr. Russell Keenan, a toxicologist\nwho analyzed the survey data and determined that it was im-\npossible to determine whether the presence of PCBs on the\nLiebharts’ property was due to the recent demolition or to\něȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ.\n In December 2017, the Liebharts moved for partial sum-\nmary judgment on the issue of causation, reserving the issue\nof damages for a jury trial. The defendants cross-moved for\nsummary judgmentDzȱ¢ȱȱęȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ\n¢ȱȱě’ experts Woodyard and Carpenter un-\nder Fed. R. Evid. 702. In February 2018, after those motions\nwere fully briefed to the court, the Liebharts sought leave to\namend their complaint. In light of the information they ob-\ntained through discovery regarding the burial of concrete on\nthe property, they intended to allege separate RCRA and\nTSCA violations and seek an enlargement of the proposed in-\njunction to include removal of that material.\n The district court issued its decisions on March 30. First,\nthe court granted in part the defendants’ motion to exclude\nthe ě’ expert witness reports. The court explained that\nWoodyard’s report was “equivocal” as to the issue of causa-\ntion; it hedged on whether the contaminants came from dem-\nȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ See\nLiebhart v. SPX Corp., No. 16-cv-700-jdp, 2018 WL 1583296 at\n\f6 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\n*3–4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2018). Second, the report “over-\nlook[ed] tȱȱęȱ” and failed to account\nfor “obvious alternative explanations” in determining the\ncause of the contamination. Id. at *4 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702\n¢ȱĴ’s note to 2000 amendments). Finally, the\ncourt noted that Woodyard’s report depended on “unreliable\nor uninformative” evidence, including the Liebharts’ defec-\nȱ ȱǰȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ\nclippings and a chromatogram that allegedly detected PCBs\non the property. Id. at *4–5. For those reasons, the court ex-\ncluded Woodyard’s report in its entirety. Id. at *5.\n \u0003ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ\u0006ǯȱ\u0005Ȭ\npenter’s report, it struck Carpenter’s conclusion that “there is\nno ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not increase the\nrisk of disease” as unsupported by the medical studies he\ncited. Id. at *5. In doing so, the court pointed to the absence of\nPCBs inside the Liebharts’ home and in their blood, suggest-\ning that the Liebharts had not actually been exposed to PCBs\nȱȱȱȱȱěȱǯȱId. at 5–6.\n \u0019ȱȱ¡ȱ¢ȱěȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ\nconcluded that the Liebharts failed to present any admissible\nevidence to support their RCRA and TSCA claims. The re-\nmaining photos and videos certainly showed dust migrating\nonto the Liebharts’ property, but there was no reliable evi-\ndence proving that the dust contained PCBs. Given that any\nPCBs detected in the soil may have been there prior to the\ndemolition, the lack of evidence doomed the Liebharts’ case.\n\u0016ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱě,\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal\nclaims, and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice.\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 7\n\n The district court also denied the Liebharts’ petition for\nleave to amend their complaint on two grounds. First, alt-\nȱȱȱ ȱȱȱěȱȱ\nthe factual basis for the new counts over a year ȱęȱȱ\ninitial complaint, it also noted that they took an additional\nfour months thereafter to seek leave to amend. During that\nȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ\ntheir motions for summary judgment, and the trial date was\nfast approaching. It found their petition untimely. Second, the\ndistrict court determined that the new claims were futile un-\nder both statutes' advance-notice requirements.\n The ěȱ¢ȱ. Several months after\nthe judgment, the clerk of the district court imposed costs on\nthe Liebharts in the amount of $46,320.02. The Liebharts sep-\narately appealed that decision. We consolidated the two ap-\npeals and now consider them together.\n II. ANALYSIS\n The \u000eȱȱęȱȱȱȱǯȱ\bǰȱ\nthey argue that the district court erred in excluding the opin-\nions of expert witnesses Woodyard in full and Carpenter in\npart. As part of that argument, they allege that the district\ncourt failed to apply the same stringent standard to the de-\nfendants’ expert Keenan. Second, they contend that summary\njudgment was inappropriate because, even absent the testi-\n¢ȱȱȱ¡ȱ ǰȱ¢ȱĴȱȱȬ\nȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\nRCRA and TSCA. Third, they challenge the district court’s de-\nȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ¢ have iden-\nęȱȱ\u0015\u0012\u001a’s state-approved clean-up plan. Fourth, they ar-\ngue that the district court abused its discretion in denying\n\f8 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nleave to amend their complaint. Finally, they challenge the\nimposition of costs.\n But there’s a larger issue looming in the background. The\ndistrict court’s opinion operates under the assumption that\n\u0014\u0005\u0014\u0003ȱ ěs must demonstrate “an imminent and sub-\nstantial danger with evidence of health problems they have\n¢ȱ ěǯ” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *6. Relying\nprimarily on Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C.\nŗşşŜǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ \u0014\u0005\u0014\u0003ȱ ěǰȱ\nholding that “it doesn’t follow necessarily that there is an im-\nminent and substantial risk of harm simply because there is\nsome amount of PCBs on the property.” Liebhart 2018 WL\n1583296 at *5. We review that question of law, which was the\nunderlying basis for the award of summary judgment, de\nnovo. Daugherty v. Harrington, 906 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2018).\n A. RCRA Requires Only that Harm “May” Be Imminent\n \u0016ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱ\nmake out a prima facie violation of RCRA has led to much dis-\ncussion among the circuits. We have yet to tackle that issue\nhead on, so the district court necessarily had to look else-\nwhere for guidance. Passed in 1976, “RCRA is a comprehen-\nsive environmental statute that empowers [the] EPA to regu-\nlate hazardous wastes from cradle to grave.” City of Chicago v.\nEnvtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). The statute’s “pri-\nmary purpose … is to reduce the generation of hazardous\nwaste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and dis-\nposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, ‘so as to\nminimize the present and future threat to human health and\nthe environment.’” Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479,\n483 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)).\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 9\n\n Although the EPA has the primary responsibility for en-\nforcing the law, the statute, “like other environmental laws,\n… contains a citizen suit provision, § 6972, which permits pri-\nvate citizens to enforce its provisions in some circumstances.”\nId. at 484. As relevant to this case, the statute provides that\n any person may commence a civil action on his own\n behalf … against any person, … including … any\n past or present owner or operator of a treatment,\n storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or\n who is contributing to the past or present handling,\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any\n solid or hazardous waste which may present an im-\n minent and substantial endangerment to health or\n the environment.\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Notably, Con-\ngress amended the language in 1980 by substituting the\nphrase “may present” for the original 1976 wording “is pre-\nsenting.” Maine People’s All. and Nat. Res. Def. Council v.\nMallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Solid\nWaste Disposal Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–482, § 25, 94 Stat. 2334,\n2348). The section authorizes district courts to grant injunctive\nrelief and “order [a violator] to take such other action as may\nbe necessary” to remediate the endangerment. Id.; see also Me-\nghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (“Under a plain reading of this remedial\nscheme, a private citizen suing under § 6972(a)(1)(B) could\nseek a mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible\nparty to ‘take action’ ¢ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ\ndisposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one\nthat ‘restrains’ a responsible party from further violating\nRCRA.”); Avondale Fed. Sav. Bank v. Amoco Oil Co., 170 F.3d\n692, 694 (7th Cir. 1999).\n\f10 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\n The critical question in this case is how to determine\nwhether alleged contamination “may present an imminent\nand substantial endangerment to health.” § 6972(a)(1)(b). We\ntouched on this question only brĚ¢ȱȱAlbany Bank & Trust\nCo. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2002).\n\u0016ǰȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ prima facie RCRA\nclaim: “a ěȱȱȱǻŗǼȱȱȱȱȱȬ\nerated solid or hazardous waste, (2) that the defendant is con-\ntributing to or has contributed to the handling of this waste,\nand (3) that this waste may present an imminent and substan-\ntial danger to health or the environment.” Id. (citing Cox v.\nCity of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 2001)). We then ob-\nǰȱȱȱęȱǰȱȱ“[i]mminence does\nnot require an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\nharm.” Id. (citing Cox, 256 F.3d at 299). That is the extent of\nour circuit precedent on the “may present” language con-\ntained in § 6972(a)(1)(B).\n But our sister circuits have engaged with this question in\nȱǯȱ\u000bȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ\nthe Third Circuit emphasized that the statute “enhanced the\ncourts’ traditional equitable powers by authorizing the issu-\nance of injunctions when there is but a risk of harm, a more\nlenient standard than the traditional requirement of threat-\nened irreparable harm.” United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204,\n211 (3d Cir. 1982). The court found the statutory language\n“unequivocal,” demonstrating that Congress “intended to\nȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĜȱȬ\nuitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate” the risks\nposed by toxic waste. Id. at 213–14.\n In the subsequent decades, several other circuits adopted\nand further developed the same interpretation of § 6972. See\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 11\n\nMallinckrodt, 471 F.3d at 277; Dague v. City of Burlington, 935\nF.2d 1343, 1355–56 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds,\n502 U.S. 1071 (1992); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l,\nInc., 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Waste Indus.,\nInc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument\nthat “[§ 6972] was designed to control pollution only in emer-\ngency situations”); Cox, 256 F.3d at 299–301; Price v. United\nStates Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994); Burlington N.\nand Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1019–22 (10th Cir.\n2007); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1014–\n15 (11th Cir. 2004). We now join those courts and explicitly\nembrace the core content of their interpretation.\n The district court therefore used an incorrect legal stand-\nard to evaluate the Liebharts’ argument that PCBs from the\ndemolition may present an imminent and substantial danger\nto their health and that of their tenants. It did not cite any of\nthe cases we listed above, but instead relied on a single district\ncourt decision from a circuit that has not yet addressed the\nissue. See Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *5 (quoting Foster, 922\nF. Supp. at 662 (“While there can be no question that the levels\nof contamination present at the Site may warrant future re-\nȱ ǰȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ\nrisk of substantial or serious threatened harm, or some neces-\nsity for action.”)).\n That error undercuts several of the reasons the district\ncourt gave for rejecting the Liebharts’ RCRA claim. For exam-\nple, the district court cursorily adopted a passing statement\nwe made over twenty-ę years ago that “[t]he [EPA’s] ac-\ncepted safe level of PCBs in the ȱȱę¢ȱȱȱ\nmillion,” id. (quoting Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor\n\f12 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nServ., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1994)), to create a require-\nment that the Liebharts show that PCB contamination on their\nproperty met that threshold. But there is no requirement in\n\u0014\u0005\u0014\u0003ȱȱȱěȱȱȱ“a particular quantitative show-\ning as a sine qua non for liability.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 260; see\nalso Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. Only one circuit has come to an\narguably contrary conclusion. In Price v. United States Navy,\n818 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (S.D. Cal. 1992), ě’d 39 F.3d 1011 (9th\n\u0005ǯȱŗşşŚǼǰȱȱȱȱȱ\u0014\u0005\u0014\u0003ȱěȱȱ ȱ\nthat “the level of contaminants [was] above levels that are con-\nsidered acceptable by the State.” But as the Interfaith court\nnoted, the Ninth Circuit’ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ\ncourt’s judgment did not discuss that requirement. RCRA\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěs demonstrate contamination\nabove some agency-derived threshold level of concentration.\n399 F.3d at 260–61. It merely requires that they show that con-\ntaminants on the property are seriously dangerous to human\nhealth (or will be, given prolonged exposure over time). See\nCox, 256 F.3d at 299–300 (“an endangerment is ‘substantial’ if\nit is ‘serious’” (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019)).\n That’s especially true when the standard is taken out of\ncontext. The district court relied on Cincinnati Ins. Co. to sup-\nport its contention that contamination below the threshold\nȱȱę¢ȱȱȱȱ(“ppm”) does not qualify as a\nregulatory violation, thereby contradicting Woodyard’s opin-\nion regarding safe levels of PCBs and providing the grounds\nfor excluding it. In that case, we evaluated whether an insur-\nance company was required to indemnify its insured for dam-\nages arising out of PCB contamination at an industrial site.\n\u0016ȱ\u0007\u0012\u0003ȱȱęȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ\nthe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,\nand Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. In\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 13\n\nthat context, we noted that the contaminated site contained\nPCBs concentrated at levels up to 58,000 ppm, well above the\nEPA’ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱę¢ȱǯȱŚŖȱF.3d at 148\n(citing 40 C.F.R. § 761.60).\n \u0004ȱ ȱ ǰȱȱȱěȱ¢ǰȱęȱ Ȭ\ntrial equipment and other wastes contaminated at levels\nabove ę¢ȱppm and requires special procedures for their stor-\nage and disposal. It does not unequivocally state that PCBs\nȱȱȱ ȱȱę¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ\nexposure. Neither Cincinnati Ins. Co. nor the EPA regulation\nstand for the proposition that PCBs concentrated at forty-nine\nppm on residential property do not present a substantial endan-\ngerment to the health of the residents. That is especially ap-\nparent when we consider that the same set of regulations dis-\ntinguishes between low and high-occupancy areas and re-\nquires that, in high-occupancy areas, bulk PCB remediation\nwaste, such as soil, be cleaned up to levels of concentration at\nor below one ppm. § 761.61(a)(4)(i)(A). Section ŝŜŗǯřȱęȱ\nthat the term “high-occupancy area” includes residences. See\nalso § ŝŜŗǯŗŘřȱǻȱȱȱ\u0012\u0005\u0004ȱȱȱę¢ȱ\nppm or greater but emphasizing that “[t]he concentration of\nPCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concentration in the\nmaterial spilled as opposed to the concentration of PCBs in\nthe material onto which the PCBs were spilled”). “Proof of\ncontamination in excess of [agency] standards may support a\nęȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱĜȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ\nǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱȬ\nute.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 261.\n This is not to say that ȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱshow\nsome bit of soil on their property that tests positive for PCBs\n\f14 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nabove one ppm (or even above the purported lower Wiscon-\nsin DNR standard, which the defendants seem to have\nacknowledged in their state-approved clean-up plan). Of\ncourse, there must be accompanying evidence that establishes\nsome connection between the existing contaminants and\nsome imminent and substantial endangerment to health. 1 But\nȱ \u000eȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ\ndistrict court held the bar higher than necessary under\nRCRA’s standard. In criticizing expert witness Carpenter’s\nstatement that “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that\ndoes not increase the risk of disease,” the district court re-\njected Carpenter’s citation to studies showing the general\nrisks of PCB exposure because “the Liebharts do not cite any\nevidence that they have been exposed to PCBs.” Liebhart, 2018\nWL 1583296 at *5. Moreover, the district court concluded that\n“[t]he Liebharts do not contend that they can prove an immi-\nnent and substantial danger with evidence of health problems\n¢ȱȱ¢ȱěǯ” Id. at *6.\n As we noted in Albany Bank, “[i]mminence does not re-\nquire an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\n\n\n 1 On appeal, the Liebharts contend that there is no separate require-\nment for expert witness testimony because the photos and videos they\nhave submitted into evidence suffice to prove their RCRA claim. The de-\nfendants push back on that argument, insisting that many of the issues are\nbeyond the competence of lay fact-finders and require the assistance of\nexperts to address. See, e.g., C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827,\n838 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Given the complex nature of this case, … [and w]ith\nno experts to prove causation … the appellants cannot prove their toxic-\ntort case under [state] law.”) Because the district court did not make a fac-\ntual finding as to whether this case is sufficient complex to require expert\ntestimony, and because we remand for reconsideration of a separate legal\nissue, we need not reach that question today.\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 15\n\nharm.” 310 F.3d at 973. Although the Supreme Court has in-\nstructed that “[a]n endangerment can only be ‘imminent’ if it\n‘threaten[s] to occur immediately,’” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485\n(quoting Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary of English Language\nŗŘŚśȱǻŘȱǯȱŗşřŚǼǼǰȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱȬ\ningly quoted the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the statu-\ntory term “implies that there must be a threat which is present\nnow, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until\nlater.” Id. at 486 (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019).\nWe take that to mean that the Liebharts must show that there\nare PCBs currently on the property that have the potential to\nsubstantially threaten their health at some point in the future\nif they continue to occupy the premises and prolong their ex-\nposure. On remand, the district court should reevaluate its ex-\nclusion of Dr. Carpenter’s assertion regarding PCB safety un-\nder the standards we have outlined above and determine\nwhether, if admissible, the report demonstrates that a sub-\nstantial and imminent threat to the Liebharts’ health may be\npresent.\n B. TSCA Likewise Requires No Heightened Showing\n TSCA authorizes a separate, private cause of action allow-\ning “any person [to] commence a civil action … against any\nperson … who is alleged to be in violation of … any rule\npromulgated under” the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1). The EPA\npromulgated the PCB regulations in question pursuant to\nstatutory authority under TSCA, designating PCBs as “haz-\nardous waste” and controlling their manufacture, use, stor-\nage, and disposal. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 761. The Liebharts’ TSCA\nclaim alleged that the defendants violated those regulations,\nthereby authorizing the district court to “restrain [the] viola-\ntion.” § 2619(a). Unlike RCRA, which authorizes mandatory\n\f16 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\ninjunctions to compel remediation of previous violations,\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions to stop ongoing\nviolations. Id. The defendants argued that there was no longer\nan ongoing violation, as demolition was complete by the time\nȱ\u000eȱęȱȱǯ 2\n The purported violation was based on 40 C.F.R. § 761.123,\nwhich, as we noted above, regulates “spills” of PCB materials\nȱȱȱȱę¢ȱǯȱ\u0016 district court cor-\nrectly noted that the Liebharts had not shown any evidence\nthat any PCBs had been “spilled” onto their property (by\nmeans of dust migration) at that level of concentration, and it\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on that basis.\n But the district court seems to have overlooked the follow-\ning sentence in the regulation, which directs that “[t]he con-\ncentration of PCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concen-\ntration in the material spilled as opposed to the concentration\nof the material onto which the PCBs were spilled.” Id. The\nLiebharts’ complaint seems to have alleged that the concrete\nĚȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȬ\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ę¢-ppm threshold, was demolished\nand “spilled” onto the Liebharts’ property. By the plain text\nof the regulation, there is no need to show that contaminants\non the Liebharts’ property are themselves concentrated above\nę¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ\nof that spill met the criteria. On remand, the district court may\nagain determine that there is no ongoing violation, but it must\n\n 2 The district court determined that the Liebharts waived this claim\nby failing to engage the defendants’ argument that there was no “ongoing\nviolation.” But the court chose to analyze the merits of the claim regardless\nof waiver and reached its conclusion on an alternative basis. We likewise\nset aside the issue of waiver to reach the district court’s merits analysis.\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 17\n\nęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ\nthe meaning of § 761.123 ȱȱęȱ.\n C. The District Court Should Reconsider the Remaining Issues\non Remand\n \u0010 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ standard ȱ ěȱ\nmust meet, we turn to the remaining procedural issues the\nLiebharts have asked to us to address.\n 1. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding\nWoodyard’s Testimony\n “The summary-judgment decision here turned [in large\npart] on the district court’s conclusion that [the] expert testi-\nmony was inadmissible. Whether the district court applied\nthe appropriate legal framework for evaluating expert testi-\nmony is reviewed de novo, but the court’s choice of relevant\nfactors within that framework and its ultimate conclusion as\nto admissibility are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Lees v.\nCarthage College, 714 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 2013). When a dis-\ntrict court is “[Ǿȱ ȱȱěȱȱ¡ȱęȱȬ\nmony … the trial judge must determine at the outset …\n ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǻŗǼȱ ęȱ\nknowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or\ndetermine a fact in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,\n509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). “The trial court must have … latitude\nin deciding how to test an expert’s reliability.” Kumho Tire Co.,\nLtd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).\n The district court was well within its discretion to exclude\nthe ěȱ¢ȱȱ¡ȱ ȱ\u0019¢ǯȱ\u0004¢ȱ\nȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȬ\nsue in the district court by failing to engage with the defend-\nants’ arguments in their motion to strike the testimony,\n\f18 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nWoodyard’s analysis sěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ě ȱ ȱ ȱ\nfrom the way in which the parties have framed this lawsuit.\n\u0016ȱȱȱĚ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ“both sides\nassume that none of the defendants can be held liable for any\nPCB contamination on the Liebharts’ property that occurred\nbefore the demolition began, so the court will make the same\nassumption.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *1. That’s a curious\nchoice. RCRA permits the Liebharts to obtain injunctive relief\nfrom the owner of the facility for any cognizable contamina-\ntion, regardless of whether the PCBs migrated onto their\nproperty before or after the demolition occurred. See 42 U.S.C.\n§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (authorizing suit against “any person … who\nhas contributed … to the past or present handling … or dis-\nposal” of hazardous waste); see also Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486\n(“RCRA contains no statute of limitations.”).\n But because the Liebharts restricted their claims to PCBs\nthat allegedly migrated onto their property via the dust from\nthe 2015 demolition, they necessarily excluded claims result-\ning from PCBs that may ȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱȬ\ning the previous century. The district court correctly noted\nthat Woodyard’s expert opinion could not distinguish be-\ntween these two alternatives, as both sets of contaminants\noriginated from the same source. There was even evidence\nshowing that PCBs existed in the soil beneath the Liebharts’\nasphalt driveway—Woodyard could not explain how that\nmight have occurred as the result of dust blowing in the wind\nas opposed to seepage over the course of years before any\ndemolition occurred.\n Perhaps the Liebharts decided to frame their claims in this\nway because they wanted to go after defendants TRC and\nApollo, who would not be liable for what happened before\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 19\n\ndemolition. Or perhaps some element of their state-law\nclaims, which we have not addressed, required them to con-\nstrict the scope. They did not explain their reasoning to us (or\nit seems, to the district court). But the distinction makes it dif-\nęȱȱ\u0019¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ\n“adequately account[] for obvious alternative explanations.”\n\tȱǯȱ\n Ĵ-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 787 (7th Cir.\n2017). Viewed in this light, the district court was within its\ndiscretion to exclude the testimony as unreliable and unhelp-\nful to the trier of fact. The district court may choose to rethink\nthat evaluation on remand under the legal standards we out-\nlined above, but it may well reach the same conclusion.\n 2. The District Court Should Reconsider Its Denial of Injunctive\nRelief\n The district court denied injunctive relief to the Liebharts\nbecause the defendants had already agreed to a clean-up plan\nthat had been approved by the Wisconsin DNR. We review\nthat decision for an abuse of discretion. See AMI Int’l, Inc. v.\nDatacard Corp. 106 F.3d 1342, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997) (remanding\ngrant of RCRA injunction).\n As we mentioned above, RCRA authorizes district courts\nto issue either mandatory or prohibitory injunctions, while\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions. “[I]t is appro-\npriate ‘to give great deference to the district court’s decision\nas to the precise equitable relief necessary in a particular\ncase.’” Bowes v. Ind. Sec. of State, 837 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir.\n2016) (quoting Gjersten v. Bd. Of Election Com’rs for City of Chi-\ncago, 791 F.2d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1986)). That is especially true\n ȱȱěȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ ȱ“im-\nȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ\nful consideration of the intrusiveness of the ordered act, as\n\f20 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\n ȱȱȱĜȱȱ¢ȱȱȱin supervising\nthe enjoined party’s compliance with the court’s order.” Kart-\nman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir.\n2011).\n Considering SPX’s decision to formulate a clean-up plan\nand obtain approval from the state agency, the district court\ndetermined that there was no need for separate, federally-su-\npervised remediation. It reached that conclusion even while\nassuming that the defendants were in violation of either\nRCRA or TSCA, despite the fact it found no such violation.\nOther courts have determined that the existence of a parallel\nplan of remediation supervised by the state does not neces-\nsarily prevent a federal district court from granting an injunc-\nȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢’ȱȱȱȱĜȱȱ\nremedy the violation of federal law. See, e.g., Interfaith, 399\nF.3d at 264–68. On the other hand, the same courts have also\nupheld denials of injunctions in similar situations when the\nȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ\ntask. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735\nF.3d 131, 139–40 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Interfaith). We\nrecently reached the same conclusion. See LAJIM, LLC v. Gen.\nElec. Co., No. 18-1522, 2019 WL 1011021, at *4–11 (7th Cir. Mar.\n4, 2019) (“[T]he district court correctly held that it has discre-\ntion to award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not re-\nȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱ¢ǰ” particularly\nin light of ongoing relief supervised by a state environmental\nagency).\n Here, the district court determined that SPX’s existing\nȱ ȱ Ĝ and that the Liebharts had not “iden-\ntif[ied] any way that SPX’ȱȱǽ ǾȱęȱȱǽǾȱ\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 21\n\nfederal law.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *7. We agree. Alt-\nhough the Liebharts point to certain statistical sampling re-\nquirements outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 761.125 and contend that\nSPX’s existing plan fails to meet those requirements, the dis-\ntrict court noted that SPX’s plan includes further sampling of\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ property. It emphasized that “the\nLiebharts do not otherwise explain why SPX’s proposed sam-\npling scheme is substantively inadequate.” Liebhart, 2018 WL\n1583296 at *7. We see no evidence that compels us to contra-\nȱȱȱęǯ\n However, in light of the legal standards we outlined\nabove, we ask the district court to reconsider its decision to\ndeny injunctive relief on remand. Because the bar for estab-\nlishing an imminent and substantial danger is lower than the\ndistrict court believed when evaluating the request for an in-\njunction, it would be prudent to reassess whether the DNR-\napproved plan adequately remedies harms that may come\nwithin RCRA’s scope. See LAJIM, 2019 WL 1011021 at *6\n(“[\u0011Ǿȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\nimminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the case\nthat injunctive relief is warranted. But that is not always the\ncase.”) ǻȱȱȱȱĴǼǯ\n 3. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying\nLeave to Amend the Complaint.\n We review a denial of leave to amend a complaint for\nabuse of discretion. Life Plans, Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co.,\n800 F.3d 343, 357 (7th Cir. 2015). District courts are to “freely\ngive leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.\nP. 15(a)(2). “The Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to\nrequire a district court to allow amendment unless there is a\ngood reason—futility, undue delay, undue prejudice, or bad\n\f22 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nfaith—for denying leave to amend.” Life Plans, 800 F.3d at 357\n(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The district\nȱȱȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\ndenial: futility and undue delay. While we disagree with the\n¢ȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱ\nand decline to reverse.\n We begin with the question of futility. Both statutes con-\ntain advance-ȱȱȱ£ȱěȱȱ\nȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ \u0014\u0005\u0014\u0003ȱ ȱ \u0016\u0015\u0005\u0003ȱ ǯȱ \u0016¢ȱ ȱ\nȱěȱȱ¢ȱȱ\u0007\u0012\u0003ȱ60–90 ¢ȱȱȱȱęȬ\ning the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2); 15 U.S.C.\n§ 2619(b)(1)(A). But the district court chose to apply the re-\nȱȱ¢ȱȱȱęȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ\nany subsequent amendments that sought to add new RCRA\nor TSCA counts. Although the Liebharts complied with the\nȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ\u0003ȱ\n2016, they gave no new notice to the EPA before ęȱ ȱ\nleave to amend in February 2018. The district court held that,\nbecause the prior notice did not contain any mention of bur-\nȱ\u0012\u0005\u0004ȱȱȱ\u0015\u0012\u001aȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱĜȱȱȱȱ\nEPA to the particular violation the Liebharts sought to include\nin the amended complaint.\n The notice provisions serve two purposes. “First, notice al-\nlows Government agencies to take responsibility for enforc-\ning environmental regulations, thus obviating the need for\ncitizen suits. … Second, notice gives the alleged violator ‘an\nopportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the\nAct[s] and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit.’”\nHallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (quoting\n\t ¢ȱ ȱ \u0015ęǰȱ\u000bǯȱ ǯȱ\u0005ȱ\u0004¢ȱ \bǯǰȱ\u000bǯ, 484\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 23\n\nU.S. 49, 60 (1987)). The district court’s decision to require no-\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ pur-\nposeǯȱ\u0004¢ȱȱȱȱ\u000eȱĴȱȱȱȱȬ\nplaint, the EPA had been on notice of alleged PCB contamina-\ntion at the SPX property for over two years—and it had de-\nclined to get involved. Moreover, it was unlikely that the de-\nfendants would resolve the alleged violation to avoid being\nsued when they were already in the midst of an extended law-\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěǯȱ See AM Int’l, 106 F.3d at 1351\n(“[T]he delay period is designed to allow a [defendant] a pe-\nriod in which to clean up its act and avoid litigation. [This de-\nfendant] was clearly not interested in using the delay period\nto resolve the dispute without going to court.”); see also Dague,\n935 F.2d at 1351 (“There is no need to maintain a window of\nopportunity for the government to take the lead enforcement\nrole … ȱȱ£ǰȱȱȱȱȱĴ¢ȱǰȱȱ\nalready lawfully assumed the lead role in bringing a … claim\nagainst the same facility.”) (quoting Dague v. City of Burling-\nton, 733 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D. Vt. 1990)). When the original notice\nis “Ĝ¢ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱǽȱȱ\nagency] about what it is doing wrong, so that it will know\nwhat corrective actions will avert a lawsuit,” Atl. States Legal\nFound., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir.\n1994), there is no need to require a second round of advance\nnotice for an amended complaint in the same litigation.\n But an error in the futility analysis alone does not neces-\nsarily constitute an abuse of discretion on the whole. In addi-\ntion to futility, the district court cited undue delay and preju-\ndice in its decision to deny leave to amend. “[D]elay by itself\nȱ¢ȱȱĜȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ\nto amend. Delay must be coupled with some other reason.\nTypically, that reason … is prejudice to the non-moving\n\f24 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\n\nparty.” Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 793\n(7th Cir. 2004). The district court cited the Liebharts’ admis-\nsion that they learned of the possible burial of contaminated\nconcrete on the SPX property on October 11, 2017 but failed\nto seek leave to amend their complaint until February 22,\n2018. During that more than four-month period, the parties\nĴȱȱȱȱ-motions for summary judg-\nment, and by February, trial was only three months away. The\n\u000eȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ǯ\n In response, the Liebharts contend that there was no un-\nȱȱȱȱDZȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱęȱȱ\nǰȱęȱ of discovery still remained. We disagree.\nWhile the district court’s explanation of prejudice was fairly\nshort, even if the district court had failed ȱȱȱęȬ\ning of prejudice altogether, we might still “Ĝȱȱ\nthat ‘the prejudice that would result from such amendment\nwas apparent.’” Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 613 (7th\nCir. 2002) (quoting Feldman v. Am. Mem’l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d\n783, 793 (7th Cir. 1999)). In Parkǰȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ¡ȱ\nmonths to move for leave to amend a complaint after she\nknew (or should have known) of the additional alleged viola-\ntion. Id. Because trial was approaching, we concluded that the\ndistrict court was well within its discretion to deny leave. Id.;\nsee also Perrian v. O’Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194–95 (7th Cir. 1992)\n(“Because substantive amendments shortly before trial serve\nto defeat the public’s interest in speedy resolution of legal dis-\nputes, ‘[a] district court judge is entitled, in such circum-\nǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱě’s amendment.’” (quoting\nCampbell v. Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co., 893 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir.\n1990)) ǻȱȱĴǼ).\n\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 25\n\n On the contrary, in Life Plans, we found no undue delay\n ȱȱěȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\nten days after learning of the factual basis for its new count\nduring discovery. 800 F.3d at 358. The Liebharts delayed more\nthan four months in the same circumstances. Although dis-\ncovery was ongoing at the time of the Liebharts’ motion, the\nparties had already briefed their dispositive motions, and the\ndistrict court was preparing its summary-judgment order that\nwould ultimately dispose of the case. We therefore cannot say\nthat denial of leave for undue delay and prejudice was an\nabuse of the district court’s discretion. Of course, the district\ncourt may permit an amendment on remand if the interests of\njustice so require.\n III. CONCLUSION\n Although the district court properly exercised its discre-\ntion on the various evidentiary and procedural issues the\něȱȱaised, its analysis on the merits was narrower\nthan the statutes demand. It may reach the same conclusions\non reconsideration, but the parties should have another op-\nportunity to litigate whether a substantial and imminent en-\ndangerment to health exists in this case under the standards\nwe have outlined. We therefore VACATE the order of the dis-\ntrict court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent\nwith this opinion. 3\n\n\n\n\n 3 The Liebharts also challenge the taxation of costs against them by the\n\nclerk of the district court. Because we vacate the district court’s judgment,\nwe assume that the imposition of costs is automatically vacated and so do\nnot reach that issue. The clerk of the district court is free to reassess costs\non remand as the case proceeds.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\nWILLIAM LIEBHART & NANCY LIEBHART,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n v.\\n\\nSPX CORPORATION, TRC ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION, &\\nAPOLLO DISMANTLING SERVICES, INC.\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-700 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n KANNE, Circuit Judge. William and Nancy Liebhart to-\\ngether own three houses on the same block in Watertown,\\nWisconsin. Besides a few other houses, the rest of the block\\nwas previously occupied by an abandoned transformer fac-\\ntory, last owned by SPX Corporation. In 2014, SPX demol-\\nished the building with the assistance of TRC Environmental\\nCorporation and Apollo Dismantling Services (collectively,\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n“the defendants”). The Liebharts allege that dust and debris\\ncontaining toxic chemicals migrated onto their properties,\\ncontaminating their yards and jeopardizing their health and\\nthe health of their tenants.\\n The Liebharts sued under federal statutes authorizing pri-\\nvate rights of action for environmental contamination. They\\nalso brought various state-law claims. Following discovery\\nand the submission of expert witness reports, the district\\ncourt denied the Liebharts’ motion for partial summary judg-\\nment and granted summary judgment to the defendants with\\ncosts. Although the district court adequately evaluated the ex-\\npert witnesses and did not abuse its discretion in its proce-\\ndural decisions, the court set the bar unnecessarily high for\\nȱěȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ\\nutes. For that reason, we vacate the district court’s judgment\\nand remand for reconsideration.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n The factory dates to the 1920s and was used to manufac-\\nture various industrial equipment. Most relevant to our pur-\\npose, the factory manufactured power transformers contain-\\ning polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a carcinogenic chemi-\\ncal banned by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1979.\\nSee Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Pro-\\ncessing, Distribution in Commerce, and Use Prohibitions, 44\\nFǯȱ\\u0014ǯȱřŗǰśŗŚȱǻ\\u000f¢ȱřŗǰȱŗşŝşǼȱǻęȱȱŚŖȱ\\u0005ǯ\\bǯ\\u0014ǯȱpt. 761).\\nThe parties all agree that the facility has not manufactured or\\nhandled any items containing PCBs since 1971, and that it\\nshut down completely in 2005.\\n But even with all the products and manufacturing equip-\\nment removed, PCB contaminants remained in the facility. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 3\\n\\n2009, SPX retained TRC and another company (not named as\\na defendant in this suit) to study the property and determine\\nthe extent and precise location of any PCB contamination.\\n\\u0016ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱ\\nwas generally contaminated, with concentrated amounts lo-\\ncatȱȱęȱȱȱȱǯ\\n Several years went by. In 2014, SPX decided to move ahead\\nwith the demolition, retaining Apollo to conduct the work\\nand TRC to supervise the project. That November, the defend-\\nants timely proposed a self-implementing cleanup plan to the\\nEPA, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 761.61(a). The trouble began\\nas demolition commenced in January 2015. The Liebharts al-\\nlege that Apollo demolished the building recklessly, failing to\\nuse appropriate safety methods to control the dust generated\\nby demolition equipment. They assert that their properties\\n ȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱĴȱȱof photos\\nand videos of dust from the facility blowing toward their\\nhomes to support their allegation.\\n \\u0016ȱ\\u000eȱęȱȱȱ th the local government\\nin February. They also collected a dust-covered sample of\\nsnow from their yard and placed it in a mason jar. Soon there-\\nafter, a representative of the Wisconsin Department of Natu-\\nral Resources (“DNR”) contacted the defendants about the\\nLiebharts’ concerns. In April, TRC collected samples of the\\nsurface soil (roughly down to eight inches below ground) on\\nboth the industrial and residential properties. Sure enough,\\nthe properties tested positive for the presence of PCBs. In Au-\\ngust, the Liebharts vacated the property on advice of their\\nphysician to avoid further exposure to the chemicals. Frus-\\ntrated with the lack of action, William Liebhart had the snow\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nsample tested for PCBs. Although the sample did, in fact, con-\\ntain PCBs, the irregular manner of collection and storage\\nspoiled the sample, and the laboratory declined to endorse the\\nȱ ȱ¢ȱęǯ\\n In September 2015ǰȱ\\u0015\\u0012\\u001aȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\ncontamination to the DNR. In turn, the Liebharts sued in fed-\\neral district court in October. The complaint sought injunctive\\nrelief under both the Resource Conservation and Recovery\\nAct (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and the Toxic Substances\\nControl Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. In addition, the\\nLiebharts brought a host of state-law claims under supple-\\nmental jurisdiction, including strict liability, negligence, tres-\\nǰȱǰȱȱȱĚȱȱȱǯ\\n During discoveryǰȱȱ\\u000eȱĴȱȱȱȬ\\ning for PCBs both in their yard and inside their home. They\\nalso underwent blood testing. Although the external surveys\\nrevealed a more comprehensive picture of the extent to which\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ properties contained PCBs, the in-\\nternal sampling and blood tests were both negative for con-\\ntamination. The Liebharts later learned in October 2017 that\\nthe defendants allegedly buried some of the concrete remains\\non-site rather than removing them to a toxic waste dump as\\nrequired by the EPA-approved clean-up plan.\\n The parties prepared and Ĵȱȱȱȱȱ¡Ȭ\\npert witnesses who were to testify at trial. Among those, three\\nȱȱȱȱǯȱ\\bǰȱȱ\\u000eȱĴȱ\\na report by John Woodyard, a licensed professional engineer.\\nHis report included a description of standard methods used\\nwhen demolishing PCB-contaminated buildings and an anal-\\nysis of the purported ways in which the defendants deviated\\nfrom those practices, thereby causing the contamination of the\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 5\\n\\nresidences. The Liebharts’ second expert was Dr. David Car-\\npenter, a public health physician who opined on ways in\\nwhich the Liebharts might have been exposed to PCBs and the\\nȱȱěȱȱȱ¡ǯȱ\\nȱȱ\\nthat “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not\\nincrease the risk of disease.” Finally, the defendants submit-\\nted a report prepared by Dr. Russell Keenan, a toxicologist\\nwho analyzed the survey data and determined that it was im-\\npossible to determine whether the presence of PCBs on the\\nLiebharts’ property was due to the recent demolition or to\\něȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ.\\n In December 2017, the Liebharts moved for partial sum-\\nmary judgment on the issue of causation, reserving the issue\\nof damages for a jury trial. The defendants cross-moved for\\nsummary judgmentDzȱ¢ȱȱęȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱ\\n¢ȱȱě’ experts Woodyard and Carpenter un-\\nder Fed. R. Evid. 702. In February 2018, after those motions\\nwere fully briefed to the court, the Liebharts sought leave to\\namend their complaint. In light of the information they ob-\\ntained through discovery regarding the burial of concrete on\\nthe property, they intended to allege separate RCRA and\\nTSCA violations and seek an enlargement of the proposed in-\\njunction to include removal of that material.\\n The district court issued its decisions on March 30. First,\\nthe court granted in part the defendants’ motion to exclude\\nthe ě’ expert witness reports. The court explained that\\nWoodyard’s report was “equivocal” as to the issue of causa-\\ntion; it hedged on whether the contaminants came from dem-\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ See\\nLiebhart v. SPX Corp., No. 16-cv-700-jdp, 2018 WL 1583296 at\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n*3–4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2018). Second, the report “over-\\nlook[ed] tȱȱęȱ” and failed to account\\nfor “obvious alternative explanations” in determining the\\ncause of the contamination. Id. at *4 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702\\n¢ȱĴ’s note to 2000 amendments). Finally, the\\ncourt noted that Woodyard’s report depended on “unreliable\\nor uninformative” evidence, including the Liebharts’ defec-\\nȱ ȱǰȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nclippings and a chromatogram that allegedly detected PCBs\\non the property. Id. at *4–5. For those reasons, the court ex-\\ncluded Woodyard’s report in its entirety. Id. at *5.\\n \\u0003ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ\\u0006ǯȱ\\u0005Ȭ\\npenter’s report, it struck Carpenter’s conclusion that “there is\\nno ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that does not increase the\\nrisk of disease” as unsupported by the medical studies he\\ncited. Id. at *5. In doing so, the court pointed to the absence of\\nPCBs inside the Liebharts’ home and in their blood, suggest-\\ning that the Liebharts had not actually been exposed to PCBs\\nȱȱȱȱȱěȱǯȱId. at 5–6.\\n \\u0019ȱȱ¡ȱ¢ȱěȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ\\nconcluded that the Liebharts failed to present any admissible\\nevidence to support their RCRA and TSCA claims. The re-\\nmaining photos and videos certainly showed dust migrating\\nonto the Liebharts’ property, but there was no reliable evi-\\ndence proving that the dust contained PCBs. Given that any\\nPCBs detected in the soil may have been there prior to the\\ndemolition, the lack of evidence doomed the Liebharts’ case.\\n\\u0016ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱě,\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal\\nclaims, and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 7\\n\\n The district court also denied the Liebharts’ petition for\\nleave to amend their complaint on two grounds. First, alt-\\nȱȱȱ ȱȱȱěȱȱ\\nthe factual basis for the new counts over a year ȱęȱȱ\\ninitial complaint, it also noted that they took an additional\\nfour months thereafter to seek leave to amend. During that\\nȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ\\ntheir motions for summary judgment, and the trial date was\\nfast approaching. It found their petition untimely. Second, the\\ndistrict court determined that the new claims were futile un-\\nder both statutes' advance-notice requirements.\\n The ěȱ¢ȱ. Several months after\\nthe judgment, the clerk of the district court imposed costs on\\nthe Liebharts in the amount of $46,320.02. The Liebharts sep-\\narately appealed that decision. We consolidated the two ap-\\npeals and now consider them together.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n The \\u000eȱȱęȱȱȱȱǯȱ\\bǰȱ\\nthey argue that the district court erred in excluding the opin-\\nions of expert witnesses Woodyard in full and Carpenter in\\npart. As part of that argument, they allege that the district\\ncourt failed to apply the same stringent standard to the de-\\nfendants’ expert Keenan. Second, they contend that summary\\njudgment was inappropriate because, even absent the testi-\\n¢ȱȱȱ¡ȱ ǰȱ¢ȱĴȱȱȬ\\nȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nRCRA and TSCA. Third, they challenge the district court’s de-\\nȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ¢ have iden-\\nęȱȱ\\u0015\\u0012\\u001a’s state-approved clean-up plan. Fourth, they ar-\\ngue that the district court abused its discretion in denying\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nleave to amend their complaint. Finally, they challenge the\\nimposition of costs.\\n But there’s a larger issue looming in the background. The\\ndistrict court’s opinion operates under the assumption that\\n\\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱ ěs must demonstrate “an imminent and sub-\\nstantial danger with evidence of health problems they have\\n¢ȱ ěǯ” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *6. Relying\\nprimarily on Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C.\\nŗşşŜǼǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ \\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱ ěǰȱ\\nholding that “it doesn’t follow necessarily that there is an im-\\nminent and substantial risk of harm simply because there is\\nsome amount of PCBs on the property.” Liebhart 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *5. We review that question of law, which was the\\nunderlying basis for the award of summary judgment, de\\nnovo. Daugherty v. Harrington, 906 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n A. RCRA Requires Only that Harm “May” Be Imminent\\n \\u0016ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱ\\nmake out a prima facie violation of RCRA has led to much dis-\\ncussion among the circuits. We have yet to tackle that issue\\nhead on, so the district court necessarily had to look else-\\nwhere for guidance. Passed in 1976, “RCRA is a comprehen-\\nsive environmental statute that empowers [the] EPA to regu-\\nlate hazardous wastes from cradle to grave.” City of Chicago v.\\nEnvtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994). The statute’s “pri-\\nmary purpose … is to reduce the generation of hazardous\\nwaste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and dis-\\nposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, ‘so as to\\nminimize the present and future threat to human health and\\nthe environment.’” Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479,\\n483 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 9\\n\\n Although the EPA has the primary responsibility for en-\\nforcing the law, the statute, “like other environmental laws,\\n… contains a citizen suit provision, § 6972, which permits pri-\\nvate citizens to enforce its provisions in some circumstances.”\\nId. at 484. As relevant to this case, the statute provides that\\n any person may commence a civil action on his own\\n behalf … against any person, … including … any\\n past or present owner or operator of a treatment,\\n storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or\\n who is contributing to the past or present handling,\\n storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any\\n solid or hazardous waste which may present an im-\\n minent and substantial endangerment to health or\\n the environment.\\n42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Notably, Con-\\ngress amended the language in 1980 by substituting the\\nphrase “may present” for the original 1976 wording “is pre-\\nsenting.” Maine People’s All. and Nat. Res. Def. Council v.\\nMallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Solid\\nWaste Disposal Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–482, § 25, 94 Stat. 2334,\\n2348). The section authorizes district courts to grant injunctive\\nrelief and “order [a violator] to take such other action as may\\nbe necessary” to remediate the endangerment. Id.; see also Me-\\nghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (“Under a plain reading of this remedial\\nscheme, a private citizen suing under § 6972(a)(1)(B) could\\nseek a mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible\\nparty to ‘take action’ ¢ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\ndisposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one\\nthat ‘restrains’ a responsible party from further violating\\nRCRA.”); Avondale Fed. Sav. Bank v. Amoco Oil Co., 170 F.3d\\n692, 694 (7th Cir. 1999).\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n The critical question in this case is how to determine\\nwhether alleged contamination “may present an imminent\\nand substantial endangerment to health.” § 6972(a)(1)(b). We\\ntouched on this question only brĚ¢ȱȱAlbany Bank & Trust\\nCo. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2002).\\n\\u0016ǰȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ prima facie RCRA\\nclaim: “a ěȱȱȱǻŗǼȱȱȱȱȱȬ\\nerated solid or hazardous waste, (2) that the defendant is con-\\ntributing to or has contributed to the handling of this waste,\\nand (3) that this waste may present an imminent and substan-\\ntial danger to health or the environment.” Id. (citing Cox v.\\nCity of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 2001)). We then ob-\\nǰȱȱȱęȱǰȱȱ“[i]mminence does\\nnot require an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\nharm.” Id. (citing Cox, 256 F.3d at 299). That is the extent of\\nour circuit precedent on the “may present” language con-\\ntained in § 6972(a)(1)(B).\\n But our sister circuits have engaged with this question in\\nȱǯȱ\\u000bȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ\\nthe Third Circuit emphasized that the statute “enhanced the\\ncourts’ traditional equitable powers by authorizing the issu-\\nance of injunctions when there is but a risk of harm, a more\\nlenient standard than the traditional requirement of threat-\\nened irreparable harm.” United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204,\\n211 (3d Cir. 1982). The court found the statutory language\\n“unequivocal,” demonstrating that Congress “intended to\\nȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĜȱȬ\\nuitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate” the risks\\nposed by toxic waste. Id. at 213–14.\\n In the subsequent decades, several other circuits adopted\\nand further developed the same interpretation of § 6972. See\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 11\\n\\nMallinckrodt, 471 F.3d at 277; Dague v. City of Burlington, 935\\nF.2d 1343, 1355–56 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds,\\n502 U.S. 1071 (1992); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l,\\nInc., 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Waste Indus.,\\nInc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the argument\\nthat “[§ 6972] was designed to control pollution only in emer-\\ngency situations”); Cox, 256 F.3d at 299–301; Price v. United\\nStates Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1994); Burlington N.\\nand Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1019–22 (10th Cir.\\n2007); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1014–\\n15 (11th Cir. 2004). We now join those courts and explicitly\\nembrace the core content of their interpretation.\\n The district court therefore used an incorrect legal stand-\\nard to evaluate the Liebharts’ argument that PCBs from the\\ndemolition may present an imminent and substantial danger\\nto their health and that of their tenants. It did not cite any of\\nthe cases we listed above, but instead relied on a single district\\ncourt decision from a circuit that has not yet addressed the\\nissue. See Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *5 (quoting Foster, 922\\nF. Supp. at 662 (“While there can be no question that the levels\\nof contamination present at the Site may warrant future re-\\nȱ ǰȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ\\nrisk of substantial or serious threatened harm, or some neces-\\nsity for action.”)).\\n That error undercuts several of the reasons the district\\ncourt gave for rejecting the Liebharts’ RCRA claim. For exam-\\nple, the district court cursorily adopted a passing statement\\nwe made over twenty-ę years ago that “[t]he [EPA’s] ac-\\ncepted safe level of PCBs in the ȱȱę¢ȱȱȱ\\nmillion,” id. (quoting Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nServ., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1994)), to create a require-\\nment that the Liebharts show that PCB contamination on their\\nproperty met that threshold. But there is no requirement in\\n\\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱȱȱěȱȱȱ“a particular quantitative show-\\ning as a sine qua non for liability.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 260; see\\nalso Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. Only one circuit has come to an\\narguably contrary conclusion. In Price v. United States Navy,\\n818 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (S.D. Cal. 1992), ě’d 39 F.3d 1011 (9th\\n\\u0005ǯȱŗşşŚǼǰȱȱȱȱȱ\\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱěȱȱ ȱ\\nthat “the level of contaminants [was] above levels that are con-\\nsidered acceptable by the State.” But as the Interfaith court\\nnoted, the Ninth Circuit’ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ\\ncourt’s judgment did not discuss that requirement. RCRA\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěs demonstrate contamination\\nabove some agency-derived threshold level of concentration.\\n399 F.3d at 260–61. It merely requires that they show that con-\\ntaminants on the property are seriously dangerous to human\\nhealth (or will be, given prolonged exposure over time). See\\nCox, 256 F.3d at 299–300 (“an endangerment is ‘substantial’ if\\nit is ‘serious’” (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019)).\\n That’s especially true when the standard is taken out of\\ncontext. The district court relied on Cincinnati Ins. Co. to sup-\\nport its contention that contamination below the threshold\\nȱȱę¢ȱȱȱȱ(“ppm”) does not qualify as a\\nregulatory violation, thereby contradicting Woodyard’s opin-\\nion regarding safe levels of PCBs and providing the grounds\\nfor excluding it. In that case, we evaluated whether an insur-\\nance company was required to indemnify its insured for dam-\\nages arising out of PCB contamination at an industrial site.\\n\\u0016ȱ\\u0007\\u0012\\u0003ȱȱęȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ\\nthe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,\\nand Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. In\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 13\\n\\nthat context, we noted that the contaminated site contained\\nPCBs concentrated at levels up to 58,000 ppm, well above the\\nEPA’ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱę¢ȱǯȱŚŖȱF.3d at 148\\n(citing 40 C.F.R. § 761.60).\\n \\u0004ȱ ȱ ǰȱȱȱěȱ¢ǰȱęȱ Ȭ\\ntrial equipment and other wastes contaminated at levels\\nabove ę¢ȱppm and requires special procedures for their stor-\\nage and disposal. It does not unequivocally state that PCBs\\nȱȱȱ ȱȱę¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nexposure. Neither Cincinnati Ins. Co. nor the EPA regulation\\nstand for the proposition that PCBs concentrated at forty-nine\\nppm on residential property do not present a substantial endan-\\ngerment to the health of the residents. That is especially ap-\\nparent when we consider that the same set of regulations dis-\\ntinguishes between low and high-occupancy areas and re-\\nquires that, in high-occupancy areas, bulk PCB remediation\\nwaste, such as soil, be cleaned up to levels of concentration at\\nor below one ppm. § 761.61(a)(4)(i)(A). Section ŝŜŗǯřȱęȱ\\nthat the term “high-occupancy area” includes residences. See\\nalso § ŝŜŗǯŗŘřȱǻȱȱȱ\\u0012\\u0005\\u0004ȱȱȱę¢ȱ\\nppm or greater but emphasizing that “[t]he concentration of\\nPCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concentration in the\\nmaterial spilled as opposed to the concentration of PCBs in\\nthe material onto which the PCBs were spilled”). “Proof of\\ncontamination in excess of [agency] standards may support a\\nęȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱĜȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ\\nǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱȬ\\nute.” Interfaith, 399 F.3d at 261.\\n This is not to say that ȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱshow\\nsome bit of soil on their property that tests positive for PCBs\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nabove one ppm (or even above the purported lower Wiscon-\\nsin DNR standard, which the defendants seem to have\\nacknowledged in their state-approved clean-up plan). Of\\ncourse, there must be accompanying evidence that establishes\\nsome connection between the existing contaminants and\\nsome imminent and substantial endangerment to health. 1 But\\nȱ \\u000eȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ\\ndistrict court held the bar higher than necessary under\\nRCRA’s standard. In criticizing expert witness Carpenter’s\\nstatement that “there is no ‘safe’ level of exposure to PCBs that\\ndoes not increase the risk of disease,” the district court re-\\njected Carpenter’s citation to studies showing the general\\nrisks of PCB exposure because “the Liebharts do not cite any\\nevidence that they have been exposed to PCBs.” Liebhart, 2018\\nWL 1583296 at *5. Moreover, the district court concluded that\\n“[t]he Liebharts do not contend that they can prove an immi-\\nnent and substantial danger with evidence of health problems\\n¢ȱȱ¢ȱěǯ” Id. at *6.\\n As we noted in Albany Bank, “[i]mminence does not re-\\nquire an existing harm, only an ongoing threat of future\\n\\n\\n 1 On appeal, the Liebharts contend that there is no separate require-\\nment for expert witness testimony because the photos and videos they\\nhave submitted into evidence suffice to prove their RCRA claim. The de-\\nfendants push back on that argument, insisting that many of the issues are\\nbeyond the competence of lay fact-finders and require the assistance of\\nexperts to address. See, e.g., C.W. ex rel. Wood v. Textron, Inc., 807 F.3d 827,\\n838 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Given the complex nature of this case, … [and w]ith\\nno experts to prove causation … the appellants cannot prove their toxic-\\ntort case under [state] law.”) Because the district court did not make a fac-\\ntual finding as to whether this case is sufficient complex to require expert\\ntestimony, and because we remand for reconsideration of a separate legal\\nissue, we need not reach that question today.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 15\\n\\nharm.” 310 F.3d at 973. Although the Supreme Court has in-\\nstructed that “[a]n endangerment can only be ‘imminent’ if it\\n‘threaten[s] to occur immediately,’” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485\\n(quoting Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary of English Language\\nŗŘŚśȱǻŘȱǯȱŗşřŚǼǼǰȱȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱȬ\\ningly quoted the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the statu-\\ntory term “implies that there must be a threat which is present\\nnow, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until\\nlater.” Id. at 486 (quoting United States Navy, 39 F.3d at 1019).\\nWe take that to mean that the Liebharts must show that there\\nare PCBs currently on the property that have the potential to\\nsubstantially threaten their health at some point in the future\\nif they continue to occupy the premises and prolong their ex-\\nposure. On remand, the district court should reevaluate its ex-\\nclusion of Dr. Carpenter’s assertion regarding PCB safety un-\\nder the standards we have outlined above and determine\\nwhether, if admissible, the report demonstrates that a sub-\\nstantial and imminent threat to the Liebharts’ health may be\\npresent.\\n B. TSCA Likewise Requires No Heightened Showing\\n TSCA authorizes a separate, private cause of action allow-\\ning “any person [to] commence a civil action … against any\\nperson … who is alleged to be in violation of … any rule\\npromulgated under” the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1). The EPA\\npromulgated the PCB regulations in question pursuant to\\nstatutory authority under TSCA, designating PCBs as “haz-\\nardous waste” and controlling their manufacture, use, stor-\\nage, and disposal. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 761. The Liebharts’ TSCA\\nclaim alleged that the defendants violated those regulations,\\nthereby authorizing the district court to “restrain [the] viola-\\ntion.” § 2619(a). Unlike RCRA, which authorizes mandatory\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\ninjunctions to compel remediation of previous violations,\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions to stop ongoing\\nviolations. Id. The defendants argued that there was no longer\\nan ongoing violation, as demolition was complete by the time\\nȱ\\u000eȱęȱȱǯ 2\\n The purported violation was based on 40 C.F.R. § 761.123,\\nwhich, as we noted above, regulates “spills” of PCB materials\\nȱȱȱȱę¢ȱǯȱ\\u0016 district court cor-\\nrectly noted that the Liebharts had not shown any evidence\\nthat any PCBs had been “spilled” onto their property (by\\nmeans of dust migration) at that level of concentration, and it\\ngranted summary judgment to the defendants on that basis.\\n But the district court seems to have overlooked the follow-\\ning sentence in the regulation, which directs that “[t]he con-\\ncentration of PCBs spilled is determined by the PCB concen-\\ntration in the material spilled as opposed to the concentration\\nof the material onto which the PCBs were spilled.” Id. The\\nLiebharts’ complaint seems to have alleged that the concrete\\nĚȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȬ\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ę¢-ppm threshold, was demolished\\nand “spilled” onto the Liebharts’ property. By the plain text\\nof the regulation, there is no need to show that contaminants\\non the Liebharts’ property are themselves concentrated above\\nę¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ\\nof that spill met the criteria. On remand, the district court may\\nagain determine that there is no ongoing violation, but it must\\n\\n 2 The district court determined that the Liebharts waived this claim\\nby failing to engage the defendants’ argument that there was no “ongoing\\nviolation.” But the court chose to analyze the merits of the claim regardless\\nof waiver and reached its conclusion on an alternative basis. We likewise\\nset aside the issue of waiver to reach the district court’s merits analysis.\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 17\\n\\nęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ\\nthe meaning of § 761.123 ȱȱęȱ.\\n C. The District Court Should Reconsider the Remaining Issues\\non Remand\\n \\u0010 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ standard ȱ ěȱ\\nmust meet, we turn to the remaining procedural issues the\\nLiebharts have asked to us to address.\\n 1. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding\\nWoodyard’s Testimony\\n “The summary-judgment decision here turned [in large\\npart] on the district court’s conclusion that [the] expert testi-\\nmony was inadmissible. Whether the district court applied\\nthe appropriate legal framework for evaluating expert testi-\\nmony is reviewed de novo, but the court’s choice of relevant\\nfactors within that framework and its ultimate conclusion as\\nto admissibility are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Lees v.\\nCarthage College, 714 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 2013). When a dis-\\ntrict court is “[Ǿȱ ȱȱěȱȱ¡ȱęȱȬ\\nmony … the trial judge must determine at the outset …\\n ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǻŗǼȱ ęȱ\\nknowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or\\ndetermine a fact in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,\\n509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). “The trial court must have … latitude\\nin deciding how to test an expert’s reliability.” Kumho Tire Co.,\\nLtd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).\\n The district court was well within its discretion to exclude\\nthe ěȱ¢ȱȱ¡ȱ ȱ\\u0019¢ǯȱ\\u0004¢ȱ\\nȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȬ\\nsue in the district court by failing to engage with the defend-\\nants’ arguments in their motion to strike the testimony,\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nWoodyard’s analysis sěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ě ȱ ȱ ȱ\\nfrom the way in which the parties have framed this lawsuit.\\n\\u0016ȱȱȱĚ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ“both sides\\nassume that none of the defendants can be held liable for any\\nPCB contamination on the Liebharts’ property that occurred\\nbefore the demolition began, so the court will make the same\\nassumption.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *1. That’s a curious\\nchoice. RCRA permits the Liebharts to obtain injunctive relief\\nfrom the owner of the facility for any cognizable contamina-\\ntion, regardless of whether the PCBs migrated onto their\\nproperty before or after the demolition occurred. See 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (authorizing suit against “any person … who\\nhas contributed … to the past or present handling … or dis-\\nposal” of hazardous waste); see also Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486\\n(“RCRA contains no statute of limitations.”).\\n But because the Liebharts restricted their claims to PCBs\\nthat allegedly migrated onto their property via the dust from\\nthe 2015 demolition, they necessarily excluded claims result-\\ning from PCBs that may ȱĴȱȱȱ¢ȱȬ\\ning the previous century. The district court correctly noted\\nthat Woodyard’s expert opinion could not distinguish be-\\ntween these two alternatives, as both sets of contaminants\\noriginated from the same source. There was even evidence\\nshowing that PCBs existed in the soil beneath the Liebharts’\\nasphalt driveway—Woodyard could not explain how that\\nmight have occurred as the result of dust blowing in the wind\\nas opposed to seepage over the course of years before any\\ndemolition occurred.\\n Perhaps the Liebharts decided to frame their claims in this\\nway because they wanted to go after defendants TRC and\\nApollo, who would not be liable for what happened before\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 19\\n\\ndemolition. Or perhaps some element of their state-law\\nclaims, which we have not addressed, required them to con-\\nstrict the scope. They did not explain their reasoning to us (or\\nit seems, to the district court). But the distinction makes it dif-\\nęȱȱ\\u0019¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\n“adequately account[] for obvious alternative explanations.”\\n\\tȱǯȱ\\n Ĵ-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 787 (7th Cir.\\n2017). Viewed in this light, the district court was within its\\ndiscretion to exclude the testimony as unreliable and unhelp-\\nful to the trier of fact. The district court may choose to rethink\\nthat evaluation on remand under the legal standards we out-\\nlined above, but it may well reach the same conclusion.\\n 2. The District Court Should Reconsider Its Denial of Injunctive\\nRelief\\n The district court denied injunctive relief to the Liebharts\\nbecause the defendants had already agreed to a clean-up plan\\nthat had been approved by the Wisconsin DNR. We review\\nthat decision for an abuse of discretion. See AMI Int’l, Inc. v.\\nDatacard Corp. 106 F.3d 1342, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997) (remanding\\ngrant of RCRA injunction).\\n As we mentioned above, RCRA authorizes district courts\\nto issue either mandatory or prohibitory injunctions, while\\nTSCA authorizes only prohibitory injunctions. “[I]t is appro-\\npriate ‘to give great deference to the district court’s decision\\nas to the precise equitable relief necessary in a particular\\ncase.’” Bowes v. Ind. Sec. of State, 837 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (quoting Gjersten v. Bd. Of Election Com’rs for City of Chi-\\ncago, 791 F.2d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1986)). That is especially true\\n ȱȱěȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ ȱ“im-\\nȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ\\nful consideration of the intrusiveness of the ordered act, as\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\n ȱȱȱĜȱȱ¢ȱȱȱin supervising\\nthe enjoined party’s compliance with the court’s order.” Kart-\\nman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir.\\n2011).\\n Considering SPX’s decision to formulate a clean-up plan\\nand obtain approval from the state agency, the district court\\ndetermined that there was no need for separate, federally-su-\\npervised remediation. It reached that conclusion even while\\nassuming that the defendants were in violation of either\\nRCRA or TSCA, despite the fact it found no such violation.\\nOther courts have determined that the existence of a parallel\\nplan of remediation supervised by the state does not neces-\\nsarily prevent a federal district court from granting an injunc-\\nȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢’ȱȱȱȱĜȱȱ\\nremedy the violation of federal law. See, e.g., Interfaith, 399\\nF.3d at 264–68. On the other hand, the same courts have also\\nupheld denials of injunctions in similar situations when the\\nȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ\\ntask. See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735\\nF.3d 131, 139–40 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Interfaith). We\\nrecently reached the same conclusion. See LAJIM, LLC v. Gen.\\nElec. Co., No. 18-1522, 2019 WL 1011021, at *4–11 (7th Cir. Mar.\\n4, 2019) (“[T]he district court correctly held that it has discre-\\ntion to award injunctive relief under the RCRA and is not re-\\nȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱ¢ǰ” particularly\\nin light of ongoing relief supervised by a state environmental\\nagency).\\n Here, the district court determined that SPX’s existing\\nȱ ȱ Ĝ and that the Liebharts had not “iden-\\ntif[ied] any way that SPX’ȱȱǽ ǾȱęȱȱǽǾȱ\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 21\\n\\nfederal law.” Liebhart, 2018 WL 1583296 at *7. We agree. Alt-\\nhough the Liebharts point to certain statistical sampling re-\\nquirements outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 761.125 and contend that\\nSPX’s existing plan fails to meet those requirements, the dis-\\ntrict court noted that SPX’s plan includes further sampling of\\nthe soil on the Liebharts’ property. It emphasized that “the\\nLiebharts do not otherwise explain why SPX’s proposed sam-\\npling scheme is substantively inadequate.” Liebhart, 2018 WL\\n1583296 at *7. We see no evidence that compels us to contra-\\nȱȱȱęǯ\\n However, in light of the legal standards we outlined\\nabove, we ask the district court to reconsider its decision to\\ndeny injunctive relief on remand. Because the bar for estab-\\nlishing an imminent and substantial danger is lower than the\\ndistrict court believed when evaluating the request for an in-\\njunction, it would be prudent to reassess whether the DNR-\\napproved plan adequately remedies harms that may come\\nwithin RCRA’s scope. See LAJIM, 2019 WL 1011021 at *6\\n(“[\\u0011Ǿȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nimminent and substantial danger, it will usually be the case\\nthat injunctive relief is warranted. But that is not always the\\ncase.”) ǻȱȱȱȱĴǼǯ\\n 3. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying\\nLeave to Amend the Complaint.\\n We review a denial of leave to amend a complaint for\\nabuse of discretion. Life Plans, Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co.,\\n800 F.3d 343, 357 (7th Cir. 2015). District courts are to “freely\\ngive leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.\\nP. 15(a)(2). “The Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to\\nrequire a district court to allow amendment unless there is a\\ngood reason—futility, undue delay, undue prejudice, or bad\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nfaith—for denying leave to amend.” Life Plans, 800 F.3d at 357\\n(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). The district\\nȱȱȱȱęȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\ndenial: futility and undue delay. While we disagree with the\\n¢ȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ȱ\\nand decline to reverse.\\n We begin with the question of futility. Both statutes con-\\ntain advance-ȱȱȱ£ȱěȱȱ\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ \\u0014\\u0005\\u0014\\u0003ȱ ȱ \\u0016\\u0015\\u0005\\u0003ȱ ǯȱ \\u0016¢ȱ ȱ\\nȱěȱȱ¢ȱȱ\\u0007\\u0012\\u0003ȱ60–90 ¢ȱȱȱȱęȬ\\ning the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2); 15 U.S.C.\\n§ 2619(b)(1)(A). But the district court chose to apply the re-\\nȱȱ¢ȱȱȱęȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ\\nany subsequent amendments that sought to add new RCRA\\nor TSCA counts. Although the Liebharts complied with the\\nȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ\\u0003ȱ\\n2016, they gave no new notice to the EPA before ęȱ ȱ\\nleave to amend in February 2018. The district court held that,\\nbecause the prior notice did not contain any mention of bur-\\nȱ\\u0012\\u0005\\u0004ȱȱȱ\\u0015\\u0012\\u001aȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱĜȱȱȱȱ\\nEPA to the particular violation the Liebharts sought to include\\nin the amended complaint.\\n The notice provisions serve two purposes. “First, notice al-\\nlows Government agencies to take responsibility for enforc-\\ning environmental regulations, thus obviating the need for\\ncitizen suits. … Second, notice gives the alleged violator ‘an\\nopportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the\\nAct[s] and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit.’”\\nHallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (quoting\\n\\t ¢ȱ ȱ \\u0015ęǰȱ\\u000bǯȱ ǯȱ\\u0005ȱ\\u0004¢ȱ \\bǯǰȱ\\u000bǯ, 484\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 23\\n\\nU.S. 49, 60 (1987)). The district court’s decision to require no-\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ pur-\\nposeǯȱ\\u0004¢ȱȱȱȱ\\u000eȱĴȱȱȱȱȬ\\nplaint, the EPA had been on notice of alleged PCB contamina-\\ntion at the SPX property for over two years—and it had de-\\nclined to get involved. Moreover, it was unlikely that the de-\\nfendants would resolve the alleged violation to avoid being\\nsued when they were already in the midst of an extended law-\\nȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěǯȱ See AM Int’l, 106 F.3d at 1351\\n(“[T]he delay period is designed to allow a [defendant] a pe-\\nriod in which to clean up its act and avoid litigation. [This de-\\nfendant] was clearly not interested in using the delay period\\nto resolve the dispute without going to court.”); see also Dague,\\n935 F.2d at 1351 (“There is no need to maintain a window of\\nopportunity for the government to take the lead enforcement\\nrole … ȱȱ£ǰȱȱȱȱȱĴ¢ȱǰȱȱ\\nalready lawfully assumed the lead role in bringing a … claim\\nagainst the same facility.”) (quoting Dague v. City of Burling-\\nton, 733 F. Supp. 23, 26 (D. Vt. 1990)). When the original notice\\nis “Ĝ¢ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱǽȱȱ\\nagency] about what it is doing wrong, so that it will know\\nwhat corrective actions will avert a lawsuit,” Atl. States Legal\\nFound., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir.\\n1994), there is no need to require a second round of advance\\nnotice for an amended complaint in the same litigation.\\n But an error in the futility analysis alone does not neces-\\nsarily constitute an abuse of discretion on the whole. In addi-\\ntion to futility, the district court cited undue delay and preju-\\ndice in its decision to deny leave to amend. “[D]elay by itself\\nȱ¢ȱȱĜȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ\\nto amend. Delay must be coupled with some other reason.\\nTypically, that reason … is prejudice to the non-moving\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\\n\\nparty.” Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 793\\n(7th Cir. 2004). The district court cited the Liebharts’ admis-\\nsion that they learned of the possible burial of contaminated\\nconcrete on the SPX property on October 11, 2017 but failed\\nto seek leave to amend their complaint until February 22,\\n2018. During that more than four-month period, the parties\\nĴȱȱȱȱ-motions for summary judg-\\nment, and by February, trial was only three months away. The\\n\\u000eȱȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ǯ\\n In response, the Liebharts contend that there was no un-\\nȱȱȱȱDZȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱęȱȱ\\nǰȱęȱ of discovery still remained. We disagree.\\nWhile the district court’s explanation of prejudice was fairly\\nshort, even if the district court had failed ȱȱȱęȬ\\ning of prejudice altogether, we might still “Ĝȱȱ\\nthat ‘the prejudice that would result from such amendment\\nwas apparent.’” Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 613 (7th\\nCir. 2002) (quoting Feldman v. Am. Mem’l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d\\n783, 793 (7th Cir. 1999)). In Parkǰȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ¡ȱ\\nmonths to move for leave to amend a complaint after she\\nknew (or should have known) of the additional alleged viola-\\ntion. Id. Because trial was approaching, we concluded that the\\ndistrict court was well within its discretion to deny leave. Id.;\\nsee also Perrian v. O’Grady, 958 F.2d 192, 194–95 (7th Cir. 1992)\\n(“Because substantive amendments shortly before trial serve\\nto defeat the public’s interest in speedy resolution of legal dis-\\nputes, ‘[a] district court judge is entitled, in such circum-\\nǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱě’s amendment.’” (quoting\\nCampbell v. Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co., 893 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir.\\n1990)) ǻȱȱĴǼ).\\n\\fNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598 25\\n\\n On the contrary, in Life Plans, we found no undue delay\\n ȱȱěȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ\\nten days after learning of the factual basis for its new count\\nduring discovery. 800 F.3d at 358. The Liebharts delayed more\\nthan four months in the same circumstances. Although dis-\\ncovery was ongoing at the time of the Liebharts’ motion, the\\nparties had already briefed their dispositive motions, and the\\ndistrict court was preparing its summary-judgment order that\\nwould ultimately dispose of the case. We therefore cannot say\\nthat denial of leave for undue delay and prejudice was an\\nabuse of the district court’s discretion. Of course, the district\\ncourt may permit an amendment on remand if the interests of\\njustice so require.\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n Although the district court properly exercised its discre-\\ntion on the various evidentiary and procedural issues the\\něȱȱaised, its analysis on the merits was narrower\\nthan the statutes demand. It may reach the same conclusions\\non reconsideration, but the parties should have another op-\\nportunity to litigate whether a substantial and imminent en-\\ndangerment to health exists in this case under the standards\\nwe have outlined. We therefore VACATE the order of the dis-\\ntrict court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent\\nwith this opinion. 3\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 The Liebharts also challenge the taxation of costs against them by the\\n\\nclerk of the district court. Because we vacate the district court’s judgment,\\nwe assume that the imposition of costs is automatically vacated and so do\\nnot reach that issue. The clerk of the district court is free to reassess costs\\non remand as the case proceeds.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1177,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4597351,"string":"4,597,351"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Steve Briggins"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1921"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐1921 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nSTEVE BRIGGINS, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 1:17‐cr‐00243‐1 — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. In 2017 Steve Briggins was con‐\\nvicted of robbing multiple banks over several months. This \\nwas not Briggins’s first foray into bank robbery. Eighteen \\nyears earlier, in 1999, Briggins was convicted of and sentenced \\nfor ten bank robberies he committed over a span of a few \\nmonths. When the district court sentenced Briggins for the \\n2017 robberies, it accounted for the 1999 robberies in calculat‐\\ning his criminal history points under the Sentencing \\n\\f2 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\nGuidelines. Briggins now appeals, contending that the district \\ncourt, when determining his advisory sentencing range, im‐\\nproperly determined his criminal history category by impos‐\\ning too many criminal history points for the 1999 robberies. \\nSeeing no error, we affirm. \\n I \\n Briggins pleaded guilty in 2017 to committing multiple \\nbank robberies. At sentencing a primary focus became \\nBriggins’s criminal history and, more specifically, how many \\ncriminal history points should be assessed for the ten bank \\nrobberies he was convicted of in 1999 and for which he was \\nsentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment. The number of points \\nto be added for the 1999 robberies depended on whether the \\nprior 84‐month term reflected one sentence (for all ten \\nrobberies) or multiple concurrent sentences (for the ten \\nseparate robberies). Briggins urged the former—if the 84‐\\nmonth term reflected one sentence, it would yield fewer \\ncriminal history points and thus a lower advisory guidelines \\nrange. \\n The district court’s determination of Briggins’s criminal \\nhistory points tracked the Sentencing Guidelines analysis of‐\\nfered by the probation office. In its presentence investigation \\nreport, the probation office concluded that Briggins received \\nten concurrent sentences—one for each of the ten bank rob‐\\nberies. So, too, did the probation office recognize that the cal‐\\nculation of Briggins’s criminal history points needed to ac‐\\ncount for the threefold reality that he was charged with all ten \\nrobberies in the same indictment, pleaded guilty to each of \\nthose robberies in the same proceeding, and faced sentencing \\nfor all ten on the same day. All of this had ramifications for \\nthe proper criminal history calculation. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 3\\n\\n In the end, the probation office recommended that \\nBriggins receive six criminal history points for the 1999 bank \\nrobberies. These six points captured all ten robberies and \\ncame from an application of two provisions within § 4A1.1 of \\nthe guidelines. The first three of those points came from \\n§ 4A1.1(a), which requires sentencing courts to “[a]dd 3 \\npoints for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one \\nyear and one month.” And the other three points came from \\na provision, § 4A1.1(e), that applies where, as here, a \\ndefendant is convicted of multiple offenses charged in the \\nsame indictment or receives multiple sentences on the same \\nday. In this way, § 4A1.1(e) accounts for the circumstance of \\nmultiple convictions and sentences. \\n We can put the point in even plainer terms. A defendant \\nsentenced to more than 13 months’ imprisonment following a \\nfelony conviction ordinarily receives three criminal history \\npoints for that offense at a later sentencing. See U.S.S.G. \\n§ 4A1.1(a). By this logic, it may seem that a defendant like \\nBriggins convicted of and sentenced for ten separate robberies \\nshould receive 30 criminal history points—three for each \\nconviction. The guidelines do not work that way, though, in \\nsituations like the ones present here. Where the prior \\nsentences “resulted from offenses contained in the same \\ncharging instrument” or were “imposed on the same day,” \\nthe Sentencing Commission limited the number of criminal \\nhistory points assigned to those sentences. Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2). \\nThe first sentence still receives three points (consistent with \\nthe ordinary rule), but the remaining sentences are subject to \\na capping rule: § 4A1.1(e) assigns one criminal history point \\nfor each additional sentence resulting from a conviction of a \\ncrime of violence but limits the maximum number of \\nadditional points to three. \\n\\f4 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\n The probation office applied this capping rule when calcu‐\\nlating Briggins’s criminal history points here. It began with \\nthe ten sentences Briggins received for the ten 1999 robberies \\nand assigned three points to the first of those sentences under \\n§ 4A1.1(a) because the sentence exceeded 13 months. From \\nthere the probation office recognized that, because the ten \\nsentences came from the same indictment and were imposed \\non the same day, the limitations of § 4A1.1(e) applied. Apply‐\\ning § 4A1.1(e) meant that only three additional points were \\nallowed for Briggins’s remaining nine robberies. The math \\nfrom there was simple: Briggins received a total of six criminal \\nhistory points for the ten 1999 robberies. \\n At the sentencing hearing for the 2017 robberies, the \\ndistrict court agreed with and adopted the probation office’s \\nanalysis of Briggins’s criminal history. The resulting advisory \\nguidelines range for Briggins’s 2017 bank robberies was 77 to \\n96 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed a \\nsentence of 96 months. \\n II \\n On appeal Briggins renews his challenge to the district \\ncourt’s calculation of the criminal history points assigned to \\nhis 1999 bank robberies. He does so by attacking a key factual \\npremise upon which the district court based its determination \\nthat the prior robberies warranted a total of six criminal his‐\\ntory points. As Briggins sees the 1999 proceeding, he received \\nnot ten concurrent sentences, but rather one sentence of 84 \\nmonths for all ten robberies. On this view, he contends he \\nshould have received only three criminal history points for \\nthe single term of 84 months he received for the 1999 rob‐\\nberies, and thus there was no need for the district court to ever \\nget into how the guidelines treat multiple sentences. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 5\\n\\n Resolving whether Briggins received multiple concurrent \\nsentences or one sentence for his ten bank robberies requires \\nus to review the 1999 sentencing hearing in some detail. The \\nbeginning point is recognizing that Briggins pleaded guilty to \\ncommitting ten separate bank robberies, each of which had \\nbeen charged as a separate count in the underlying indict‐\\nment. At the 1999 sentencing hearing, the district court stated \\nthat it was sentencing Briggins “to a term of 84 months.” In \\ndoing so, the court emphasized that Briggins deserved to be \\npunished for each robbery—he should not, as the sentencing \\njudge put it, receive any “group discounts” for having com‐\\nmitted ten separate robberies. The district court’s written \\njudgment reflected that Briggins pleaded guilty to ten counts \\nthat resulted in “a total term of 84 months.” Nowhere in the \\nwritten judgment did the court indicate whether the 84‐\\nmonth term reflected concurrent sentences. \\n Briggins latches onto the district court’s use of the phrase \\n“a term” of imprisonment to argue that he received a single, \\nlump‐sum term of 84 months for the ten robberies. He does \\nnot dispute that he pleaded guilty to ten separate robberies, \\nbut rather underscores that he was sentenced to “a term” of \\n84 months—a single term, not multiple terms or concurrent \\nterms. And this single sentence, Briggins continues, is wholly \\naccounted for by the three criminal history points added un‐\\nder § 4A1.1(a); there was no basis for assigning additional \\ncriminal history points under § 4A1.1(e) or any other provi‐\\nsion of the guidelines. The upshot of Briggins’s argument is \\nthat it was not even necessary for the district court to reach \\n§ 4A1.1(e) because multiple sentences were not in play in the \\nfirst place. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\n We disagree. Briggins’s insistence that he received only \\none sentence because the district court announced “a term” of \\nimprisonment ignores the substance and full context of what \\ntranspired at his 1999 sentencing hearing. The transcript \\nshows that the district court intended to punish each robbery \\nseparately, for there is no other way to understand the sen‐\\ntencing judge’s comments that Briggins was not entitled to \\n“any type of group discounts” or “a two‐for‐one sale or a ten‐\\nfor‐one sale.” \\n The district judge made other statements at sentencing to \\ndrive home that Briggins deserved to be punished for each of \\nthe ten robberies. At one point, for example, the judge \\nexplained that, if Briggins had committed just one bank \\nrobbery, he would “probably be looking at three to five years \\neasily,” and that “any judge could sentence [him] to 30 years \\nand say, well, it’s three years for each of the bank robberies.” \\nThe district judge further observed that, even if he sentenced \\nBriggins to just “one year for every one of the bank robberies,” \\nhe would face a total of ten years. But the court was quick to \\nrecognize that a sentence along those lines would be well \\noutside the then‐mandatory guidelines range of 63 to 78 \\nmonths. So the district court instead applied an upward \\ndeparture, reasoning that the ten robberies conducted over a \\nshort period of time presented an “unusual circumstance” \\nthat was not adequately taken into consideration by the \\nguidelines. The 1999 sentencing ended with the district court \\nimposing a sentence of 84 months. \\n A broader point deserves underscoring. Accepting \\nBriggins’s position would require us to conclude that the \\ndistrict court sentenced him to 84 months for one of the ten \\n1999 bank robberies but to no time for the other nine. But any \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 7\\n\\nview like that neither accounts for what the district judge said \\nat sentencing—that Briggins would not receive a break \\nbecause he committed multiple bank robberies—nor the \\nreality that the court was obligated to sentence him on each of \\nthe ten separate bank robberies to which he pleaded guilty. \\nWe also cannot overlook that the district court imposed a \\nspecial assessment of $100 for each of the ten robberies for a \\ntotal of $1,000—yet another indicator that the district judge \\nunderstood the ten robberies as resulting in separate \\nconvictions warranting separate sentences. The only other \\ninterpretation, which makes even less sense, is that the 84‐\\nmonth sentence reflected the sum total of ten consecutive \\nsentences of 8.4 months each. Not only would a sentence like \\nthat—less than one year for a bank robbery—bear little \\nrelationship to the applicable guidelines range, but it would \\nalso require us to assume the district judge (who uttered not \\na word about consecutive sentences) intended to impose ten \\nsmall but consecutive sentences. \\n Our conclusion that the district court imposed ten \\nconcurrent sentences for the 1999 robberies aligns squarely \\nwith the presumption that sentences imposed in a multiple‐\\ncount case run concurrently with one another. See U.S.S.G. \\n§ 5G1.2(c) (explaining that “[i]f the sentence imposed on the \\ncount carrying the highest statutory maximum is adequate to \\nachieve the total punishment, then the sentences on all counts \\nshall run concurrently”). Indeed, the Sentencing \\nCommission’s accompanying commentary (in effect at the \\ntime of the 1999 sentencing and now) clarifies that, in a \\nmultiple‐count case, the total punishment is to be imposed on \\neach count and the sentences on all counts are to run \\nconcurrently. See id. § 5G1.2 & cmt; see also id. § 5G1.2 & cmt. \\n(effective Nov. 1, 1998). Congress incorporated this same \\n\\f8 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\npresumption of concurrence into the statutory provision \\ngoverning the imposition of multiple sentences for a \\ndefendant convicted of a federal offense. See 18 U.S.C. \\n§ 3584(a). \\n We decline to interpret Briggins’s 1999 sentence in a way \\nthat contravenes not only this presumption of concurrence, \\nbut also the sentencing judge’s clear statements that he in‐\\ntended to hold Briggins accountable for each robbery. The \\nmost accurate reading of Briggins’s 1999 sentence—the read‐\\ning fairest to the record—is that “a term of 84 months” re‐\\nflected multiple concurrent sentences. \\n Briggins urges a contrary conclusion by pointing to prior \\ndecisions where courts have concluded that “a term” refers to \\none sentence or, at the very least, creates enough ambiguity \\nabout what sentence a defendant received to warrant resen‐\\ntencing. In United States v. Eskridge, for example, the question \\nwas whether the district court had imposed one term or two \\nconcurrent terms of supervised release for the defendant’s \\ntwo convictions. 445 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2006). After exam‐\\nining the sentencing transcript, we held that the defendant \\nwas entitled to resentencing for supervised release violations \\nbecause the district judge, in sentencing the defendant to “a \\nterm of 26 months,” in no way clarified (in the judgment or \\notherwise) whether he had sentenced the defendant to one or \\ntwo terms of supervised release. See id. at 935. And we added \\nthat “if the order accurately reflects the judge’s decision, how‐\\never mistaken, to impose just a single term, it cannot be cor‐\\nrected.” Id. at 934. \\n The circumstances here are different. The statements the \\ndistrict judge made immediately before sentencing Briggins \\nfor the 1999 robberies do not leave room for an interpretation \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 9\\n\\nthat the court may have decided—however mistakenly—to \\nimpose a single term of imprisonment. To the contrary, the \\ndistrict judge’s statements made clear that he intended to hold \\nBriggins accountable for each of the ten robbery convictions. \\nAt the time, moreover, the guidelines required the court to \\nsentence Briggins on each count of conviction, with the pre‐\\nsumption that such sentences would run concurrently. \\n On this record, we conclude that the district court in 1999 \\nimposed multiple sentences for Briggins’s ten robbery convic‐\\ntions. At Briggins’s sentencing for the 2017 convictions, the \\ndistrict court thus properly assessed six criminal history \\npoints for Briggins’s 1999 sentences—three criminal history \\npoints under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a) for one sentence, and three \\nadditional points for the remaining nine sentences under \\nU.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e). \\n Accordingly, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4374604/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597351/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Steve Briggins\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐1921 \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \n v. \n\nSTEVE BRIGGINS, \n Defendant‐Appellant. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \n No. 1:17‐cr‐00243‐1 — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. In 2017 Steve Briggins was con‐\nvicted of robbing multiple banks over several months. This \nwas not Briggins’s first foray into bank robbery. Eighteen \nyears earlier, in 1999, Briggins was convicted of and sentenced \nfor ten bank robberies he committed over a span of a few \nmonths. When the district court sentenced Briggins for the \n2017 robberies, it accounted for the 1999 robberies in calculat‐\ning his criminal history points under the Sentencing \n\f2 No. 18‐1921 \n\nGuidelines. Briggins now appeals, contending that the district \ncourt, when determining his advisory sentencing range, im‐\nproperly determined his criminal history category by impos‐\ning too many criminal history points for the 1999 robberies. \nSeeing no error, we affirm. \n I \n Briggins pleaded guilty in 2017 to committing multiple \nbank robberies. At sentencing a primary focus became \nBriggins’s criminal history and, more specifically, how many \ncriminal history points should be assessed for the ten bank \nrobberies he was convicted of in 1999 and for which he was \nsentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment. The number of points \nto be added for the 1999 robberies depended on whether the \nprior 84‐month term reflected one sentence (for all ten \nrobberies) or multiple concurrent sentences (for the ten \nseparate robberies). Briggins urged the former—if the 84‐\nmonth term reflected one sentence, it would yield fewer \ncriminal history points and thus a lower advisory guidelines \nrange. \n The district court’s determination of Briggins’s criminal \nhistory points tracked the Sentencing Guidelines analysis of‐\nfered by the probation office. In its presentence investigation \nreport, the probation office concluded that Briggins received \nten concurrent sentences—one for each of the ten bank rob‐\nberies. So, too, did the probation office recognize that the cal‐\nculation of Briggins’s criminal history points needed to ac‐\ncount for the threefold reality that he was charged with all ten \nrobberies in the same indictment, pleaded guilty to each of \nthose robberies in the same proceeding, and faced sentencing \nfor all ten on the same day. All of this had ramifications for \nthe proper criminal history calculation. \n\fNo. 18‐1921 3\n\n In the end, the probation office recommended that \nBriggins receive six criminal history points for the 1999 bank \nrobberies. These six points captured all ten robberies and \ncame from an application of two provisions within § 4A1.1 of \nthe guidelines. The first three of those points came from \n§ 4A1.1(a), which requires sentencing courts to “[a]dd 3 \npoints for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one \nyear and one month.” And the other three points came from \na provision, § 4A1.1(e), that applies where, as here, a \ndefendant is convicted of multiple offenses charged in the \nsame indictment or receives multiple sentences on the same \nday. In this way, § 4A1.1(e) accounts for the circumstance of \nmultiple convictions and sentences. \n We can put the point in even plainer terms. A defendant \nsentenced to more than 13 months’ imprisonment following a \nfelony conviction ordinarily receives three criminal history \npoints for that offense at a later sentencing. See U.S.S.G. \n§ 4A1.1(a). By this logic, it may seem that a defendant like \nBriggins convicted of and sentenced for ten separate robberies \nshould receive 30 criminal history points—three for each \nconviction. The guidelines do not work that way, though, in \nsituations like the ones present here. Where the prior \nsentences “resulted from offenses contained in the same \ncharging instrument” or were “imposed on the same day,” \nthe Sentencing Commission limited the number of criminal \nhistory points assigned to those sentences. Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2). \nThe first sentence still receives three points (consistent with \nthe ordinary rule), but the remaining sentences are subject to \na capping rule: § 4A1.1(e) assigns one criminal history point \nfor each additional sentence resulting from a conviction of a \ncrime of violence but limits the maximum number of \nadditional points to three. \n\f4 No. 18‐1921 \n\n The probation office applied this capping rule when calcu‐\nlating Briggins’s criminal history points here. It began with \nthe ten sentences Briggins received for the ten 1999 robberies \nand assigned three points to the first of those sentences under \n§ 4A1.1(a) because the sentence exceeded 13 months. From \nthere the probation office recognized that, because the ten \nsentences came from the same indictment and were imposed \non the same day, the limitations of § 4A1.1(e) applied. Apply‐\ning § 4A1.1(e) meant that only three additional points were \nallowed for Briggins’s remaining nine robberies. The math \nfrom there was simple: Briggins received a total of six criminal \nhistory points for the ten 1999 robberies. \n At the sentencing hearing for the 2017 robberies, the \ndistrict court agreed with and adopted the probation office’s \nanalysis of Briggins’s criminal history. The resulting advisory \nguidelines range for Briggins’s 2017 bank robberies was 77 to \n96 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed a \nsentence of 96 months. \n II \n On appeal Briggins renews his challenge to the district \ncourt’s calculation of the criminal history points assigned to \nhis 1999 bank robberies. He does so by attacking a key factual \npremise upon which the district court based its determination \nthat the prior robberies warranted a total of six criminal his‐\ntory points. As Briggins sees the 1999 proceeding, he received \nnot ten concurrent sentences, but rather one sentence of 84 \nmonths for all ten robberies. On this view, he contends he \nshould have received only three criminal history points for \nthe single term of 84 months he received for the 1999 rob‐\nberies, and thus there was no need for the district court to ever \nget into how the guidelines treat multiple sentences. \n\fNo. 18‐1921 5\n\n Resolving whether Briggins received multiple concurrent \nsentences or one sentence for his ten bank robberies requires \nus to review the 1999 sentencing hearing in some detail. The \nbeginning point is recognizing that Briggins pleaded guilty to \ncommitting ten separate bank robberies, each of which had \nbeen charged as a separate count in the underlying indict‐\nment. At the 1999 sentencing hearing, the district court stated \nthat it was sentencing Briggins “to a term of 84 months.” In \ndoing so, the court emphasized that Briggins deserved to be \npunished for each robbery—he should not, as the sentencing \njudge put it, receive any “group discounts” for having com‐\nmitted ten separate robberies. The district court’s written \njudgment reflected that Briggins pleaded guilty to ten counts \nthat resulted in “a total term of 84 months.” Nowhere in the \nwritten judgment did the court indicate whether the 84‐\nmonth term reflected concurrent sentences. \n Briggins latches onto the district court’s use of the phrase \n“a term” of imprisonment to argue that he received a single, \nlump‐sum term of 84 months for the ten robberies. He does \nnot dispute that he pleaded guilty to ten separate robberies, \nbut rather underscores that he was sentenced to “a term” of \n84 months—a single term, not multiple terms or concurrent \nterms. And this single sentence, Briggins continues, is wholly \naccounted for by the three criminal history points added un‐\nder § 4A1.1(a); there was no basis for assigning additional \ncriminal history points under § 4A1.1(e) or any other provi‐\nsion of the guidelines. The upshot of Briggins’s argument is \nthat it was not even necessary for the district court to reach \n§ 4A1.1(e) because multiple sentences were not in play in the \nfirst place. \n\f6 No. 18‐1921 \n\n We disagree. Briggins’s insistence that he received only \none sentence because the district court announced “a term” of \nimprisonment ignores the substance and full context of what \ntranspired at his 1999 sentencing hearing. The transcript \nshows that the district court intended to punish each robbery \nseparately, for there is no other way to understand the sen‐\ntencing judge’s comments that Briggins was not entitled to \n“any type of group discounts” or “a two‐for‐one sale or a ten‐\nfor‐one sale.” \n The district judge made other statements at sentencing to \ndrive home that Briggins deserved to be punished for each of \nthe ten robberies. At one point, for example, the judge \nexplained that, if Briggins had committed just one bank \nrobbery, he would “probably be looking at three to five years \neasily,” and that “any judge could sentence [him] to 30 years \nand say, well, it’s three years for each of the bank robberies.” \nThe district judge further observed that, even if he sentenced \nBriggins to just “one year for every one of the bank robberies,” \nhe would face a total of ten years. But the court was quick to \nrecognize that a sentence along those lines would be well \noutside the then‐mandatory guidelines range of 63 to 78 \nmonths. So the district court instead applied an upward \ndeparture, reasoning that the ten robberies conducted over a \nshort period of time presented an “unusual circumstance” \nthat was not adequately taken into consideration by the \nguidelines. The 1999 sentencing ended with the district court \nimposing a sentence of 84 months. \n A broader point deserves underscoring. Accepting \nBriggins’s position would require us to conclude that the \ndistrict court sentenced him to 84 months for one of the ten \n1999 bank robberies but to no time for the other nine. But any \n\fNo. 18‐1921 7\n\nview like that neither accounts for what the district judge said \nat sentencing—that Briggins would not receive a break \nbecause he committed multiple bank robberies—nor the \nreality that the court was obligated to sentence him on each of \nthe ten separate bank robberies to which he pleaded guilty. \nWe also cannot overlook that the district court imposed a \nspecial assessment of $100 for each of the ten robberies for a \ntotal of $1,000—yet another indicator that the district judge \nunderstood the ten robberies as resulting in separate \nconvictions warranting separate sentences. The only other \ninterpretation, which makes even less sense, is that the 84‐\nmonth sentence reflected the sum total of ten consecutive \nsentences of 8.4 months each. Not only would a sentence like \nthat—less than one year for a bank robbery—bear little \nrelationship to the applicable guidelines range, but it would \nalso require us to assume the district judge (who uttered not \na word about consecutive sentences) intended to impose ten \nsmall but consecutive sentences. \n Our conclusion that the district court imposed ten \nconcurrent sentences for the 1999 robberies aligns squarely \nwith the presumption that sentences imposed in a multiple‐\ncount case run concurrently with one another. See U.S.S.G. \n§ 5G1.2(c) (explaining that “[i]f the sentence imposed on the \ncount carrying the highest statutory maximum is adequate to \nachieve the total punishment, then the sentences on all counts \nshall run concurrently”). Indeed, the Sentencing \nCommission’s accompanying commentary (in effect at the \ntime of the 1999 sentencing and now) clarifies that, in a \nmultiple‐count case, the total punishment is to be imposed on \neach count and the sentences on all counts are to run \nconcurrently. See id. § 5G1.2 & cmt; see also id. § 5G1.2 & cmt. \n(effective Nov. 1, 1998). Congress incorporated this same \n\f8 No. 18‐1921 \n\npresumption of concurrence into the statutory provision \ngoverning the imposition of multiple sentences for a \ndefendant convicted of a federal offense. See 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3584(a). \n We decline to interpret Briggins’s 1999 sentence in a way \nthat contravenes not only this presumption of concurrence, \nbut also the sentencing judge’s clear statements that he in‐\ntended to hold Briggins accountable for each robbery. The \nmost accurate reading of Briggins’s 1999 sentence—the read‐\ning fairest to the record—is that “a term of 84 months” re‐\nflected multiple concurrent sentences. \n Briggins urges a contrary conclusion by pointing to prior \ndecisions where courts have concluded that “a term” refers to \none sentence or, at the very least, creates enough ambiguity \nabout what sentence a defendant received to warrant resen‐\ntencing. In United States v. Eskridge, for example, the question \nwas whether the district court had imposed one term or two \nconcurrent terms of supervised release for the defendant’s \ntwo convictions. 445 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2006). After exam‐\nining the sentencing transcript, we held that the defendant \nwas entitled to resentencing for supervised release violations \nbecause the district judge, in sentencing the defendant to “a \nterm of 26 months,” in no way clarified (in the judgment or \notherwise) whether he had sentenced the defendant to one or \ntwo terms of supervised release. See id. at 935. And we added \nthat “if the order accurately reflects the judge’s decision, how‐\never mistaken, to impose just a single term, it cannot be cor‐\nrected.” Id. at 934. \n The circumstances here are different. The statements the \ndistrict judge made immediately before sentencing Briggins \nfor the 1999 robberies do not leave room for an interpretation \n\fNo. 18‐1921 9\n\nthat the court may have decided—however mistakenly—to \nimpose a single term of imprisonment. To the contrary, the \ndistrict judge’s statements made clear that he intended to hold \nBriggins accountable for each of the ten robbery convictions. \nAt the time, moreover, the guidelines required the court to \nsentence Briggins on each count of conviction, with the pre‐\nsumption that such sentences would run concurrently. \n On this record, we conclude that the district court in 1999 \nimposed multiple sentences for Briggins’s ten robbery convic‐\ntions. At Briggins’s sentencing for the 2017 convictions, the \ndistrict court thus properly assessed six criminal history \npoints for Briggins’s 1999 sentences—three criminal history \npoints under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a) for one sentence, and three \nadditional points for the remaining nine sentences under \nU.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e). \n Accordingly, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Steve Briggins\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐1921 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nSTEVE BRIGGINS, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 1:17‐cr‐00243‐1 — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. \\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. In 2017 Steve Briggins was con‐\\nvicted of robbing multiple banks over several months. This \\nwas not Briggins’s first foray into bank robbery. Eighteen \\nyears earlier, in 1999, Briggins was convicted of and sentenced \\nfor ten bank robberies he committed over a span of a few \\nmonths. When the district court sentenced Briggins for the \\n2017 robberies, it accounted for the 1999 robberies in calculat‐\\ning his criminal history points under the Sentencing \\n\\f2 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\nGuidelines. Briggins now appeals, contending that the district \\ncourt, when determining his advisory sentencing range, im‐\\nproperly determined his criminal history category by impos‐\\ning too many criminal history points for the 1999 robberies. \\nSeeing no error, we affirm. \\n I \\n Briggins pleaded guilty in 2017 to committing multiple \\nbank robberies. At sentencing a primary focus became \\nBriggins’s criminal history and, more specifically, how many \\ncriminal history points should be assessed for the ten bank \\nrobberies he was convicted of in 1999 and for which he was \\nsentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment. The number of points \\nto be added for the 1999 robberies depended on whether the \\nprior 84‐month term reflected one sentence (for all ten \\nrobberies) or multiple concurrent sentences (for the ten \\nseparate robberies). Briggins urged the former—if the 84‐\\nmonth term reflected one sentence, it would yield fewer \\ncriminal history points and thus a lower advisory guidelines \\nrange. \\n The district court’s determination of Briggins’s criminal \\nhistory points tracked the Sentencing Guidelines analysis of‐\\nfered by the probation office. In its presentence investigation \\nreport, the probation office concluded that Briggins received \\nten concurrent sentences—one for each of the ten bank rob‐\\nberies. So, too, did the probation office recognize that the cal‐\\nculation of Briggins’s criminal history points needed to ac‐\\ncount for the threefold reality that he was charged with all ten \\nrobberies in the same indictment, pleaded guilty to each of \\nthose robberies in the same proceeding, and faced sentencing \\nfor all ten on the same day. All of this had ramifications for \\nthe proper criminal history calculation. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 3\\n\\n In the end, the probation office recommended that \\nBriggins receive six criminal history points for the 1999 bank \\nrobberies. These six points captured all ten robberies and \\ncame from an application of two provisions within § 4A1.1 of \\nthe guidelines. The first three of those points came from \\n§ 4A1.1(a), which requires sentencing courts to “[a]dd 3 \\npoints for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one \\nyear and one month.” And the other three points came from \\na provision, § 4A1.1(e), that applies where, as here, a \\ndefendant is convicted of multiple offenses charged in the \\nsame indictment or receives multiple sentences on the same \\nday. In this way, § 4A1.1(e) accounts for the circumstance of \\nmultiple convictions and sentences. \\n We can put the point in even plainer terms. A defendant \\nsentenced to more than 13 months’ imprisonment following a \\nfelony conviction ordinarily receives three criminal history \\npoints for that offense at a later sentencing. See U.S.S.G. \\n§ 4A1.1(a). By this logic, it may seem that a defendant like \\nBriggins convicted of and sentenced for ten separate robberies \\nshould receive 30 criminal history points—three for each \\nconviction. The guidelines do not work that way, though, in \\nsituations like the ones present here. Where the prior \\nsentences “resulted from offenses contained in the same \\ncharging instrument” or were “imposed on the same day,” \\nthe Sentencing Commission limited the number of criminal \\nhistory points assigned to those sentences. Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2). \\nThe first sentence still receives three points (consistent with \\nthe ordinary rule), but the remaining sentences are subject to \\na capping rule: § 4A1.1(e) assigns one criminal history point \\nfor each additional sentence resulting from a conviction of a \\ncrime of violence but limits the maximum number of \\nadditional points to three. \\n\\f4 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\n The probation office applied this capping rule when calcu‐\\nlating Briggins’s criminal history points here. It began with \\nthe ten sentences Briggins received for the ten 1999 robberies \\nand assigned three points to the first of those sentences under \\n§ 4A1.1(a) because the sentence exceeded 13 months. From \\nthere the probation office recognized that, because the ten \\nsentences came from the same indictment and were imposed \\non the same day, the limitations of § 4A1.1(e) applied. Apply‐\\ning § 4A1.1(e) meant that only three additional points were \\nallowed for Briggins’s remaining nine robberies. The math \\nfrom there was simple: Briggins received a total of six criminal \\nhistory points for the ten 1999 robberies. \\n At the sentencing hearing for the 2017 robberies, the \\ndistrict court agreed with and adopted the probation office’s \\nanalysis of Briggins’s criminal history. The resulting advisory \\nguidelines range for Briggins’s 2017 bank robberies was 77 to \\n96 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed a \\nsentence of 96 months. \\n II \\n On appeal Briggins renews his challenge to the district \\ncourt’s calculation of the criminal history points assigned to \\nhis 1999 bank robberies. He does so by attacking a key factual \\npremise upon which the district court based its determination \\nthat the prior robberies warranted a total of six criminal his‐\\ntory points. As Briggins sees the 1999 proceeding, he received \\nnot ten concurrent sentences, but rather one sentence of 84 \\nmonths for all ten robberies. On this view, he contends he \\nshould have received only three criminal history points for \\nthe single term of 84 months he received for the 1999 rob‐\\nberies, and thus there was no need for the district court to ever \\nget into how the guidelines treat multiple sentences. \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 5\\n\\n Resolving whether Briggins received multiple concurrent \\nsentences or one sentence for his ten bank robberies requires \\nus to review the 1999 sentencing hearing in some detail. The \\nbeginning point is recognizing that Briggins pleaded guilty to \\ncommitting ten separate bank robberies, each of which had \\nbeen charged as a separate count in the underlying indict‐\\nment. At the 1999 sentencing hearing, the district court stated \\nthat it was sentencing Briggins “to a term of 84 months.” In \\ndoing so, the court emphasized that Briggins deserved to be \\npunished for each robbery—he should not, as the sentencing \\njudge put it, receive any “group discounts” for having com‐\\nmitted ten separate robberies. The district court’s written \\njudgment reflected that Briggins pleaded guilty to ten counts \\nthat resulted in “a total term of 84 months.” Nowhere in the \\nwritten judgment did the court indicate whether the 84‐\\nmonth term reflected concurrent sentences. \\n Briggins latches onto the district court’s use of the phrase \\n“a term” of imprisonment to argue that he received a single, \\nlump‐sum term of 84 months for the ten robberies. He does \\nnot dispute that he pleaded guilty to ten separate robberies, \\nbut rather underscores that he was sentenced to “a term” of \\n84 months—a single term, not multiple terms or concurrent \\nterms. And this single sentence, Briggins continues, is wholly \\naccounted for by the three criminal history points added un‐\\nder § 4A1.1(a); there was no basis for assigning additional \\ncriminal history points under § 4A1.1(e) or any other provi‐\\nsion of the guidelines. The upshot of Briggins’s argument is \\nthat it was not even necessary for the district court to reach \\n§ 4A1.1(e) because multiple sentences were not in play in the \\nfirst place. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\n We disagree. Briggins’s insistence that he received only \\none sentence because the district court announced “a term” of \\nimprisonment ignores the substance and full context of what \\ntranspired at his 1999 sentencing hearing. The transcript \\nshows that the district court intended to punish each robbery \\nseparately, for there is no other way to understand the sen‐\\ntencing judge’s comments that Briggins was not entitled to \\n“any type of group discounts” or “a two‐for‐one sale or a ten‐\\nfor‐one sale.” \\n The district judge made other statements at sentencing to \\ndrive home that Briggins deserved to be punished for each of \\nthe ten robberies. At one point, for example, the judge \\nexplained that, if Briggins had committed just one bank \\nrobbery, he would “probably be looking at three to five years \\neasily,” and that “any judge could sentence [him] to 30 years \\nand say, well, it’s three years for each of the bank robberies.” \\nThe district judge further observed that, even if he sentenced \\nBriggins to just “one year for every one of the bank robberies,” \\nhe would face a total of ten years. But the court was quick to \\nrecognize that a sentence along those lines would be well \\noutside the then‐mandatory guidelines range of 63 to 78 \\nmonths. So the district court instead applied an upward \\ndeparture, reasoning that the ten robberies conducted over a \\nshort period of time presented an “unusual circumstance” \\nthat was not adequately taken into consideration by the \\nguidelines. The 1999 sentencing ended with the district court \\nimposing a sentence of 84 months. \\n A broader point deserves underscoring. Accepting \\nBriggins’s position would require us to conclude that the \\ndistrict court sentenced him to 84 months for one of the ten \\n1999 bank robberies but to no time for the other nine. But any \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 7\\n\\nview like that neither accounts for what the district judge said \\nat sentencing—that Briggins would not receive a break \\nbecause he committed multiple bank robberies—nor the \\nreality that the court was obligated to sentence him on each of \\nthe ten separate bank robberies to which he pleaded guilty. \\nWe also cannot overlook that the district court imposed a \\nspecial assessment of $100 for each of the ten robberies for a \\ntotal of $1,000—yet another indicator that the district judge \\nunderstood the ten robberies as resulting in separate \\nconvictions warranting separate sentences. The only other \\ninterpretation, which makes even less sense, is that the 84‐\\nmonth sentence reflected the sum total of ten consecutive \\nsentences of 8.4 months each. Not only would a sentence like \\nthat—less than one year for a bank robbery—bear little \\nrelationship to the applicable guidelines range, but it would \\nalso require us to assume the district judge (who uttered not \\na word about consecutive sentences) intended to impose ten \\nsmall but consecutive sentences. \\n Our conclusion that the district court imposed ten \\nconcurrent sentences for the 1999 robberies aligns squarely \\nwith the presumption that sentences imposed in a multiple‐\\ncount case run concurrently with one another. See U.S.S.G. \\n§ 5G1.2(c) (explaining that “[i]f the sentence imposed on the \\ncount carrying the highest statutory maximum is adequate to \\nachieve the total punishment, then the sentences on all counts \\nshall run concurrently”). Indeed, the Sentencing \\nCommission’s accompanying commentary (in effect at the \\ntime of the 1999 sentencing and now) clarifies that, in a \\nmultiple‐count case, the total punishment is to be imposed on \\neach count and the sentences on all counts are to run \\nconcurrently. See id. § 5G1.2 & cmt; see also id. § 5G1.2 & cmt. \\n(effective Nov. 1, 1998). Congress incorporated this same \\n\\f8 No. 18‐1921 \\n\\npresumption of concurrence into the statutory provision \\ngoverning the imposition of multiple sentences for a \\ndefendant convicted of a federal offense. See 18 U.S.C. \\n§ 3584(a). \\n We decline to interpret Briggins’s 1999 sentence in a way \\nthat contravenes not only this presumption of concurrence, \\nbut also the sentencing judge’s clear statements that he in‐\\ntended to hold Briggins accountable for each robbery. The \\nmost accurate reading of Briggins’s 1999 sentence—the read‐\\ning fairest to the record—is that “a term of 84 months” re‐\\nflected multiple concurrent sentences. \\n Briggins urges a contrary conclusion by pointing to prior \\ndecisions where courts have concluded that “a term” refers to \\none sentence or, at the very least, creates enough ambiguity \\nabout what sentence a defendant received to warrant resen‐\\ntencing. In United States v. Eskridge, for example, the question \\nwas whether the district court had imposed one term or two \\nconcurrent terms of supervised release for the defendant’s \\ntwo convictions. 445 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2006). After exam‐\\nining the sentencing transcript, we held that the defendant \\nwas entitled to resentencing for supervised release violations \\nbecause the district judge, in sentencing the defendant to “a \\nterm of 26 months,” in no way clarified (in the judgment or \\notherwise) whether he had sentenced the defendant to one or \\ntwo terms of supervised release. See id. at 935. And we added \\nthat “if the order accurately reflects the judge’s decision, how‐\\never mistaken, to impose just a single term, it cannot be cor‐\\nrected.” Id. at 934. \\n The circumstances here are different. The statements the \\ndistrict judge made immediately before sentencing Briggins \\nfor the 1999 robberies do not leave room for an interpretation \\n\\fNo. 18‐1921 9\\n\\nthat the court may have decided—however mistakenly—to \\nimpose a single term of imprisonment. To the contrary, the \\ndistrict judge’s statements made clear that he intended to hold \\nBriggins accountable for each of the ten robbery convictions. \\nAt the time, moreover, the guidelines required the court to \\nsentence Briggins on each count of conviction, with the pre‐\\nsumption that such sentences would run concurrently. \\n On this record, we conclude that the district court in 1999 \\nimposed multiple sentences for Briggins’s ten robbery convic‐\\ntions. At Briggins’s sentencing for the 2017 convictions, the \\ndistrict court thus properly assessed six criminal history \\npoints for Briggins’s 1999 sentences—three criminal history \\npoints under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a) for one sentence, and three \\nadditional points for the remaining nine sentences under \\nU.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e). \\n Accordingly, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1178,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4597352,"string":"4,597,352"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Jesus Salgado"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2194"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐2194 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nJESUS SALGADO, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 16‐cr‐00394‐2 — John Robert Blakey, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 4, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Jesus Salgado pleaded guilty to con‐\\nspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. At sentenc‐\\ning, over Salgado’s objection, the district court applied an ag‐\\ngravating role enhancement and calculated the Guidelines \\nrange to be 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. The court sen‐\\ntenced Salgado below that range, to 192 months’ imprison‐\\nment. It explained, however, that even if it were wrong on the \\n\\f2 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\nenhancement’s application, it would have imposed the same \\nsentence. Salgado appeals, challenging the district court’s ap‐\\nplication of the aggravating role enhancement and the sub‐\\nstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm. \\n I. Background \\n Beginning in 2015 or earlier, Salgado conspired with Lo‐\\nrenzo Salgado (his father), Ruby Joy Buenaventura, Jose Luis \\nRivera, Jr., and others to distribute heroin. As part of the con‐\\nspiracy, Salgado used a stash house in Bensenville, Illinois to \\nreceive and store narcotics. Salgado’s father, who lived in \\nMexico, was the leader of the drug trafficking organization. \\n Salgado was arrested in August 2016, after which a federal \\ngrand jury indicted him on several heroin‐related charges. See \\n21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Salgado pleaded guilty to conspir‐\\nacy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. Before sentenc‐\\ning, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investi‐\\ngation Report (“PSR”), relying on, among other things, the \\ngovernment’s version of events, Rivera’s grand jury testi‐\\nmony, and statements from a DEA Special Agent. \\n The PSR recommended an aggravating role enhancement \\nunder § 3B1.1(b), reasoning that Salgado, though subordinate \\nto his father, “directed and controlled” Buenaventura and Ri‐\\nvera and was the Chicago‐based leader of the conspiracy. Sal‐\\ngado objected to the enhancement in a presentencing memo‐\\nrandum and also at sentencing on the primary basis that his \\nfather ran the drug organization. According to Salgado, he \\nhad “no decision making authority, acted solely at the direc‐\\ntion of [his father] … did not arrange the importation of the \\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 3\\n\\ndrugs, and did not set any of the price or quantity terms.” Sal‐\\ngado argued that the government had failed to prove other‐\\nwise by a preponderance of the evidence. \\n At sentencing, the district court asked the parties if they \\nhad any corrections to the PSR. Both parties said no. The dis‐\\ntrict court heard argument on the disputed enhancement un‐\\nder § 3B1.1(b), which provides for a three‐level enhancement \\nif the defendant “was a manager or supervisor (but not an or‐\\nganizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or \\nmore participants … .” The court applied the enhancement, \\nexplaining that based on the “undisputed portions of the fac‐\\ntual record” there were at least five participants to the con‐\\nspiracy, and that Salgado’s “role as the supervisor is clear \\nfrom the materials that are not disputed.” The court did not \\nidentify any evidence in the record, nor did it make any spe‐\\ncific factual findings to support the enhancement. With the \\nenhancement applied, the district court calculated the Guide‐\\nlines range as 210 to 262 months in prison. \\n The court then heard argument on the appropriate sen‐\\ntence. Seeking a statutory minimum sentence of 120 months, \\nSalgado argued that his family, especially his father, pres‐\\nsured him into criminal activity. He also argued that the \\nGuidelines overstated his criminal history and role in the of‐\\nfense. For its part, the government emphasized the serious‐\\nness of the offense and disputed that the Guidelines over‐\\nstated Salgado’s criminal history or role in the offense. \\n The court discussed the § 3553 factors in detail. In impos‐\\ning sentence, the court initially explained that even if it erred \\nin applying the § 3B1.1(b) aggravating role enhancement, the \\nsentence would have been the same: \\n\\f4 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\n The court has considered the factors under 3553 to fashion \\n a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to \\n accomplish the purposes of sentencing. And having consid‐\\n ered those factors, the sentence I am about to impose would \\n be the same even if the guidelines were a little bit different. \\n Counsel’s made a variety of arguments regarding the calcu‐\\n lation. He’s made some arguments by way of 3553 factors, \\n other guideline objections, certainly in particular the … ag‐\\n gravating role. The Court has considered those arguments. \\n And while the aggravating role objection was overruled \\n and I believe the application was appropriate in this case, \\n the arguments made by your counsel were considered and \\n are reflected in the 3553 factors. So even if the guideline cal‐\\n culation was different, even if I made a mistake in the cal‐\\n culation with respect to the aggravating role, the guideline \\n sentence is going to not control the sentence here. What’s \\n going to control is the 3553 factors. So even if that calcula‐\\n tion should have been different, the ultimate sentence is go‐\\n ing to be the same either. \\nThe court touched on this point later in the hearing: \\n I’ve also considered your role in the offense. The enhance‐\\n ment was appropriate but not all defendants who are enti‐\\n tled or should have that enhancement are created equally \\n and your counsel made a lot of good arguments in that re‐\\n gard and I’ve considered them in fashioning a sentence un‐\\n der 3553 … . And while … I believe … the enhancement was \\n appropriately applied, that’s what 3553 is to for, to fashion \\n an individual sentence and that’s what I’ve tried to do. \\n The court explained its sentencing rationale, discussing \\nboth mitigating and aggravating factors in detail. Afterwards, \\nthe court asked defense counsel if it had considered all \\n“primary arguments in mitigation.” Counsel responded: \\n“You have, your Honor.” The court then imposed a below‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 5\\n\\nGuidelines sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment. The court \\nasked if either party wanted “any further elaboration of [its] \\nreasons under 3553.” Defense counsel responded: “No, your \\nHonor.” \\n II. Discussion \\n Salgado argues that the district court erred in applying the \\naggravating role enhancement and in not adequately consid‐\\nering all of his mitigation arguments. He also challenges the \\nsubstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We take these ar‐\\nguments in turn. \\nA. Procedural Reasonableness \\n We review procedural challenges to sentences de novo. \\nUnited States v. Griffith, 913 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2019). Our \\ntask is to “ensure that the district court committed no signifi‐\\ncant procedural error, such as incorrectly calculating the \\nguidelines range, failing to consider the section 3553(a) fac‐\\ntors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or \\nfailing to explain adequately the chosen sentence.” Id. (citing \\nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). \\n 1. Aggravating Role Enhancement \\n Salgado first argues that the district court failed to make \\nsufficient factual findings to support the enhancement. We \\nagree. Despite Salgado’s objection to the enhancement—\\ndetailed in a presentencing memorandum and argued at \\nsentencing—the district court made no factual findings to \\nsupport the enhancement. Instead, it vaguely referenced \\nsupposedly undisputed record items to support its decision \\nto apply the enhancement. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\n This is a problem, both because the district court’s cursory \\napplication of the enhancement precludes meaningful judicial \\nreview and because Salgado did, in fact, dispute the salient \\nfacts, including the extent of his supervision of others, the \\ngrand jury testimony of Rivera, and the role that his father \\nplayed. As we have said before, “it is not our role to justify a \\nsentence that lacks a sufficient explanation with our best \\nguess for why the court imposed the sentence that it did.” \\nUnited States v. Titus, 821 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n The district court’s procedural error, however, was harm‐\\nless under the circumstances. See United States v. Clark, 906 \\nF.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d \\n660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009). While we need not determine whether \\nthe enhancement in fact applies, the district court unambigu‐\\nously stated, with specific detail, that it would have—and \\nwhy it would have—imposed the same sentence under \\n§ 3553, even if it had erred in applying the enhancement. 560 \\nF.3d at 667; see also United States v. Shelton, 905 F.3d 1026, 1032 \\n(7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Rabiu, 721 F.3d 467, 471 (7th \\nCir. 2013). Put another way, whether or not the enhancement \\nshould have applied, the district court’s detailed explanation \\nmakes a remand pointless. \\n Salgado nevertheless argues that if the enhancement does \\nnot apply, the district court’s 192‐month sentence would be \\nabove, not below, the applicable Guideline range, making it \\ndifficult for this court to find harmless error. But the district \\ncourt provided the sort of detailed analysis under § 3553 that \\nwould sustain an above‐Guidelines sentence. And we rejected \\nthis type of reasoning in Abbas, where under similar circum‐\\nstances we found harmless error in light of the district court’s \\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 7\\n\\nunambiguous statements and its “detailed explanation for the \\nparallel result.” Abbas, 560 F.3d at 665–68. \\n 2. Mitigation Arguments \\n Salgado also argues that the district court procedurally \\nerred by failing to consider all of his mitigation arguments. \\nSalgado has waived this challenge. The district court, follow‐\\ning United States v. Garcia‐Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. \\n2013), asked defense counsel if it considered all of counsel’s \\nmitigation arguments, to which counsel responded affirma‐\\ntively. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court likewise \\nasked if counsel had “any legal objection to the sentence I \\nhave proposed or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\\nsons under 3553 both as to the term of imprisonment, the con‐\\ndition or terms of supervised release, or any other aspect of \\nthe sentencing.” Defense counsel responded in the negative. \\nThe challenge is thus waived.1 United States v. Tartareanu, 884 \\nF.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2018). \\nB. Substantive Reasonableness \\n Finally, Salgado challenges the substantive reasonable‐\\nness of his sentence, an issue we review for abuse of discre‐\\ntion. See United States v. Thompson, 864 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. \\n2017). In doing so, “we take into account that the sentencing \\n\\n \\n 1 \\n Regardless, Salgado forfeited his arguments by not objecting at sen‐\\ntencing, leaving us to review for plain error, which did not occur here. \\nUnited States v. Pankow, 884 F.3d 785, 791 (7th Cir. 2018). The district court \\nacknowledged and gave meaningful consideration to Salgado’s mitiga‐\\ntion arguments and the § 3553 factors. See United States v. Bustos, 912 F.3d \\n1059, 1063–64 (7th Cir. 2019). \\n \\n\\f8 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\njudge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their im‐\\nport under section 3553(a) in the individual case.” United \\nStates v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quo‐\\ntation marks and citation omitted). \\n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in im‐\\nposing a sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment, which is sub‐\\nstantively reasonable in light of the § 3553 factors. This is true \\nregardless of whether the sentence falls above, within or be‐\\nlow the Guideline range. See Abbas, 560 F.3d at 668. Like in \\nAbbas, the district court gave meaningful and thorough con‐\\nsideration to the pertinent factors to fashion a sentence that \\nmeets the statutory purpose of sentencing. The district court \\nconsidered multiple factors, including the seriousness and na‐\\nture of the offense and the family pressures that contributed \\nto Salgado’s participation in his father’s criminal enterprise. \\nAlthough Salgado may disagree with the district court’s \\nweighing of these factors, neither he nor the record offer any \\nsound reason to disturb the district court’s judgment. \\n III. Conclusion \\n We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4374605/\", \"author_raw\": \"ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597352/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Jesus Salgado\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐2194 \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \n v. \n\nJESUS SALGADO, \n Defendant‐Appellant. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \n No. 16‐cr‐00394‐2 — John Robert Blakey, Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 4, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, \nCircuit Judges. \n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Jesus Salgado pleaded guilty to con‐\nspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. At sentenc‐\ning, over Salgado’s objection, the district court applied an ag‐\ngravating role enhancement and calculated the Guidelines \nrange to be 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. The court sen‐\ntenced Salgado below that range, to 192 months’ imprison‐\nment. It explained, however, that even if it were wrong on the \n\f2 No. 18‐2194 \n\nenhancement’s application, it would have imposed the same \nsentence. Salgado appeals, challenging the district court’s ap‐\nplication of the aggravating role enhancement and the sub‐\nstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm. \n I. Background \n Beginning in 2015 or earlier, Salgado conspired with Lo‐\nrenzo Salgado (his father), Ruby Joy Buenaventura, Jose Luis \nRivera, Jr., and others to distribute heroin. As part of the con‐\nspiracy, Salgado used a stash house in Bensenville, Illinois to \nreceive and store narcotics. Salgado’s father, who lived in \nMexico, was the leader of the drug trafficking organization. \n Salgado was arrested in August 2016, after which a federal \ngrand jury indicted him on several heroin‐related charges. See \n21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Salgado pleaded guilty to conspir‐\nacy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. Before sentenc‐\ning, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investi‐\ngation Report (“PSR”), relying on, among other things, the \ngovernment’s version of events, Rivera’s grand jury testi‐\nmony, and statements from a DEA Special Agent. \n The PSR recommended an aggravating role enhancement \nunder § 3B1.1(b), reasoning that Salgado, though subordinate \nto his father, “directed and controlled” Buenaventura and Ri‐\nvera and was the Chicago‐based leader of the conspiracy. Sal‐\ngado objected to the enhancement in a presentencing memo‐\nrandum and also at sentencing on the primary basis that his \nfather ran the drug organization. According to Salgado, he \nhad “no decision making authority, acted solely at the direc‐\ntion of [his father] … did not arrange the importation of the \n\fNo. 18‐2194 3\n\ndrugs, and did not set any of the price or quantity terms.” Sal‐\ngado argued that the government had failed to prove other‐\nwise by a preponderance of the evidence. \n At sentencing, the district court asked the parties if they \nhad any corrections to the PSR. Both parties said no. The dis‐\ntrict court heard argument on the disputed enhancement un‐\nder § 3B1.1(b), which provides for a three‐level enhancement \nif the defendant “was a manager or supervisor (but not an or‐\nganizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or \nmore participants … .” The court applied the enhancement, \nexplaining that based on the “undisputed portions of the fac‐\ntual record” there were at least five participants to the con‐\nspiracy, and that Salgado’s “role as the supervisor is clear \nfrom the materials that are not disputed.” The court did not \nidentify any evidence in the record, nor did it make any spe‐\ncific factual findings to support the enhancement. With the \nenhancement applied, the district court calculated the Guide‐\nlines range as 210 to 262 months in prison. \n The court then heard argument on the appropriate sen‐\ntence. Seeking a statutory minimum sentence of 120 months, \nSalgado argued that his family, especially his father, pres‐\nsured him into criminal activity. He also argued that the \nGuidelines overstated his criminal history and role in the of‐\nfense. For its part, the government emphasized the serious‐\nness of the offense and disputed that the Guidelines over‐\nstated Salgado’s criminal history or role in the offense. \n The court discussed the § 3553 factors in detail. In impos‐\ning sentence, the court initially explained that even if it erred \nin applying the § 3B1.1(b) aggravating role enhancement, the \nsentence would have been the same: \n\f4 No. 18‐2194 \n\n The court has considered the factors under 3553 to fashion \n a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to \n accomplish the purposes of sentencing. And having consid‐\n ered those factors, the sentence I am about to impose would \n be the same even if the guidelines were a little bit different. \n Counsel’s made a variety of arguments regarding the calcu‐\n lation. He’s made some arguments by way of 3553 factors, \n other guideline objections, certainly in particular the … ag‐\n gravating role. The Court has considered those arguments. \n And while the aggravating role objection was overruled \n and I believe the application was appropriate in this case, \n the arguments made by your counsel were considered and \n are reflected in the 3553 factors. So even if the guideline cal‐\n culation was different, even if I made a mistake in the cal‐\n culation with respect to the aggravating role, the guideline \n sentence is going to not control the sentence here. What’s \n going to control is the 3553 factors. So even if that calcula‐\n tion should have been different, the ultimate sentence is go‐\n ing to be the same either. \nThe court touched on this point later in the hearing: \n I’ve also considered your role in the offense. The enhance‐\n ment was appropriate but not all defendants who are enti‐\n tled or should have that enhancement are created equally \n and your counsel made a lot of good arguments in that re‐\n gard and I’ve considered them in fashioning a sentence un‐\n der 3553 … . And while … I believe … the enhancement was \n appropriately applied, that’s what 3553 is to for, to fashion \n an individual sentence and that’s what I’ve tried to do. \n The court explained its sentencing rationale, discussing \nboth mitigating and aggravating factors in detail. Afterwards, \nthe court asked defense counsel if it had considered all \n“primary arguments in mitigation.” Counsel responded: \n“You have, your Honor.” The court then imposed a below‐\n\fNo. 18‐2194 5\n\nGuidelines sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment. The court \nasked if either party wanted “any further elaboration of [its] \nreasons under 3553.” Defense counsel responded: “No, your \nHonor.” \n II. Discussion \n Salgado argues that the district court erred in applying the \naggravating role enhancement and in not adequately consid‐\nering all of his mitigation arguments. He also challenges the \nsubstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We take these ar‐\nguments in turn. \nA. Procedural Reasonableness \n We review procedural challenges to sentences de novo. \nUnited States v. Griffith, 913 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2019). Our \ntask is to “ensure that the district court committed no signifi‐\ncant procedural error, such as incorrectly calculating the \nguidelines range, failing to consider the section 3553(a) fac‐\ntors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or \nfailing to explain adequately the chosen sentence.” Id. (citing \nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). \n 1. Aggravating Role Enhancement \n Salgado first argues that the district court failed to make \nsufficient factual findings to support the enhancement. We \nagree. Despite Salgado’s objection to the enhancement—\ndetailed in a presentencing memorandum and argued at \nsentencing—the district court made no factual findings to \nsupport the enhancement. Instead, it vaguely referenced \nsupposedly undisputed record items to support its decision \nto apply the enhancement. \n\f6 No. 18‐2194 \n\n This is a problem, both because the district court’s cursory \napplication of the enhancement precludes meaningful judicial \nreview and because Salgado did, in fact, dispute the salient \nfacts, including the extent of his supervision of others, the \ngrand jury testimony of Rivera, and the role that his father \nplayed. As we have said before, “it is not our role to justify a \nsentence that lacks a sufficient explanation with our best \nguess for why the court imposed the sentence that it did.” \nUnited States v. Titus, 821 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2016). \n The district court’s procedural error, however, was harm‐\nless under the circumstances. See United States v. Clark, 906 \nF.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d \n660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009). While we need not determine whether \nthe enhancement in fact applies, the district court unambigu‐\nously stated, with specific detail, that it would have—and \nwhy it would have—imposed the same sentence under \n§ 3553, even if it had erred in applying the enhancement. 560 \nF.3d at 667; see also United States v. Shelton, 905 F.3d 1026, 1032 \n(7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Rabiu, 721 F.3d 467, 471 (7th \nCir. 2013). Put another way, whether or not the enhancement \nshould have applied, the district court’s detailed explanation \nmakes a remand pointless. \n Salgado nevertheless argues that if the enhancement does \nnot apply, the district court’s 192‐month sentence would be \nabove, not below, the applicable Guideline range, making it \ndifficult for this court to find harmless error. But the district \ncourt provided the sort of detailed analysis under § 3553 that \nwould sustain an above‐Guidelines sentence. And we rejected \nthis type of reasoning in Abbas, where under similar circum‐\nstances we found harmless error in light of the district court’s \n\fNo. 18‐2194 7\n\nunambiguous statements and its “detailed explanation for the \nparallel result.” Abbas, 560 F.3d at 665–68. \n 2. Mitigation Arguments \n Salgado also argues that the district court procedurally \nerred by failing to consider all of his mitigation arguments. \nSalgado has waived this challenge. The district court, follow‐\ning United States v. Garcia‐Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. \n2013), asked defense counsel if it considered all of counsel’s \nmitigation arguments, to which counsel responded affirma‐\ntively. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court likewise \nasked if counsel had “any legal objection to the sentence I \nhave proposed or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\nsons under 3553 both as to the term of imprisonment, the con‐\ndition or terms of supervised release, or any other aspect of \nthe sentencing.” Defense counsel responded in the negative. \nThe challenge is thus waived.1 United States v. Tartareanu, 884 \nF.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2018). \nB. Substantive Reasonableness \n Finally, Salgado challenges the substantive reasonable‐\nness of his sentence, an issue we review for abuse of discre‐\ntion. See United States v. Thompson, 864 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. \n2017). In doing so, “we take into account that the sentencing \n\n \n 1 \n Regardless, Salgado forfeited his arguments by not objecting at sen‐\ntencing, leaving us to review for plain error, which did not occur here. \nUnited States v. Pankow, 884 F.3d 785, 791 (7th Cir. 2018). The district court \nacknowledged and gave meaningful consideration to Salgado’s mitiga‐\ntion arguments and the § 3553 factors. See United States v. Bustos, 912 F.3d \n1059, 1063–64 (7th Cir. 2019). \n \n\f8 No. 18‐2194 \n\njudge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their im‐\nport under section 3553(a) in the individual case.” United \nStates v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quo‐\ntation marks and citation omitted). \n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in im‐\nposing a sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment, which is sub‐\nstantively reasonable in light of the § 3553 factors. This is true \nregardless of whether the sentence falls above, within or be‐\nlow the Guideline range. See Abbas, 560 F.3d at 668. Like in \nAbbas, the district court gave meaningful and thorough con‐\nsideration to the pertinent factors to fashion a sentence that \nmeets the statutory purpose of sentencing. The district court \nconsidered multiple factors, including the seriousness and na‐\nture of the offense and the family pressures that contributed \nto Salgado’s participation in his father’s criminal enterprise. \nAlthough Salgado may disagree with the district court’s \nweighing of these factors, neither he nor the record offer any \nsound reason to disturb the district court’s judgment. \n III. Conclusion \n We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Jesus Salgado\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 18‐2194 \\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellee, \\n v. \\n\\nJESUS SALGADO, \\n Defendant‐Appellant. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 16‐cr‐00394‐2 — John Robert Blakey, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 4, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, \\nCircuit Judges. \\n ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Jesus Salgado pleaded guilty to con‐\\nspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. At sentenc‐\\ning, over Salgado’s objection, the district court applied an ag‐\\ngravating role enhancement and calculated the Guidelines \\nrange to be 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. The court sen‐\\ntenced Salgado below that range, to 192 months’ imprison‐\\nment. It explained, however, that even if it were wrong on the \\n\\f2 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\nenhancement’s application, it would have imposed the same \\nsentence. Salgado appeals, challenging the district court’s ap‐\\nplication of the aggravating role enhancement and the sub‐\\nstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm. \\n I. Background \\n Beginning in 2015 or earlier, Salgado conspired with Lo‐\\nrenzo Salgado (his father), Ruby Joy Buenaventura, Jose Luis \\nRivera, Jr., and others to distribute heroin. As part of the con‐\\nspiracy, Salgado used a stash house in Bensenville, Illinois to \\nreceive and store narcotics. Salgado’s father, who lived in \\nMexico, was the leader of the drug trafficking organization. \\n Salgado was arrested in August 2016, after which a federal \\ngrand jury indicted him on several heroin‐related charges. See \\n21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Salgado pleaded guilty to conspir‐\\nacy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. Before sentenc‐\\ning, the U.S. Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investi‐\\ngation Report (“PSR”), relying on, among other things, the \\ngovernment’s version of events, Rivera’s grand jury testi‐\\nmony, and statements from a DEA Special Agent. \\n The PSR recommended an aggravating role enhancement \\nunder § 3B1.1(b), reasoning that Salgado, though subordinate \\nto his father, “directed and controlled” Buenaventura and Ri‐\\nvera and was the Chicago‐based leader of the conspiracy. Sal‐\\ngado objected to the enhancement in a presentencing memo‐\\nrandum and also at sentencing on the primary basis that his \\nfather ran the drug organization. According to Salgado, he \\nhad “no decision making authority, acted solely at the direc‐\\ntion of [his father] … did not arrange the importation of the \\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 3\\n\\ndrugs, and did not set any of the price or quantity terms.” Sal‐\\ngado argued that the government had failed to prove other‐\\nwise by a preponderance of the evidence. \\n At sentencing, the district court asked the parties if they \\nhad any corrections to the PSR. Both parties said no. The dis‐\\ntrict court heard argument on the disputed enhancement un‐\\nder § 3B1.1(b), which provides for a three‐level enhancement \\nif the defendant “was a manager or supervisor (but not an or‐\\nganizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or \\nmore participants … .” The court applied the enhancement, \\nexplaining that based on the “undisputed portions of the fac‐\\ntual record” there were at least five participants to the con‐\\nspiracy, and that Salgado’s “role as the supervisor is clear \\nfrom the materials that are not disputed.” The court did not \\nidentify any evidence in the record, nor did it make any spe‐\\ncific factual findings to support the enhancement. With the \\nenhancement applied, the district court calculated the Guide‐\\nlines range as 210 to 262 months in prison. \\n The court then heard argument on the appropriate sen‐\\ntence. Seeking a statutory minimum sentence of 120 months, \\nSalgado argued that his family, especially his father, pres‐\\nsured him into criminal activity. He also argued that the \\nGuidelines overstated his criminal history and role in the of‐\\nfense. For its part, the government emphasized the serious‐\\nness of the offense and disputed that the Guidelines over‐\\nstated Salgado’s criminal history or role in the offense. \\n The court discussed the § 3553 factors in detail. In impos‐\\ning sentence, the court initially explained that even if it erred \\nin applying the § 3B1.1(b) aggravating role enhancement, the \\nsentence would have been the same: \\n\\f4 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\n The court has considered the factors under 3553 to fashion \\n a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to \\n accomplish the purposes of sentencing. And having consid‐\\n ered those factors, the sentence I am about to impose would \\n be the same even if the guidelines were a little bit different. \\n Counsel’s made a variety of arguments regarding the calcu‐\\n lation. He’s made some arguments by way of 3553 factors, \\n other guideline objections, certainly in particular the … ag‐\\n gravating role. The Court has considered those arguments. \\n And while the aggravating role objection was overruled \\n and I believe the application was appropriate in this case, \\n the arguments made by your counsel were considered and \\n are reflected in the 3553 factors. So even if the guideline cal‐\\n culation was different, even if I made a mistake in the cal‐\\n culation with respect to the aggravating role, the guideline \\n sentence is going to not control the sentence here. What’s \\n going to control is the 3553 factors. So even if that calcula‐\\n tion should have been different, the ultimate sentence is go‐\\n ing to be the same either. \\nThe court touched on this point later in the hearing: \\n I’ve also considered your role in the offense. The enhance‐\\n ment was appropriate but not all defendants who are enti‐\\n tled or should have that enhancement are created equally \\n and your counsel made a lot of good arguments in that re‐\\n gard and I’ve considered them in fashioning a sentence un‐\\n der 3553 … . And while … I believe … the enhancement was \\n appropriately applied, that’s what 3553 is to for, to fashion \\n an individual sentence and that’s what I’ve tried to do. \\n The court explained its sentencing rationale, discussing \\nboth mitigating and aggravating factors in detail. Afterwards, \\nthe court asked defense counsel if it had considered all \\n“primary arguments in mitigation.” Counsel responded: \\n“You have, your Honor.” The court then imposed a below‐\\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 5\\n\\nGuidelines sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment. The court \\nasked if either party wanted “any further elaboration of [its] \\nreasons under 3553.” Defense counsel responded: “No, your \\nHonor.” \\n II. Discussion \\n Salgado argues that the district court erred in applying the \\naggravating role enhancement and in not adequately consid‐\\nering all of his mitigation arguments. He also challenges the \\nsubstantive reasonableness of his sentence. We take these ar‐\\nguments in turn. \\nA. Procedural Reasonableness \\n We review procedural challenges to sentences de novo. \\nUnited States v. Griffith, 913 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2019). Our \\ntask is to “ensure that the district court committed no signifi‐\\ncant procedural error, such as incorrectly calculating the \\nguidelines range, failing to consider the section 3553(a) fac‐\\ntors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or \\nfailing to explain adequately the chosen sentence.” Id. (citing \\nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). \\n 1. Aggravating Role Enhancement \\n Salgado first argues that the district court failed to make \\nsufficient factual findings to support the enhancement. We \\nagree. Despite Salgado’s objection to the enhancement—\\ndetailed in a presentencing memorandum and argued at \\nsentencing—the district court made no factual findings to \\nsupport the enhancement. Instead, it vaguely referenced \\nsupposedly undisputed record items to support its decision \\nto apply the enhancement. \\n\\f6 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\n This is a problem, both because the district court’s cursory \\napplication of the enhancement precludes meaningful judicial \\nreview and because Salgado did, in fact, dispute the salient \\nfacts, including the extent of his supervision of others, the \\ngrand jury testimony of Rivera, and the role that his father \\nplayed. As we have said before, “it is not our role to justify a \\nsentence that lacks a sufficient explanation with our best \\nguess for why the court imposed the sentence that it did.” \\nUnited States v. Titus, 821 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2016). \\n The district court’s procedural error, however, was harm‐\\nless under the circumstances. See United States v. Clark, 906 \\nF.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d \\n660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009). While we need not determine whether \\nthe enhancement in fact applies, the district court unambigu‐\\nously stated, with specific detail, that it would have—and \\nwhy it would have—imposed the same sentence under \\n§ 3553, even if it had erred in applying the enhancement. 560 \\nF.3d at 667; see also United States v. Shelton, 905 F.3d 1026, 1032 \\n(7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Rabiu, 721 F.3d 467, 471 (7th \\nCir. 2013). Put another way, whether or not the enhancement \\nshould have applied, the district court’s detailed explanation \\nmakes a remand pointless. \\n Salgado nevertheless argues that if the enhancement does \\nnot apply, the district court’s 192‐month sentence would be \\nabove, not below, the applicable Guideline range, making it \\ndifficult for this court to find harmless error. But the district \\ncourt provided the sort of detailed analysis under § 3553 that \\nwould sustain an above‐Guidelines sentence. And we rejected \\nthis type of reasoning in Abbas, where under similar circum‐\\nstances we found harmless error in light of the district court’s \\n\\fNo. 18‐2194 7\\n\\nunambiguous statements and its “detailed explanation for the \\nparallel result.” Abbas, 560 F.3d at 665–68. \\n 2. Mitigation Arguments \\n Salgado also argues that the district court procedurally \\nerred by failing to consider all of his mitigation arguments. \\nSalgado has waived this challenge. The district court, follow‐\\ning United States v. Garcia‐Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. \\n2013), asked defense counsel if it considered all of counsel’s \\nmitigation arguments, to which counsel responded affirma‐\\ntively. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court likewise \\nasked if counsel had “any legal objection to the sentence I \\nhave proposed or request any further elaboration of my rea‐\\nsons under 3553 both as to the term of imprisonment, the con‐\\ndition or terms of supervised release, or any other aspect of \\nthe sentencing.” Defense counsel responded in the negative. \\nThe challenge is thus waived.1 United States v. Tartareanu, 884 \\nF.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2018). \\nB. Substantive Reasonableness \\n Finally, Salgado challenges the substantive reasonable‐\\nness of his sentence, an issue we review for abuse of discre‐\\ntion. See United States v. Thompson, 864 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. \\n2017). In doing so, “we take into account that the sentencing \\n\\n \\n 1 \\n Regardless, Salgado forfeited his arguments by not objecting at sen‐\\ntencing, leaving us to review for plain error, which did not occur here. \\nUnited States v. Pankow, 884 F.3d 785, 791 (7th Cir. 2018). The district court \\nacknowledged and gave meaningful consideration to Salgado’s mitiga‐\\ntion arguments and the § 3553 factors. See United States v. Bustos, 912 F.3d \\n1059, 1063–64 (7th Cir. 2019). \\n \\n\\f8 No. 18‐2194 \\n\\njudge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their im‐\\nport under section 3553(a) in the individual case.” United \\nStates v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quo‐\\ntation marks and citation omitted). \\n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in im‐\\nposing a sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment, which is sub‐\\nstantively reasonable in light of the § 3553 factors. This is true \\nregardless of whether the sentence falls above, within or be‐\\nlow the Guideline range. See Abbas, 560 F.3d at 668. Like in \\nAbbas, the district court gave meaningful and thorough con‐\\nsideration to the pertinent factors to fashion a sentence that \\nmeets the statutory purpose of sentencing. The district court \\nconsidered multiple factors, including the seriousness and na‐\\nture of the offense and the family pressures that contributed \\nto Salgado’s participation in his father’s criminal enterprise. \\nAlthough Salgado may disagree with the district court’s \\nweighing of these factors, neither he nor the record offer any \\nsound reason to disturb the district court’s judgment. \\n III. Conclusion \\n We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1179,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4597356,"string":"4,597,356"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Anthony Sansone v. Megan Brennan"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3632"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-3534 & No. 17-3632\\nANTHONY SANSONE,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General of the United States,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:13-cv-03415 — Milton I. Shadur, Judge,\\n and Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Tony Sansone, who is confined to\\na wheelchair, needs a parking place with room to deploy his\\nvan’s wheelchair ramp. For years, the Postal Service, his\\nemployer, provided him one. But in 2011, it took that spot\\naway and failed to provide him with a suitable replacement.\\nSansone then retired and sued the Service under the\\nRehabilitation Act for failing to accommodate his disability.\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nA jury returned a verdict in his favor and Sansone recovered\\ncompensatory damages, as well as back and front pay.\\n The Service asks us to vacate the district court’s judgment\\nbecause of two jury instructions: one about an employee’s\\nobligation to cooperate with his employer in identifying a\\nreasonable accommodation and the other about how the jury\\nshould evaluate the Service’s expert witness. We hold that the\\ndistrict court did not err with respect to the former, but its\\ninstruction about the expert was both wrong and prejudicial.\\nThe Service also appeals the district court’s award of back and\\nfront pay, but it forfeited that argument by failing to raise it\\nbelow.\\n I.\\n Anthony Sansone began his thirty-year career at the Postal\\nService in 1981. He was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in\\n1991, and, 8 years later, the disease put him in a wheelchair.\\nThe Service gave him a reserved space near the loading docks,\\nwhere there was room to deploy his van’s wheelchair ramp.\\nThat arrangement lasted until 2011, when the plant manager,\\nRuby Branch, asked Sansone to stop parking there.\\n Sansone was greatly upset by Branch’s decision. He\\nviewed it as arbitrary; Branch told him that it was driven by\\nsafety concerns. She offered Sansone two other options: to\\npark in one of the handicapped spots in front of the building\\nor her own reserved space in the back of the building. Neither\\nmet his needs. Branch’s reserved space, like most of the\\nhandicapped spots, didn’t provide enough room to deploy\\nhis van’s passenger-side ramp, and the few handicapped\\nspots that had enough room were usually taken. In addition,\\nthe spots in the back of the building (like Branch’s spot)\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 3\\n\\nwould require him to travel in his wheelchair along a busy\\ntruck route in the dark. So with the permission of his direct\\nsupervisor, Chuck von Rhein, Sansone continued to park in\\nhis usual place while waiting for a solution to the problem.\\n Two weeks later, Sansone emailed the maintenance\\nmanager, LaShawn Jacobs, for an update on his parking\\nsituation. Jacobs reiterated what Branch had said before: that\\nSansone must park in one of the proposed spaces. Sansone\\nthen sought help from Stephen Grieser, chair of the Postal\\nService district’s Reasonable Accommodation Committee,\\nwho told Sansone that he would start the process of\\nidentifying a reasonable accommodation for him.\\n A few days later, Branch noticed Sansone’s van parked\\nnear the loading docks. She told Jacobs to inform Sansone that\\nhe should move it or risk having it towed. When Jacobs\\nrelayed the message, Sansone panicked, started to experience\\nchest pain, and left work. He worried that if his van had been\\ntowed, he would have been stranded at work because he\\nneeded the van to load his wheelchair. The next day he went\\nto see a doctor because he was still experiencing panic attacks.\\nThe doctor recommended that he stay home until the\\nsituation was rectified and prescribed medication to help him\\ndeal with the stress.\\n After another two weeks passed, Grieser sent Sansone a\\nletter asking him to provide medical information about his\\n“condition and the specific limitations that it imposes” so that\\nhe could address Sansone’s parking situation. The letter\\nexacerbated Sansone’s frustration because in his view, it\\nsought information that the Service already knew—that he\\nhad multiple sclerosis and was confined to a wheelchair.\\nSansone did not provide Grieser with the redundant medical\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\ninformation. Instead, he asked von Rhein, his supervisor, to\\ntell Grieser to stop pursuing the parking issue because by that\\npoint, the stress of the situation had rendered Sansone unable\\nto go back to work at the Service no matter where he parked.\\nHe filed for disability retirement, which the Office of\\nPersonnel Management granted.\\n Sansone then sued the Service under the Rehabilitation\\nAct, 29 U.S.C. § 791, et seq., for constructive discharge and\\nfailure to accommodate. The district court granted the\\nService’s summary judgment motion on the constructive\\ndischarge claim, but it denied both parties’ motions for\\nsummary judgment on the failure to accommodate claim. The\\ncase proceeded to trial, and Sansone won $300,000 in\\ncompensatory damages.\\n After the verdict came in, the district court addressed\\nSansone’s equitable claim for back and front pay. It awarded\\nhim $828,774—an amount covering the period between the\\ndate of his termination and January 20, 2023, the date on\\nwhich he would have retired.\\n The Service presses three arguments on appeal, one\\nrelated to the merits of Sansone’s “failure to accommodate”\\nclaim and the other two related to damages.\\n II.\\n To succeed on his failure to accommodate claim under 29\\nU.S.C. § 794, Sansone had to prove that (1) he was a qualified\\nindividual with a disability, (2) the Service was aware of his\\ndisability, and (3) the Service failed to reasonably\\naccommodate his disability. King v. City of Madison, 550 F.3d\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 5\\n\\n598, 600 (7th Cir. 2008). 1 Relevant to—and sometimes\\ndeterminative of—the third element is the employer and\\nemployee’s respective cooperation “in an interactive process\\nto determine a reasonable accommodation.” Baert v. Euclid\\nBeverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 1998). The Service\\ncontends that the district court erroneously instructed the jury\\nabout the consequences of an employee’s failure to cooperate\\nin this “interactive process.”\\n Some background on this “interactive process” is\\nnecessary to understand the Service’s objection to the jury\\ninstruction. While the “interactive process” is important, it is\\na means for identifying a reasonable accommodation rather\\nthan an end in itself. Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d\\n1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 1997). And because the process is not an\\nend in itself, an employer cannot be liable solely for refusing\\nto take part in it. For example, “[f]ailure to engage in this\\n‘interactive process’ cannot give rise to a claim for relief … if\\nthe employer can show that no reasonable accommodation\\nwas possible.” Hansen v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir.\\n2000). Nor will it give rise to a claim against an employer who\\nreasonably accommodated the employee. Rehling v. City of\\nChicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The ADA seeks\\nto ensure that qualified individuals are accommodated in the\\nworkplace, not to punish employers who, despite their failure\\nto engage in an interactive process, have made reasonable\\naccommodations.”). But when a reasonable accommodation\\nwas possible and the employer did not offer it, the third\\n\\n\\n1\\n “[T]o determine whether the Rehabilitation Act has been violated in the\\nemployment context, we refer to the provisions and standards of the\\n[Americans with Disabilities Act].” Jackson v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806,\\n810–11 (7th Cir. 2005); see 29 U.S.C. § 794(d).\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nelement of a “failure to accommodate” claim turns on the\\n“interactive process” requirement. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &\\nCo., 417 F.3d 789, 805 (7th Cir. 2005). In that event,\\n“responsibility will lie with the party that caused the\\nbreakdown.” Id. at 805. According to the Service, this is where\\nthe district court went awry.\\n The Service insists that the court erroneously instructed\\nthe jury that it could render a verdict for Sansone even if he\\nwas at fault for the breakdown of the interactive process. Over\\nthe Service’s objection, the court instructed the jury as\\nfollows:\\n Once an employer is aware of the employee’s\\n disability and an accommodation has been\\n requested, the employer must discuss with the\\n employee whether there is a reasonable\\n accommodation that will permit him to perform\\n his job. Both the employer and the employee\\n must cooperate in the interactive process in\\n good faith. Neither party can win this case\\n solely because the other did not cooperate in\\n that process in the way that the party believed\\n appropriate, but you may consider whether a\\n party cooperated in that process when deciding\\n whether a reasonable accommodation existed.\\nThe Service argues that telling the jury that “neither party can\\nwin this case solely because the other did not cooperate” is\\ninconsistent with Sears, which says that “when an employer\\ntakes an active, good-faith role in the interactive process, it\\nwill not be liable if the employee refuses to participate or\\nwithholds essential information.” 417 F.3d at 806.\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 7\\n\\n The Service’s argument distorts the jury instruction by\\nfocusing exclusively on the opening few words of a longer\\nsentence. Read out of context, the cherry-picked words state\\nthat the jury cannot treat one party’s failure to cooperate as\\noutcome-determinative. That is inconsistent with Sears. Read\\nin context, however, they make a different and entirely\\nuncontroversial point: that the jury cannot evaluate the\\nsufficiency of one party’s cooperation according to the\\nexpectations of the other. (“Neither party can win solely\\nbecause the other did not cooperate in that process in the way\\nthat the party believed appropriate … .” (emphasis added)). In\\nother words, the Service’s belief that Sansone did not\\ncooperate did not mean that he did not cooperate—and vice\\nversa. That is plainly correct.\\n In sum, the Service would have a point if the court had\\ntold the jury that Sansone could win even if he shut down the\\ninteractive process. Unfortunately for the Service, however,\\nthat is not what the court said.\\n III.\\n The Service’s next argument concerns its expert witness,\\nDr. Diana Goldstein, who offered an opinion on the cause of\\nSansone’s emotional distress, an issue relevant to\\ncompensatory damages. On cross-examination, Sansone’s\\nlawyer asked Goldstein if she had read the Service’s brief in\\nsupport of its summary judgment motion in the course of\\npreparing her report. She said that she had, and Sansone’s\\nlawyer pressed: “To get your understanding of the facts you\\nread the Postal Service’s Statement of Material Facts in\\nsupport of its motion for summary judgment, correct?”\\nGoldstein replied:\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\n I wouldn’t agree with that statement. I would\\n say that it helps me understand the story, but I\\n get my facts about what Mr. Sansone is claiming\\n in turn—by way of emotional distress and\\n changes in physical symptoms by meeting with\\n him, by reviewing objective records, et cetera.\\n But I do like to have context and so I always\\n review the records just to get a sense of what the\\n whole story is.\\nShe added that as part of that context, she had also read\\nSansone’s complaint, his answers to interrogatories, and his\\ndeposition. Sansone’s lawyer asked whether she had read the\\nbrief opposing the Service’s motion for summary judgment or\\nthe district court’s decision denying the motion, and\\nGoldstein said that she had not.\\n Shortly thereafter, Goldstein responded to a question\\nabout whether she had read the deposition of plant manager\\nRuby Branch by explaining that, although she had, she did\\nnot view it “as relevant to [her] role in assessing Mr. Sansone’s\\nemotional distress claim.” The court interjected: “Wait just a\\nminute. But you thought that the brief in support of a motion\\nfor summary judgment which was denied, that was relevant\\nto your opinion?” When Goldstein answered, “I always read\\nthose,” the court interrupted, “I am not asking what you\\nalways do. I am asking, in this case you felt that that is\\nrelevant to your rendition of an opinion, a lawyer’s argument\\nin connection with this case which was unsuccessful.”\\nGoldstein replied, “No. I just like to know what is going on\\nwith the case.” The court later admonished counsel that\\ngiving Goldstein the summary judgment motion was a “flat-\\nout violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 703.”\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 9\\n\\n The court hammered that position home in its jury\\ninstructions. In evaluating Goldstein’s opinion, it told the\\njurors that they should keep in mind that\\n [S]he had been provided by counsel for the\\n Postal Service with a copy of the Postal Service’s\\n argument that had been made earlier in the case\\n in support of an unsuccessful motion to prevent\\n the case from going to trial on the premise that\\n there were no genuine issues of material fact\\n that called for consideration by a jury. That is a\\n document that presents the Postal Service’s\\n version of the facts and of the legal arguments\\n that they sought to support that motion. It was\\n inappropriate for that information to be\\n provided to the opinion witness. And that\\n inappropriateness was amplified by the failure\\n of the Postal Service’s counsel to provide her\\n with the successful argument that had been\\n made by Sansone’s lawyer in opposition to the\\n motion and, more importantly, by the failure of\\n Postal Service’s counsel to provide her with the\\n Court’s opinion that rejected the motion.\\n It should be added, though, that Sansone’s\\n counsel is also at fault. Why? For not having\\n raised the matter before this Court well in\\n advance of trial because the teaching of the\\n Supreme Court is that the trial judge serves as\\n what they call the gatekeeper in ruling on\\n whether it is or is not proper for any specific\\n proposed opinion witness to be allowed to\\n present his or her testimony to a fact-finding\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\n jury for its consideration. And that matter came\\n before you, just as it came before me, solely at\\n the end of the case.\\n Now with all of that said, you may consider\\n what has been set forth in this instruction that I\\n have composed in explaining the determination\\n called for in the first paragraph of the\\n instruction, that is, give the testimony of each of\\n the witnesses whatever weight you think it\\n deserves, considering the reasons for the\\n opinion, the witness’ qualifications and all of\\n the other evidence in the case.\\nThe Service contends that this instruction erroneously invited\\nthe jury to disregard Goldstein’s opinion.\\n The Service is right. Contrary to the court’s belief, the\\nService did not commit a “flat-out violation of Federal Rule of\\nEvidence 703” by giving Goldstein its summary judgment\\nmotion. Rule 703 does not govern the information that experts\\ncan have; it governs the information on which they can base\\ntheir opinions. It allows experts to rely on inadmissible facts\\nor data in forming an opinion so long as “experts in the\\nparticular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts\\nor data in forming an opinion on the subject.” FED. R. EVID.\\n703.\\n If Goldstein had relied on the summary judgment motion\\nin forming her opinion, the court would have had to\\ndetermine whether experts in her field “reasonably rely” on\\nsummary judgment motions in assessing someone’s\\nemotional distress—and presumably they don’t. But\\nGoldstein expressly stated that she did not rely on the\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 11\\n\\nsummary judgment motion in forming her opinion. She read\\nthe summary judgment motion—along with Sansone’s\\ncomplaint and answers to interrogatories—solely to get\\ncontext about the case. She based her opinion on the facts that\\nshe got from Sansone and his medical records. So long as\\nthose are the kinds of facts and data on which experts in her\\nfield reasonably rely—and presumably they are—her opinion\\nsatisfied Rule 703. Any suggestion that Goldstein was biased\\nin favor of the Service could be explored on cross—as Sansone\\nwas doing before the court seized sua sponte on the illusory\\nRule 703 issue.\\n The district court thus erred when it told the jury that the\\nService had acted inappropriately by giving Goldstein the\\nsummary judgment motion and suggesting that it would\\nhave excluded her testimony had it learned about the issue\\nearlier. Even so, “a new trial is required only if the flawed\\ninstruction could have confused or misled the jury causing\\nprejudice to the complaining party.” Doornbos v. City of\\nChicago, 868 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2017). Sansone says that the\\nService was not prejudiced because Goldstein testified that\\nshe didn’t rely on the summary judgment motion, the court\\npermitted the jury to consider her testimony, and the\\ninstruction emphasized that Sansone was also to blame for\\nnot raising the issue earlier.\\n None of those things blunted the effect of the district\\ncourt’s erroneous instruction, which all but told the jury that\\nit shouldn’t trust anything that Goldstein had said. This not\\nonly misled the jury but also invaded the jury’s function in\\nassessing witness credibility. See Stollings v. Ryobi Tech., Inc.,\\n725 F.3d 753, 765 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that although the\\ndistrict court serves as gatekeeper, “[t]he jury must still be\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nallowed to play its essential role as the arbiter of the weight\\nand credibility of expert testimony”). At the very least, the\\ninstruction left the jury unsure what to make of Goldstein’s\\ntestimony. See Rapold v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 718 F.3d 602, 609 (7th\\nCir. 2013) (explaining that a party is prejudiced by jury\\ninstructions when the “jury was likely to be misled or\\nconfused” by them); Miller v. Neathery, 52 F.3d 634, 639 (7th\\nCir. 1995) (“Under these circumstances, it would be\\nimprudent for us to determine that the lack of sufficient\\nguidance in the instructions did not contribute significantly\\nto the jury’s conclusion.”).\\n The prejudice was particularly acute given what had\\nhappened earlier in the trial. See Susan Wakeen Doll Co., Inc. v.\\nAshton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 452 (7th Cir. 2001) (“An\\nerroneous jury instruction could not prejudice [a party] unless\\nconsidering the instructions as a whole, along with all of the\\nevidence and arguments, the jury was misinformed about the\\napplicable law.”). The court interrupted the cross-\\nexamination of Goldstein to admonish her, expressing\\nincredulity that she had read the summary judgment motion.\\nSee United States v. El-Bey, 873 F.3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir. 2017)\\n(explaining that a trial judge has great influence on the jury\\nand that any statement made about a witness carries great\\nweight). The instructions therefore invited the jury to act on\\nthe skepticism that the court had already sowed.\\n In short, the instruction was erroneous and prejudicial.\\nBut because Goldstein’s testimony went solely to\\ncompensatory damages, we remand for a new trial on that\\nissue only. See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d\\n1081, 1166 (7th Cir. 1983).\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 13\\n\\n IV.\\n The Service’s final argument is that the court erred by\\nawarding Sansone equitable relief in the form of back and\\nfront pay for the time after he retired. It contends that\\nconstructive discharge is required for equitable relief; because\\nSansone was never actively or constructively discharged, it\\nsays, he does not qualify.\\n Sansone argues that the Service waived this argument by\\nfailing to raise it below. What he means to say, however, is\\nthat the Service forfeited this argument. See Hamer v.\\nNeighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 n.1 (2017)\\n(“The terms waiver and forfeiture—although often used\\ninterchangeably by jurists and litigants—are not\\nsynonymous.”). Waiver is intentionally abandoning a known\\nright. United States v. Seals, 813 F.3d 1038, 1044–45 (7th Cir.\\n2016). Forfeiture occurs when a party fails to make an\\nargument because of accident or neglect. Id. at 1045. That’s\\nwhat Sansone says that the Service did here.\\n The Service insists that it raised this argument—that\\nSansone failed to prove actual or constructive discharge and\\nthus could not receive back or front pay—in its damages brief\\nto the district court. This is wishful thinking. The damages\\nbrief focused on two things: (1) errors that the court made\\nbased on the evidence at trial and (2) why Sansone’s award\\nshould be offset by his retirement benefits. And the sole legal\\ncitation in the entire brief went to the offset issue. Indeed, only\\none sentence in the analysis section of its brief mentioned that\\nSansone chose to retire. Read in isolation, that reference might\\ngesture toward a lack of actual or constructive discharge—but\\nthe rest of that sentence continued the brief’s focus on\\noffsetting damages with Sansone’s retirement benefits. The\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nvery best we can say—and it is a stretch—is that the Service\\nraised the “general issue” in its damages brief. Avoiding\\nforfeiture requires more. See Domka v. Portage Cty., Wis., 523\\nF.3d 776, 783 n.11 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that a party cannot\\nraise an issue for the first time on appeal when it raised only\\nthe “general issue” below).\\n ***\\n We VACATE the judgment and REMAND for a new trial\\non the damages issue. We AFFIRM it with respect to the\\nService’s liability, the award of back and front pay, and the\\naward of attorneys’ fees and expenses. 2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n2\\n Because we affirm the judgment as to the Service’s liability, Sansone remains\\nentitled to attorneys’ fees and expenses. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-\\n5(k); cf. Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health\\nand Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (“In designating those parties\\neligible for an award of litigation costs, Congress employed the term ‘prevailing\\nparty,’ a legal term of art. Black’s Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999) defines\\n‘prevailing party’ as ‘[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless\\nof the amount of damages awarded.’” (alteration in original))\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4374609/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597356/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Anthony Sansone v. Megan Brennan\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3534 & No. 17-3632\nANTHONY SANSONE,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nMEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General of the United States,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:13-cv-03415 — Milton I. Shadur, Judge,\n and Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Tony Sansone, who is confined to\na wheelchair, needs a parking place with room to deploy his\nvan’s wheelchair ramp. For years, the Postal Service, his\nemployer, provided him one. But in 2011, it took that spot\naway and failed to provide him with a suitable replacement.\nSansone then retired and sued the Service under the\nRehabilitation Act for failing to accommodate his disability.\n\f2 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\nA jury returned a verdict in his favor and Sansone recovered\ncompensatory damages, as well as back and front pay.\n The Service asks us to vacate the district court’s judgment\nbecause of two jury instructions: one about an employee’s\nobligation to cooperate with his employer in identifying a\nreasonable accommodation and the other about how the jury\nshould evaluate the Service’s expert witness. We hold that the\ndistrict court did not err with respect to the former, but its\ninstruction about the expert was both wrong and prejudicial.\nThe Service also appeals the district court’s award of back and\nfront pay, but it forfeited that argument by failing to raise it\nbelow.\n I.\n Anthony Sansone began his thirty-year career at the Postal\nService in 1981. He was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in\n1991, and, 8 years later, the disease put him in a wheelchair.\nThe Service gave him a reserved space near the loading docks,\nwhere there was room to deploy his van’s wheelchair ramp.\nThat arrangement lasted until 2011, when the plant manager,\nRuby Branch, asked Sansone to stop parking there.\n Sansone was greatly upset by Branch’s decision. He\nviewed it as arbitrary; Branch told him that it was driven by\nsafety concerns. She offered Sansone two other options: to\npark in one of the handicapped spots in front of the building\nor her own reserved space in the back of the building. Neither\nmet his needs. Branch’s reserved space, like most of the\nhandicapped spots, didn’t provide enough room to deploy\nhis van’s passenger-side ramp, and the few handicapped\nspots that had enough room were usually taken. In addition,\nthe spots in the back of the building (like Branch’s spot)\n\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 3\n\nwould require him to travel in his wheelchair along a busy\ntruck route in the dark. So with the permission of his direct\nsupervisor, Chuck von Rhein, Sansone continued to park in\nhis usual place while waiting for a solution to the problem.\n Two weeks later, Sansone emailed the maintenance\nmanager, LaShawn Jacobs, for an update on his parking\nsituation. Jacobs reiterated what Branch had said before: that\nSansone must park in one of the proposed spaces. Sansone\nthen sought help from Stephen Grieser, chair of the Postal\nService district’s Reasonable Accommodation Committee,\nwho told Sansone that he would start the process of\nidentifying a reasonable accommodation for him.\n A few days later, Branch noticed Sansone’s van parked\nnear the loading docks. She told Jacobs to inform Sansone that\nhe should move it or risk having it towed. When Jacobs\nrelayed the message, Sansone panicked, started to experience\nchest pain, and left work. He worried that if his van had been\ntowed, he would have been stranded at work because he\nneeded the van to load his wheelchair. The next day he went\nto see a doctor because he was still experiencing panic attacks.\nThe doctor recommended that he stay home until the\nsituation was rectified and prescribed medication to help him\ndeal with the stress.\n After another two weeks passed, Grieser sent Sansone a\nletter asking him to provide medical information about his\n“condition and the specific limitations that it imposes” so that\nhe could address Sansone’s parking situation. The letter\nexacerbated Sansone’s frustration because in his view, it\nsought information that the Service already knew—that he\nhad multiple sclerosis and was confined to a wheelchair.\nSansone did not provide Grieser with the redundant medical\n\f4 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\ninformation. Instead, he asked von Rhein, his supervisor, to\ntell Grieser to stop pursuing the parking issue because by that\npoint, the stress of the situation had rendered Sansone unable\nto go back to work at the Service no matter where he parked.\nHe filed for disability retirement, which the Office of\nPersonnel Management granted.\n Sansone then sued the Service under the Rehabilitation\nAct, 29 U.S.C. § 791, et seq., for constructive discharge and\nfailure to accommodate. The district court granted the\nService’s summary judgment motion on the constructive\ndischarge claim, but it denied both parties’ motions for\nsummary judgment on the failure to accommodate claim. The\ncase proceeded to trial, and Sansone won $300,000 in\ncompensatory damages.\n After the verdict came in, the district court addressed\nSansone’s equitable claim for back and front pay. It awarded\nhim $828,774—an amount covering the period between the\ndate of his termination and January 20, 2023, the date on\nwhich he would have retired.\n The Service presses three arguments on appeal, one\nrelated to the merits of Sansone’s “failure to accommodate”\nclaim and the other two related to damages.\n II.\n To succeed on his failure to accommodate claim under 29\nU.S.C. § 794, Sansone had to prove that (1) he was a qualified\nindividual with a disability, (2) the Service was aware of his\ndisability, and (3) the Service failed to reasonably\naccommodate his disability. King v. City of Madison, 550 F.3d\n\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 5\n\n598, 600 (7th Cir. 2008). 1 Relevant to—and sometimes\ndeterminative of—the third element is the employer and\nemployee’s respective cooperation “in an interactive process\nto determine a reasonable accommodation.” Baert v. Euclid\nBeverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 1998). The Service\ncontends that the district court erroneously instructed the jury\nabout the consequences of an employee’s failure to cooperate\nin this “interactive process.”\n Some background on this “interactive process” is\nnecessary to understand the Service’s objection to the jury\ninstruction. While the “interactive process” is important, it is\na means for identifying a reasonable accommodation rather\nthan an end in itself. Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d\n1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 1997). And because the process is not an\nend in itself, an employer cannot be liable solely for refusing\nto take part in it. For example, “[f]ailure to engage in this\n‘interactive process’ cannot give rise to a claim for relief … if\nthe employer can show that no reasonable accommodation\nwas possible.” Hansen v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir.\n2000). Nor will it give rise to a claim against an employer who\nreasonably accommodated the employee. Rehling v. City of\nChicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The ADA seeks\nto ensure that qualified individuals are accommodated in the\nworkplace, not to punish employers who, despite their failure\nto engage in an interactive process, have made reasonable\naccommodations.”). But when a reasonable accommodation\nwas possible and the employer did not offer it, the third\n\n\n1\n “[T]o determine whether the Rehabilitation Act has been violated in the\nemployment context, we refer to the provisions and standards of the\n[Americans with Disabilities Act].” Jackson v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806,\n810–11 (7th Cir. 2005); see 29 U.S.C. § 794(d).\n\f6 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\nelement of a “failure to accommodate” claim turns on the\n“interactive process” requirement. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &\nCo., 417 F.3d 789, 805 (7th Cir. 2005). In that event,\n“responsibility will lie with the party that caused the\nbreakdown.” Id. at 805. According to the Service, this is where\nthe district court went awry.\n The Service insists that the court erroneously instructed\nthe jury that it could render a verdict for Sansone even if he\nwas at fault for the breakdown of the interactive process. Over\nthe Service’s objection, the court instructed the jury as\nfollows:\n Once an employer is aware of the employee’s\n disability and an accommodation has been\n requested, the employer must discuss with the\n employee whether there is a reasonable\n accommodation that will permit him to perform\n his job. Both the employer and the employee\n must cooperate in the interactive process in\n good faith. Neither party can win this case\n solely because the other did not cooperate in\n that process in the way that the party believed\n appropriate, but you may consider whether a\n party cooperated in that process when deciding\n whether a reasonable accommodation existed.\nThe Service argues that telling the jury that “neither party can\nwin this case solely because the other did not cooperate” is\ninconsistent with Sears, which says that “when an employer\ntakes an active, good-faith role in the interactive process, it\nwill not be liable if the employee refuses to participate or\nwithholds essential information.” 417 F.3d at 806.\n\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 7\n\n The Service’s argument distorts the jury instruction by\nfocusing exclusively on the opening few words of a longer\nsentence. Read out of context, the cherry-picked words state\nthat the jury cannot treat one party’s failure to cooperate as\noutcome-determinative. That is inconsistent with Sears. Read\nin context, however, they make a different and entirely\nuncontroversial point: that the jury cannot evaluate the\nsufficiency of one party’s cooperation according to the\nexpectations of the other. (“Neither party can win solely\nbecause the other did not cooperate in that process in the way\nthat the party believed appropriate … .” (emphasis added)). In\nother words, the Service’s belief that Sansone did not\ncooperate did not mean that he did not cooperate—and vice\nversa. That is plainly correct.\n In sum, the Service would have a point if the court had\ntold the jury that Sansone could win even if he shut down the\ninteractive process. Unfortunately for the Service, however,\nthat is not what the court said.\n III.\n The Service’s next argument concerns its expert witness,\nDr. Diana Goldstein, who offered an opinion on the cause of\nSansone’s emotional distress, an issue relevant to\ncompensatory damages. On cross-examination, Sansone’s\nlawyer asked Goldstein if she had read the Service’s brief in\nsupport of its summary judgment motion in the course of\npreparing her report. She said that she had, and Sansone’s\nlawyer pressed: “To get your understanding of the facts you\nread the Postal Service’s Statement of Material Facts in\nsupport of its motion for summary judgment, correct?”\nGoldstein replied:\n\f8 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\n I wouldn’t agree with that statement. I would\n say that it helps me understand the story, but I\n get my facts about what Mr. Sansone is claiming\n in turn—by way of emotional distress and\n changes in physical symptoms by meeting with\n him, by reviewing objective records, et cetera.\n But I do like to have context and so I always\n review the records just to get a sense of what the\n whole story is.\nShe added that as part of that context, she had also read\nSansone’s complaint, his answers to interrogatories, and his\ndeposition. Sansone’s lawyer asked whether she had read the\nbrief opposing the Service’s motion for summary judgment or\nthe district court’s decision denying the motion, and\nGoldstein said that she had not.\n Shortly thereafter, Goldstein responded to a question\nabout whether she had read the deposition of plant manager\nRuby Branch by explaining that, although she had, she did\nnot view it “as relevant to [her] role in assessing Mr. Sansone’s\nemotional distress claim.” The court interjected: “Wait just a\nminute. But you thought that the brief in support of a motion\nfor summary judgment which was denied, that was relevant\nto your opinion?” When Goldstein answered, “I always read\nthose,” the court interrupted, “I am not asking what you\nalways do. I am asking, in this case you felt that that is\nrelevant to your rendition of an opinion, a lawyer’s argument\nin connection with this case which was unsuccessful.”\nGoldstein replied, “No. I just like to know what is going on\nwith the case.” The court later admonished counsel that\ngiving Goldstein the summary judgment motion was a “flat-\nout violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 703.”\n\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 9\n\n The court hammered that position home in its jury\ninstructions. In evaluating Goldstein’s opinion, it told the\njurors that they should keep in mind that\n [S]he had been provided by counsel for the\n Postal Service with a copy of the Postal Service’s\n argument that had been made earlier in the case\n in support of an unsuccessful motion to prevent\n the case from going to trial on the premise that\n there were no genuine issues of material fact\n that called for consideration by a jury. That is a\n document that presents the Postal Service’s\n version of the facts and of the legal arguments\n that they sought to support that motion. It was\n inappropriate for that information to be\n provided to the opinion witness. And that\n inappropriateness was amplified by the failure\n of the Postal Service’s counsel to provide her\n with the successful argument that had been\n made by Sansone’s lawyer in opposition to the\n motion and, more importantly, by the failure of\n Postal Service’s counsel to provide her with the\n Court’s opinion that rejected the motion.\n It should be added, though, that Sansone’s\n counsel is also at fault. Why? For not having\n raised the matter before this Court well in\n advance of trial because the teaching of the\n Supreme Court is that the trial judge serves as\n what they call the gatekeeper in ruling on\n whether it is or is not proper for any specific\n proposed opinion witness to be allowed to\n present his or her testimony to a fact-finding\n\f10 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\n jury for its consideration. And that matter came\n before you, just as it came before me, solely at\n the end of the case.\n Now with all of that said, you may consider\n what has been set forth in this instruction that I\n have composed in explaining the determination\n called for in the first paragraph of the\n instruction, that is, give the testimony of each of\n the witnesses whatever weight you think it\n deserves, considering the reasons for the\n opinion, the witness’ qualifications and all of\n the other evidence in the case.\nThe Service contends that this instruction erroneously invited\nthe jury to disregard Goldstein’s opinion.\n The Service is right. Contrary to the court’s belief, the\nService did not commit a “flat-out violation of Federal Rule of\nEvidence 703” by giving Goldstein its summary judgment\nmotion. Rule 703 does not govern the information that experts\ncan have; it governs the information on which they can base\ntheir opinions. It allows experts to rely on inadmissible facts\nor data in forming an opinion so long as “experts in the\nparticular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts\nor data in forming an opinion on the subject.” FED. R. EVID.\n703.\n If Goldstein had relied on the summary judgment motion\nin forming her opinion, the court would have had to\ndetermine whether experts in her field “reasonably rely” on\nsummary judgment motions in assessing someone’s\nemotional distress—and presumably they don’t. But\nGoldstein expressly stated that she did not rely on the\n\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 11\n\nsummary judgment motion in forming her opinion. She read\nthe summary judgment motion—along with Sansone’s\ncomplaint and answers to interrogatories—solely to get\ncontext about the case. She based her opinion on the facts that\nshe got from Sansone and his medical records. So long as\nthose are the kinds of facts and data on which experts in her\nfield reasonably rely—and presumably they are—her opinion\nsatisfied Rule 703. Any suggestion that Goldstein was biased\nin favor of the Service could be explored on cross—as Sansone\nwas doing before the court seized sua sponte on the illusory\nRule 703 issue.\n The district court thus erred when it told the jury that the\nService had acted inappropriately by giving Goldstein the\nsummary judgment motion and suggesting that it would\nhave excluded her testimony had it learned about the issue\nearlier. Even so, “a new trial is required only if the flawed\ninstruction could have confused or misled the jury causing\nprejudice to the complaining party.” Doornbos v. City of\nChicago, 868 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2017). Sansone says that the\nService was not prejudiced because Goldstein testified that\nshe didn’t rely on the summary judgment motion, the court\npermitted the jury to consider her testimony, and the\ninstruction emphasized that Sansone was also to blame for\nnot raising the issue earlier.\n None of those things blunted the effect of the district\ncourt’s erroneous instruction, which all but told the jury that\nit shouldn’t trust anything that Goldstein had said. This not\nonly misled the jury but also invaded the jury’s function in\nassessing witness credibility. See Stollings v. Ryobi Tech., Inc.,\n725 F.3d 753, 765 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that although the\ndistrict court serves as gatekeeper, “[t]he jury must still be\n\f12 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\nallowed to play its essential role as the arbiter of the weight\nand credibility of expert testimony”). At the very least, the\ninstruction left the jury unsure what to make of Goldstein’s\ntestimony. See Rapold v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 718 F.3d 602, 609 (7th\nCir. 2013) (explaining that a party is prejudiced by jury\ninstructions when the “jury was likely to be misled or\nconfused” by them); Miller v. Neathery, 52 F.3d 634, 639 (7th\nCir. 1995) (“Under these circumstances, it would be\nimprudent for us to determine that the lack of sufficient\nguidance in the instructions did not contribute significantly\nto the jury’s conclusion.”).\n The prejudice was particularly acute given what had\nhappened earlier in the trial. See Susan Wakeen Doll Co., Inc. v.\nAshton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 452 (7th Cir. 2001) (“An\nerroneous jury instruction could not prejudice [a party] unless\nconsidering the instructions as a whole, along with all of the\nevidence and arguments, the jury was misinformed about the\napplicable law.”). The court interrupted the cross-\nexamination of Goldstein to admonish her, expressing\nincredulity that she had read the summary judgment motion.\nSee United States v. El-Bey, 873 F.3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir. 2017)\n(explaining that a trial judge has great influence on the jury\nand that any statement made about a witness carries great\nweight). The instructions therefore invited the jury to act on\nthe skepticism that the court had already sowed.\n In short, the instruction was erroneous and prejudicial.\nBut because Goldstein’s testimony went solely to\ncompensatory damages, we remand for a new trial on that\nissue only. See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d\n1081, 1166 (7th Cir. 1983).\n\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 13\n\n IV.\n The Service’s final argument is that the court erred by\nawarding Sansone equitable relief in the form of back and\nfront pay for the time after he retired. It contends that\nconstructive discharge is required for equitable relief; because\nSansone was never actively or constructively discharged, it\nsays, he does not qualify.\n Sansone argues that the Service waived this argument by\nfailing to raise it below. What he means to say, however, is\nthat the Service forfeited this argument. See Hamer v.\nNeighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 n.1 (2017)\n(“The terms waiver and forfeiture—although often used\ninterchangeably by jurists and litigants—are not\nsynonymous.”). Waiver is intentionally abandoning a known\nright. United States v. Seals, 813 F.3d 1038, 1044–45 (7th Cir.\n2016). Forfeiture occurs when a party fails to make an\nargument because of accident or neglect. Id. at 1045. That’s\nwhat Sansone says that the Service did here.\n The Service insists that it raised this argument—that\nSansone failed to prove actual or constructive discharge and\nthus could not receive back or front pay—in its damages brief\nto the district court. This is wishful thinking. The damages\nbrief focused on two things: (1) errors that the court made\nbased on the evidence at trial and (2) why Sansone’s award\nshould be offset by his retirement benefits. And the sole legal\ncitation in the entire brief went to the offset issue. Indeed, only\none sentence in the analysis section of its brief mentioned that\nSansone chose to retire. Read in isolation, that reference might\ngesture toward a lack of actual or constructive discharge—but\nthe rest of that sentence continued the brief’s focus on\noffsetting damages with Sansone’s retirement benefits. The\n\f14 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\n\nvery best we can say—and it is a stretch—is that the Service\nraised the “general issue” in its damages brief. Avoiding\nforfeiture requires more. See Domka v. Portage Cty., Wis., 523\nF.3d 776, 783 n.11 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that a party cannot\nraise an issue for the first time on appeal when it raised only\nthe “general issue” below).\n ***\n We VACATE the judgment and REMAND for a new trial\non the damages issue. We AFFIRM it with respect to the\nService’s liability, the award of back and front pay, and the\naward of attorneys’ fees and expenses. 2\n\n\n\n\n2\n Because we affirm the judgment as to the Service’s liability, Sansone remains\nentitled to attorneys’ fees and expenses. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-\n5(k); cf. Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health\nand Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (“In designating those parties\neligible for an award of litigation costs, Congress employed the term ‘prevailing\nparty,’ a legal term of art. Black’s Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999) defines\n‘prevailing party’ as ‘[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless\nof the amount of damages awarded.’” (alteration in original))\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Anthony Sansone v. Megan Brennan\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-3534 & No. 17-3632\\nANTHONY SANSONE,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General of the United States,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:13-cv-03415 — Milton I. Shadur, Judge,\\n and Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Tony Sansone, who is confined to\\na wheelchair, needs a parking place with room to deploy his\\nvan’s wheelchair ramp. For years, the Postal Service, his\\nemployer, provided him one. But in 2011, it took that spot\\naway and failed to provide him with a suitable replacement.\\nSansone then retired and sued the Service under the\\nRehabilitation Act for failing to accommodate his disability.\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nA jury returned a verdict in his favor and Sansone recovered\\ncompensatory damages, as well as back and front pay.\\n The Service asks us to vacate the district court’s judgment\\nbecause of two jury instructions: one about an employee’s\\nobligation to cooperate with his employer in identifying a\\nreasonable accommodation and the other about how the jury\\nshould evaluate the Service’s expert witness. We hold that the\\ndistrict court did not err with respect to the former, but its\\ninstruction about the expert was both wrong and prejudicial.\\nThe Service also appeals the district court’s award of back and\\nfront pay, but it forfeited that argument by failing to raise it\\nbelow.\\n I.\\n Anthony Sansone began his thirty-year career at the Postal\\nService in 1981. He was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in\\n1991, and, 8 years later, the disease put him in a wheelchair.\\nThe Service gave him a reserved space near the loading docks,\\nwhere there was room to deploy his van’s wheelchair ramp.\\nThat arrangement lasted until 2011, when the plant manager,\\nRuby Branch, asked Sansone to stop parking there.\\n Sansone was greatly upset by Branch’s decision. He\\nviewed it as arbitrary; Branch told him that it was driven by\\nsafety concerns. She offered Sansone two other options: to\\npark in one of the handicapped spots in front of the building\\nor her own reserved space in the back of the building. Neither\\nmet his needs. Branch’s reserved space, like most of the\\nhandicapped spots, didn’t provide enough room to deploy\\nhis van’s passenger-side ramp, and the few handicapped\\nspots that had enough room were usually taken. In addition,\\nthe spots in the back of the building (like Branch’s spot)\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 3\\n\\nwould require him to travel in his wheelchair along a busy\\ntruck route in the dark. So with the permission of his direct\\nsupervisor, Chuck von Rhein, Sansone continued to park in\\nhis usual place while waiting for a solution to the problem.\\n Two weeks later, Sansone emailed the maintenance\\nmanager, LaShawn Jacobs, for an update on his parking\\nsituation. Jacobs reiterated what Branch had said before: that\\nSansone must park in one of the proposed spaces. Sansone\\nthen sought help from Stephen Grieser, chair of the Postal\\nService district’s Reasonable Accommodation Committee,\\nwho told Sansone that he would start the process of\\nidentifying a reasonable accommodation for him.\\n A few days later, Branch noticed Sansone’s van parked\\nnear the loading docks. She told Jacobs to inform Sansone that\\nhe should move it or risk having it towed. When Jacobs\\nrelayed the message, Sansone panicked, started to experience\\nchest pain, and left work. He worried that if his van had been\\ntowed, he would have been stranded at work because he\\nneeded the van to load his wheelchair. The next day he went\\nto see a doctor because he was still experiencing panic attacks.\\nThe doctor recommended that he stay home until the\\nsituation was rectified and prescribed medication to help him\\ndeal with the stress.\\n After another two weeks passed, Grieser sent Sansone a\\nletter asking him to provide medical information about his\\n“condition and the specific limitations that it imposes” so that\\nhe could address Sansone’s parking situation. The letter\\nexacerbated Sansone’s frustration because in his view, it\\nsought information that the Service already knew—that he\\nhad multiple sclerosis and was confined to a wheelchair.\\nSansone did not provide Grieser with the redundant medical\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\ninformation. Instead, he asked von Rhein, his supervisor, to\\ntell Grieser to stop pursuing the parking issue because by that\\npoint, the stress of the situation had rendered Sansone unable\\nto go back to work at the Service no matter where he parked.\\nHe filed for disability retirement, which the Office of\\nPersonnel Management granted.\\n Sansone then sued the Service under the Rehabilitation\\nAct, 29 U.S.C. § 791, et seq., for constructive discharge and\\nfailure to accommodate. The district court granted the\\nService’s summary judgment motion on the constructive\\ndischarge claim, but it denied both parties’ motions for\\nsummary judgment on the failure to accommodate claim. The\\ncase proceeded to trial, and Sansone won $300,000 in\\ncompensatory damages.\\n After the verdict came in, the district court addressed\\nSansone’s equitable claim for back and front pay. It awarded\\nhim $828,774—an amount covering the period between the\\ndate of his termination and January 20, 2023, the date on\\nwhich he would have retired.\\n The Service presses three arguments on appeal, one\\nrelated to the merits of Sansone’s “failure to accommodate”\\nclaim and the other two related to damages.\\n II.\\n To succeed on his failure to accommodate claim under 29\\nU.S.C. § 794, Sansone had to prove that (1) he was a qualified\\nindividual with a disability, (2) the Service was aware of his\\ndisability, and (3) the Service failed to reasonably\\naccommodate his disability. King v. City of Madison, 550 F.3d\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 5\\n\\n598, 600 (7th Cir. 2008). 1 Relevant to—and sometimes\\ndeterminative of—the third element is the employer and\\nemployee’s respective cooperation “in an interactive process\\nto determine a reasonable accommodation.” Baert v. Euclid\\nBeverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 1998). The Service\\ncontends that the district court erroneously instructed the jury\\nabout the consequences of an employee’s failure to cooperate\\nin this “interactive process.”\\n Some background on this “interactive process” is\\nnecessary to understand the Service’s objection to the jury\\ninstruction. While the “interactive process” is important, it is\\na means for identifying a reasonable accommodation rather\\nthan an end in itself. Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d\\n1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 1997). And because the process is not an\\nend in itself, an employer cannot be liable solely for refusing\\nto take part in it. For example, “[f]ailure to engage in this\\n‘interactive process’ cannot give rise to a claim for relief … if\\nthe employer can show that no reasonable accommodation\\nwas possible.” Hansen v. Henderson, 233 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir.\\n2000). Nor will it give rise to a claim against an employer who\\nreasonably accommodated the employee. Rehling v. City of\\nChicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The ADA seeks\\nto ensure that qualified individuals are accommodated in the\\nworkplace, not to punish employers who, despite their failure\\nto engage in an interactive process, have made reasonable\\naccommodations.”). But when a reasonable accommodation\\nwas possible and the employer did not offer it, the third\\n\\n\\n1\\n “[T]o determine whether the Rehabilitation Act has been violated in the\\nemployment context, we refer to the provisions and standards of the\\n[Americans with Disabilities Act].” Jackson v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806,\\n810–11 (7th Cir. 2005); see 29 U.S.C. § 794(d).\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nelement of a “failure to accommodate” claim turns on the\\n“interactive process” requirement. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &\\nCo., 417 F.3d 789, 805 (7th Cir. 2005). In that event,\\n“responsibility will lie with the party that caused the\\nbreakdown.” Id. at 805. According to the Service, this is where\\nthe district court went awry.\\n The Service insists that the court erroneously instructed\\nthe jury that it could render a verdict for Sansone even if he\\nwas at fault for the breakdown of the interactive process. Over\\nthe Service’s objection, the court instructed the jury as\\nfollows:\\n Once an employer is aware of the employee’s\\n disability and an accommodation has been\\n requested, the employer must discuss with the\\n employee whether there is a reasonable\\n accommodation that will permit him to perform\\n his job. Both the employer and the employee\\n must cooperate in the interactive process in\\n good faith. Neither party can win this case\\n solely because the other did not cooperate in\\n that process in the way that the party believed\\n appropriate, but you may consider whether a\\n party cooperated in that process when deciding\\n whether a reasonable accommodation existed.\\nThe Service argues that telling the jury that “neither party can\\nwin this case solely because the other did not cooperate” is\\ninconsistent with Sears, which says that “when an employer\\ntakes an active, good-faith role in the interactive process, it\\nwill not be liable if the employee refuses to participate or\\nwithholds essential information.” 417 F.3d at 806.\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 7\\n\\n The Service’s argument distorts the jury instruction by\\nfocusing exclusively on the opening few words of a longer\\nsentence. Read out of context, the cherry-picked words state\\nthat the jury cannot treat one party’s failure to cooperate as\\noutcome-determinative. That is inconsistent with Sears. Read\\nin context, however, they make a different and entirely\\nuncontroversial point: that the jury cannot evaluate the\\nsufficiency of one party’s cooperation according to the\\nexpectations of the other. (“Neither party can win solely\\nbecause the other did not cooperate in that process in the way\\nthat the party believed appropriate … .” (emphasis added)). In\\nother words, the Service’s belief that Sansone did not\\ncooperate did not mean that he did not cooperate—and vice\\nversa. That is plainly correct.\\n In sum, the Service would have a point if the court had\\ntold the jury that Sansone could win even if he shut down the\\ninteractive process. Unfortunately for the Service, however,\\nthat is not what the court said.\\n III.\\n The Service’s next argument concerns its expert witness,\\nDr. Diana Goldstein, who offered an opinion on the cause of\\nSansone’s emotional distress, an issue relevant to\\ncompensatory damages. On cross-examination, Sansone’s\\nlawyer asked Goldstein if she had read the Service’s brief in\\nsupport of its summary judgment motion in the course of\\npreparing her report. She said that she had, and Sansone’s\\nlawyer pressed: “To get your understanding of the facts you\\nread the Postal Service’s Statement of Material Facts in\\nsupport of its motion for summary judgment, correct?”\\nGoldstein replied:\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\n I wouldn’t agree with that statement. I would\\n say that it helps me understand the story, but I\\n get my facts about what Mr. Sansone is claiming\\n in turn—by way of emotional distress and\\n changes in physical symptoms by meeting with\\n him, by reviewing objective records, et cetera.\\n But I do like to have context and so I always\\n review the records just to get a sense of what the\\n whole story is.\\nShe added that as part of that context, she had also read\\nSansone’s complaint, his answers to interrogatories, and his\\ndeposition. Sansone’s lawyer asked whether she had read the\\nbrief opposing the Service’s motion for summary judgment or\\nthe district court’s decision denying the motion, and\\nGoldstein said that she had not.\\n Shortly thereafter, Goldstein responded to a question\\nabout whether she had read the deposition of plant manager\\nRuby Branch by explaining that, although she had, she did\\nnot view it “as relevant to [her] role in assessing Mr. Sansone’s\\nemotional distress claim.” The court interjected: “Wait just a\\nminute. But you thought that the brief in support of a motion\\nfor summary judgment which was denied, that was relevant\\nto your opinion?” When Goldstein answered, “I always read\\nthose,” the court interrupted, “I am not asking what you\\nalways do. I am asking, in this case you felt that that is\\nrelevant to your rendition of an opinion, a lawyer’s argument\\nin connection with this case which was unsuccessful.”\\nGoldstein replied, “No. I just like to know what is going on\\nwith the case.” The court later admonished counsel that\\ngiving Goldstein the summary judgment motion was a “flat-\\nout violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 703.”\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 9\\n\\n The court hammered that position home in its jury\\ninstructions. In evaluating Goldstein’s opinion, it told the\\njurors that they should keep in mind that\\n [S]he had been provided by counsel for the\\n Postal Service with a copy of the Postal Service’s\\n argument that had been made earlier in the case\\n in support of an unsuccessful motion to prevent\\n the case from going to trial on the premise that\\n there were no genuine issues of material fact\\n that called for consideration by a jury. That is a\\n document that presents the Postal Service’s\\n version of the facts and of the legal arguments\\n that they sought to support that motion. It was\\n inappropriate for that information to be\\n provided to the opinion witness. And that\\n inappropriateness was amplified by the failure\\n of the Postal Service’s counsel to provide her\\n with the successful argument that had been\\n made by Sansone’s lawyer in opposition to the\\n motion and, more importantly, by the failure of\\n Postal Service’s counsel to provide her with the\\n Court’s opinion that rejected the motion.\\n It should be added, though, that Sansone’s\\n counsel is also at fault. Why? For not having\\n raised the matter before this Court well in\\n advance of trial because the teaching of the\\n Supreme Court is that the trial judge serves as\\n what they call the gatekeeper in ruling on\\n whether it is or is not proper for any specific\\n proposed opinion witness to be allowed to\\n present his or her testimony to a fact-finding\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\n jury for its consideration. And that matter came\\n before you, just as it came before me, solely at\\n the end of the case.\\n Now with all of that said, you may consider\\n what has been set forth in this instruction that I\\n have composed in explaining the determination\\n called for in the first paragraph of the\\n instruction, that is, give the testimony of each of\\n the witnesses whatever weight you think it\\n deserves, considering the reasons for the\\n opinion, the witness’ qualifications and all of\\n the other evidence in the case.\\nThe Service contends that this instruction erroneously invited\\nthe jury to disregard Goldstein’s opinion.\\n The Service is right. Contrary to the court’s belief, the\\nService did not commit a “flat-out violation of Federal Rule of\\nEvidence 703” by giving Goldstein its summary judgment\\nmotion. Rule 703 does not govern the information that experts\\ncan have; it governs the information on which they can base\\ntheir opinions. It allows experts to rely on inadmissible facts\\nor data in forming an opinion so long as “experts in the\\nparticular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts\\nor data in forming an opinion on the subject.” FED. R. EVID.\\n703.\\n If Goldstein had relied on the summary judgment motion\\nin forming her opinion, the court would have had to\\ndetermine whether experts in her field “reasonably rely” on\\nsummary judgment motions in assessing someone’s\\nemotional distress—and presumably they don’t. But\\nGoldstein expressly stated that she did not rely on the\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 11\\n\\nsummary judgment motion in forming her opinion. She read\\nthe summary judgment motion—along with Sansone’s\\ncomplaint and answers to interrogatories—solely to get\\ncontext about the case. She based her opinion on the facts that\\nshe got from Sansone and his medical records. So long as\\nthose are the kinds of facts and data on which experts in her\\nfield reasonably rely—and presumably they are—her opinion\\nsatisfied Rule 703. Any suggestion that Goldstein was biased\\nin favor of the Service could be explored on cross—as Sansone\\nwas doing before the court seized sua sponte on the illusory\\nRule 703 issue.\\n The district court thus erred when it told the jury that the\\nService had acted inappropriately by giving Goldstein the\\nsummary judgment motion and suggesting that it would\\nhave excluded her testimony had it learned about the issue\\nearlier. Even so, “a new trial is required only if the flawed\\ninstruction could have confused or misled the jury causing\\nprejudice to the complaining party.” Doornbos v. City of\\nChicago, 868 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2017). Sansone says that the\\nService was not prejudiced because Goldstein testified that\\nshe didn’t rely on the summary judgment motion, the court\\npermitted the jury to consider her testimony, and the\\ninstruction emphasized that Sansone was also to blame for\\nnot raising the issue earlier.\\n None of those things blunted the effect of the district\\ncourt’s erroneous instruction, which all but told the jury that\\nit shouldn’t trust anything that Goldstein had said. This not\\nonly misled the jury but also invaded the jury’s function in\\nassessing witness credibility. See Stollings v. Ryobi Tech., Inc.,\\n725 F.3d 753, 765 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that although the\\ndistrict court serves as gatekeeper, “[t]he jury must still be\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nallowed to play its essential role as the arbiter of the weight\\nand credibility of expert testimony”). At the very least, the\\ninstruction left the jury unsure what to make of Goldstein’s\\ntestimony. See Rapold v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 718 F.3d 602, 609 (7th\\nCir. 2013) (explaining that a party is prejudiced by jury\\ninstructions when the “jury was likely to be misled or\\nconfused” by them); Miller v. Neathery, 52 F.3d 634, 639 (7th\\nCir. 1995) (“Under these circumstances, it would be\\nimprudent for us to determine that the lack of sufficient\\nguidance in the instructions did not contribute significantly\\nto the jury’s conclusion.”).\\n The prejudice was particularly acute given what had\\nhappened earlier in the trial. See Susan Wakeen Doll Co., Inc. v.\\nAshton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 452 (7th Cir. 2001) (“An\\nerroneous jury instruction could not prejudice [a party] unless\\nconsidering the instructions as a whole, along with all of the\\nevidence and arguments, the jury was misinformed about the\\napplicable law.”). The court interrupted the cross-\\nexamination of Goldstein to admonish her, expressing\\nincredulity that she had read the summary judgment motion.\\nSee United States v. El-Bey, 873 F.3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir. 2017)\\n(explaining that a trial judge has great influence on the jury\\nand that any statement made about a witness carries great\\nweight). The instructions therefore invited the jury to act on\\nthe skepticism that the court had already sowed.\\n In short, the instruction was erroneous and prejudicial.\\nBut because Goldstein’s testimony went solely to\\ncompensatory damages, we remand for a new trial on that\\nissue only. See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d\\n1081, 1166 (7th Cir. 1983).\\n\\fNos. 17-3534 & 17-3632 13\\n\\n IV.\\n The Service’s final argument is that the court erred by\\nawarding Sansone equitable relief in the form of back and\\nfront pay for the time after he retired. It contends that\\nconstructive discharge is required for equitable relief; because\\nSansone was never actively or constructively discharged, it\\nsays, he does not qualify.\\n Sansone argues that the Service waived this argument by\\nfailing to raise it below. What he means to say, however, is\\nthat the Service forfeited this argument. See Hamer v.\\nNeighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 n.1 (2017)\\n(“The terms waiver and forfeiture—although often used\\ninterchangeably by jurists and litigants—are not\\nsynonymous.”). Waiver is intentionally abandoning a known\\nright. United States v. Seals, 813 F.3d 1038, 1044–45 (7th Cir.\\n2016). Forfeiture occurs when a party fails to make an\\nargument because of accident or neglect. Id. at 1045. That’s\\nwhat Sansone says that the Service did here.\\n The Service insists that it raised this argument—that\\nSansone failed to prove actual or constructive discharge and\\nthus could not receive back or front pay—in its damages brief\\nto the district court. This is wishful thinking. The damages\\nbrief focused on two things: (1) errors that the court made\\nbased on the evidence at trial and (2) why Sansone’s award\\nshould be offset by his retirement benefits. And the sole legal\\ncitation in the entire brief went to the offset issue. Indeed, only\\none sentence in the analysis section of its brief mentioned that\\nSansone chose to retire. Read in isolation, that reference might\\ngesture toward a lack of actual or constructive discharge—but\\nthe rest of that sentence continued the brief’s focus on\\noffsetting damages with Sansone’s retirement benefits. The\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-3534 & 17-3632\\n\\nvery best we can say—and it is a stretch—is that the Service\\nraised the “general issue” in its damages brief. Avoiding\\nforfeiture requires more. See Domka v. Portage Cty., Wis., 523\\nF.3d 776, 783 n.11 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that a party cannot\\nraise an issue for the first time on appeal when it raised only\\nthe “general issue” below).\\n ***\\n We VACATE the judgment and REMAND for a new trial\\non the damages issue. We AFFIRM it with respect to the\\nService’s liability, the award of back and front pay, and the\\naward of attorneys’ fees and expenses. 2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n2\\n Because we affirm the judgment as to the Service’s liability, Sansone remains\\nentitled to attorneys’ fees and expenses. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-\\n5(k); cf. Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health\\nand Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (“In designating those parties\\neligible for an award of litigation costs, Congress employed the term ‘prevailing\\nparty,’ a legal term of art. Black’s Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999) defines\\n‘prevailing party’ as ‘[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless\\nof the amount of damages awarded.’” (alteration in original))\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1180,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443912,"string":"8,443,912"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Jesus SALGADO"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Salgado"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 18-2194"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Easterbrook, Eve, Wood\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415343/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443912/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Jesus SALGADO\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Jesus SALGADO\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1181,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443913,"string":"8,443,913"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Steve BRIGGINS"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Briggins"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 18-1921"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Brennan, Manion, Scudder\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415344/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443913/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Steve BRIGGINS\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Steve BRIGGINS\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1182,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4598150,"string":"4,598,150"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Charles GREENHILL and Amphib, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Richard M. VARTANIAN and Platinum Fighter Sales, Inc., Defendants-Appellants."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Charles Greenhill v. Richard Vartanian"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3526"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Wood, Easterbrook, Eve\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 17-3526\\nCHARLES GREENHILL and AMPHIB, INC.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nRICHARD M. VARTANIAN and PLATINUM FIGHTER SALES, INC.,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15-cv-09585 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 4, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 8, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Hermann Göring, head of the\\nLuftwaffe in World War II, remarked: “When I saw those\\nMustangs over Berlin, I knew that the war was lost.” The P-\\n51 Mustang fighter entered service in January 1942, and\\nlong-range variants introduced late in 1943 could escort Al-\\nlied bombers to Germany and back. (With external fuel\\ntanks, they had a range exceeding 1,600 miles.) More than\\n\\f2 No. 17-3526\\n\\n15,500 Mustangs were built; the plane served as this nation’s\\nmain fighter until jets succeeded it during the Korean War.\\nSome Mustangs remained in military use in other nations\\nuntil 1984. The picture below shows one of the long-range\\nversions. Surviving aircraft are collector’s items, “warbirds”\\nlovingly rebuilt and maintained by private aficionados, dis-\\nplayed in museums, and occasionally flown at air shows.\\nOne is in the collection of the Smithsonian’s National Air\\nand Space Museum. The Federal Aviation Administration\\nhas more than 100 airworthy Mustangs on its register today.\\nThis suit is about one of them—or perhaps two of them.\\n\\fNo. 17-3526 3\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n In 1965 Richard Vartanian bought a Mustang that had\\nflown in the Royal Canadian Air Force but had been in pri-\\nvate hands since 1960. Its serial number was 44-74543. He\\nstored it at a car dealership until 1973 or 1974, when he\\nmoved it to a hangar at Fulton County Airport in New York.\\nIn 1985 Vartanian decided to move the plane to California,\\nbut his representative could not find it. Vartanian suspected\\nWilbur Martin, who had promised to restore the plane on\\nVartanian’s behalf. In April 1985 Vartanian’s lawyer de-\\n\\f4 No. 17-3526\\n\\nmanded that Martin return the plane and, when that did not\\noccur, Vartanian personally complained to the FAA, the FBI,\\nand law-enforcement agencies in Los Angeles, Chicago, and\\nNew York that the plane may have been stolen.\\n Martin denied taking Vartanian’s plane but conceded\\nbuying some Mustang parts from Waterman Brown, one of\\nVartanian’s associates. Martin later registered with the FAA\\n(which administers the federal system of aircraft ownership)\\na Mustang having serial number 44-63655. Martin asserts\\nthat it had been cobbled together using parts from a plane of\\nhis that had crashed in Nicaragua plus components that he\\nhad acquired from several sources, including Brown.\\n In 1998 Martin sold the plane bearing SN 44-63655 to\\nAmphib, Inc., a corporation controlled by Charles Greenhill.\\nVartanian learned about this transaction in 2002 or 2003 by\\nreading an article in Air Classics magazine that incorrectly\\nidentified the serial number of Greenhill’s plane as 44-74543\\n(which, recall, had been amached to Vartanian’s plane) and\\nspecified its provenance as one that the Royal Canadian Air\\nForce had sold as military surplus. In 2004 Vartanian hired\\nanother lawyer to investigate. He obtained the FAA’s file on\\nthe plane, which showed the sale to Greenhill in 1998, and\\nprepared the complaint for a tort action against Martin and\\nGreenhill. But this lawyer died before filing the suit, and\\nVartanian did not follow up.\\n In 2009 Vartanian wrote a lemer to the United States\\nAmorney for the Northern District of Illinois contending that\\nhis Mustang had been stolen by Martin in 1984 and that\\nMartin used the serial number of the plane destroyed in Nic-\\naragua to conceal his crime. The United States Amorney de-\\nclined to prosecute but urged Vartanian to retain counsel to\\n\\fNo. 17-3526 5\\n\\npursue civil relief. Vartanian did nothing further until after\\nlearning from a historian in 2013 that there were irregulari-\\nties in the serial numbers of several of Martin’s planes. In\\nFebruary 2014 Vartanian sent Greenhill a lemer demanding\\nthat he turn over the plane purchased from Martin. Greenhill\\nresponded in 2015 with this suit under the diversity jurisdic-\\ntion, seeking a declaratory judgment that he owns the plane.\\nVartanian and his corporation Platinum Fighter Sales filed\\ncounterclaims seeking that relief for themselves, because a\\nthief cannot convey good title, plus an order that Greenhill\\nor Amphib hand the plane over to them. But the district\\njudge concluded that the time to accuse Martin of theft had\\nexpired long ago. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186706 (N.D. Ill. Nov.\\n13, 2017).\\n Although the judge’s opinion states that plaintiffs are en-\\ntitled to a declaratory judgment, the court did not enter one.\\nInstead it entered this decision on the form used for judg-\\nments under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58:\\n Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant\\n on Plaintiffs’ complaint for declaratory relief [1], and on Defend-\\n ants’ counterclaims for conversion and declaratory relief [14].\\n\\nA document providing that “[j]udgment is entered” does not\\nsatisfy Rule 58. A judgment must provide the relief to which\\nthe prevailing party is entitled. See, e.g., Hyland v. Liberty\\nMutual Fire Insurance Co., 885 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2018); Cooke\\nv. Jackson National Life Insurance Co., 882 F.3d 630 (7th Cir.\\n2018); ReytblaD v. Denton, 812 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir. 1987); Azeez\\nv. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296 (7th Cir. 1986). This document does\\nnot do that. It shows that the district court is done with the\\ncase, which permits an appeal, but it does not resolve the\\nparties’ dispute. The judgment also does not show that it\\n\\f6 No. 17-3526\\n\\nwas reviewed and approved by the judge, although Rule\\n58(b)(2) provides that the judge, not a clerk, must approve\\ndecisions of this kind.\\n The district judge failed to resolve two subjects on which\\nthe parties’ appellate briefs disagree. First, who receives the\\nrelief? The judgment refers to “Plaintiff”, but there are two\\nplaintiffs. The corporate plaintiff (Amphib) is the registered\\nowner of the airplane, but some of the district court’s opin-\\nion suggests that relief is being awarded to Greenhill. Sec-\\nond, although plaintiffs’ initial complaint sought a declara-\\ntory judgment that they own the airplane against the world\\n(a standard outcome of a quiet-title action), at oral argument\\non appeal they recognized that this suit concerns personal\\nproperty rather than real estate and disclaimed entitlement\\nto relief broader than a declaration that their rights are supe-\\nrior to Vartanian’s. Neither the district court’s opinion nor its\\njudgment distinguishes these possibilities.\\n These shortcomings led us to remand the case with in-\\nstructions to enter a proper declaratory judgment. The dis-\\ntrict court promptly complied. The revised judgment pro-\\nvides that Amphib owns the aircraft free of any claim by\\nVartanian. It does not insulate Amphib from other persons’\\npotential claims or bestow any ownership rights on Green-\\nhill. This eliminates two of the parties’ appellate controver-\\nsies but still requires us to address Vartanian’s contention\\nthat the district court should have decided whether Martin\\nstole the plane in or before 1984.\\n Although federal law provides a registration system for\\naircraft, state law supplies the rules for determining owner-\\nship. See 49 U.S.C. §44108(c)(1); Shacket v. Philko Aviation,\\nInc., 841 F.2d 166, 169 (7th Cir. 1988). The district court ap-\\n\\fNo. 17-3526 7\\n\\nplied Illinois law, and neither side has asked us to use the\\nlaw of some other state. The district court classified Var-\\ntanian’s claim as one for conversion, which is subject to a\\nfive-year period of limitations under 735 ILCS 5/13-205. Ob-\\nserving that Vartanian accused Martin of theft in 1985 and\\n2009, and was on the verge of suing in 2004, the judge con-\\ncluded that the five-year period had long expired, which\\nblocked Vartanian from contending that Amphib’s title to\\nthe plane is derived from any theft by Martin.\\n Vartanian’s appellate position incorporates elements of\\nthe discovery doctrine with elements of equitable estoppel.\\nThe discovery rule in Illinois provides that a period of limi-\\ntations starts to run when the injured party “knows or rea-\\nsonably should know” of the injury and its cause. Knox Col-\\nlege v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 414–16 (1981). Vartanian\\nknew in 1985 that his Mustang had vanished; he suspected\\nMartin from the outset and had plenty of time to investigate.\\nIndeed, he did investigate, and in Illinois having enough in-\\nformation to start an investigation also starts the period of\\nlimitations. See LaSalle National Bank v. Skidmore, Owings &\\nMerrill, 262 Ill. App. 3d 899, 902–04 (1994). Yet for more than\\n30 years, during which he complained to federal and state\\nprosecutors, Vartanian did not commence civil litigation\\nagainst Martin, Greenhill, or Amphib.\\n His current arguments have less to do with the discovery\\nrule than with the doctrine of equitable estoppel (which Illi-\\nnois calls fraudulent concealment)—the rule that a wrong-\\ndoer who actively tries to prevent suit cannot invoke the\\nstatute of limitations when suit finally comes. Playing games\\nwith serial numbers, and failing to admit wrongdoing, come\\nwithin that doctrine, Vartanian asserts. Yet Vartanian knew\\n\\f8 No. 17-3526\\n\\nlong ago what serial number Martin was using; he was not\\nthrown off the scent. Illinois starts the period of limitations\\nno later than actual discovery, even if the potential defend-\\nant tried unsuccessfully to conceal the offense. See 735 ILCS\\n5/13-215. And Illinois does not defer the limitations period\\nuntil an admission of wrongdoing. See Kheirkhahvash v. Ban-\\niassadi, 407 Ill. App. 3d 171, 182 (2011). That would effective-\\nly abolish all statutes of limitations, for wrongdoers rarely\\nown up to their transgressions.\\n It does not help Vartanian to characterize the events as a\\ncontinuing violation. The disappearance of his Mustang was\\na discrete event, and the fact that discrete wrongs have con-\\ntinuing consequences does not extend the time to sue. See,\\ne.g., National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,\\n110–15 (2002); Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 654–55 (7th\\nCir. 2013) (concurring opinion); Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota\\nMotor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 348–49 (2002). The\\nstatute of limitations expired long ago, just as the district\\ncourt concluded.\\n That does not mamer, Vartanian asserts, because even if\\nhe cannot pursue a conversion claim against Greenhill, Am-\\nphib cannot obtain any relief against him without proving\\nthat Martin is not a thief. Illinois would not apply a statute of\\nlimitations to a defense against a quiet-title action, Vartanian\\ninsists. We know from the district court’s corrected judg-\\nment that this is not a quiet-title action (the court did not\\naward Greenhill or Amphib rights against the world).\\nWhat’s more, having lost his conversion claim, Vartanian\\nlacks any way to show that his rights are superior to Am-\\nphib’s, the only mamer resolved by the judgment the district\\ncourt entered on remand.\\n\\fNo. 17-3526 9\\n\\n Still more: Even if Illinois would not apply a statute of\\nlimitations, the doctrine of laches would remain. Between\\n1985 and the beginning of this suit Waterman Brown died,\\nand the parties’ inability to obtain his evidence would cause\\nprejudice that is amributable to Vartanian’s long delay. Four\\nother potential witnesses died in the decades between 1985\\nand the filing of Vartanian’s counterclaim; they might have\\naddressed topics such as whether Vartanian abandoned the\\nplane between 1965 and 1985. All of the principals (Var-\\ntanian, Greenhill, and Martin) are in their 80s and experienc-\\ning difficulty remembering events of decades ago. Important\\nbusiness records from the 1960s through the 1990s cannot be\\nlocated. It is too late for the judicial system to make a reliable\\ndecision about what happened to Vartanian’s plane (or parts\\nof it) and which components of Greenhill’s plane might be\\ntraced to the Mustang that the Royal Canadian Air Force\\nsold as surplus in 1960.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4375403/\", \"author_raw\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":""},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4598150/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Charles GREENHILL and Amphib, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Richard M. VARTANIAN and Platinum Fighter Sales, Inc., Defendants-Appellants.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 17-3526\nCHARLES GREENHILL and AMPHIB, INC.,\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\n\n v.\n\nRICHARD M. VARTANIAN and PLATINUM FIGHTER SALES, INC.,\n Defendants-Appellants.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 15-cv-09585 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 4, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 8, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE,\nCircuit Judges.\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Hermann Göring, head of the\nLuftwaffe in World War II, remarked: “When I saw those\nMustangs over Berlin, I knew that the war was lost.” The P-\n51 Mustang fighter entered service in January 1942, and\nlong-range variants introduced late in 1943 could escort Al-\nlied bombers to Germany and back. (With external fuel\ntanks, they had a range exceeding 1,600 miles.) More than\n\f2 No. 17-3526\n\n15,500 Mustangs were built; the plane served as this nation’s\nmain fighter until jets succeeded it during the Korean War.\nSome Mustangs remained in military use in other nations\nuntil 1984. The picture below shows one of the long-range\nversions. Surviving aircraft are collector’s items, “warbirds”\nlovingly rebuilt and maintained by private aficionados, dis-\nplayed in museums, and occasionally flown at air shows.\nOne is in the collection of the Smithsonian’s National Air\nand Space Museum. The Federal Aviation Administration\nhas more than 100 airworthy Mustangs on its register today.\nThis suit is about one of them—or perhaps two of them.\n\fNo. 17-3526 3\n\n\n\n\n In 1965 Richard Vartanian bought a Mustang that had\nflown in the Royal Canadian Air Force but had been in pri-\nvate hands since 1960. Its serial number was 44-74543. He\nstored it at a car dealership until 1973 or 1974, when he\nmoved it to a hangar at Fulton County Airport in New York.\nIn 1985 Vartanian decided to move the plane to California,\nbut his representative could not find it. Vartanian suspected\nWilbur Martin, who had promised to restore the plane on\nVartanian’s behalf. In April 1985 Vartanian’s lawyer de-\n\f4 No. 17-3526\n\nmanded that Martin return the plane and, when that did not\noccur, Vartanian personally complained to the FAA, the FBI,\nand law-enforcement agencies in Los Angeles, Chicago, and\nNew York that the plane may have been stolen.\n Martin denied taking Vartanian’s plane but conceded\nbuying some Mustang parts from Waterman Brown, one of\nVartanian’s associates. Martin later registered with the FAA\n(which administers the federal system of aircraft ownership)\na Mustang having serial number 44-63655. Martin asserts\nthat it had been cobbled together using parts from a plane of\nhis that had crashed in Nicaragua plus components that he\nhad acquired from several sources, including Brown.\n In 1998 Martin sold the plane bearing SN 44-63655 to\nAmphib, Inc., a corporation controlled by Charles Greenhill.\nVartanian learned about this transaction in 2002 or 2003 by\nreading an article in Air Classics magazine that incorrectly\nidentified the serial number of Greenhill’s plane as 44-74543\n(which, recall, had been amached to Vartanian’s plane) and\nspecified its provenance as one that the Royal Canadian Air\nForce had sold as military surplus. In 2004 Vartanian hired\nanother lawyer to investigate. He obtained the FAA’s file on\nthe plane, which showed the sale to Greenhill in 1998, and\nprepared the complaint for a tort action against Martin and\nGreenhill. But this lawyer died before filing the suit, and\nVartanian did not follow up.\n In 2009 Vartanian wrote a lemer to the United States\nAmorney for the Northern District of Illinois contending that\nhis Mustang had been stolen by Martin in 1984 and that\nMartin used the serial number of the plane destroyed in Nic-\naragua to conceal his crime. The United States Amorney de-\nclined to prosecute but urged Vartanian to retain counsel to\n\fNo. 17-3526 5\n\npursue civil relief. Vartanian did nothing further until after\nlearning from a historian in 2013 that there were irregulari-\nties in the serial numbers of several of Martin’s planes. In\nFebruary 2014 Vartanian sent Greenhill a lemer demanding\nthat he turn over the plane purchased from Martin. Greenhill\nresponded in 2015 with this suit under the diversity jurisdic-\ntion, seeking a declaratory judgment that he owns the plane.\nVartanian and his corporation Platinum Fighter Sales filed\ncounterclaims seeking that relief for themselves, because a\nthief cannot convey good title, plus an order that Greenhill\nor Amphib hand the plane over to them. But the district\njudge concluded that the time to accuse Martin of theft had\nexpired long ago. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186706 (N.D. Ill. Nov.\n13, 2017).\n Although the judge’s opinion states that plaintiffs are en-\ntitled to a declaratory judgment, the court did not enter one.\nInstead it entered this decision on the form used for judg-\nments under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58:\n Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant\n on Plaintiffs’ complaint for declaratory relief [1], and on Defend-\n ants’ counterclaims for conversion and declaratory relief [14].\n\nA document providing that “[j]udgment is entered” does not\nsatisfy Rule 58. A judgment must provide the relief to which\nthe prevailing party is entitled. See, e.g., Hyland v. Liberty\nMutual Fire Insurance Co., 885 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2018); Cooke\nv. Jackson National Life Insurance Co., 882 F.3d 630 (7th Cir.\n2018); ReytblaD v. Denton, 812 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir. 1987); Azeez\nv. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296 (7th Cir. 1986). This document does\nnot do that. It shows that the district court is done with the\ncase, which permits an appeal, but it does not resolve the\nparties’ dispute. The judgment also does not show that it\n\f6 No. 17-3526\n\nwas reviewed and approved by the judge, although Rule\n58(b)(2) provides that the judge, not a clerk, must approve\ndecisions of this kind.\n The district judge failed to resolve two subjects on which\nthe parties’ appellate briefs disagree. First, who receives the\nrelief? The judgment refers to “Plaintiff”, but there are two\nplaintiffs. The corporate plaintiff (Amphib) is the registered\nowner of the airplane, but some of the district court’s opin-\nion suggests that relief is being awarded to Greenhill. Sec-\nond, although plaintiffs’ initial complaint sought a declara-\ntory judgment that they own the airplane against the world\n(a standard outcome of a quiet-title action), at oral argument\non appeal they recognized that this suit concerns personal\nproperty rather than real estate and disclaimed entitlement\nto relief broader than a declaration that their rights are supe-\nrior to Vartanian’s. Neither the district court’s opinion nor its\njudgment distinguishes these possibilities.\n These shortcomings led us to remand the case with in-\nstructions to enter a proper declaratory judgment. The dis-\ntrict court promptly complied. The revised judgment pro-\nvides that Amphib owns the aircraft free of any claim by\nVartanian. It does not insulate Amphib from other persons’\npotential claims or bestow any ownership rights on Green-\nhill. This eliminates two of the parties’ appellate controver-\nsies but still requires us to address Vartanian’s contention\nthat the district court should have decided whether Martin\nstole the plane in or before 1984.\n Although federal law provides a registration system for\naircraft, state law supplies the rules for determining owner-\nship. See 49 U.S.C. §44108(c)(1); Shacket v. Philko Aviation,\nInc., 841 F.2d 166, 169 (7th Cir. 1988). The district court ap-\n\fNo. 17-3526 7\n\nplied Illinois law, and neither side has asked us to use the\nlaw of some other state. The district court classified Var-\ntanian’s claim as one for conversion, which is subject to a\nfive-year period of limitations under 735 ILCS 5/13-205. Ob-\nserving that Vartanian accused Martin of theft in 1985 and\n2009, and was on the verge of suing in 2004, the judge con-\ncluded that the five-year period had long expired, which\nblocked Vartanian from contending that Amphib’s title to\nthe plane is derived from any theft by Martin.\n Vartanian’s appellate position incorporates elements of\nthe discovery doctrine with elements of equitable estoppel.\nThe discovery rule in Illinois provides that a period of limi-\ntations starts to run when the injured party “knows or rea-\nsonably should know” of the injury and its cause. Knox Col-\nlege v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 414–16 (1981). Vartanian\nknew in 1985 that his Mustang had vanished; he suspected\nMartin from the outset and had plenty of time to investigate.\nIndeed, he did investigate, and in Illinois having enough in-\nformation to start an investigation also starts the period of\nlimitations. See LaSalle National Bank v. Skidmore, Owings &\nMerrill, 262 Ill. App. 3d 899, 902–04 (1994). Yet for more than\n30 years, during which he complained to federal and state\nprosecutors, Vartanian did not commence civil litigation\nagainst Martin, Greenhill, or Amphib.\n His current arguments have less to do with the discovery\nrule than with the doctrine of equitable estoppel (which Illi-\nnois calls fraudulent concealment)—the rule that a wrong-\ndoer who actively tries to prevent suit cannot invoke the\nstatute of limitations when suit finally comes. Playing games\nwith serial numbers, and failing to admit wrongdoing, come\nwithin that doctrine, Vartanian asserts. Yet Vartanian knew\n\f8 No. 17-3526\n\nlong ago what serial number Martin was using; he was not\nthrown off the scent. Illinois starts the period of limitations\nno later than actual discovery, even if the potential defend-\nant tried unsuccessfully to conceal the offense. See 735 ILCS\n5/13-215. And Illinois does not defer the limitations period\nuntil an admission of wrongdoing. See Kheirkhahvash v. Ban-\niassadi, 407 Ill. App. 3d 171, 182 (2011). That would effective-\nly abolish all statutes of limitations, for wrongdoers rarely\nown up to their transgressions.\n It does not help Vartanian to characterize the events as a\ncontinuing violation. The disappearance of his Mustang was\na discrete event, and the fact that discrete wrongs have con-\ntinuing consequences does not extend the time to sue. See,\ne.g., National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,\n110–15 (2002); Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 654–55 (7th\nCir. 2013) (concurring opinion); Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota\nMotor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 348–49 (2002). The\nstatute of limitations expired long ago, just as the district\ncourt concluded.\n That does not mamer, Vartanian asserts, because even if\nhe cannot pursue a conversion claim against Greenhill, Am-\nphib cannot obtain any relief against him without proving\nthat Martin is not a thief. Illinois would not apply a statute of\nlimitations to a defense against a quiet-title action, Vartanian\ninsists. We know from the district court’s corrected judg-\nment that this is not a quiet-title action (the court did not\naward Greenhill or Amphib rights against the world).\nWhat’s more, having lost his conversion claim, Vartanian\nlacks any way to show that his rights are superior to Am-\nphib’s, the only mamer resolved by the judgment the district\ncourt entered on remand.\n\fNo. 17-3526 9\n\n Still more: Even if Illinois would not apply a statute of\nlimitations, the doctrine of laches would remain. Between\n1985 and the beginning of this suit Waterman Brown died,\nand the parties’ inability to obtain his evidence would cause\nprejudice that is amributable to Vartanian’s long delay. Four\nother potential witnesses died in the decades between 1985\nand the filing of Vartanian’s counterclaim; they might have\naddressed topics such as whether Vartanian abandoned the\nplane between 1965 and 1985. All of the principals (Var-\ntanian, Greenhill, and Martin) are in their 80s and experienc-\ning difficulty remembering events of decades ago. Important\nbusiness records from the 1960s through the 1990s cannot be\nlocated. It is too late for the judicial system to make a reliable\ndecision about what happened to Vartanian’s plane (or parts\nof it) and which components of Greenhill’s plane might be\ntraced to the Mustang that the Royal Canadian Air Force\nsold as surplus in 1960.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Charles GREENHILL and Amphib, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Richard M. VARTANIAN and Platinum Fighter Sales, Inc., Defendants-Appellants.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 17-3526\\nCHARLES GREENHILL and AMPHIB, INC.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nRICHARD M. VARTANIAN and PLATINUM FIGHTER SALES, INC.,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15-cv-09585 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 4, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 8, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Hermann Göring, head of the\\nLuftwaffe in World War II, remarked: “When I saw those\\nMustangs over Berlin, I knew that the war was lost.” The P-\\n51 Mustang fighter entered service in January 1942, and\\nlong-range variants introduced late in 1943 could escort Al-\\nlied bombers to Germany and back. (With external fuel\\ntanks, they had a range exceeding 1,600 miles.) More than\\n\\f2 No. 17-3526\\n\\n15,500 Mustangs were built; the plane served as this nation’s\\nmain fighter until jets succeeded it during the Korean War.\\nSome Mustangs remained in military use in other nations\\nuntil 1984. The picture below shows one of the long-range\\nversions. Surviving aircraft are collector’s items, “warbirds”\\nlovingly rebuilt and maintained by private aficionados, dis-\\nplayed in museums, and occasionally flown at air shows.\\nOne is in the collection of the Smithsonian’s National Air\\nand Space Museum. The Federal Aviation Administration\\nhas more than 100 airworthy Mustangs on its register today.\\nThis suit is about one of them—or perhaps two of them.\\n\\fNo. 17-3526 3\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n In 1965 Richard Vartanian bought a Mustang that had\\nflown in the Royal Canadian Air Force but had been in pri-\\nvate hands since 1960. Its serial number was 44-74543. He\\nstored it at a car dealership until 1973 or 1974, when he\\nmoved it to a hangar at Fulton County Airport in New York.\\nIn 1985 Vartanian decided to move the plane to California,\\nbut his representative could not find it. Vartanian suspected\\nWilbur Martin, who had promised to restore the plane on\\nVartanian’s behalf. In April 1985 Vartanian’s lawyer de-\\n\\f4 No. 17-3526\\n\\nmanded that Martin return the plane and, when that did not\\noccur, Vartanian personally complained to the FAA, the FBI,\\nand law-enforcement agencies in Los Angeles, Chicago, and\\nNew York that the plane may have been stolen.\\n Martin denied taking Vartanian’s plane but conceded\\nbuying some Mustang parts from Waterman Brown, one of\\nVartanian’s associates. Martin later registered with the FAA\\n(which administers the federal system of aircraft ownership)\\na Mustang having serial number 44-63655. Martin asserts\\nthat it had been cobbled together using parts from a plane of\\nhis that had crashed in Nicaragua plus components that he\\nhad acquired from several sources, including Brown.\\n In 1998 Martin sold the plane bearing SN 44-63655 to\\nAmphib, Inc., a corporation controlled by Charles Greenhill.\\nVartanian learned about this transaction in 2002 or 2003 by\\nreading an article in Air Classics magazine that incorrectly\\nidentified the serial number of Greenhill’s plane as 44-74543\\n(which, recall, had been amached to Vartanian’s plane) and\\nspecified its provenance as one that the Royal Canadian Air\\nForce had sold as military surplus. In 2004 Vartanian hired\\nanother lawyer to investigate. He obtained the FAA’s file on\\nthe plane, which showed the sale to Greenhill in 1998, and\\nprepared the complaint for a tort action against Martin and\\nGreenhill. But this lawyer died before filing the suit, and\\nVartanian did not follow up.\\n In 2009 Vartanian wrote a lemer to the United States\\nAmorney for the Northern District of Illinois contending that\\nhis Mustang had been stolen by Martin in 1984 and that\\nMartin used the serial number of the plane destroyed in Nic-\\naragua to conceal his crime. The United States Amorney de-\\nclined to prosecute but urged Vartanian to retain counsel to\\n\\fNo. 17-3526 5\\n\\npursue civil relief. Vartanian did nothing further until after\\nlearning from a historian in 2013 that there were irregulari-\\nties in the serial numbers of several of Martin’s planes. In\\nFebruary 2014 Vartanian sent Greenhill a lemer demanding\\nthat he turn over the plane purchased from Martin. Greenhill\\nresponded in 2015 with this suit under the diversity jurisdic-\\ntion, seeking a declaratory judgment that he owns the plane.\\nVartanian and his corporation Platinum Fighter Sales filed\\ncounterclaims seeking that relief for themselves, because a\\nthief cannot convey good title, plus an order that Greenhill\\nor Amphib hand the plane over to them. But the district\\njudge concluded that the time to accuse Martin of theft had\\nexpired long ago. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186706 (N.D. Ill. Nov.\\n13, 2017).\\n Although the judge’s opinion states that plaintiffs are en-\\ntitled to a declaratory judgment, the court did not enter one.\\nInstead it entered this decision on the form used for judg-\\nments under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58:\\n Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant\\n on Plaintiffs’ complaint for declaratory relief [1], and on Defend-\\n ants’ counterclaims for conversion and declaratory relief [14].\\n\\nA document providing that “[j]udgment is entered” does not\\nsatisfy Rule 58. A judgment must provide the relief to which\\nthe prevailing party is entitled. See, e.g., Hyland v. Liberty\\nMutual Fire Insurance Co., 885 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2018); Cooke\\nv. Jackson National Life Insurance Co., 882 F.3d 630 (7th Cir.\\n2018); ReytblaD v. Denton, 812 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir. 1987); Azeez\\nv. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296 (7th Cir. 1986). This document does\\nnot do that. It shows that the district court is done with the\\ncase, which permits an appeal, but it does not resolve the\\nparties’ dispute. The judgment also does not show that it\\n\\f6 No. 17-3526\\n\\nwas reviewed and approved by the judge, although Rule\\n58(b)(2) provides that the judge, not a clerk, must approve\\ndecisions of this kind.\\n The district judge failed to resolve two subjects on which\\nthe parties’ appellate briefs disagree. First, who receives the\\nrelief? The judgment refers to “Plaintiff”, but there are two\\nplaintiffs. The corporate plaintiff (Amphib) is the registered\\nowner of the airplane, but some of the district court’s opin-\\nion suggests that relief is being awarded to Greenhill. Sec-\\nond, although plaintiffs’ initial complaint sought a declara-\\ntory judgment that they own the airplane against the world\\n(a standard outcome of a quiet-title action), at oral argument\\non appeal they recognized that this suit concerns personal\\nproperty rather than real estate and disclaimed entitlement\\nto relief broader than a declaration that their rights are supe-\\nrior to Vartanian’s. Neither the district court’s opinion nor its\\njudgment distinguishes these possibilities.\\n These shortcomings led us to remand the case with in-\\nstructions to enter a proper declaratory judgment. The dis-\\ntrict court promptly complied. The revised judgment pro-\\nvides that Amphib owns the aircraft free of any claim by\\nVartanian. It does not insulate Amphib from other persons’\\npotential claims or bestow any ownership rights on Green-\\nhill. This eliminates two of the parties’ appellate controver-\\nsies but still requires us to address Vartanian’s contention\\nthat the district court should have decided whether Martin\\nstole the plane in or before 1984.\\n Although federal law provides a registration system for\\naircraft, state law supplies the rules for determining owner-\\nship. See 49 U.S.C. §44108(c)(1); Shacket v. Philko Aviation,\\nInc., 841 F.2d 166, 169 (7th Cir. 1988). The district court ap-\\n\\fNo. 17-3526 7\\n\\nplied Illinois law, and neither side has asked us to use the\\nlaw of some other state. The district court classified Var-\\ntanian’s claim as one for conversion, which is subject to a\\nfive-year period of limitations under 735 ILCS 5/13-205. Ob-\\nserving that Vartanian accused Martin of theft in 1985 and\\n2009, and was on the verge of suing in 2004, the judge con-\\ncluded that the five-year period had long expired, which\\nblocked Vartanian from contending that Amphib’s title to\\nthe plane is derived from any theft by Martin.\\n Vartanian’s appellate position incorporates elements of\\nthe discovery doctrine with elements of equitable estoppel.\\nThe discovery rule in Illinois provides that a period of limi-\\ntations starts to run when the injured party “knows or rea-\\nsonably should know” of the injury and its cause. Knox Col-\\nlege v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 414–16 (1981). Vartanian\\nknew in 1985 that his Mustang had vanished; he suspected\\nMartin from the outset and had plenty of time to investigate.\\nIndeed, he did investigate, and in Illinois having enough in-\\nformation to start an investigation also starts the period of\\nlimitations. See LaSalle National Bank v. Skidmore, Owings &\\nMerrill, 262 Ill. App. 3d 899, 902–04 (1994). Yet for more than\\n30 years, during which he complained to federal and state\\nprosecutors, Vartanian did not commence civil litigation\\nagainst Martin, Greenhill, or Amphib.\\n His current arguments have less to do with the discovery\\nrule than with the doctrine of equitable estoppel (which Illi-\\nnois calls fraudulent concealment)—the rule that a wrong-\\ndoer who actively tries to prevent suit cannot invoke the\\nstatute of limitations when suit finally comes. Playing games\\nwith serial numbers, and failing to admit wrongdoing, come\\nwithin that doctrine, Vartanian asserts. Yet Vartanian knew\\n\\f8 No. 17-3526\\n\\nlong ago what serial number Martin was using; he was not\\nthrown off the scent. Illinois starts the period of limitations\\nno later than actual discovery, even if the potential defend-\\nant tried unsuccessfully to conceal the offense. See 735 ILCS\\n5/13-215. And Illinois does not defer the limitations period\\nuntil an admission of wrongdoing. See Kheirkhahvash v. Ban-\\niassadi, 407 Ill. App. 3d 171, 182 (2011). That would effective-\\nly abolish all statutes of limitations, for wrongdoers rarely\\nown up to their transgressions.\\n It does not help Vartanian to characterize the events as a\\ncontinuing violation. The disappearance of his Mustang was\\na discrete event, and the fact that discrete wrongs have con-\\ntinuing consequences does not extend the time to sue. See,\\ne.g., National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,\\n110–15 (2002); Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 654–55 (7th\\nCir. 2013) (concurring opinion); Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota\\nMotor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 348–49 (2002). The\\nstatute of limitations expired long ago, just as the district\\ncourt concluded.\\n That does not mamer, Vartanian asserts, because even if\\nhe cannot pursue a conversion claim against Greenhill, Am-\\nphib cannot obtain any relief against him without proving\\nthat Martin is not a thief. Illinois would not apply a statute of\\nlimitations to a defense against a quiet-title action, Vartanian\\ninsists. We know from the district court’s corrected judg-\\nment that this is not a quiet-title action (the court did not\\naward Greenhill or Amphib rights against the world).\\nWhat’s more, having lost his conversion claim, Vartanian\\nlacks any way to show that his rights are superior to Am-\\nphib’s, the only mamer resolved by the judgment the district\\ncourt entered on remand.\\n\\fNo. 17-3526 9\\n\\n Still more: Even if Illinois would not apply a statute of\\nlimitations, the doctrine of laches would remain. Between\\n1985 and the beginning of this suit Waterman Brown died,\\nand the parties’ inability to obtain his evidence would cause\\nprejudice that is amributable to Vartanian’s long delay. Four\\nother potential witnesses died in the decades between 1985\\nand the filing of Vartanian’s counterclaim; they might have\\naddressed topics such as whether Vartanian abandoned the\\nplane between 1965 and 1985. All of the principals (Var-\\ntanian, Greenhill, and Martin) are in their 80s and experienc-\\ning difficulty remembering events of decades ago. Important\\nbusiness records from the 1960s through the 1990s cannot be\\nlocated. It is too late for the judicial system to make a reliable\\ndecision about what happened to Vartanian’s plane (or parts\\nof it) and which components of Greenhill’s plane might be\\ntraced to the Mustang that the Royal Canadian Air Force\\nsold as surplus in 1960.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1183,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4598239,"string":"4,598,239"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Charles Greenhill v. Richard Vartanian"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3526"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 17-3526\\nCHARLES GREENHILL and AMPHIB, INC.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nRICHARD M. VARTANIAN and PLATINUM FIGHTER SALES, INC.,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15-cv-09585 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 4, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 8, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Hermann Göring, head of the\\nLuftwaffe in World War II, remarked: “When I saw those\\nMustangs over Berlin, I knew that the war was lost.” The P-\\n51 Mustang fighter entered service in January 1942, and\\nlong-range variants introduced late in 1943 could escort Al-\\nlied bombers to Germany and back. (With external fuel\\ntanks, they had a range exceeding 1,600 miles.) More than\\n\\f2 No. 17-3526\\n\\n15,500 Mustangs were built; the plane served as this nation’s\\nmain fighter until jets succeeded it during the Korean War.\\nSome Mustangs remained in military use in other nations\\nuntil 1984. The picture below shows one of the long-range\\nversions. Surviving aircraft are collector’s items, “warbirds”\\nlovingly rebuilt and maintained by private aficionados, dis-\\nplayed in museums, and occasionally flown at air shows.\\nOne is in the collection of the Smithsonian’s National Air\\nand Space Museum. The Federal Aviation Administration\\nhas more than 100 airworthy Mustangs on its register today.\\nThis suit is about one of them—or perhaps two of them.\\n\\fNo. 17-3526 3\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n In 1965 Richard Vartanian bought a Mustang that had\\nflown in the Royal Canadian Air Force but had been in pri-\\nvate hands since 1960. Its serial number was 44-74543. He\\nstored it at a car dealership until 1973 or 1974, when he\\nmoved it to a hangar at Fulton County Airport in New York.\\nIn 1985 Vartanian decided to move the plane to California,\\nbut his representative could not find it. Vartanian suspected\\nWilbur Martin, who had promised to restore the plane on\\nVartanian’s behalf. In April 1985 Vartanian’s lawyer de-\\n\\f4 No. 17-3526\\n\\nmanded that Martin return the plane and, when that did not\\noccur, Vartanian personally complained to the FAA, the FBI,\\nand law-enforcement agencies in Los Angeles, Chicago, and\\nNew York that the plane may have been stolen.\\n Martin denied taking Vartanian’s plane but conceded\\nbuying some Mustang parts from Waterman Brown, one of\\nVartanian’s associates. Martin later registered with the FAA\\n(which administers the federal system of aircraft ownership)\\na Mustang having serial number 44-63655. Martin asserts\\nthat it had been cobbled together using parts from a plane of\\nhis that had crashed in Nicaragua plus components that he\\nhad acquired from several sources, including Brown.\\n In 1998 Martin sold the plane bearing SN 44-63655 to\\nAmphib, Inc., a corporation controlled by Charles Greenhill.\\nVartanian learned about this transaction in 2002 or 2003 by\\nreading an article in Air Classics magazine that incorrectly\\nidentified the serial number of Greenhill’s plane as 44-74543\\n(which, recall, had been amached to Vartanian’s plane) and\\nspecified its provenance as one that the Royal Canadian Air\\nForce had sold as military surplus. In 2004 Vartanian hired\\nanother lawyer to investigate. He obtained the FAA’s file on\\nthe plane, which showed the sale to Greenhill in 1998, and\\nprepared the complaint for a tort action against Martin and\\nGreenhill. But this lawyer died before filing the suit, and\\nVartanian did not follow up.\\n In 2009 Vartanian wrote a lemer to the United States\\nAmorney for the Northern District of Illinois contending that\\nhis Mustang had been stolen by Martin in 1984 and that\\nMartin used the serial number of the plane destroyed in Nic-\\naragua to conceal his crime. The United States Amorney de-\\nclined to prosecute but urged Vartanian to retain counsel to\\n\\fNo. 17-3526 5\\n\\npursue civil relief. Vartanian did nothing further until after\\nlearning from a historian in 2013 that there were irregulari-\\nties in the serial numbers of several of Martin’s planes. In\\nFebruary 2014 Vartanian sent Greenhill a lemer demanding\\nthat he turn over the plane purchased from Martin. Greenhill\\nresponded in 2015 with this suit under the diversity jurisdic-\\ntion, seeking a declaratory judgment that he owns the plane.\\nVartanian and his corporation Platinum Fighter Sales filed\\ncounterclaims seeking that relief for themselves, because a\\nthief cannot convey good title, plus an order that Greenhill\\nor Amphib hand the plane over to them. But the district\\njudge concluded that the time to accuse Martin of theft had\\nexpired long ago. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186706 (N.D. Ill. Nov.\\n13, 2017).\\n Although the judge’s opinion states that plaintiffs are en-\\ntitled to a declaratory judgment, the court did not enter one.\\nInstead it entered this decision on the form used for judg-\\nments under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58:\\n Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant\\n on Plaintiffs’ complaint for declaratory relief [1], and on Defend-\\n ants’ counterclaims for conversion and declaratory relief [14].\\n\\nA document providing that “[j]udgment is entered” does not\\nsatisfy Rule 58. A judgment must provide the relief to which\\nthe prevailing party is entitled. See, e.g., Hyland v. Liberty\\nMutual Fire Insurance Co., 885 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2018); Cooke\\nv. Jackson National Life Insurance Co., 882 F.3d 630 (7th Cir.\\n2018); ReytblaD v. Denton, 812 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir. 1987); Azeez\\nv. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296 (7th Cir. 1986). This document does\\nnot do that. It shows that the district court is done with the\\ncase, which permits an appeal, but it does not resolve the\\nparties’ dispute. The judgment also does not show that it\\n\\f6 No. 17-3526\\n\\nwas reviewed and approved by the judge, although Rule\\n58(b)(2) provides that the judge, not a clerk, must approve\\ndecisions of this kind.\\n The district judge failed to resolve two subjects on which\\nthe parties’ appellate briefs disagree. First, who receives the\\nrelief? The judgment refers to “Plaintiff”, but there are two\\nplaintiffs. The corporate plaintiff (Amphib) is the registered\\nowner of the airplane, but some of the district court’s opin-\\nion suggests that relief is being awarded to Greenhill. Sec-\\nond, although plaintiffs’ initial complaint sought a declara-\\ntory judgment that they own the airplane against the world\\n(a standard outcome of a quiet-title action), at oral argument\\non appeal they recognized that this suit concerns personal\\nproperty rather than real estate and disclaimed entitlement\\nto relief broader than a declaration that their rights are supe-\\nrior to Vartanian’s. Neither the district court’s opinion nor its\\njudgment distinguishes these possibilities.\\n These shortcomings led us to remand the case with in-\\nstructions to enter a proper declaratory judgment. The dis-\\ntrict court promptly complied. The revised judgment pro-\\nvides that Amphib owns the aircraft free of any claim by\\nVartanian. It does not insulate Amphib from other persons’\\npotential claims or bestow any ownership rights on Green-\\nhill. This eliminates two of the parties’ appellate controver-\\nsies but still requires us to address Vartanian’s contention\\nthat the district court should have decided whether Martin\\nstole the plane in or before 1984.\\n Although federal law provides a registration system for\\naircraft, state law supplies the rules for determining owner-\\nship. See 49 U.S.C. §44108(c)(1); Shacket v. Philko Aviation,\\nInc., 841 F.2d 166, 169 (7th Cir. 1988). The district court ap-\\n\\fNo. 17-3526 7\\n\\nplied Illinois law, and neither side has asked us to use the\\nlaw of some other state. The district court classified Var-\\ntanian’s claim as one for conversion, which is subject to a\\nfive-year period of limitations under 735 ILCS 5/13-205. Ob-\\nserving that Vartanian accused Martin of theft in 1985 and\\n2009, and was on the verge of suing in 2004, the judge con-\\ncluded that the five-year period had long expired, which\\nblocked Vartanian from contending that Amphib’s title to\\nthe plane is derived from any theft by Martin.\\n Vartanian’s appellate position incorporates elements of\\nthe discovery doctrine with elements of equitable estoppel.\\nThe discovery rule in Illinois provides that a period of limi-\\ntations starts to run when the injured party “knows or rea-\\nsonably should know” of the injury and its cause. Knox Col-\\nlege v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 414–16 (1981). Vartanian\\nknew in 1985 that his Mustang had vanished; he suspected\\nMartin from the outset and had plenty of time to investigate.\\nIndeed, he did investigate, and in Illinois having enough in-\\nformation to start an investigation also starts the period of\\nlimitations. See LaSalle National Bank v. Skidmore, Owings &\\nMerrill, 262 Ill. App. 3d 899, 902–04 (1994). Yet for more than\\n30 years, during which he complained to federal and state\\nprosecutors, Vartanian did not commence civil litigation\\nagainst Martin, Greenhill, or Amphib.\\n His current arguments have less to do with the discovery\\nrule than with the doctrine of equitable estoppel (which Illi-\\nnois calls fraudulent concealment)—the rule that a wrong-\\ndoer who actively tries to prevent suit cannot invoke the\\nstatute of limitations when suit finally comes. Playing games\\nwith serial numbers, and failing to admit wrongdoing, come\\nwithin that doctrine, Vartanian asserts. Yet Vartanian knew\\n\\f8 No. 17-3526\\n\\nlong ago what serial number Martin was using; he was not\\nthrown off the scent. Illinois starts the period of limitations\\nno later than actual discovery, even if the potential defend-\\nant tried unsuccessfully to conceal the offense. See 735 ILCS\\n5/13-215. And Illinois does not defer the limitations period\\nuntil an admission of wrongdoing. See Kheirkhahvash v. Ban-\\niassadi, 407 Ill. App. 3d 171, 182 (2011). That would effective-\\nly abolish all statutes of limitations, for wrongdoers rarely\\nown up to their transgressions.\\n It does not help Vartanian to characterize the events as a\\ncontinuing violation. The disappearance of his Mustang was\\na discrete event, and the fact that discrete wrongs have con-\\ntinuing consequences does not extend the time to sue. See,\\ne.g., National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,\\n110–15 (2002); Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 654–55 (7th\\nCir. 2013) (concurring opinion); Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota\\nMotor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 348–49 (2002). The\\nstatute of limitations expired long ago, just as the district\\ncourt concluded.\\n That does not mamer, Vartanian asserts, because even if\\nhe cannot pursue a conversion claim against Greenhill, Am-\\nphib cannot obtain any relief against him without proving\\nthat Martin is not a thief. Illinois would not apply a statute of\\nlimitations to a defense against a quiet-title action, Vartanian\\ninsists. We know from the district court’s corrected judg-\\nment that this is not a quiet-title action (the court did not\\naward Greenhill or Amphib rights against the world).\\nWhat’s more, having lost his conversion claim, Vartanian\\nlacks any way to show that his rights are superior to Am-\\nphib’s, the only mamer resolved by the judgment the district\\ncourt entered on remand.\\n\\fNo. 17-3526 9\\n\\n Still more: Even if Illinois would not apply a statute of\\nlimitations, the doctrine of laches would remain. Between\\n1985 and the beginning of this suit Waterman Brown died,\\nand the parties’ inability to obtain his evidence would cause\\nprejudice that is amributable to Vartanian’s long delay. Four\\nother potential witnesses died in the decades between 1985\\nand the filing of Vartanian’s counterclaim; they might have\\naddressed topics such as whether Vartanian abandoned the\\nplane between 1965 and 1985. All of the principals (Var-\\ntanian, Greenhill, and Martin) are in their 80s and experienc-\\ning difficulty remembering events of decades ago. Important\\nbusiness records from the 1960s through the 1990s cannot be\\nlocated. It is too late for the judicial system to make a reliable\\ndecision about what happened to Vartanian’s plane (or parts\\nof it) and which components of Greenhill’s plane might be\\ntraced to the Mustang that the Royal Canadian Air Force\\nsold as surplus in 1960.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4375492/\", \"author_raw\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4598239/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Charles Greenhill v. Richard Vartanian\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 17-3526\nCHARLES GREENHILL and AMPHIB, INC.,\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\n\n v.\n\nRICHARD M. VARTANIAN and PLATINUM FIGHTER SALES, INC.,\n Defendants-Appellants.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 15-cv-09585 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 4, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 8, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE,\nCircuit Judges.\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Hermann Göring, head of the\nLuftwaffe in World War II, remarked: “When I saw those\nMustangs over Berlin, I knew that the war was lost.” The P-\n51 Mustang fighter entered service in January 1942, and\nlong-range variants introduced late in 1943 could escort Al-\nlied bombers to Germany and back. (With external fuel\ntanks, they had a range exceeding 1,600 miles.) More than\n\f2 No. 17-3526\n\n15,500 Mustangs were built; the plane served as this nation’s\nmain fighter until jets succeeded it during the Korean War.\nSome Mustangs remained in military use in other nations\nuntil 1984. The picture below shows one of the long-range\nversions. Surviving aircraft are collector’s items, “warbirds”\nlovingly rebuilt and maintained by private aficionados, dis-\nplayed in museums, and occasionally flown at air shows.\nOne is in the collection of the Smithsonian’s National Air\nand Space Museum. The Federal Aviation Administration\nhas more than 100 airworthy Mustangs on its register today.\nThis suit is about one of them—or perhaps two of them.\n\fNo. 17-3526 3\n\n\n\n\n In 1965 Richard Vartanian bought a Mustang that had\nflown in the Royal Canadian Air Force but had been in pri-\nvate hands since 1960. Its serial number was 44-74543. He\nstored it at a car dealership until 1973 or 1974, when he\nmoved it to a hangar at Fulton County Airport in New York.\nIn 1985 Vartanian decided to move the plane to California,\nbut his representative could not find it. Vartanian suspected\nWilbur Martin, who had promised to restore the plane on\nVartanian’s behalf. In April 1985 Vartanian’s lawyer de-\n\f4 No. 17-3526\n\nmanded that Martin return the plane and, when that did not\noccur, Vartanian personally complained to the FAA, the FBI,\nand law-enforcement agencies in Los Angeles, Chicago, and\nNew York that the plane may have been stolen.\n Martin denied taking Vartanian’s plane but conceded\nbuying some Mustang parts from Waterman Brown, one of\nVartanian’s associates. Martin later registered with the FAA\n(which administers the federal system of aircraft ownership)\na Mustang having serial number 44-63655. Martin asserts\nthat it had been cobbled together using parts from a plane of\nhis that had crashed in Nicaragua plus components that he\nhad acquired from several sources, including Brown.\n In 1998 Martin sold the plane bearing SN 44-63655 to\nAmphib, Inc., a corporation controlled by Charles Greenhill.\nVartanian learned about this transaction in 2002 or 2003 by\nreading an article in Air Classics magazine that incorrectly\nidentified the serial number of Greenhill’s plane as 44-74543\n(which, recall, had been amached to Vartanian’s plane) and\nspecified its provenance as one that the Royal Canadian Air\nForce had sold as military surplus. In 2004 Vartanian hired\nanother lawyer to investigate. He obtained the FAA’s file on\nthe plane, which showed the sale to Greenhill in 1998, and\nprepared the complaint for a tort action against Martin and\nGreenhill. But this lawyer died before filing the suit, and\nVartanian did not follow up.\n In 2009 Vartanian wrote a lemer to the United States\nAmorney for the Northern District of Illinois contending that\nhis Mustang had been stolen by Martin in 1984 and that\nMartin used the serial number of the plane destroyed in Nic-\naragua to conceal his crime. The United States Amorney de-\nclined to prosecute but urged Vartanian to retain counsel to\n\fNo. 17-3526 5\n\npursue civil relief. Vartanian did nothing further until after\nlearning from a historian in 2013 that there were irregulari-\nties in the serial numbers of several of Martin’s planes. In\nFebruary 2014 Vartanian sent Greenhill a lemer demanding\nthat he turn over the plane purchased from Martin. Greenhill\nresponded in 2015 with this suit under the diversity jurisdic-\ntion, seeking a declaratory judgment that he owns the plane.\nVartanian and his corporation Platinum Fighter Sales filed\ncounterclaims seeking that relief for themselves, because a\nthief cannot convey good title, plus an order that Greenhill\nor Amphib hand the plane over to them. But the district\njudge concluded that the time to accuse Martin of theft had\nexpired long ago. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186706 (N.D. Ill. Nov.\n13, 2017).\n Although the judge’s opinion states that plaintiffs are en-\ntitled to a declaratory judgment, the court did not enter one.\nInstead it entered this decision on the form used for judg-\nments under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58:\n Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant\n on Plaintiffs’ complaint for declaratory relief [1], and on Defend-\n ants’ counterclaims for conversion and declaratory relief [14].\n\nA document providing that “[j]udgment is entered” does not\nsatisfy Rule 58. A judgment must provide the relief to which\nthe prevailing party is entitled. See, e.g., Hyland v. Liberty\nMutual Fire Insurance Co., 885 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2018); Cooke\nv. Jackson National Life Insurance Co., 882 F.3d 630 (7th Cir.\n2018); ReytblaD v. Denton, 812 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir. 1987); Azeez\nv. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296 (7th Cir. 1986). This document does\nnot do that. It shows that the district court is done with the\ncase, which permits an appeal, but it does not resolve the\nparties’ dispute. The judgment also does not show that it\n\f6 No. 17-3526\n\nwas reviewed and approved by the judge, although Rule\n58(b)(2) provides that the judge, not a clerk, must approve\ndecisions of this kind.\n The district judge failed to resolve two subjects on which\nthe parties’ appellate briefs disagree. First, who receives the\nrelief? The judgment refers to “Plaintiff”, but there are two\nplaintiffs. The corporate plaintiff (Amphib) is the registered\nowner of the airplane, but some of the district court’s opin-\nion suggests that relief is being awarded to Greenhill. Sec-\nond, although plaintiffs’ initial complaint sought a declara-\ntory judgment that they own the airplane against the world\n(a standard outcome of a quiet-title action), at oral argument\non appeal they recognized that this suit concerns personal\nproperty rather than real estate and disclaimed entitlement\nto relief broader than a declaration that their rights are supe-\nrior to Vartanian’s. Neither the district court’s opinion nor its\njudgment distinguishes these possibilities.\n These shortcomings led us to remand the case with in-\nstructions to enter a proper declaratory judgment. The dis-\ntrict court promptly complied. The revised judgment pro-\nvides that Amphib owns the aircraft free of any claim by\nVartanian. It does not insulate Amphib from other persons’\npotential claims or bestow any ownership rights on Green-\nhill. This eliminates two of the parties’ appellate controver-\nsies but still requires us to address Vartanian’s contention\nthat the district court should have decided whether Martin\nstole the plane in or before 1984.\n Although federal law provides a registration system for\naircraft, state law supplies the rules for determining owner-\nship. See 49 U.S.C. §44108(c)(1); Shacket v. Philko Aviation,\nInc., 841 F.2d 166, 169 (7th Cir. 1988). The district court ap-\n\fNo. 17-3526 7\n\nplied Illinois law, and neither side has asked us to use the\nlaw of some other state. The district court classified Var-\ntanian’s claim as one for conversion, which is subject to a\nfive-year period of limitations under 735 ILCS 5/13-205. Ob-\nserving that Vartanian accused Martin of theft in 1985 and\n2009, and was on the verge of suing in 2004, the judge con-\ncluded that the five-year period had long expired, which\nblocked Vartanian from contending that Amphib’s title to\nthe plane is derived from any theft by Martin.\n Vartanian’s appellate position incorporates elements of\nthe discovery doctrine with elements of equitable estoppel.\nThe discovery rule in Illinois provides that a period of limi-\ntations starts to run when the injured party “knows or rea-\nsonably should know” of the injury and its cause. Knox Col-\nlege v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 414–16 (1981). Vartanian\nknew in 1985 that his Mustang had vanished; he suspected\nMartin from the outset and had plenty of time to investigate.\nIndeed, he did investigate, and in Illinois having enough in-\nformation to start an investigation also starts the period of\nlimitations. See LaSalle National Bank v. Skidmore, Owings &\nMerrill, 262 Ill. App. 3d 899, 902–04 (1994). Yet for more than\n30 years, during which he complained to federal and state\nprosecutors, Vartanian did not commence civil litigation\nagainst Martin, Greenhill, or Amphib.\n His current arguments have less to do with the discovery\nrule than with the doctrine of equitable estoppel (which Illi-\nnois calls fraudulent concealment)—the rule that a wrong-\ndoer who actively tries to prevent suit cannot invoke the\nstatute of limitations when suit finally comes. Playing games\nwith serial numbers, and failing to admit wrongdoing, come\nwithin that doctrine, Vartanian asserts. Yet Vartanian knew\n\f8 No. 17-3526\n\nlong ago what serial number Martin was using; he was not\nthrown off the scent. Illinois starts the period of limitations\nno later than actual discovery, even if the potential defend-\nant tried unsuccessfully to conceal the offense. See 735 ILCS\n5/13-215. And Illinois does not defer the limitations period\nuntil an admission of wrongdoing. See Kheirkhahvash v. Ban-\niassadi, 407 Ill. App. 3d 171, 182 (2011). That would effective-\nly abolish all statutes of limitations, for wrongdoers rarely\nown up to their transgressions.\n It does not help Vartanian to characterize the events as a\ncontinuing violation. The disappearance of his Mustang was\na discrete event, and the fact that discrete wrongs have con-\ntinuing consequences does not extend the time to sue. See,\ne.g., National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,\n110–15 (2002); Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 654–55 (7th\nCir. 2013) (concurring opinion); Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota\nMotor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 348–49 (2002). The\nstatute of limitations expired long ago, just as the district\ncourt concluded.\n That does not mamer, Vartanian asserts, because even if\nhe cannot pursue a conversion claim against Greenhill, Am-\nphib cannot obtain any relief against him without proving\nthat Martin is not a thief. Illinois would not apply a statute of\nlimitations to a defense against a quiet-title action, Vartanian\ninsists. We know from the district court’s corrected judg-\nment that this is not a quiet-title action (the court did not\naward Greenhill or Amphib rights against the world).\nWhat’s more, having lost his conversion claim, Vartanian\nlacks any way to show that his rights are superior to Am-\nphib’s, the only mamer resolved by the judgment the district\ncourt entered on remand.\n\fNo. 17-3526 9\n\n Still more: Even if Illinois would not apply a statute of\nlimitations, the doctrine of laches would remain. Between\n1985 and the beginning of this suit Waterman Brown died,\nand the parties’ inability to obtain his evidence would cause\nprejudice that is amributable to Vartanian’s long delay. Four\nother potential witnesses died in the decades between 1985\nand the filing of Vartanian’s counterclaim; they might have\naddressed topics such as whether Vartanian abandoned the\nplane between 1965 and 1985. All of the principals (Var-\ntanian, Greenhill, and Martin) are in their 80s and experienc-\ning difficulty remembering events of decades ago. Important\nbusiness records from the 1960s through the 1990s cannot be\nlocated. It is too late for the judicial system to make a reliable\ndecision about what happened to Vartanian’s plane (or parts\nof it) and which components of Greenhill’s plane might be\ntraced to the Mustang that the Royal Canadian Air Force\nsold as surplus in 1960.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Charles Greenhill v. Richard Vartanian\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 17-3526\\nCHARLES GREENHILL and AMPHIB, INC.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nRICHARD M. VARTANIAN and PLATINUM FIGHTER SALES, INC.,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15-cv-09585 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 4, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 8, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Hermann Göring, head of the\\nLuftwaffe in World War II, remarked: “When I saw those\\nMustangs over Berlin, I knew that the war was lost.” The P-\\n51 Mustang fighter entered service in January 1942, and\\nlong-range variants introduced late in 1943 could escort Al-\\nlied bombers to Germany and back. (With external fuel\\ntanks, they had a range exceeding 1,600 miles.) More than\\n\\f2 No. 17-3526\\n\\n15,500 Mustangs were built; the plane served as this nation’s\\nmain fighter until jets succeeded it during the Korean War.\\nSome Mustangs remained in military use in other nations\\nuntil 1984. The picture below shows one of the long-range\\nversions. Surviving aircraft are collector’s items, “warbirds”\\nlovingly rebuilt and maintained by private aficionados, dis-\\nplayed in museums, and occasionally flown at air shows.\\nOne is in the collection of the Smithsonian’s National Air\\nand Space Museum. The Federal Aviation Administration\\nhas more than 100 airworthy Mustangs on its register today.\\nThis suit is about one of them—or perhaps two of them.\\n\\fNo. 17-3526 3\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n In 1965 Richard Vartanian bought a Mustang that had\\nflown in the Royal Canadian Air Force but had been in pri-\\nvate hands since 1960. Its serial number was 44-74543. He\\nstored it at a car dealership until 1973 or 1974, when he\\nmoved it to a hangar at Fulton County Airport in New York.\\nIn 1985 Vartanian decided to move the plane to California,\\nbut his representative could not find it. Vartanian suspected\\nWilbur Martin, who had promised to restore the plane on\\nVartanian’s behalf. In April 1985 Vartanian’s lawyer de-\\n\\f4 No. 17-3526\\n\\nmanded that Martin return the plane and, when that did not\\noccur, Vartanian personally complained to the FAA, the FBI,\\nand law-enforcement agencies in Los Angeles, Chicago, and\\nNew York that the plane may have been stolen.\\n Martin denied taking Vartanian’s plane but conceded\\nbuying some Mustang parts from Waterman Brown, one of\\nVartanian’s associates. Martin later registered with the FAA\\n(which administers the federal system of aircraft ownership)\\na Mustang having serial number 44-63655. Martin asserts\\nthat it had been cobbled together using parts from a plane of\\nhis that had crashed in Nicaragua plus components that he\\nhad acquired from several sources, including Brown.\\n In 1998 Martin sold the plane bearing SN 44-63655 to\\nAmphib, Inc., a corporation controlled by Charles Greenhill.\\nVartanian learned about this transaction in 2002 or 2003 by\\nreading an article in Air Classics magazine that incorrectly\\nidentified the serial number of Greenhill’s plane as 44-74543\\n(which, recall, had been amached to Vartanian’s plane) and\\nspecified its provenance as one that the Royal Canadian Air\\nForce had sold as military surplus. In 2004 Vartanian hired\\nanother lawyer to investigate. He obtained the FAA’s file on\\nthe plane, which showed the sale to Greenhill in 1998, and\\nprepared the complaint for a tort action against Martin and\\nGreenhill. But this lawyer died before filing the suit, and\\nVartanian did not follow up.\\n In 2009 Vartanian wrote a lemer to the United States\\nAmorney for the Northern District of Illinois contending that\\nhis Mustang had been stolen by Martin in 1984 and that\\nMartin used the serial number of the plane destroyed in Nic-\\naragua to conceal his crime. The United States Amorney de-\\nclined to prosecute but urged Vartanian to retain counsel to\\n\\fNo. 17-3526 5\\n\\npursue civil relief. Vartanian did nothing further until after\\nlearning from a historian in 2013 that there were irregulari-\\nties in the serial numbers of several of Martin’s planes. In\\nFebruary 2014 Vartanian sent Greenhill a lemer demanding\\nthat he turn over the plane purchased from Martin. Greenhill\\nresponded in 2015 with this suit under the diversity jurisdic-\\ntion, seeking a declaratory judgment that he owns the plane.\\nVartanian and his corporation Platinum Fighter Sales filed\\ncounterclaims seeking that relief for themselves, because a\\nthief cannot convey good title, plus an order that Greenhill\\nor Amphib hand the plane over to them. But the district\\njudge concluded that the time to accuse Martin of theft had\\nexpired long ago. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186706 (N.D. Ill. Nov.\\n13, 2017).\\n Although the judge’s opinion states that plaintiffs are en-\\ntitled to a declaratory judgment, the court did not enter one.\\nInstead it entered this decision on the form used for judg-\\nments under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58:\\n Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant\\n on Plaintiffs’ complaint for declaratory relief [1], and on Defend-\\n ants’ counterclaims for conversion and declaratory relief [14].\\n\\nA document providing that “[j]udgment is entered” does not\\nsatisfy Rule 58. A judgment must provide the relief to which\\nthe prevailing party is entitled. See, e.g., Hyland v. Liberty\\nMutual Fire Insurance Co., 885 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2018); Cooke\\nv. Jackson National Life Insurance Co., 882 F.3d 630 (7th Cir.\\n2018); ReytblaD v. Denton, 812 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir. 1987); Azeez\\nv. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296 (7th Cir. 1986). This document does\\nnot do that. It shows that the district court is done with the\\ncase, which permits an appeal, but it does not resolve the\\nparties’ dispute. The judgment also does not show that it\\n\\f6 No. 17-3526\\n\\nwas reviewed and approved by the judge, although Rule\\n58(b)(2) provides that the judge, not a clerk, must approve\\ndecisions of this kind.\\n The district judge failed to resolve two subjects on which\\nthe parties’ appellate briefs disagree. First, who receives the\\nrelief? The judgment refers to “Plaintiff”, but there are two\\nplaintiffs. The corporate plaintiff (Amphib) is the registered\\nowner of the airplane, but some of the district court’s opin-\\nion suggests that relief is being awarded to Greenhill. Sec-\\nond, although plaintiffs’ initial complaint sought a declara-\\ntory judgment that they own the airplane against the world\\n(a standard outcome of a quiet-title action), at oral argument\\non appeal they recognized that this suit concerns personal\\nproperty rather than real estate and disclaimed entitlement\\nto relief broader than a declaration that their rights are supe-\\nrior to Vartanian’s. Neither the district court’s opinion nor its\\njudgment distinguishes these possibilities.\\n These shortcomings led us to remand the case with in-\\nstructions to enter a proper declaratory judgment. The dis-\\ntrict court promptly complied. The revised judgment pro-\\nvides that Amphib owns the aircraft free of any claim by\\nVartanian. It does not insulate Amphib from other persons’\\npotential claims or bestow any ownership rights on Green-\\nhill. This eliminates two of the parties’ appellate controver-\\nsies but still requires us to address Vartanian’s contention\\nthat the district court should have decided whether Martin\\nstole the plane in or before 1984.\\n Although federal law provides a registration system for\\naircraft, state law supplies the rules for determining owner-\\nship. See 49 U.S.C. §44108(c)(1); Shacket v. Philko Aviation,\\nInc., 841 F.2d 166, 169 (7th Cir. 1988). The district court ap-\\n\\fNo. 17-3526 7\\n\\nplied Illinois law, and neither side has asked us to use the\\nlaw of some other state. The district court classified Var-\\ntanian’s claim as one for conversion, which is subject to a\\nfive-year period of limitations under 735 ILCS 5/13-205. Ob-\\nserving that Vartanian accused Martin of theft in 1985 and\\n2009, and was on the verge of suing in 2004, the judge con-\\ncluded that the five-year period had long expired, which\\nblocked Vartanian from contending that Amphib’s title to\\nthe plane is derived from any theft by Martin.\\n Vartanian’s appellate position incorporates elements of\\nthe discovery doctrine with elements of equitable estoppel.\\nThe discovery rule in Illinois provides that a period of limi-\\ntations starts to run when the injured party “knows or rea-\\nsonably should know” of the injury and its cause. Knox Col-\\nlege v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 414–16 (1981). Vartanian\\nknew in 1985 that his Mustang had vanished; he suspected\\nMartin from the outset and had plenty of time to investigate.\\nIndeed, he did investigate, and in Illinois having enough in-\\nformation to start an investigation also starts the period of\\nlimitations. See LaSalle National Bank v. Skidmore, Owings &\\nMerrill, 262 Ill. App. 3d 899, 902–04 (1994). Yet for more than\\n30 years, during which he complained to federal and state\\nprosecutors, Vartanian did not commence civil litigation\\nagainst Martin, Greenhill, or Amphib.\\n His current arguments have less to do with the discovery\\nrule than with the doctrine of equitable estoppel (which Illi-\\nnois calls fraudulent concealment)—the rule that a wrong-\\ndoer who actively tries to prevent suit cannot invoke the\\nstatute of limitations when suit finally comes. Playing games\\nwith serial numbers, and failing to admit wrongdoing, come\\nwithin that doctrine, Vartanian asserts. Yet Vartanian knew\\n\\f8 No. 17-3526\\n\\nlong ago what serial number Martin was using; he was not\\nthrown off the scent. Illinois starts the period of limitations\\nno later than actual discovery, even if the potential defend-\\nant tried unsuccessfully to conceal the offense. See 735 ILCS\\n5/13-215. And Illinois does not defer the limitations period\\nuntil an admission of wrongdoing. See Kheirkhahvash v. Ban-\\niassadi, 407 Ill. App. 3d 171, 182 (2011). That would effective-\\nly abolish all statutes of limitations, for wrongdoers rarely\\nown up to their transgressions.\\n It does not help Vartanian to characterize the events as a\\ncontinuing violation. The disappearance of his Mustang was\\na discrete event, and the fact that discrete wrongs have con-\\ntinuing consequences does not extend the time to sue. See,\\ne.g., National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,\\n110–15 (2002); Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 654–55 (7th\\nCir. 2013) (concurring opinion); Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota\\nMotor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 348–49 (2002). The\\nstatute of limitations expired long ago, just as the district\\ncourt concluded.\\n That does not mamer, Vartanian asserts, because even if\\nhe cannot pursue a conversion claim against Greenhill, Am-\\nphib cannot obtain any relief against him without proving\\nthat Martin is not a thief. Illinois would not apply a statute of\\nlimitations to a defense against a quiet-title action, Vartanian\\ninsists. We know from the district court’s corrected judg-\\nment that this is not a quiet-title action (the court did not\\naward Greenhill or Amphib rights against the world).\\nWhat’s more, having lost his conversion claim, Vartanian\\nlacks any way to show that his rights are superior to Am-\\nphib’s, the only mamer resolved by the judgment the district\\ncourt entered on remand.\\n\\fNo. 17-3526 9\\n\\n Still more: Even if Illinois would not apply a statute of\\nlimitations, the doctrine of laches would remain. Between\\n1985 and the beginning of this suit Waterman Brown died,\\nand the parties’ inability to obtain his evidence would cause\\nprejudice that is amributable to Vartanian’s long delay. Four\\nother potential witnesses died in the decades between 1985\\nand the filing of Vartanian’s counterclaim; they might have\\naddressed topics such as whether Vartanian abandoned the\\nplane between 1965 and 1985. All of the principals (Var-\\ntanian, Greenhill, and Martin) are in their 80s and experienc-\\ning difficulty remembering events of decades ago. Important\\nbusiness records from the 1960s through the 1990s cannot be\\nlocated. It is too late for the judicial system to make a reliable\\ndecision about what happened to Vartanian’s plane (or parts\\nof it) and which components of Greenhill’s plane might be\\ntraced to the Mustang that the Royal Canadian Air Force\\nsold as surplus in 1960.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1184,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4598418,"string":"4,598,418"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Maurice WALKER, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Maurice Walker"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-11"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2825"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Ripple, Manion, Brennan\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2825\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMAURICE WALKER,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16-cr-00783-1 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 22, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 11, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. A grand jury indicted Maurice\\nWalker on one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted\\nfelon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). During his deten-\\ntion awaiting trial, the Government discovered that\\nMr. Walker, his associates, and a family member had bribed\\nmultiple witnesses to testify falsely on his behalf at his up-\\ncoming trial. The grand jury therefore returned a superseding\\nindictment, which added one count charging Mr. Walker with\\n\\f2 No. 18-2825\\n\\nconspiring to obstruct justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 1512(k). He subsequently pleaded guilty to both counts of\\nthe superseding indictment. The district court imposed sen-\\ntences of 80 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be\\nserved concurrently, and to be followed by a three-year term\\nof supervised release.1 The district court recommended to the\\nBureau of Prisons (“BOP”) that Mr. Walker should not receive\\ncredit for time served prior to June 29, 2017, the date the su-\\nperseding indictment was filed, because of his conduct lead-\\ning to the addition of the obstruction of justice charge.\\n Mr. Walker now contends that the district court improp-\\nerly left to the BOP the calculation of credit for his time served\\nbefore trial. He also submits that he should receive credit for\\nall the time he spent in custody between his arrest and the su-\\nperseding indictment. For the reasons set forth in more detail\\nin this opinion, we cannot accept these contentions; they are\\ncontrolled by settled law. Congress has committed the re-\\nsponsibility for the calculation of credit for pretrial confine-\\nment to the BOP. The district court therefore lacked the au-\\nthority to make such a determination. The court does have,\\nhowever, the discretion to make a recommendation to the\\nBOP as to whether pretrial credit is appropriate. The district\\ncourt therefore acted well within its discretion when it made\\nsuch a recommendation. We therefore affirm its judgment.2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n1 The jurisdiction of the district court is grounded in 18 U.S.C. § 3231.\\n2 Our jurisdiction is grounded in 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 3\\n\\n I.\\n BACKGROUND\\n On June 11, 2016, while Mr. Walker was on parole for\\nprior state convictions, Chicago police officers arrested him\\nafter he fled with a gun in hand and attempted to discard the\\nweapon before being apprehended. On December 1, 2016, a\\ngrand jury returned an indictment charging Mr. Walker with\\none count of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, in\\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On January 5, 2017, he\\npleaded not guilty to the indictment, and the court remanded\\nhim into federal custody. The district court scheduled his trial\\nto begin on July 11, 2017.\\n While awaiting trial, Mr. Walker was detained at the\\nKankakee County Jail, where his phone calls were recorded.\\nThe government listened to these recordings, which revealed\\nthat Mr. Walker had communicated with a family member\\nand associates about locating individuals to testify falsely on\\nhis behalf at his upcoming trial. Specifically, the defendant’s\\nmother, a close associate, and others deposited money into the\\ncommissary account of another inmate, who agreed to sign a\\nfalse affidavit and to testify falsely that the gun belonged to\\nhim and not to Mr. Walker. Another individual received ap-\\nproximately $500 to testify falsely that she had witnessed\\nMr. Walker’s arrest and that he had not been carrying a gun\\nat the time. Mr. Walker also conferred with his family and as-\\nsociates about finding other witnesses to provide false testi-\\nmony. As a result, on June 29, 2017, a grand jury returned a\\nsuperseding indictment, which charged Mr. Walker with an\\nadditional count of conspiracy to obstruct justice, in violation\\nof 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k).\\n\\f4 No. 18-2825\\n\\n On February 20, 2018, Mr. Walker filed a pro se plea dec-\\nlaration, and on April 2, 2018, he pleaded guilty to both counts\\nof the superseding indictment. The probation office prepared\\na presentence report, calculating a guidelines range of 92 to\\n115 months based on a total offense level of 23 and a criminal\\nhistory category of VI. The presentence report recommended\\na sentence of 103 months’ imprisonment per count, to run\\nconcurrently.\\n On August 8, 2018, the district court conducted a sentenc-\\ning hearing. The Government recommended a sentence\\nwithin the guidelines range. Mr. Walker requested a sentence\\nof 41 months. After considering the sentencing factors set\\nforth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court imposed a sen-\\ntence of 80 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be served\\nconcurrently and to be followed by a three-year term of su-\\npervised release. Noting that the grand jury had returned the\\nsuperseding indictment on June 29, 2017, the district court\\nfurther concluded:\\n So this Court is going to recommend that any\\n credit time start from there [June 29, 2017] to the\\n present, not from the time he went in. The rea-\\n son I’m doing that, sir, is because again, you\\n were in there plotting and planning to try to\\n subvert these proceedings. And this Court does\\n not recommend you get time for that. And so I\\n don’t know if they give it to you anyway, but I\\n do recommend that since the indictment, you\\n do get [credit] for [time] served.3\\n\\n\\n\\n3 R.94 at 66.\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 5\\n\\n\\n\\nNeither Mr. Walker nor his counsel objected to this recom-\\nmendation.\\n On August 10, 2018, the district court entered its final\\njudgment. It committed Mr. Walker to the custody of the BOP\\nfor a term of 80 months on each count with those terms to run\\nconcurrently. The judgment further reiterated the court’s rec-\\nommendation to the BOP: “Defendant to receive credit for\\ntime being served beginning 6/29/2017 when the superseding\\nindictment was filed (and not sooner), as conduct charged in\\nCount 2 of the superseding indictment occurred while De-\\nfendant was detained in federal custody.”4 Mr. Walker filed a\\ntimely notice of appeal on August 21, 2018.\\n II.\\n DISCUSSION\\n A.\\n Mr. Walker contends that the district court erred by leav-\\ning to the BOP the decision of how much sentencing credit he\\nshould receive and by recommending to the BOP that he\\nshould not receive credit for time served prior to June 29,\\n2017, the day on which the superseding indictment was filed.\\nIn Mr. Walker’s view, we should review these issues de novo\\nbecause these issues raise questions of law. The Government\\ncontends, however, that we should review the district court’s\\nsentencing decision only for plain error because Mr. Walker\\nfailed to object to his sentence in the district court.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n4 R.77 at 2.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2825\\n\\n The Government is correct. Before the sentencing hearing,\\nMr. Walker filed a pro se motion for a downward departure\\nfrom the recommended guidelines range, but that motion fo-\\ncused exclusively on the “substandard conditions of confine-\\nment” at the Livingston County Detention Center.5 At the sen-\\ntencing hearing, neither Mr. Walker nor his counsel objected\\nto the district court’s recommendation to the BOP that he\\nshould not receive credit for time served prior to June 29,\\n2017. Therefore, we review the district court’s sentence for\\nplain error.6 Mr. Walker therefore must demonstrate that “(1)\\nthere was error, (2) it was plain, (3) it affected his substantial\\nrights and (4) the court should exercise its discretion to correct\\nthe error because it seriously affected the fairness, integrity or\\npublic reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v.\\nJumah, 599 F.3d 799, 811 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v.\\nOlano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–35 (1993); United States v.\\nJaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 847–49 (7th Cir. 2005)).\\n B.\\n Mr. Walker believes the district court erred by leaving it\\nto the BOP to determine whether he should receive credit for\\nall of the time he served in federal custody awaiting trial. He\\nreasons that the BOP “is not authorized to determine penal-\\nties” and that “that is a duty that is bestowed upon the district\\n\\n\\n\\n5 R.72 at 1 (capitalization omitted).\\n6 See United States v. Jumah, 599 F.3d 799, 811 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When no\\nobjection to sentencing guidelines calculations is made at trial, we review\\nthose calculations for plain error.”); United States v. Wainwright, 509 F.3d\\n812, 815 (7th Cir. 2007) (reviewing for plain error because the defendant\\nfailed to object to the enhancement at sentencing).\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 7\\n\\ncourt.”7 Mr. Walker points to the federal statute governing the\\ncalculation of a term of imprisonment, which provides that:\\n A defendant shall be given credit toward the\\n service of a term of imprisonment for any time\\n he has spent in official detention prior to the\\n date the sentence commences—\\n (1) as a result of the offense for which the\\n sentence was imposed …\\n that has not been credited against another sen-\\n tence.\\n18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).\\n The first of the plain error requirements is outcome-deter-\\nminative here. Mr. Walker’s position conflicts directly with\\nthe established precedent of the Supreme Court and of our\\ncourt. In United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992), the peti-\\ntioner submitted that, when Congress enacted the Sentencing\\nReform Act of 1984 and replaced 18 U.S.C. § 3568 with 18\\nU.S.C. § 3585, “Congress expressed a desire to remove the At-\\ntorney General from the process of computing sentences” and\\ntransferred that responsibility to the district court. Id. at 336.\\nThe Supreme Court specifically rejected this argument. It held\\nthat “§ 3585(b) does not authorize a district court to compute\\nthe credit at sentencing.” Id. at 334. The Court observed that\\n§ 3585(b) “indicates that a defendant may receive credit\\nagainst a sentence that ‘was imposed’” and that “the amount of\\nthe credit depends on the time that the defendant ‘has spent’\\nin official detention ‘prior to the date the sentence com-\\nmences.’” Id. at 333 (emphasis in original). Congress thus\\n\\n7 Appellant’s Br. 3.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2825\\n\\n“indicated that computation of the credit must occur after the\\ndefendant begins his sentence.” Id. The Court reasoned that\\nbecause “[f]ederal defendants do not always begin to serve\\ntheir sentences immediately,” the district court at sentencing\\ncould only “speculate[] about the amount of time that Wilson\\nwould spend in detention prior to the commencement of his\\nsentence.” Id. at 333–34. Elaborating further, the Court ex-\\nplained that after sentencing, the Attorney General, acting\\nthrough the BOP, “has the responsibility for administering\\nthe sentence.” Id. at 335. “Because the offender has a right to\\ncertain jail-time credit under § 3585(b), and because the dis-\\ntrict court cannot determine the amount of the credit at sen-\\ntencing, the Attorney General has no choice but to make the\\ndetermination as an administrative matter when imprisoning\\nthe defendant.” Id. Wilson made clear that the Attorney Gen-\\neral, acting through the BOP, must compute the credit for\\ntime served under § 3585(b). Id. at 334. Therefore, even if it\\nhad wanted to give Mr. Walker credit for the time in question,\\nthe district court could not have done so.\\n Relying on Wilson, we have repeatedly recognized that “it\\nis the Attorney General,” acting through the BOP, “and not\\nthe sentencing court, that computes the credit due under\\n§ 3585(b).” United States v. McGee, 60 F.3d 1266, 1272 (7th Cir.\\n1995) (citing Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334).8 This is consistent with\\nthe approach in every other circuit.9 Therefore, “[t]he district\\n\\n\\n8 See also Manuel v. Terris, 803 F.3d 826, 828–29 (7th Cir. 2015); United States\\n\\nv. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 495,\\n499 (7th Cir. 1994).\\n9 See, e.g., Barnes v. Masters, 733 F. App’x 93, 98 (4th Cir. 2018) (“The sen-\\ntencing court has no authority ‘to compute the amount of the credit’ or ‘to\\naward credit at sentencing.’” (quoting United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329,\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n333–34 (1992))); United States v. Haipe, 769 F.3d 1189, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2014)\\n(holding that defense counsel correctly “acknowledged in the district\\ncourt that the issue of time served was to be addressed by the Attorney\\nGeneral through the Bureau of Prisons”); Pierce v. Holder, 614 F.3d 158, 160\\n(5th Cir. 2010) (“Only the Attorney General, through the BOP, may com-\\npute a prisoner’s credits.”); United States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1259\\n(11th Cir. 2010) (“Authority to calculate credit for time served under sec-\\ntion 3585(b) is vested in the Attorney General, not the sentencing court.”\\n(citing Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334)); United States v. Mills, 501 F.3d 9, 12 (1st\\nCir. 2007) (relying on Wilson to conclude the district court “should not\\nhave taken into account Mills’s custody in its sentencing decision, but\\nshould have instead left the determination of Mills’s eligibility for credit\\nfor time served to the Attorney General and the Bureau of Prisons”);\\nUnited States v. Tindall, 455 F.3d 885, 888 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The Bureau of\\nPrisons is responsible for computing the sentence credit after the defend-\\nant has begun serving his sentence.”); United States v. Pineyro, 112 F.3d 43,\\n45 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that after sentencing, “it falls to BOP, not the\\ndistrict judge, to determine … whether the defendant should receive\\ncredit for time spent in custody before the sentence ‘commenced’” (citing\\n§ 3585(b))); United States v. Jenkins, 38 F.3d 1143, 1144 (10th Cir. 1994) (re-\\njecting defendant’s position as “ignor[ing] the Supreme Court’s unequiv-\\nocal statement in Wilson that a district court does not have the authority\\nto grant a sentence credit at sentencing”); United States v. Brann, 990 F.2d\\n98, 103–04 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that Brann’s claim seeking credit for\\nprior custody was “not ripe” because “[t]he Attorney General has the\\npower to grant credit for pretrial custody in the first instance”); McClain\\nv. Bureau of Prisons, 9 F.3d 503, 505 (6th Cir. 1993) (“The district court cor-\\nrectly concluded that the Attorney General, not the court, has the author-\\nity to compute sentence credits for time in detention prior to sentencing.”);\\nUnited States v. Checchini, 967 F.2d 348, 350 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding, “in\\naccord with Wilson,” that “the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant\\nChecchini credit for the time spent under house arrest”).\\n\\f10 No. 18-2825\\n\\ncourt had no authority to order the BOP to give [Mr. Walker]\\nthe credit because that authority rests exclusively with the\\nBOP.” United States v. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000).10\\n C.\\n Mr. Walker also challenges the substance of the district\\ncourt’s recommendation to the BOP and contends that he\\nshould “receive credit for the time he served from the time of\\nhis arrest through when he was sentenced, including through\\nand including June 29, 2017.”11 Of course, this appeal is not\\nthe proper mechanism for Mr. Walker to challenge the\\namount of sentencing credit he ultimately received from the\\nBOP.12 Instead, he first must seek relief through the BOP’s ad-\\nministrative procedures. See Jake v. Herschberger, 173 F.3d\\n1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999). Once he has exhausted his admin-\\nistrative remedies, he then may challenge the BOP’s determi-\\nnation by filing a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for habeas\\nrelief in the district where he is incarcerated. United States v.\\nKoller, 956 F.2d 1408, 1417 (7th Cir. 1992).13\\n Conclusion\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Because the\\nBOP has exclusive authority over the computation of credit\\n\\n\\n10 See also United States v. Evans, 1 F.3d 654, 654–55 (7th Cir. 1993) (per cu-\\nriam).\\n11 Appellant’s Br. 4.\\n12At oral argument, counsel for the United States informed us that the\\nBOP had given Mr. Walker partial credit for his pretrial confinement. Be-\\ncause this credit is less than the credit he seeks in this appeal, this case is\\nnot moot.\\n13 See also Jones, 34 F.3d at 499.\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 11\\n\\nfor time served under § 3585, the district court committed no\\nerror, let alone plain error, in leaving to the BOP the ultimate\\ncalculation of Mr. Walker’s sentencing credit.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4375671/\", \"author_raw\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4598418/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Maurice WALKER, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-11\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2825\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nMAURICE WALKER,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:16-cr-00783-1 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 22, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 11, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before RIPPLE, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. A grand jury indicted Maurice\nWalker on one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted\nfelon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). During his deten-\ntion awaiting trial, the Government discovered that\nMr. Walker, his associates, and a family member had bribed\nmultiple witnesses to testify falsely on his behalf at his up-\ncoming trial. The grand jury therefore returned a superseding\nindictment, which added one count charging Mr. Walker with\n\f2 No. 18-2825\n\nconspiring to obstruct justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\n§ 1512(k). He subsequently pleaded guilty to both counts of\nthe superseding indictment. The district court imposed sen-\ntences of 80 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be\nserved concurrently, and to be followed by a three-year term\nof supervised release.1 The district court recommended to the\nBureau of Prisons (“BOP”) that Mr. Walker should not receive\ncredit for time served prior to June 29, 2017, the date the su-\nperseding indictment was filed, because of his conduct lead-\ning to the addition of the obstruction of justice charge.\n Mr. Walker now contends that the district court improp-\nerly left to the BOP the calculation of credit for his time served\nbefore trial. He also submits that he should receive credit for\nall the time he spent in custody between his arrest and the su-\nperseding indictment. For the reasons set forth in more detail\nin this opinion, we cannot accept these contentions; they are\ncontrolled by settled law. Congress has committed the re-\nsponsibility for the calculation of credit for pretrial confine-\nment to the BOP. The district court therefore lacked the au-\nthority to make such a determination. The court does have,\nhowever, the discretion to make a recommendation to the\nBOP as to whether pretrial credit is appropriate. The district\ncourt therefore acted well within its discretion when it made\nsuch a recommendation. We therefore affirm its judgment.2\n\n\n\n\n1 The jurisdiction of the district court is grounded in 18 U.S.C. § 3231.\n2 Our jurisdiction is grounded in 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\n\fNo. 18-2825 3\n\n I.\n BACKGROUND\n On June 11, 2016, while Mr. Walker was on parole for\nprior state convictions, Chicago police officers arrested him\nafter he fled with a gun in hand and attempted to discard the\nweapon before being apprehended. On December 1, 2016, a\ngrand jury returned an indictment charging Mr. Walker with\none count of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, in\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On January 5, 2017, he\npleaded not guilty to the indictment, and the court remanded\nhim into federal custody. The district court scheduled his trial\nto begin on July 11, 2017.\n While awaiting trial, Mr. Walker was detained at the\nKankakee County Jail, where his phone calls were recorded.\nThe government listened to these recordings, which revealed\nthat Mr. Walker had communicated with a family member\nand associates about locating individuals to testify falsely on\nhis behalf at his upcoming trial. Specifically, the defendant’s\nmother, a close associate, and others deposited money into the\ncommissary account of another inmate, who agreed to sign a\nfalse affidavit and to testify falsely that the gun belonged to\nhim and not to Mr. Walker. Another individual received ap-\nproximately $500 to testify falsely that she had witnessed\nMr. Walker’s arrest and that he had not been carrying a gun\nat the time. Mr. Walker also conferred with his family and as-\nsociates about finding other witnesses to provide false testi-\nmony. As a result, on June 29, 2017, a grand jury returned a\nsuperseding indictment, which charged Mr. Walker with an\nadditional count of conspiracy to obstruct justice, in violation\nof 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k).\n\f4 No. 18-2825\n\n On February 20, 2018, Mr. Walker filed a pro se plea dec-\nlaration, and on April 2, 2018, he pleaded guilty to both counts\nof the superseding indictment. The probation office prepared\na presentence report, calculating a guidelines range of 92 to\n115 months based on a total offense level of 23 and a criminal\nhistory category of VI. The presentence report recommended\na sentence of 103 months’ imprisonment per count, to run\nconcurrently.\n On August 8, 2018, the district court conducted a sentenc-\ning hearing. The Government recommended a sentence\nwithin the guidelines range. Mr. Walker requested a sentence\nof 41 months. After considering the sentencing factors set\nforth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court imposed a sen-\ntence of 80 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be served\nconcurrently and to be followed by a three-year term of su-\npervised release. Noting that the grand jury had returned the\nsuperseding indictment on June 29, 2017, the district court\nfurther concluded:\n So this Court is going to recommend that any\n credit time start from there [June 29, 2017] to the\n present, not from the time he went in. The rea-\n son I’m doing that, sir, is because again, you\n were in there plotting and planning to try to\n subvert these proceedings. And this Court does\n not recommend you get time for that. And so I\n don’t know if they give it to you anyway, but I\n do recommend that since the indictment, you\n do get [credit] for [time] served.3\n\n\n\n3 R.94 at 66.\n\fNo. 18-2825 5\n\n\n\nNeither Mr. Walker nor his counsel objected to this recom-\nmendation.\n On August 10, 2018, the district court entered its final\njudgment. It committed Mr. Walker to the custody of the BOP\nfor a term of 80 months on each count with those terms to run\nconcurrently. The judgment further reiterated the court’s rec-\nommendation to the BOP: “Defendant to receive credit for\ntime being served beginning 6/29/2017 when the superseding\nindictment was filed (and not sooner), as conduct charged in\nCount 2 of the superseding indictment occurred while De-\nfendant was detained in federal custody.”4 Mr. Walker filed a\ntimely notice of appeal on August 21, 2018.\n II.\n DISCUSSION\n A.\n Mr. Walker contends that the district court erred by leav-\ning to the BOP the decision of how much sentencing credit he\nshould receive and by recommending to the BOP that he\nshould not receive credit for time served prior to June 29,\n2017, the day on which the superseding indictment was filed.\nIn Mr. Walker’s view, we should review these issues de novo\nbecause these issues raise questions of law. The Government\ncontends, however, that we should review the district court’s\nsentencing decision only for plain error because Mr. Walker\nfailed to object to his sentence in the district court.\n\n\n\n\n4 R.77 at 2.\n\f6 No. 18-2825\n\n The Government is correct. Before the sentencing hearing,\nMr. Walker filed a pro se motion for a downward departure\nfrom the recommended guidelines range, but that motion fo-\ncused exclusively on the “substandard conditions of confine-\nment” at the Livingston County Detention Center.5 At the sen-\ntencing hearing, neither Mr. Walker nor his counsel objected\nto the district court’s recommendation to the BOP that he\nshould not receive credit for time served prior to June 29,\n2017. Therefore, we review the district court’s sentence for\nplain error.6 Mr. Walker therefore must demonstrate that “(1)\nthere was error, (2) it was plain, (3) it affected his substantial\nrights and (4) the court should exercise its discretion to correct\nthe error because it seriously affected the fairness, integrity or\npublic reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v.\nJumah, 599 F.3d 799, 811 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v.\nOlano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–35 (1993); United States v.\nJaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 847–49 (7th Cir. 2005)).\n B.\n Mr. Walker believes the district court erred by leaving it\nto the BOP to determine whether he should receive credit for\nall of the time he served in federal custody awaiting trial. He\nreasons that the BOP “is not authorized to determine penal-\nties” and that “that is a duty that is bestowed upon the district\n\n\n\n5 R.72 at 1 (capitalization omitted).\n6 See United States v. Jumah, 599 F.3d 799, 811 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When no\nobjection to sentencing guidelines calculations is made at trial, we review\nthose calculations for plain error.”); United States v. Wainwright, 509 F.3d\n812, 815 (7th Cir. 2007) (reviewing for plain error because the defendant\nfailed to object to the enhancement at sentencing).\n\fNo. 18-2825 7\n\ncourt.”7 Mr. Walker points to the federal statute governing the\ncalculation of a term of imprisonment, which provides that:\n A defendant shall be given credit toward the\n service of a term of imprisonment for any time\n he has spent in official detention prior to the\n date the sentence commences—\n (1) as a result of the offense for which the\n sentence was imposed …\n that has not been credited against another sen-\n tence.\n18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).\n The first of the plain error requirements is outcome-deter-\nminative here. Mr. Walker’s position conflicts directly with\nthe established precedent of the Supreme Court and of our\ncourt. In United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992), the peti-\ntioner submitted that, when Congress enacted the Sentencing\nReform Act of 1984 and replaced 18 U.S.C. § 3568 with 18\nU.S.C. § 3585, “Congress expressed a desire to remove the At-\ntorney General from the process of computing sentences” and\ntransferred that responsibility to the district court. Id. at 336.\nThe Supreme Court specifically rejected this argument. It held\nthat “§ 3585(b) does not authorize a district court to compute\nthe credit at sentencing.” Id. at 334. The Court observed that\n§ 3585(b) “indicates that a defendant may receive credit\nagainst a sentence that ‘was imposed’” and that “the amount of\nthe credit depends on the time that the defendant ‘has spent’\nin official detention ‘prior to the date the sentence com-\nmences.’” Id. at 333 (emphasis in original). Congress thus\n\n7 Appellant’s Br. 3.\n\f8 No. 18-2825\n\n“indicated that computation of the credit must occur after the\ndefendant begins his sentence.” Id. The Court reasoned that\nbecause “[f]ederal defendants do not always begin to serve\ntheir sentences immediately,” the district court at sentencing\ncould only “speculate[] about the amount of time that Wilson\nwould spend in detention prior to the commencement of his\nsentence.” Id. at 333–34. Elaborating further, the Court ex-\nplained that after sentencing, the Attorney General, acting\nthrough the BOP, “has the responsibility for administering\nthe sentence.” Id. at 335. “Because the offender has a right to\ncertain jail-time credit under § 3585(b), and because the dis-\ntrict court cannot determine the amount of the credit at sen-\ntencing, the Attorney General has no choice but to make the\ndetermination as an administrative matter when imprisoning\nthe defendant.” Id. Wilson made clear that the Attorney Gen-\neral, acting through the BOP, must compute the credit for\ntime served under § 3585(b). Id. at 334. Therefore, even if it\nhad wanted to give Mr. Walker credit for the time in question,\nthe district court could not have done so.\n Relying on Wilson, we have repeatedly recognized that “it\nis the Attorney General,” acting through the BOP, “and not\nthe sentencing court, that computes the credit due under\n§ 3585(b).” United States v. McGee, 60 F.3d 1266, 1272 (7th Cir.\n1995) (citing Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334).8 This is consistent with\nthe approach in every other circuit.9 Therefore, “[t]he district\n\n\n8 See also Manuel v. Terris, 803 F.3d 826, 828–29 (7th Cir. 2015); United States\n\nv. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 495,\n499 (7th Cir. 1994).\n9 See, e.g., Barnes v. Masters, 733 F. App’x 93, 98 (4th Cir. 2018) (“The sen-\ntencing court has no authority ‘to compute the amount of the credit’ or ‘to\naward credit at sentencing.’” (quoting United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329,\n\fNo. 18-2825 9\n\n\n\n\n333–34 (1992))); United States v. Haipe, 769 F.3d 1189, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2014)\n(holding that defense counsel correctly “acknowledged in the district\ncourt that the issue of time served was to be addressed by the Attorney\nGeneral through the Bureau of Prisons”); Pierce v. Holder, 614 F.3d 158, 160\n(5th Cir. 2010) (“Only the Attorney General, through the BOP, may com-\npute a prisoner’s credits.”); United States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1259\n(11th Cir. 2010) (“Authority to calculate credit for time served under sec-\ntion 3585(b) is vested in the Attorney General, not the sentencing court.”\n(citing Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334)); United States v. Mills, 501 F.3d 9, 12 (1st\nCir. 2007) (relying on Wilson to conclude the district court “should not\nhave taken into account Mills’s custody in its sentencing decision, but\nshould have instead left the determination of Mills’s eligibility for credit\nfor time served to the Attorney General and the Bureau of Prisons”);\nUnited States v. Tindall, 455 F.3d 885, 888 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The Bureau of\nPrisons is responsible for computing the sentence credit after the defend-\nant has begun serving his sentence.”); United States v. Pineyro, 112 F.3d 43,\n45 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that after sentencing, “it falls to BOP, not the\ndistrict judge, to determine … whether the defendant should receive\ncredit for time spent in custody before the sentence ‘commenced’” (citing\n§ 3585(b))); United States v. Jenkins, 38 F.3d 1143, 1144 (10th Cir. 1994) (re-\njecting defendant’s position as “ignor[ing] the Supreme Court’s unequiv-\nocal statement in Wilson that a district court does not have the authority\nto grant a sentence credit at sentencing”); United States v. Brann, 990 F.2d\n98, 103–04 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that Brann’s claim seeking credit for\nprior custody was “not ripe” because “[t]he Attorney General has the\npower to grant credit for pretrial custody in the first instance”); McClain\nv. Bureau of Prisons, 9 F.3d 503, 505 (6th Cir. 1993) (“The district court cor-\nrectly concluded that the Attorney General, not the court, has the author-\nity to compute sentence credits for time in detention prior to sentencing.”);\nUnited States v. Checchini, 967 F.2d 348, 350 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding, “in\naccord with Wilson,” that “the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant\nChecchini credit for the time spent under house arrest”).\n\f10 No. 18-2825\n\ncourt had no authority to order the BOP to give [Mr. Walker]\nthe credit because that authority rests exclusively with the\nBOP.” United States v. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000).10\n C.\n Mr. Walker also challenges the substance of the district\ncourt’s recommendation to the BOP and contends that he\nshould “receive credit for the time he served from the time of\nhis arrest through when he was sentenced, including through\nand including June 29, 2017.”11 Of course, this appeal is not\nthe proper mechanism for Mr. Walker to challenge the\namount of sentencing credit he ultimately received from the\nBOP.12 Instead, he first must seek relief through the BOP’s ad-\nministrative procedures. See Jake v. Herschberger, 173 F.3d\n1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999). Once he has exhausted his admin-\nistrative remedies, he then may challenge the BOP’s determi-\nnation by filing a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for habeas\nrelief in the district where he is incarcerated. United States v.\nKoller, 956 F.2d 1408, 1417 (7th Cir. 1992).13\n Conclusion\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Because the\nBOP has exclusive authority over the computation of credit\n\n\n10 See also United States v. Evans, 1 F.3d 654, 654–55 (7th Cir. 1993) (per cu-\nriam).\n11 Appellant’s Br. 4.\n12At oral argument, counsel for the United States informed us that the\nBOP had given Mr. Walker partial credit for his pretrial confinement. Be-\ncause this credit is less than the credit he seeks in this appeal, this case is\nnot moot.\n13 See also Jones, 34 F.3d at 499.\n\fNo. 18-2825 11\n\nfor time served under § 3585, the district court committed no\nerror, let alone plain error, in leaving to the BOP the ultimate\ncalculation of Mr. Walker’s sentencing credit.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Maurice WALKER, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-11\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2825\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMAURICE WALKER,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16-cr-00783-1 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 22, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 11, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. A grand jury indicted Maurice\\nWalker on one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted\\nfelon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). During his deten-\\ntion awaiting trial, the Government discovered that\\nMr. Walker, his associates, and a family member had bribed\\nmultiple witnesses to testify falsely on his behalf at his up-\\ncoming trial. The grand jury therefore returned a superseding\\nindictment, which added one count charging Mr. Walker with\\n\\f2 No. 18-2825\\n\\nconspiring to obstruct justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 1512(k). He subsequently pleaded guilty to both counts of\\nthe superseding indictment. The district court imposed sen-\\ntences of 80 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be\\nserved concurrently, and to be followed by a three-year term\\nof supervised release.1 The district court recommended to the\\nBureau of Prisons (“BOP”) that Mr. Walker should not receive\\ncredit for time served prior to June 29, 2017, the date the su-\\nperseding indictment was filed, because of his conduct lead-\\ning to the addition of the obstruction of justice charge.\\n Mr. Walker now contends that the district court improp-\\nerly left to the BOP the calculation of credit for his time served\\nbefore trial. He also submits that he should receive credit for\\nall the time he spent in custody between his arrest and the su-\\nperseding indictment. For the reasons set forth in more detail\\nin this opinion, we cannot accept these contentions; they are\\ncontrolled by settled law. Congress has committed the re-\\nsponsibility for the calculation of credit for pretrial confine-\\nment to the BOP. The district court therefore lacked the au-\\nthority to make such a determination. The court does have,\\nhowever, the discretion to make a recommendation to the\\nBOP as to whether pretrial credit is appropriate. The district\\ncourt therefore acted well within its discretion when it made\\nsuch a recommendation. We therefore affirm its judgment.2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n1 The jurisdiction of the district court is grounded in 18 U.S.C. § 3231.\\n2 Our jurisdiction is grounded in 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 3\\n\\n I.\\n BACKGROUND\\n On June 11, 2016, while Mr. Walker was on parole for\\nprior state convictions, Chicago police officers arrested him\\nafter he fled with a gun in hand and attempted to discard the\\nweapon before being apprehended. On December 1, 2016, a\\ngrand jury returned an indictment charging Mr. Walker with\\none count of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, in\\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On January 5, 2017, he\\npleaded not guilty to the indictment, and the court remanded\\nhim into federal custody. The district court scheduled his trial\\nto begin on July 11, 2017.\\n While awaiting trial, Mr. Walker was detained at the\\nKankakee County Jail, where his phone calls were recorded.\\nThe government listened to these recordings, which revealed\\nthat Mr. Walker had communicated with a family member\\nand associates about locating individuals to testify falsely on\\nhis behalf at his upcoming trial. Specifically, the defendant’s\\nmother, a close associate, and others deposited money into the\\ncommissary account of another inmate, who agreed to sign a\\nfalse affidavit and to testify falsely that the gun belonged to\\nhim and not to Mr. Walker. Another individual received ap-\\nproximately $500 to testify falsely that she had witnessed\\nMr. Walker’s arrest and that he had not been carrying a gun\\nat the time. Mr. Walker also conferred with his family and as-\\nsociates about finding other witnesses to provide false testi-\\nmony. As a result, on June 29, 2017, a grand jury returned a\\nsuperseding indictment, which charged Mr. Walker with an\\nadditional count of conspiracy to obstruct justice, in violation\\nof 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k).\\n\\f4 No. 18-2825\\n\\n On February 20, 2018, Mr. Walker filed a pro se plea dec-\\nlaration, and on April 2, 2018, he pleaded guilty to both counts\\nof the superseding indictment. The probation office prepared\\na presentence report, calculating a guidelines range of 92 to\\n115 months based on a total offense level of 23 and a criminal\\nhistory category of VI. The presentence report recommended\\na sentence of 103 months’ imprisonment per count, to run\\nconcurrently.\\n On August 8, 2018, the district court conducted a sentenc-\\ning hearing. The Government recommended a sentence\\nwithin the guidelines range. Mr. Walker requested a sentence\\nof 41 months. After considering the sentencing factors set\\nforth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court imposed a sen-\\ntence of 80 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be served\\nconcurrently and to be followed by a three-year term of su-\\npervised release. Noting that the grand jury had returned the\\nsuperseding indictment on June 29, 2017, the district court\\nfurther concluded:\\n So this Court is going to recommend that any\\n credit time start from there [June 29, 2017] to the\\n present, not from the time he went in. The rea-\\n son I’m doing that, sir, is because again, you\\n were in there plotting and planning to try to\\n subvert these proceedings. And this Court does\\n not recommend you get time for that. And so I\\n don’t know if they give it to you anyway, but I\\n do recommend that since the indictment, you\\n do get [credit] for [time] served.3\\n\\n\\n\\n3 R.94 at 66.\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 5\\n\\n\\n\\nNeither Mr. Walker nor his counsel objected to this recom-\\nmendation.\\n On August 10, 2018, the district court entered its final\\njudgment. It committed Mr. Walker to the custody of the BOP\\nfor a term of 80 months on each count with those terms to run\\nconcurrently. The judgment further reiterated the court’s rec-\\nommendation to the BOP: “Defendant to receive credit for\\ntime being served beginning 6/29/2017 when the superseding\\nindictment was filed (and not sooner), as conduct charged in\\nCount 2 of the superseding indictment occurred while De-\\nfendant was detained in federal custody.”4 Mr. Walker filed a\\ntimely notice of appeal on August 21, 2018.\\n II.\\n DISCUSSION\\n A.\\n Mr. Walker contends that the district court erred by leav-\\ning to the BOP the decision of how much sentencing credit he\\nshould receive and by recommending to the BOP that he\\nshould not receive credit for time served prior to June 29,\\n2017, the day on which the superseding indictment was filed.\\nIn Mr. Walker’s view, we should review these issues de novo\\nbecause these issues raise questions of law. The Government\\ncontends, however, that we should review the district court’s\\nsentencing decision only for plain error because Mr. Walker\\nfailed to object to his sentence in the district court.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n4 R.77 at 2.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2825\\n\\n The Government is correct. Before the sentencing hearing,\\nMr. Walker filed a pro se motion for a downward departure\\nfrom the recommended guidelines range, but that motion fo-\\ncused exclusively on the “substandard conditions of confine-\\nment” at the Livingston County Detention Center.5 At the sen-\\ntencing hearing, neither Mr. Walker nor his counsel objected\\nto the district court’s recommendation to the BOP that he\\nshould not receive credit for time served prior to June 29,\\n2017. Therefore, we review the district court’s sentence for\\nplain error.6 Mr. Walker therefore must demonstrate that “(1)\\nthere was error, (2) it was plain, (3) it affected his substantial\\nrights and (4) the court should exercise its discretion to correct\\nthe error because it seriously affected the fairness, integrity or\\npublic reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v.\\nJumah, 599 F.3d 799, 811 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v.\\nOlano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–35 (1993); United States v.\\nJaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 847–49 (7th Cir. 2005)).\\n B.\\n Mr. Walker believes the district court erred by leaving it\\nto the BOP to determine whether he should receive credit for\\nall of the time he served in federal custody awaiting trial. He\\nreasons that the BOP “is not authorized to determine penal-\\nties” and that “that is a duty that is bestowed upon the district\\n\\n\\n\\n5 R.72 at 1 (capitalization omitted).\\n6 See United States v. Jumah, 599 F.3d 799, 811 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When no\\nobjection to sentencing guidelines calculations is made at trial, we review\\nthose calculations for plain error.”); United States v. Wainwright, 509 F.3d\\n812, 815 (7th Cir. 2007) (reviewing for plain error because the defendant\\nfailed to object to the enhancement at sentencing).\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 7\\n\\ncourt.”7 Mr. Walker points to the federal statute governing the\\ncalculation of a term of imprisonment, which provides that:\\n A defendant shall be given credit toward the\\n service of a term of imprisonment for any time\\n he has spent in official detention prior to the\\n date the sentence commences—\\n (1) as a result of the offense for which the\\n sentence was imposed …\\n that has not been credited against another sen-\\n tence.\\n18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).\\n The first of the plain error requirements is outcome-deter-\\nminative here. Mr. Walker’s position conflicts directly with\\nthe established precedent of the Supreme Court and of our\\ncourt. In United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992), the peti-\\ntioner submitted that, when Congress enacted the Sentencing\\nReform Act of 1984 and replaced 18 U.S.C. § 3568 with 18\\nU.S.C. § 3585, “Congress expressed a desire to remove the At-\\ntorney General from the process of computing sentences” and\\ntransferred that responsibility to the district court. Id. at 336.\\nThe Supreme Court specifically rejected this argument. It held\\nthat “§ 3585(b) does not authorize a district court to compute\\nthe credit at sentencing.” Id. at 334. The Court observed that\\n§ 3585(b) “indicates that a defendant may receive credit\\nagainst a sentence that ‘was imposed’” and that “the amount of\\nthe credit depends on the time that the defendant ‘has spent’\\nin official detention ‘prior to the date the sentence com-\\nmences.’” Id. at 333 (emphasis in original). Congress thus\\n\\n7 Appellant’s Br. 3.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2825\\n\\n“indicated that computation of the credit must occur after the\\ndefendant begins his sentence.” Id. The Court reasoned that\\nbecause “[f]ederal defendants do not always begin to serve\\ntheir sentences immediately,” the district court at sentencing\\ncould only “speculate[] about the amount of time that Wilson\\nwould spend in detention prior to the commencement of his\\nsentence.” Id. at 333–34. Elaborating further, the Court ex-\\nplained that after sentencing, the Attorney General, acting\\nthrough the BOP, “has the responsibility for administering\\nthe sentence.” Id. at 335. “Because the offender has a right to\\ncertain jail-time credit under § 3585(b), and because the dis-\\ntrict court cannot determine the amount of the credit at sen-\\ntencing, the Attorney General has no choice but to make the\\ndetermination as an administrative matter when imprisoning\\nthe defendant.” Id. Wilson made clear that the Attorney Gen-\\neral, acting through the BOP, must compute the credit for\\ntime served under § 3585(b). Id. at 334. Therefore, even if it\\nhad wanted to give Mr. Walker credit for the time in question,\\nthe district court could not have done so.\\n Relying on Wilson, we have repeatedly recognized that “it\\nis the Attorney General,” acting through the BOP, “and not\\nthe sentencing court, that computes the credit due under\\n§ 3585(b).” United States v. McGee, 60 F.3d 1266, 1272 (7th Cir.\\n1995) (citing Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334).8 This is consistent with\\nthe approach in every other circuit.9 Therefore, “[t]he district\\n\\n\\n8 See also Manuel v. Terris, 803 F.3d 826, 828–29 (7th Cir. 2015); United States\\n\\nv. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 495,\\n499 (7th Cir. 1994).\\n9 See, e.g., Barnes v. Masters, 733 F. App’x 93, 98 (4th Cir. 2018) (“The sen-\\ntencing court has no authority ‘to compute the amount of the credit’ or ‘to\\naward credit at sentencing.’” (quoting United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329,\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n333–34 (1992))); United States v. Haipe, 769 F.3d 1189, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2014)\\n(holding that defense counsel correctly “acknowledged in the district\\ncourt that the issue of time served was to be addressed by the Attorney\\nGeneral through the Bureau of Prisons”); Pierce v. Holder, 614 F.3d 158, 160\\n(5th Cir. 2010) (“Only the Attorney General, through the BOP, may com-\\npute a prisoner’s credits.”); United States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1259\\n(11th Cir. 2010) (“Authority to calculate credit for time served under sec-\\ntion 3585(b) is vested in the Attorney General, not the sentencing court.”\\n(citing Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334)); United States v. Mills, 501 F.3d 9, 12 (1st\\nCir. 2007) (relying on Wilson to conclude the district court “should not\\nhave taken into account Mills’s custody in its sentencing decision, but\\nshould have instead left the determination of Mills’s eligibility for credit\\nfor time served to the Attorney General and the Bureau of Prisons”);\\nUnited States v. Tindall, 455 F.3d 885, 888 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The Bureau of\\nPrisons is responsible for computing the sentence credit after the defend-\\nant has begun serving his sentence.”); United States v. Pineyro, 112 F.3d 43,\\n45 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that after sentencing, “it falls to BOP, not the\\ndistrict judge, to determine … whether the defendant should receive\\ncredit for time spent in custody before the sentence ‘commenced’” (citing\\n§ 3585(b))); United States v. Jenkins, 38 F.3d 1143, 1144 (10th Cir. 1994) (re-\\njecting defendant’s position as “ignor[ing] the Supreme Court’s unequiv-\\nocal statement in Wilson that a district court does not have the authority\\nto grant a sentence credit at sentencing”); United States v. Brann, 990 F.2d\\n98, 103–04 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that Brann’s claim seeking credit for\\nprior custody was “not ripe” because “[t]he Attorney General has the\\npower to grant credit for pretrial custody in the first instance”); McClain\\nv. Bureau of Prisons, 9 F.3d 503, 505 (6th Cir. 1993) (“The district court cor-\\nrectly concluded that the Attorney General, not the court, has the author-\\nity to compute sentence credits for time in detention prior to sentencing.”);\\nUnited States v. Checchini, 967 F.2d 348, 350 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding, “in\\naccord with Wilson,” that “the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant\\nChecchini credit for the time spent under house arrest”).\\n\\f10 No. 18-2825\\n\\ncourt had no authority to order the BOP to give [Mr. Walker]\\nthe credit because that authority rests exclusively with the\\nBOP.” United States v. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000).10\\n C.\\n Mr. Walker also challenges the substance of the district\\ncourt’s recommendation to the BOP and contends that he\\nshould “receive credit for the time he served from the time of\\nhis arrest through when he was sentenced, including through\\nand including June 29, 2017.”11 Of course, this appeal is not\\nthe proper mechanism for Mr. Walker to challenge the\\namount of sentencing credit he ultimately received from the\\nBOP.12 Instead, he first must seek relief through the BOP’s ad-\\nministrative procedures. See Jake v. Herschberger, 173 F.3d\\n1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999). Once he has exhausted his admin-\\nistrative remedies, he then may challenge the BOP’s determi-\\nnation by filing a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for habeas\\nrelief in the district where he is incarcerated. United States v.\\nKoller, 956 F.2d 1408, 1417 (7th Cir. 1992).13\\n Conclusion\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Because the\\nBOP has exclusive authority over the computation of credit\\n\\n\\n10 See also United States v. Evans, 1 F.3d 654, 654–55 (7th Cir. 1993) (per cu-\\nriam).\\n11 Appellant’s Br. 4.\\n12At oral argument, counsel for the United States informed us that the\\nBOP had given Mr. Walker partial credit for his pretrial confinement. Be-\\ncause this credit is less than the credit he seeks in this appeal, this case is\\nnot moot.\\n13 See also Jones, 34 F.3d at 499.\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 11\\n\\nfor time served under § 3585, the district court committed no\\nerror, let alone plain error, in leaving to the BOP the ultimate\\ncalculation of Mr. Walker’s sentencing credit.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1185,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4598596,"string":"4,598,596"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Maurice Walker"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-11"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2825"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before RIPPLE, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2825\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMAURICE WALKER,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16-cr-00783-1 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 22, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 11, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. A grand jury indicted Maurice\\nWalker on one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted\\nfelon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). During his deten-\\ntion awaiting trial, the Government discovered that\\nMr. Walker, his associates, and a family member had bribed\\nmultiple witnesses to testify falsely on his behalf at his up-\\ncoming trial. The grand jury therefore returned a superseding\\nindictment, which added one count charging Mr. Walker with\\n\\f2 No. 18-2825\\n\\nconspiring to obstruct justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 1512(k). He subsequently pleaded guilty to both counts of\\nthe superseding indictment. The district court imposed sen-\\ntences of 80 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be\\nserved concurrently, and to be followed by a three-year term\\nof supervised release.1 The district court recommended to the\\nBureau of Prisons (“BOP”) that Mr. Walker should not receive\\ncredit for time served prior to June 29, 2017, the date the su-\\nperseding indictment was filed, because of his conduct lead-\\ning to the addition of the obstruction of justice charge.\\n Mr. Walker now contends that the district court improp-\\nerly left to the BOP the calculation of credit for his time served\\nbefore trial. He also submits that he should receive credit for\\nall the time he spent in custody between his arrest and the su-\\nperseding indictment. For the reasons set forth in more detail\\nin this opinion, we cannot accept these contentions; they are\\ncontrolled by settled law. Congress has committed the re-\\nsponsibility for the calculation of credit for pretrial confine-\\nment to the BOP. The district court therefore lacked the au-\\nthority to make such a determination. The court does have,\\nhowever, the discretion to make a recommendation to the\\nBOP as to whether pretrial credit is appropriate. The district\\ncourt therefore acted well within its discretion when it made\\nsuch a recommendation. We therefore affirm its judgment.2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n1 The jurisdiction of the district court is grounded in 18 U.S.C. § 3231.\\n2 Our jurisdiction is grounded in 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 3\\n\\n I.\\n BACKGROUND\\n On June 11, 2016, while Mr. Walker was on parole for\\nprior state convictions, Chicago police officers arrested him\\nafter he fled with a gun in hand and attempted to discard the\\nweapon before being apprehended. On December 1, 2016, a\\ngrand jury returned an indictment charging Mr. Walker with\\none count of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, in\\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On January 5, 2017, he\\npleaded not guilty to the indictment, and the court remanded\\nhim into federal custody. The district court scheduled his trial\\nto begin on July 11, 2017.\\n While awaiting trial, Mr. Walker was detained at the\\nKankakee County Jail, where his phone calls were recorded.\\nThe government listened to these recordings, which revealed\\nthat Mr. Walker had communicated with a family member\\nand associates about locating individuals to testify falsely on\\nhis behalf at his upcoming trial. Specifically, the defendant’s\\nmother, a close associate, and others deposited money into the\\ncommissary account of another inmate, who agreed to sign a\\nfalse affidavit and to testify falsely that the gun belonged to\\nhim and not to Mr. Walker. Another individual received ap-\\nproximately $500 to testify falsely that she had witnessed\\nMr. Walker’s arrest and that he had not been carrying a gun\\nat the time. Mr. Walker also conferred with his family and as-\\nsociates about finding other witnesses to provide false testi-\\nmony. As a result, on June 29, 2017, a grand jury returned a\\nsuperseding indictment, which charged Mr. Walker with an\\nadditional count of conspiracy to obstruct justice, in violation\\nof 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k).\\n\\f4 No. 18-2825\\n\\n On February 20, 2018, Mr. Walker filed a pro se plea dec-\\nlaration, and on April 2, 2018, he pleaded guilty to both counts\\nof the superseding indictment. The probation office prepared\\na presentence report, calculating a guidelines range of 92 to\\n115 months based on a total offense level of 23 and a criminal\\nhistory category of VI. The presentence report recommended\\na sentence of 103 months’ imprisonment per count, to run\\nconcurrently.\\n On August 8, 2018, the district court conducted a sentenc-\\ning hearing. The Government recommended a sentence\\nwithin the guidelines range. Mr. Walker requested a sentence\\nof 41 months. After considering the sentencing factors set\\nforth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court imposed a sen-\\ntence of 80 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be served\\nconcurrently and to be followed by a three-year term of su-\\npervised release. Noting that the grand jury had returned the\\nsuperseding indictment on June 29, 2017, the district court\\nfurther concluded:\\n So this Court is going to recommend that any\\n credit time start from there [June 29, 2017] to the\\n present, not from the time he went in. The rea-\\n son I’m doing that, sir, is because again, you\\n were in there plotting and planning to try to\\n subvert these proceedings. And this Court does\\n not recommend you get time for that. And so I\\n don’t know if they give it to you anyway, but I\\n do recommend that since the indictment, you\\n do get [credit] for [time] served.3\\n\\n\\n\\n3 R.94 at 66.\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 5\\n\\n\\n\\nNeither Mr. Walker nor his counsel objected to this recom-\\nmendation.\\n On August 10, 2018, the district court entered its final\\njudgment. It committed Mr. Walker to the custody of the BOP\\nfor a term of 80 months on each count with those terms to run\\nconcurrently. The judgment further reiterated the court’s rec-\\nommendation to the BOP: “Defendant to receive credit for\\ntime being served beginning 6/29/2017 when the superseding\\nindictment was filed (and not sooner), as conduct charged in\\nCount 2 of the superseding indictment occurred while De-\\nfendant was detained in federal custody.”4 Mr. Walker filed a\\ntimely notice of appeal on August 21, 2018.\\n II.\\n DISCUSSION\\n A.\\n Mr. Walker contends that the district court erred by leav-\\ning to the BOP the decision of how much sentencing credit he\\nshould receive and by recommending to the BOP that he\\nshould not receive credit for time served prior to June 29,\\n2017, the day on which the superseding indictment was filed.\\nIn Mr. Walker’s view, we should review these issues de novo\\nbecause these issues raise questions of law. The Government\\ncontends, however, that we should review the district court’s\\nsentencing decision only for plain error because Mr. Walker\\nfailed to object to his sentence in the district court.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n4 R.77 at 2.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2825\\n\\n The Government is correct. Before the sentencing hearing,\\nMr. Walker filed a pro se motion for a downward departure\\nfrom the recommended guidelines range, but that motion fo-\\ncused exclusively on the “substandard conditions of confine-\\nment” at the Livingston County Detention Center.5 At the sen-\\ntencing hearing, neither Mr. Walker nor his counsel objected\\nto the district court’s recommendation to the BOP that he\\nshould not receive credit for time served prior to June 29,\\n2017. Therefore, we review the district court’s sentence for\\nplain error.6 Mr. Walker therefore must demonstrate that “(1)\\nthere was error, (2) it was plain, (3) it affected his substantial\\nrights and (4) the court should exercise its discretion to correct\\nthe error because it seriously affected the fairness, integrity or\\npublic reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v.\\nJumah, 599 F.3d 799, 811 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v.\\nOlano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–35 (1993); United States v.\\nJaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 847–49 (7th Cir. 2005)).\\n B.\\n Mr. Walker believes the district court erred by leaving it\\nto the BOP to determine whether he should receive credit for\\nall of the time he served in federal custody awaiting trial. He\\nreasons that the BOP “is not authorized to determine penal-\\nties” and that “that is a duty that is bestowed upon the district\\n\\n\\n\\n5 R.72 at 1 (capitalization omitted).\\n6 See United States v. Jumah, 599 F.3d 799, 811 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When no\\nobjection to sentencing guidelines calculations is made at trial, we review\\nthose calculations for plain error.”); United States v. Wainwright, 509 F.3d\\n812, 815 (7th Cir. 2007) (reviewing for plain error because the defendant\\nfailed to object to the enhancement at sentencing).\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 7\\n\\ncourt.”7 Mr. Walker points to the federal statute governing the\\ncalculation of a term of imprisonment, which provides that:\\n A defendant shall be given credit toward the\\n service of a term of imprisonment for any time\\n he has spent in official detention prior to the\\n date the sentence commences—\\n (1) as a result of the offense for which the\\n sentence was imposed …\\n that has not been credited against another sen-\\n tence.\\n18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).\\n The first of the plain error requirements is outcome-deter-\\nminative here. Mr. Walker’s position conflicts directly with\\nthe established precedent of the Supreme Court and of our\\ncourt. In United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992), the peti-\\ntioner submitted that, when Congress enacted the Sentencing\\nReform Act of 1984 and replaced 18 U.S.C. § 3568 with 18\\nU.S.C. § 3585, “Congress expressed a desire to remove the At-\\ntorney General from the process of computing sentences” and\\ntransferred that responsibility to the district court. Id. at 336.\\nThe Supreme Court specifically rejected this argument. It held\\nthat “§ 3585(b) does not authorize a district court to compute\\nthe credit at sentencing.” Id. at 334. The Court observed that\\n§ 3585(b) “indicates that a defendant may receive credit\\nagainst a sentence that ‘was imposed’” and that “the amount of\\nthe credit depends on the time that the defendant ‘has spent’\\nin official detention ‘prior to the date the sentence com-\\nmences.’” Id. at 333 (emphasis in original). Congress thus\\n\\n7 Appellant’s Br. 3.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2825\\n\\n“indicated that computation of the credit must occur after the\\ndefendant begins his sentence.” Id. The Court reasoned that\\nbecause “[f]ederal defendants do not always begin to serve\\ntheir sentences immediately,” the district court at sentencing\\ncould only “speculate[] about the amount of time that Wilson\\nwould spend in detention prior to the commencement of his\\nsentence.” Id. at 333–34. Elaborating further, the Court ex-\\nplained that after sentencing, the Attorney General, acting\\nthrough the BOP, “has the responsibility for administering\\nthe sentence.” Id. at 335. “Because the offender has a right to\\ncertain jail-time credit under § 3585(b), and because the dis-\\ntrict court cannot determine the amount of the credit at sen-\\ntencing, the Attorney General has no choice but to make the\\ndetermination as an administrative matter when imprisoning\\nthe defendant.” Id. Wilson made clear that the Attorney Gen-\\neral, acting through the BOP, must compute the credit for\\ntime served under § 3585(b). Id. at 334. Therefore, even if it\\nhad wanted to give Mr. Walker credit for the time in question,\\nthe district court could not have done so.\\n Relying on Wilson, we have repeatedly recognized that “it\\nis the Attorney General,” acting through the BOP, “and not\\nthe sentencing court, that computes the credit due under\\n§ 3585(b).” United States v. McGee, 60 F.3d 1266, 1272 (7th Cir.\\n1995) (citing Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334).8 This is consistent with\\nthe approach in every other circuit.9 Therefore, “[t]he district\\n\\n\\n8 See also Manuel v. Terris, 803 F.3d 826, 828–29 (7th Cir. 2015); United States\\n\\nv. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 495,\\n499 (7th Cir. 1994).\\n9 See, e.g., Barnes v. Masters, 733 F. App’x 93, 98 (4th Cir. 2018) (“The sen-\\ntencing court has no authority ‘to compute the amount of the credit’ or ‘to\\naward credit at sentencing.’” (quoting United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329,\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n333–34 (1992))); United States v. Haipe, 769 F.3d 1189, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2014)\\n(holding that defense counsel correctly “acknowledged in the district\\ncourt that the issue of time served was to be addressed by the Attorney\\nGeneral through the Bureau of Prisons”); Pierce v. Holder, 614 F.3d 158, 160\\n(5th Cir. 2010) (“Only the Attorney General, through the BOP, may com-\\npute a prisoner’s credits.”); United States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1259\\n(11th Cir. 2010) (“Authority to calculate credit for time served under sec-\\ntion 3585(b) is vested in the Attorney General, not the sentencing court.”\\n(citing Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334)); United States v. Mills, 501 F.3d 9, 12 (1st\\nCir. 2007) (relying on Wilson to conclude the district court “should not\\nhave taken into account Mills’s custody in its sentencing decision, but\\nshould have instead left the determination of Mills’s eligibility for credit\\nfor time served to the Attorney General and the Bureau of Prisons”);\\nUnited States v. Tindall, 455 F.3d 885, 888 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The Bureau of\\nPrisons is responsible for computing the sentence credit after the defend-\\nant has begun serving his sentence.”); United States v. Pineyro, 112 F.3d 43,\\n45 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that after sentencing, “it falls to BOP, not the\\ndistrict judge, to determine … whether the defendant should receive\\ncredit for time spent in custody before the sentence ‘commenced’” (citing\\n§ 3585(b))); United States v. Jenkins, 38 F.3d 1143, 1144 (10th Cir. 1994) (re-\\njecting defendant’s position as “ignor[ing] the Supreme Court’s unequiv-\\nocal statement in Wilson that a district court does not have the authority\\nto grant a sentence credit at sentencing”); United States v. Brann, 990 F.2d\\n98, 103–04 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that Brann’s claim seeking credit for\\nprior custody was “not ripe” because “[t]he Attorney General has the\\npower to grant credit for pretrial custody in the first instance”); McClain\\nv. Bureau of Prisons, 9 F.3d 503, 505 (6th Cir. 1993) (“The district court cor-\\nrectly concluded that the Attorney General, not the court, has the author-\\nity to compute sentence credits for time in detention prior to sentencing.”);\\nUnited States v. Checchini, 967 F.2d 348, 350 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding, “in\\naccord with Wilson,” that “the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant\\nChecchini credit for the time spent under house arrest”).\\n\\f10 No. 18-2825\\n\\ncourt had no authority to order the BOP to give [Mr. Walker]\\nthe credit because that authority rests exclusively with the\\nBOP.” United States v. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000).10\\n C.\\n Mr. Walker also challenges the substance of the district\\ncourt’s recommendation to the BOP and contends that he\\nshould “receive credit for the time he served from the time of\\nhis arrest through when he was sentenced, including through\\nand including June 29, 2017.”11 Of course, this appeal is not\\nthe proper mechanism for Mr. Walker to challenge the\\namount of sentencing credit he ultimately received from the\\nBOP.12 Instead, he first must seek relief through the BOP’s ad-\\nministrative procedures. See Jake v. Herschberger, 173 F.3d\\n1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999). Once he has exhausted his admin-\\nistrative remedies, he then may challenge the BOP’s determi-\\nnation by filing a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for habeas\\nrelief in the district where he is incarcerated. United States v.\\nKoller, 956 F.2d 1408, 1417 (7th Cir. 1992).13\\n Conclusion\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Because the\\nBOP has exclusive authority over the computation of credit\\n\\n\\n10 See also United States v. Evans, 1 F.3d 654, 654–55 (7th Cir. 1993) (per cu-\\nriam).\\n11 Appellant’s Br. 4.\\n12At oral argument, counsel for the United States informed us that the\\nBOP had given Mr. Walker partial credit for his pretrial confinement. Be-\\ncause this credit is less than the credit he seeks in this appeal, this case is\\nnot moot.\\n13 See also Jones, 34 F.3d at 499.\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 11\\n\\nfor time served under § 3585, the district court committed no\\nerror, let alone plain error, in leaving to the BOP the ultimate\\ncalculation of Mr. Walker’s sentencing credit.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4375849/\", \"author_raw\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4598596/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Maurice Walker\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-11\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2825\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nMAURICE WALKER,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:16-cr-00783-1 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 22, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 11, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before RIPPLE, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. A grand jury indicted Maurice\nWalker on one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted\nfelon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). During his deten-\ntion awaiting trial, the Government discovered that\nMr. Walker, his associates, and a family member had bribed\nmultiple witnesses to testify falsely on his behalf at his up-\ncoming trial. The grand jury therefore returned a superseding\nindictment, which added one count charging Mr. Walker with\n\f2 No. 18-2825\n\nconspiring to obstruct justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\n§ 1512(k). He subsequently pleaded guilty to both counts of\nthe superseding indictment. The district court imposed sen-\ntences of 80 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be\nserved concurrently, and to be followed by a three-year term\nof supervised release.1 The district court recommended to the\nBureau of Prisons (“BOP”) that Mr. Walker should not receive\ncredit for time served prior to June 29, 2017, the date the su-\nperseding indictment was filed, because of his conduct lead-\ning to the addition of the obstruction of justice charge.\n Mr. Walker now contends that the district court improp-\nerly left to the BOP the calculation of credit for his time served\nbefore trial. He also submits that he should receive credit for\nall the time he spent in custody between his arrest and the su-\nperseding indictment. For the reasons set forth in more detail\nin this opinion, we cannot accept these contentions; they are\ncontrolled by settled law. Congress has committed the re-\nsponsibility for the calculation of credit for pretrial confine-\nment to the BOP. The district court therefore lacked the au-\nthority to make such a determination. The court does have,\nhowever, the discretion to make a recommendation to the\nBOP as to whether pretrial credit is appropriate. The district\ncourt therefore acted well within its discretion when it made\nsuch a recommendation. We therefore affirm its judgment.2\n\n\n\n\n1 The jurisdiction of the district court is grounded in 18 U.S.C. § 3231.\n2 Our jurisdiction is grounded in 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\n\fNo. 18-2825 3\n\n I.\n BACKGROUND\n On June 11, 2016, while Mr. Walker was on parole for\nprior state convictions, Chicago police officers arrested him\nafter he fled with a gun in hand and attempted to discard the\nweapon before being apprehended. On December 1, 2016, a\ngrand jury returned an indictment charging Mr. Walker with\none count of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, in\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On January 5, 2017, he\npleaded not guilty to the indictment, and the court remanded\nhim into federal custody. The district court scheduled his trial\nto begin on July 11, 2017.\n While awaiting trial, Mr. Walker was detained at the\nKankakee County Jail, where his phone calls were recorded.\nThe government listened to these recordings, which revealed\nthat Mr. Walker had communicated with a family member\nand associates about locating individuals to testify falsely on\nhis behalf at his upcoming trial. Specifically, the defendant’s\nmother, a close associate, and others deposited money into the\ncommissary account of another inmate, who agreed to sign a\nfalse affidavit and to testify falsely that the gun belonged to\nhim and not to Mr. Walker. Another individual received ap-\nproximately $500 to testify falsely that she had witnessed\nMr. Walker’s arrest and that he had not been carrying a gun\nat the time. Mr. Walker also conferred with his family and as-\nsociates about finding other witnesses to provide false testi-\nmony. As a result, on June 29, 2017, a grand jury returned a\nsuperseding indictment, which charged Mr. Walker with an\nadditional count of conspiracy to obstruct justice, in violation\nof 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k).\n\f4 No. 18-2825\n\n On February 20, 2018, Mr. Walker filed a pro se plea dec-\nlaration, and on April 2, 2018, he pleaded guilty to both counts\nof the superseding indictment. The probation office prepared\na presentence report, calculating a guidelines range of 92 to\n115 months based on a total offense level of 23 and a criminal\nhistory category of VI. The presentence report recommended\na sentence of 103 months’ imprisonment per count, to run\nconcurrently.\n On August 8, 2018, the district court conducted a sentenc-\ning hearing. The Government recommended a sentence\nwithin the guidelines range. Mr. Walker requested a sentence\nof 41 months. After considering the sentencing factors set\nforth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court imposed a sen-\ntence of 80 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be served\nconcurrently and to be followed by a three-year term of su-\npervised release. Noting that the grand jury had returned the\nsuperseding indictment on June 29, 2017, the district court\nfurther concluded:\n So this Court is going to recommend that any\n credit time start from there [June 29, 2017] to the\n present, not from the time he went in. The rea-\n son I’m doing that, sir, is because again, you\n were in there plotting and planning to try to\n subvert these proceedings. And this Court does\n not recommend you get time for that. And so I\n don’t know if they give it to you anyway, but I\n do recommend that since the indictment, you\n do get [credit] for [time] served.3\n\n\n\n3 R.94 at 66.\n\fNo. 18-2825 5\n\n\n\nNeither Mr. Walker nor his counsel objected to this recom-\nmendation.\n On August 10, 2018, the district court entered its final\njudgment. It committed Mr. Walker to the custody of the BOP\nfor a term of 80 months on each count with those terms to run\nconcurrently. The judgment further reiterated the court’s rec-\nommendation to the BOP: “Defendant to receive credit for\ntime being served beginning 6/29/2017 when the superseding\nindictment was filed (and not sooner), as conduct charged in\nCount 2 of the superseding indictment occurred while De-\nfendant was detained in federal custody.”4 Mr. Walker filed a\ntimely notice of appeal on August 21, 2018.\n II.\n DISCUSSION\n A.\n Mr. Walker contends that the district court erred by leav-\ning to the BOP the decision of how much sentencing credit he\nshould receive and by recommending to the BOP that he\nshould not receive credit for time served prior to June 29,\n2017, the day on which the superseding indictment was filed.\nIn Mr. Walker’s view, we should review these issues de novo\nbecause these issues raise questions of law. The Government\ncontends, however, that we should review the district court’s\nsentencing decision only for plain error because Mr. Walker\nfailed to object to his sentence in the district court.\n\n\n\n\n4 R.77 at 2.\n\f6 No. 18-2825\n\n The Government is correct. Before the sentencing hearing,\nMr. Walker filed a pro se motion for a downward departure\nfrom the recommended guidelines range, but that motion fo-\ncused exclusively on the “substandard conditions of confine-\nment” at the Livingston County Detention Center.5 At the sen-\ntencing hearing, neither Mr. Walker nor his counsel objected\nto the district court’s recommendation to the BOP that he\nshould not receive credit for time served prior to June 29,\n2017. Therefore, we review the district court’s sentence for\nplain error.6 Mr. Walker therefore must demonstrate that “(1)\nthere was error, (2) it was plain, (3) it affected his substantial\nrights and (4) the court should exercise its discretion to correct\nthe error because it seriously affected the fairness, integrity or\npublic reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v.\nJumah, 599 F.3d 799, 811 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v.\nOlano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–35 (1993); United States v.\nJaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 847–49 (7th Cir. 2005)).\n B.\n Mr. Walker believes the district court erred by leaving it\nto the BOP to determine whether he should receive credit for\nall of the time he served in federal custody awaiting trial. He\nreasons that the BOP “is not authorized to determine penal-\nties” and that “that is a duty that is bestowed upon the district\n\n\n\n5 R.72 at 1 (capitalization omitted).\n6 See United States v. Jumah, 599 F.3d 799, 811 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When no\nobjection to sentencing guidelines calculations is made at trial, we review\nthose calculations for plain error.”); United States v. Wainwright, 509 F.3d\n812, 815 (7th Cir. 2007) (reviewing for plain error because the defendant\nfailed to object to the enhancement at sentencing).\n\fNo. 18-2825 7\n\ncourt.”7 Mr. Walker points to the federal statute governing the\ncalculation of a term of imprisonment, which provides that:\n A defendant shall be given credit toward the\n service of a term of imprisonment for any time\n he has spent in official detention prior to the\n date the sentence commences—\n (1) as a result of the offense for which the\n sentence was imposed …\n that has not been credited against another sen-\n tence.\n18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).\n The first of the plain error requirements is outcome-deter-\nminative here. Mr. Walker’s position conflicts directly with\nthe established precedent of the Supreme Court and of our\ncourt. In United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992), the peti-\ntioner submitted that, when Congress enacted the Sentencing\nReform Act of 1984 and replaced 18 U.S.C. § 3568 with 18\nU.S.C. § 3585, “Congress expressed a desire to remove the At-\ntorney General from the process of computing sentences” and\ntransferred that responsibility to the district court. Id. at 336.\nThe Supreme Court specifically rejected this argument. It held\nthat “§ 3585(b) does not authorize a district court to compute\nthe credit at sentencing.” Id. at 334. The Court observed that\n§ 3585(b) “indicates that a defendant may receive credit\nagainst a sentence that ‘was imposed’” and that “the amount of\nthe credit depends on the time that the defendant ‘has spent’\nin official detention ‘prior to the date the sentence com-\nmences.’” Id. at 333 (emphasis in original). Congress thus\n\n7 Appellant’s Br. 3.\n\f8 No. 18-2825\n\n“indicated that computation of the credit must occur after the\ndefendant begins his sentence.” Id. The Court reasoned that\nbecause “[f]ederal defendants do not always begin to serve\ntheir sentences immediately,” the district court at sentencing\ncould only “speculate[] about the amount of time that Wilson\nwould spend in detention prior to the commencement of his\nsentence.” Id. at 333–34. Elaborating further, the Court ex-\nplained that after sentencing, the Attorney General, acting\nthrough the BOP, “has the responsibility for administering\nthe sentence.” Id. at 335. “Because the offender has a right to\ncertain jail-time credit under § 3585(b), and because the dis-\ntrict court cannot determine the amount of the credit at sen-\ntencing, the Attorney General has no choice but to make the\ndetermination as an administrative matter when imprisoning\nthe defendant.” Id. Wilson made clear that the Attorney Gen-\neral, acting through the BOP, must compute the credit for\ntime served under § 3585(b). Id. at 334. Therefore, even if it\nhad wanted to give Mr. Walker credit for the time in question,\nthe district court could not have done so.\n Relying on Wilson, we have repeatedly recognized that “it\nis the Attorney General,” acting through the BOP, “and not\nthe sentencing court, that computes the credit due under\n§ 3585(b).” United States v. McGee, 60 F.3d 1266, 1272 (7th Cir.\n1995) (citing Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334).8 This is consistent with\nthe approach in every other circuit.9 Therefore, “[t]he district\n\n\n8 See also Manuel v. Terris, 803 F.3d 826, 828–29 (7th Cir. 2015); United States\n\nv. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 495,\n499 (7th Cir. 1994).\n9 See, e.g., Barnes v. Masters, 733 F. App’x 93, 98 (4th Cir. 2018) (“The sen-\ntencing court has no authority ‘to compute the amount of the credit’ or ‘to\naward credit at sentencing.’” (quoting United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329,\n\fNo. 18-2825 9\n\n\n\n\n333–34 (1992))); United States v. Haipe, 769 F.3d 1189, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2014)\n(holding that defense counsel correctly “acknowledged in the district\ncourt that the issue of time served was to be addressed by the Attorney\nGeneral through the Bureau of Prisons”); Pierce v. Holder, 614 F.3d 158, 160\n(5th Cir. 2010) (“Only the Attorney General, through the BOP, may com-\npute a prisoner’s credits.”); United States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1259\n(11th Cir. 2010) (“Authority to calculate credit for time served under sec-\ntion 3585(b) is vested in the Attorney General, not the sentencing court.”\n(citing Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334)); United States v. Mills, 501 F.3d 9, 12 (1st\nCir. 2007) (relying on Wilson to conclude the district court “should not\nhave taken into account Mills’s custody in its sentencing decision, but\nshould have instead left the determination of Mills’s eligibility for credit\nfor time served to the Attorney General and the Bureau of Prisons”);\nUnited States v. Tindall, 455 F.3d 885, 888 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The Bureau of\nPrisons is responsible for computing the sentence credit after the defend-\nant has begun serving his sentence.”); United States v. Pineyro, 112 F.3d 43,\n45 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that after sentencing, “it falls to BOP, not the\ndistrict judge, to determine … whether the defendant should receive\ncredit for time spent in custody before the sentence ‘commenced’” (citing\n§ 3585(b))); United States v. Jenkins, 38 F.3d 1143, 1144 (10th Cir. 1994) (re-\njecting defendant’s position as “ignor[ing] the Supreme Court’s unequiv-\nocal statement in Wilson that a district court does not have the authority\nto grant a sentence credit at sentencing”); United States v. Brann, 990 F.2d\n98, 103–04 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that Brann’s claim seeking credit for\nprior custody was “not ripe” because “[t]he Attorney General has the\npower to grant credit for pretrial custody in the first instance”); McClain\nv. Bureau of Prisons, 9 F.3d 503, 505 (6th Cir. 1993) (“The district court cor-\nrectly concluded that the Attorney General, not the court, has the author-\nity to compute sentence credits for time in detention prior to sentencing.”);\nUnited States v. Checchini, 967 F.2d 348, 350 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding, “in\naccord with Wilson,” that “the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant\nChecchini credit for the time spent under house arrest”).\n\f10 No. 18-2825\n\ncourt had no authority to order the BOP to give [Mr. Walker]\nthe credit because that authority rests exclusively with the\nBOP.” United States v. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000).10\n C.\n Mr. Walker also challenges the substance of the district\ncourt’s recommendation to the BOP and contends that he\nshould “receive credit for the time he served from the time of\nhis arrest through when he was sentenced, including through\nand including June 29, 2017.”11 Of course, this appeal is not\nthe proper mechanism for Mr. Walker to challenge the\namount of sentencing credit he ultimately received from the\nBOP.12 Instead, he first must seek relief through the BOP’s ad-\nministrative procedures. See Jake v. Herschberger, 173 F.3d\n1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999). Once he has exhausted his admin-\nistrative remedies, he then may challenge the BOP’s determi-\nnation by filing a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for habeas\nrelief in the district where he is incarcerated. United States v.\nKoller, 956 F.2d 1408, 1417 (7th Cir. 1992).13\n Conclusion\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Because the\nBOP has exclusive authority over the computation of credit\n\n\n10 See also United States v. Evans, 1 F.3d 654, 654–55 (7th Cir. 1993) (per cu-\nriam).\n11 Appellant’s Br. 4.\n12At oral argument, counsel for the United States informed us that the\nBOP had given Mr. Walker partial credit for his pretrial confinement. Be-\ncause this credit is less than the credit he seeks in this appeal, this case is\nnot moot.\n13 See also Jones, 34 F.3d at 499.\n\fNo. 18-2825 11\n\nfor time served under § 3585, the district court committed no\nerror, let alone plain error, in leaving to the BOP the ultimate\ncalculation of Mr. Walker’s sentencing credit.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Maurice Walker\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-11\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2825\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMAURICE WALKER,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16-cr-00783-1 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 22, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 11, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. A grand jury indicted Maurice\\nWalker on one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted\\nfelon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). During his deten-\\ntion awaiting trial, the Government discovered that\\nMr. Walker, his associates, and a family member had bribed\\nmultiple witnesses to testify falsely on his behalf at his up-\\ncoming trial. The grand jury therefore returned a superseding\\nindictment, which added one count charging Mr. Walker with\\n\\f2 No. 18-2825\\n\\nconspiring to obstruct justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 1512(k). He subsequently pleaded guilty to both counts of\\nthe superseding indictment. The district court imposed sen-\\ntences of 80 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be\\nserved concurrently, and to be followed by a three-year term\\nof supervised release.1 The district court recommended to the\\nBureau of Prisons (“BOP”) that Mr. Walker should not receive\\ncredit for time served prior to June 29, 2017, the date the su-\\nperseding indictment was filed, because of his conduct lead-\\ning to the addition of the obstruction of justice charge.\\n Mr. Walker now contends that the district court improp-\\nerly left to the BOP the calculation of credit for his time served\\nbefore trial. He also submits that he should receive credit for\\nall the time he spent in custody between his arrest and the su-\\nperseding indictment. For the reasons set forth in more detail\\nin this opinion, we cannot accept these contentions; they are\\ncontrolled by settled law. Congress has committed the re-\\nsponsibility for the calculation of credit for pretrial confine-\\nment to the BOP. The district court therefore lacked the au-\\nthority to make such a determination. The court does have,\\nhowever, the discretion to make a recommendation to the\\nBOP as to whether pretrial credit is appropriate. The district\\ncourt therefore acted well within its discretion when it made\\nsuch a recommendation. We therefore affirm its judgment.2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n1 The jurisdiction of the district court is grounded in 18 U.S.C. § 3231.\\n2 Our jurisdiction is grounded in 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 3\\n\\n I.\\n BACKGROUND\\n On June 11, 2016, while Mr. Walker was on parole for\\nprior state convictions, Chicago police officers arrested him\\nafter he fled with a gun in hand and attempted to discard the\\nweapon before being apprehended. On December 1, 2016, a\\ngrand jury returned an indictment charging Mr. Walker with\\none count of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, in\\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On January 5, 2017, he\\npleaded not guilty to the indictment, and the court remanded\\nhim into federal custody. The district court scheduled his trial\\nto begin on July 11, 2017.\\n While awaiting trial, Mr. Walker was detained at the\\nKankakee County Jail, where his phone calls were recorded.\\nThe government listened to these recordings, which revealed\\nthat Mr. Walker had communicated with a family member\\nand associates about locating individuals to testify falsely on\\nhis behalf at his upcoming trial. Specifically, the defendant’s\\nmother, a close associate, and others deposited money into the\\ncommissary account of another inmate, who agreed to sign a\\nfalse affidavit and to testify falsely that the gun belonged to\\nhim and not to Mr. Walker. Another individual received ap-\\nproximately $500 to testify falsely that she had witnessed\\nMr. Walker’s arrest and that he had not been carrying a gun\\nat the time. Mr. Walker also conferred with his family and as-\\nsociates about finding other witnesses to provide false testi-\\nmony. As a result, on June 29, 2017, a grand jury returned a\\nsuperseding indictment, which charged Mr. Walker with an\\nadditional count of conspiracy to obstruct justice, in violation\\nof 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k).\\n\\f4 No. 18-2825\\n\\n On February 20, 2018, Mr. Walker filed a pro se plea dec-\\nlaration, and on April 2, 2018, he pleaded guilty to both counts\\nof the superseding indictment. The probation office prepared\\na presentence report, calculating a guidelines range of 92 to\\n115 months based on a total offense level of 23 and a criminal\\nhistory category of VI. The presentence report recommended\\na sentence of 103 months’ imprisonment per count, to run\\nconcurrently.\\n On August 8, 2018, the district court conducted a sentenc-\\ning hearing. The Government recommended a sentence\\nwithin the guidelines range. Mr. Walker requested a sentence\\nof 41 months. After considering the sentencing factors set\\nforth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court imposed a sen-\\ntence of 80 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be served\\nconcurrently and to be followed by a three-year term of su-\\npervised release. Noting that the grand jury had returned the\\nsuperseding indictment on June 29, 2017, the district court\\nfurther concluded:\\n So this Court is going to recommend that any\\n credit time start from there [June 29, 2017] to the\\n present, not from the time he went in. The rea-\\n son I’m doing that, sir, is because again, you\\n were in there plotting and planning to try to\\n subvert these proceedings. And this Court does\\n not recommend you get time for that. And so I\\n don’t know if they give it to you anyway, but I\\n do recommend that since the indictment, you\\n do get [credit] for [time] served.3\\n\\n\\n\\n3 R.94 at 66.\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 5\\n\\n\\n\\nNeither Mr. Walker nor his counsel objected to this recom-\\nmendation.\\n On August 10, 2018, the district court entered its final\\njudgment. It committed Mr. Walker to the custody of the BOP\\nfor a term of 80 months on each count with those terms to run\\nconcurrently. The judgment further reiterated the court’s rec-\\nommendation to the BOP: “Defendant to receive credit for\\ntime being served beginning 6/29/2017 when the superseding\\nindictment was filed (and not sooner), as conduct charged in\\nCount 2 of the superseding indictment occurred while De-\\nfendant was detained in federal custody.”4 Mr. Walker filed a\\ntimely notice of appeal on August 21, 2018.\\n II.\\n DISCUSSION\\n A.\\n Mr. Walker contends that the district court erred by leav-\\ning to the BOP the decision of how much sentencing credit he\\nshould receive and by recommending to the BOP that he\\nshould not receive credit for time served prior to June 29,\\n2017, the day on which the superseding indictment was filed.\\nIn Mr. Walker’s view, we should review these issues de novo\\nbecause these issues raise questions of law. The Government\\ncontends, however, that we should review the district court’s\\nsentencing decision only for plain error because Mr. Walker\\nfailed to object to his sentence in the district court.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n4 R.77 at 2.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2825\\n\\n The Government is correct. Before the sentencing hearing,\\nMr. Walker filed a pro se motion for a downward departure\\nfrom the recommended guidelines range, but that motion fo-\\ncused exclusively on the “substandard conditions of confine-\\nment” at the Livingston County Detention Center.5 At the sen-\\ntencing hearing, neither Mr. Walker nor his counsel objected\\nto the district court’s recommendation to the BOP that he\\nshould not receive credit for time served prior to June 29,\\n2017. Therefore, we review the district court’s sentence for\\nplain error.6 Mr. Walker therefore must demonstrate that “(1)\\nthere was error, (2) it was plain, (3) it affected his substantial\\nrights and (4) the court should exercise its discretion to correct\\nthe error because it seriously affected the fairness, integrity or\\npublic reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v.\\nJumah, 599 F.3d 799, 811 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v.\\nOlano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–35 (1993); United States v.\\nJaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 847–49 (7th Cir. 2005)).\\n B.\\n Mr. Walker believes the district court erred by leaving it\\nto the BOP to determine whether he should receive credit for\\nall of the time he served in federal custody awaiting trial. He\\nreasons that the BOP “is not authorized to determine penal-\\nties” and that “that is a duty that is bestowed upon the district\\n\\n\\n\\n5 R.72 at 1 (capitalization omitted).\\n6 See United States v. Jumah, 599 F.3d 799, 811 (7th Cir. 2010) (“When no\\nobjection to sentencing guidelines calculations is made at trial, we review\\nthose calculations for plain error.”); United States v. Wainwright, 509 F.3d\\n812, 815 (7th Cir. 2007) (reviewing for plain error because the defendant\\nfailed to object to the enhancement at sentencing).\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 7\\n\\ncourt.”7 Mr. Walker points to the federal statute governing the\\ncalculation of a term of imprisonment, which provides that:\\n A defendant shall be given credit toward the\\n service of a term of imprisonment for any time\\n he has spent in official detention prior to the\\n date the sentence commences—\\n (1) as a result of the offense for which the\\n sentence was imposed …\\n that has not been credited against another sen-\\n tence.\\n18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).\\n The first of the plain error requirements is outcome-deter-\\nminative here. Mr. Walker’s position conflicts directly with\\nthe established precedent of the Supreme Court and of our\\ncourt. In United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992), the peti-\\ntioner submitted that, when Congress enacted the Sentencing\\nReform Act of 1984 and replaced 18 U.S.C. § 3568 with 18\\nU.S.C. § 3585, “Congress expressed a desire to remove the At-\\ntorney General from the process of computing sentences” and\\ntransferred that responsibility to the district court. Id. at 336.\\nThe Supreme Court specifically rejected this argument. It held\\nthat “§ 3585(b) does not authorize a district court to compute\\nthe credit at sentencing.” Id. at 334. The Court observed that\\n§ 3585(b) “indicates that a defendant may receive credit\\nagainst a sentence that ‘was imposed’” and that “the amount of\\nthe credit depends on the time that the defendant ‘has spent’\\nin official detention ‘prior to the date the sentence com-\\nmences.’” Id. at 333 (emphasis in original). Congress thus\\n\\n7 Appellant’s Br. 3.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2825\\n\\n“indicated that computation of the credit must occur after the\\ndefendant begins his sentence.” Id. The Court reasoned that\\nbecause “[f]ederal defendants do not always begin to serve\\ntheir sentences immediately,” the district court at sentencing\\ncould only “speculate[] about the amount of time that Wilson\\nwould spend in detention prior to the commencement of his\\nsentence.” Id. at 333–34. Elaborating further, the Court ex-\\nplained that after sentencing, the Attorney General, acting\\nthrough the BOP, “has the responsibility for administering\\nthe sentence.” Id. at 335. “Because the offender has a right to\\ncertain jail-time credit under § 3585(b), and because the dis-\\ntrict court cannot determine the amount of the credit at sen-\\ntencing, the Attorney General has no choice but to make the\\ndetermination as an administrative matter when imprisoning\\nthe defendant.” Id. Wilson made clear that the Attorney Gen-\\neral, acting through the BOP, must compute the credit for\\ntime served under § 3585(b). Id. at 334. Therefore, even if it\\nhad wanted to give Mr. Walker credit for the time in question,\\nthe district court could not have done so.\\n Relying on Wilson, we have repeatedly recognized that “it\\nis the Attorney General,” acting through the BOP, “and not\\nthe sentencing court, that computes the credit due under\\n§ 3585(b).” United States v. McGee, 60 F.3d 1266, 1272 (7th Cir.\\n1995) (citing Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334).8 This is consistent with\\nthe approach in every other circuit.9 Therefore, “[t]he district\\n\\n\\n8 See also Manuel v. Terris, 803 F.3d 826, 828–29 (7th Cir. 2015); United States\\n\\nv. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 495,\\n499 (7th Cir. 1994).\\n9 See, e.g., Barnes v. Masters, 733 F. App’x 93, 98 (4th Cir. 2018) (“The sen-\\ntencing court has no authority ‘to compute the amount of the credit’ or ‘to\\naward credit at sentencing.’” (quoting United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329,\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n333–34 (1992))); United States v. Haipe, 769 F.3d 1189, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2014)\\n(holding that defense counsel correctly “acknowledged in the district\\ncourt that the issue of time served was to be addressed by the Attorney\\nGeneral through the Bureau of Prisons”); Pierce v. Holder, 614 F.3d 158, 160\\n(5th Cir. 2010) (“Only the Attorney General, through the BOP, may com-\\npute a prisoner’s credits.”); United States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1259\\n(11th Cir. 2010) (“Authority to calculate credit for time served under sec-\\ntion 3585(b) is vested in the Attorney General, not the sentencing court.”\\n(citing Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334)); United States v. Mills, 501 F.3d 9, 12 (1st\\nCir. 2007) (relying on Wilson to conclude the district court “should not\\nhave taken into account Mills’s custody in its sentencing decision, but\\nshould have instead left the determination of Mills’s eligibility for credit\\nfor time served to the Attorney General and the Bureau of Prisons”);\\nUnited States v. Tindall, 455 F.3d 885, 888 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The Bureau of\\nPrisons is responsible for computing the sentence credit after the defend-\\nant has begun serving his sentence.”); United States v. Pineyro, 112 F.3d 43,\\n45 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that after sentencing, “it falls to BOP, not the\\ndistrict judge, to determine … whether the defendant should receive\\ncredit for time spent in custody before the sentence ‘commenced’” (citing\\n§ 3585(b))); United States v. Jenkins, 38 F.3d 1143, 1144 (10th Cir. 1994) (re-\\njecting defendant’s position as “ignor[ing] the Supreme Court’s unequiv-\\nocal statement in Wilson that a district court does not have the authority\\nto grant a sentence credit at sentencing”); United States v. Brann, 990 F.2d\\n98, 103–04 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that Brann’s claim seeking credit for\\nprior custody was “not ripe” because “[t]he Attorney General has the\\npower to grant credit for pretrial custody in the first instance”); McClain\\nv. Bureau of Prisons, 9 F.3d 503, 505 (6th Cir. 1993) (“The district court cor-\\nrectly concluded that the Attorney General, not the court, has the author-\\nity to compute sentence credits for time in detention prior to sentencing.”);\\nUnited States v. Checchini, 967 F.2d 348, 350 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding, “in\\naccord with Wilson,” that “the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant\\nChecchini credit for the time spent under house arrest”).\\n\\f10 No. 18-2825\\n\\ncourt had no authority to order the BOP to give [Mr. Walker]\\nthe credit because that authority rests exclusively with the\\nBOP.” United States v. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000).10\\n C.\\n Mr. Walker also challenges the substance of the district\\ncourt’s recommendation to the BOP and contends that he\\nshould “receive credit for the time he served from the time of\\nhis arrest through when he was sentenced, including through\\nand including June 29, 2017.”11 Of course, this appeal is not\\nthe proper mechanism for Mr. Walker to challenge the\\namount of sentencing credit he ultimately received from the\\nBOP.12 Instead, he first must seek relief through the BOP’s ad-\\nministrative procedures. See Jake v. Herschberger, 173 F.3d\\n1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999). Once he has exhausted his admin-\\nistrative remedies, he then may challenge the BOP’s determi-\\nnation by filing a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for habeas\\nrelief in the district where he is incarcerated. United States v.\\nKoller, 956 F.2d 1408, 1417 (7th Cir. 1992).13\\n Conclusion\\n The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Because the\\nBOP has exclusive authority over the computation of credit\\n\\n\\n10 See also United States v. Evans, 1 F.3d 654, 654–55 (7th Cir. 1993) (per cu-\\nriam).\\n11 Appellant’s Br. 4.\\n12At oral argument, counsel for the United States informed us that the\\nBOP had given Mr. Walker partial credit for his pretrial confinement. Be-\\ncause this credit is less than the credit he seeks in this appeal, this case is\\nnot moot.\\n13 See also Jones, 34 F.3d at 499.\\n\\fNo. 18-2825 11\\n\\nfor time served under § 3585, the district court committed no\\nerror, let alone plain error, in leaving to the BOP the ultimate\\ncalculation of Mr. Walker’s sentencing credit.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1186,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4599324,"string":"4,599,324"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Paul REGAINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Paul Regains v. City of Chicago"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-13"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"15-2444"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Easterbrook, Hamilton, Pepper\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PEPPER, District Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 15-2444\\nPAUL REGAINS,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nCITY OF CHICAGO,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 14 C 9687 — James B. Zagel, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 13, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and\\nPEPPER, District Judge. *\\n The Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) requires\\nsex offenders to register with the police. Because he did not\\nhave a permanent address (he was homeless), Paul Regains\\nfollowed the instructions of officers who directed him to a\\n\\n\\n * Of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.\\n\\f2 No. 15-2444\\n\\nlocal homeless shelter (which they listed on his registration as\\nhis permanent address), and to return for re-registration in\\nninety days. When he appeared to report three months later,\\nChicago police officers arrested Regains on an “investigative\\nalert,” because other officers had not been able to locate Re-\\ngains at the address provided. Regains remained in custody\\nseventeen months before the Illinois trial court found him not\\nguilty of failing to a report a change of address.\\n Regains sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,\\nclaiming that it violated his rights under the Due Process\\nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dis-\\nmissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure\\n12(b)(6), finding that either the claim was time-barred under\\nIllinois’ two-year statute of limitations for personal injury\\nclaims, or that it was barred by this court’s decision in New-\\nsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001), abrogated by\\nManual v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (“Manuel I”). The\\ndistrict court also found that the amended complaint lacked\\nsufficient factual details to give the City fair notice, and that\\nbecause Regains did not specifically identify a particular con-\\nstitutional violation, the City could not be held liable under\\nMonell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978).\\n We reverse the district court’s decision that Regains’ claim\\nwas time-barred, and remand for further proceedings.\\n I. Background\\n In 2012, SORA required sex offenders to register in person\\nwithin three days of establishing a residence or a temporary\\ndomicile in any county. 730 ILCS § 150/3(b) (2012). Sex offend-\\ners in the City of Chicago registered “at the Chicago Police\\nDepartment Headquarters.” 730 ILCS § 150/3(a)(1). The law\\n\\fNo. 15-2444 3\\n\\nrequired sex offenders without a fixed address or temporary\\ndomicile to report weekly to the chief of police in the munici-\\npality in which that person was located. 730 ILCS § 150/3.\\n The plaintiff asserts that SORA required “persons with a\\nfixed abode” to report every ninety days, citing 730 ILCS\\n§ 150/6. Appellant’s Br. at 2. In fact, that section of the statute\\nrequired a person who had been adjudicated to be sexually\\ndangerous or was a sexually violent person to report every\\nninety days (and required such offenders to report weekly if\\nthey did not have a fixed residence). “Any other person” re-\\nquired to register under the statute was required to report\\nonce a year. The record does not indicate whether Regains,\\nhad he had a fixed residence, would have been subject to the\\nninety-day reporting interval or the one-year reporting inter-\\nval. Either way, the law required homeless sex offenders to\\nreport more frequently than sex offenders with fixed resi-\\ndences. Failure to comply with the provisions of the statute\\nconstituted a felony, for which there was strict liability. 730\\nILCS § 150/10(a); People v. Molnar, 857 N.E.2d 209, 224 (Ill.\\n2006).\\n By 2012, the Chicago police officers assigned to sex of-\\nfender registration/reporting duty felt that the weekly report-\\ning requirement for homeless sex offenders had become bur-\\ndensome. Some of those police officers engaged in a wide-\\nspread practice of steering homeless sex offenders to home-\\nless shelters that would accept sex offenders, and directing\\nthe sex offenders to return with documentation showing the\\nshelter as the sex offender’s residence. This scheme had the\\neffect of providing homeless sex offenders with a “residence,”\\nwhich meant that they were not subject to the weekly report-\\ning requirement. The officers who engaged in this steering\\n\\f4 No. 15-2444\\n\\npractice, and their supervisors, were aware that the number\\nof persons registered at the shelters far exceeded the shelter’s\\ncapacity. In other words, they knew that the homeless sex of-\\nfenders who listed the shelter as their “address” likely would\\nnot be able to remain there.\\n Other Chicago police officers assigned to registration du-\\nties disagreed with the steering practice. These other officers\\nvisited homeless shelters that accepted sex offender regis-\\ntrants and attempted to locate the registrant; if they could not\\nlocate the registrant at the shelter, the officers would prepare\\nan investigative alert, informing any Chicago police officer\\nwho encountered the registrant that there was probable cause\\nfor arrest.\\n Regains alleges that in April 2012, Chicago police officers\\nemployed the steering practice when he attempted to register\\nas a homeless sex offender. He asserts that they directed him\\nto a shelter, registered him as residing at that shelter, and in-\\nstructed him to return for quarterly reporting and re-registra-\\ntion in July 2012.\\n In early May 2012, two Chicago police officers went to the\\nshelter to look for Regains. They did not find him, and they\\nprepared a report for failure to register at that address. The\\nnext day, a Chicago police detective reviewed the report, vis-\\nited the shelter without finding Regains, and issued an inves-\\ntigative alert informing other Chicago police officers that\\nthere was probable cause to arrest Regains.\\n On July 18, 2012, Regains reported as directed; Chicago\\npolice officers arrested him under the investigative alert. The\\nprosecutor charged Regains with two violations of 730 ILCS\\n§ 150/6—failure to register within three days after changing\\n\\fNo. 15-2444 5\\n\\nhis address, and failure to report every ninety days. On Sep-\\ntember 4, 2012, Cook County Judge Thomas V. Gainer ar-\\nraigned Regains and ordered him detained. Regains re-\\nmained in custody until his December 3, 2012 trial—some sev-\\nenteen months—at which time the judge found him not\\nguilty. 1\\n Regains filed his original § 1983 complaint in federal court\\non December 3, 2014.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review de novo a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6)\\nmotion to dismiss. Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840\\nF.3d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “In construing\\nthe complaint, we accept all well-pleaded facts as true and\\ndraw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor.” Id. We\\nmay affirm on any ground that the record supports, as long\\nas the district court adequately addressed that ground and the\\nnon-moving party had the opportunity to contest it. Thayer v.\\nChiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 247 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).\\n Regains argues that he was deprived of his liberty for sev-\\nenteen months without due process of law, as a result of “the\\nwidespread practice within the Chicago police department to-\\nwards homeless sex offenders.” Appellant’s Br. at 6. He as-\\nserts that the City violated his Fourteenth Amendment due\\nprocess rights by engaging in conduct “in the nature of\\n\\n\\n1 The transcript of Regains’ trial indicates that he registered on April 17,\\n2012. App. to Appellee’s Br. at A27. He appeared at the police station on\\nJuly 18, 2012, id. at A30, ninety-two days after the date he last registered,\\nid. at A37. The trial judge stated that he could not tell from looking at the\\nreport date Regains had been given whether he was to report on July 16\\nor July 18, 2012, and made a finding that Regains was not guilty. Id. at A37.\\n\\f6 No. 15-2444\\n\\nmalicious prosecution.” He has taken pains to avoid giving\\nhis personal injury claim a specific label. The district court\\nfound that if Regains’ claim sounded in false arrest, it was\\ntime-barred, and that if it sounded in malicious prosecution,\\nit was barred for other reasons.\\n Regains sued under a federal statute—42 U.S.C. § 1983—\\nbut we look to the law of the state in which the personal injury\\noccurred to determine the length of the statute of limitations.\\nWallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Serino v. Hensley, 735\\nF.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013). Under Illinois law, a plaintiff\\nmust bring a personal injury action within two years after its\\naccrual. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387 (citing 735 ILCS § 5/13-202\\n(West 2003)).\\n The question of when the cause of action accrues “is a\\nquestion of federal law that is not resolved by reference to\\nstate law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (emphasis in the original).\\nFederal common law holds that a cause of action accrues\\nwhen “the plaintiff has a ‘complete and present cause of ac-\\ntion’”—in other words, when “the plaintiff can file suit and\\nobtain relief.” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning\\nPension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201\\n(1997)). Put another way, a personal injury claim raised under\\n§ 1983 accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to\\nknow of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Serino, 735\\nF.3d at 591. Because there is “no single accrual rule for all\\n§ 1983 claims,” we must “use the rule that applies to the com-\\nmon-law cause of action most similar to the kind of claim the\\nplaintiff asserts.” Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir.\\n2013).\\n At the time of briefing and oral argument, there was a de-\\nbatable question as to whether Regains’ claim was time-\\n\\fNo. 15-2444 7\\n\\nbarred. His assertion that he should not have been arrested\\nand charged sounded like a claim for false arrest, or false im-\\nprisonment. His assertion that he was detained for seventeen\\nmonths while awaiting trial on a charge that was unfounded\\nsounded like a malicious prosecution claim. The accrual rule\\nfor false arrest/false imprisonment claims is different from the\\naccrual rule for malicious prosecution claims. A claim for false\\narrest or false imprisonment accrues once the plaintiff is de-\\ntained (or released) as a result of a lawful process. Wallace, 549\\nU.S. at 390-391. A cause of action for malicious prosecution\\n“does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have termi-\\nnated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,\\n48 (1994).\\n When he appealed, that difference was critical for Regains.\\nHe was arraigned and detained by lawful process on Septem-\\nber 4, 2012; under the false arrest/false imprisonment accrual\\nrule, he would have had to file his § 1983 complaint by Sep-\\ntember 4, 2014. He did not file the complaint until December\\n3, 2014, three months later. In contrast, under the malicious\\nprosecution accrual rule, Regains’ claim would have accrued\\non December 3, 2012—the date he was acquitted. Regains filed\\nhis § 1983 complaint exactly two years after that date. If his\\nclaims properly fell into the false arrest/false imprisonment\\nrealm, his claim would have been time barred; if it fell into the\\nmalicious prosecution realm, it would have been timely.\\n After oral argument, this court resolved the timing ques-\\ntion. In Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018)\\n(“Manuel II”), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 22, 2019) (No. 18-\\n1093), we held that a claim that a plaintiff was detained\\n\\f8 No. 15-2444\\n\\nwithout probable cause “accrues when the detention ends.” 2\\nRegains concedes that the officers who arrested him had prob-\\nable cause to believe that he violated SORA, but he has con-\\nsistently argued that he seeks damages because he was “de-\\nprived of liberty without due process of law when he was\\nheld at the Cook County Jail until he was acquitted.” Appel-\\nlant’s Br. at 13. Applying the principle of Manuel II to Regains’\\nargument that his seventeen-month detention for a crime that\\nhe was misled into committing was unconstitutional, we con-\\nclude that his claim accrued when he was released on Decem-\\nber 3, 2012, and that his claim was timely filed.\\n This conclusion does not necessarily mandate remand,\\nhowever, because the district court stated other bases for dis-\\nmissing the case. The court also found that Regains’ amended\\ncomplaint failed to identify specific conduct on the City’s part\\nthat formed the basis for Regains’ claim that it violated his\\nrights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Regains named\\nonly the City as a defendant; he did not sue individual offic-\\ners. The amended complaint was terse—six of its twenty par-\\nagraphs described how and why officers steered homeless sex\\noffenders to shelters. The complaint then alleged that when\\nRegains tried to register, officers steered him to a shelter, reg-\\nistered him at that shelter and required him to come back for\\n\\n2 The Supreme Court has accepted certiorari in McDonough v. Smith, 2019\\nWL 166879 (No. 18-485). The petition presents the following question:\\n“Whether the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim based on fab-\\nrication of evidence in criminal proceedings begins to run when those pro-\\nceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor (as the majority of circuits has\\nheld) or whether it begins to run when the defendant becomes aware of\\nthe tainted evidence and its improper use (as the Second Circuit held be-\\nlow).” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McDounough 2018 WL 5026294 (No.\\n18-845). The Court will hear argument on April 17, 2019.\\n\\fNo. 15-2444 9\\n\\nre-registration in three months. It alleged the facts surround-\\ning Regains’ arrest and charging, and alleged that he stayed\\nin custody until his trial and acquittal. The penultimate para-\\ngraph stated, “As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff was de-\\nprived of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendments to\\nthe Constitution of the United States and incurred damages.”\\n The amended complaint does not link specific conduct to\\nRegains’ assertion that his due process rights were violated.\\nOther than identifying the City as an Illinois municipal cor-\\nporation, it does not describe any conduct by the City. It de-\\nscribes the actions of the officers who steered Regains to the\\nshelter, the actions of the officers who issued the investigative\\nalert and the actions of the officers who arrested him, but does\\nnot say which—if any—of these actions constitute conduct by\\nthe City that violated his due process rights. It says he “was\\ncharged” with a felony, and “remained” in custody until his\\nacquittal, but does not attribute to the City or anyone else re-\\nsponsibility for the charges or his detention. It does not allege\\nthat police department officials with policy-making authority\\nknew about these practices and allowed them to continue.\\n A plaintiff may remedy a deficient complaint by amend-\\ning it, but the district court also questioned whether Regains\\ncould state a claim against the City at all. In brief comments\\nat the end of its decision, the court noted that a municipality\\nsuch as the City is subject to liability under § 1983 only if an\\nofficial municipal policy caused the violation of the plaintiff’s\\nconstitutional rights, citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. The court\\nstated that in the absence of a constitutional violation, the City\\ncould not be held liable. Regains has not addressed the Monell\\nquestion in his appellate briefs.\\n\\f10 No. 15-2444\\n\\n Because Regains has chosen to sue only the City, he must\\nstate a claim that the denial of his liberty for seventeen months\\nwas the result of the implementation or execution of “a policy\\nstatement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially\\nadopted and promulgated by [the municipality’s] officers,” or\\na “governmental ‘custom’ … .” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Alle-\\ngations that the City is liable “on a respondeat superior theory”\\nwill not suffice. Id. at 691.\\n Before this court, Regains has alleged that there was a\\n“widespread practice within the police department of the City\\nof Chicago to manipulate the registration process to force\\nhomeless sex offenders into violations of the Monitoring Act.”\\nAppellant’s Brief at 6. He asserts that “[t]his practice was ‘so\\nwidespread and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or us-\\nage with the force of law even though it is not authorized by\\nwritten law or express policy.’” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2,\\nquoting Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir.\\n2015). Regains has presented no evidence to support these al-\\nlegations; he never got the chance, because the district court\\ndismissed the case at the pleading stage. Other plaintiffs have\\nhad the opportunity to present such evidence.\\n In Beley v. City of Chicago, a class composed of “[a]ll per-\\nsons who attempted to register under the Illinois Sex Offender\\nRegistration Act with the City of Chicago from December 6,\\n2010 to the date of entry of judgment and who were not per-\\nmitted to register because they were homeless” alleged that\\nthe City had violated, among other provisions, the due pro-\\ncess clause. Beley v. City of Chicago, Case No. 12-cv-9714, 2017\\nWL 77096, at *1 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 28, 2017), aff’d 901 F.3d 823 (7th\\nCir. 2018). The district court granted summary judgment in\\nfavor of the City on the due process claim. The court stated\\n\\fNo. 15-2444 11\\n\\nthat its ruling turned on “one dispositive issue: whether Plain-\\ntiffs present sufficient evidence of a ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ on the\\npart of Defendant to support municipal liability.” Id. at *6.\\nViewing the evidence the plaintiffs had presented in the light\\nmost favorable to them, the court found that they “fail[ed] to\\nraise a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether [Criminal\\nRegistration Section] personnel acted pursuant to an official\\npolicy or practice regarding the registration of homeless sex\\noffenders.” Id. at *8. The court found that, at best, the plaintiffs\\nhad proven that on ten occasions, individual officers may\\nhave engaged in unconstitutional behavior. Id. Although the\\nplaintiffs appear to have presented a substantial amount of\\nevidence in Beley, the court concluded that “the evidence does\\nnot present a triable issue of fact regarding whether there was\\na policy or widespread practice of denying SORA registration\\nto sex offenders who lacked a fixed address at the time of reg-\\nistration.” Id. at *10. “At most, Plaintiffs have shown ‘occa-\\nsional lapses of judgment’ or ‘individual misconduct by po-\\nlice officers,’ not ‘systemic problems’ or ‘institutional behav-\\nior.’” Id., quoting Rossi 790 F.3d at 737. The plaintiffs appealed;\\nwe affirmed on other grounds. Beley 901 F.3d at 826 (affirming\\non the ground that the ability to register under SORA is not a\\ncognizable liberty interest).\\n Another district court reached the same conclusion in a\\ncase involving individual plaintiffs. See Derfus v. City of Chi-\\ncago, Case No. 13 C 7298, 2015 WL 1592558 (N.D. Ill., April 6,\\n2015). In granting summary judgment in favor of the City, the\\nDerfus court concluded:\\n The fact that the City registered more offenders\\n as not having a fixed residence or temporary\\n domicile in two random time periods in 2014\\n\\f12 No. 15-2444\\n\\n than in two random time periods in prior years\\n does not suggest that the City had a policy of\\n refusing to register offenders with that status.\\n Nor does the fact that it refused over a three-\\n year period to register six offenders as “home-\\n less,” a term that does not appear in SORA and\\n that is commonly used to refer to a much\\n broader segment of people than those deemed\\n by SORA to be lacking a fixed residence or tem-\\n porary domicile.\\nId. at *4.\\n These cases raise doubts about whether Regains could\\namend his complaint to allege a widespread policy or prac-\\ntice, or marshal proof the proof at summary judgment that the\\nBeley and Derfus plaintiffs could not. Even if he can allege that\\na practice existed and that it was widespread enough to con-\\nstitute a custom, Monell requires more. Regains’ arguments\\nand the very fact of his arrest and detention show that not all\\nofficers followed the practice. He describes a schism between\\nregistering officers who followed the steering practice and\\nthose who did not. To state a Monell claim, Regains will need\\nto show that high-ranking members of the Chicago Police De-\\npartment knew of the differing practices and allowed them to\\ncontinue. This may be a tall order, but we cannot conclude\\nthat allowing Regains to try would be an exercise in futility.\\n A final point: on appeal, Regains consistently has charac-\\nterized his claim as a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment\\ndue process rights. At the time he filed the appeal, that was\\nhis only option; our decision in Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750, pre-\\ncluded the argument that pretrial detention that occurred af-\\nter the start of the judicial process violated the Fourth\\n\\fNo. 15-2444 13\\n\\nAmendment. Manuel I since has abrogated Newsome, holding\\nthat “the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful\\npretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process.” 137\\nU.S. at 920. In the post-Manuel I/Manuel II world, “the Fourth\\nAmendment, not the Due Process Clause, is the source of the\\nright in a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention,\\nwhether before or after the initiation of formal legal process.”\\nLewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. Jan. 23,\\n2019).\\n III. Conclusion\\n Because Regains timely filed his complaint, we reverse the\\ndistrict court’s dismissal of the complaint and remand for fur-\\nther proceedings consistent with this decision.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4376577/\", \"author_raw\": \"PEPPER, District Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"PEPPER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4599324/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Paul REGAINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-13\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 15-2444\nPAUL REGAINS,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nCITY OF CHICAGO,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 14 C 9687 — James B. Zagel, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 13, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and\nPEPPER, District Judge. *\n The Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) requires\nsex offenders to register with the police. Because he did not\nhave a permanent address (he was homeless), Paul Regains\nfollowed the instructions of officers who directed him to a\n\n\n * Of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.\n\f2 No. 15-2444\n\nlocal homeless shelter (which they listed on his registration as\nhis permanent address), and to return for re-registration in\nninety days. When he appeared to report three months later,\nChicago police officers arrested Regains on an “investigative\nalert,” because other officers had not been able to locate Re-\ngains at the address provided. Regains remained in custody\nseventeen months before the Illinois trial court found him not\nguilty of failing to a report a change of address.\n Regains sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,\nclaiming that it violated his rights under the Due Process\nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dis-\nmissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure\n12(b)(6), finding that either the claim was time-barred under\nIllinois’ two-year statute of limitations for personal injury\nclaims, or that it was barred by this court’s decision in New-\nsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001), abrogated by\nManual v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (“Manuel I”). The\ndistrict court also found that the amended complaint lacked\nsufficient factual details to give the City fair notice, and that\nbecause Regains did not specifically identify a particular con-\nstitutional violation, the City could not be held liable under\nMonell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978).\n We reverse the district court’s decision that Regains’ claim\nwas time-barred, and remand for further proceedings.\n I. Background\n In 2012, SORA required sex offenders to register in person\nwithin three days of establishing a residence or a temporary\ndomicile in any county. 730 ILCS § 150/3(b) (2012). Sex offend-\ners in the City of Chicago registered “at the Chicago Police\nDepartment Headquarters.” 730 ILCS § 150/3(a)(1). The law\n\fNo. 15-2444 3\n\nrequired sex offenders without a fixed address or temporary\ndomicile to report weekly to the chief of police in the munici-\npality in which that person was located. 730 ILCS § 150/3.\n The plaintiff asserts that SORA required “persons with a\nfixed abode” to report every ninety days, citing 730 ILCS\n§ 150/6. Appellant’s Br. at 2. In fact, that section of the statute\nrequired a person who had been adjudicated to be sexually\ndangerous or was a sexually violent person to report every\nninety days (and required such offenders to report weekly if\nthey did not have a fixed residence). “Any other person” re-\nquired to register under the statute was required to report\nonce a year. The record does not indicate whether Regains,\nhad he had a fixed residence, would have been subject to the\nninety-day reporting interval or the one-year reporting inter-\nval. Either way, the law required homeless sex offenders to\nreport more frequently than sex offenders with fixed resi-\ndences. Failure to comply with the provisions of the statute\nconstituted a felony, for which there was strict liability. 730\nILCS § 150/10(a); People v. Molnar, 857 N.E.2d 209, 224 (Ill.\n2006).\n By 2012, the Chicago police officers assigned to sex of-\nfender registration/reporting duty felt that the weekly report-\ning requirement for homeless sex offenders had become bur-\ndensome. Some of those police officers engaged in a wide-\nspread practice of steering homeless sex offenders to home-\nless shelters that would accept sex offenders, and directing\nthe sex offenders to return with documentation showing the\nshelter as the sex offender’s residence. This scheme had the\neffect of providing homeless sex offenders with a “residence,”\nwhich meant that they were not subject to the weekly report-\ning requirement. The officers who engaged in this steering\n\f4 No. 15-2444\n\npractice, and their supervisors, were aware that the number\nof persons registered at the shelters far exceeded the shelter’s\ncapacity. In other words, they knew that the homeless sex of-\nfenders who listed the shelter as their “address” likely would\nnot be able to remain there.\n Other Chicago police officers assigned to registration du-\nties disagreed with the steering practice. These other officers\nvisited homeless shelters that accepted sex offender regis-\ntrants and attempted to locate the registrant; if they could not\nlocate the registrant at the shelter, the officers would prepare\nan investigative alert, informing any Chicago police officer\nwho encountered the registrant that there was probable cause\nfor arrest.\n Regains alleges that in April 2012, Chicago police officers\nemployed the steering practice when he attempted to register\nas a homeless sex offender. He asserts that they directed him\nto a shelter, registered him as residing at that shelter, and in-\nstructed him to return for quarterly reporting and re-registra-\ntion in July 2012.\n In early May 2012, two Chicago police officers went to the\nshelter to look for Regains. They did not find him, and they\nprepared a report for failure to register at that address. The\nnext day, a Chicago police detective reviewed the report, vis-\nited the shelter without finding Regains, and issued an inves-\ntigative alert informing other Chicago police officers that\nthere was probable cause to arrest Regains.\n On July 18, 2012, Regains reported as directed; Chicago\npolice officers arrested him under the investigative alert. The\nprosecutor charged Regains with two violations of 730 ILCS\n§ 150/6—failure to register within three days after changing\n\fNo. 15-2444 5\n\nhis address, and failure to report every ninety days. On Sep-\ntember 4, 2012, Cook County Judge Thomas V. Gainer ar-\nraigned Regains and ordered him detained. Regains re-\nmained in custody until his December 3, 2012 trial—some sev-\nenteen months—at which time the judge found him not\nguilty. 1\n Regains filed his original § 1983 complaint in federal court\non December 3, 2014.\n II. Discussion\n We review de novo a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6)\nmotion to dismiss. Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840\nF.3d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “In construing\nthe complaint, we accept all well-pleaded facts as true and\ndraw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor.” Id. We\nmay affirm on any ground that the record supports, as long\nas the district court adequately addressed that ground and the\nnon-moving party had the opportunity to contest it. Thayer v.\nChiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 247 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).\n Regains argues that he was deprived of his liberty for sev-\nenteen months without due process of law, as a result of “the\nwidespread practice within the Chicago police department to-\nwards homeless sex offenders.” Appellant’s Br. at 6. He as-\nserts that the City violated his Fourteenth Amendment due\nprocess rights by engaging in conduct “in the nature of\n\n\n1 The transcript of Regains’ trial indicates that he registered on April 17,\n2012. App. to Appellee’s Br. at A27. He appeared at the police station on\nJuly 18, 2012, id. at A30, ninety-two days after the date he last registered,\nid. at A37. The trial judge stated that he could not tell from looking at the\nreport date Regains had been given whether he was to report on July 16\nor July 18, 2012, and made a finding that Regains was not guilty. Id. at A37.\n\f6 No. 15-2444\n\nmalicious prosecution.” He has taken pains to avoid giving\nhis personal injury claim a specific label. The district court\nfound that if Regains’ claim sounded in false arrest, it was\ntime-barred, and that if it sounded in malicious prosecution,\nit was barred for other reasons.\n Regains sued under a federal statute—42 U.S.C. § 1983—\nbut we look to the law of the state in which the personal injury\noccurred to determine the length of the statute of limitations.\nWallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Serino v. Hensley, 735\nF.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013). Under Illinois law, a plaintiff\nmust bring a personal injury action within two years after its\naccrual. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387 (citing 735 ILCS § 5/13-202\n(West 2003)).\n The question of when the cause of action accrues “is a\nquestion of federal law that is not resolved by reference to\nstate law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (emphasis in the original).\nFederal common law holds that a cause of action accrues\nwhen “the plaintiff has a ‘complete and present cause of ac-\ntion’”—in other words, when “the plaintiff can file suit and\nobtain relief.” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning\nPension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201\n(1997)). Put another way, a personal injury claim raised under\n§ 1983 accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to\nknow of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Serino, 735\nF.3d at 591. Because there is “no single accrual rule for all\n§ 1983 claims,” we must “use the rule that applies to the com-\nmon-law cause of action most similar to the kind of claim the\nplaintiff asserts.” Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir.\n2013).\n At the time of briefing and oral argument, there was a de-\nbatable question as to whether Regains’ claim was time-\n\fNo. 15-2444 7\n\nbarred. His assertion that he should not have been arrested\nand charged sounded like a claim for false arrest, or false im-\nprisonment. His assertion that he was detained for seventeen\nmonths while awaiting trial on a charge that was unfounded\nsounded like a malicious prosecution claim. The accrual rule\nfor false arrest/false imprisonment claims is different from the\naccrual rule for malicious prosecution claims. A claim for false\narrest or false imprisonment accrues once the plaintiff is de-\ntained (or released) as a result of a lawful process. Wallace, 549\nU.S. at 390-391. A cause of action for malicious prosecution\n“does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have termi-\nnated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,\n48 (1994).\n When he appealed, that difference was critical for Regains.\nHe was arraigned and detained by lawful process on Septem-\nber 4, 2012; under the false arrest/false imprisonment accrual\nrule, he would have had to file his § 1983 complaint by Sep-\ntember 4, 2014. He did not file the complaint until December\n3, 2014, three months later. In contrast, under the malicious\nprosecution accrual rule, Regains’ claim would have accrued\non December 3, 2012—the date he was acquitted. Regains filed\nhis § 1983 complaint exactly two years after that date. If his\nclaims properly fell into the false arrest/false imprisonment\nrealm, his claim would have been time barred; if it fell into the\nmalicious prosecution realm, it would have been timely.\n After oral argument, this court resolved the timing ques-\ntion. In Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018)\n(“Manuel II”), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 22, 2019) (No. 18-\n1093), we held that a claim that a plaintiff was detained\n\f8 No. 15-2444\n\nwithout probable cause “accrues when the detention ends.” 2\nRegains concedes that the officers who arrested him had prob-\nable cause to believe that he violated SORA, but he has con-\nsistently argued that he seeks damages because he was “de-\nprived of liberty without due process of law when he was\nheld at the Cook County Jail until he was acquitted.” Appel-\nlant’s Br. at 13. Applying the principle of Manuel II to Regains’\nargument that his seventeen-month detention for a crime that\nhe was misled into committing was unconstitutional, we con-\nclude that his claim accrued when he was released on Decem-\nber 3, 2012, and that his claim was timely filed.\n This conclusion does not necessarily mandate remand,\nhowever, because the district court stated other bases for dis-\nmissing the case. The court also found that Regains’ amended\ncomplaint failed to identify specific conduct on the City’s part\nthat formed the basis for Regains’ claim that it violated his\nrights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Regains named\nonly the City as a defendant; he did not sue individual offic-\ners. The amended complaint was terse—six of its twenty par-\nagraphs described how and why officers steered homeless sex\noffenders to shelters. The complaint then alleged that when\nRegains tried to register, officers steered him to a shelter, reg-\nistered him at that shelter and required him to come back for\n\n2 The Supreme Court has accepted certiorari in McDonough v. Smith, 2019\nWL 166879 (No. 18-485). The petition presents the following question:\n“Whether the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim based on fab-\nrication of evidence in criminal proceedings begins to run when those pro-\nceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor (as the majority of circuits has\nheld) or whether it begins to run when the defendant becomes aware of\nthe tainted evidence and its improper use (as the Second Circuit held be-\nlow).” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McDounough 2018 WL 5026294 (No.\n18-845). The Court will hear argument on April 17, 2019.\n\fNo. 15-2444 9\n\nre-registration in three months. It alleged the facts surround-\ning Regains’ arrest and charging, and alleged that he stayed\nin custody until his trial and acquittal. The penultimate para-\ngraph stated, “As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff was de-\nprived of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendments to\nthe Constitution of the United States and incurred damages.”\n The amended complaint does not link specific conduct to\nRegains’ assertion that his due process rights were violated.\nOther than identifying the City as an Illinois municipal cor-\nporation, it does not describe any conduct by the City. It de-\nscribes the actions of the officers who steered Regains to the\nshelter, the actions of the officers who issued the investigative\nalert and the actions of the officers who arrested him, but does\nnot say which—if any—of these actions constitute conduct by\nthe City that violated his due process rights. It says he “was\ncharged” with a felony, and “remained” in custody until his\nacquittal, but does not attribute to the City or anyone else re-\nsponsibility for the charges or his detention. It does not allege\nthat police department officials with policy-making authority\nknew about these practices and allowed them to continue.\n A plaintiff may remedy a deficient complaint by amend-\ning it, but the district court also questioned whether Regains\ncould state a claim against the City at all. In brief comments\nat the end of its decision, the court noted that a municipality\nsuch as the City is subject to liability under § 1983 only if an\nofficial municipal policy caused the violation of the plaintiff’s\nconstitutional rights, citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. The court\nstated that in the absence of a constitutional violation, the City\ncould not be held liable. Regains has not addressed the Monell\nquestion in his appellate briefs.\n\f10 No. 15-2444\n\n Because Regains has chosen to sue only the City, he must\nstate a claim that the denial of his liberty for seventeen months\nwas the result of the implementation or execution of “a policy\nstatement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially\nadopted and promulgated by [the municipality’s] officers,” or\na “governmental ‘custom’ … .” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Alle-\ngations that the City is liable “on a respondeat superior theory”\nwill not suffice. Id. at 691.\n Before this court, Regains has alleged that there was a\n“widespread practice within the police department of the City\nof Chicago to manipulate the registration process to force\nhomeless sex offenders into violations of the Monitoring Act.”\nAppellant’s Brief at 6. He asserts that “[t]his practice was ‘so\nwidespread and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or us-\nage with the force of law even though it is not authorized by\nwritten law or express policy.’” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2,\nquoting Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir.\n2015). Regains has presented no evidence to support these al-\nlegations; he never got the chance, because the district court\ndismissed the case at the pleading stage. Other plaintiffs have\nhad the opportunity to present such evidence.\n In Beley v. City of Chicago, a class composed of “[a]ll per-\nsons who attempted to register under the Illinois Sex Offender\nRegistration Act with the City of Chicago from December 6,\n2010 to the date of entry of judgment and who were not per-\nmitted to register because they were homeless” alleged that\nthe City had violated, among other provisions, the due pro-\ncess clause. Beley v. City of Chicago, Case No. 12-cv-9714, 2017\nWL 77096, at *1 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 28, 2017), aff’d 901 F.3d 823 (7th\nCir. 2018). The district court granted summary judgment in\nfavor of the City on the due process claim. The court stated\n\fNo. 15-2444 11\n\nthat its ruling turned on “one dispositive issue: whether Plain-\ntiffs present sufficient evidence of a ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ on the\npart of Defendant to support municipal liability.” Id. at *6.\nViewing the evidence the plaintiffs had presented in the light\nmost favorable to them, the court found that they “fail[ed] to\nraise a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether [Criminal\nRegistration Section] personnel acted pursuant to an official\npolicy or practice regarding the registration of homeless sex\noffenders.” Id. at *8. The court found that, at best, the plaintiffs\nhad proven that on ten occasions, individual officers may\nhave engaged in unconstitutional behavior. Id. Although the\nplaintiffs appear to have presented a substantial amount of\nevidence in Beley, the court concluded that “the evidence does\nnot present a triable issue of fact regarding whether there was\na policy or widespread practice of denying SORA registration\nto sex offenders who lacked a fixed address at the time of reg-\nistration.” Id. at *10. “At most, Plaintiffs have shown ‘occa-\nsional lapses of judgment’ or ‘individual misconduct by po-\nlice officers,’ not ‘systemic problems’ or ‘institutional behav-\nior.’” Id., quoting Rossi 790 F.3d at 737. The plaintiffs appealed;\nwe affirmed on other grounds. Beley 901 F.3d at 826 (affirming\non the ground that the ability to register under SORA is not a\ncognizable liberty interest).\n Another district court reached the same conclusion in a\ncase involving individual plaintiffs. See Derfus v. City of Chi-\ncago, Case No. 13 C 7298, 2015 WL 1592558 (N.D. Ill., April 6,\n2015). In granting summary judgment in favor of the City, the\nDerfus court concluded:\n The fact that the City registered more offenders\n as not having a fixed residence or temporary\n domicile in two random time periods in 2014\n\f12 No. 15-2444\n\n than in two random time periods in prior years\n does not suggest that the City had a policy of\n refusing to register offenders with that status.\n Nor does the fact that it refused over a three-\n year period to register six offenders as “home-\n less,” a term that does not appear in SORA and\n that is commonly used to refer to a much\n broader segment of people than those deemed\n by SORA to be lacking a fixed residence or tem-\n porary domicile.\nId. at *4.\n These cases raise doubts about whether Regains could\namend his complaint to allege a widespread policy or prac-\ntice, or marshal proof the proof at summary judgment that the\nBeley and Derfus plaintiffs could not. Even if he can allege that\na practice existed and that it was widespread enough to con-\nstitute a custom, Monell requires more. Regains’ arguments\nand the very fact of his arrest and detention show that not all\nofficers followed the practice. He describes a schism between\nregistering officers who followed the steering practice and\nthose who did not. To state a Monell claim, Regains will need\nto show that high-ranking members of the Chicago Police De-\npartment knew of the differing practices and allowed them to\ncontinue. This may be a tall order, but we cannot conclude\nthat allowing Regains to try would be an exercise in futility.\n A final point: on appeal, Regains consistently has charac-\nterized his claim as a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment\ndue process rights. At the time he filed the appeal, that was\nhis only option; our decision in Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750, pre-\ncluded the argument that pretrial detention that occurred af-\nter the start of the judicial process violated the Fourth\n\fNo. 15-2444 13\n\nAmendment. Manuel I since has abrogated Newsome, holding\nthat “the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful\npretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process.” 137\nU.S. at 920. In the post-Manuel I/Manuel II world, “the Fourth\nAmendment, not the Due Process Clause, is the source of the\nright in a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention,\nwhether before or after the initiation of formal legal process.”\nLewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. Jan. 23,\n2019).\n III. Conclusion\n Because Regains timely filed his complaint, we reverse the\ndistrict court’s dismissal of the complaint and remand for fur-\nther proceedings consistent with this decision.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Paul REGAINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-13\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 15-2444\\nPAUL REGAINS,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nCITY OF CHICAGO,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 14 C 9687 — James B. Zagel, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 13, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and\\nPEPPER, District Judge. *\\n The Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) requires\\nsex offenders to register with the police. Because he did not\\nhave a permanent address (he was homeless), Paul Regains\\nfollowed the instructions of officers who directed him to a\\n\\n\\n * Of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.\\n\\f2 No. 15-2444\\n\\nlocal homeless shelter (which they listed on his registration as\\nhis permanent address), and to return for re-registration in\\nninety days. When he appeared to report three months later,\\nChicago police officers arrested Regains on an “investigative\\nalert,” because other officers had not been able to locate Re-\\ngains at the address provided. Regains remained in custody\\nseventeen months before the Illinois trial court found him not\\nguilty of failing to a report a change of address.\\n Regains sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,\\nclaiming that it violated his rights under the Due Process\\nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dis-\\nmissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure\\n12(b)(6), finding that either the claim was time-barred under\\nIllinois’ two-year statute of limitations for personal injury\\nclaims, or that it was barred by this court’s decision in New-\\nsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001), abrogated by\\nManual v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (“Manuel I”). The\\ndistrict court also found that the amended complaint lacked\\nsufficient factual details to give the City fair notice, and that\\nbecause Regains did not specifically identify a particular con-\\nstitutional violation, the City could not be held liable under\\nMonell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978).\\n We reverse the district court’s decision that Regains’ claim\\nwas time-barred, and remand for further proceedings.\\n I. Background\\n In 2012, SORA required sex offenders to register in person\\nwithin three days of establishing a residence or a temporary\\ndomicile in any county. 730 ILCS § 150/3(b) (2012). Sex offend-\\ners in the City of Chicago registered “at the Chicago Police\\nDepartment Headquarters.” 730 ILCS § 150/3(a)(1). The law\\n\\fNo. 15-2444 3\\n\\nrequired sex offenders without a fixed address or temporary\\ndomicile to report weekly to the chief of police in the munici-\\npality in which that person was located. 730 ILCS § 150/3.\\n The plaintiff asserts that SORA required “persons with a\\nfixed abode” to report every ninety days, citing 730 ILCS\\n§ 150/6. Appellant’s Br. at 2. In fact, that section of the statute\\nrequired a person who had been adjudicated to be sexually\\ndangerous or was a sexually violent person to report every\\nninety days (and required such offenders to report weekly if\\nthey did not have a fixed residence). “Any other person” re-\\nquired to register under the statute was required to report\\nonce a year. The record does not indicate whether Regains,\\nhad he had a fixed residence, would have been subject to the\\nninety-day reporting interval or the one-year reporting inter-\\nval. Either way, the law required homeless sex offenders to\\nreport more frequently than sex offenders with fixed resi-\\ndences. Failure to comply with the provisions of the statute\\nconstituted a felony, for which there was strict liability. 730\\nILCS § 150/10(a); People v. Molnar, 857 N.E.2d 209, 224 (Ill.\\n2006).\\n By 2012, the Chicago police officers assigned to sex of-\\nfender registration/reporting duty felt that the weekly report-\\ning requirement for homeless sex offenders had become bur-\\ndensome. Some of those police officers engaged in a wide-\\nspread practice of steering homeless sex offenders to home-\\nless shelters that would accept sex offenders, and directing\\nthe sex offenders to return with documentation showing the\\nshelter as the sex offender’s residence. This scheme had the\\neffect of providing homeless sex offenders with a “residence,”\\nwhich meant that they were not subject to the weekly report-\\ning requirement. The officers who engaged in this steering\\n\\f4 No. 15-2444\\n\\npractice, and their supervisors, were aware that the number\\nof persons registered at the shelters far exceeded the shelter’s\\ncapacity. In other words, they knew that the homeless sex of-\\nfenders who listed the shelter as their “address” likely would\\nnot be able to remain there.\\n Other Chicago police officers assigned to registration du-\\nties disagreed with the steering practice. These other officers\\nvisited homeless shelters that accepted sex offender regis-\\ntrants and attempted to locate the registrant; if they could not\\nlocate the registrant at the shelter, the officers would prepare\\nan investigative alert, informing any Chicago police officer\\nwho encountered the registrant that there was probable cause\\nfor arrest.\\n Regains alleges that in April 2012, Chicago police officers\\nemployed the steering practice when he attempted to register\\nas a homeless sex offender. He asserts that they directed him\\nto a shelter, registered him as residing at that shelter, and in-\\nstructed him to return for quarterly reporting and re-registra-\\ntion in July 2012.\\n In early May 2012, two Chicago police officers went to the\\nshelter to look for Regains. They did not find him, and they\\nprepared a report for failure to register at that address. The\\nnext day, a Chicago police detective reviewed the report, vis-\\nited the shelter without finding Regains, and issued an inves-\\ntigative alert informing other Chicago police officers that\\nthere was probable cause to arrest Regains.\\n On July 18, 2012, Regains reported as directed; Chicago\\npolice officers arrested him under the investigative alert. The\\nprosecutor charged Regains with two violations of 730 ILCS\\n§ 150/6—failure to register within three days after changing\\n\\fNo. 15-2444 5\\n\\nhis address, and failure to report every ninety days. On Sep-\\ntember 4, 2012, Cook County Judge Thomas V. Gainer ar-\\nraigned Regains and ordered him detained. Regains re-\\nmained in custody until his December 3, 2012 trial—some sev-\\nenteen months—at which time the judge found him not\\nguilty. 1\\n Regains filed his original § 1983 complaint in federal court\\non December 3, 2014.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review de novo a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6)\\nmotion to dismiss. Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840\\nF.3d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “In construing\\nthe complaint, we accept all well-pleaded facts as true and\\ndraw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor.” Id. We\\nmay affirm on any ground that the record supports, as long\\nas the district court adequately addressed that ground and the\\nnon-moving party had the opportunity to contest it. Thayer v.\\nChiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 247 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).\\n Regains argues that he was deprived of his liberty for sev-\\nenteen months without due process of law, as a result of “the\\nwidespread practice within the Chicago police department to-\\nwards homeless sex offenders.” Appellant’s Br. at 6. He as-\\nserts that the City violated his Fourteenth Amendment due\\nprocess rights by engaging in conduct “in the nature of\\n\\n\\n1 The transcript of Regains’ trial indicates that he registered on April 17,\\n2012. App. to Appellee’s Br. at A27. He appeared at the police station on\\nJuly 18, 2012, id. at A30, ninety-two days after the date he last registered,\\nid. at A37. The trial judge stated that he could not tell from looking at the\\nreport date Regains had been given whether he was to report on July 16\\nor July 18, 2012, and made a finding that Regains was not guilty. Id. at A37.\\n\\f6 No. 15-2444\\n\\nmalicious prosecution.” He has taken pains to avoid giving\\nhis personal injury claim a specific label. The district court\\nfound that if Regains’ claim sounded in false arrest, it was\\ntime-barred, and that if it sounded in malicious prosecution,\\nit was barred for other reasons.\\n Regains sued under a federal statute—42 U.S.C. § 1983—\\nbut we look to the law of the state in which the personal injury\\noccurred to determine the length of the statute of limitations.\\nWallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Serino v. Hensley, 735\\nF.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013). Under Illinois law, a plaintiff\\nmust bring a personal injury action within two years after its\\naccrual. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387 (citing 735 ILCS § 5/13-202\\n(West 2003)).\\n The question of when the cause of action accrues “is a\\nquestion of federal law that is not resolved by reference to\\nstate law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (emphasis in the original).\\nFederal common law holds that a cause of action accrues\\nwhen “the plaintiff has a ‘complete and present cause of ac-\\ntion’”—in other words, when “the plaintiff can file suit and\\nobtain relief.” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning\\nPension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201\\n(1997)). Put another way, a personal injury claim raised under\\n§ 1983 accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to\\nknow of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Serino, 735\\nF.3d at 591. Because there is “no single accrual rule for all\\n§ 1983 claims,” we must “use the rule that applies to the com-\\nmon-law cause of action most similar to the kind of claim the\\nplaintiff asserts.” Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir.\\n2013).\\n At the time of briefing and oral argument, there was a de-\\nbatable question as to whether Regains’ claim was time-\\n\\fNo. 15-2444 7\\n\\nbarred. His assertion that he should not have been arrested\\nand charged sounded like a claim for false arrest, or false im-\\nprisonment. His assertion that he was detained for seventeen\\nmonths while awaiting trial on a charge that was unfounded\\nsounded like a malicious prosecution claim. The accrual rule\\nfor false arrest/false imprisonment claims is different from the\\naccrual rule for malicious prosecution claims. A claim for false\\narrest or false imprisonment accrues once the plaintiff is de-\\ntained (or released) as a result of a lawful process. Wallace, 549\\nU.S. at 390-391. A cause of action for malicious prosecution\\n“does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have termi-\\nnated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,\\n48 (1994).\\n When he appealed, that difference was critical for Regains.\\nHe was arraigned and detained by lawful process on Septem-\\nber 4, 2012; under the false arrest/false imprisonment accrual\\nrule, he would have had to file his § 1983 complaint by Sep-\\ntember 4, 2014. He did not file the complaint until December\\n3, 2014, three months later. In contrast, under the malicious\\nprosecution accrual rule, Regains’ claim would have accrued\\non December 3, 2012—the date he was acquitted. Regains filed\\nhis § 1983 complaint exactly two years after that date. If his\\nclaims properly fell into the false arrest/false imprisonment\\nrealm, his claim would have been time barred; if it fell into the\\nmalicious prosecution realm, it would have been timely.\\n After oral argument, this court resolved the timing ques-\\ntion. In Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018)\\n(“Manuel II”), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 22, 2019) (No. 18-\\n1093), we held that a claim that a plaintiff was detained\\n\\f8 No. 15-2444\\n\\nwithout probable cause “accrues when the detention ends.” 2\\nRegains concedes that the officers who arrested him had prob-\\nable cause to believe that he violated SORA, but he has con-\\nsistently argued that he seeks damages because he was “de-\\nprived of liberty without due process of law when he was\\nheld at the Cook County Jail until he was acquitted.” Appel-\\nlant’s Br. at 13. Applying the principle of Manuel II to Regains’\\nargument that his seventeen-month detention for a crime that\\nhe was misled into committing was unconstitutional, we con-\\nclude that his claim accrued when he was released on Decem-\\nber 3, 2012, and that his claim was timely filed.\\n This conclusion does not necessarily mandate remand,\\nhowever, because the district court stated other bases for dis-\\nmissing the case. The court also found that Regains’ amended\\ncomplaint failed to identify specific conduct on the City’s part\\nthat formed the basis for Regains’ claim that it violated his\\nrights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Regains named\\nonly the City as a defendant; he did not sue individual offic-\\ners. The amended complaint was terse—six of its twenty par-\\nagraphs described how and why officers steered homeless sex\\noffenders to shelters. The complaint then alleged that when\\nRegains tried to register, officers steered him to a shelter, reg-\\nistered him at that shelter and required him to come back for\\n\\n2 The Supreme Court has accepted certiorari in McDonough v. Smith, 2019\\nWL 166879 (No. 18-485). The petition presents the following question:\\n“Whether the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim based on fab-\\nrication of evidence in criminal proceedings begins to run when those pro-\\nceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor (as the majority of circuits has\\nheld) or whether it begins to run when the defendant becomes aware of\\nthe tainted evidence and its improper use (as the Second Circuit held be-\\nlow).” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McDounough 2018 WL 5026294 (No.\\n18-845). The Court will hear argument on April 17, 2019.\\n\\fNo. 15-2444 9\\n\\nre-registration in three months. It alleged the facts surround-\\ning Regains’ arrest and charging, and alleged that he stayed\\nin custody until his trial and acquittal. The penultimate para-\\ngraph stated, “As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff was de-\\nprived of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendments to\\nthe Constitution of the United States and incurred damages.”\\n The amended complaint does not link specific conduct to\\nRegains’ assertion that his due process rights were violated.\\nOther than identifying the City as an Illinois municipal cor-\\nporation, it does not describe any conduct by the City. It de-\\nscribes the actions of the officers who steered Regains to the\\nshelter, the actions of the officers who issued the investigative\\nalert and the actions of the officers who arrested him, but does\\nnot say which—if any—of these actions constitute conduct by\\nthe City that violated his due process rights. It says he “was\\ncharged” with a felony, and “remained” in custody until his\\nacquittal, but does not attribute to the City or anyone else re-\\nsponsibility for the charges or his detention. It does not allege\\nthat police department officials with policy-making authority\\nknew about these practices and allowed them to continue.\\n A plaintiff may remedy a deficient complaint by amend-\\ning it, but the district court also questioned whether Regains\\ncould state a claim against the City at all. In brief comments\\nat the end of its decision, the court noted that a municipality\\nsuch as the City is subject to liability under § 1983 only if an\\nofficial municipal policy caused the violation of the plaintiff’s\\nconstitutional rights, citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. The court\\nstated that in the absence of a constitutional violation, the City\\ncould not be held liable. Regains has not addressed the Monell\\nquestion in his appellate briefs.\\n\\f10 No. 15-2444\\n\\n Because Regains has chosen to sue only the City, he must\\nstate a claim that the denial of his liberty for seventeen months\\nwas the result of the implementation or execution of “a policy\\nstatement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially\\nadopted and promulgated by [the municipality’s] officers,” or\\na “governmental ‘custom’ … .” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Alle-\\ngations that the City is liable “on a respondeat superior theory”\\nwill not suffice. Id. at 691.\\n Before this court, Regains has alleged that there was a\\n“widespread practice within the police department of the City\\nof Chicago to manipulate the registration process to force\\nhomeless sex offenders into violations of the Monitoring Act.”\\nAppellant’s Brief at 6. He asserts that “[t]his practice was ‘so\\nwidespread and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or us-\\nage with the force of law even though it is not authorized by\\nwritten law or express policy.’” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2,\\nquoting Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir.\\n2015). Regains has presented no evidence to support these al-\\nlegations; he never got the chance, because the district court\\ndismissed the case at the pleading stage. Other plaintiffs have\\nhad the opportunity to present such evidence.\\n In Beley v. City of Chicago, a class composed of “[a]ll per-\\nsons who attempted to register under the Illinois Sex Offender\\nRegistration Act with the City of Chicago from December 6,\\n2010 to the date of entry of judgment and who were not per-\\nmitted to register because they were homeless” alleged that\\nthe City had violated, among other provisions, the due pro-\\ncess clause. Beley v. City of Chicago, Case No. 12-cv-9714, 2017\\nWL 77096, at *1 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 28, 2017), aff’d 901 F.3d 823 (7th\\nCir. 2018). The district court granted summary judgment in\\nfavor of the City on the due process claim. The court stated\\n\\fNo. 15-2444 11\\n\\nthat its ruling turned on “one dispositive issue: whether Plain-\\ntiffs present sufficient evidence of a ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ on the\\npart of Defendant to support municipal liability.” Id. at *6.\\nViewing the evidence the plaintiffs had presented in the light\\nmost favorable to them, the court found that they “fail[ed] to\\nraise a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether [Criminal\\nRegistration Section] personnel acted pursuant to an official\\npolicy or practice regarding the registration of homeless sex\\noffenders.” Id. at *8. The court found that, at best, the plaintiffs\\nhad proven that on ten occasions, individual officers may\\nhave engaged in unconstitutional behavior. Id. Although the\\nplaintiffs appear to have presented a substantial amount of\\nevidence in Beley, the court concluded that “the evidence does\\nnot present a triable issue of fact regarding whether there was\\na policy or widespread practice of denying SORA registration\\nto sex offenders who lacked a fixed address at the time of reg-\\nistration.” Id. at *10. “At most, Plaintiffs have shown ‘occa-\\nsional lapses of judgment’ or ‘individual misconduct by po-\\nlice officers,’ not ‘systemic problems’ or ‘institutional behav-\\nior.’” Id., quoting Rossi 790 F.3d at 737. The plaintiffs appealed;\\nwe affirmed on other grounds. Beley 901 F.3d at 826 (affirming\\non the ground that the ability to register under SORA is not a\\ncognizable liberty interest).\\n Another district court reached the same conclusion in a\\ncase involving individual plaintiffs. See Derfus v. City of Chi-\\ncago, Case No. 13 C 7298, 2015 WL 1592558 (N.D. Ill., April 6,\\n2015). In granting summary judgment in favor of the City, the\\nDerfus court concluded:\\n The fact that the City registered more offenders\\n as not having a fixed residence or temporary\\n domicile in two random time periods in 2014\\n\\f12 No. 15-2444\\n\\n than in two random time periods in prior years\\n does not suggest that the City had a policy of\\n refusing to register offenders with that status.\\n Nor does the fact that it refused over a three-\\n year period to register six offenders as “home-\\n less,” a term that does not appear in SORA and\\n that is commonly used to refer to a much\\n broader segment of people than those deemed\\n by SORA to be lacking a fixed residence or tem-\\n porary domicile.\\nId. at *4.\\n These cases raise doubts about whether Regains could\\namend his complaint to allege a widespread policy or prac-\\ntice, or marshal proof the proof at summary judgment that the\\nBeley and Derfus plaintiffs could not. Even if he can allege that\\na practice existed and that it was widespread enough to con-\\nstitute a custom, Monell requires more. Regains’ arguments\\nand the very fact of his arrest and detention show that not all\\nofficers followed the practice. He describes a schism between\\nregistering officers who followed the steering practice and\\nthose who did not. To state a Monell claim, Regains will need\\nto show that high-ranking members of the Chicago Police De-\\npartment knew of the differing practices and allowed them to\\ncontinue. This may be a tall order, but we cannot conclude\\nthat allowing Regains to try would be an exercise in futility.\\n A final point: on appeal, Regains consistently has charac-\\nterized his claim as a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment\\ndue process rights. At the time he filed the appeal, that was\\nhis only option; our decision in Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750, pre-\\ncluded the argument that pretrial detention that occurred af-\\nter the start of the judicial process violated the Fourth\\n\\fNo. 15-2444 13\\n\\nAmendment. Manuel I since has abrogated Newsome, holding\\nthat “the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful\\npretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process.” 137\\nU.S. at 920. In the post-Manuel I/Manuel II world, “the Fourth\\nAmendment, not the Due Process Clause, is the source of the\\nright in a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention,\\nwhether before or after the initiation of formal legal process.”\\nLewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. Jan. 23,\\n2019).\\n III. Conclusion\\n Because Regains timely filed his complaint, we reverse the\\ndistrict court’s dismissal of the complaint and remand for fur-\\nther proceedings consistent with this decision.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1187,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4599424,"string":"4,599,424"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Paul Regains v. City of Chicago"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-13"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"15-2444"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PEPPER, District Judge.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PEPPER, District Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 15‐2444 \\nPAUL REGAINS, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \\n v. \\n\\nCITY OF CHICAGO, \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n ____________________ \\n \\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 14 C 9687 — James B. Zagel, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 13, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and \\nPEPPER, District Judge.* \\n PEPPER, District Judge. The Illinois Sex Offender Registra‐\\ntion Act (SORA) requires sex offenders to register with the po‐\\nlice. Because he did not have a permanent address (he was \\nhomeless), Paul Regains followed the instructions of officers \\n\\n \\n * Of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation. \\n\\f2 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nwho directed him to a local homeless shelter (which they \\nlisted on his registration as his permanent address), and to re‐\\nturn for re‐registration in ninety days. When he appeared to \\nreport three months later, Chicago police officers arrested Re‐\\ngains on an “investigative alert,” because other officers had \\nnot been able to locate Regains at the address provided. Re‐\\ngains remained in custody seventeen months before the Illi‐\\nnois trial court found him not guilty of failing to a report a \\nchange of address. \\n Regains sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, \\nclaiming that it violated his rights under the Due Process \\nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dis‐\\nmissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \\n12(b)(6), finding that either the claim was time‐barred under \\nIllinois’ two‐year statute of limitations for personal injury \\nclaims, or that it was barred by this court’s decision in New‐\\nsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001), abrogated by \\nManual v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (“Manuel I”). The \\ndistrict court also found that the amended complaint lacked \\nsufficient factual details to give the City fair notice, and that \\nbecause Regains did not specifically identify a particular con‐\\nstitutional violation, the City could not be held liable under \\nMonell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). \\n We reverse the district court’s decision that Regains’ claim \\nwas time‐barred, and remand for further proceedings. \\n I. Background \\n In 2012, SORA required sex offenders to register in person \\nwithin three days of establishing a residence or a temporary \\ndomicile in any county. 730 ILCS § 150/3(b) (2012). Sex offend‐\\ners in the City of Chicago registered “at the Chicago Police \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 3 \\n\\nDepartment Headquarters.” 730 ILCS § 150/3(a)(1). The law \\nrequired sex offenders without a fixed address or temporary \\ndomicile to report weekly to the chief of police in the munici‐\\npality in which that person was located. 730 ILCS § 150/3. \\n The plaintiff asserts that SORA required “persons with a \\nfixed abode” to report every ninety days, citing 730 ILCS \\n§ 150/6. Appellant’s Br. at 2. In fact, that section of the statute \\nrequired a person who had been adjudicated to be sexually \\ndangerous or was a sexually violent person to report every \\nninety days (and required such offenders to report weekly if \\nthey did not have a fixed residence). “Any other person” re‐\\nquired to register under the statute was required to report \\nonce a year. The record does not indicate whether Regains, \\nhad he had a fixed residence, would have been subject to the \\nninety‐day reporting interval or the one‐year reporting inter‐\\nval. Either way, the law required homeless sex offenders to \\nreport more frequently than sex offenders with fixed resi‐\\ndences. Failure to comply with the provisions of the statute \\nconstituted a felony, for which there was strict liability. 730 \\nILCS § 150/10(a); People v. Molnar, 857 N.E.2d 209, 224 (Ill. \\n2006). \\n By 2012, the Chicago police officers assigned to sex of‐\\nfender registration/reporting duty felt that the weekly report‐\\ning requirement for homeless sex offenders had become bur‐\\ndensome. Some of those police officers engaged in a wide‐\\nspread practice of steering homeless sex offenders to home‐\\nless shelters that would accept sex offenders, and directing \\nthe sex offenders to return with documentation showing the \\nshelter as the sex offender’s residence. This scheme had the \\neffect of providing homeless sex offenders with a “residence,” \\nwhich meant that they were not subject to the weekly \\n\\f4 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nreporting requirement. The officers who engaged in this steer‐\\ning practice, and their supervisors, were aware that the num‐\\nber of persons registered at the shelters far exceeded the shel‐\\nter’s capacity. In other words, they knew that the homeless \\nsex offenders who listed the shelter as their “address” likely \\nwould not be able to remain there. \\n Other Chicago police officers assigned to registration du‐\\nties disagreed with the steering practice. These other officers \\nvisited homeless shelters that accepted sex offender regis‐\\ntrants and attempted to locate the registrant; if they could not \\nlocate the registrant at the shelter, the officers would prepare \\nan investigative alert, informing any Chicago police officer \\nwho encountered the registrant that there was probable cause \\nfor arrest. \\n Regains alleges that in April 2012, Chicago police officers \\nemployed the steering practice when he attempted to register \\nas a homeless sex offender. He asserts that they directed him \\nto a shelter, registered him as residing at that shelter, and in‐\\nstructed him to return for quarterly reporting and re‐registra‐\\ntion in July 2012. \\n In early May 2012, two Chicago police officers went to the \\nshelter to look for Regains. They did not find him, and they \\nprepared a report for failure to register at that address. The \\nnext day, a Chicago police detective reviewed the report, vis‐\\nited the shelter without finding Regains, and issued an inves‐\\ntigative alert informing other Chicago police officers that \\nthere was probable cause to arrest Regains. \\n On July 18, 2012, Regains reported as directed; Chicago \\npolice officers arrested him under the investigative alert. The \\nprosecutor charged Regains with two violations of 730 ILCS \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 5 \\n\\n§ 150/6—failure to register within three days after changing \\nhis address, and failure to report every ninety days. On Sep‐\\ntember 4, 2012, Cook County Judge Thomas V. Gainer ar‐\\nraigned Regains and ordered him detained. Regains re‐\\nmained in custody until his December 3, 2012 trial—some sev‐\\nenteen months—at which time the judge found him not \\nguilty.1 \\n Regains filed his original § 1983 complaint in federal court \\non December 3, 2014. \\n II. Discussion \\n We review de novo a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) \\nmotion to dismiss. Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840 \\nF.3d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “In construing \\nthe complaint, we accept all well‐pleaded facts as true and \\ndraw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffsʹ favor.” Id. We \\nmay affirm on any ground that the record supports, as long \\nas the district court adequately addressed that ground and the \\nnon‐moving party had the opportunity to contest it. Thayer v. \\nChiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 247 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). \\n Regains argues that he was deprived of his liberty for sev‐\\nenteen months without due process of law, as a result of “the \\nwidespread practice within the Chicago police department to‐\\nwards homeless sex offenders.” Appellant’s Br. at 6. He as‐\\nserts that the City violated his Fourteenth Amendment due \\n\\n \\n1 The transcript of Regains’ trial indicates that he registered on April 17, \\n\\n2012. App. to Appellee’s Br. at A27. He appeared at the police station on \\nJuly 18, 2012, id. at A30, ninety‐two days after the date he last registered, \\nid. at A37. The trial judge stated that he could not tell from looking at the \\nreport date Regains had been given whether he was to report on July 16 \\nor July 18, 2012, and made a finding that Regains was not guilty. Id. at A37. \\n\\f6 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nprocess rights by engaging in conduct “in the nature of mali‐\\ncious prosecution.” He has taken pains to avoid giving his \\npersonal injury claim a specific label. The district court found \\nthat if Regains’ claim sounded in false arrest, it was time‐\\nbarred, and that if it sounded in malicious prosecution, it was \\nbarred for other reasons. \\n Regains sued under a federal statute—42 U.S.C. § 1983—\\nbut we look to the law of the state in which the personal injury \\noccurred to determine the length of the statute of limitations. \\nWallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Serino v. Hensley, 735 \\nF.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013). Under Illinois law, a plaintiff \\nmust bring a personal injury action within two years after its \\naccrual. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387 (citing 735 ILCS § 5/13‐202 \\n(West 2003)). \\n The question of when the cause of action accrues “is a \\nquestion of federal law that is not resolved by reference to \\nstate law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (emphasis in the original). \\nFederal common law holds that a cause of action accrues \\nwhen “the plaintiff has a ‘complete and present cause of ac‐\\ntion’”—in other words, when “the plaintiff can file suit and \\nobtain relief.” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning \\nPension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 \\n(1997)). Put another way, a personal injury claim raised under \\n§ 1983 accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to \\nknow of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Serino, 735 \\nF.3d at 591. Because there is “no single accrual rule for all \\n§ 1983 claims,” we must “use the rule that applies to the com‐\\nmon‐law cause of action most similar to the kind of claim the \\nplaintiff asserts.” Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. \\n2013). \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 7 \\n\\n At the time of briefing and oral argument, there was a de‐\\nbatable question as to whether Regains’ claim was time‐\\nbarred. His assertion that he should not have been arrested \\nand charged sounded like a claim for false arrest, or false im‐\\nprisonment. His assertion that he was detained for seventeen \\nmonths while awaiting trial on a charge that was unfounded \\nsounded like a malicious prosecution claim. The accrual rule \\nfor false arrest/false imprisonment claims is different from the \\naccrual rule for malicious prosecution claims. A claim for false \\narrest or false imprisonment accrues once the plaintiff is de‐\\ntained (or released) as a result of a lawful process. Wallace, 549 \\nU.S. at 390‐391. A cause of action for malicious prosecution \\n“does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have termi‐\\nnated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, \\n48 (1994). \\n When he appealed, that difference was critical for Regains. \\nHe was arraigned and detained by lawful process on Septem‐\\nber 4, 2012; under the false arrest/false imprisonment accrual \\nrule, he would have had to file his § 1983 complaint by Sep‐\\ntember 4, 2014. He did not file the complaint until December \\n3, 2014, three months later. In contrast, under the malicious \\nprosecution accrual rule, Regains’ claim would have accrued \\non December 3, 2012—the date he was acquitted. Regains filed \\nhis § 1983 complaint exactly two years after that date. If his \\nclaims properly fell into the false arrest/false imprisonment \\nrealm, his claim would have been time barred; if it fell into the \\nmalicious prosecution realm, it would have been timely. \\n After oral argument, this court resolved the timing ques‐\\ntion. In Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) \\n(“Manuel II”), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 22, 2019) (No. 18‐\\n1093), we held that a claim that a plaintiff was detained \\n\\f8 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nwithout probable cause “accrues when the detention ends.”2 \\nRegains concedes that the officers who arrested him had prob‐\\nable cause to believe that he violated SORA, but he has con‐\\nsistently argued that he seeks damages because he was “de‐\\nprived of liberty without due process of law when he was \\nheld at the Cook County Jail until he was acquitted.” Appel‐\\nlant’s Br. at 13. Applying the principle of Manuel II to Regains’ \\nargument that his seventeen‐month detention for a crime that \\nhe was misled into committing was unconstitutional, we con‐\\nclude that his claim accrued when he was released on Decem‐\\nber 3, 2012, and that his claim was timely filed. \\n This conclusion does not necessarily mandate remand, \\nhowever, because the district court stated other bases for dis‐\\nmissing the case. The court also found that Regains’ amended \\ncomplaint failed to identify specific conduct on the City’s part \\nthat formed the basis for Regains’ claim that it violated his \\nrights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Regains named \\nonly the City as a defendant; he did not sue individual offic‐\\ners. The amended complaint was terse—six of its twenty par‐\\nagraphs described how and why officers steered homeless sex \\noffenders to shelters. The complaint then alleged that when \\nRegains tried to register, officers steered him to a shelter, reg‐\\nistered him at that shelter and required him to come back for \\n \\n2 The Supreme Court has accepted certiorari in McDonough v. Smith, 2019 \\n\\nWL 166879 (No. 18‐485). The petition presents the following question: \\n“Whether the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim based on fab‐\\nrication of evidence in criminal proceedings begins to run when those pro‐\\nceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor (as the majority of circuits has \\nheld) or whether it begins to run when the defendant becomes aware of \\nthe tainted evidence and its improper use (as the Second Circuit held be‐\\nlow).” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McDounough 2018 WL 5026294 (No. \\n18‐845). The Court will hear argument on April 17, 2019. \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 9 \\n\\nre‐registration in three months. It alleged the facts surround‐\\ning Regains’ arrest and charging, and alleged that he stayed \\nin custody until his trial and acquittal. The penultimate para‐\\ngraph stated, “As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff was de‐\\nprived of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendments to \\nthe Constitution of the United States and incurred damages.” \\n The amended complaint does not link specific conduct to \\nRegains’ assertion that his due process rights were violated. \\nOther than identifying the City as an Illinois municipal cor‐\\nporation, it does not describe any conduct by the City. It de‐\\nscribes the actions of the officers who steered Regains to the \\nshelter, the actions of the officers who issued the investigative \\nalert and the actions of the officers who arrested him, but does \\nnot say which—if any—of these actions constitute conduct by \\nthe City that violated his due process rights. It says he “was \\ncharged” with a felony, and “remained” in custody until his \\nacquittal, but does not attribute to the City or anyone else re‐\\nsponsibility for the charges or his detention. It does not allege \\nthat police department officials with policy‐making authority \\nknew about these practices and allowed them to continue. \\n A plaintiff may remedy a deficient complaint by amend‐\\ning it, but the district court also questioned whether Regains \\ncould state a claim against the City at all. In brief comments \\nat the end of its decision, the court noted that a municipality \\nsuch as the City is subject to liability under § 1983 only if an \\nofficial municipal policy caused the violation of the plaintiff’s \\nconstitutional rights, citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. The court \\nstated that in the absence of a constitutional violation, the City \\ncould not be held liable. Regains has not addressed the Monell \\nquestion in his appellate briefs. \\n\\f10 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\n Because Regains has chosen to sue only the City, he must \\nstate a claim that the denial of his liberty for seventeen months \\nwas the result of the implementation or execution of “a policy \\nstatement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially \\nadopted and promulgated by [the municipality’s] officers,” or \\na “governmental ‘custom’ … .” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Alle‐\\ngations that the City is liable “on a respondeat superior theory” \\nwill not suffice. Id. at 691. \\n Before this court, Regains has alleged that there was a \\n“widespread practice within the police department of the City \\nof Chicago to manipulate the registration process to force \\nhomeless sex offenders into violations of the Monitoring Act.” \\nAppellant’s Brief at 6. He asserts that “[t]his practice was ‘so \\nwidespread and well‐settled that it constitutes a custom or us‐\\nage with the force of law even though it is not authorized by \\nwritten law or express policy.’” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, \\nquoting Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. \\n2015). Regains has presented no evidence to support these al‐\\nlegations; he never got the chance, because the district court \\ndismissed the case at the pleading stage. Other plaintiffs have \\nhad the opportunity to present such evidence. \\n In Beley v. City of Chicago, a class composed of “[a]ll per‐\\nsons who attempted to register under the Illinois Sex Offender \\nRegistration Act with the City of Chicago from December 6, \\n2010 to the date of entry of judgment and who were not per‐\\nmitted to register because they were homeless” alleged that \\nthe City had violated, among other provisions, the due pro‐\\ncess clause. Beley v. City of Chicago, Case No. 12‐cv‐9714, 2017 \\nWL 77096, at *1 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 28, 2017), aff’d 901 F.3d 823 (7th \\nCir. 2018). The district court granted summary judgment in \\nfavor of the City on the due process claim. The court stated \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 11 \\n\\nthat its ruling turned on “one dispositive issue: whether Plain‐\\ntiffs present sufficient evidence of a ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ on the \\npart of Defendant to support municipal liability.” Id. at *6. \\nViewing the evidence the plaintiffs had presented in the light \\nmost favorable to them, the court found that they “fail[ed] to \\nraise a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether [Criminal \\nRegistration Section] personnel acted pursuant to an official \\npolicy or practice regarding the registration of homeless sex \\noffenders.” Id. at *8. The court found that, at best, the plaintiffs \\nhad proven that on ten occasions, individual officers may \\nhave engaged in unconstitutional behavior. Id. Although the \\nplaintiffs appear to have presented a substantial amount of \\nevidence in Beley, the court concluded that “the evidence does \\nnot present a triable issue of fact regarding whether there was \\na policy or widespread practice of denying SORA registration \\nto sex offenders who lacked a fixed address at the time of reg‐\\nistration.” Id. at *10. “At most, Plaintiffs have shown ‘occa‐\\nsional lapses of judgment’ or ‘individual misconduct by po‐\\nlice officers,’ not ‘systemic problems’ or ‘institutional behav‐\\nior.’” Id., quoting Rossi 790 F.3d at 737. The plaintiffs appealed; \\nwe affirmed on other grounds. Beley 901 F.3d at 826 (affirming \\non the ground that the ability to register under SORA is not a \\ncognizable liberty interest). \\n Another district court reached the same conclusion in a \\ncase involving individual plaintiffs. See Derfus v. City of Chi‐\\ncago, Case No. 13 C 7298, 2015 WL 1592558 (N.D. Ill., April 6, \\n2015). In granting summary judgment in favor of the City, the \\nDerfus court concluded: \\n The fact that the City registered more offenders \\n as not having a fixed residence or temporary \\n domicile in two random time periods in 2014 \\n\\f12 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\n than in two random time periods in prior years \\n does not suggest that the City had a policy of \\n refusing to register offenders with that status. \\n Nor does the fact that it refused over a three‐\\n year period to register six offenders as “home‐\\n less,” a term that does not appear in SORA and \\n that is commonly used to refer to a much \\n broader segment of people than those deemed \\n by SORA to be lacking a fixed residence or tem‐\\n porary domicile. \\nId. at *4. \\n These cases raise doubts about whether Regains could \\namend his complaint to allege a widespread policy or prac‐\\ntice, or marshal proof the proof at summary judgment that the \\nBeley and Derfus plaintiffs could not. Even if he can allege that \\na practice existed and that it was widespread enough to con‐\\nstitute a custom, Monell requires more. Regains’ arguments \\nand the very fact of his arrest and detention show that not all \\nofficers followed the practice. He describes a schism between \\nregistering officers who followed the steering practice and \\nthose who did not. To state a Monell claim, Regains will need \\nto show that high‐ranking members of the Chicago Police De‐\\npartment knew of the differing practices and allowed them to \\ncontinue. This may be a tall order, but we cannot conclude \\nthat allowing Regains to try would be an exercise in futility. \\n A final point: on appeal, Regains consistently has charac‐\\nterized his claim as a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment \\ndue process rights. At the time he filed the appeal, that was \\nhis only option; our decision in Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750, pre‐\\ncluded the argument that pretrial detention that occurred af‐\\nter the start of the judicial process violated the Fourth \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 13 \\n\\nAmendment. Manuel I since has abrogated Newsome, holding \\nthat “the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful \\npretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process.” 137 \\nU.S. at 920. In the post‐Manuel I/Manuel II world, “the Fourth \\nAmendment, not the Due Process Clause, is the source of the \\nright in a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention, \\nwhether before or after the initiation of formal legal process.” \\nLewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. Jan. 23, \\n2019). \\n III. Conclusion \\n Because Regains timely filed his complaint, we reverse the \\ndistrict court’s dismissal of the complaint and remand for fur‐\\nther proceedings consistent with this decision.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4376677/\", \"author_raw\": \"PEPPER, District Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"PEPPER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"PEPPER\": \", District\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4599424/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Paul Regains v. City of Chicago\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-13\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 15‐2444 \nPAUL REGAINS, \n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \n v. \n\nCITY OF CHICAGO, \n Defendant‐Appellee. \n ____________________ \n \n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \n No. 14 C 9687 — James B. Zagel, Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 13, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and \nPEPPER, District Judge.* \n PEPPER, District Judge. The Illinois Sex Offender Registra‐\ntion Act (SORA) requires sex offenders to register with the po‐\nlice. Because he did not have a permanent address (he was \nhomeless), Paul Regains followed the instructions of officers \n\n \n * Of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation. \n\f2 No. 15‐2444 \n\nwho directed him to a local homeless shelter (which they \nlisted on his registration as his permanent address), and to re‐\nturn for re‐registration in ninety days. When he appeared to \nreport three months later, Chicago police officers arrested Re‐\ngains on an “investigative alert,” because other officers had \nnot been able to locate Regains at the address provided. Re‐\ngains remained in custody seventeen months before the Illi‐\nnois trial court found him not guilty of failing to a report a \nchange of address. \n Regains sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, \nclaiming that it violated his rights under the Due Process \nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dis‐\nmissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \n12(b)(6), finding that either the claim was time‐barred under \nIllinois’ two‐year statute of limitations for personal injury \nclaims, or that it was barred by this court’s decision in New‐\nsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001), abrogated by \nManual v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (“Manuel I”). The \ndistrict court also found that the amended complaint lacked \nsufficient factual details to give the City fair notice, and that \nbecause Regains did not specifically identify a particular con‐\nstitutional violation, the City could not be held liable under \nMonell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). \n We reverse the district court’s decision that Regains’ claim \nwas time‐barred, and remand for further proceedings. \n I. Background \n In 2012, SORA required sex offenders to register in person \nwithin three days of establishing a residence or a temporary \ndomicile in any county. 730 ILCS § 150/3(b) (2012). Sex offend‐\ners in the City of Chicago registered “at the Chicago Police \n\fNo. 15‐2444 3 \n\nDepartment Headquarters.” 730 ILCS § 150/3(a)(1). The law \nrequired sex offenders without a fixed address or temporary \ndomicile to report weekly to the chief of police in the munici‐\npality in which that person was located. 730 ILCS § 150/3. \n The plaintiff asserts that SORA required “persons with a \nfixed abode” to report every ninety days, citing 730 ILCS \n§ 150/6. Appellant’s Br. at 2. In fact, that section of the statute \nrequired a person who had been adjudicated to be sexually \ndangerous or was a sexually violent person to report every \nninety days (and required such offenders to report weekly if \nthey did not have a fixed residence). “Any other person” re‐\nquired to register under the statute was required to report \nonce a year. The record does not indicate whether Regains, \nhad he had a fixed residence, would have been subject to the \nninety‐day reporting interval or the one‐year reporting inter‐\nval. Either way, the law required homeless sex offenders to \nreport more frequently than sex offenders with fixed resi‐\ndences. Failure to comply with the provisions of the statute \nconstituted a felony, for which there was strict liability. 730 \nILCS § 150/10(a); People v. Molnar, 857 N.E.2d 209, 224 (Ill. \n2006). \n By 2012, the Chicago police officers assigned to sex of‐\nfender registration/reporting duty felt that the weekly report‐\ning requirement for homeless sex offenders had become bur‐\ndensome. Some of those police officers engaged in a wide‐\nspread practice of steering homeless sex offenders to home‐\nless shelters that would accept sex offenders, and directing \nthe sex offenders to return with documentation showing the \nshelter as the sex offender’s residence. This scheme had the \neffect of providing homeless sex offenders with a “residence,” \nwhich meant that they were not subject to the weekly \n\f4 No. 15‐2444 \n\nreporting requirement. The officers who engaged in this steer‐\ning practice, and their supervisors, were aware that the num‐\nber of persons registered at the shelters far exceeded the shel‐\nter’s capacity. In other words, they knew that the homeless \nsex offenders who listed the shelter as their “address” likely \nwould not be able to remain there. \n Other Chicago police officers assigned to registration du‐\nties disagreed with the steering practice. These other officers \nvisited homeless shelters that accepted sex offender regis‐\ntrants and attempted to locate the registrant; if they could not \nlocate the registrant at the shelter, the officers would prepare \nan investigative alert, informing any Chicago police officer \nwho encountered the registrant that there was probable cause \nfor arrest. \n Regains alleges that in April 2012, Chicago police officers \nemployed the steering practice when he attempted to register \nas a homeless sex offender. He asserts that they directed him \nto a shelter, registered him as residing at that shelter, and in‐\nstructed him to return for quarterly reporting and re‐registra‐\ntion in July 2012. \n In early May 2012, two Chicago police officers went to the \nshelter to look for Regains. They did not find him, and they \nprepared a report for failure to register at that address. The \nnext day, a Chicago police detective reviewed the report, vis‐\nited the shelter without finding Regains, and issued an inves‐\ntigative alert informing other Chicago police officers that \nthere was probable cause to arrest Regains. \n On July 18, 2012, Regains reported as directed; Chicago \npolice officers arrested him under the investigative alert. The \nprosecutor charged Regains with two violations of 730 ILCS \n\fNo. 15‐2444 5 \n\n§ 150/6—failure to register within three days after changing \nhis address, and failure to report every ninety days. On Sep‐\ntember 4, 2012, Cook County Judge Thomas V. Gainer ar‐\nraigned Regains and ordered him detained. Regains re‐\nmained in custody until his December 3, 2012 trial—some sev‐\nenteen months—at which time the judge found him not \nguilty.1 \n Regains filed his original § 1983 complaint in federal court \non December 3, 2014. \n II. Discussion \n We review de novo a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) \nmotion to dismiss. Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840 \nF.3d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “In construing \nthe complaint, we accept all well‐pleaded facts as true and \ndraw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffsʹ favor.” Id. We \nmay affirm on any ground that the record supports, as long \nas the district court adequately addressed that ground and the \nnon‐moving party had the opportunity to contest it. Thayer v. \nChiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 247 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). \n Regains argues that he was deprived of his liberty for sev‐\nenteen months without due process of law, as a result of “the \nwidespread practice within the Chicago police department to‐\nwards homeless sex offenders.” Appellant’s Br. at 6. He as‐\nserts that the City violated his Fourteenth Amendment due \n\n \n1 The transcript of Regains’ trial indicates that he registered on April 17, \n\n2012. App. to Appellee’s Br. at A27. He appeared at the police station on \nJuly 18, 2012, id. at A30, ninety‐two days after the date he last registered, \nid. at A37. The trial judge stated that he could not tell from looking at the \nreport date Regains had been given whether he was to report on July 16 \nor July 18, 2012, and made a finding that Regains was not guilty. Id. at A37. \n\f6 No. 15‐2444 \n\nprocess rights by engaging in conduct “in the nature of mali‐\ncious prosecution.” He has taken pains to avoid giving his \npersonal injury claim a specific label. The district court found \nthat if Regains’ claim sounded in false arrest, it was time‐\nbarred, and that if it sounded in malicious prosecution, it was \nbarred for other reasons. \n Regains sued under a federal statute—42 U.S.C. § 1983—\nbut we look to the law of the state in which the personal injury \noccurred to determine the length of the statute of limitations. \nWallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Serino v. Hensley, 735 \nF.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013). Under Illinois law, a plaintiff \nmust bring a personal injury action within two years after its \naccrual. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387 (citing 735 ILCS § 5/13‐202 \n(West 2003)). \n The question of when the cause of action accrues “is a \nquestion of federal law that is not resolved by reference to \nstate law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (emphasis in the original). \nFederal common law holds that a cause of action accrues \nwhen “the plaintiff has a ‘complete and present cause of ac‐\ntion’”—in other words, when “the plaintiff can file suit and \nobtain relief.” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning \nPension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 \n(1997)). Put another way, a personal injury claim raised under \n§ 1983 accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to \nknow of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Serino, 735 \nF.3d at 591. Because there is “no single accrual rule for all \n§ 1983 claims,” we must “use the rule that applies to the com‐\nmon‐law cause of action most similar to the kind of claim the \nplaintiff asserts.” Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. \n2013). \n\fNo. 15‐2444 7 \n\n At the time of briefing and oral argument, there was a de‐\nbatable question as to whether Regains’ claim was time‐\nbarred. His assertion that he should not have been arrested \nand charged sounded like a claim for false arrest, or false im‐\nprisonment. His assertion that he was detained for seventeen \nmonths while awaiting trial on a charge that was unfounded \nsounded like a malicious prosecution claim. The accrual rule \nfor false arrest/false imprisonment claims is different from the \naccrual rule for malicious prosecution claims. A claim for false \narrest or false imprisonment accrues once the plaintiff is de‐\ntained (or released) as a result of a lawful process. Wallace, 549 \nU.S. at 390‐391. A cause of action for malicious prosecution \n“does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have termi‐\nnated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, \n48 (1994). \n When he appealed, that difference was critical for Regains. \nHe was arraigned and detained by lawful process on Septem‐\nber 4, 2012; under the false arrest/false imprisonment accrual \nrule, he would have had to file his § 1983 complaint by Sep‐\ntember 4, 2014. He did not file the complaint until December \n3, 2014, three months later. In contrast, under the malicious \nprosecution accrual rule, Regains’ claim would have accrued \non December 3, 2012—the date he was acquitted. Regains filed \nhis § 1983 complaint exactly two years after that date. If his \nclaims properly fell into the false arrest/false imprisonment \nrealm, his claim would have been time barred; if it fell into the \nmalicious prosecution realm, it would have been timely. \n After oral argument, this court resolved the timing ques‐\ntion. In Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) \n(“Manuel II”), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 22, 2019) (No. 18‐\n1093), we held that a claim that a plaintiff was detained \n\f8 No. 15‐2444 \n\nwithout probable cause “accrues when the detention ends.”2 \nRegains concedes that the officers who arrested him had prob‐\nable cause to believe that he violated SORA, but he has con‐\nsistently argued that he seeks damages because he was “de‐\nprived of liberty without due process of law when he was \nheld at the Cook County Jail until he was acquitted.” Appel‐\nlant’s Br. at 13. Applying the principle of Manuel II to Regains’ \nargument that his seventeen‐month detention for a crime that \nhe was misled into committing was unconstitutional, we con‐\nclude that his claim accrued when he was released on Decem‐\nber 3, 2012, and that his claim was timely filed. \n This conclusion does not necessarily mandate remand, \nhowever, because the district court stated other bases for dis‐\nmissing the case. The court also found that Regains’ amended \ncomplaint failed to identify specific conduct on the City’s part \nthat formed the basis for Regains’ claim that it violated his \nrights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Regains named \nonly the City as a defendant; he did not sue individual offic‐\ners. The amended complaint was terse—six of its twenty par‐\nagraphs described how and why officers steered homeless sex \noffenders to shelters. The complaint then alleged that when \nRegains tried to register, officers steered him to a shelter, reg‐\nistered him at that shelter and required him to come back for \n \n2 The Supreme Court has accepted certiorari in McDonough v. Smith, 2019 \n\nWL 166879 (No. 18‐485). The petition presents the following question: \n“Whether the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim based on fab‐\nrication of evidence in criminal proceedings begins to run when those pro‐\nceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor (as the majority of circuits has \nheld) or whether it begins to run when the defendant becomes aware of \nthe tainted evidence and its improper use (as the Second Circuit held be‐\nlow).” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McDounough 2018 WL 5026294 (No. \n18‐845). The Court will hear argument on April 17, 2019. \n\fNo. 15‐2444 9 \n\nre‐registration in three months. It alleged the facts surround‐\ning Regains’ arrest and charging, and alleged that he stayed \nin custody until his trial and acquittal. The penultimate para‐\ngraph stated, “As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff was de‐\nprived of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendments to \nthe Constitution of the United States and incurred damages.” \n The amended complaint does not link specific conduct to \nRegains’ assertion that his due process rights were violated. \nOther than identifying the City as an Illinois municipal cor‐\nporation, it does not describe any conduct by the City. It de‐\nscribes the actions of the officers who steered Regains to the \nshelter, the actions of the officers who issued the investigative \nalert and the actions of the officers who arrested him, but does \nnot say which—if any—of these actions constitute conduct by \nthe City that violated his due process rights. It says he “was \ncharged” with a felony, and “remained” in custody until his \nacquittal, but does not attribute to the City or anyone else re‐\nsponsibility for the charges or his detention. It does not allege \nthat police department officials with policy‐making authority \nknew about these practices and allowed them to continue. \n A plaintiff may remedy a deficient complaint by amend‐\ning it, but the district court also questioned whether Regains \ncould state a claim against the City at all. In brief comments \nat the end of its decision, the court noted that a municipality \nsuch as the City is subject to liability under § 1983 only if an \nofficial municipal policy caused the violation of the plaintiff’s \nconstitutional rights, citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. The court \nstated that in the absence of a constitutional violation, the City \ncould not be held liable. Regains has not addressed the Monell \nquestion in his appellate briefs. \n\f10 No. 15‐2444 \n\n Because Regains has chosen to sue only the City, he must \nstate a claim that the denial of his liberty for seventeen months \nwas the result of the implementation or execution of “a policy \nstatement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially \nadopted and promulgated by [the municipality’s] officers,” or \na “governmental ‘custom’ … .” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Alle‐\ngations that the City is liable “on a respondeat superior theory” \nwill not suffice. Id. at 691. \n Before this court, Regains has alleged that there was a \n“widespread practice within the police department of the City \nof Chicago to manipulate the registration process to force \nhomeless sex offenders into violations of the Monitoring Act.” \nAppellant’s Brief at 6. He asserts that “[t]his practice was ‘so \nwidespread and well‐settled that it constitutes a custom or us‐\nage with the force of law even though it is not authorized by \nwritten law or express policy.’” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, \nquoting Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. \n2015). Regains has presented no evidence to support these al‐\nlegations; he never got the chance, because the district court \ndismissed the case at the pleading stage. Other plaintiffs have \nhad the opportunity to present such evidence. \n In Beley v. City of Chicago, a class composed of “[a]ll per‐\nsons who attempted to register under the Illinois Sex Offender \nRegistration Act with the City of Chicago from December 6, \n2010 to the date of entry of judgment and who were not per‐\nmitted to register because they were homeless” alleged that \nthe City had violated, among other provisions, the due pro‐\ncess clause. Beley v. City of Chicago, Case No. 12‐cv‐9714, 2017 \nWL 77096, at *1 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 28, 2017), aff’d 901 F.3d 823 (7th \nCir. 2018). The district court granted summary judgment in \nfavor of the City on the due process claim. The court stated \n\fNo. 15‐2444 11 \n\nthat its ruling turned on “one dispositive issue: whether Plain‐\ntiffs present sufficient evidence of a ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ on the \npart of Defendant to support municipal liability.” Id. at *6. \nViewing the evidence the plaintiffs had presented in the light \nmost favorable to them, the court found that they “fail[ed] to \nraise a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether [Criminal \nRegistration Section] personnel acted pursuant to an official \npolicy or practice regarding the registration of homeless sex \noffenders.” Id. at *8. The court found that, at best, the plaintiffs \nhad proven that on ten occasions, individual officers may \nhave engaged in unconstitutional behavior. Id. Although the \nplaintiffs appear to have presented a substantial amount of \nevidence in Beley, the court concluded that “the evidence does \nnot present a triable issue of fact regarding whether there was \na policy or widespread practice of denying SORA registration \nto sex offenders who lacked a fixed address at the time of reg‐\nistration.” Id. at *10. “At most, Plaintiffs have shown ‘occa‐\nsional lapses of judgment’ or ‘individual misconduct by po‐\nlice officers,’ not ‘systemic problems’ or ‘institutional behav‐\nior.’” Id., quoting Rossi 790 F.3d at 737. The plaintiffs appealed; \nwe affirmed on other grounds. Beley 901 F.3d at 826 (affirming \non the ground that the ability to register under SORA is not a \ncognizable liberty interest). \n Another district court reached the same conclusion in a \ncase involving individual plaintiffs. See Derfus v. City of Chi‐\ncago, Case No. 13 C 7298, 2015 WL 1592558 (N.D. Ill., April 6, \n2015). In granting summary judgment in favor of the City, the \nDerfus court concluded: \n The fact that the City registered more offenders \n as not having a fixed residence or temporary \n domicile in two random time periods in 2014 \n\f12 No. 15‐2444 \n\n than in two random time periods in prior years \n does not suggest that the City had a policy of \n refusing to register offenders with that status. \n Nor does the fact that it refused over a three‐\n year period to register six offenders as “home‐\n less,” a term that does not appear in SORA and \n that is commonly used to refer to a much \n broader segment of people than those deemed \n by SORA to be lacking a fixed residence or tem‐\n porary domicile. \nId. at *4. \n These cases raise doubts about whether Regains could \namend his complaint to allege a widespread policy or prac‐\ntice, or marshal proof the proof at summary judgment that the \nBeley and Derfus plaintiffs could not. Even if he can allege that \na practice existed and that it was widespread enough to con‐\nstitute a custom, Monell requires more. Regains’ arguments \nand the very fact of his arrest and detention show that not all \nofficers followed the practice. He describes a schism between \nregistering officers who followed the steering practice and \nthose who did not. To state a Monell claim, Regains will need \nto show that high‐ranking members of the Chicago Police De‐\npartment knew of the differing practices and allowed them to \ncontinue. This may be a tall order, but we cannot conclude \nthat allowing Regains to try would be an exercise in futility. \n A final point: on appeal, Regains consistently has charac‐\nterized his claim as a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment \ndue process rights. At the time he filed the appeal, that was \nhis only option; our decision in Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750, pre‐\ncluded the argument that pretrial detention that occurred af‐\nter the start of the judicial process violated the Fourth \n\fNo. 15‐2444 13 \n\nAmendment. Manuel I since has abrogated Newsome, holding \nthat “the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful \npretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process.” 137 \nU.S. at 920. In the post‐Manuel I/Manuel II world, “the Fourth \nAmendment, not the Due Process Clause, is the source of the \nright in a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention, \nwhether before or after the initiation of formal legal process.” \nLewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. Jan. 23, \n2019). \n III. Conclusion \n Because Regains timely filed his complaint, we reverse the \ndistrict court’s dismissal of the complaint and remand for fur‐\nther proceedings consistent with this decision.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Paul Regains v. City of Chicago\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-13\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 15‐2444 \\nPAUL REGAINS, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \\n v. \\n\\nCITY OF CHICAGO, \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n ____________________ \\n \\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 14 C 9687 — James B. Zagel, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 13, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and \\nPEPPER, District Judge.* \\n PEPPER, District Judge. The Illinois Sex Offender Registra‐\\ntion Act (SORA) requires sex offenders to register with the po‐\\nlice. Because he did not have a permanent address (he was \\nhomeless), Paul Regains followed the instructions of officers \\n\\n \\n * Of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation. \\n\\f2 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nwho directed him to a local homeless shelter (which they \\nlisted on his registration as his permanent address), and to re‐\\nturn for re‐registration in ninety days. When he appeared to \\nreport three months later, Chicago police officers arrested Re‐\\ngains on an “investigative alert,” because other officers had \\nnot been able to locate Regains at the address provided. Re‐\\ngains remained in custody seventeen months before the Illi‐\\nnois trial court found him not guilty of failing to a report a \\nchange of address. \\n Regains sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, \\nclaiming that it violated his rights under the Due Process \\nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dis‐\\nmissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \\n12(b)(6), finding that either the claim was time‐barred under \\nIllinois’ two‐year statute of limitations for personal injury \\nclaims, or that it was barred by this court’s decision in New‐\\nsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001), abrogated by \\nManual v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (“Manuel I”). The \\ndistrict court also found that the amended complaint lacked \\nsufficient factual details to give the City fair notice, and that \\nbecause Regains did not specifically identify a particular con‐\\nstitutional violation, the City could not be held liable under \\nMonell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). \\n We reverse the district court’s decision that Regains’ claim \\nwas time‐barred, and remand for further proceedings. \\n I. Background \\n In 2012, SORA required sex offenders to register in person \\nwithin three days of establishing a residence or a temporary \\ndomicile in any county. 730 ILCS § 150/3(b) (2012). Sex offend‐\\ners in the City of Chicago registered “at the Chicago Police \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 3 \\n\\nDepartment Headquarters.” 730 ILCS § 150/3(a)(1). The law \\nrequired sex offenders without a fixed address or temporary \\ndomicile to report weekly to the chief of police in the munici‐\\npality in which that person was located. 730 ILCS § 150/3. \\n The plaintiff asserts that SORA required “persons with a \\nfixed abode” to report every ninety days, citing 730 ILCS \\n§ 150/6. Appellant’s Br. at 2. In fact, that section of the statute \\nrequired a person who had been adjudicated to be sexually \\ndangerous or was a sexually violent person to report every \\nninety days (and required such offenders to report weekly if \\nthey did not have a fixed residence). “Any other person” re‐\\nquired to register under the statute was required to report \\nonce a year. The record does not indicate whether Regains, \\nhad he had a fixed residence, would have been subject to the \\nninety‐day reporting interval or the one‐year reporting inter‐\\nval. Either way, the law required homeless sex offenders to \\nreport more frequently than sex offenders with fixed resi‐\\ndences. Failure to comply with the provisions of the statute \\nconstituted a felony, for which there was strict liability. 730 \\nILCS § 150/10(a); People v. Molnar, 857 N.E.2d 209, 224 (Ill. \\n2006). \\n By 2012, the Chicago police officers assigned to sex of‐\\nfender registration/reporting duty felt that the weekly report‐\\ning requirement for homeless sex offenders had become bur‐\\ndensome. Some of those police officers engaged in a wide‐\\nspread practice of steering homeless sex offenders to home‐\\nless shelters that would accept sex offenders, and directing \\nthe sex offenders to return with documentation showing the \\nshelter as the sex offender’s residence. This scheme had the \\neffect of providing homeless sex offenders with a “residence,” \\nwhich meant that they were not subject to the weekly \\n\\f4 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nreporting requirement. The officers who engaged in this steer‐\\ning practice, and their supervisors, were aware that the num‐\\nber of persons registered at the shelters far exceeded the shel‐\\nter’s capacity. In other words, they knew that the homeless \\nsex offenders who listed the shelter as their “address” likely \\nwould not be able to remain there. \\n Other Chicago police officers assigned to registration du‐\\nties disagreed with the steering practice. These other officers \\nvisited homeless shelters that accepted sex offender regis‐\\ntrants and attempted to locate the registrant; if they could not \\nlocate the registrant at the shelter, the officers would prepare \\nan investigative alert, informing any Chicago police officer \\nwho encountered the registrant that there was probable cause \\nfor arrest. \\n Regains alleges that in April 2012, Chicago police officers \\nemployed the steering practice when he attempted to register \\nas a homeless sex offender. He asserts that they directed him \\nto a shelter, registered him as residing at that shelter, and in‐\\nstructed him to return for quarterly reporting and re‐registra‐\\ntion in July 2012. \\n In early May 2012, two Chicago police officers went to the \\nshelter to look for Regains. They did not find him, and they \\nprepared a report for failure to register at that address. The \\nnext day, a Chicago police detective reviewed the report, vis‐\\nited the shelter without finding Regains, and issued an inves‐\\ntigative alert informing other Chicago police officers that \\nthere was probable cause to arrest Regains. \\n On July 18, 2012, Regains reported as directed; Chicago \\npolice officers arrested him under the investigative alert. The \\nprosecutor charged Regains with two violations of 730 ILCS \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 5 \\n\\n§ 150/6—failure to register within three days after changing \\nhis address, and failure to report every ninety days. On Sep‐\\ntember 4, 2012, Cook County Judge Thomas V. Gainer ar‐\\nraigned Regains and ordered him detained. Regains re‐\\nmained in custody until his December 3, 2012 trial—some sev‐\\nenteen months—at which time the judge found him not \\nguilty.1 \\n Regains filed his original § 1983 complaint in federal court \\non December 3, 2014. \\n II. Discussion \\n We review de novo a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) \\nmotion to dismiss. Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840 \\nF.3d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “In construing \\nthe complaint, we accept all well‐pleaded facts as true and \\ndraw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffsʹ favor.” Id. We \\nmay affirm on any ground that the record supports, as long \\nas the district court adequately addressed that ground and the \\nnon‐moving party had the opportunity to contest it. Thayer v. \\nChiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 247 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). \\n Regains argues that he was deprived of his liberty for sev‐\\nenteen months without due process of law, as a result of “the \\nwidespread practice within the Chicago police department to‐\\nwards homeless sex offenders.” Appellant’s Br. at 6. He as‐\\nserts that the City violated his Fourteenth Amendment due \\n\\n \\n1 The transcript of Regains’ trial indicates that he registered on April 17, \\n\\n2012. App. to Appellee’s Br. at A27. He appeared at the police station on \\nJuly 18, 2012, id. at A30, ninety‐two days after the date he last registered, \\nid. at A37. The trial judge stated that he could not tell from looking at the \\nreport date Regains had been given whether he was to report on July 16 \\nor July 18, 2012, and made a finding that Regains was not guilty. Id. at A37. \\n\\f6 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nprocess rights by engaging in conduct “in the nature of mali‐\\ncious prosecution.” He has taken pains to avoid giving his \\npersonal injury claim a specific label. The district court found \\nthat if Regains’ claim sounded in false arrest, it was time‐\\nbarred, and that if it sounded in malicious prosecution, it was \\nbarred for other reasons. \\n Regains sued under a federal statute—42 U.S.C. § 1983—\\nbut we look to the law of the state in which the personal injury \\noccurred to determine the length of the statute of limitations. \\nWallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Serino v. Hensley, 735 \\nF.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013). Under Illinois law, a plaintiff \\nmust bring a personal injury action within two years after its \\naccrual. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387 (citing 735 ILCS § 5/13‐202 \\n(West 2003)). \\n The question of when the cause of action accrues “is a \\nquestion of federal law that is not resolved by reference to \\nstate law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (emphasis in the original). \\nFederal common law holds that a cause of action accrues \\nwhen “the plaintiff has a ‘complete and present cause of ac‐\\ntion’”—in other words, when “the plaintiff can file suit and \\nobtain relief.” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning \\nPension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 \\n(1997)). Put another way, a personal injury claim raised under \\n§ 1983 accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to \\nknow of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Serino, 735 \\nF.3d at 591. Because there is “no single accrual rule for all \\n§ 1983 claims,” we must “use the rule that applies to the com‐\\nmon‐law cause of action most similar to the kind of claim the \\nplaintiff asserts.” Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. \\n2013). \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 7 \\n\\n At the time of briefing and oral argument, there was a de‐\\nbatable question as to whether Regains’ claim was time‐\\nbarred. His assertion that he should not have been arrested \\nand charged sounded like a claim for false arrest, or false im‐\\nprisonment. His assertion that he was detained for seventeen \\nmonths while awaiting trial on a charge that was unfounded \\nsounded like a malicious prosecution claim. The accrual rule \\nfor false arrest/false imprisonment claims is different from the \\naccrual rule for malicious prosecution claims. A claim for false \\narrest or false imprisonment accrues once the plaintiff is de‐\\ntained (or released) as a result of a lawful process. Wallace, 549 \\nU.S. at 390‐391. A cause of action for malicious prosecution \\n“does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have termi‐\\nnated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, \\n48 (1994). \\n When he appealed, that difference was critical for Regains. \\nHe was arraigned and detained by lawful process on Septem‐\\nber 4, 2012; under the false arrest/false imprisonment accrual \\nrule, he would have had to file his § 1983 complaint by Sep‐\\ntember 4, 2014. He did not file the complaint until December \\n3, 2014, three months later. In contrast, under the malicious \\nprosecution accrual rule, Regains’ claim would have accrued \\non December 3, 2012—the date he was acquitted. Regains filed \\nhis § 1983 complaint exactly two years after that date. If his \\nclaims properly fell into the false arrest/false imprisonment \\nrealm, his claim would have been time barred; if it fell into the \\nmalicious prosecution realm, it would have been timely. \\n After oral argument, this court resolved the timing ques‐\\ntion. In Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) \\n(“Manuel II”), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 22, 2019) (No. 18‐\\n1093), we held that a claim that a plaintiff was detained \\n\\f8 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nwithout probable cause “accrues when the detention ends.”2 \\nRegains concedes that the officers who arrested him had prob‐\\nable cause to believe that he violated SORA, but he has con‐\\nsistently argued that he seeks damages because he was “de‐\\nprived of liberty without due process of law when he was \\nheld at the Cook County Jail until he was acquitted.” Appel‐\\nlant’s Br. at 13. Applying the principle of Manuel II to Regains’ \\nargument that his seventeen‐month detention for a crime that \\nhe was misled into committing was unconstitutional, we con‐\\nclude that his claim accrued when he was released on Decem‐\\nber 3, 2012, and that his claim was timely filed. \\n This conclusion does not necessarily mandate remand, \\nhowever, because the district court stated other bases for dis‐\\nmissing the case. The court also found that Regains’ amended \\ncomplaint failed to identify specific conduct on the City’s part \\nthat formed the basis for Regains’ claim that it violated his \\nrights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Regains named \\nonly the City as a defendant; he did not sue individual offic‐\\ners. The amended complaint was terse—six of its twenty par‐\\nagraphs described how and why officers steered homeless sex \\noffenders to shelters. The complaint then alleged that when \\nRegains tried to register, officers steered him to a shelter, reg‐\\nistered him at that shelter and required him to come back for \\n \\n2 The Supreme Court has accepted certiorari in McDonough v. Smith, 2019 \\n\\nWL 166879 (No. 18‐485). The petition presents the following question: \\n“Whether the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim based on fab‐\\nrication of evidence in criminal proceedings begins to run when those pro‐\\nceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor (as the majority of circuits has \\nheld) or whether it begins to run when the defendant becomes aware of \\nthe tainted evidence and its improper use (as the Second Circuit held be‐\\nlow).” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McDounough 2018 WL 5026294 (No. \\n18‐845). The Court will hear argument on April 17, 2019. \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 9 \\n\\nre‐registration in three months. It alleged the facts surround‐\\ning Regains’ arrest and charging, and alleged that he stayed \\nin custody until his trial and acquittal. The penultimate para‐\\ngraph stated, “As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff was de‐\\nprived of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendments to \\nthe Constitution of the United States and incurred damages.” \\n The amended complaint does not link specific conduct to \\nRegains’ assertion that his due process rights were violated. \\nOther than identifying the City as an Illinois municipal cor‐\\nporation, it does not describe any conduct by the City. It de‐\\nscribes the actions of the officers who steered Regains to the \\nshelter, the actions of the officers who issued the investigative \\nalert and the actions of the officers who arrested him, but does \\nnot say which—if any—of these actions constitute conduct by \\nthe City that violated his due process rights. It says he “was \\ncharged” with a felony, and “remained” in custody until his \\nacquittal, but does not attribute to the City or anyone else re‐\\nsponsibility for the charges or his detention. It does not allege \\nthat police department officials with policy‐making authority \\nknew about these practices and allowed them to continue. \\n A plaintiff may remedy a deficient complaint by amend‐\\ning it, but the district court also questioned whether Regains \\ncould state a claim against the City at all. In brief comments \\nat the end of its decision, the court noted that a municipality \\nsuch as the City is subject to liability under § 1983 only if an \\nofficial municipal policy caused the violation of the plaintiff’s \\nconstitutional rights, citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. The court \\nstated that in the absence of a constitutional violation, the City \\ncould not be held liable. Regains has not addressed the Monell \\nquestion in his appellate briefs. \\n\\f10 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\n Because Regains has chosen to sue only the City, he must \\nstate a claim that the denial of his liberty for seventeen months \\nwas the result of the implementation or execution of “a policy \\nstatement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially \\nadopted and promulgated by [the municipality’s] officers,” or \\na “governmental ‘custom’ … .” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Alle‐\\ngations that the City is liable “on a respondeat superior theory” \\nwill not suffice. Id. at 691. \\n Before this court, Regains has alleged that there was a \\n“widespread practice within the police department of the City \\nof Chicago to manipulate the registration process to force \\nhomeless sex offenders into violations of the Monitoring Act.” \\nAppellant’s Brief at 6. He asserts that “[t]his practice was ‘so \\nwidespread and well‐settled that it constitutes a custom or us‐\\nage with the force of law even though it is not authorized by \\nwritten law or express policy.’” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, \\nquoting Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. \\n2015). Regains has presented no evidence to support these al‐\\nlegations; he never got the chance, because the district court \\ndismissed the case at the pleading stage. Other plaintiffs have \\nhad the opportunity to present such evidence. \\n In Beley v. City of Chicago, a class composed of “[a]ll per‐\\nsons who attempted to register under the Illinois Sex Offender \\nRegistration Act with the City of Chicago from December 6, \\n2010 to the date of entry of judgment and who were not per‐\\nmitted to register because they were homeless” alleged that \\nthe City had violated, among other provisions, the due pro‐\\ncess clause. Beley v. City of Chicago, Case No. 12‐cv‐9714, 2017 \\nWL 77096, at *1 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 28, 2017), aff’d 901 F.3d 823 (7th \\nCir. 2018). The district court granted summary judgment in \\nfavor of the City on the due process claim. The court stated \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 11 \\n\\nthat its ruling turned on “one dispositive issue: whether Plain‐\\ntiffs present sufficient evidence of a ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ on the \\npart of Defendant to support municipal liability.” Id. at *6. \\nViewing the evidence the plaintiffs had presented in the light \\nmost favorable to them, the court found that they “fail[ed] to \\nraise a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether [Criminal \\nRegistration Section] personnel acted pursuant to an official \\npolicy or practice regarding the registration of homeless sex \\noffenders.” Id. at *8. The court found that, at best, the plaintiffs \\nhad proven that on ten occasions, individual officers may \\nhave engaged in unconstitutional behavior. Id. Although the \\nplaintiffs appear to have presented a substantial amount of \\nevidence in Beley, the court concluded that “the evidence does \\nnot present a triable issue of fact regarding whether there was \\na policy or widespread practice of denying SORA registration \\nto sex offenders who lacked a fixed address at the time of reg‐\\nistration.” Id. at *10. “At most, Plaintiffs have shown ‘occa‐\\nsional lapses of judgment’ or ‘individual misconduct by po‐\\nlice officers,’ not ‘systemic problems’ or ‘institutional behav‐\\nior.’” Id., quoting Rossi 790 F.3d at 737. The plaintiffs appealed; \\nwe affirmed on other grounds. Beley 901 F.3d at 826 (affirming \\non the ground that the ability to register under SORA is not a \\ncognizable liberty interest). \\n Another district court reached the same conclusion in a \\ncase involving individual plaintiffs. See Derfus v. City of Chi‐\\ncago, Case No. 13 C 7298, 2015 WL 1592558 (N.D. Ill., April 6, \\n2015). In granting summary judgment in favor of the City, the \\nDerfus court concluded: \\n The fact that the City registered more offenders \\n as not having a fixed residence or temporary \\n domicile in two random time periods in 2014 \\n\\f12 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\n than in two random time periods in prior years \\n does not suggest that the City had a policy of \\n refusing to register offenders with that status. \\n Nor does the fact that it refused over a three‐\\n year period to register six offenders as “home‐\\n less,” a term that does not appear in SORA and \\n that is commonly used to refer to a much \\n broader segment of people than those deemed \\n by SORA to be lacking a fixed residence or tem‐\\n porary domicile. \\nId. at *4. \\n These cases raise doubts about whether Regains could \\namend his complaint to allege a widespread policy or prac‐\\ntice, or marshal proof the proof at summary judgment that the \\nBeley and Derfus plaintiffs could not. Even if he can allege that \\na practice existed and that it was widespread enough to con‐\\nstitute a custom, Monell requires more. Regains’ arguments \\nand the very fact of his arrest and detention show that not all \\nofficers followed the practice. He describes a schism between \\nregistering officers who followed the steering practice and \\nthose who did not. To state a Monell claim, Regains will need \\nto show that high‐ranking members of the Chicago Police De‐\\npartment knew of the differing practices and allowed them to \\ncontinue. This may be a tall order, but we cannot conclude \\nthat allowing Regains to try would be an exercise in futility. \\n A final point: on appeal, Regains consistently has charac‐\\nterized his claim as a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment \\ndue process rights. At the time he filed the appeal, that was \\nhis only option; our decision in Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750, pre‐\\ncluded the argument that pretrial detention that occurred af‐\\nter the start of the judicial process violated the Fourth \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 13 \\n\\nAmendment. Manuel I since has abrogated Newsome, holding \\nthat “the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful \\npretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process.” 137 \\nU.S. at 920. In the post‐Manuel I/Manuel II world, “the Fourth \\nAmendment, not the Due Process Clause, is the source of the \\nright in a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention, \\nwhether before or after the initiation of formal legal process.” \\nLewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. Jan. 23, \\n2019). \\n III. Conclusion \\n Because Regains timely filed his complaint, we reverse the \\ndistrict court’s dismissal of the complaint and remand for fur‐\\nther proceedings consistent with this decision.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1188,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4599469,"string":"4,599,469"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Paul Regains v. City of Chicago"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-13"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"15-2444"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PEPPER, District Judge.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PEPPER, District Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 15‐2444 \\nPAUL REGAINS, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \\n v. \\n\\nCITY OF CHICAGO, \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n ____________________ \\n \\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 14 C 9687 — James B. Zagel, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 13, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and \\nPEPPER, District Judge.* \\n PEPPER, District Judge. The Illinois Sex Offender Registra‐\\ntion Act (SORA) requires sex offenders to register with the po‐\\nlice. Because he did not have a permanent address (he was \\nhomeless), Paul Regains followed the instructions of officers \\n\\n \\n * Of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation. \\n\\f2 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nwho directed him to a local homeless shelter (which they \\nlisted on his registration as his permanent address), and to re‐\\nturn for re‐registration in ninety days. When he appeared to \\nreport three months later, Chicago police officers arrested Re‐\\ngains on an “investigative alert,” because other officers had \\nnot been able to locate Regains at the address provided. Re‐\\ngains remained in custody seventeen months before the Illi‐\\nnois trial court found him not guilty of failing to a report a \\nchange of address. \\n Regains sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, \\nclaiming that it violated his rights under the Due Process \\nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dis‐\\nmissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \\n12(b)(6), finding that either the claim was time‐barred under \\nIllinois’ two‐year statute of limitations for personal injury \\nclaims, or that it was barred by this court’s decision in New‐\\nsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001), abrogated by \\nManual v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (“Manuel I”). The \\ndistrict court also found that the amended complaint lacked \\nsufficient factual details to give the City fair notice, and that \\nbecause Regains did not specifically identify a particular con‐\\nstitutional violation, the City could not be held liable under \\nMonell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). \\n We reverse the district court’s decision that Regains’ claim \\nwas time‐barred, and remand for further proceedings. \\n I. Background \\n In 2012, SORA required sex offenders to register in person \\nwithin three days of establishing a residence or a temporary \\ndomicile in any county. 730 ILCS § 150/3(b) (2012). Sex offend‐\\ners in the City of Chicago registered “at the Chicago Police \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 3 \\n\\nDepartment Headquarters.” 730 ILCS § 150/3(a)(1). The law \\nrequired sex offenders without a fixed address or temporary \\ndomicile to report weekly to the chief of police in the munici‐\\npality in which that person was located. 730 ILCS § 150/3. \\n The plaintiff asserts that SORA required “persons with a \\nfixed abode” to report every ninety days, citing 730 ILCS \\n§ 150/6. Appellant’s Br. at 2. In fact, that section of the statute \\nrequired a person who had been adjudicated to be sexually \\ndangerous or was a sexually violent person to report every \\nninety days (and required such offenders to report weekly if \\nthey did not have a fixed residence). “Any other person” re‐\\nquired to register under the statute was required to report \\nonce a year. The record does not indicate whether Regains, \\nhad he had a fixed residence, would have been subject to the \\nninety‐day reporting interval or the one‐year reporting inter‐\\nval. Either way, the law required homeless sex offenders to \\nreport more frequently than sex offenders with fixed resi‐\\ndences. Failure to comply with the provisions of the statute \\nconstituted a felony, for which there was strict liability. 730 \\nILCS § 150/10(a); People v. Molnar, 857 N.E.2d 209, 224 (Ill. \\n2006). \\n By 2012, the Chicago police officers assigned to sex of‐\\nfender registration/reporting duty felt that the weekly report‐\\ning requirement for homeless sex offenders had become bur‐\\ndensome. Some of those police officers engaged in a wide‐\\nspread practice of steering homeless sex offenders to home‐\\nless shelters that would accept sex offenders, and directing \\nthe sex offenders to return with documentation showing the \\nshelter as the sex offender’s residence. This scheme had the \\neffect of providing homeless sex offenders with a “residence,” \\nwhich meant that they were not subject to the weekly \\n\\f4 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nreporting requirement. The officers who engaged in this steer‐\\ning practice, and their supervisors, were aware that the num‐\\nber of persons registered at the shelters far exceeded the shel‐\\nter’s capacity. In other words, they knew that the homeless \\nsex offenders who listed the shelter as their “address” likely \\nwould not be able to remain there. \\n Other Chicago police officers assigned to registration du‐\\nties disagreed with the steering practice. These other officers \\nvisited homeless shelters that accepted sex offender regis‐\\ntrants and attempted to locate the registrant; if they could not \\nlocate the registrant at the shelter, the officers would prepare \\nan investigative alert, informing any Chicago police officer \\nwho encountered the registrant that there was probable cause \\nfor arrest. \\n Regains alleges that in April 2012, Chicago police officers \\nemployed the steering practice when he attempted to register \\nas a homeless sex offender. He asserts that they directed him \\nto a shelter, registered him as residing at that shelter, and in‐\\nstructed him to return for quarterly reporting and re‐registra‐\\ntion in July 2012. \\n In early May 2012, two Chicago police officers went to the \\nshelter to look for Regains. They did not find him, and they \\nprepared a report for failure to register at that address. The \\nnext day, a Chicago police detective reviewed the report, vis‐\\nited the shelter without finding Regains, and issued an inves‐\\ntigative alert informing other Chicago police officers that \\nthere was probable cause to arrest Regains. \\n On July 18, 2012, Regains reported as directed; Chicago \\npolice officers arrested him under the investigative alert. The \\nprosecutor charged Regains with two violations of 730 ILCS \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 5 \\n\\n§ 150/6—failure to register within three days after changing \\nhis address, and failure to report every ninety days. On Sep‐\\ntember 4, 2012, Cook County Judge Thomas V. Gainer ar‐\\nraigned Regains and ordered him detained. Regains re‐\\nmained in custody until his December 3, 2012 trial—some sev‐\\nenteen months—at which time the judge found him not \\nguilty.1 \\n Regains filed his original § 1983 complaint in federal court \\non December 3, 2014. \\n II. Discussion \\n We review de novo a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) \\nmotion to dismiss. Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840 \\nF.3d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “In construing \\nthe complaint, we accept all well‐pleaded facts as true and \\ndraw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffsʹ favor.” Id. We \\nmay affirm on any ground that the record supports, as long \\nas the district court adequately addressed that ground and the \\nnon‐moving party had the opportunity to contest it. Thayer v. \\nChiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 247 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). \\n Regains argues that he was deprived of his liberty for sev‐\\nenteen months without due process of law, as a result of “the \\nwidespread practice within the Chicago police department to‐\\nwards homeless sex offenders.” Appellant’s Br. at 6. He as‐\\nserts that the City violated his Fourteenth Amendment due \\n\\n \\n1 The transcript of Regains’ trial indicates that he registered on April 17, \\n\\n2012. App. to Appellee’s Br. at A27. He appeared at the police station on \\nJuly 18, 2012, id. at A30, ninety‐two days after the date he last registered, \\nid. at A37. The trial judge stated that he could not tell from looking at the \\nreport date Regains had been given whether he was to report on July 16 \\nor July 18, 2012, and made a finding that Regains was not guilty. Id. at A37. \\n\\f6 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nprocess rights by engaging in conduct “in the nature of mali‐\\ncious prosecution.” He has taken pains to avoid giving his \\npersonal injury claim a specific label. The district court found \\nthat if Regains’ claim sounded in false arrest, it was time‐\\nbarred, and that if it sounded in malicious prosecution, it was \\nbarred for other reasons. \\n Regains sued under a federal statute—42 U.S.C. § 1983—\\nbut we look to the law of the state in which the personal injury \\noccurred to determine the length of the statute of limitations. \\nWallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Serino v. Hensley, 735 \\nF.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013). Under Illinois law, a plaintiff \\nmust bring a personal injury action within two years after its \\naccrual. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387 (citing 735 ILCS § 5/13‐202 \\n(West 2003)). \\n The question of when the cause of action accrues “is a \\nquestion of federal law that is not resolved by reference to \\nstate law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (emphasis in the original). \\nFederal common law holds that a cause of action accrues \\nwhen “the plaintiff has a ‘complete and present cause of ac‐\\ntion’”—in other words, when “the plaintiff can file suit and \\nobtain relief.” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning \\nPension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 \\n(1997)). Put another way, a personal injury claim raised under \\n§ 1983 accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to \\nknow of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Serino, 735 \\nF.3d at 591. Because there is “no single accrual rule for all \\n§ 1983 claims,” we must “use the rule that applies to the com‐\\nmon‐law cause of action most similar to the kind of claim the \\nplaintiff asserts.” Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. \\n2013). \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 7 \\n\\n At the time of briefing and oral argument, there was a de‐\\nbatable question as to whether Regains’ claim was time‐\\nbarred. His assertion that he should not have been arrested \\nand charged sounded like a claim for false arrest, or false im‐\\nprisonment. His assertion that he was detained for seventeen \\nmonths while awaiting trial on a charge that was unfounded \\nsounded like a malicious prosecution claim. The accrual rule \\nfor false arrest/false imprisonment claims is different from the \\naccrual rule for malicious prosecution claims. A claim for false \\narrest or false imprisonment accrues once the plaintiff is de‐\\ntained (or released) as a result of a lawful process. Wallace, 549 \\nU.S. at 390‐391. A cause of action for malicious prosecution \\n“does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have termi‐\\nnated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, \\n48 (1994). \\n When he appealed, that difference was critical for Regains. \\nHe was arraigned and detained by lawful process on Septem‐\\nber 4, 2012; under the false arrest/false imprisonment accrual \\nrule, he would have had to file his § 1983 complaint by Sep‐\\ntember 4, 2014. He did not file the complaint until December \\n3, 2014, three months later. In contrast, under the malicious \\nprosecution accrual rule, Regains’ claim would have accrued \\non December 3, 2012—the date he was acquitted. Regains filed \\nhis § 1983 complaint exactly two years after that date. If his \\nclaims properly fell into the false arrest/false imprisonment \\nrealm, his claim would have been time barred; if it fell into the \\nmalicious prosecution realm, it would have been timely. \\n After oral argument, this court resolved the timing ques‐\\ntion. In Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) \\n(“Manuel II”), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 22, 2019) (No. 18‐\\n1093), we held that a claim that a plaintiff was detained \\n\\f8 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nwithout probable cause “accrues when the detention ends.”2 \\nRegains concedes that the officers who arrested him had prob‐\\nable cause to believe that he violated SORA, but he has con‐\\nsistently argued that he seeks damages because he was “de‐\\nprived of liberty without due process of law when he was \\nheld at the Cook County Jail until he was acquitted.” Appel‐\\nlant’s Br. at 13. Applying the principle of Manuel II to Regains’ \\nargument that his seventeen‐month detention for a crime that \\nhe was misled into committing was unconstitutional, we con‐\\nclude that his claim accrued when he was released on Decem‐\\nber 3, 2012, and that his claim was timely filed. \\n This conclusion does not necessarily mandate remand, \\nhowever, because the district court stated other bases for dis‐\\nmissing the case. The court also found that Regains’ amended \\ncomplaint failed to identify specific conduct on the City’s part \\nthat formed the basis for Regains’ claim that it violated his \\nrights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Regains named \\nonly the City as a defendant; he did not sue individual offic‐\\ners. The amended complaint was terse—six of its twenty par‐\\nagraphs described how and why officers steered homeless sex \\noffenders to shelters. The complaint then alleged that when \\nRegains tried to register, officers steered him to a shelter, reg‐\\nistered him at that shelter and required him to come back for \\n \\n2 The Supreme Court has accepted certiorari in McDonough v. Smith, 2019 \\n\\nWL 166879 (No. 18‐485). The petition presents the following question: \\n“Whether the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim based on fab‐\\nrication of evidence in criminal proceedings begins to run when those pro‐\\nceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor (as the majority of circuits has \\nheld) or whether it begins to run when the defendant becomes aware of \\nthe tainted evidence and its improper use (as the Second Circuit held be‐\\nlow).” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McDounough 2018 WL 5026294 (No. \\n18‐845). The Court will hear argument on April 17, 2019. \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 9 \\n\\nre‐registration in three months. It alleged the facts surround‐\\ning Regains’ arrest and charging, and alleged that he stayed \\nin custody until his trial and acquittal. The penultimate para‐\\ngraph stated, “As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff was de‐\\nprived of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendments to \\nthe Constitution of the United States and incurred damages.” \\n The amended complaint does not link specific conduct to \\nRegains’ assertion that his due process rights were violated. \\nOther than identifying the City as an Illinois municipal cor‐\\nporation, it does not describe any conduct by the City. It de‐\\nscribes the actions of the officers who steered Regains to the \\nshelter, the actions of the officers who issued the investigative \\nalert and the actions of the officers who arrested him, but does \\nnot say which—if any—of these actions constitute conduct by \\nthe City that violated his due process rights. It says he “was \\ncharged” with a felony, and “remained” in custody until his \\nacquittal, but does not attribute to the City or anyone else re‐\\nsponsibility for the charges or his detention. It does not allege \\nthat police department officials with policy‐making authority \\nknew about these practices and allowed them to continue. \\n A plaintiff may remedy a deficient complaint by amend‐\\ning it, but the district court also questioned whether Regains \\ncould state a claim against the City at all. In brief comments \\nat the end of its decision, the court noted that a municipality \\nsuch as the City is subject to liability under § 1983 only if an \\nofficial municipal policy caused the violation of the plaintiff’s \\nconstitutional rights, citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. The court \\nstated that in the absence of a constitutional violation, the City \\ncould not be held liable. Regains has not addressed the Monell \\nquestion in his appellate briefs. \\n\\f10 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\n Because Regains has chosen to sue only the City, he must \\nstate a claim that the denial of his liberty for seventeen months \\nwas the result of the implementation or execution of “a policy \\nstatement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially \\nadopted and promulgated by [the municipality’s] officers,” or \\na “governmental ‘custom’ … .” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Alle‐\\ngations that the City is liable “on a respondeat superior theory” \\nwill not suffice. Id. at 691. \\n Before this court, Regains has alleged that there was a \\n“widespread practice within the police department of the City \\nof Chicago to manipulate the registration process to force \\nhomeless sex offenders into violations of the Monitoring Act.” \\nAppellant’s Brief at 6. He asserts that “[t]his practice was ‘so \\nwidespread and well‐settled that it constitutes a custom or us‐\\nage with the force of law even though it is not authorized by \\nwritten law or express policy.’” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, \\nquoting Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. \\n2015). Regains has presented no evidence to support these al‐\\nlegations; he never got the chance, because the district court \\ndismissed the case at the pleading stage. Other plaintiffs have \\nhad the opportunity to present such evidence. \\n In Beley v. City of Chicago, a class composed of “[a]ll per‐\\nsons who attempted to register under the Illinois Sex Offender \\nRegistration Act with the City of Chicago from December 6, \\n2010 to the date of entry of judgment and who were not per‐\\nmitted to register because they were homeless” alleged that \\nthe City had violated, among other provisions, the due pro‐\\ncess clause. Beley v. City of Chicago, Case No. 12‐cv‐9714, 2017 \\nWL 77096, at *1 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 28, 2017), aff’d 901 F.3d 823 (7th \\nCir. 2018). The district court granted summary judgment in \\nfavor of the City on the due process claim. The court stated \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 11 \\n\\nthat its ruling turned on “one dispositive issue: whether Plain‐\\ntiffs present sufficient evidence of a ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ on the \\npart of Defendant to support municipal liability.” Id. at *6. \\nViewing the evidence the plaintiffs had presented in the light \\nmost favorable to them, the court found that they “fail[ed] to \\nraise a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether [Criminal \\nRegistration Section] personnel acted pursuant to an official \\npolicy or practice regarding the registration of homeless sex \\noffenders.” Id. at *8. The court found that, at best, the plaintiffs \\nhad proven that on ten occasions, individual officers may \\nhave engaged in unconstitutional behavior. Id. Although the \\nplaintiffs appear to have presented a substantial amount of \\nevidence in Beley, the court concluded that “the evidence does \\nnot present a triable issue of fact regarding whether there was \\na policy or widespread practice of denying SORA registration \\nto sex offenders who lacked a fixed address at the time of reg‐\\nistration.” Id. at *10. “At most, Plaintiffs have shown ‘occa‐\\nsional lapses of judgment’ or ‘individual misconduct by po‐\\nlice officers,’ not ‘systemic problems’ or ‘institutional behav‐\\nior.’” Id., quoting Rossi 790 F.3d at 737. The plaintiffs appealed; \\nwe affirmed on other grounds. Beley 901 F.3d at 826 (affirming \\non the ground that the ability to register under SORA is not a \\ncognizable liberty interest). \\n Another district court reached the same conclusion in a \\ncase involving individual plaintiffs. See Derfus v. City of Chi‐\\ncago, Case No. 13 C 7298, 2015 WL 1592558 (N.D. Ill., April 6, \\n2015). In granting summary judgment in favor of the City, the \\nDerfus court concluded: \\n The fact that the City registered more offenders \\n as not having a fixed residence or temporary \\n domicile in two random time periods in 2014 \\n\\f12 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\n than in two random time periods in prior years \\n does not suggest that the City had a policy of \\n refusing to register offenders with that status. \\n Nor does the fact that it refused over a three‐\\n year period to register six offenders as “home‐\\n less,” a term that does not appear in SORA and \\n that is commonly used to refer to a much \\n broader segment of people than those deemed \\n by SORA to be lacking a fixed residence or tem‐\\n porary domicile. \\nId. at *4. \\n These cases raise doubts about whether Regains could \\namend his complaint to allege a widespread policy or prac‐\\ntice, or marshal proof the proof at summary judgment that the \\nBeley and Derfus plaintiffs could not. Even if he can allege that \\na practice existed and that it was widespread enough to con‐\\nstitute a custom, Monell requires more. Regains’ arguments \\nand the very fact of his arrest and detention show that not all \\nofficers followed the practice. He describes a schism between \\nregistering officers who followed the steering practice and \\nthose who did not. To state a Monell claim, Regains will need \\nto show that high‐ranking members of the Chicago Police De‐\\npartment knew of the differing practices and allowed them to \\ncontinue. This may be a tall order, but we cannot conclude \\nthat allowing Regains to try would be an exercise in futility. \\n A final point: on appeal, Regains consistently has charac‐\\nterized his claim as a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment \\ndue process rights. At the time he filed the appeal, that was \\nhis only option; our decision in Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750, pre‐\\ncluded the argument that pretrial detention that occurred af‐\\nter the start of the judicial process violated the Fourth \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 13 \\n\\nAmendment. Manuel I since has abrogated Newsome, holding \\nthat “the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful \\npretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process.” 137 \\nU.S. at 920. In the post‐Manuel I/Manuel II world, “the Fourth \\nAmendment, not the Due Process Clause, is the source of the \\nright in a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention, \\nwhether before or after the initiation of formal legal process.” \\nLewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. Jan. 23, \\n2019). \\n III. Conclusion \\n Because Regains timely filed his complaint, we reverse the \\ndistrict court’s dismissal of the complaint and remand for fur‐\\nther proceedings consistent with this decision.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4376722/\", \"author_raw\": \"PEPPER, District Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"PEPPER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"PEPPER\": \", District\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4599469/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Paul Regains v. City of Chicago\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-13\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 15‐2444 \nPAUL REGAINS, \n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \n v. \n\nCITY OF CHICAGO, \n Defendant‐Appellee. \n ____________________ \n \n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \n No. 14 C 9687 — James B. Zagel, Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 13, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and \nPEPPER, District Judge.* \n PEPPER, District Judge. The Illinois Sex Offender Registra‐\ntion Act (SORA) requires sex offenders to register with the po‐\nlice. Because he did not have a permanent address (he was \nhomeless), Paul Regains followed the instructions of officers \n\n \n * Of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation. \n\f2 No. 15‐2444 \n\nwho directed him to a local homeless shelter (which they \nlisted on his registration as his permanent address), and to re‐\nturn for re‐registration in ninety days. When he appeared to \nreport three months later, Chicago police officers arrested Re‐\ngains on an “investigative alert,” because other officers had \nnot been able to locate Regains at the address provided. Re‐\ngains remained in custody seventeen months before the Illi‐\nnois trial court found him not guilty of failing to a report a \nchange of address. \n Regains sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, \nclaiming that it violated his rights under the Due Process \nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dis‐\nmissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \n12(b)(6), finding that either the claim was time‐barred under \nIllinois’ two‐year statute of limitations for personal injury \nclaims, or that it was barred by this court’s decision in New‐\nsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001), abrogated by \nManual v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (“Manuel I”). The \ndistrict court also found that the amended complaint lacked \nsufficient factual details to give the City fair notice, and that \nbecause Regains did not specifically identify a particular con‐\nstitutional violation, the City could not be held liable under \nMonell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). \n We reverse the district court’s decision that Regains’ claim \nwas time‐barred, and remand for further proceedings. \n I. Background \n In 2012, SORA required sex offenders to register in person \nwithin three days of establishing a residence or a temporary \ndomicile in any county. 730 ILCS § 150/3(b) (2012). Sex offend‐\ners in the City of Chicago registered “at the Chicago Police \n\fNo. 15‐2444 3 \n\nDepartment Headquarters.” 730 ILCS § 150/3(a)(1). The law \nrequired sex offenders without a fixed address or temporary \ndomicile to report weekly to the chief of police in the munici‐\npality in which that person was located. 730 ILCS § 150/3. \n The plaintiff asserts that SORA required “persons with a \nfixed abode” to report every ninety days, citing 730 ILCS \n§ 150/6. Appellant’s Br. at 2. In fact, that section of the statute \nrequired a person who had been adjudicated to be sexually \ndangerous or was a sexually violent person to report every \nninety days (and required such offenders to report weekly if \nthey did not have a fixed residence). “Any other person” re‐\nquired to register under the statute was required to report \nonce a year. The record does not indicate whether Regains, \nhad he had a fixed residence, would have been subject to the \nninety‐day reporting interval or the one‐year reporting inter‐\nval. Either way, the law required homeless sex offenders to \nreport more frequently than sex offenders with fixed resi‐\ndences. Failure to comply with the provisions of the statute \nconstituted a felony, for which there was strict liability. 730 \nILCS § 150/10(a); People v. Molnar, 857 N.E.2d 209, 224 (Ill. \n2006). \n By 2012, the Chicago police officers assigned to sex of‐\nfender registration/reporting duty felt that the weekly report‐\ning requirement for homeless sex offenders had become bur‐\ndensome. Some of those police officers engaged in a wide‐\nspread practice of steering homeless sex offenders to home‐\nless shelters that would accept sex offenders, and directing \nthe sex offenders to return with documentation showing the \nshelter as the sex offender’s residence. This scheme had the \neffect of providing homeless sex offenders with a “residence,” \nwhich meant that they were not subject to the weekly \n\f4 No. 15‐2444 \n\nreporting requirement. The officers who engaged in this steer‐\ning practice, and their supervisors, were aware that the num‐\nber of persons registered at the shelters far exceeded the shel‐\nter’s capacity. In other words, they knew that the homeless \nsex offenders who listed the shelter as their “address” likely \nwould not be able to remain there. \n Other Chicago police officers assigned to registration du‐\nties disagreed with the steering practice. These other officers \nvisited homeless shelters that accepted sex offender regis‐\ntrants and attempted to locate the registrant; if they could not \nlocate the registrant at the shelter, the officers would prepare \nan investigative alert, informing any Chicago police officer \nwho encountered the registrant that there was probable cause \nfor arrest. \n Regains alleges that in April 2012, Chicago police officers \nemployed the steering practice when he attempted to register \nas a homeless sex offender. He asserts that they directed him \nto a shelter, registered him as residing at that shelter, and in‐\nstructed him to return for quarterly reporting and re‐registra‐\ntion in July 2012. \n In early May 2012, two Chicago police officers went to the \nshelter to look for Regains. They did not find him, and they \nprepared a report for failure to register at that address. The \nnext day, a Chicago police detective reviewed the report, vis‐\nited the shelter without finding Regains, and issued an inves‐\ntigative alert informing other Chicago police officers that \nthere was probable cause to arrest Regains. \n On July 18, 2012, Regains reported as directed; Chicago \npolice officers arrested him under the investigative alert. The \nprosecutor charged Regains with two violations of 730 ILCS \n\fNo. 15‐2444 5 \n\n§ 150/6—failure to register within three days after changing \nhis address, and failure to report every ninety days. On Sep‐\ntember 4, 2012, Cook County Judge Thomas V. Gainer ar‐\nraigned Regains and ordered him detained. Regains re‐\nmained in custody until his December 3, 2012 trial—some sev‐\nenteen months—at which time the judge found him not \nguilty.1 \n Regains filed his original § 1983 complaint in federal court \non December 3, 2014. \n II. Discussion \n We review de novo a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) \nmotion to dismiss. Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840 \nF.3d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “In construing \nthe complaint, we accept all well‐pleaded facts as true and \ndraw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffsʹ favor.” Id. We \nmay affirm on any ground that the record supports, as long \nas the district court adequately addressed that ground and the \nnon‐moving party had the opportunity to contest it. Thayer v. \nChiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 247 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). \n Regains argues that he was deprived of his liberty for sev‐\nenteen months without due process of law, as a result of “the \nwidespread practice within the Chicago police department to‐\nwards homeless sex offenders.” Appellant’s Br. at 6. He as‐\nserts that the City violated his Fourteenth Amendment due \n\n \n1 The transcript of Regains’ trial indicates that he registered on April 17, \n\n2012. App. to Appellee’s Br. at A27. He appeared at the police station on \nJuly 18, 2012, id. at A30, ninety‐two days after the date he last registered, \nid. at A37. The trial judge stated that he could not tell from looking at the \nreport date Regains had been given whether he was to report on July 16 \nor July 18, 2012, and made a finding that Regains was not guilty. Id. at A37. \n\f6 No. 15‐2444 \n\nprocess rights by engaging in conduct “in the nature of mali‐\ncious prosecution.” He has taken pains to avoid giving his \npersonal injury claim a specific label. The district court found \nthat if Regains’ claim sounded in false arrest, it was time‐\nbarred, and that if it sounded in malicious prosecution, it was \nbarred for other reasons. \n Regains sued under a federal statute—42 U.S.C. § 1983—\nbut we look to the law of the state in which the personal injury \noccurred to determine the length of the statute of limitations. \nWallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Serino v. Hensley, 735 \nF.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013). Under Illinois law, a plaintiff \nmust bring a personal injury action within two years after its \naccrual. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387 (citing 735 ILCS § 5/13‐202 \n(West 2003)). \n The question of when the cause of action accrues “is a \nquestion of federal law that is not resolved by reference to \nstate law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (emphasis in the original). \nFederal common law holds that a cause of action accrues \nwhen “the plaintiff has a ‘complete and present cause of ac‐\ntion’”—in other words, when “the plaintiff can file suit and \nobtain relief.” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning \nPension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 \n(1997)). Put another way, a personal injury claim raised under \n§ 1983 accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to \nknow of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Serino, 735 \nF.3d at 591. Because there is “no single accrual rule for all \n§ 1983 claims,” we must “use the rule that applies to the com‐\nmon‐law cause of action most similar to the kind of claim the \nplaintiff asserts.” Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. \n2013). \n\fNo. 15‐2444 7 \n\n At the time of briefing and oral argument, there was a de‐\nbatable question as to whether Regains’ claim was time‐\nbarred. His assertion that he should not have been arrested \nand charged sounded like a claim for false arrest, or false im‐\nprisonment. His assertion that he was detained for seventeen \nmonths while awaiting trial on a charge that was unfounded \nsounded like a malicious prosecution claim. The accrual rule \nfor false arrest/false imprisonment claims is different from the \naccrual rule for malicious prosecution claims. A claim for false \narrest or false imprisonment accrues once the plaintiff is de‐\ntained (or released) as a result of a lawful process. Wallace, 549 \nU.S. at 390‐391. A cause of action for malicious prosecution \n“does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have termi‐\nnated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, \n48 (1994). \n When he appealed, that difference was critical for Regains. \nHe was arraigned and detained by lawful process on Septem‐\nber 4, 2012; under the false arrest/false imprisonment accrual \nrule, he would have had to file his § 1983 complaint by Sep‐\ntember 4, 2014. He did not file the complaint until December \n3, 2014, three months later. In contrast, under the malicious \nprosecution accrual rule, Regains’ claim would have accrued \non December 3, 2012—the date he was acquitted. Regains filed \nhis § 1983 complaint exactly two years after that date. If his \nclaims properly fell into the false arrest/false imprisonment \nrealm, his claim would have been time barred; if it fell into the \nmalicious prosecution realm, it would have been timely. \n After oral argument, this court resolved the timing ques‐\ntion. In Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) \n(“Manuel II”), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 22, 2019) (No. 18‐\n1093), we held that a claim that a plaintiff was detained \n\f8 No. 15‐2444 \n\nwithout probable cause “accrues when the detention ends.”2 \nRegains concedes that the officers who arrested him had prob‐\nable cause to believe that he violated SORA, but he has con‐\nsistently argued that he seeks damages because he was “de‐\nprived of liberty without due process of law when he was \nheld at the Cook County Jail until he was acquitted.” Appel‐\nlant’s Br. at 13. Applying the principle of Manuel II to Regains’ \nargument that his seventeen‐month detention for a crime that \nhe was misled into committing was unconstitutional, we con‐\nclude that his claim accrued when he was released on Decem‐\nber 3, 2012, and that his claim was timely filed. \n This conclusion does not necessarily mandate remand, \nhowever, because the district court stated other bases for dis‐\nmissing the case. The court also found that Regains’ amended \ncomplaint failed to identify specific conduct on the City’s part \nthat formed the basis for Regains’ claim that it violated his \nrights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Regains named \nonly the City as a defendant; he did not sue individual offic‐\ners. The amended complaint was terse—six of its twenty par‐\nagraphs described how and why officers steered homeless sex \noffenders to shelters. The complaint then alleged that when \nRegains tried to register, officers steered him to a shelter, reg‐\nistered him at that shelter and required him to come back for \n \n2 The Supreme Court has accepted certiorari in McDonough v. Smith, 2019 \n\nWL 166879 (No. 18‐485). The petition presents the following question: \n“Whether the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim based on fab‐\nrication of evidence in criminal proceedings begins to run when those pro‐\nceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor (as the majority of circuits has \nheld) or whether it begins to run when the defendant becomes aware of \nthe tainted evidence and its improper use (as the Second Circuit held be‐\nlow).” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McDounough 2018 WL 5026294 (No. \n18‐845). The Court will hear argument on April 17, 2019. \n\fNo. 15‐2444 9 \n\nre‐registration in three months. It alleged the facts surround‐\ning Regains’ arrest and charging, and alleged that he stayed \nin custody until his trial and acquittal. The penultimate para‐\ngraph stated, “As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff was de‐\nprived of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendments to \nthe Constitution of the United States and incurred damages.” \n The amended complaint does not link specific conduct to \nRegains’ assertion that his due process rights were violated. \nOther than identifying the City as an Illinois municipal cor‐\nporation, it does not describe any conduct by the City. It de‐\nscribes the actions of the officers who steered Regains to the \nshelter, the actions of the officers who issued the investigative \nalert and the actions of the officers who arrested him, but does \nnot say which—if any—of these actions constitute conduct by \nthe City that violated his due process rights. It says he “was \ncharged” with a felony, and “remained” in custody until his \nacquittal, but does not attribute to the City or anyone else re‐\nsponsibility for the charges or his detention. It does not allege \nthat police department officials with policy‐making authority \nknew about these practices and allowed them to continue. \n A plaintiff may remedy a deficient complaint by amend‐\ning it, but the district court also questioned whether Regains \ncould state a claim against the City at all. In brief comments \nat the end of its decision, the court noted that a municipality \nsuch as the City is subject to liability under § 1983 only if an \nofficial municipal policy caused the violation of the plaintiff’s \nconstitutional rights, citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. The court \nstated that in the absence of a constitutional violation, the City \ncould not be held liable. Regains has not addressed the Monell \nquestion in his appellate briefs. \n\f10 No. 15‐2444 \n\n Because Regains has chosen to sue only the City, he must \nstate a claim that the denial of his liberty for seventeen months \nwas the result of the implementation or execution of “a policy \nstatement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially \nadopted and promulgated by [the municipality’s] officers,” or \na “governmental ‘custom’ … .” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Alle‐\ngations that the City is liable “on a respondeat superior theory” \nwill not suffice. Id. at 691. \n Before this court, Regains has alleged that there was a \n“widespread practice within the police department of the City \nof Chicago to manipulate the registration process to force \nhomeless sex offenders into violations of the Monitoring Act.” \nAppellant’s Brief at 6. He asserts that “[t]his practice was ‘so \nwidespread and well‐settled that it constitutes a custom or us‐\nage with the force of law even though it is not authorized by \nwritten law or express policy.’” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, \nquoting Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. \n2015). Regains has presented no evidence to support these al‐\nlegations; he never got the chance, because the district court \ndismissed the case at the pleading stage. Other plaintiffs have \nhad the opportunity to present such evidence. \n In Beley v. City of Chicago, a class composed of “[a]ll per‐\nsons who attempted to register under the Illinois Sex Offender \nRegistration Act with the City of Chicago from December 6, \n2010 to the date of entry of judgment and who were not per‐\nmitted to register because they were homeless” alleged that \nthe City had violated, among other provisions, the due pro‐\ncess clause. Beley v. City of Chicago, Case No. 12‐cv‐9714, 2017 \nWL 77096, at *1 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 28, 2017), aff’d 901 F.3d 823 (7th \nCir. 2018). The district court granted summary judgment in \nfavor of the City on the due process claim. The court stated \n\fNo. 15‐2444 11 \n\nthat its ruling turned on “one dispositive issue: whether Plain‐\ntiffs present sufficient evidence of a ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ on the \npart of Defendant to support municipal liability.” Id. at *6. \nViewing the evidence the plaintiffs had presented in the light \nmost favorable to them, the court found that they “fail[ed] to \nraise a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether [Criminal \nRegistration Section] personnel acted pursuant to an official \npolicy or practice regarding the registration of homeless sex \noffenders.” Id. at *8. The court found that, at best, the plaintiffs \nhad proven that on ten occasions, individual officers may \nhave engaged in unconstitutional behavior. Id. Although the \nplaintiffs appear to have presented a substantial amount of \nevidence in Beley, the court concluded that “the evidence does \nnot present a triable issue of fact regarding whether there was \na policy or widespread practice of denying SORA registration \nto sex offenders who lacked a fixed address at the time of reg‐\nistration.” Id. at *10. “At most, Plaintiffs have shown ‘occa‐\nsional lapses of judgment’ or ‘individual misconduct by po‐\nlice officers,’ not ‘systemic problems’ or ‘institutional behav‐\nior.’” Id., quoting Rossi 790 F.3d at 737. The plaintiffs appealed; \nwe affirmed on other grounds. Beley 901 F.3d at 826 (affirming \non the ground that the ability to register under SORA is not a \ncognizable liberty interest). \n Another district court reached the same conclusion in a \ncase involving individual plaintiffs. See Derfus v. City of Chi‐\ncago, Case No. 13 C 7298, 2015 WL 1592558 (N.D. Ill., April 6, \n2015). In granting summary judgment in favor of the City, the \nDerfus court concluded: \n The fact that the City registered more offenders \n as not having a fixed residence or temporary \n domicile in two random time periods in 2014 \n\f12 No. 15‐2444 \n\n than in two random time periods in prior years \n does not suggest that the City had a policy of \n refusing to register offenders with that status. \n Nor does the fact that it refused over a three‐\n year period to register six offenders as “home‐\n less,” a term that does not appear in SORA and \n that is commonly used to refer to a much \n broader segment of people than those deemed \n by SORA to be lacking a fixed residence or tem‐\n porary domicile. \nId. at *4. \n These cases raise doubts about whether Regains could \namend his complaint to allege a widespread policy or prac‐\ntice, or marshal proof the proof at summary judgment that the \nBeley and Derfus plaintiffs could not. Even if he can allege that \na practice existed and that it was widespread enough to con‐\nstitute a custom, Monell requires more. Regains’ arguments \nand the very fact of his arrest and detention show that not all \nofficers followed the practice. He describes a schism between \nregistering officers who followed the steering practice and \nthose who did not. To state a Monell claim, Regains will need \nto show that high‐ranking members of the Chicago Police De‐\npartment knew of the differing practices and allowed them to \ncontinue. This may be a tall order, but we cannot conclude \nthat allowing Regains to try would be an exercise in futility. \n A final point: on appeal, Regains consistently has charac‐\nterized his claim as a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment \ndue process rights. At the time he filed the appeal, that was \nhis only option; our decision in Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750, pre‐\ncluded the argument that pretrial detention that occurred af‐\nter the start of the judicial process violated the Fourth \n\fNo. 15‐2444 13 \n\nAmendment. Manuel I since has abrogated Newsome, holding \nthat “the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful \npretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process.” 137 \nU.S. at 920. In the post‐Manuel I/Manuel II world, “the Fourth \nAmendment, not the Due Process Clause, is the source of the \nright in a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention, \nwhether before or after the initiation of formal legal process.” \nLewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. Jan. 23, \n2019). \n III. Conclusion \n Because Regains timely filed his complaint, we reverse the \ndistrict court’s dismissal of the complaint and remand for fur‐\nther proceedings consistent with this decision.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Paul Regains v. City of Chicago\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-13\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 15‐2444 \\nPAUL REGAINS, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \\n v. \\n\\nCITY OF CHICAGO, \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n ____________________ \\n \\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 14 C 9687 — James B. Zagel, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 13, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and \\nPEPPER, District Judge.* \\n PEPPER, District Judge. The Illinois Sex Offender Registra‐\\ntion Act (SORA) requires sex offenders to register with the po‐\\nlice. Because he did not have a permanent address (he was \\nhomeless), Paul Regains followed the instructions of officers \\n\\n \\n * Of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation. \\n\\f2 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nwho directed him to a local homeless shelter (which they \\nlisted on his registration as his permanent address), and to re‐\\nturn for re‐registration in ninety days. When he appeared to \\nreport three months later, Chicago police officers arrested Re‐\\ngains on an “investigative alert,” because other officers had \\nnot been able to locate Regains at the address provided. Re‐\\ngains remained in custody seventeen months before the Illi‐\\nnois trial court found him not guilty of failing to a report a \\nchange of address. \\n Regains sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, \\nclaiming that it violated his rights under the Due Process \\nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dis‐\\nmissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \\n12(b)(6), finding that either the claim was time‐barred under \\nIllinois’ two‐year statute of limitations for personal injury \\nclaims, or that it was barred by this court’s decision in New‐\\nsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001), abrogated by \\nManual v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (“Manuel I”). The \\ndistrict court also found that the amended complaint lacked \\nsufficient factual details to give the City fair notice, and that \\nbecause Regains did not specifically identify a particular con‐\\nstitutional violation, the City could not be held liable under \\nMonell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). \\n We reverse the district court’s decision that Regains’ claim \\nwas time‐barred, and remand for further proceedings. \\n I. Background \\n In 2012, SORA required sex offenders to register in person \\nwithin three days of establishing a residence or a temporary \\ndomicile in any county. 730 ILCS § 150/3(b) (2012). Sex offend‐\\ners in the City of Chicago registered “at the Chicago Police \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 3 \\n\\nDepartment Headquarters.” 730 ILCS § 150/3(a)(1). The law \\nrequired sex offenders without a fixed address or temporary \\ndomicile to report weekly to the chief of police in the munici‐\\npality in which that person was located. 730 ILCS § 150/3. \\n The plaintiff asserts that SORA required “persons with a \\nfixed abode” to report every ninety days, citing 730 ILCS \\n§ 150/6. Appellant’s Br. at 2. In fact, that section of the statute \\nrequired a person who had been adjudicated to be sexually \\ndangerous or was a sexually violent person to report every \\nninety days (and required such offenders to report weekly if \\nthey did not have a fixed residence). “Any other person” re‐\\nquired to register under the statute was required to report \\nonce a year. The record does not indicate whether Regains, \\nhad he had a fixed residence, would have been subject to the \\nninety‐day reporting interval or the one‐year reporting inter‐\\nval. Either way, the law required homeless sex offenders to \\nreport more frequently than sex offenders with fixed resi‐\\ndences. Failure to comply with the provisions of the statute \\nconstituted a felony, for which there was strict liability. 730 \\nILCS § 150/10(a); People v. Molnar, 857 N.E.2d 209, 224 (Ill. \\n2006). \\n By 2012, the Chicago police officers assigned to sex of‐\\nfender registration/reporting duty felt that the weekly report‐\\ning requirement for homeless sex offenders had become bur‐\\ndensome. Some of those police officers engaged in a wide‐\\nspread practice of steering homeless sex offenders to home‐\\nless shelters that would accept sex offenders, and directing \\nthe sex offenders to return with documentation showing the \\nshelter as the sex offender’s residence. This scheme had the \\neffect of providing homeless sex offenders with a “residence,” \\nwhich meant that they were not subject to the weekly \\n\\f4 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nreporting requirement. The officers who engaged in this steer‐\\ning practice, and their supervisors, were aware that the num‐\\nber of persons registered at the shelters far exceeded the shel‐\\nter’s capacity. In other words, they knew that the homeless \\nsex offenders who listed the shelter as their “address” likely \\nwould not be able to remain there. \\n Other Chicago police officers assigned to registration du‐\\nties disagreed with the steering practice. These other officers \\nvisited homeless shelters that accepted sex offender regis‐\\ntrants and attempted to locate the registrant; if they could not \\nlocate the registrant at the shelter, the officers would prepare \\nan investigative alert, informing any Chicago police officer \\nwho encountered the registrant that there was probable cause \\nfor arrest. \\n Regains alleges that in April 2012, Chicago police officers \\nemployed the steering practice when he attempted to register \\nas a homeless sex offender. He asserts that they directed him \\nto a shelter, registered him as residing at that shelter, and in‐\\nstructed him to return for quarterly reporting and re‐registra‐\\ntion in July 2012. \\n In early May 2012, two Chicago police officers went to the \\nshelter to look for Regains. They did not find him, and they \\nprepared a report for failure to register at that address. The \\nnext day, a Chicago police detective reviewed the report, vis‐\\nited the shelter without finding Regains, and issued an inves‐\\ntigative alert informing other Chicago police officers that \\nthere was probable cause to arrest Regains. \\n On July 18, 2012, Regains reported as directed; Chicago \\npolice officers arrested him under the investigative alert. The \\nprosecutor charged Regains with two violations of 730 ILCS \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 5 \\n\\n§ 150/6—failure to register within three days after changing \\nhis address, and failure to report every ninety days. On Sep‐\\ntember 4, 2012, Cook County Judge Thomas V. Gainer ar‐\\nraigned Regains and ordered him detained. Regains re‐\\nmained in custody until his December 3, 2012 trial—some sev‐\\nenteen months—at which time the judge found him not \\nguilty.1 \\n Regains filed his original § 1983 complaint in federal court \\non December 3, 2014. \\n II. Discussion \\n We review de novo a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) \\nmotion to dismiss. Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840 \\nF.3d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “In construing \\nthe complaint, we accept all well‐pleaded facts as true and \\ndraw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffsʹ favor.” Id. We \\nmay affirm on any ground that the record supports, as long \\nas the district court adequately addressed that ground and the \\nnon‐moving party had the opportunity to contest it. Thayer v. \\nChiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 247 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). \\n Regains argues that he was deprived of his liberty for sev‐\\nenteen months without due process of law, as a result of “the \\nwidespread practice within the Chicago police department to‐\\nwards homeless sex offenders.” Appellant’s Br. at 6. He as‐\\nserts that the City violated his Fourteenth Amendment due \\n\\n \\n1 The transcript of Regains’ trial indicates that he registered on April 17, \\n\\n2012. App. to Appellee’s Br. at A27. He appeared at the police station on \\nJuly 18, 2012, id. at A30, ninety‐two days after the date he last registered, \\nid. at A37. The trial judge stated that he could not tell from looking at the \\nreport date Regains had been given whether he was to report on July 16 \\nor July 18, 2012, and made a finding that Regains was not guilty. Id. at A37. \\n\\f6 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nprocess rights by engaging in conduct “in the nature of mali‐\\ncious prosecution.” He has taken pains to avoid giving his \\npersonal injury claim a specific label. The district court found \\nthat if Regains’ claim sounded in false arrest, it was time‐\\nbarred, and that if it sounded in malicious prosecution, it was \\nbarred for other reasons. \\n Regains sued under a federal statute—42 U.S.C. § 1983—\\nbut we look to the law of the state in which the personal injury \\noccurred to determine the length of the statute of limitations. \\nWallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Serino v. Hensley, 735 \\nF.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013). Under Illinois law, a plaintiff \\nmust bring a personal injury action within two years after its \\naccrual. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387 (citing 735 ILCS § 5/13‐202 \\n(West 2003)). \\n The question of when the cause of action accrues “is a \\nquestion of federal law that is not resolved by reference to \\nstate law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (emphasis in the original). \\nFederal common law holds that a cause of action accrues \\nwhen “the plaintiff has a ‘complete and present cause of ac‐\\ntion’”—in other words, when “the plaintiff can file suit and \\nobtain relief.” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning \\nPension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 \\n(1997)). Put another way, a personal injury claim raised under \\n§ 1983 accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to \\nknow of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Serino, 735 \\nF.3d at 591. Because there is “no single accrual rule for all \\n§ 1983 claims,” we must “use the rule that applies to the com‐\\nmon‐law cause of action most similar to the kind of claim the \\nplaintiff asserts.” Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. \\n2013). \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 7 \\n\\n At the time of briefing and oral argument, there was a de‐\\nbatable question as to whether Regains’ claim was time‐\\nbarred. His assertion that he should not have been arrested \\nand charged sounded like a claim for false arrest, or false im‐\\nprisonment. His assertion that he was detained for seventeen \\nmonths while awaiting trial on a charge that was unfounded \\nsounded like a malicious prosecution claim. The accrual rule \\nfor false arrest/false imprisonment claims is different from the \\naccrual rule for malicious prosecution claims. A claim for false \\narrest or false imprisonment accrues once the plaintiff is de‐\\ntained (or released) as a result of a lawful process. Wallace, 549 \\nU.S. at 390‐391. A cause of action for malicious prosecution \\n“does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have termi‐\\nnated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, \\n48 (1994). \\n When he appealed, that difference was critical for Regains. \\nHe was arraigned and detained by lawful process on Septem‐\\nber 4, 2012; under the false arrest/false imprisonment accrual \\nrule, he would have had to file his § 1983 complaint by Sep‐\\ntember 4, 2014. He did not file the complaint until December \\n3, 2014, three months later. In contrast, under the malicious \\nprosecution accrual rule, Regains’ claim would have accrued \\non December 3, 2012—the date he was acquitted. Regains filed \\nhis § 1983 complaint exactly two years after that date. If his \\nclaims properly fell into the false arrest/false imprisonment \\nrealm, his claim would have been time barred; if it fell into the \\nmalicious prosecution realm, it would have been timely. \\n After oral argument, this court resolved the timing ques‐\\ntion. In Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) \\n(“Manuel II”), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 22, 2019) (No. 18‐\\n1093), we held that a claim that a plaintiff was detained \\n\\f8 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nwithout probable cause “accrues when the detention ends.”2 \\nRegains concedes that the officers who arrested him had prob‐\\nable cause to believe that he violated SORA, but he has con‐\\nsistently argued that he seeks damages because he was “de‐\\nprived of liberty without due process of law when he was \\nheld at the Cook County Jail until he was acquitted.” Appel‐\\nlant’s Br. at 13. Applying the principle of Manuel II to Regains’ \\nargument that his seventeen‐month detention for a crime that \\nhe was misled into committing was unconstitutional, we con‐\\nclude that his claim accrued when he was released on Decem‐\\nber 3, 2012, and that his claim was timely filed. \\n This conclusion does not necessarily mandate remand, \\nhowever, because the district court stated other bases for dis‐\\nmissing the case. The court also found that Regains’ amended \\ncomplaint failed to identify specific conduct on the City’s part \\nthat formed the basis for Regains’ claim that it violated his \\nrights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Regains named \\nonly the City as a defendant; he did not sue individual offic‐\\ners. The amended complaint was terse—six of its twenty par‐\\nagraphs described how and why officers steered homeless sex \\noffenders to shelters. The complaint then alleged that when \\nRegains tried to register, officers steered him to a shelter, reg‐\\nistered him at that shelter and required him to come back for \\n \\n2 The Supreme Court has accepted certiorari in McDonough v. Smith, 2019 \\n\\nWL 166879 (No. 18‐485). The petition presents the following question: \\n“Whether the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim based on fab‐\\nrication of evidence in criminal proceedings begins to run when those pro‐\\nceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor (as the majority of circuits has \\nheld) or whether it begins to run when the defendant becomes aware of \\nthe tainted evidence and its improper use (as the Second Circuit held be‐\\nlow).” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McDounough 2018 WL 5026294 (No. \\n18‐845). The Court will hear argument on April 17, 2019. \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 9 \\n\\nre‐registration in three months. It alleged the facts surround‐\\ning Regains’ arrest and charging, and alleged that he stayed \\nin custody until his trial and acquittal. The penultimate para‐\\ngraph stated, “As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff was de‐\\nprived of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendments to \\nthe Constitution of the United States and incurred damages.” \\n The amended complaint does not link specific conduct to \\nRegains’ assertion that his due process rights were violated. \\nOther than identifying the City as an Illinois municipal cor‐\\nporation, it does not describe any conduct by the City. It de‐\\nscribes the actions of the officers who steered Regains to the \\nshelter, the actions of the officers who issued the investigative \\nalert and the actions of the officers who arrested him, but does \\nnot say which—if any—of these actions constitute conduct by \\nthe City that violated his due process rights. It says he “was \\ncharged” with a felony, and “remained” in custody until his \\nacquittal, but does not attribute to the City or anyone else re‐\\nsponsibility for the charges or his detention. It does not allege \\nthat police department officials with policy‐making authority \\nknew about these practices and allowed them to continue. \\n A plaintiff may remedy a deficient complaint by amend‐\\ning it, but the district court also questioned whether Regains \\ncould state a claim against the City at all. In brief comments \\nat the end of its decision, the court noted that a municipality \\nsuch as the City is subject to liability under § 1983 only if an \\nofficial municipal policy caused the violation of the plaintiff’s \\nconstitutional rights, citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. The court \\nstated that in the absence of a constitutional violation, the City \\ncould not be held liable. Regains has not addressed the Monell \\nquestion in his appellate briefs. \\n\\f10 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\n Because Regains has chosen to sue only the City, he must \\nstate a claim that the denial of his liberty for seventeen months \\nwas the result of the implementation or execution of “a policy \\nstatement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially \\nadopted and promulgated by [the municipality’s] officers,” or \\na “governmental ‘custom’ … .” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Alle‐\\ngations that the City is liable “on a respondeat superior theory” \\nwill not suffice. Id. at 691. \\n Before this court, Regains has alleged that there was a \\n“widespread practice within the police department of the City \\nof Chicago to manipulate the registration process to force \\nhomeless sex offenders into violations of the Monitoring Act.” \\nAppellant’s Brief at 6. He asserts that “[t]his practice was ‘so \\nwidespread and well‐settled that it constitutes a custom or us‐\\nage with the force of law even though it is not authorized by \\nwritten law or express policy.’” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, \\nquoting Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. \\n2015). Regains has presented no evidence to support these al‐\\nlegations; he never got the chance, because the district court \\ndismissed the case at the pleading stage. Other plaintiffs have \\nhad the opportunity to present such evidence. \\n In Beley v. City of Chicago, a class composed of “[a]ll per‐\\nsons who attempted to register under the Illinois Sex Offender \\nRegistration Act with the City of Chicago from December 6, \\n2010 to the date of entry of judgment and who were not per‐\\nmitted to register because they were homeless” alleged that \\nthe City had violated, among other provisions, the due pro‐\\ncess clause. Beley v. City of Chicago, Case No. 12‐cv‐9714, 2017 \\nWL 77096, at *1 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 28, 2017), aff’d 901 F.3d 823 (7th \\nCir. 2018). The district court granted summary judgment in \\nfavor of the City on the due process claim. The court stated \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 11 \\n\\nthat its ruling turned on “one dispositive issue: whether Plain‐\\ntiffs present sufficient evidence of a ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ on the \\npart of Defendant to support municipal liability.” Id. at *6. \\nViewing the evidence the plaintiffs had presented in the light \\nmost favorable to them, the court found that they “fail[ed] to \\nraise a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether [Criminal \\nRegistration Section] personnel acted pursuant to an official \\npolicy or practice regarding the registration of homeless sex \\noffenders.” Id. at *8. The court found that, at best, the plaintiffs \\nhad proven that on ten occasions, individual officers may \\nhave engaged in unconstitutional behavior. Id. Although the \\nplaintiffs appear to have presented a substantial amount of \\nevidence in Beley, the court concluded that “the evidence does \\nnot present a triable issue of fact regarding whether there was \\na policy or widespread practice of denying SORA registration \\nto sex offenders who lacked a fixed address at the time of reg‐\\nistration.” Id. at *10. “At most, Plaintiffs have shown ‘occa‐\\nsional lapses of judgment’ or ‘individual misconduct by po‐\\nlice officers,’ not ‘systemic problems’ or ‘institutional behav‐\\nior.’” Id., quoting Rossi 790 F.3d at 737. The plaintiffs appealed; \\nwe affirmed on other grounds. Beley 901 F.3d at 826 (affirming \\non the ground that the ability to register under SORA is not a \\ncognizable liberty interest). \\n Another district court reached the same conclusion in a \\ncase involving individual plaintiffs. See Derfus v. City of Chi‐\\ncago, Case No. 13 C 7298, 2015 WL 1592558 (N.D. Ill., April 6, \\n2015). In granting summary judgment in favor of the City, the \\nDerfus court concluded: \\n The fact that the City registered more offenders \\n as not having a fixed residence or temporary \\n domicile in two random time periods in 2014 \\n\\f12 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\n than in two random time periods in prior years \\n does not suggest that the City had a policy of \\n refusing to register offenders with that status. \\n Nor does the fact that it refused over a three‐\\n year period to register six offenders as “home‐\\n less,” a term that does not appear in SORA and \\n that is commonly used to refer to a much \\n broader segment of people than those deemed \\n by SORA to be lacking a fixed residence or tem‐\\n porary domicile. \\nId. at *4. \\n These cases raise doubts about whether Regains could \\namend his complaint to allege a widespread policy or prac‐\\ntice, or marshal proof the proof at summary judgment that the \\nBeley and Derfus plaintiffs could not. Even if he can allege that \\na practice existed and that it was widespread enough to con‐\\nstitute a custom, Monell requires more. Regains’ arguments \\nand the very fact of his arrest and detention show that not all \\nofficers followed the practice. He describes a schism between \\nregistering officers who followed the steering practice and \\nthose who did not. To state a Monell claim, Regains will need \\nto show that high‐ranking members of the Chicago Police De‐\\npartment knew of the differing practices and allowed them to \\ncontinue. This may be a tall order, but we cannot conclude \\nthat allowing Regains to try would be an exercise in futility. \\n A final point: on appeal, Regains consistently has charac‐\\nterized his claim as a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment \\ndue process rights. At the time he filed the appeal, that was \\nhis only option; our decision in Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750, pre‐\\ncluded the argument that pretrial detention that occurred af‐\\nter the start of the judicial process violated the Fourth \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 13 \\n\\nAmendment. Manuel I since has abrogated Newsome, holding \\nthat “the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful \\npretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process.” 137 \\nU.S. at 920. In the post‐Manuel I/Manuel II world, “the Fourth \\nAmendment, not the Due Process Clause, is the source of the \\nright in a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention, \\nwhether before or after the initiation of formal legal process.” \\nLewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. Jan. 23, \\n2019). \\n III. Conclusion \\n Because Regains timely filed his complaint, we reverse the \\ndistrict court’s dismissal of the complaint and remand for fur‐\\nther proceedings consistent with this decision.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1189,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4599680,"string":"4,599,680"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Paul Regains v. City of Chicago"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-13"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"15-2444"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PEPPER, District Judge.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PEPPER, District Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 15‐2444 \\nPAUL REGAINS, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \\n v. \\n\\nCITY OF CHICAGO, \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n ____________________ \\n \\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 14 C 9687 — James B. Zagel, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 13, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and \\nPEPPER, District Judge.* \\n PEPPER, District Judge. The Illinois Sex Offender Registra‐\\ntion Act (SORA) requires sex offenders to register with the po‐\\nlice. Because he did not have a permanent address (he was \\nhomeless), Paul Regains followed the instructions of officers \\n\\n \\n * Of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation. \\n\\f2 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nwho directed him to a local homeless shelter (which they \\nlisted on his registration as his permanent address), and to re‐\\nturn for re‐registration in ninety days. When he appeared to \\nreport three months later, Chicago police officers arrested Re‐\\ngains on an “investigative alert,” because other officers had \\nnot been able to locate Regains at the address provided. Re‐\\ngains remained in custody seventeen months before the Illi‐\\nnois trial court found him not guilty of failing to a report a \\nchange of address. \\n Regains sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, \\nclaiming that it violated his rights under the Due Process \\nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dis‐\\nmissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \\n12(b)(6), finding that either the claim was time‐barred under \\nIllinois’ two‐year statute of limitations for personal injury \\nclaims, or that it was barred by this court’s decision in New‐\\nsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001), abrogated by \\nManual v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (“Manuel I”). The \\ndistrict court also found that the amended complaint lacked \\nsufficient factual details to give the City fair notice, and that \\nbecause Regains did not specifically identify a particular con‐\\nstitutional violation, the City could not be held liable under \\nMonell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). \\n We reverse the district court’s decision that Regains’ claim \\nwas time‐barred, and remand for further proceedings. \\n I. Background \\n In 2012, SORA required sex offenders to register in person \\nwithin three days of establishing a residence or a temporary \\ndomicile in any county. 730 ILCS § 150/3(b) (2012). Sex offend‐\\ners in the City of Chicago registered “at the Chicago Police \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 3 \\n\\nDepartment Headquarters.” 730 ILCS § 150/3(a)(1). The law \\nrequired sex offenders without a fixed address or temporary \\ndomicile to report weekly to the chief of police in the munici‐\\npality in which that person was located. 730 ILCS § 150/3. \\n The plaintiff asserts that SORA required “persons with a \\nfixed abode” to report every ninety days, citing 730 ILCS \\n§ 150/6. Appellant’s Br. at 2. In fact, that section of the statute \\nrequired a person who had been adjudicated to be sexually \\ndangerous or was a sexually violent person to report every \\nninety days (and required such offenders to report weekly if \\nthey did not have a fixed residence). “Any other person” re‐\\nquired to register under the statute was required to report \\nonce a year. The record does not indicate whether Regains, \\nhad he had a fixed residence, would have been subject to the \\nninety‐day reporting interval or the one‐year reporting inter‐\\nval. Either way, the law required homeless sex offenders to \\nreport more frequently than sex offenders with fixed resi‐\\ndences. Failure to comply with the provisions of the statute \\nconstituted a felony, for which there was strict liability. 730 \\nILCS § 150/10(a); People v. Molnar, 857 N.E.2d 209, 224 (Ill. \\n2006). \\n By 2012, the Chicago police officers assigned to sex of‐\\nfender registration/reporting duty felt that the weekly report‐\\ning requirement for homeless sex offenders had become bur‐\\ndensome. Some of those police officers engaged in a wide‐\\nspread practice of steering homeless sex offenders to home‐\\nless shelters that would accept sex offenders, and directing \\nthe sex offenders to return with documentation showing the \\nshelter as the sex offender’s residence. This scheme had the \\neffect of providing homeless sex offenders with a “residence,” \\nwhich meant that they were not subject to the weekly \\n\\f4 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nreporting requirement. The officers who engaged in this steer‐\\ning practice, and their supervisors, were aware that the num‐\\nber of persons registered at the shelters far exceeded the shel‐\\nter’s capacity. In other words, they knew that the homeless \\nsex offenders who listed the shelter as their “address” likely \\nwould not be able to remain there. \\n Other Chicago police officers assigned to registration du‐\\nties disagreed with the steering practice. These other officers \\nvisited homeless shelters that accepted sex offender regis‐\\ntrants and attempted to locate the registrant; if they could not \\nlocate the registrant at the shelter, the officers would prepare \\nan investigative alert, informing any Chicago police officer \\nwho encountered the registrant that there was probable cause \\nfor arrest. \\n Regains alleges that in April 2012, Chicago police officers \\nemployed the steering practice when he attempted to register \\nas a homeless sex offender. He asserts that they directed him \\nto a shelter, registered him as residing at that shelter, and in‐\\nstructed him to return for quarterly reporting and re‐registra‐\\ntion in July 2012. \\n In early May 2012, two Chicago police officers went to the \\nshelter to look for Regains. They did not find him, and they \\nprepared a report for failure to register at that address. The \\nnext day, a Chicago police detective reviewed the report, vis‐\\nited the shelter without finding Regains, and issued an inves‐\\ntigative alert informing other Chicago police officers that \\nthere was probable cause to arrest Regains. \\n On July 18, 2012, Regains reported as directed; Chicago \\npolice officers arrested him under the investigative alert. The \\nprosecutor charged Regains with two violations of 730 ILCS \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 5 \\n\\n§ 150/6—failure to register within three days after changing \\nhis address, and failure to report every ninety days. On Sep‐\\ntember 4, 2012, Cook County Judge Thomas V. Gainer ar‐\\nraigned Regains and ordered him detained. Regains re‐\\nmained in custody until his December 3, 2012 trial—some sev‐\\nenteen months—at which time the judge found him not \\nguilty.1 \\n Regains filed his original § 1983 complaint in federal court \\non December 3, 2014. \\n II. Discussion \\n We review de novo a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) \\nmotion to dismiss. Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840 \\nF.3d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “In construing \\nthe complaint, we accept all well‐pleaded facts as true and \\ndraw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffsʹ favor.” Id. We \\nmay affirm on any ground that the record supports, as long \\nas the district court adequately addressed that ground and the \\nnon‐moving party had the opportunity to contest it. Thayer v. \\nChiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 247 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). \\n Regains argues that he was deprived of his liberty for sev‐\\nenteen months without due process of law, as a result of “the \\nwidespread practice within the Chicago police department to‐\\nwards homeless sex offenders.” Appellant’s Br. at 6. He as‐\\nserts that the City violated his Fourteenth Amendment due \\n\\n \\n1 The transcript of Regains’ trial indicates that he registered on April 17, \\n\\n2012. App. to Appellee’s Br. at A27. He appeared at the police station on \\nJuly 18, 2012, id. at A30, ninety‐two days after the date he last registered, \\nid. at A37. The trial judge stated that he could not tell from looking at the \\nreport date Regains had been given whether he was to report on July 16 \\nor July 18, 2012, and made a finding that Regains was not guilty. Id. at A37. \\n\\f6 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nprocess rights by engaging in conduct “in the nature of mali‐\\ncious prosecution.” He has taken pains to avoid giving his \\npersonal injury claim a specific label. The district court found \\nthat if Regains’ claim sounded in false arrest, it was time‐\\nbarred, and that if it sounded in malicious prosecution, it was \\nbarred for other reasons. \\n Regains sued under a federal statute—42 U.S.C. § 1983—\\nbut we look to the law of the state in which the personal injury \\noccurred to determine the length of the statute of limitations. \\nWallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Serino v. Hensley, 735 \\nF.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013). Under Illinois law, a plaintiff \\nmust bring a personal injury action within two years after its \\naccrual. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387 (citing 735 ILCS § 5/13‐202 \\n(West 2003)). \\n The question of when the cause of action accrues “is a \\nquestion of federal law that is not resolved by reference to \\nstate law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (emphasis in the original). \\nFederal common law holds that a cause of action accrues \\nwhen “the plaintiff has a ‘complete and present cause of ac‐\\ntion’”—in other words, when “the plaintiff can file suit and \\nobtain relief.” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning \\nPension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 \\n(1997)). Put another way, a personal injury claim raised under \\n§ 1983 accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to \\nknow of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Serino, 735 \\nF.3d at 591. Because there is “no single accrual rule for all \\n§ 1983 claims,” we must “use the rule that applies to the com‐\\nmon‐law cause of action most similar to the kind of claim the \\nplaintiff asserts.” Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. \\n2013). \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 7 \\n\\n At the time of briefing and oral argument, there was a de‐\\nbatable question as to whether Regains’ claim was time‐\\nbarred. His assertion that he should not have been arrested \\nand charged sounded like a claim for false arrest, or false im‐\\nprisonment. His assertion that he was detained for seventeen \\nmonths while awaiting trial on a charge that was unfounded \\nsounded like a malicious prosecution claim. The accrual rule \\nfor false arrest/false imprisonment claims is different from the \\naccrual rule for malicious prosecution claims. A claim for false \\narrest or false imprisonment accrues once the plaintiff is de‐\\ntained (or released) as a result of a lawful process. Wallace, 549 \\nU.S. at 390‐391. A cause of action for malicious prosecution \\n“does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have termi‐\\nnated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, \\n48 (1994). \\n When he appealed, that difference was critical for Regains. \\nHe was arraigned and detained by lawful process on Septem‐\\nber 4, 2012; under the false arrest/false imprisonment accrual \\nrule, he would have had to file his § 1983 complaint by Sep‐\\ntember 4, 2014. He did not file the complaint until December \\n3, 2014, three months later. In contrast, under the malicious \\nprosecution accrual rule, Regains’ claim would have accrued \\non December 3, 2012—the date he was acquitted. Regains filed \\nhis § 1983 complaint exactly two years after that date. If his \\nclaims properly fell into the false arrest/false imprisonment \\nrealm, his claim would have been time barred; if it fell into the \\nmalicious prosecution realm, it would have been timely. \\n After oral argument, this court resolved the timing ques‐\\ntion. In Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) \\n(“Manuel II”), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 22, 2019) (No. 18‐\\n1093), we held that a claim that a plaintiff was detained \\n\\f8 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nwithout probable cause “accrues when the detention ends.”2 \\nRegains concedes that the officers who arrested him had prob‐\\nable cause to believe that he violated SORA, but he has con‐\\nsistently argued that he seeks damages because he was “de‐\\nprived of liberty without due process of law when he was \\nheld at the Cook County Jail until he was acquitted.” Appel‐\\nlant’s Br. at 13. Applying the principle of Manuel II to Regains’ \\nargument that his seventeen‐month detention for a crime that \\nhe was misled into committing was unconstitutional, we con‐\\nclude that his claim accrued when he was released on Decem‐\\nber 3, 2012, and that his claim was timely filed. \\n This conclusion does not necessarily mandate remand, \\nhowever, because the district court stated other bases for dis‐\\nmissing the case. The court also found that Regains’ amended \\ncomplaint failed to identify specific conduct on the City’s part \\nthat formed the basis for Regains’ claim that it violated his \\nrights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Regains named \\nonly the City as a defendant; he did not sue individual offic‐\\ners. The amended complaint was terse—six of its twenty par‐\\nagraphs described how and why officers steered homeless sex \\noffenders to shelters. The complaint then alleged that when \\nRegains tried to register, officers steered him to a shelter, reg‐\\nistered him at that shelter and required him to come back for \\n \\n2 The Supreme Court has accepted certiorari in McDonough v. Smith, 2019 \\n\\nWL 166879 (No. 18‐485). The petition presents the following question: \\n“Whether the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim based on fab‐\\nrication of evidence in criminal proceedings begins to run when those pro‐\\nceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor (as the majority of circuits has \\nheld) or whether it begins to run when the defendant becomes aware of \\nthe tainted evidence and its improper use (as the Second Circuit held be‐\\nlow).” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McDounough 2018 WL 5026294 (No. \\n18‐845). The Court will hear argument on April 17, 2019. \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 9 \\n\\nre‐registration in three months. It alleged the facts surround‐\\ning Regains’ arrest and charging, and alleged that he stayed \\nin custody until his trial and acquittal. The penultimate para‐\\ngraph stated, “As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff was de‐\\nprived of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendments to \\nthe Constitution of the United States and incurred damages.” \\n The amended complaint does not link specific conduct to \\nRegains’ assertion that his due process rights were violated. \\nOther than identifying the City as an Illinois municipal cor‐\\nporation, it does not describe any conduct by the City. It de‐\\nscribes the actions of the officers who steered Regains to the \\nshelter, the actions of the officers who issued the investigative \\nalert and the actions of the officers who arrested him, but does \\nnot say which—if any—of these actions constitute conduct by \\nthe City that violated his due process rights. It says he “was \\ncharged” with a felony, and “remained” in custody until his \\nacquittal, but does not attribute to the City or anyone else re‐\\nsponsibility for the charges or his detention. It does not allege \\nthat police department officials with policy‐making authority \\nknew about these practices and allowed them to continue. \\n A plaintiff may remedy a deficient complaint by amend‐\\ning it, but the district court also questioned whether Regains \\ncould state a claim against the City at all. In brief comments \\nat the end of its decision, the court noted that a municipality \\nsuch as the City is subject to liability under § 1983 only if an \\nofficial municipal policy caused the violation of the plaintiff’s \\nconstitutional rights, citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. The court \\nstated that in the absence of a constitutional violation, the City \\ncould not be held liable. Regains has not addressed the Monell \\nquestion in his appellate briefs. \\n\\f10 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\n Because Regains has chosen to sue only the City, he must \\nstate a claim that the denial of his liberty for seventeen months \\nwas the result of the implementation or execution of “a policy \\nstatement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially \\nadopted and promulgated by [the municipality’s] officers,” or \\na “governmental ‘custom’ … .” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Alle‐\\ngations that the City is liable “on a respondeat superior theory” \\nwill not suffice. Id. at 691. \\n Before this court, Regains has alleged that there was a \\n“widespread practice within the police department of the City \\nof Chicago to manipulate the registration process to force \\nhomeless sex offenders into violations of the Monitoring Act.” \\nAppellant’s Brief at 6. He asserts that “[t]his practice was ‘so \\nwidespread and well‐settled that it constitutes a custom or us‐\\nage with the force of law even though it is not authorized by \\nwritten law or express policy.’” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, \\nquoting Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. \\n2015). Regains has presented no evidence to support these al‐\\nlegations; he never got the chance, because the district court \\ndismissed the case at the pleading stage. Other plaintiffs have \\nhad the opportunity to present such evidence. \\n In Beley v. City of Chicago, a class composed of “[a]ll per‐\\nsons who attempted to register under the Illinois Sex Offender \\nRegistration Act with the City of Chicago from December 6, \\n2010 to the date of entry of judgment and who were not per‐\\nmitted to register because they were homeless” alleged that \\nthe City had violated, among other provisions, the due pro‐\\ncess clause. Beley v. City of Chicago, Case No. 12‐cv‐9714, 2017 \\nWL 77096, at *1 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 28, 2017), aff’d 901 F.3d 823 (7th \\nCir. 2018). The district court granted summary judgment in \\nfavor of the City on the due process claim. The court stated \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 11 \\n\\nthat its ruling turned on “one dispositive issue: whether Plain‐\\ntiffs present sufficient evidence of a ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ on the \\npart of Defendant to support municipal liability.” Id. at *6. \\nViewing the evidence the plaintiffs had presented in the light \\nmost favorable to them, the court found that they “fail[ed] to \\nraise a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether [Criminal \\nRegistration Section] personnel acted pursuant to an official \\npolicy or practice regarding the registration of homeless sex \\noffenders.” Id. at *8. The court found that, at best, the plaintiffs \\nhad proven that on ten occasions, individual officers may \\nhave engaged in unconstitutional behavior. Id. Although the \\nplaintiffs appear to have presented a substantial amount of \\nevidence in Beley, the court concluded that “the evidence does \\nnot present a triable issue of fact regarding whether there was \\na policy or widespread practice of denying SORA registration \\nto sex offenders who lacked a fixed address at the time of reg‐\\nistration.” Id. at *10. “At most, Plaintiffs have shown ‘occa‐\\nsional lapses of judgment’ or ‘individual misconduct by po‐\\nlice officers,’ not ‘systemic problems’ or ‘institutional behav‐\\nior.’” Id., quoting Rossi 790 F.3d at 737. The plaintiffs appealed; \\nwe affirmed on other grounds. Beley 901 F.3d at 826 (affirming \\non the ground that the ability to register under SORA is not a \\ncognizable liberty interest). \\n Another district court reached the same conclusion in a \\ncase involving individual plaintiffs. See Derfus v. City of Chi‐\\ncago, Case No. 13 C 7298, 2015 WL 1592558 (N.D. Ill., April 6, \\n2015). In granting summary judgment in favor of the City, the \\nDerfus court concluded: \\n The fact that the City registered more offenders \\n as not having a fixed residence or temporary \\n domicile in two random time periods in 2014 \\n\\f12 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\n than in two random time periods in prior years \\n does not suggest that the City had a policy of \\n refusing to register offenders with that status. \\n Nor does the fact that it refused over a three‐\\n year period to register six offenders as “home‐\\n less,” a term that does not appear in SORA and \\n that is commonly used to refer to a much \\n broader segment of people than those deemed \\n by SORA to be lacking a fixed residence or tem‐\\n porary domicile. \\nId. at *4. \\n These cases raise doubts about whether Regains could \\namend his complaint to allege a widespread policy or prac‐\\ntice, or marshal proof the proof at summary judgment that the \\nBeley and Derfus plaintiffs could not. Even if he can allege that \\na practice existed and that it was widespread enough to con‐\\nstitute a custom, Monell requires more. Regains’ arguments \\nand the very fact of his arrest and detention show that not all \\nofficers followed the practice. He describes a schism between \\nregistering officers who followed the steering practice and \\nthose who did not. To state a Monell claim, Regains will need \\nto show that high‐ranking members of the Chicago Police De‐\\npartment knew of the differing practices and allowed them to \\ncontinue. This may be a tall order, but we cannot conclude \\nthat allowing Regains to try would be an exercise in futility. \\n A final point: on appeal, Regains consistently has charac‐\\nterized his claim as a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment \\ndue process rights. At the time he filed the appeal, that was \\nhis only option; our decision in Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750, pre‐\\ncluded the argument that pretrial detention that occurred af‐\\nter the start of the judicial process violated the Fourth \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 13 \\n\\nAmendment. Manuel I since has abrogated Newsome, holding \\nthat “the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful \\npretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process.” 137 \\nU.S. at 920. In the post‐Manuel I/Manuel II world, “the Fourth \\nAmendment, not the Due Process Clause, is the source of the \\nright in a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention, \\nwhether before or after the initiation of formal legal process.” \\nLewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. Jan. 23, \\n2019). \\n III. Conclusion \\n Because Regains timely filed his complaint, we reverse the \\ndistrict court’s dismissal of the complaint and remand for fur‐\\nther proceedings consistent with this decision.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4376933/\", \"author_raw\": \"PEPPER, District Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"PEPPER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"PEPPER\": \", District\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4599680/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Paul Regains v. City of Chicago\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-13\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 15‐2444 \nPAUL REGAINS, \n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \n v. \n\nCITY OF CHICAGO, \n Defendant‐Appellee. \n ____________________ \n \n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \n No. 14 C 9687 — James B. Zagel, Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 13, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and \nPEPPER, District Judge.* \n PEPPER, District Judge. The Illinois Sex Offender Registra‐\ntion Act (SORA) requires sex offenders to register with the po‐\nlice. Because he did not have a permanent address (he was \nhomeless), Paul Regains followed the instructions of officers \n\n \n * Of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation. \n\f2 No. 15‐2444 \n\nwho directed him to a local homeless shelter (which they \nlisted on his registration as his permanent address), and to re‐\nturn for re‐registration in ninety days. When he appeared to \nreport three months later, Chicago police officers arrested Re‐\ngains on an “investigative alert,” because other officers had \nnot been able to locate Regains at the address provided. Re‐\ngains remained in custody seventeen months before the Illi‐\nnois trial court found him not guilty of failing to a report a \nchange of address. \n Regains sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, \nclaiming that it violated his rights under the Due Process \nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dis‐\nmissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \n12(b)(6), finding that either the claim was time‐barred under \nIllinois’ two‐year statute of limitations for personal injury \nclaims, or that it was barred by this court’s decision in New‐\nsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001), abrogated by \nManual v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (“Manuel I”). The \ndistrict court also found that the amended complaint lacked \nsufficient factual details to give the City fair notice, and that \nbecause Regains did not specifically identify a particular con‐\nstitutional violation, the City could not be held liable under \nMonell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). \n We reverse the district court’s decision that Regains’ claim \nwas time‐barred, and remand for further proceedings. \n I. Background \n In 2012, SORA required sex offenders to register in person \nwithin three days of establishing a residence or a temporary \ndomicile in any county. 730 ILCS § 150/3(b) (2012). Sex offend‐\ners in the City of Chicago registered “at the Chicago Police \n\fNo. 15‐2444 3 \n\nDepartment Headquarters.” 730 ILCS § 150/3(a)(1). The law \nrequired sex offenders without a fixed address or temporary \ndomicile to report weekly to the chief of police in the munici‐\npality in which that person was located. 730 ILCS § 150/3. \n The plaintiff asserts that SORA required “persons with a \nfixed abode” to report every ninety days, citing 730 ILCS \n§ 150/6. Appellant’s Br. at 2. In fact, that section of the statute \nrequired a person who had been adjudicated to be sexually \ndangerous or was a sexually violent person to report every \nninety days (and required such offenders to report weekly if \nthey did not have a fixed residence). “Any other person” re‐\nquired to register under the statute was required to report \nonce a year. The record does not indicate whether Regains, \nhad he had a fixed residence, would have been subject to the \nninety‐day reporting interval or the one‐year reporting inter‐\nval. Either way, the law required homeless sex offenders to \nreport more frequently than sex offenders with fixed resi‐\ndences. Failure to comply with the provisions of the statute \nconstituted a felony, for which there was strict liability. 730 \nILCS § 150/10(a); People v. Molnar, 857 N.E.2d 209, 224 (Ill. \n2006). \n By 2012, the Chicago police officers assigned to sex of‐\nfender registration/reporting duty felt that the weekly report‐\ning requirement for homeless sex offenders had become bur‐\ndensome. Some of those police officers engaged in a wide‐\nspread practice of steering homeless sex offenders to home‐\nless shelters that would accept sex offenders, and directing \nthe sex offenders to return with documentation showing the \nshelter as the sex offender’s residence. This scheme had the \neffect of providing homeless sex offenders with a “residence,” \nwhich meant that they were not subject to the weekly \n\f4 No. 15‐2444 \n\nreporting requirement. The officers who engaged in this steer‐\ning practice, and their supervisors, were aware that the num‐\nber of persons registered at the shelters far exceeded the shel‐\nter’s capacity. In other words, they knew that the homeless \nsex offenders who listed the shelter as their “address” likely \nwould not be able to remain there. \n Other Chicago police officers assigned to registration du‐\nties disagreed with the steering practice. These other officers \nvisited homeless shelters that accepted sex offender regis‐\ntrants and attempted to locate the registrant; if they could not \nlocate the registrant at the shelter, the officers would prepare \nan investigative alert, informing any Chicago police officer \nwho encountered the registrant that there was probable cause \nfor arrest. \n Regains alleges that in April 2012, Chicago police officers \nemployed the steering practice when he attempted to register \nas a homeless sex offender. He asserts that they directed him \nto a shelter, registered him as residing at that shelter, and in‐\nstructed him to return for quarterly reporting and re‐registra‐\ntion in July 2012. \n In early May 2012, two Chicago police officers went to the \nshelter to look for Regains. They did not find him, and they \nprepared a report for failure to register at that address. The \nnext day, a Chicago police detective reviewed the report, vis‐\nited the shelter without finding Regains, and issued an inves‐\ntigative alert informing other Chicago police officers that \nthere was probable cause to arrest Regains. \n On July 18, 2012, Regains reported as directed; Chicago \npolice officers arrested him under the investigative alert. The \nprosecutor charged Regains with two violations of 730 ILCS \n\fNo. 15‐2444 5 \n\n§ 150/6—failure to register within three days after changing \nhis address, and failure to report every ninety days. On Sep‐\ntember 4, 2012, Cook County Judge Thomas V. Gainer ar‐\nraigned Regains and ordered him detained. Regains re‐\nmained in custody until his December 3, 2012 trial—some sev‐\nenteen months—at which time the judge found him not \nguilty.1 \n Regains filed his original § 1983 complaint in federal court \non December 3, 2014. \n II. Discussion \n We review de novo a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) \nmotion to dismiss. Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840 \nF.3d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “In construing \nthe complaint, we accept all well‐pleaded facts as true and \ndraw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffsʹ favor.” Id. We \nmay affirm on any ground that the record supports, as long \nas the district court adequately addressed that ground and the \nnon‐moving party had the opportunity to contest it. Thayer v. \nChiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 247 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). \n Regains argues that he was deprived of his liberty for sev‐\nenteen months without due process of law, as a result of “the \nwidespread practice within the Chicago police department to‐\nwards homeless sex offenders.” Appellant’s Br. at 6. He as‐\nserts that the City violated his Fourteenth Amendment due \n\n \n1 The transcript of Regains’ trial indicates that he registered on April 17, \n\n2012. App. to Appellee’s Br. at A27. He appeared at the police station on \nJuly 18, 2012, id. at A30, ninety‐two days after the date he last registered, \nid. at A37. The trial judge stated that he could not tell from looking at the \nreport date Regains had been given whether he was to report on July 16 \nor July 18, 2012, and made a finding that Regains was not guilty. Id. at A37. \n\f6 No. 15‐2444 \n\nprocess rights by engaging in conduct “in the nature of mali‐\ncious prosecution.” He has taken pains to avoid giving his \npersonal injury claim a specific label. The district court found \nthat if Regains’ claim sounded in false arrest, it was time‐\nbarred, and that if it sounded in malicious prosecution, it was \nbarred for other reasons. \n Regains sued under a federal statute—42 U.S.C. § 1983—\nbut we look to the law of the state in which the personal injury \noccurred to determine the length of the statute of limitations. \nWallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Serino v. Hensley, 735 \nF.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013). Under Illinois law, a plaintiff \nmust bring a personal injury action within two years after its \naccrual. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387 (citing 735 ILCS § 5/13‐202 \n(West 2003)). \n The question of when the cause of action accrues “is a \nquestion of federal law that is not resolved by reference to \nstate law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (emphasis in the original). \nFederal common law holds that a cause of action accrues \nwhen “the plaintiff has a ‘complete and present cause of ac‐\ntion’”—in other words, when “the plaintiff can file suit and \nobtain relief.” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning \nPension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 \n(1997)). Put another way, a personal injury claim raised under \n§ 1983 accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to \nknow of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Serino, 735 \nF.3d at 591. Because there is “no single accrual rule for all \n§ 1983 claims,” we must “use the rule that applies to the com‐\nmon‐law cause of action most similar to the kind of claim the \nplaintiff asserts.” Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. \n2013). \n\fNo. 15‐2444 7 \n\n At the time of briefing and oral argument, there was a de‐\nbatable question as to whether Regains’ claim was time‐\nbarred. His assertion that he should not have been arrested \nand charged sounded like a claim for false arrest, or false im‐\nprisonment. His assertion that he was detained for seventeen \nmonths while awaiting trial on a charge that was unfounded \nsounded like a malicious prosecution claim. The accrual rule \nfor false arrest/false imprisonment claims is different from the \naccrual rule for malicious prosecution claims. A claim for false \narrest or false imprisonment accrues once the plaintiff is de‐\ntained (or released) as a result of a lawful process. Wallace, 549 \nU.S. at 390‐391. A cause of action for malicious prosecution \n“does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have termi‐\nnated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, \n48 (1994). \n When he appealed, that difference was critical for Regains. \nHe was arraigned and detained by lawful process on Septem‐\nber 4, 2012; under the false arrest/false imprisonment accrual \nrule, he would have had to file his § 1983 complaint by Sep‐\ntember 4, 2014. He did not file the complaint until December \n3, 2014, three months later. In contrast, under the malicious \nprosecution accrual rule, Regains’ claim would have accrued \non December 3, 2012—the date he was acquitted. Regains filed \nhis § 1983 complaint exactly two years after that date. If his \nclaims properly fell into the false arrest/false imprisonment \nrealm, his claim would have been time barred; if it fell into the \nmalicious prosecution realm, it would have been timely. \n After oral argument, this court resolved the timing ques‐\ntion. In Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) \n(“Manuel II”), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 22, 2019) (No. 18‐\n1093), we held that a claim that a plaintiff was detained \n\f8 No. 15‐2444 \n\nwithout probable cause “accrues when the detention ends.”2 \nRegains concedes that the officers who arrested him had prob‐\nable cause to believe that he violated SORA, but he has con‐\nsistently argued that he seeks damages because he was “de‐\nprived of liberty without due process of law when he was \nheld at the Cook County Jail until he was acquitted.” Appel‐\nlant’s Br. at 13. Applying the principle of Manuel II to Regains’ \nargument that his seventeen‐month detention for a crime that \nhe was misled into committing was unconstitutional, we con‐\nclude that his claim accrued when he was released on Decem‐\nber 3, 2012, and that his claim was timely filed. \n This conclusion does not necessarily mandate remand, \nhowever, because the district court stated other bases for dis‐\nmissing the case. The court also found that Regains’ amended \ncomplaint failed to identify specific conduct on the City’s part \nthat formed the basis for Regains’ claim that it violated his \nrights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Regains named \nonly the City as a defendant; he did not sue individual offic‐\ners. The amended complaint was terse—six of its twenty par‐\nagraphs described how and why officers steered homeless sex \noffenders to shelters. The complaint then alleged that when \nRegains tried to register, officers steered him to a shelter, reg‐\nistered him at that shelter and required him to come back for \n \n2 The Supreme Court has accepted certiorari in McDonough v. Smith, 2019 \n\nWL 166879 (No. 18‐485). The petition presents the following question: \n“Whether the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim based on fab‐\nrication of evidence in criminal proceedings begins to run when those pro‐\nceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor (as the majority of circuits has \nheld) or whether it begins to run when the defendant becomes aware of \nthe tainted evidence and its improper use (as the Second Circuit held be‐\nlow).” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McDounough 2018 WL 5026294 (No. \n18‐845). The Court will hear argument on April 17, 2019. \n\fNo. 15‐2444 9 \n\nre‐registration in three months. It alleged the facts surround‐\ning Regains’ arrest and charging, and alleged that he stayed \nin custody until his trial and acquittal. The penultimate para‐\ngraph stated, “As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff was de‐\nprived of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendments to \nthe Constitution of the United States and incurred damages.” \n The amended complaint does not link specific conduct to \nRegains’ assertion that his due process rights were violated. \nOther than identifying the City as an Illinois municipal cor‐\nporation, it does not describe any conduct by the City. It de‐\nscribes the actions of the officers who steered Regains to the \nshelter, the actions of the officers who issued the investigative \nalert and the actions of the officers who arrested him, but does \nnot say which—if any—of these actions constitute conduct by \nthe City that violated his due process rights. It says he “was \ncharged” with a felony, and “remained” in custody until his \nacquittal, but does not attribute to the City or anyone else re‐\nsponsibility for the charges or his detention. It does not allege \nthat police department officials with policy‐making authority \nknew about these practices and allowed them to continue. \n A plaintiff may remedy a deficient complaint by amend‐\ning it, but the district court also questioned whether Regains \ncould state a claim against the City at all. In brief comments \nat the end of its decision, the court noted that a municipality \nsuch as the City is subject to liability under § 1983 only if an \nofficial municipal policy caused the violation of the plaintiff’s \nconstitutional rights, citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. The court \nstated that in the absence of a constitutional violation, the City \ncould not be held liable. Regains has not addressed the Monell \nquestion in his appellate briefs. \n\f10 No. 15‐2444 \n\n Because Regains has chosen to sue only the City, he must \nstate a claim that the denial of his liberty for seventeen months \nwas the result of the implementation or execution of “a policy \nstatement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially \nadopted and promulgated by [the municipality’s] officers,” or \na “governmental ‘custom’ … .” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Alle‐\ngations that the City is liable “on a respondeat superior theory” \nwill not suffice. Id. at 691. \n Before this court, Regains has alleged that there was a \n“widespread practice within the police department of the City \nof Chicago to manipulate the registration process to force \nhomeless sex offenders into violations of the Monitoring Act.” \nAppellant’s Brief at 6. He asserts that “[t]his practice was ‘so \nwidespread and well‐settled that it constitutes a custom or us‐\nage with the force of law even though it is not authorized by \nwritten law or express policy.’” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, \nquoting Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. \n2015). Regains has presented no evidence to support these al‐\nlegations; he never got the chance, because the district court \ndismissed the case at the pleading stage. Other plaintiffs have \nhad the opportunity to present such evidence. \n In Beley v. City of Chicago, a class composed of “[a]ll per‐\nsons who attempted to register under the Illinois Sex Offender \nRegistration Act with the City of Chicago from December 6, \n2010 to the date of entry of judgment and who were not per‐\nmitted to register because they were homeless” alleged that \nthe City had violated, among other provisions, the due pro‐\ncess clause. Beley v. City of Chicago, Case No. 12‐cv‐9714, 2017 \nWL 77096, at *1 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 28, 2017), aff’d 901 F.3d 823 (7th \nCir. 2018). The district court granted summary judgment in \nfavor of the City on the due process claim. The court stated \n\fNo. 15‐2444 11 \n\nthat its ruling turned on “one dispositive issue: whether Plain‐\ntiffs present sufficient evidence of a ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ on the \npart of Defendant to support municipal liability.” Id. at *6. \nViewing the evidence the plaintiffs had presented in the light \nmost favorable to them, the court found that they “fail[ed] to \nraise a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether [Criminal \nRegistration Section] personnel acted pursuant to an official \npolicy or practice regarding the registration of homeless sex \noffenders.” Id. at *8. The court found that, at best, the plaintiffs \nhad proven that on ten occasions, individual officers may \nhave engaged in unconstitutional behavior. Id. Although the \nplaintiffs appear to have presented a substantial amount of \nevidence in Beley, the court concluded that “the evidence does \nnot present a triable issue of fact regarding whether there was \na policy or widespread practice of denying SORA registration \nto sex offenders who lacked a fixed address at the time of reg‐\nistration.” Id. at *10. “At most, Plaintiffs have shown ‘occa‐\nsional lapses of judgment’ or ‘individual misconduct by po‐\nlice officers,’ not ‘systemic problems’ or ‘institutional behav‐\nior.’” Id., quoting Rossi 790 F.3d at 737. The plaintiffs appealed; \nwe affirmed on other grounds. Beley 901 F.3d at 826 (affirming \non the ground that the ability to register under SORA is not a \ncognizable liberty interest). \n Another district court reached the same conclusion in a \ncase involving individual plaintiffs. See Derfus v. City of Chi‐\ncago, Case No. 13 C 7298, 2015 WL 1592558 (N.D. Ill., April 6, \n2015). In granting summary judgment in favor of the City, the \nDerfus court concluded: \n The fact that the City registered more offenders \n as not having a fixed residence or temporary \n domicile in two random time periods in 2014 \n\f12 No. 15‐2444 \n\n than in two random time periods in prior years \n does not suggest that the City had a policy of \n refusing to register offenders with that status. \n Nor does the fact that it refused over a three‐\n year period to register six offenders as “home‐\n less,” a term that does not appear in SORA and \n that is commonly used to refer to a much \n broader segment of people than those deemed \n by SORA to be lacking a fixed residence or tem‐\n porary domicile. \nId. at *4. \n These cases raise doubts about whether Regains could \namend his complaint to allege a widespread policy or prac‐\ntice, or marshal proof the proof at summary judgment that the \nBeley and Derfus plaintiffs could not. Even if he can allege that \na practice existed and that it was widespread enough to con‐\nstitute a custom, Monell requires more. Regains’ arguments \nand the very fact of his arrest and detention show that not all \nofficers followed the practice. He describes a schism between \nregistering officers who followed the steering practice and \nthose who did not. To state a Monell claim, Regains will need \nto show that high‐ranking members of the Chicago Police De‐\npartment knew of the differing practices and allowed them to \ncontinue. This may be a tall order, but we cannot conclude \nthat allowing Regains to try would be an exercise in futility. \n A final point: on appeal, Regains consistently has charac‐\nterized his claim as a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment \ndue process rights. At the time he filed the appeal, that was \nhis only option; our decision in Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750, pre‐\ncluded the argument that pretrial detention that occurred af‐\nter the start of the judicial process violated the Fourth \n\fNo. 15‐2444 13 \n\nAmendment. Manuel I since has abrogated Newsome, holding \nthat “the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful \npretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process.” 137 \nU.S. at 920. In the post‐Manuel I/Manuel II world, “the Fourth \nAmendment, not the Due Process Clause, is the source of the \nright in a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention, \nwhether before or after the initiation of formal legal process.” \nLewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. Jan. 23, \n2019). \n III. Conclusion \n Because Regains timely filed his complaint, we reverse the \ndistrict court’s dismissal of the complaint and remand for fur‐\nther proceedings consistent with this decision.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Paul Regains v. City of Chicago\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-13\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________ \\nNo. 15‐2444 \\nPAUL REGAINS, \\n Plaintiff‐Appellant, \\n v. \\n\\nCITY OF CHICAGO, \\n Defendant‐Appellee. \\n ____________________ \\n \\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the \\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. \\n No. 14 C 9687 — James B. Zagel, Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 13, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and \\nPEPPER, District Judge.* \\n PEPPER, District Judge. The Illinois Sex Offender Registra‐\\ntion Act (SORA) requires sex offenders to register with the po‐\\nlice. Because he did not have a permanent address (he was \\nhomeless), Paul Regains followed the instructions of officers \\n\\n \\n * Of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation. \\n\\f2 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nwho directed him to a local homeless shelter (which they \\nlisted on his registration as his permanent address), and to re‐\\nturn for re‐registration in ninety days. When he appeared to \\nreport three months later, Chicago police officers arrested Re‐\\ngains on an “investigative alert,” because other officers had \\nnot been able to locate Regains at the address provided. Re‐\\ngains remained in custody seventeen months before the Illi‐\\nnois trial court found him not guilty of failing to a report a \\nchange of address. \\n Regains sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, \\nclaiming that it violated his rights under the Due Process \\nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dis‐\\nmissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure \\n12(b)(6), finding that either the claim was time‐barred under \\nIllinois’ two‐year statute of limitations for personal injury \\nclaims, or that it was barred by this court’s decision in New‐\\nsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001), abrogated by \\nManual v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (“Manuel I”). The \\ndistrict court also found that the amended complaint lacked \\nsufficient factual details to give the City fair notice, and that \\nbecause Regains did not specifically identify a particular con‐\\nstitutional violation, the City could not be held liable under \\nMonell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). \\n We reverse the district court’s decision that Regains’ claim \\nwas time‐barred, and remand for further proceedings. \\n I. Background \\n In 2012, SORA required sex offenders to register in person \\nwithin three days of establishing a residence or a temporary \\ndomicile in any county. 730 ILCS § 150/3(b) (2012). Sex offend‐\\ners in the City of Chicago registered “at the Chicago Police \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 3 \\n\\nDepartment Headquarters.” 730 ILCS § 150/3(a)(1). The law \\nrequired sex offenders without a fixed address or temporary \\ndomicile to report weekly to the chief of police in the munici‐\\npality in which that person was located. 730 ILCS § 150/3. \\n The plaintiff asserts that SORA required “persons with a \\nfixed abode” to report every ninety days, citing 730 ILCS \\n§ 150/6. Appellant’s Br. at 2. In fact, that section of the statute \\nrequired a person who had been adjudicated to be sexually \\ndangerous or was a sexually violent person to report every \\nninety days (and required such offenders to report weekly if \\nthey did not have a fixed residence). “Any other person” re‐\\nquired to register under the statute was required to report \\nonce a year. The record does not indicate whether Regains, \\nhad he had a fixed residence, would have been subject to the \\nninety‐day reporting interval or the one‐year reporting inter‐\\nval. Either way, the law required homeless sex offenders to \\nreport more frequently than sex offenders with fixed resi‐\\ndences. Failure to comply with the provisions of the statute \\nconstituted a felony, for which there was strict liability. 730 \\nILCS § 150/10(a); People v. Molnar, 857 N.E.2d 209, 224 (Ill. \\n2006). \\n By 2012, the Chicago police officers assigned to sex of‐\\nfender registration/reporting duty felt that the weekly report‐\\ning requirement for homeless sex offenders had become bur‐\\ndensome. Some of those police officers engaged in a wide‐\\nspread practice of steering homeless sex offenders to home‐\\nless shelters that would accept sex offenders, and directing \\nthe sex offenders to return with documentation showing the \\nshelter as the sex offender’s residence. This scheme had the \\neffect of providing homeless sex offenders with a “residence,” \\nwhich meant that they were not subject to the weekly \\n\\f4 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nreporting requirement. The officers who engaged in this steer‐\\ning practice, and their supervisors, were aware that the num‐\\nber of persons registered at the shelters far exceeded the shel‐\\nter’s capacity. In other words, they knew that the homeless \\nsex offenders who listed the shelter as their “address” likely \\nwould not be able to remain there. \\n Other Chicago police officers assigned to registration du‐\\nties disagreed with the steering practice. These other officers \\nvisited homeless shelters that accepted sex offender regis‐\\ntrants and attempted to locate the registrant; if they could not \\nlocate the registrant at the shelter, the officers would prepare \\nan investigative alert, informing any Chicago police officer \\nwho encountered the registrant that there was probable cause \\nfor arrest. \\n Regains alleges that in April 2012, Chicago police officers \\nemployed the steering practice when he attempted to register \\nas a homeless sex offender. He asserts that they directed him \\nto a shelter, registered him as residing at that shelter, and in‐\\nstructed him to return for quarterly reporting and re‐registra‐\\ntion in July 2012. \\n In early May 2012, two Chicago police officers went to the \\nshelter to look for Regains. They did not find him, and they \\nprepared a report for failure to register at that address. The \\nnext day, a Chicago police detective reviewed the report, vis‐\\nited the shelter without finding Regains, and issued an inves‐\\ntigative alert informing other Chicago police officers that \\nthere was probable cause to arrest Regains. \\n On July 18, 2012, Regains reported as directed; Chicago \\npolice officers arrested him under the investigative alert. The \\nprosecutor charged Regains with two violations of 730 ILCS \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 5 \\n\\n§ 150/6—failure to register within three days after changing \\nhis address, and failure to report every ninety days. On Sep‐\\ntember 4, 2012, Cook County Judge Thomas V. Gainer ar‐\\nraigned Regains and ordered him detained. Regains re‐\\nmained in custody until his December 3, 2012 trial—some sev‐\\nenteen months—at which time the judge found him not \\nguilty.1 \\n Regains filed his original § 1983 complaint in federal court \\non December 3, 2014. \\n II. Discussion \\n We review de novo a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) \\nmotion to dismiss. Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., Inc., 840 \\nF.3d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “In construing \\nthe complaint, we accept all well‐pleaded facts as true and \\ndraw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffsʹ favor.” Id. We \\nmay affirm on any ground that the record supports, as long \\nas the district court adequately addressed that ground and the \\nnon‐moving party had the opportunity to contest it. Thayer v. \\nChiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 247 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). \\n Regains argues that he was deprived of his liberty for sev‐\\nenteen months without due process of law, as a result of “the \\nwidespread practice within the Chicago police department to‐\\nwards homeless sex offenders.” Appellant’s Br. at 6. He as‐\\nserts that the City violated his Fourteenth Amendment due \\n\\n \\n1 The transcript of Regains’ trial indicates that he registered on April 17, \\n\\n2012. App. to Appellee’s Br. at A27. He appeared at the police station on \\nJuly 18, 2012, id. at A30, ninety‐two days after the date he last registered, \\nid. at A37. The trial judge stated that he could not tell from looking at the \\nreport date Regains had been given whether he was to report on July 16 \\nor July 18, 2012, and made a finding that Regains was not guilty. Id. at A37. \\n\\f6 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nprocess rights by engaging in conduct “in the nature of mali‐\\ncious prosecution.” He has taken pains to avoid giving his \\npersonal injury claim a specific label. The district court found \\nthat if Regains’ claim sounded in false arrest, it was time‐\\nbarred, and that if it sounded in malicious prosecution, it was \\nbarred for other reasons. \\n Regains sued under a federal statute—42 U.S.C. § 1983—\\nbut we look to the law of the state in which the personal injury \\noccurred to determine the length of the statute of limitations. \\nWallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Serino v. Hensley, 735 \\nF.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 2013). Under Illinois law, a plaintiff \\nmust bring a personal injury action within two years after its \\naccrual. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387 (citing 735 ILCS § 5/13‐202 \\n(West 2003)). \\n The question of when the cause of action accrues “is a \\nquestion of federal law that is not resolved by reference to \\nstate law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (emphasis in the original). \\nFederal common law holds that a cause of action accrues \\nwhen “the plaintiff has a ‘complete and present cause of ac‐\\ntion’”—in other words, when “the plaintiff can file suit and \\nobtain relief.” Id. (quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning \\nPension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 \\n(1997)). Put another way, a personal injury claim raised under \\n§ 1983 accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to \\nknow of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Serino, 735 \\nF.3d at 591. Because there is “no single accrual rule for all \\n§ 1983 claims,” we must “use the rule that applies to the com‐\\nmon‐law cause of action most similar to the kind of claim the \\nplaintiff asserts.” Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. \\n2013). \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 7 \\n\\n At the time of briefing and oral argument, there was a de‐\\nbatable question as to whether Regains’ claim was time‐\\nbarred. His assertion that he should not have been arrested \\nand charged sounded like a claim for false arrest, or false im‐\\nprisonment. His assertion that he was detained for seventeen \\nmonths while awaiting trial on a charge that was unfounded \\nsounded like a malicious prosecution claim. The accrual rule \\nfor false arrest/false imprisonment claims is different from the \\naccrual rule for malicious prosecution claims. A claim for false \\narrest or false imprisonment accrues once the plaintiff is de‐\\ntained (or released) as a result of a lawful process. Wallace, 549 \\nU.S. at 390‐391. A cause of action for malicious prosecution \\n“does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have termi‐\\nnated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, \\n48 (1994). \\n When he appealed, that difference was critical for Regains. \\nHe was arraigned and detained by lawful process on Septem‐\\nber 4, 2012; under the false arrest/false imprisonment accrual \\nrule, he would have had to file his § 1983 complaint by Sep‐\\ntember 4, 2014. He did not file the complaint until December \\n3, 2014, three months later. In contrast, under the malicious \\nprosecution accrual rule, Regains’ claim would have accrued \\non December 3, 2012—the date he was acquitted. Regains filed \\nhis § 1983 complaint exactly two years after that date. If his \\nclaims properly fell into the false arrest/false imprisonment \\nrealm, his claim would have been time barred; if it fell into the \\nmalicious prosecution realm, it would have been timely. \\n After oral argument, this court resolved the timing ques‐\\ntion. In Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) \\n(“Manuel II”), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 22, 2019) (No. 18‐\\n1093), we held that a claim that a plaintiff was detained \\n\\f8 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\nwithout probable cause “accrues when the detention ends.”2 \\nRegains concedes that the officers who arrested him had prob‐\\nable cause to believe that he violated SORA, but he has con‐\\nsistently argued that he seeks damages because he was “de‐\\nprived of liberty without due process of law when he was \\nheld at the Cook County Jail until he was acquitted.” Appel‐\\nlant’s Br. at 13. Applying the principle of Manuel II to Regains’ \\nargument that his seventeen‐month detention for a crime that \\nhe was misled into committing was unconstitutional, we con‐\\nclude that his claim accrued when he was released on Decem‐\\nber 3, 2012, and that his claim was timely filed. \\n This conclusion does not necessarily mandate remand, \\nhowever, because the district court stated other bases for dis‐\\nmissing the case. The court also found that Regains’ amended \\ncomplaint failed to identify specific conduct on the City’s part \\nthat formed the basis for Regains’ claim that it violated his \\nrights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Regains named \\nonly the City as a defendant; he did not sue individual offic‐\\ners. The amended complaint was terse—six of its twenty par‐\\nagraphs described how and why officers steered homeless sex \\noffenders to shelters. The complaint then alleged that when \\nRegains tried to register, officers steered him to a shelter, reg‐\\nistered him at that shelter and required him to come back for \\n \\n2 The Supreme Court has accepted certiorari in McDonough v. Smith, 2019 \\n\\nWL 166879 (No. 18‐485). The petition presents the following question: \\n“Whether the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim based on fab‐\\nrication of evidence in criminal proceedings begins to run when those pro‐\\nceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor (as the majority of circuits has \\nheld) or whether it begins to run when the defendant becomes aware of \\nthe tainted evidence and its improper use (as the Second Circuit held be‐\\nlow).” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McDounough 2018 WL 5026294 (No. \\n18‐845). The Court will hear argument on April 17, 2019. \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 9 \\n\\nre‐registration in three months. It alleged the facts surround‐\\ning Regains’ arrest and charging, and alleged that he stayed \\nin custody until his trial and acquittal. The penultimate para‐\\ngraph stated, “As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff was de‐\\nprived of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendments to \\nthe Constitution of the United States and incurred damages.” \\n The amended complaint does not link specific conduct to \\nRegains’ assertion that his due process rights were violated. \\nOther than identifying the City as an Illinois municipal cor‐\\nporation, it does not describe any conduct by the City. It de‐\\nscribes the actions of the officers who steered Regains to the \\nshelter, the actions of the officers who issued the investigative \\nalert and the actions of the officers who arrested him, but does \\nnot say which—if any—of these actions constitute conduct by \\nthe City that violated his due process rights. It says he “was \\ncharged” with a felony, and “remained” in custody until his \\nacquittal, but does not attribute to the City or anyone else re‐\\nsponsibility for the charges or his detention. It does not allege \\nthat police department officials with policy‐making authority \\nknew about these practices and allowed them to continue. \\n A plaintiff may remedy a deficient complaint by amend‐\\ning it, but the district court also questioned whether Regains \\ncould state a claim against the City at all. In brief comments \\nat the end of its decision, the court noted that a municipality \\nsuch as the City is subject to liability under § 1983 only if an \\nofficial municipal policy caused the violation of the plaintiff’s \\nconstitutional rights, citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. The court \\nstated that in the absence of a constitutional violation, the City \\ncould not be held liable. Regains has not addressed the Monell \\nquestion in his appellate briefs. \\n\\f10 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\n Because Regains has chosen to sue only the City, he must \\nstate a claim that the denial of his liberty for seventeen months \\nwas the result of the implementation or execution of “a policy \\nstatement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially \\nadopted and promulgated by [the municipality’s] officers,” or \\na “governmental ‘custom’ … .” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Alle‐\\ngations that the City is liable “on a respondeat superior theory” \\nwill not suffice. Id. at 691. \\n Before this court, Regains has alleged that there was a \\n“widespread practice within the police department of the City \\nof Chicago to manipulate the registration process to force \\nhomeless sex offenders into violations of the Monitoring Act.” \\nAppellant’s Brief at 6. He asserts that “[t]his practice was ‘so \\nwidespread and well‐settled that it constitutes a custom or us‐\\nage with the force of law even though it is not authorized by \\nwritten law or express policy.’” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, \\nquoting Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. \\n2015). Regains has presented no evidence to support these al‐\\nlegations; he never got the chance, because the district court \\ndismissed the case at the pleading stage. Other plaintiffs have \\nhad the opportunity to present such evidence. \\n In Beley v. City of Chicago, a class composed of “[a]ll per‐\\nsons who attempted to register under the Illinois Sex Offender \\nRegistration Act with the City of Chicago from December 6, \\n2010 to the date of entry of judgment and who were not per‐\\nmitted to register because they were homeless” alleged that \\nthe City had violated, among other provisions, the due pro‐\\ncess clause. Beley v. City of Chicago, Case No. 12‐cv‐9714, 2017 \\nWL 77096, at *1 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 28, 2017), aff’d 901 F.3d 823 (7th \\nCir. 2018). The district court granted summary judgment in \\nfavor of the City on the due process claim. The court stated \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 11 \\n\\nthat its ruling turned on “one dispositive issue: whether Plain‐\\ntiffs present sufficient evidence of a ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ on the \\npart of Defendant to support municipal liability.” Id. at *6. \\nViewing the evidence the plaintiffs had presented in the light \\nmost favorable to them, the court found that they “fail[ed] to \\nraise a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether [Criminal \\nRegistration Section] personnel acted pursuant to an official \\npolicy or practice regarding the registration of homeless sex \\noffenders.” Id. at *8. The court found that, at best, the plaintiffs \\nhad proven that on ten occasions, individual officers may \\nhave engaged in unconstitutional behavior. Id. Although the \\nplaintiffs appear to have presented a substantial amount of \\nevidence in Beley, the court concluded that “the evidence does \\nnot present a triable issue of fact regarding whether there was \\na policy or widespread practice of denying SORA registration \\nto sex offenders who lacked a fixed address at the time of reg‐\\nistration.” Id. at *10. “At most, Plaintiffs have shown ‘occa‐\\nsional lapses of judgment’ or ‘individual misconduct by po‐\\nlice officers,’ not ‘systemic problems’ or ‘institutional behav‐\\nior.’” Id., quoting Rossi 790 F.3d at 737. The plaintiffs appealed; \\nwe affirmed on other grounds. Beley 901 F.3d at 826 (affirming \\non the ground that the ability to register under SORA is not a \\ncognizable liberty interest). \\n Another district court reached the same conclusion in a \\ncase involving individual plaintiffs. See Derfus v. City of Chi‐\\ncago, Case No. 13 C 7298, 2015 WL 1592558 (N.D. Ill., April 6, \\n2015). In granting summary judgment in favor of the City, the \\nDerfus court concluded: \\n The fact that the City registered more offenders \\n as not having a fixed residence or temporary \\n domicile in two random time periods in 2014 \\n\\f12 No. 15‐2444 \\n\\n than in two random time periods in prior years \\n does not suggest that the City had a policy of \\n refusing to register offenders with that status. \\n Nor does the fact that it refused over a three‐\\n year period to register six offenders as “home‐\\n less,” a term that does not appear in SORA and \\n that is commonly used to refer to a much \\n broader segment of people than those deemed \\n by SORA to be lacking a fixed residence or tem‐\\n porary domicile. \\nId. at *4. \\n These cases raise doubts about whether Regains could \\namend his complaint to allege a widespread policy or prac‐\\ntice, or marshal proof the proof at summary judgment that the \\nBeley and Derfus plaintiffs could not. Even if he can allege that \\na practice existed and that it was widespread enough to con‐\\nstitute a custom, Monell requires more. Regains’ arguments \\nand the very fact of his arrest and detention show that not all \\nofficers followed the practice. He describes a schism between \\nregistering officers who followed the steering practice and \\nthose who did not. To state a Monell claim, Regains will need \\nto show that high‐ranking members of the Chicago Police De‐\\npartment knew of the differing practices and allowed them to \\ncontinue. This may be a tall order, but we cannot conclude \\nthat allowing Regains to try would be an exercise in futility. \\n A final point: on appeal, Regains consistently has charac‐\\nterized his claim as a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment \\ndue process rights. At the time he filed the appeal, that was \\nhis only option; our decision in Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750, pre‐\\ncluded the argument that pretrial detention that occurred af‐\\nter the start of the judicial process violated the Fourth \\n\\fNo. 15‐2444 13 \\n\\nAmendment. Manuel I since has abrogated Newsome, holding \\nthat “the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful \\npretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process.” 137 \\nU.S. at 920. In the post‐Manuel I/Manuel II world, “the Fourth \\nAmendment, not the Due Process Clause, is the source of the \\nright in a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention, \\nwhether before or after the initiation of formal legal process.” \\nLewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. Jan. 23, \\n2019). \\n III. Conclusion \\n Because Regains timely filed his complaint, we reverse the \\ndistrict court’s dismissal of the complaint and remand for fur‐\\nther proceedings consistent with this decision.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1190,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4599879,"string":"4,599,879"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"TRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. Terry CURRY, Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County, Indiana, and Christopher Gaal, Prosecuting Attorney of Monroe County, Indiana, Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Trustees of Indiana University v. Terry Curry"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-14"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1146; 18-1247; 18-1308"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Easterbrook, Hamilton, Scudder\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888151/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"040dissent\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888152/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit \\n ____________________ \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\nTRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY, et al., \\n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, Cross‐Appellants, \\n\\n v. \\n\\nTERRY CURRY, Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County, Indi‐\\nana, and CHRISTOPHER GAAL, Prosecuting Attorney of Mon‐\\nroe County, Indiana, \\n Defendants‐Appellants, Cross‐Appellees. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the \\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. \\n No. 1:16‐cv‐01289‐JMS‐DML — Jane E. Magnus‐Stinson, Chief Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 14, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit \\nJudges. \\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In Indiana “[a] person who \\nintentionally acquires, receives, sells, or transfers fetal tissue \\ncommits unlawful transfer of fetal tissue, a Level 5 felony.” \\nInd. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5(d). A federal district court held that \\n\\n2 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nseveral terms in this statute are unconstitutionally vague and \\nthat it must be treated as if it read: “A person who intention‐\\nally sells fetal tissue commits unlawful transfer of fetal tis‐\\nsue, a Level 5 felony.” 289 F. Supp. 3d 905, 934–35 (S.D. Ind. \\n2018). The district court also held that a definitional clause is \\ninvalid. As enacted, §35‐46‐5‐1.5(b) reads: “As used in this \\nsection, ‘fetal tissue’ includes tissue, organs, or any other \\npart of an aborted fetus.” This must be treated as if it read: \\n“As used in this section, ‘fetal tissue’ includes tissue or or‐\\ngans of an aborted fetus.” The district court thus held that \\nthe words “acquires”, “receives”, and “transfers”, and the \\nphrase “any other part”, are too uncertain to have legal \\nforce. If that is right, then big chunks of the legal system are \\ninvalid, because those words are ubiquitous in statutes, reg‐\\nulations, and judicial opinions. \\n This case began when Indiana University and three of its \\nfaculty members filed this suit, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, \\nagainst the state’s prosecuting attorneys in two counties. \\nThey asked the district court to enjoin the prosecutors from \\nattempting to enforce any part of §35‐46‐5‐1.5. According to \\nthe plaintiffs, the statute not only is excessively vague but \\nalso violates the First Amendment by blocking one kind of \\nmedical research, takes the University’s property without \\njust compensation, violates the Equal Protection Clause by \\ndistinguishing fetal tissue produced by abortions from that \\nproduced by miscarriages, and violates the dormant Com‐\\nmerce Clause by regulating the interstate market in fetal tis‐\\nsue. Plaintiffs do not contend that the statute imposes an un‐\\ndue burden on any woman who seeks to have an abortion, \\nnor would they have standing to make such an argument. \\nInstead the three faculty‐member plaintiffs contend that the \\nstatute interferes with medical scholarship. \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 3 \\n\\n As we have recounted, the district court found four \\nwords or phrases to be unconstitutionally vague. It rejected \\nplaintiffs’ theories under the First Amendment and the \\nEqual Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And \\nit did not come to a conclusion with respect to the Takings \\nClause or the Commerce Clause, reasoning that because it \\ncould not determine what the statute means, it could not \\nproperly analyze it under either of those provisions. It then \\nentered a permanent injunction in plaintiffs’ favor and \\nclosed the case. Both sides have appealed. Plaintiffs want the \\nwhole statute enjoined, while defendants want the injunc‐\\ntion vacated and the suit dismissed. \\n Justiciability is an initial problem. Indiana University, \\nwhich is part of the State of Indiana, see Haynes v. Indiana \\nUniversity, 902 F.3d 724, 731 (7th Cir. 2018), has sued two \\nprosecutors who carry out state powers. The two defendants \\nhave been sued in their official capacities, which means that \\nthey must be treated as the State of Indiana. Will v. Michigan \\nDepartment of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). There is consid‐\\nerable doubt that federal courts are authorized to adjust \\ngrievances among different parts of a state government. See, \\ne.g., Illinois v. Chicago, 137 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1998) (a state \\ncan’t sue part of itself); Arlington Heights v. Regional Transpor‐\\ntation Authority, 653 F.2d 1149, 1150–53 (7th Cir. 1981) (part \\nof a state can’t sue the state); Branson School District RE‐82 v. \\nRomer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases). \\nCf. South Bend v. South Bend Common Council, 865 F.3d 889 \\n(7th Cir. 2017) (a city can’t sue a part of itself). The suit is \\nsaved, however, by the fact that three faculty members are \\nplaintiffs. All three have standing to litigate in their personal \\ncapacities, and with one exception (to which we return) they \\npresent all of the complaint’s legal theories. \\n\\n4 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n We start with vagueness, the Due Process Clause theory \\non which the district court based its injunction, and then ad‐\\ndress the other four theories. \\n The Constitution requires criminal statutes to have a core \\nof understandable meaning. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, \\n135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 \\n(1975); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913). Some uncer‐\\ntainty at the margins does not condemn a statute. It is there‐\\nfore hard to see what can be wrong with words such as “ac‐\\nquires,” which people use and understand in normal life. A \\nperson “acquires” a car by buying it or leasing it or receiving \\nit as a gift from a parent or spouse—or by stealing it. Even a \\nprotean word such as “reasonable” has enough of a core to \\nallow its use in situations where rights to speak are at issue. \\nSee Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 324 (2002). \\nWords such as “acquire” are materially (another protean le‐\\ngal word) more definite than “reasonable.” \\n Johnson shows that uncertainty so pervasive that most of \\na law’s potential applications are impossible to evaluate may \\nrule out enforcement. But the district court did not deny that \\neach of the words “acquires”, “receives”, and “transfers”, \\nand the phrase “any other part”, has a substantial, under‐\\nstandable core. Instead the judge worried about the periph‐\\nery. \\n Take “transfers.” The judge thought it hard to know \\nwhether a medical researcher “transfers” fetal material by \\npassing a pipette containing fetal tissue to someone else at \\nthe same laboratory bench. 289 F. Supp. 3d at 920. Or take \\nthe phrase “any other part.” Although this ensures that the \\nstatute covers every part of a fetus, the judge thought it hard \\nto say how things work at the level of individual cells or \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 5 \\n\\nstrands of DNA. Suppose someone in Washington state \\n(from which much of Indiana University’s fetal tissue comes) \\nextracts a few cells from an aborted fetus and uses them to \\ncreate a line of stem‐cell tissue, exemplars of which (dozens \\nof generations later) are transferred to a researcher in Indi‐\\nana. Is anything derived from fetal tissue included in the \\nphrase “any other part”? The judge did not see a clear an‐\\nswer. Id. at 918–19. These and similar open questions led the \\njudge to deem the words and phrase unconstitutional. \\n The two prosecutors did not help their defense by pro‐\\nfessing to see answers to these and similar questions. They \\nassured the judge that of course stem cells derived from fetal \\ntissue are not “any other part” of a fetus. They asserted that \\nmoving a pipette across a lab bench is of course not a “trans‐\\nfer” of fetal tissue, because “transfer” means “convey own‐\\nership.” That’s implausible. Federal statutes forbid the trans‐\\nfer of heroin and other contraband, see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. \\n§841(a)(1), and judges implementing such laws do not condi‐\\ntion their application on a change of ownership; those laws \\napply to people who act as agents as well as to principals. \\nThe prosecutors also asserted that placental or umbilical \\ncord tissue is of course not “any other part” of a fetus. Maybe: \\nThe placenta is an independent organ and so may be outside \\nthe statutory scope, but the statute does not address the top‐\\nic. Prosecutors can’t offer definitive interpretations of crimi‐\\nnal laws, and one prosecutor can’t bind a successor in office. \\nMore: Indiana has 90 other counties, whose prosecutors may \\nhave different ideas about the statute’s scope. The district \\njudge was right to say that, if the prosecutors’ assurances are \\nall the plaintiffs have to go on, they are at needless risk. \\n\\n6 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n Yet although prosecutorial assurances should not set an‐\\nyone’s mind at rest, the legal system offers a way to work \\nout the uncertainties that lurk at every statute’s periphery: \\nthe judiciary. Resolving edge questions is a principal role of \\nthe courts. If the district court’s approach is correct, then \\nevery time a court needs to decide a tough question about \\njust how far a statute reaches, it should declare the law un‐\\nconstitutional. That is fundamentally inconsistent with the \\nSupreme Court’s approach, under which a core of meaning \\nis enough to reject a vagueness challenge, leaving to future \\nadjudication the inevitable questions at the statutory margin. \\n A federal district judge cannot definitively interpret Ind. \\nCode §35‐46‐5‐1.5, but the state judiciary can do so. Declara‐\\ntory judgments are available in Indiana under Ind. Trial Rule \\n57 and Ind. Code §34‐14‐1‐1. Any medical researcher can file \\na suit with the theme: “I want to do X and fear that I will be \\nprosecuted, so please give me a declaratory judgment that X \\nis lawful.” Yet none of the plaintiffs has filed such a suit \\nseeking assurances about the scope of §35‐46‐5‐1.5. Instead \\nof using a readily available state‐law remedy for unwelcome \\nrisk, they asked a federal court to blot the law from the \\nbooks. That’s not how uncertainty should be addressed. \\n We have held this already about uncertainty under Indi‐\\nana law. Indiana forbids judges, and candidates for judicial \\noffice, from making any public commitment “inconsistent \\nwith the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of \\njudicial office”. The scope for debate about the meaning of \\nthat clause puts to shame any uncertainty about the meaning \\nof Ind. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5, but we held the language valid, \\neven when rights to speak are at stake—not because it is \\nclear, but because the state offers a process to resolve debat‐\\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 7 \\n\\nable issues. Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 715–17 (7th Cir. \\n2010). We explained (id. at 716–17): \\n Plaintiffs want us to deem the law vague by identifying situa‐\\n tions in which state officials might take an untenably broad read‐\\n ing of the [language], and then predicting that they will do so. It \\n is far preferable, however, and more respectful of our judicial \\n colleagues in Indiana, to assume that they will act sensibly and \\n resolve the open questions in a way that honors candidates’ \\n rights under the first amendment. \\n When a statute is accompanied by [a] system that can flesh out \\n details, the due process clause permits those details to be left to \\n that system. Parts of the Hatch Act are every bit as vague as the \\n [language here], but in [Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, \\n 413 U.S. 548 (1973)] the Court held that problems of implementa‐\\n tion could be tackled by administrative adjudication. 413 U.S. at \\n 580. Similarly, in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), the Court \\n held that an article of the Uniform Code of Military Justice mak‐\\n ing it a court‐martial offense to engage in “conduct unbecoming \\n an officer and a gentleman” is not unconstitutionally vague, be‐\\n cause military tribunals have elaborated on what is “unbecom‐\\n ing” for an officer and made it more specific than the unadorned \\n words. The National Labor Relations Act is full of vague terms \\n [such as “unfair labor practice”], and the National Labor Rela‐\\n tions Board has yet to make all of them concrete, but no one \\n supposes that the whole Act could be chucked out. The Justices \\n have been chary of holding laws unconstitutional “on their face” \\n precisely because they have recognized that vagueness will be \\n reduced through a process of interpretation. \\n\\nThis is equally true of Ind. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5. Declaratory‐\\njudgment actions can resolve ambiguities with limited (if \\nany) risk to medical researchers. \\n One thing the state judiciary might do—in addition to re‐\\nsolving concrete disputes such as the coverage of cells de‐\\nrived from fetal tissue—is read the word “intentionally” in \\n§35‐46‐5‐1.5(d) to protect researchers who do not subjective‐\\n\\n8 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nly understand that they are violating the law. That is what \\nthe Supreme Court did in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 \\n(1945), to save what is now codified as 18 U.S.C. §242, which \\none might classify as the ultimately vague criminal statute. \\n(It forbids any act under color of law that deprives anyone of \\nany constitutional right.) This potential for risk reduction \\nthrough interpretation, plus the fact that all of the contested \\nterms have a substantial core of ascertainable meaning, leads \\nus to reject the district court’s vagueness holding.\", \"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}, {\"type\": \"dissent\", \"author\": \"Our\", \"text\": \"Our dissenting colleague calls our approach “a novel var‐\\niation on Pullman abstention” (below at 14), but it is neither \\nnovel nor a form of abstention. It reflects the Supreme \\nCourt’s holdings in Letter Carriers, Parker, and many other \\ndecisions, such as Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975), that when \\nconsidering whether statutory terms are too vague a federal \\ncourt must take into account how they have been interpreted \\nand applied. Johnson is an example. The Justices declared a \\nstatute unconstitutionally vague only after this process of \\ninterpretation had been used for more than 20 years without \\ncurtailing uncertainty. For Indiana’s fetal‐tissue statute, by \\ncontrast, the process has not even begun. Whether the pro‐\\ncess of interpretation is administrative (as in Letter Carriers \\nand Bauer) or judicial (as in Parker, Rose, and Johnson) does \\nnot matter. What does matter is whether the process can an‐\\nswer important questions about the statute’s scope. \\n Plaintiffs believe that, if they sue in federal court before \\nthe state judiciary has had a chance to interpret state law, \\nthey can ensure that the state never gets that chance. Akron v. \\nAkron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 451–52 \\n(1983), used vagueness doctrine in that fashion without cit‐\\ning Letter Carriers, Parker, or Rose. Akron was overruled by \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 9 \\n\\nPlanned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 \\n(1992), and we are not aware of any other decision by the \\nSupreme Court that has used vagueness doctrine to prevent \\nthe state judiciary from having even a chance to give the law \\na construction that will produce adequate clarity. \\n Thus we arrive at the four theories that are the subjects of \\nplaintiffs’ cross‐appeal. \\n The parties agree that the statute does not burden a sus‐\\npect class or affect a fundamental right, so the rational‐basis \\nstandard applies to the equal‐protection theory. The district \\ncourt held that ethical considerations support a distinction \\nbetween fetal tissue obtained from abortions and tissue ob‐\\ntained from miscarriages. 289 F. Supp. 3d at 931–33. There is \\na moral debate about abortion and no equivalent debate \\nabout miscarriages. The Supreme Court wrote in Washington \\nv. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997), that “[t]he State … has \\nan interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medi‐\\ncal profession.” Cf. Cavel International, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 \\nF.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2007) (ethical considerations support a ban \\non slaughtering horses for human consumption). Plaintiffs \\nstress that under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1974), and its \\nsuccessors, a fetus is not a “person.” See also Planned \\nParenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc. v. Commissioner of In‐\\ndiana State Department of Health, 888 F.3d 300, rehearing en \\nbanc denied, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 17676 (7th Cir. June 25, \\n2018), petition for certiorari pending, No. 18–483. But that \\ndoes not eliminate the possibility of serious debate about \\nwhen, if at all, it is ethical to perform medical experiments \\non aborted fetal tissue. The rational‐basis standard does not \\nrequire much in the way of justification, see FCC v. Beach \\nCommunications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993), and we \\n\\n10 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nagree with the district court that the statute survives an \\nequal‐protection challenge. Indiana’s statute may or may not \\nbe sensible—for even persons who find abortion immoral \\nmust recognize that neurological research using fetal tissue \\ncan save innocent lives—but choosing sides in an ethical de‐\\nbate does not condemn a law. \\n The First Amendment argument is a non‐starter. The \\nstatute regulates conduct, not speech. See Clark v. Community \\nfor Creative Non‐Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). True, plaintiffs \\nwant to use fetal tissue in research that could lead to speech, \\nin classrooms or research papers. But a desire to obtain an \\ninput into speech does not convert regulation of conduct into \\nregulation of speech. Surely plaintiffs do not think that re‐\\nsearchers at Indiana University are entitled to blow up a \\ncommercial airliner, or administer dangerous pathogens to \\npatients in the University’s hospital, just so that they can ob‐\\nserve the results and write down their findings. Nor do \\nplaintiffs think that they are entitled to steal pens, paper, and \\ncomputers from the local Office Depot so that they can write \\narticles at lower cost. Plaintiffs assert that the statute casts “a \\npall of orthodoxy over the classroom”, but it does not. They \\ncan say, write, and teach anything they want. They can refer \\nto results generated by work done on aborted fetal tissue in \\nother states and nations. But they cannot treat enforcement \\nof rules about conduct as equivalent to prohibitions of \\nspeech. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional \\nRights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (Solomon Amendment does \\nnot regulate speech). \\n Plaintiffs contend that Indiana’s law violates the Com‐\\nmerce Clause because much of the tissue they seek to use \\ncomes from other states. Yet the law does not discriminate \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 11 \\n\\nagainst interstate commerce; it applies equally to fetal tissue \\nfrom Indiana and fetal tissue from Iowa, Illinois, or Indone‐\\nsia. Nor does it bear more heavily on interstate commerce as \\na practical matter, the subject of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 \\nU.S. 137 (1970). We have held repeatedly that outright bans \\non particular items do not offend the dormant Commerce \\nClause. See, e.g., National Paint & Coatings Association v. Chi‐\\ncago, 45 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1995) (spray paint); Park Pet Shop, \\nInc. v. Chicago, 872 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 2017) (dogs from puppy \\nmills). Plaintiffs do not contend that Indiana’s law concerns a \\nsubject on which there is a “compelling need for national \\nuniformity in regulation.” General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 \\nU.S. 278, 298 n.12 (1997). \\n Finally, the claim under the Takings Clause is confined to \\nthe University itself. None of the three individual plaintiffs \\ncontends that he has any property interest in particular fetal \\ntissue, so nothing has been taken from any of them. The \\nstatute does render valueless any fetal tissue, derived from \\nabortions, owned by Indiana University. But as we observed \\nearlier, the University, as part of Indiana, is not entitled to \\nsue its own state. Indiana’s legislature is free to decide what \\nuse (including none) to make of Indiana’s property. See, e.g., \\nGreat Lakes Higher Education Corp. v. Cavazos, 911 F.2d 10, 14–\\n15 (7th Cir. 1990). Our decision in Illinois Clean Energy Com‐\\nmunity Foundation v. Filan, 392 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2004), does \\nnot hold otherwise. The Illinois Clean Energy Community \\nFoundation is a charitable foundation funded by private do‐\\nnations. Confiscation of its property is a taking in a way that \\na state’s decision about what to do with its own property \\nnever could be. \\n\\n12 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n Several lesser arguments have been considered but do \\nnot require discussion. We conclude that the district court \\nshould have entered judgment in defendants’ favor. The in‐\\njunction is reversed, and the case is remanded for that pur‐\\npose. \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 13\"}, {\"author\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. We should affirm. \\nThe Indiana law making it a felony to acquire, receive, sell, or \\ntransfer the “tissue, organs, or any other part of an aborted \\nfetus” is unconstitutionally vague. As explained below, some \\nunusual features of this law and this lawsuit lead me to that \\nconclusion: both the State’s lawyers and the authoring legis‐\\nlators have tried to run away from the apparent meaning of \\nthe statutory language. As a result, it’s clear that the law does \\nnot give fair notice of its scope, and it effectively abandons the \\nproper separation of powers by delegating critical policy de‐\\ncisions to prosecutors and judges. I agree with my colleagues, \\nhowever, that plaintiffs cannot prevail on their First Amend‐\\nment, Equal Protection, and Commerce Clause challenges. \\n The unusual features of this law, its enactment, and this \\nlawsuit mean that the district judge’s reasoning does not ac‐\\ntually threaten to invalidate “big chunks of the legal system.” \\nIt was not the district judge who found it hard to know what \\n“transfer” means in this statute, nor was the problem that the \\njudge “did not see a clear answer” as to what is meant by “any \\nother part.” See ante at 4–5. If the district judge erred, it was \\nin taking the State of Indiana at its word that the statutory text \\ndoes not mean what it seems to say. The subject of this litiga‐\\ntion is not handwringing about the “periphery” of the new \\nlaw. The majority’s hypothesized “core of understandable \\nmeaning”—the transfer or acquisition of fetal organs—ad‐\\ndresses a factual scenario that is not and was not actually hap‐\\npening. The new law is relevant only to practices as to which \\nits application seems, based on the State’s defense, unforeseen \\nand indeterminate. \\n This case fits comfortably within the majority’s descrip‐\\ntion of what Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) \\n\\n14 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nteaches: “that uncertainty so pervasive that most of a law’s \\npotential applications are impossible to evaluate may rule out \\nenforcement.” Ante at 4. Instead of affirming, however, the \\nmajority proposes a novel variation on Pullman abstention in \\nwhich the federal courts direct plaintiffs who reasonably fear \\nprosecution under a vague law to file a series of declaratory \\njudgment cases in the state courts. \\n Plaintiffs should not have to take such extraordinary \\nmeasures to determine the scope of a criminal law. Legisla‐\\ntures must draft criminal statutes so that ordinary people \\nhave fair notice of what acts are criminal. Skilling v. United \\nStates, 561 U.S. 358, 402–03 (2010); United States v. Sylla, 790 \\nF.3d 772, 774–75 (7th Cir. 2015). That does not mean that the \\ncorrect application of even a criminal law must be free from \\ndoubt in all cases. There will often be, perhaps will always be, \\na periphery where there is room for disagreement and inter‐\\npretation. That possibility does not mean that a law is void for \\nvagueness, particularly as applied to the core of matters \\nclearly covered by the statute. \\n Still, there are limits. Fair notice of what is prohibited is an \\nessential element of due process and the rule of law. Vague \\nlaws “can invite the exercise of arbitrary power … by leaving \\nthe people in the dark about what the law demands and al‐\\nlowing prosecutors and courts to make it up.” Sessions v. Di‐\\nmaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223–24 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); \\nsee also Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101,1108 (2018) \\n(“to rely upon prosecutorial discretion to narrow the other‐\\nwise wide‐ranging scope of a criminal statute’s highly ab‐\\nstract general statutory language places great power in the \\nhands of the prosecutor”). \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 15\\n\\n Vagueness doctrine is also built on the separation of pow‐\\ners. Legislators “may not ‘abdicate their responsibilities for \\nsetting the standards of the criminal law.’” Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. \\nat 1227 (Gorsuch, J. concurring), quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 \\nU.S. 566, 575 (1974). Vague laws transfer legislative power to \\ncourts and police and prosecutors, where such power most \\nemphatically does not belong. Id. at 1228. \\n The unusual record here shows just such a legislative ab‐\\ndication. As a result, scientists engaged in potentially invalu‐\\nable medical research risk criminal prosecution based on \\nvague statutory language that leaves the hard choices to pros‐\\necutors and judges. “Under the Constitution, the adoption of \\nnew laws restricting liberty is supposed to be a hard business, \\nthe product of an open and public debate among a large and \\ndiverse number of elected representatives. Allowing the leg‐\\nislature to hand off the job of lawmaking risks substituting \\nthis design for one where legislation is made easy, with a \\nmere handful of unelected judges and prosecutors free to \\n‘condem[n] all that [they] personally disapprove and for no \\nbetter reason than [they] disapprove it.’” Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at \\n1228 (Gorsuch, J., concurring), quoting Jordan v. De George, 341 \\nU.S. 223, 242 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). \\n To explain these issues and why they matter, I first pro‐\\nvide some background on the plaintiffs and their research on \\nAlzheimer’s disease. I then explain the vagueness problems \\nin terms of the statutory language, the unusual course of this \\nlitigation, and the legislative process that led to the chal‐\\nlenged law. I conclude with the university’s takings claim. \\n Plaintiffs and Their Alzheimer’s Research: Few diseases are as \\nfrightening as Alzheimer’s disease, a progressive disease that \\ncauses brain cells to waste away and die. The symptoms can \\n\\n16 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nprogress from severe memory loss to declines in thinking and \\nbehavioral and social skills, spiraling downward to dementia \\nand the loss of a person’s very selfhood, and ultimately to \\ndeath. Between five and ten percent of Americans aged 65 al‐\\nready have Alzheimer’s disease. Between 40 and 50 percent \\nof Americans who turn 85 years old will have Alzheimer’s. \\nDkt. 77‐3 at 6, 16 (Lamb Dep. I, at 18, 61). \\n Alzheimer’s disease is the focus of extensive medical re‐\\nsearch toward treatment and possible cure. The Indiana Uni‐\\nversity School of Medicine houses the National Cell Reposi‐\\ntory for Alzheimer’s Disease, as well as an Alzheimer’s Dis‐\\nease Center, one of 32 research centers funded by the National \\nInstitutes of Health on the subject. Indiana University also op‐\\nerates the Stark Neurosciences Research Institute, which con‐\\nducts research on Alzheimer’s disease and other neurological \\ndisorders. \\n One plaintiff, Dr. Debomoy Lahiri, is a leading neurologi‐\\ncal researcher on the university faculty. He and his colleagues \\nspecialize in the study of brain disorders, primarily Alz‐\\nheimer’s disease. They use tissue from aborted fetuses and de‐\\nrivatives from such tissue, including cells cultured in labora‐\\ntories from fetal cells, as well as DNA, RNA, proteins and \\nother molecules and sub‐cellular structures obtained from \\nsuch cells. The evidence in this record establishes that fetal \\nbrain tissue—or at least cells and complex molecules derived \\nfrom such tissue—is essential to research on possible cures \\nand treatments. There is no adequate substitute. \\n Since 2011, Dr. Lahiri has received about 25 shipments of \\nfetal tissue from the Birth Defects Research Laboratory at the \\nUniversity of Washington, which receives tissue from abor‐\\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 17\\n\\ntions performed lawfully in the State of Washington. The rec‐\\nord here shows that the nationally recognized laboratory ad‐\\nheres to strict federal and state regulations for receiving do‐\\nnated fetal tissue and providing the tissue for research, in‐\\ncluding ensuring (1) that all women donating fetal tissue have \\ngiven informed consent, and (2) that the laboratory does not \\nsell or profit from providing fetal material. Dkt. 77‐20 at 1–3 \\n(BDRL affidavit), The shipments do not include any intact or‐\\ngans but only tiny tissue samples. Each shipment includes tis‐\\nsue contained within approximately two teaspoons of liquid \\nmedium. \\n Even if one could say confidently that the Birth Defects \\nResearch Laboratory material is “fetal tissue” for purposes of \\nthe statute (and I am not so confident), it becomes even less \\nclear once Dr. Lahiri works with the material. One critical step \\nin research with these tiny samples of tissues is to “dissociate” \\nand culture them—i.e., to separate the cells from each other \\nand to place them in a laboratory dish with conditions and \\nnutrients that allow the cells to grow, divide, and re‐divide, \\nthus multiplying the material available for research. \\n Also relevant here, medical research is collaborative, both \\nwithin Indiana University and with the NIH and other insti‐\\ntutions. To be valuable, research must be replicable. That re‐\\nquires cooperation and collaboration among researchers. Dr. \\nLahiri and his colleagues are requested and expected to trans‐\\nfer tissue samples between laboratories in the course of that \\ncollaboration. Such collaboration is also, understandably, a \\ncondition of their NIH funding. \\n The Statutory Language, This Lawsuit, and the Legislative Pro‐\\ncess: The Indiana law poses serious vagueness problems in \\nterms of what counts as “fetal tissue,” what researchers may \\n\\n18 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\ndo with fetal tissue, and whether the law even applies to fetal \\ntissue that is not actually sold. Some of the problems are ap‐\\nparent from the statutory text itself. Others have emerged in \\nthis lawsuit and examination of the legislative process that led \\nto enactment of the law in 2016. \\n The statute says: “A person who intentionally acquires, re‐\\nceives, sells, or transfers fetal tissue commits unlawful trans‐\\nfer of fetal tissue, a Level 5 felony.” Ind. Code § 35‐46‐5‐1.5(d). \\nA key definition provides: “As used in this section, ‘fetal tis‐\\nsue’ includes tissue, organs, or any other part of an aborted \\nfetus.” § 1.5(b). \\n The sharpest dispute between the parties is the scope of \\nthe “any other part” phrase in the definition of fetal tissue. \\nLet’s assume the statute makes criminal the receipt of ship‐\\nments of fetal tissue like those plaintiffs received in the past \\nfrom the birth defects laboratory in Washington. \\n That raises the question whether the “any part of” defini‐\\ntion in the Indiana law extends to make criminal the receipt \\nof lines of cells derived from fetal tissue. The parties agree here \\nthat, as a matter of biology, the process of cell division pro‐\\nduces a culture that contains some cells remaining from the \\noriginal tissue. The new culture also contains other, newly‐\\ndivided cells that were not part of the original tissue, but \\nwhich may well contain complex molecules (such as DNA, \\nRNA, or proteins) that were present in the original tissue sam‐\\nple. See Prosecutors’ Br. at 10; Plaintiffs’ Br. at 40. So, to re‐\\nphrase the key question, does a second‐, third‐, tenth‐, or nth‐\\ngeneration cell with such molecules fall under the statutory \\ndefinition as “any other part” of an aborted fetus? \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 19\\n\\n That question is not at the periphery of this statute but at \\nits core. The statutory language, “any other part,” offers no \\nguidance. It does not signal that the legislature even recog‐\\nnized this critical issue. And as the law has been defended in \\nthis lawsuit, the problem has actually become even more se‐\\nvere. In the district court, the State took the position that “any \\nother part” does not apply to: \\n (a) placental or umbilical cord blood tissue or \\n cells, or biological material obtained from such \\n blood, tissue or cells; \\n (b) fetal cell lines including but not limited to \\n HEK293 (or biological material obtained from \\n such cell lines) derived from the cells of an \\n aborted fetus, but which do not contain cells \\n which were originally part of an aborted fetus; \\n (c) fetal cells (or biological material obtained \\n from such cells) which were derived from \\n aborted fetal cells, but are not cells which were \\n originally part of an aborted fetus. \\nDkt. 75 at 2.1 \\n Later in the district court proceedings, the State asserted \\nthat once cells have been separated from the fetal tissue and \\ngrow, divide into new cells, and are moved from the first dish \\nto the second dish, they can no longer be considered part of \\nthe aborted fetus. Dkt. 81 at 48. Or, the State suggests, that \\nseparation may occur even earlier in the process of culturing \\n\\n \\n 1 HEK293 is a line of cells first cultured in 1973 and widely used in \\n\\nresearch. The record indicates it is unknown whether the original cells \\ncame from an aborted fetus. See Dkt. 79‐8 at 59–62 (Cate Dep.). \\n\\n20 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\ncells, even before the first passage, when cells are dissociated. \\nId. at 48. \\n Those limits imply that the Indiana law would not inter‐\\nfere with plaintiffs’ research as long as the laboratory in \\nWashington or some other lab outside of Indiana could per‐\\nform the first round of cell growth and division. If the cultures \\nof cells would not count as “fetal tissue” under the Indiana \\nlaw, plaintiffs would be free to obtain and use them for re‐\\nsearch. \\n The vagueness problem stems from the fact that it’s im‐\\npossible to know what weight to give the State’s assurances. \\nThe proposed limits might well be sensible as a matter of pol‐\\nicy. But as the district judge pointed out, these proposed lim‐\\nits have no apparent basis in the statutory text, and the State \\nhas not explained how it derives those supposedly comfort‐\\ning limits from the Indiana law. The State’s lawyers asserted \\nin oral argument that their assurances would be binding on \\nthe State and its present and future prosecuting attorneys. \\nThat remains to be seen.2 \\n Another focus of the vagueness challenge is the key verbs \\nin the statute. If you have “fetal tissue” within the meaning of \\nthe statute, what can you do with it? A person who intention‐\\nally “acquires, receives, sells, or transfers fetal tissue” com‐\\nmits a felony. § 1.5(d). Federal law, however, already makes \\n \\n 2 The defendant prosecutors are not representing themselves, nor are \\n\\nthey represented by the Indiana Attorney General or even by private law‐\\nyers from Indiana. Nevertheless, their private lawyers have been given the \\nresponsibility of defending and interpreting the law. See Ind. Code § 4‐6‐\\n5‐3 (Attorney General must consent in writing to employment of other \\ncounsel for state agencies and the State). Their views must be taken seri‐\\nously. \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 21\\n\\nit a federal crime to sell fetal tissue for “valuable considera‐\\ntion,” regardless of source, see 42 U.S.C. § 289g–2(a), so “sell” \\nis not at issue here.3 \\n The focus is on “acquire,” “receive,” and “transfer.” My \\ncolleagues correctly point out that these are common, well‐\\nunderstood terms in criminal law. But when plaintiffs chal‐\\nlenged the new law, the State took the following position: \\n The word ‘transfer’ in Section 1.5(b) of the Stat‐\\n ute does not apply to physical movement of \\n cells or biological materials received, generated \\n or stored at Indiana University before the enact‐\\n ment of the Statute provided that: \\n (a) the physical movement is within or among \\n laboratories, buildings or physical facilities of \\n Indiana University by any faculty member, em‐\\n ployee, representative or agent of Indiana Uni‐\\n versity; \\n (b) the physical movement is the result of a fac‐\\n ulty member, employee, representative or agent \\n of Indiana University permanently removing \\n such materials from Indiana University’s build‐\\n ings or physical facilities; or \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n 3 Under the federal law, “valuable consideration” does not include \\n\\nreasonable payments associated with transportation, implantation, pro‐\\ncessing, preservation, quality control, or storage of human fetal tissue. 42 \\nU.S.C. § 289g–2(e)(3). Unlike the Indiana law, which applies only to tissue \\nfrom abortions, federal law applies regardless of the source of the tissue. \\n\\n22 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n (c) the physical movement is at the request of \\n the National Institute of Health (‘NIH’) or pur‐\\n suant to the terms or conditions of any NIH \\n grant. \\nDkt. 75 at 2. \\n The State further explained that there will be no “transfer” \\nif there is no change in ownership or possession of the tissue, \\nreferring apparently to possession by Indiana University as \\nan institution, not possession being transferred from one hu‐\\nman being to another inside a university laboratory. Dkt. 90 \\nat 16. The apparent concession that plaintiffs can move fetal \\ntissue around at the request of the NIH or to comply with a \\ngrant sounds reasonable, but where does that come from? \\n As with the proposed limits on “fetal tissue” itself, there is \\nno apparent textual basis for these limits. These proposed lim‐\\nits are also inconsistent with the way the law regulates trans‐\\nfer and possession of so many other forms of contraband, \\nsuch as illegal drug, firearms, and other weapons. If one per‐\\nson cooks crack cocaine in a kitchen and hands a pot of the \\ndrug to a confederate at the kitchen table, federal criminal law \\nwould say there was a transfer of possession, regardless of the \\nownership of the drug. The same problems are inherent in the \\nState’s approach to “acquire” and “receive,” proposing limits \\nthat have no apparent textual or other legal bases. \\n These attempts to defend the law by limiting it in these \\nways only add to the mystery of its meaning. One is left to \\nwonder why the State proposes them. Members of this court \\nrepeatedly asked the State’s lawyers to explain why they felt \\nthese implausible limitations were needed. No answer was \\nforthcoming. \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 23\\n\\n As best I can tell, the State’s lawyers seem to be trying to \\nprevent the new law from having effects that would flow nat‐\\nurally from the statutory language but that seem not to be sen‐\\nsible from a practical or policy perspective. Implicit in the ef‐\\nfort is the concession that, as drafted, the operative portions \\nof § 1.5 will have undesired and unintended effects that will \\ninterfere with important and legitimate medical research. \\n In other words, the State’s lawyers seem to be trying to \\nsave the legislature from itself. The majority nonetheless de‐\\nfends the potentially extreme outcome of this statute, noting \\nthat there is “serious debate about when, if at all, it is ethical \\nto perform medical experiments on aborted fetal tissue.” Ante \\nat 9. Thus, regardless of whether the statute is “sensible,” the \\nfact that the Indiana legislature “cho[se] sides in an ethical de‐\\nbate does not condemn [the] law.” Ante at 10. Unfortunately, \\nthe majority describes a legislative process regarding this stat‐\\nutory provision that did not actually happen. \\n The available evidence from the Indiana legislature indi‐\\ncates that it adopted this criminal provision on fetal tissue re‐\\nsearch without realizing it would have any impact on medical \\nresearch using fetal tissue, let alone shut down this research \\non Alzheimer’s disease. The legislature simply did not engage \\nwith the hard policy choices and the natural consequences of \\nits language. The result was to distill here both concerns at the \\ncenter of vagueness doctrine, the fair notice and separation of \\npowers so critical to liberty. \\n Section 1.5 was adopted as part of a broader bill, House \\nEnrolled Act No. 1337, that imposed a variety of restrictions \\non abortions and related issues. The primary focal points of \\nthis bill have already been considered by this court. See \\nPlanned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc. v. Comm’r of \\n\\n24 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nIndiana State Dep’t of Health, 888 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 2018) (hold‐\\ning unconstitutional provisions prohibiting women from ter‐\\nminating pregnancies due to fetal genetic abnormalities, race, \\nor gender and requiring burial or cremation of embryonic or \\nfetal tissue), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Oct. 12, 2018) (No. 18‐\\n483); Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc. v. Comm’r \\nof Indiana State Dep’t of Health, 896 F.3d 809 (7th Cir. 2018) \\n(holding unconstitutional provision requiring women to ob‐\\ntain ultrasound at least 18 hours before obtaining an abor‐\\ntion), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 4, 2019) (No. 18‐1019). \\n In over six hours of archived video footage of the relevant \\nIndiana House and Senate committees’ discussions of this bill, \\ndozens of witnesses testified in favor of and against the bill. \\nNot one witness mentioned medical research using aborted \\nfetal tissue. If the legislature was actually choosing sides on \\nsuch a significant issue, one would expect some mention of it. \\nSee Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 469 (2002) (Ste‐\\nvens, J., dissenting) (“I think judges as well as detectives may \\ntake into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark \\nin the night.”), quoting Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 \\nU.S. 578, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). \\n Nor was there any discussion of § 1.5 in the floor debates \\non the bill. The only substantive discussion of the provision I \\ncould find in the legislative history came in seven minutes of \\na meeting of the Indiana Senate’s Health & Provider Services \\nCommittee. The discussion shows not a policy choice on an \\nimportant issue but instead a startling disconnect between the \\nstatutory language and the stated intentions of the legislators. \\nOne of the bill’s sponsors, Senator Holdman, said that the pro‐\\nvision “has to do with the selling of fetal tissue. Which makes \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 25\\n\\nit illegal in the state of Indiana to sell fetal tissue, which basi‐\\ncally addresses the issue we’ve seen around the country with \\nPlanned Parenthood and some of the things that have been \\ngoing on there.” Hearing, Indiana Senate Health and Provider \\nServices Committee at 18:26–18:45 (Feb. 24, 2016), \\nhttp://iga.in.gov/information/archives/2016/video/commit‐\\ntee_health_and_provider_services_3900/.4 \\n Senator Stoops asked Senator Holdman a series of ques‐\\ntions about whether parents of an aborted fetus could consent \\nto an autopsy or other research use of the tissue. Id. at 21:39–\\n22:14. Senator Holdman said that would be possible, prompt‐\\ning this follow‐up: \\n S. Stoops: Right, that is a specific autopsy. But \\n what if the parents want to donate the fetus for \\n research into the condition? I guess that would \\n not be allowed. I mean an autopsy to determine \\n maybe a genetic defect after the abortion is one \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n 4 It was widely understood that this legislation responded to the 2015 \\n\\n“controversy over undercover videos of Planned Parenthood employees \\ndiscussing fetal organ donations,” despite the fact that federal and state \\ninvestigations of Planned Parenthood, including one in Indiana, found no \\nwrongdoing, and criminal charges had instead been filed against the \\nvideo‐makers. See Chelsea Schneider and Stephanie Wang, Bill Seeks Fur‐\\nther Limits on Abortion, The Indianapolis Star at A5 (Mar. 8, 2016); see also \\nDanielle Kurtzleben, Planned Parenthood Investigations Find No Fetal Tissue \\nSales, NPR (Jan. 28, 2016, 12:47 PM), \\nhttp://www.npr.org/2016/01/28/464594826/in‐wake‐of‐videos‐planned‐\\nparenthood‐investigations‐find‐no‐fetal‐tissue‐sales (summarizing re‐\\nsults of investigations). \\n\\n26 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n thing. But I think actually allowing the fetal tis‐\\n sue to be used for research purposes seems to be \\n outlawed in this bill. \\n S. Holdman: Well, I wouldn’t say that it [research \\n with fetal tissue] is outlawed. I think the word au‐\\n topsy encompasses that research portion of \\n what is done with that piece of tissue that is di‐\\n agnosed after the fact through an autopsy. So \\n maybe it is just a matter of semantics, here, per‐\\n haps Senator Stoop. But autopsy is the word \\n that we landed on. \\n S. Miller (Committee Chair): And just if I could \\n elaborate, I was a part of those conversations. \\n This is up to a parent to request the autopsy. \\n And I think at the time the parent requests the \\n autopsy, they could list the kind of things they \\n are looking for. And what kind of results they \\n want as part of that investigation. So I think for \\n the purposes that we put in the bill, that this co‐\\n vers it, Senator Stoops. At least I’m comfortable \\n with that. \\n S. Holdman: That’s right. And to your point, \\n Madame Chair, in any case the parent has to \\n consent to this procedure being done. It is not \\n going to be done just because the physician or \\n the hospital may want to have that done. It has \\n to be consented to by the parent itself. \\n S. Stoops: Right. So on page 15, line 9, where it \\n says: ‘A person who intentionally acquires, or \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 27\\n\\n sells, etc. or transfers fetal tissue, commits un‐\\n lawful transfer of fetal tissue and is a Level 5 fel‐\\n ony.’ So, is that if that person did not get per‐\\n mission from the parent? So otherwise if the par‐\\n ent gave permission, then that does not apply? \\n S. Holdman: That would be my understanding, yes. \\n I thought you were going to ask me what a \\n Level 5 Felony outcome was. And we have the \\n Criminal Courts Chair here who could answer \\n that question for you, as well. \\nId. at 23:17–25:43 \\n That exchange is remarkable, particularly because of the \\nrole of the pregnant woman’s consent for the research. Fed‐\\neral law already made clear that fetal tissue could not be used \\nfor any research purposes without the consent of the pregnant \\nwoman. 42 U.S.C. § 289g–1(b). The evidence here shows that \\nthe birth defect laboratory in Washington always obtains the \\nwoman’s consent to use tissue for research. And when called \\nupon to explain § 1.5 to their colleagues, the sponsors said \\n(a) that it would apply only to sale of fetal tissue in Indiana, \\nand (b) that the consent of the pregnant woman for research \\nuse would amount to a complete defense to the criminal re‐\\nstrictions. \\n Now, I am fully aware that legislatures are not required to \\nproduce legislative history. They are not required to explain \\nor discuss the language they enact. Courts generally presume \\nthat all legislators have read and understood the bills they \\nvote upon. As we try to be faithful agents of the law‐makers, \\nwe thus apply the ordinary meaning of the statutory lan‐\\nguage. After all, as the majority points out, one can have a \\n\\n28 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n“serious debate about when, if at all, it is ethical to perform \\nmedical experiments on aborted fetal tissue,” ultimately \\n“choosing sides.” Ante at 10. \\n In this instance, however, there was no such debate. In‐\\nstead, the law’s defenders have backed away from those ordi‐\\nnary meanings at every opportunity, first in the legislative \\nprocess and then in the lawsuit. This highly unusual record \\nought to raise warning flags for us. The statute is fatally vague \\nbecause its supporters did not pay enough attention to render \\nit intelligible as applied to this medical research, which is the \\nrelevant core, not the periphery, of this statute. \\n Consider this warning: “Under the Constitution, the adop‐\\ntion of new laws restricting liberty is supposed to be a hard \\nbusiness, the product of an open and public debate among a \\nlarge and diverse number of elected representatives. Allow‐\\ning the legislature to hand off the job of lawmaking risks sub‐\\nstituting this design for one where legislation is made easy, \\nwith a mere handful of unelected judges and prosecutors free \\nto ‘condem[n] all that [they] personally disapprove and for no \\nbetter reason than [they] disapprove it.’” Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at \\n1228 (Gorsuch, J., concurring), quoting Jordan, 341 U.S. at 242 \\n(Jackson, J., dissenting). \\n What happened here was just such a “hand‐off” of law‐\\nmaking power. It highlights why the majority’s solution here, \\nabstaining and leaving the statute‐writing task to the state \\ncourts, is not an appropriate response. The majority proposes \\nthat Indiana state courts should be permitted a decade or two \\nto resolve “edge questions.” like the “concrete disputes such \\nas the coverage of cells derived from fetal tissue.” Ante at \\n6 & 7. \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 29\\n\\n For example, will state courts decide that “placental or \\numbilical cord tissue” counts as “any other part of a fetus”? \\nMaybe, the majority says. On one hand, the majority muses, \\n“[t]he placenta is an independent organ and so may be out‐\\nside the statutory scope, but the statute does not address the \\ntopic.” Ante at 5. On the other hand, however, Indiana per‐\\nmits the purchase or sale of fetal material for “fetal stem cell” \\nresearch if “the biological parent has given written consent for \\nthe use of the fetal stem cells,” Ind. Code § 35‐46‐5‐3, but later \\ndefines “fetal stem cell” to include only the “placenta,” “um‐\\nbilical cord,” “amniotic fluid,” and “fetal tissue” if “taken \\nfrom a fetus that was either miscarried or stillborn”—not “any \\ncells that are taken as a result of an abortion,” Ind. Code § 16‐\\n18‐2‐128.5. Although that provision is limited to commercial \\ntransactions, which § 1.5 is not, perhaps that definition will \\nsupport the criminalization of the non‐commercial acquisi‐\\ntion and transfer of abortion‐derived umbilical and placental \\ncell. Plaintiffs apparently will just have to wait and see how \\nthe Indiana state courts will write that part of the statute. \\n The majority bases its preference for a state‐court iterative \\nprocess on Johnson, in which the Supreme Court declared the \\nstatute at issue vague only after struggling with it for 20 years, \\nwhile here “the process has not even begun.” Ante at 8. But \\nthat was not the real lesson of Johnson, even though the Court \\nacknowledged that “persistent efforts” by courts to establish \\na meaningful standard for a statute can be one source of “ev‐\\nidence of vagueness.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558 (2015), \\nquoting United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921). \\nThe Court did not signal that prosecutors and judges would \\nhave several decades to define what “edge” behavior is actu‐\\nally criminal just because a court hypothesizes that there must \\n\\n30 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nbe some knowable core of prohibited conduct. To the con‐\\ntrary, Johnson observed that its “holdings squarely contradict \\nthe theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely be‐\\ncause there is some conduct that clearly falls within the pro‐\\nvision’s grasp.” Id. at 2561 (describing examples). And note, \\ncritically, that Johnson was only about a sentencing enhance‐\\nment, not whether conduct was criminal in the first place. \\n In a context more similar to this case, the Court struck \\ndown a criminal statute that required “humane and sanitary” \\ndisposal of fetal remains. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Re‐\\nproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 451 (1983), overruled on \\nother grounds by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl‐\\nvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). To defend the provision, \\nAkron argued that it clearly intended only to “preclude the \\nmindless dumping of aborted fetuses onto garbage piles.” Id. \\n(internal quotation and citation omitted). The Court did not, \\nhowever, send the matter to the state courts to work out case \\nby case what would count on the periphery as “humane and \\nsanitary.” Rather, “[t]his level of uncertainty is fatal where \\ncriminal liability is imposed” because the statute “fails to give \\na physician ‘fair notice that his contemplated conduct is for‐\\nbidden,’ United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954), [and \\nthus] it violates the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 451–52. Nei‐\\nther did the Court indulge Akron’s proposal to sever “hu‐\\nmane” from the statute: “The uncertain meaning of the phrase \\n‘humane and sanitary’ leaves doubt as to whether the city \\nwould have enacted [the statute] with the word ‘sanitary’ \\nalone.” Id. at 452 n.45. In other words, the city was free “to \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 31\\n\\nenact more carefully drawn regulations,” id., but that was a \\nlegislative job—not a prosecutorial or judicial one.5 \\n The majority also reads too much into Bauer v. Shepard, 620 \\nF.3d 704, 706–07 (7th Cir. 2010), which considered a challenge \\nby two Indiana judges and an advocacy group to provisions \\nof Indiana’s Code of Judicial Conduct. In Bauer, the plaintiff‐\\njudges feared that responding to the group’s questionnaires \\nmight violate the state’s judicial ethics code. In that case, the \\nCommission on Judicial Qualifications might issue public ad‐\\nmonitions (if the subject of the admonition agreed), or a court \\nof appeals could remove the judge from a particular case, or, \\nas a matter of last resort, “the state’s Supreme Court c[ould] \\nremove [the] judge from office or impose substantial disci‐\\npline.” Id. at 707–08. We acknowledged that “[t]o the extent \\nthere is uncertainty” regarding some provisions, “Indiana \\nprovides means of clarification,” and the Commission on Ju‐\\ndicial Qualifications “already has issued several clarifying ad‐\\nvisory opinions.” Id. at 712. Judges who worried about further \\napplications of the Code should “wait and see,” we said, \\ngiven that beyond the “advisory opinions that reduce uncer‐\\ntainty,” when the “Commission brings a proceeding the state \\njudiciary will issue an opinion that makes the rule more con‐\\ncrete.” Id. at 716. \\n The majority quotes at length from Bauer to explain that it \\nis “more respectful of our judicial colleagues in Indiana, to as‐\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n 5 The majority writes that Akron was “overruled” by Planned \\nParenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), but \\nCasey did not overrule any portion of Akron dealing with the vague crim‐\\ninal statute on fetal remains. \\n\\n32 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nsume that they will act sensibly and resolve the open ques‐\\ntions in a way that honors candidates’ rights under the first \\namendment. When a statute is accompanied by [a] system \\nthat can flesh out details, the due process clause permits those \\ndetails to be left to that system.” Ante at 7, quoting Bauer, 620 \\nF.3d at 716. The bracketed “[a]” in the majority’s quotation, \\nhowever, stands in for Bauer’s actual language: “an adminis‐\\ntrative system”—which in that case was the Commission on \\nJudicial Qualifications and its ability to provide advisory \\nopinions. There is no parallel administrative system here that \\nwould justify the majority’s novel form of abstention. See also \\nBauer, 620 F.3d at 717 (describing Pullman abstention as an‐\\nother path to same result). \\n The majority’s approach also overlooks the fact that we \\nnow have experience with this statute, litigated with able \\ncounsel on both sides and full discovery, including deposi‐\\ntions and statements from internationally recognized scien‐\\ntific experts. It turns out that interpreting this law is a mess. \\nIn fact, the whole process makes a mockery of the standard \\nthat any “normal person” could figure out what is included \\nin “any other part of an aborted fetus.”6 \\n It is not the job of courts to tell legislators what processes \\nto follow toward the final enactment of the statutory language \\n\\n \\n 6 The majority’s surprising reliance on Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 \\n\\n(1974), and Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975), is misplaced. Parker upheld the \\nmilitary law forbidding “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentle‐\\nman,” but the Court’s opinion repeatedly emphasized the special consid‐\\nerations that apply to military law and tradition. 417 U.S. at 743–52, 756–\\n57, 760. Rose upheld a conviction for a “crime against nature,” drawing on \\na long common‐law tradition that has since been superseded. See Lawrence \\nv. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 33\\n\\nof their choice. Indiana is absolutely permitted to, as one leg‐\\nislator put it, move up from being “49 out of 50” in terms of \\nabortion restrictions, and “attempt[] to be the most restrictive \\nstate in the country … shooting for 50.” Senate Committee \\nHearing at 1:47:22–1:47:32 (Feb. 24, 2016). But it is our job to \\ninsist that the effort remain within constitutional parameters: \\nthat a new criminal law give fair notice of what is criminal \\nand what is not, and that the legislature make the key choices \\nrather than delegate them to prosecutors and courts. That \\nsimply did not happen with § 1.5. I would affirm the district \\ncourt’s injunction against its enforcement as written. \\n Takings Claim: Finally, we should not decide the merits of \\nIndiana University’s claim for taking of private property \\nwithout compensation. That claim simply is not ripe yet. The \\nmajority mistakenly asserts that the statute “does render val‐\\nueless any fetal tissue, derived from abortions, owned by In‐\\ndiana University.” Ante at 11. That is not consistent with the \\nposition taken by the law’s defenders. They insist that Indiana \\nUniversity remains free to conduct research with materials on \\nhand, and even to transfer it at the request of the NIH. Supra \\nat 21–22. \\n More fundamental, the legal status of Indiana University \\nvis‐à‐vis the state government is more nuanced than the ma‐\\njority acknowledges. For example, it is well‐established that \\nthe university is an arm of the state for purposes of the Elev‐\\nenth Amendment and is a state actor for purposes of the Four‐\\nteenth Amendment and other constitutional provisions. See \\nMedlock v. Trustees of Indiana University, 738 F.3d 867, 871 (7th \\nCir. 2013); Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2000). \\nBut Indiana law does not always treat the university as the \\nstate, particularly when it comes to property. See Sendak v. \\n\\n34 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nTrustees of Indiana University, 260 N.E.2d 601, 603–05 (Ind. \\n1970) (university not subject to constitutional bar to owner‐\\nship of private stock); State Board of Accounts v. Indiana Univer‐\\nsity Foundation, 647 N.E.2d 342, 352 (Ind. App. 1995) (univer‐\\nsity is “state” for purposes of State Board of Accounts statute \\nbut not in accepting and administering private gifts). The ma‐\\njority seems to imply that state legislators could simply con‐\\nfiscate private gifts and grants to the university (as distinct \\nfrom a private foundation associated with it) and use them for \\nmore general state‐government purposes. That would be a \\ntroubling prospect for many donors and grantors. We would \\ndo better to say that the university’s takings claim is simply \\nnot yet ripe because the actual scope of the challenged statute \\nremains in so much doubt.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4377132/\", \"author_raw\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":5,"string":"5"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4599879/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: TRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. Terry CURRY, Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County, Indiana, and Christopher Gaal, Prosecuting Attorney of Monroe County, Indiana, Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-14\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit \n ____________________ \n\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \nTRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY, et al., \n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, Cross‐Appellants, \n\n v. \n\nTERRY CURRY, Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County, Indi‐\nana, and CHRISTOPHER GAAL, Prosecuting Attorney of Mon‐\nroe County, Indiana, \n Defendants‐Appellants, Cross‐Appellees. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the \n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. \n No. 1:16‐cv‐01289‐JMS‐DML — Jane E. Magnus‐Stinson, Chief Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 14, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit \nJudges. \n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In Indiana “[a] person who \nintentionally acquires, receives, sells, or transfers fetal tissue \ncommits unlawful transfer of fetal tissue, a Level 5 felony.” \nInd. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5(d). A federal district court held that \n\n2 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \n\nseveral terms in this statute are unconstitutionally vague and \nthat it must be treated as if it read: “A person who intention‐\nally sells fetal tissue commits unlawful transfer of fetal tis‐\nsue, a Level 5 felony.” 289 F. Supp. 3d 905, 934–35 (S.D. Ind. \n2018). The district court also held that a definitional clause is \ninvalid. As enacted, §35‐46‐5‐1.5(b) reads: “As used in this \nsection, ‘fetal tissue’ includes tissue, organs, or any other \npart of an aborted fetus.” This must be treated as if it read: \n“As used in this section, ‘fetal tissue’ includes tissue or or‐\ngans of an aborted fetus.” The district court thus held that \nthe words “acquires”, “receives”, and “transfers”, and the \nphrase “any other part”, are too uncertain to have legal \nforce. If that is right, then big chunks of the legal system are \ninvalid, because those words are ubiquitous in statutes, reg‐\nulations, and judicial opinions. \n This case began when Indiana University and three of its \nfaculty members filed this suit, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, \nagainst the state’s prosecuting attorneys in two counties. \nThey asked the district court to enjoin the prosecutors from \nattempting to enforce any part of §35‐46‐5‐1.5. According to \nthe plaintiffs, the statute not only is excessively vague but \nalso violates the First Amendment by blocking one kind of \nmedical research, takes the University’s property without \njust compensation, violates the Equal Protection Clause by \ndistinguishing fetal tissue produced by abortions from that \nproduced by miscarriages, and violates the dormant Com‐\nmerce Clause by regulating the interstate market in fetal tis‐\nsue. Plaintiffs do not contend that the statute imposes an un‐\ndue burden on any woman who seeks to have an abortion, \nnor would they have standing to make such an argument. \nInstead the three faculty‐member plaintiffs contend that the \nstatute interferes with medical scholarship. \n\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 3 \n\n As we have recounted, the district court found four \nwords or phrases to be unconstitutionally vague. It rejected \nplaintiffs’ theories under the First Amendment and the \nEqual Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And \nit did not come to a conclusion with respect to the Takings \nClause or the Commerce Clause, reasoning that because it \ncould not determine what the statute means, it could not \nproperly analyze it under either of those provisions. It then \nentered a permanent injunction in plaintiffs’ favor and \nclosed the case. Both sides have appealed. Plaintiffs want the \nwhole statute enjoined, while defendants want the injunc‐\ntion vacated and the suit dismissed. \n Justiciability is an initial problem. Indiana University, \nwhich is part of the State of Indiana, see Haynes v. Indiana \nUniversity, 902 F.3d 724, 731 (7th Cir. 2018), has sued two \nprosecutors who carry out state powers. The two defendants \nhave been sued in their official capacities, which means that \nthey must be treated as the State of Indiana. Will v. Michigan \nDepartment of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). There is consid‐\nerable doubt that federal courts are authorized to adjust \ngrievances among different parts of a state government. See, \ne.g., Illinois v. Chicago, 137 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1998) (a state \ncan’t sue part of itself); Arlington Heights v. Regional Transpor‐\ntation Authority, 653 F.2d 1149, 1150–53 (7th Cir. 1981) (part \nof a state can’t sue the state); Branson School District RE‐82 v. \nRomer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases). \nCf. South Bend v. South Bend Common Council, 865 F.3d 889 \n(7th Cir. 2017) (a city can’t sue a part of itself). The suit is \nsaved, however, by the fact that three faculty members are \nplaintiffs. All three have standing to litigate in their personal \ncapacities, and with one exception (to which we return) they \npresent all of the complaint’s legal theories. \n\n4 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \n\n We start with vagueness, the Due Process Clause theory \non which the district court based its injunction, and then ad‐\ndress the other four theories. \n The Constitution requires criminal statutes to have a core \nof understandable meaning. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, \n135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 \n(1975); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913). Some uncer‐\ntainty at the margins does not condemn a statute. It is there‐\nfore hard to see what can be wrong with words such as “ac‐\nquires,” which people use and understand in normal life. A \nperson “acquires” a car by buying it or leasing it or receiving \nit as a gift from a parent or spouse—or by stealing it. Even a \nprotean word such as “reasonable” has enough of a core to \nallow its use in situations where rights to speak are at issue. \nSee Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 324 (2002). \nWords such as “acquire” are materially (another protean le‐\ngal word) more definite than “reasonable.” \n Johnson shows that uncertainty so pervasive that most of \na law’s potential applications are impossible to evaluate may \nrule out enforcement. But the district court did not deny that \neach of the words “acquires”, “receives”, and “transfers”, \nand the phrase “any other part”, has a substantial, under‐\nstandable core. Instead the judge worried about the periph‐\nery. \n Take “transfers.” The judge thought it hard to know \nwhether a medical researcher “transfers” fetal material by \npassing a pipette containing fetal tissue to someone else at \nthe same laboratory bench. 289 F. Supp. 3d at 920. Or take \nthe phrase “any other part.” Although this ensures that the \nstatute covers every part of a fetus, the judge thought it hard \nto say how things work at the level of individual cells or \n\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 5 \n\nstrands of DNA. Suppose someone in Washington state \n(from which much of Indiana University’s fetal tissue comes) \nextracts a few cells from an aborted fetus and uses them to \ncreate a line of stem‐cell tissue, exemplars of which (dozens \nof generations later) are transferred to a researcher in Indi‐\nana. Is anything derived from fetal tissue included in the \nphrase “any other part”? The judge did not see a clear an‐\nswer. Id. at 918–19. These and similar open questions led the \njudge to deem the words and phrase unconstitutional. \n The two prosecutors did not help their defense by pro‐\nfessing to see answers to these and similar questions. They \nassured the judge that of course stem cells derived from fetal \ntissue are not “any other part” of a fetus. They asserted that \nmoving a pipette across a lab bench is of course not a “trans‐\nfer” of fetal tissue, because “transfer” means “convey own‐\nership.” That’s implausible. Federal statutes forbid the trans‐\nfer of heroin and other contraband, see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. \n§841(a)(1), and judges implementing such laws do not condi‐\ntion their application on a change of ownership; those laws \napply to people who act as agents as well as to principals. \nThe prosecutors also asserted that placental or umbilical \ncord tissue is of course not “any other part” of a fetus. Maybe: \nThe placenta is an independent organ and so may be outside \nthe statutory scope, but the statute does not address the top‐\nic. Prosecutors can’t offer definitive interpretations of crimi‐\nnal laws, and one prosecutor can’t bind a successor in office. \nMore: Indiana has 90 other counties, whose prosecutors may \nhave different ideas about the statute’s scope. The district \njudge was right to say that, if the prosecutors’ assurances are \nall the plaintiffs have to go on, they are at needless risk. \n\n6 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \n\n Yet although prosecutorial assurances should not set an‐\nyone’s mind at rest, the legal system offers a way to work \nout the uncertainties that lurk at every statute’s periphery: \nthe judiciary. Resolving edge questions is a principal role of \nthe courts. If the district court’s approach is correct, then \nevery time a court needs to decide a tough question about \njust how far a statute reaches, it should declare the law un‐\nconstitutional. That is fundamentally inconsistent with the \nSupreme Court’s approach, under which a core of meaning \nis enough to reject a vagueness challenge, leaving to future \nadjudication the inevitable questions at the statutory margin. \n A federal district judge cannot definitively interpret Ind. \nCode §35‐46‐5‐1.5, but the state judiciary can do so. Declara‐\ntory judgments are available in Indiana under Ind. Trial Rule \n57 and Ind. Code §34‐14‐1‐1. Any medical researcher can file \na suit with the theme: “I want to do X and fear that I will be \nprosecuted, so please give me a declaratory judgment that X \nis lawful.” Yet none of the plaintiffs has filed such a suit \nseeking assurances about the scope of §35‐46‐5‐1.5. Instead \nof using a readily available state‐law remedy for unwelcome \nrisk, they asked a federal court to blot the law from the \nbooks. That’s not how uncertainty should be addressed. \n We have held this already about uncertainty under Indi‐\nana law. Indiana forbids judges, and candidates for judicial \noffice, from making any public commitment “inconsistent \nwith the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of \njudicial office”. The scope for debate about the meaning of \nthat clause puts to shame any uncertainty about the meaning \nof Ind. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5, but we held the language valid, \neven when rights to speak are at stake—not because it is \nclear, but because the state offers a process to resolve debat‐\n\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 7 \n\nable issues. Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 715–17 (7th Cir. \n2010). We explained (id. at 716–17): \n Plaintiffs want us to deem the law vague by identifying situa‐\n tions in which state officials might take an untenably broad read‐\n ing of the [language], and then predicting that they will do so. It \n is far preferable, however, and more respectful of our judicial \n colleagues in Indiana, to assume that they will act sensibly and \n resolve the open questions in a way that honors candidates’ \n rights under the first amendment. \n When a statute is accompanied by [a] system that can flesh out \n details, the due process clause permits those details to be left to \n that system. Parts of the Hatch Act are every bit as vague as the \n [language here], but in [Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, \n 413 U.S. 548 (1973)] the Court held that problems of implementa‐\n tion could be tackled by administrative adjudication. 413 U.S. at \n 580. Similarly, in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), the Court \n held that an article of the Uniform Code of Military Justice mak‐\n ing it a court‐martial offense to engage in “conduct unbecoming \n an officer and a gentleman” is not unconstitutionally vague, be‐\n cause military tribunals have elaborated on what is “unbecom‐\n ing” for an officer and made it more specific than the unadorned \n words. The National Labor Relations Act is full of vague terms \n [such as “unfair labor practice”], and the National Labor Rela‐\n tions Board has yet to make all of them concrete, but no one \n supposes that the whole Act could be chucked out. The Justices \n have been chary of holding laws unconstitutional “on their face” \n precisely because they have recognized that vagueness will be \n reduced through a process of interpretation. \n\nThis is equally true of Ind. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5. Declaratory‐\njudgment actions can resolve ambiguities with limited (if \nany) risk to medical researchers. \n One thing the state judiciary might do—in addition to re‐\nsolving concrete disputes such as the coverage of cells de‐\nrived from fetal tissue—is read the word “intentionally” in \n§35‐46‐5‐1.5(d) to protect researchers who do not subjective‐\n\n8 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \n\nly understand that they are violating the law. That is what \nthe Supreme Court did in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 \n(1945), to save what is now codified as 18 U.S.C. §242, which \none might classify as the ultimately vague criminal statute. \n(It forbids any act under color of law that deprives anyone of \nany constitutional right.) This potential for risk reduction \nthrough interpretation, plus the fact that all of the contested \nterms have a substantial core of ascertainable meaning, leads \nus to reject the district court’s vagueness holding.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: TRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. Terry CURRY, Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County, Indiana, and Christopher Gaal, Prosecuting Attorney of Monroe County, Indiana, Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-14\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit \\n ____________________ \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\nTRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY, et al., \\n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, Cross‐Appellants, \\n\\n v. \\n\\nTERRY CURRY, Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County, Indi‐\\nana, and CHRISTOPHER GAAL, Prosecuting Attorney of Mon‐\\nroe County, Indiana, \\n Defendants‐Appellants, Cross‐Appellees. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the \\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. \\n No. 1:16‐cv‐01289‐JMS‐DML — Jane E. Magnus‐Stinson, Chief Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 14, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit \\nJudges. \\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In Indiana “[a] person who \\nintentionally acquires, receives, sells, or transfers fetal tissue \\ncommits unlawful transfer of fetal tissue, a Level 5 felony.” \\nInd. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5(d). A federal district court held that \\n\\n2 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nseveral terms in this statute are unconstitutionally vague and \\nthat it must be treated as if it read: “A person who intention‐\\nally sells fetal tissue commits unlawful transfer of fetal tis‐\\nsue, a Level 5 felony.” 289 F. Supp. 3d 905, 934–35 (S.D. Ind. \\n2018). The district court also held that a definitional clause is \\ninvalid. As enacted, §35‐46‐5‐1.5(b) reads: “As used in this \\nsection, ‘fetal tissue’ includes tissue, organs, or any other \\npart of an aborted fetus.” This must be treated as if it read: \\n“As used in this section, ‘fetal tissue’ includes tissue or or‐\\ngans of an aborted fetus.” The district court thus held that \\nthe words “acquires”, “receives”, and “transfers”, and the \\nphrase “any other part”, are too uncertain to have legal \\nforce. If that is right, then big chunks of the legal system are \\ninvalid, because those words are ubiquitous in statutes, reg‐\\nulations, and judicial opinions. \\n This case began when Indiana University and three of its \\nfaculty members filed this suit, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, \\nagainst the state’s prosecuting attorneys in two counties. \\nThey asked the district court to enjoin the prosecutors from \\nattempting to enforce any part of §35‐46‐5‐1.5. According to \\nthe plaintiffs, the statute not only is excessively vague but \\nalso violates the First Amendment by blocking one kind of \\nmedical research, takes the University’s property without \\njust compensation, violates the Equal Protection Clause by \\ndistinguishing fetal tissue produced by abortions from that \\nproduced by miscarriages, and violates the dormant Com‐\\nmerce Clause by regulating the interstate market in fetal tis‐\\nsue. Plaintiffs do not contend that the statute imposes an un‐\\ndue burden on any woman who seeks to have an abortion, \\nnor would they have standing to make such an argument. \\nInstead the three faculty‐member plaintiffs contend that the \\nstatute interferes with medical scholarship. \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 3 \\n\\n As we have recounted, the district court found four \\nwords or phrases to be unconstitutionally vague. It rejected \\nplaintiffs’ theories under the First Amendment and the \\nEqual Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And \\nit did not come to a conclusion with respect to the Takings \\nClause or the Commerce Clause, reasoning that because it \\ncould not determine what the statute means, it could not \\nproperly analyze it under either of those provisions. It then \\nentered a permanent injunction in plaintiffs’ favor and \\nclosed the case. Both sides have appealed. Plaintiffs want the \\nwhole statute enjoined, while defendants want the injunc‐\\ntion vacated and the suit dismissed. \\n Justiciability is an initial problem. Indiana University, \\nwhich is part of the State of Indiana, see Haynes v. Indiana \\nUniversity, 902 F.3d 724, 731 (7th Cir. 2018), has sued two \\nprosecutors who carry out state powers. The two defendants \\nhave been sued in their official capacities, which means that \\nthey must be treated as the State of Indiana. Will v. Michigan \\nDepartment of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). There is consid‐\\nerable doubt that federal courts are authorized to adjust \\ngrievances among different parts of a state government. See, \\ne.g., Illinois v. Chicago, 137 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1998) (a state \\ncan’t sue part of itself); Arlington Heights v. Regional Transpor‐\\ntation Authority, 653 F.2d 1149, 1150–53 (7th Cir. 1981) (part \\nof a state can’t sue the state); Branson School District RE‐82 v. \\nRomer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases). \\nCf. South Bend v. South Bend Common Council, 865 F.3d 889 \\n(7th Cir. 2017) (a city can’t sue a part of itself). The suit is \\nsaved, however, by the fact that three faculty members are \\nplaintiffs. All three have standing to litigate in their personal \\ncapacities, and with one exception (to which we return) they \\npresent all of the complaint’s legal theories. \\n\\n4 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n We start with vagueness, the Due Process Clause theory \\non which the district court based its injunction, and then ad‐\\ndress the other four theories. \\n The Constitution requires criminal statutes to have a core \\nof understandable meaning. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, \\n135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 \\n(1975); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913). Some uncer‐\\ntainty at the margins does not condemn a statute. It is there‐\\nfore hard to see what can be wrong with words such as “ac‐\\nquires,” which people use and understand in normal life. A \\nperson “acquires” a car by buying it or leasing it or receiving \\nit as a gift from a parent or spouse—or by stealing it. Even a \\nprotean word such as “reasonable” has enough of a core to \\nallow its use in situations where rights to speak are at issue. \\nSee Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 324 (2002). \\nWords such as “acquire” are materially (another protean le‐\\ngal word) more definite than “reasonable.” \\n Johnson shows that uncertainty so pervasive that most of \\na law’s potential applications are impossible to evaluate may \\nrule out enforcement. But the district court did not deny that \\neach of the words “acquires”, “receives”, and “transfers”, \\nand the phrase “any other part”, has a substantial, under‐\\nstandable core. Instead the judge worried about the periph‐\\nery. \\n Take “transfers.” The judge thought it hard to know \\nwhether a medical researcher “transfers” fetal material by \\npassing a pipette containing fetal tissue to someone else at \\nthe same laboratory bench. 289 F. Supp. 3d at 920. Or take \\nthe phrase “any other part.” Although this ensures that the \\nstatute covers every part of a fetus, the judge thought it hard \\nto say how things work at the level of individual cells or \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 5 \\n\\nstrands of DNA. Suppose someone in Washington state \\n(from which much of Indiana University’s fetal tissue comes) \\nextracts a few cells from an aborted fetus and uses them to \\ncreate a line of stem‐cell tissue, exemplars of which (dozens \\nof generations later) are transferred to a researcher in Indi‐\\nana. Is anything derived from fetal tissue included in the \\nphrase “any other part”? The judge did not see a clear an‐\\nswer. Id. at 918–19. These and similar open questions led the \\njudge to deem the words and phrase unconstitutional. \\n The two prosecutors did not help their defense by pro‐\\nfessing to see answers to these and similar questions. They \\nassured the judge that of course stem cells derived from fetal \\ntissue are not “any other part” of a fetus. They asserted that \\nmoving a pipette across a lab bench is of course not a “trans‐\\nfer” of fetal tissue, because “transfer” means “convey own‐\\nership.” That’s implausible. Federal statutes forbid the trans‐\\nfer of heroin and other contraband, see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. \\n§841(a)(1), and judges implementing such laws do not condi‐\\ntion their application on a change of ownership; those laws \\napply to people who act as agents as well as to principals. \\nThe prosecutors also asserted that placental or umbilical \\ncord tissue is of course not “any other part” of a fetus. Maybe: \\nThe placenta is an independent organ and so may be outside \\nthe statutory scope, but the statute does not address the top‐\\nic. Prosecutors can’t offer definitive interpretations of crimi‐\\nnal laws, and one prosecutor can’t bind a successor in office. \\nMore: Indiana has 90 other counties, whose prosecutors may \\nhave different ideas about the statute’s scope. The district \\njudge was right to say that, if the prosecutors’ assurances are \\nall the plaintiffs have to go on, they are at needless risk. \\n\\n6 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n Yet although prosecutorial assurances should not set an‐\\nyone’s mind at rest, the legal system offers a way to work \\nout the uncertainties that lurk at every statute’s periphery: \\nthe judiciary. Resolving edge questions is a principal role of \\nthe courts. If the district court’s approach is correct, then \\nevery time a court needs to decide a tough question about \\njust how far a statute reaches, it should declare the law un‐\\nconstitutional. That is fundamentally inconsistent with the \\nSupreme Court’s approach, under which a core of meaning \\nis enough to reject a vagueness challenge, leaving to future \\nadjudication the inevitable questions at the statutory margin. \\n A federal district judge cannot definitively interpret Ind. \\nCode §35‐46‐5‐1.5, but the state judiciary can do so. Declara‐\\ntory judgments are available in Indiana under Ind. Trial Rule \\n57 and Ind. Code §34‐14‐1‐1. Any medical researcher can file \\na suit with the theme: “I want to do X and fear that I will be \\nprosecuted, so please give me a declaratory judgment that X \\nis lawful.” Yet none of the plaintiffs has filed such a suit \\nseeking assurances about the scope of §35‐46‐5‐1.5. Instead \\nof using a readily available state‐law remedy for unwelcome \\nrisk, they asked a federal court to blot the law from the \\nbooks. That’s not how uncertainty should be addressed. \\n We have held this already about uncertainty under Indi‐\\nana law. Indiana forbids judges, and candidates for judicial \\noffice, from making any public commitment “inconsistent \\nwith the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of \\njudicial office”. The scope for debate about the meaning of \\nthat clause puts to shame any uncertainty about the meaning \\nof Ind. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5, but we held the language valid, \\neven when rights to speak are at stake—not because it is \\nclear, but because the state offers a process to resolve debat‐\\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 7 \\n\\nable issues. Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 715–17 (7th Cir. \\n2010). We explained (id. at 716–17): \\n Plaintiffs want us to deem the law vague by identifying situa‐\\n tions in which state officials might take an untenably broad read‐\\n ing of the [language], and then predicting that they will do so. It \\n is far preferable, however, and more respectful of our judicial \\n colleagues in Indiana, to assume that they will act sensibly and \\n resolve the open questions in a way that honors candidates’ \\n rights under the first amendment. \\n When a statute is accompanied by [a] system that can flesh out \\n details, the due process clause permits those details to be left to \\n that system. Parts of the Hatch Act are every bit as vague as the \\n [language here], but in [Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, \\n 413 U.S. 548 (1973)] the Court held that problems of implementa‐\\n tion could be tackled by administrative adjudication. 413 U.S. at \\n 580. Similarly, in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), the Court \\n held that an article of the Uniform Code of Military Justice mak‐\\n ing it a court‐martial offense to engage in “conduct unbecoming \\n an officer and a gentleman” is not unconstitutionally vague, be‐\\n cause military tribunals have elaborated on what is “unbecom‐\\n ing” for an officer and made it more specific than the unadorned \\n words. The National Labor Relations Act is full of vague terms \\n [such as “unfair labor practice”], and the National Labor Rela‐\\n tions Board has yet to make all of them concrete, but no one \\n supposes that the whole Act could be chucked out. The Justices \\n have been chary of holding laws unconstitutional “on their face” \\n precisely because they have recognized that vagueness will be \\n reduced through a process of interpretation. \\n\\nThis is equally true of Ind. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5. Declaratory‐\\njudgment actions can resolve ambiguities with limited (if \\nany) risk to medical researchers. \\n One thing the state judiciary might do—in addition to re‐\\nsolving concrete disputes such as the coverage of cells de‐\\nrived from fetal tissue—is read the word “intentionally” in \\n§35‐46‐5‐1.5(d) to protect researchers who do not subjective‐\\n\\n8 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nly understand that they are violating the law. That is what \\nthe Supreme Court did in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 \\n(1945), to save what is now codified as 18 U.S.C. §242, which \\none might classify as the ultimately vague criminal statute. \\n(It forbids any act under color of law that deprives anyone of \\nany constitutional right.) This potential for risk reduction \\nthrough interpretation, plus the fact that all of the contested \\nterms have a substantial core of ascertainable meaning, leads \\nus to reject the district court’s vagueness holding.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1191,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4599905,"string":"4,599,905"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Trustees of Indiana University v. Terry Curry"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-14"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1308"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit \\n ____________________ \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\nTRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY, et al., \\n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, Cross‐Appellants, \\n\\n v. \\n\\nTERRY CURRY, Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County, Indi‐\\nana, and CHRISTOPHER GAAL, Prosecuting Attorney of Mon‐\\nroe County, Indiana, \\n Defendants‐Appellants, Cross‐Appellees. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the \\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. \\n No. 1:16‐cv‐01289‐JMS‐DML — Jane E. Magnus‐Stinson, Chief Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 14, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit \\nJudges. \\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In Indiana “[a] person who \\nintentionally acquires, receives, sells, or transfers fetal tissue \\ncommits unlawful transfer of fetal tissue, a Level 5 felony.” \\nInd. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5(d). A federal district court held that \\n\\n2 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nseveral terms in this statute are unconstitutionally vague and \\nthat it must be treated as if it read: “A person who intention‐\\nally sells fetal tissue commits unlawful transfer of fetal tis‐\\nsue, a Level 5 felony.” 289 F. Supp. 3d 905, 934–35 (S.D. Ind. \\n2018). The district court also held that a definitional clause is \\ninvalid. As enacted, §35‐46‐5‐1.5(b) reads: “As used in this \\nsection, ‘fetal tissue’ includes tissue, organs, or any other \\npart of an aborted fetus.” This must be treated as if it read: \\n“As used in this section, ‘fetal tissue’ includes tissue or or‐\\ngans of an aborted fetus.” The district court thus held that \\nthe words “acquires”, “receives”, and “transfers”, and the \\nphrase “any other part”, are too uncertain to have legal \\nforce. If that is right, then big chunks of the legal system are \\ninvalid, because those words are ubiquitous in statutes, reg‐\\nulations, and judicial opinions. \\n This case began when Indiana University and three of its \\nfaculty members filed this suit, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, \\nagainst the state’s prosecuting attorneys in two counties. \\nThey asked the district court to enjoin the prosecutors from \\nattempting to enforce any part of §35‐46‐5‐1.5. According to \\nthe plaintiffs, the statute not only is excessively vague but \\nalso violates the First Amendment by blocking one kind of \\nmedical research, takes the University’s property without \\njust compensation, violates the Equal Protection Clause by \\ndistinguishing fetal tissue produced by abortions from that \\nproduced by miscarriages, and violates the dormant Com‐\\nmerce Clause by regulating the interstate market in fetal tis‐\\nsue. Plaintiffs do not contend that the statute imposes an un‐\\ndue burden on any woman who seeks to have an abortion, \\nnor would they have standing to make such an argument. \\nInstead the three faculty‐member plaintiffs contend that the \\nstatute interferes with medical scholarship. \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 3 \\n\\n As we have recounted, the district court found four \\nwords or phrases to be unconstitutionally vague. It rejected \\nplaintiffs’ theories under the First Amendment and the \\nEqual Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And \\nit did not come to a conclusion with respect to the Takings \\nClause or the Commerce Clause, reasoning that because it \\ncould not determine what the statute means, it could not \\nproperly analyze it under either of those provisions. It then \\nentered a permanent injunction in plaintiffs’ favor and \\nclosed the case. Both sides have appealed. Plaintiffs want the \\nwhole statute enjoined, while defendants want the injunc‐\\ntion vacated and the suit dismissed. \\n Justiciability is an initial problem. Indiana University, \\nwhich is part of the State of Indiana, see Haynes v. Indiana \\nUniversity, 902 F.3d 724, 731 (7th Cir. 2018), has sued two \\nprosecutors who carry out state powers. The two defendants \\nhave been sued in their official capacities, which means that \\nthey must be treated as the State of Indiana. Will v. Michigan \\nDepartment of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). There is consid‐\\nerable doubt that federal courts are authorized to adjust \\ngrievances among different parts of a state government. See, \\ne.g., Illinois v. Chicago, 137 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1998) (a state \\ncan’t sue part of itself); Arlington Heights v. Regional Transpor‐\\ntation Authority, 653 F.2d 1149, 1150–53 (7th Cir. 1981) (part \\nof a state can’t sue the state); Branson School District RE‐82 v. \\nRomer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases). \\nCf. South Bend v. South Bend Common Council, 865 F.3d 889 \\n(7th Cir. 2017) (a city can’t sue a part of itself). The suit is \\nsaved, however, by the fact that three faculty members are \\nplaintiffs. All three have standing to litigate in their personal \\ncapacities, and with one exception (to which we return) they \\npresent all of the complaint’s legal theories. \\n\\n4 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n We start with vagueness, the Due Process Clause theory \\non which the district court based its injunction, and then ad‐\\ndress the other four theories. \\n The Constitution requires criminal statutes to have a core \\nof understandable meaning. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, \\n135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 \\n(1975); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913). Some uncer‐\\ntainty at the margins does not condemn a statute. It is there‐\\nfore hard to see what can be wrong with words such as “ac‐\\nquires,” which people use and understand in normal life. A \\nperson “acquires” a car by buying it or leasing it or receiving \\nit as a gift from a parent or spouse—or by stealing it. Even a \\nprotean word such as “reasonable” has enough of a core to \\nallow its use in situations where rights to speak are at issue. \\nSee Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 324 (2002). \\nWords such as “acquire” are materially (another protean le‐\\ngal word) more definite than “reasonable.” \\n Johnson shows that uncertainty so pervasive that most of \\na law’s potential applications are impossible to evaluate may \\nrule out enforcement. But the district court did not deny that \\neach of the words “acquires”, “receives”, and “transfers”, \\nand the phrase “any other part”, has a substantial, under‐\\nstandable core. Instead the judge worried about the periph‐\\nery. \\n Take “transfers.” The judge thought it hard to know \\nwhether a medical researcher “transfers” fetal material by \\npassing a pipette containing fetal tissue to someone else at \\nthe same laboratory bench. 289 F. Supp. 3d at 920. Or take \\nthe phrase “any other part.” Although this ensures that the \\nstatute covers every part of a fetus, the judge thought it hard \\nto say how things work at the level of individual cells or \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 5 \\n\\nstrands of DNA. Suppose someone in Washington state \\n(from which much of Indiana University’s fetal tissue comes) \\nextracts a few cells from an aborted fetus and uses them to \\ncreate a line of stem‐cell tissue, exemplars of which (dozens \\nof generations later) are transferred to a researcher in Indi‐\\nana. Is anything derived from fetal tissue included in the \\nphrase “any other part”? The judge did not see a clear an‐\\nswer. Id. at 918–19. These and similar open questions led the \\njudge to deem the words and phrase unconstitutional. \\n The two prosecutors did not help their defense by pro‐\\nfessing to see answers to these and similar questions. They \\nassured the judge that of course stem cells derived from fetal \\ntissue are not “any other part” of a fetus. They asserted that \\nmoving a pipette across a lab bench is of course not a “trans‐\\nfer” of fetal tissue, because “transfer” means “convey own‐\\nership.” That’s implausible. Federal statutes forbid the trans‐\\nfer of heroin and other contraband, see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. \\n§841(a)(1), and judges implementing such laws do not condi‐\\ntion their application on a change of ownership; those laws \\napply to people who act as agents as well as to principals. \\nThe prosecutors also asserted that placental or umbilical \\ncord tissue is of course not “any other part” of a fetus. Maybe: \\nThe placenta is an independent organ and so may be outside \\nthe statutory scope, but the statute does not address the top‐\\nic. Prosecutors can’t offer definitive interpretations of crimi‐\\nnal laws, and one prosecutor can’t bind a successor in office. \\nMore: Indiana has 90 other counties, whose prosecutors may \\nhave different ideas about the statute’s scope. The district \\njudge was right to say that, if the prosecutors’ assurances are \\nall the plaintiffs have to go on, they are at needless risk. \\n\\n6 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n Yet although prosecutorial assurances should not set an‐\\nyone’s mind at rest, the legal system offers a way to work \\nout the uncertainties that lurk at every statute’s periphery: \\nthe judiciary. Resolving edge questions is a principal role of \\nthe courts. If the district court’s approach is correct, then \\nevery time a court needs to decide a tough question about \\njust how far a statute reaches, it should declare the law un‐\\nconstitutional. That is fundamentally inconsistent with the \\nSupreme Court’s approach, under which a core of meaning \\nis enough to reject a vagueness challenge, leaving to future \\nadjudication the inevitable questions at the statutory margin. \\n A federal district judge cannot definitively interpret Ind. \\nCode §35‐46‐5‐1.5, but the state judiciary can do so. Declara‐\\ntory judgments are available in Indiana under Ind. Trial Rule \\n57 and Ind. Code §34‐14‐1‐1. Any medical researcher can file \\na suit with the theme: “I want to do X and fear that I will be \\nprosecuted, so please give me a declaratory judgment that X \\nis lawful.” Yet none of the plaintiffs has filed such a suit \\nseeking assurances about the scope of §35‐46‐5‐1.5. Instead \\nof using a readily available state‐law remedy for unwelcome \\nrisk, they asked a federal court to blot the law from the \\nbooks. That’s not how uncertainty should be addressed. \\n We have held this already about uncertainty under Indi‐\\nana law. Indiana forbids judges, and candidates for judicial \\noffice, from making any public commitment “inconsistent \\nwith the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of \\njudicial office”. The scope for debate about the meaning of \\nthat clause puts to shame any uncertainty about the meaning \\nof Ind. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5, but we held the language valid, \\neven when rights to speak are at stake—not because it is \\nclear, but because the state offers a process to resolve debat‐\\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 7 \\n\\nable issues. Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 715–17 (7th Cir. \\n2010). We explained (id. at 716–17): \\n Plaintiffs want us to deem the law vague by identifying situa‐\\n tions in which state officials might take an untenably broad read‐\\n ing of the [language], and then predicting that they will do so. It \\n is far preferable, however, and more respectful of our judicial \\n colleagues in Indiana, to assume that they will act sensibly and \\n resolve the open questions in a way that honors candidates’ \\n rights under the first amendment. \\n When a statute is accompanied by [a] system that can flesh out \\n details, the due process clause permits those details to be left to \\n that system. Parts of the Hatch Act are every bit as vague as the \\n [language here], but in [Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, \\n 413 U.S. 548 (1973)] the Court held that problems of implementa‐\\n tion could be tackled by administrative adjudication. 413 U.S. at \\n 580. Similarly, in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), the Court \\n held that an article of the Uniform Code of Military Justice mak‐\\n ing it a court‐martial offense to engage in “conduct unbecoming \\n an officer and a gentleman” is not unconstitutionally vague, be‐\\n cause military tribunals have elaborated on what is “unbecom‐\\n ing” for an officer and made it more specific than the unadorned \\n words. The National Labor Relations Act is full of vague terms \\n [such as “unfair labor practice”], and the National Labor Rela‐\\n tions Board has yet to make all of them concrete, but no one \\n supposes that the whole Act could be chucked out. The Justices \\n have been chary of holding laws unconstitutional “on their face” \\n precisely because they have recognized that vagueness will be \\n reduced through a process of interpretation. \\n\\nThis is equally true of Ind. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5. Declaratory‐\\njudgment actions can resolve ambiguities with limited (if \\nany) risk to medical researchers. \\n One thing the state judiciary might do—in addition to re‐\\nsolving concrete disputes such as the coverage of cells de‐\\nrived from fetal tissue—is read the word “intentionally” in \\n§35‐46‐5‐1.5(d) to protect researchers who do not subjective‐\\n\\n8 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nly understand that they are violating the law. That is what \\nthe Supreme Court did in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 \\n(1945), to save what is now codified as 18 U.S.C. §242, which \\none might classify as the ultimately vague criminal statute. \\n(It forbids any act under color of law that deprives anyone of \\nany constitutional right.) This potential for risk reduction \\nthrough interpretation, plus the fact that all of the contested \\nterms have a substantial core of ascertainable meaning, leads \\nus to reject the district court’s vagueness holding.\", \"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}, {\"type\": \"dissent\", \"author\": \"Our\", \"text\": \"Our dissenting colleague calls our approach “a novel var‐\\niation on Pullman abstention” (below at 14), but it is neither \\nnovel nor a form of abstention. It reflects the Supreme \\nCourt’s holdings in Letter Carriers, Parker, and many other \\ndecisions, such as Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975), that when \\nconsidering whether statutory terms are too vague a federal \\ncourt must take into account how they have been interpreted \\nand applied. Johnson is an example. The Justices declared a \\nstatute unconstitutionally vague only after this process of \\ninterpretation had been used for more than 20 years without \\ncurtailing uncertainty. For Indiana’s fetal‐tissue statute, by \\ncontrast, the process has not even begun. Whether the pro‐\\ncess of interpretation is administrative (as in Letter Carriers \\nand Bauer) or judicial (as in Parker, Rose, and Johnson) does \\nnot matter. What does matter is whether the process can an‐\\nswer important questions about the statute’s scope. \\n Plaintiffs believe that, if they sue in federal court before \\nthe state judiciary has had a chance to interpret state law, \\nthey can ensure that the state never gets that chance. Akron v. \\nAkron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 451–52 \\n(1983), used vagueness doctrine in that fashion without cit‐\\ning Letter Carriers, Parker, or Rose. Akron was overruled by \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 9 \\n\\nPlanned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 \\n(1992), and we are not aware of any other decision by the \\nSupreme Court that has used vagueness doctrine to prevent \\nthe state judiciary from having even a chance to give the law \\na construction that will produce adequate clarity. \\n Thus we arrive at the four theories that are the subjects of \\nplaintiffs’ cross‐appeal. \\n The parties agree that the statute does not burden a sus‐\\npect class or affect a fundamental right, so the rational‐basis \\nstandard applies to the equal‐protection theory. The district \\ncourt held that ethical considerations support a distinction \\nbetween fetal tissue obtained from abortions and tissue ob‐\\ntained from miscarriages. 289 F. Supp. 3d at 931–33. There is \\na moral debate about abortion and no equivalent debate \\nabout miscarriages. The Supreme Court wrote in Washington \\nv. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997), that “[t]he State … has \\nan interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medi‐\\ncal profession.” Cf. Cavel International, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 \\nF.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2007) (ethical considerations support a ban \\non slaughtering horses for human consumption). Plaintiffs \\nstress that under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1974), and its \\nsuccessors, a fetus is not a “person.” See also Planned \\nParenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc. v. Commissioner of In‐\\ndiana State Department of Health, 888 F.3d 300, rehearing en \\nbanc denied, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 17676 (7th Cir. June 25, \\n2018), petition for certiorari pending, No. 18–483. But that \\ndoes not eliminate the possibility of serious debate about \\nwhen, if at all, it is ethical to perform medical experiments \\non aborted fetal tissue. The rational‐basis standard does not \\nrequire much in the way of justification, see FCC v. Beach \\nCommunications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993), and we \\n\\n10 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nagree with the district court that the statute survives an \\nequal‐protection challenge. Indiana’s statute may or may not \\nbe sensible—for even persons who find abortion immoral \\nmust recognize that neurological research using fetal tissue \\ncan save innocent lives—but choosing sides in an ethical de‐\\nbate does not condemn a law. \\n The First Amendment argument is a non‐starter. The \\nstatute regulates conduct, not speech. See Clark v. Community \\nfor Creative Non‐Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). True, plaintiffs \\nwant to use fetal tissue in research that could lead to speech, \\nin classrooms or research papers. But a desire to obtain an \\ninput into speech does not convert regulation of conduct into \\nregulation of speech. Surely plaintiffs do not think that re‐\\nsearchers at Indiana University are entitled to blow up a \\ncommercial airliner, or administer dangerous pathogens to \\npatients in the University’s hospital, just so that they can ob‐\\nserve the results and write down their findings. Nor do \\nplaintiffs think that they are entitled to steal pens, paper, and \\ncomputers from the local Office Depot so that they can write \\narticles at lower cost. Plaintiffs assert that the statute casts “a \\npall of orthodoxy over the classroom”, but it does not. They \\ncan say, write, and teach anything they want. They can refer \\nto results generated by work done on aborted fetal tissue in \\nother states and nations. But they cannot treat enforcement \\nof rules about conduct as equivalent to prohibitions of \\nspeech. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional \\nRights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (Solomon Amendment does \\nnot regulate speech). \\n Plaintiffs contend that Indiana’s law violates the Com‐\\nmerce Clause because much of the tissue they seek to use \\ncomes from other states. Yet the law does not discriminate \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 11 \\n\\nagainst interstate commerce; it applies equally to fetal tissue \\nfrom Indiana and fetal tissue from Iowa, Illinois, or Indone‐\\nsia. Nor does it bear more heavily on interstate commerce as \\na practical matter, the subject of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 \\nU.S. 137 (1970). We have held repeatedly that outright bans \\non particular items do not offend the dormant Commerce \\nClause. See, e.g., National Paint & Coatings Association v. Chi‐\\ncago, 45 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1995) (spray paint); Park Pet Shop, \\nInc. v. Chicago, 872 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 2017) (dogs from puppy \\nmills). Plaintiffs do not contend that Indiana’s law concerns a \\nsubject on which there is a “compelling need for national \\nuniformity in regulation.” General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 \\nU.S. 278, 298 n.12 (1997). \\n Finally, the claim under the Takings Clause is confined to \\nthe University itself. None of the three individual plaintiffs \\ncontends that he has any property interest in particular fetal \\ntissue, so nothing has been taken from any of them. The \\nstatute does render valueless any fetal tissue, derived from \\nabortions, owned by Indiana University. But as we observed \\nearlier, the University, as part of Indiana, is not entitled to \\nsue its own state. Indiana’s legislature is free to decide what \\nuse (including none) to make of Indiana’s property. See, e.g., \\nGreat Lakes Higher Education Corp. v. Cavazos, 911 F.2d 10, 14–\\n15 (7th Cir. 1990). Our decision in Illinois Clean Energy Com‐\\nmunity Foundation v. Filan, 392 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2004), does \\nnot hold otherwise. The Illinois Clean Energy Community \\nFoundation is a charitable foundation funded by private do‐\\nnations. Confiscation of its property is a taking in a way that \\na state’s decision about what to do with its own property \\nnever could be. \\n\\n12 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n Several lesser arguments have been considered but do \\nnot require discussion. We conclude that the district court \\nshould have entered judgment in defendants’ favor. The in‐\\njunction is reversed, and the case is remanded for that pur‐\\npose. \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 13\"}, {\"author\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. We should affirm. \\nThe Indiana law making it a felony to acquire, receive, sell, or \\ntransfer the “tissue, organs, or any other part of an aborted \\nfetus” is unconstitutionally vague. As explained below, some \\nunusual features of this law and this lawsuit lead me to that \\nconclusion: both the State’s lawyers and the authoring legis‐\\nlators have tried to run away from the apparent meaning of \\nthe statutory language. As a result, it’s clear that the law does \\nnot give fair notice of its scope, and it effectively abandons the \\nproper separation of powers by delegating critical policy de‐\\ncisions to prosecutors and judges. I agree with my colleagues, \\nhowever, that plaintiffs cannot prevail on their First Amend‐\\nment, Equal Protection, and Commerce Clause challenges. \\n The unusual features of this law, its enactment, and this \\nlawsuit mean that the district judge’s reasoning does not ac‐\\ntually threaten to invalidate “big chunks of the legal system.” \\nIt was not the district judge who found it hard to know what \\n“transfer” means in this statute, nor was the problem that the \\njudge “did not see a clear answer” as to what is meant by “any \\nother part.” See ante at 4–5. If the district judge erred, it was \\nin taking the State of Indiana at its word that the statutory text \\ndoes not mean what it seems to say. The subject of this litiga‐\\ntion is not handwringing about the “periphery” of the new \\nlaw. The majority’s hypothesized “core of understandable \\nmeaning”—the transfer or acquisition of fetal organs—ad‐\\ndresses a factual scenario that is not and was not actually hap‐\\npening. The new law is relevant only to practices as to which \\nits application seems, based on the State’s defense, unforeseen \\nand indeterminate. \\n This case fits comfortably within the majority’s descrip‐\\ntion of what Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) \\n\\n14 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nteaches: “that uncertainty so pervasive that most of a law’s \\npotential applications are impossible to evaluate may rule out \\nenforcement.” Ante at 4. Instead of affirming, however, the \\nmajority proposes a novel variation on Pullman abstention in \\nwhich the federal courts direct plaintiffs who reasonably fear \\nprosecution under a vague law to file a series of declaratory \\njudgment cases in the state courts. \\n Plaintiffs should not have to take such extraordinary \\nmeasures to determine the scope of a criminal law. Legisla‐\\ntures must draft criminal statutes so that ordinary people \\nhave fair notice of what acts are criminal. Skilling v. United \\nStates, 561 U.S. 358, 402–03 (2010); United States v. Sylla, 790 \\nF.3d 772, 774–75 (7th Cir. 2015). That does not mean that the \\ncorrect application of even a criminal law must be free from \\ndoubt in all cases. There will often be, perhaps will always be, \\na periphery where there is room for disagreement and inter‐\\npretation. That possibility does not mean that a law is void for \\nvagueness, particularly as applied to the core of matters \\nclearly covered by the statute. \\n Still, there are limits. Fair notice of what is prohibited is an \\nessential element of due process and the rule of law. Vague \\nlaws “can invite the exercise of arbitrary power … by leaving \\nthe people in the dark about what the law demands and al‐\\nlowing prosecutors and courts to make it up.” Sessions v. Di‐\\nmaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223–24 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); \\nsee also Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101,1108 (2018) \\n(“to rely upon prosecutorial discretion to narrow the other‐\\nwise wide‐ranging scope of a criminal statute’s highly ab‐\\nstract general statutory language places great power in the \\nhands of the prosecutor”). \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 15\\n\\n Vagueness doctrine is also built on the separation of pow‐\\ners. Legislators “may not ‘abdicate their responsibilities for \\nsetting the standards of the criminal law.’” Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. \\nat 1227 (Gorsuch, J. concurring), quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 \\nU.S. 566, 575 (1974). Vague laws transfer legislative power to \\ncourts and police and prosecutors, where such power most \\nemphatically does not belong. Id. at 1228. \\n The unusual record here shows just such a legislative ab‐\\ndication. As a result, scientists engaged in potentially invalu‐\\nable medical research risk criminal prosecution based on \\nvague statutory language that leaves the hard choices to pros‐\\necutors and judges. “Under the Constitution, the adoption of \\nnew laws restricting liberty is supposed to be a hard business, \\nthe product of an open and public debate among a large and \\ndiverse number of elected representatives. Allowing the leg‐\\nislature to hand off the job of lawmaking risks substituting \\nthis design for one where legislation is made easy, with a \\nmere handful of unelected judges and prosecutors free to \\n‘condem[n] all that [they] personally disapprove and for no \\nbetter reason than [they] disapprove it.’” Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at \\n1228 (Gorsuch, J., concurring), quoting Jordan v. De George, 341 \\nU.S. 223, 242 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). \\n To explain these issues and why they matter, I first pro‐\\nvide some background on the plaintiffs and their research on \\nAlzheimer’s disease. I then explain the vagueness problems \\nin terms of the statutory language, the unusual course of this \\nlitigation, and the legislative process that led to the chal‐\\nlenged law. I conclude with the university’s takings claim. \\n Plaintiffs and Their Alzheimer’s Research: Few diseases are as \\nfrightening as Alzheimer’s disease, a progressive disease that \\ncauses brain cells to waste away and die. The symptoms can \\n\\n16 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nprogress from severe memory loss to declines in thinking and \\nbehavioral and social skills, spiraling downward to dementia \\nand the loss of a person’s very selfhood, and ultimately to \\ndeath. Between five and ten percent of Americans aged 65 al‐\\nready have Alzheimer’s disease. Between 40 and 50 percent \\nof Americans who turn 85 years old will have Alzheimer’s. \\nDkt. 77‐3 at 6, 16 (Lamb Dep. I, at 18, 61). \\n Alzheimer’s disease is the focus of extensive medical re‐\\nsearch toward treatment and possible cure. The Indiana Uni‐\\nversity School of Medicine houses the National Cell Reposi‐\\ntory for Alzheimer’s Disease, as well as an Alzheimer’s Dis‐\\nease Center, one of 32 research centers funded by the National \\nInstitutes of Health on the subject. Indiana University also op‐\\nerates the Stark Neurosciences Research Institute, which con‐\\nducts research on Alzheimer’s disease and other neurological \\ndisorders. \\n One plaintiff, Dr. Debomoy Lahiri, is a leading neurologi‐\\ncal researcher on the university faculty. He and his colleagues \\nspecialize in the study of brain disorders, primarily Alz‐\\nheimer’s disease. They use tissue from aborted fetuses and de‐\\nrivatives from such tissue, including cells cultured in labora‐\\ntories from fetal cells, as well as DNA, RNA, proteins and \\nother molecules and sub‐cellular structures obtained from \\nsuch cells. The evidence in this record establishes that fetal \\nbrain tissue—or at least cells and complex molecules derived \\nfrom such tissue—is essential to research on possible cures \\nand treatments. There is no adequate substitute. \\n Since 2011, Dr. Lahiri has received about 25 shipments of \\nfetal tissue from the Birth Defects Research Laboratory at the \\nUniversity of Washington, which receives tissue from abor‐\\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 17\\n\\ntions performed lawfully in the State of Washington. The rec‐\\nord here shows that the nationally recognized laboratory ad‐\\nheres to strict federal and state regulations for receiving do‐\\nnated fetal tissue and providing the tissue for research, in‐\\ncluding ensuring (1) that all women donating fetal tissue have \\ngiven informed consent, and (2) that the laboratory does not \\nsell or profit from providing fetal material. Dkt. 77‐20 at 1–3 \\n(BDRL affidavit), The shipments do not include any intact or‐\\ngans but only tiny tissue samples. Each shipment includes tis‐\\nsue contained within approximately two teaspoons of liquid \\nmedium. \\n Even if one could say confidently that the Birth Defects \\nResearch Laboratory material is “fetal tissue” for purposes of \\nthe statute (and I am not so confident), it becomes even less \\nclear once Dr. Lahiri works with the material. One critical step \\nin research with these tiny samples of tissues is to “dissociate” \\nand culture them—i.e., to separate the cells from each other \\nand to place them in a laboratory dish with conditions and \\nnutrients that allow the cells to grow, divide, and re‐divide, \\nthus multiplying the material available for research. \\n Also relevant here, medical research is collaborative, both \\nwithin Indiana University and with the NIH and other insti‐\\ntutions. To be valuable, research must be replicable. That re‐\\nquires cooperation and collaboration among researchers. Dr. \\nLahiri and his colleagues are requested and expected to trans‐\\nfer tissue samples between laboratories in the course of that \\ncollaboration. Such collaboration is also, understandably, a \\ncondition of their NIH funding. \\n The Statutory Language, This Lawsuit, and the Legislative Pro‐\\ncess: The Indiana law poses serious vagueness problems in \\nterms of what counts as “fetal tissue,” what researchers may \\n\\n18 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\ndo with fetal tissue, and whether the law even applies to fetal \\ntissue that is not actually sold. Some of the problems are ap‐\\nparent from the statutory text itself. Others have emerged in \\nthis lawsuit and examination of the legislative process that led \\nto enactment of the law in 2016. \\n The statute says: “A person who intentionally acquires, re‐\\nceives, sells, or transfers fetal tissue commits unlawful trans‐\\nfer of fetal tissue, a Level 5 felony.” Ind. Code § 35‐46‐5‐1.5(d). \\nA key definition provides: “As used in this section, ‘fetal tis‐\\nsue’ includes tissue, organs, or any other part of an aborted \\nfetus.” § 1.5(b). \\n The sharpest dispute between the parties is the scope of \\nthe “any other part” phrase in the definition of fetal tissue. \\nLet’s assume the statute makes criminal the receipt of ship‐\\nments of fetal tissue like those plaintiffs received in the past \\nfrom the birth defects laboratory in Washington. \\n That raises the question whether the “any part of” defini‐\\ntion in the Indiana law extends to make criminal the receipt \\nof lines of cells derived from fetal tissue. The parties agree here \\nthat, as a matter of biology, the process of cell division pro‐\\nduces a culture that contains some cells remaining from the \\noriginal tissue. The new culture also contains other, newly‐\\ndivided cells that were not part of the original tissue, but \\nwhich may well contain complex molecules (such as DNA, \\nRNA, or proteins) that were present in the original tissue sam‐\\nple. See Prosecutors’ Br. at 10; Plaintiffs’ Br. at 40. So, to re‐\\nphrase the key question, does a second‐, third‐, tenth‐, or nth‐\\ngeneration cell with such molecules fall under the statutory \\ndefinition as “any other part” of an aborted fetus? \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 19\\n\\n That question is not at the periphery of this statute but at \\nits core. The statutory language, “any other part,” offers no \\nguidance. It does not signal that the legislature even recog‐\\nnized this critical issue. And as the law has been defended in \\nthis lawsuit, the problem has actually become even more se‐\\nvere. In the district court, the State took the position that “any \\nother part” does not apply to: \\n (a) placental or umbilical cord blood tissue or \\n cells, or biological material obtained from such \\n blood, tissue or cells; \\n (b) fetal cell lines including but not limited to \\n HEK293 (or biological material obtained from \\n such cell lines) derived from the cells of an \\n aborted fetus, but which do not contain cells \\n which were originally part of an aborted fetus; \\n (c) fetal cells (or biological material obtained \\n from such cells) which were derived from \\n aborted fetal cells, but are not cells which were \\n originally part of an aborted fetus. \\nDkt. 75 at 2.1 \\n Later in the district court proceedings, the State asserted \\nthat once cells have been separated from the fetal tissue and \\ngrow, divide into new cells, and are moved from the first dish \\nto the second dish, they can no longer be considered part of \\nthe aborted fetus. Dkt. 81 at 48. Or, the State suggests, that \\nseparation may occur even earlier in the process of culturing \\n\\n \\n 1 HEK293 is a line of cells first cultured in 1973 and widely used in \\n\\nresearch. The record indicates it is unknown whether the original cells \\ncame from an aborted fetus. See Dkt. 79‐8 at 59–62 (Cate Dep.). \\n\\n20 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\ncells, even before the first passage, when cells are dissociated. \\nId. at 48. \\n Those limits imply that the Indiana law would not inter‐\\nfere with plaintiffs’ research as long as the laboratory in \\nWashington or some other lab outside of Indiana could per‐\\nform the first round of cell growth and division. If the cultures \\nof cells would not count as “fetal tissue” under the Indiana \\nlaw, plaintiffs would be free to obtain and use them for re‐\\nsearch. \\n The vagueness problem stems from the fact that it’s im‐\\npossible to know what weight to give the State’s assurances. \\nThe proposed limits might well be sensible as a matter of pol‐\\nicy. But as the district judge pointed out, these proposed lim‐\\nits have no apparent basis in the statutory text, and the State \\nhas not explained how it derives those supposedly comfort‐\\ning limits from the Indiana law. The State’s lawyers asserted \\nin oral argument that their assurances would be binding on \\nthe State and its present and future prosecuting attorneys. \\nThat remains to be seen.2 \\n Another focus of the vagueness challenge is the key verbs \\nin the statute. If you have “fetal tissue” within the meaning of \\nthe statute, what can you do with it? A person who intention‐\\nally “acquires, receives, sells, or transfers fetal tissue” com‐\\nmits a felony. § 1.5(d). Federal law, however, already makes \\n \\n 2 The defendant prosecutors are not representing themselves, nor are \\n\\nthey represented by the Indiana Attorney General or even by private law‐\\nyers from Indiana. Nevertheless, their private lawyers have been given the \\nresponsibility of defending and interpreting the law. See Ind. Code § 4‐6‐\\n5‐3 (Attorney General must consent in writing to employment of other \\ncounsel for state agencies and the State). Their views must be taken seri‐\\nously. \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 21\\n\\nit a federal crime to sell fetal tissue for “valuable considera‐\\ntion,” regardless of source, see 42 U.S.C. § 289g–2(a), so “sell” \\nis not at issue here.3 \\n The focus is on “acquire,” “receive,” and “transfer.” My \\ncolleagues correctly point out that these are common, well‐\\nunderstood terms in criminal law. But when plaintiffs chal‐\\nlenged the new law, the State took the following position: \\n The word ‘transfer’ in Section 1.5(b) of the Stat‐\\n ute does not apply to physical movement of \\n cells or biological materials received, generated \\n or stored at Indiana University before the enact‐\\n ment of the Statute provided that: \\n (a) the physical movement is within or among \\n laboratories, buildings or physical facilities of \\n Indiana University by any faculty member, em‐\\n ployee, representative or agent of Indiana Uni‐\\n versity; \\n (b) the physical movement is the result of a fac‐\\n ulty member, employee, representative or agent \\n of Indiana University permanently removing \\n such materials from Indiana University’s build‐\\n ings or physical facilities; or \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n 3 Under the federal law, “valuable consideration” does not include \\n\\nreasonable payments associated with transportation, implantation, pro‐\\ncessing, preservation, quality control, or storage of human fetal tissue. 42 \\nU.S.C. § 289g–2(e)(3). Unlike the Indiana law, which applies only to tissue \\nfrom abortions, federal law applies regardless of the source of the tissue. \\n\\n22 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n (c) the physical movement is at the request of \\n the National Institute of Health (‘NIH’) or pur‐\\n suant to the terms or conditions of any NIH \\n grant. \\nDkt. 75 at 2. \\n The State further explained that there will be no “transfer” \\nif there is no change in ownership or possession of the tissue, \\nreferring apparently to possession by Indiana University as \\nan institution, not possession being transferred from one hu‐\\nman being to another inside a university laboratory. Dkt. 90 \\nat 16. The apparent concession that plaintiffs can move fetal \\ntissue around at the request of the NIH or to comply with a \\ngrant sounds reasonable, but where does that come from? \\n As with the proposed limits on “fetal tissue” itself, there is \\nno apparent textual basis for these limits. These proposed lim‐\\nits are also inconsistent with the way the law regulates trans‐\\nfer and possession of so many other forms of contraband, \\nsuch as illegal drug, firearms, and other weapons. If one per‐\\nson cooks crack cocaine in a kitchen and hands a pot of the \\ndrug to a confederate at the kitchen table, federal criminal law \\nwould say there was a transfer of possession, regardless of the \\nownership of the drug. The same problems are inherent in the \\nState’s approach to “acquire” and “receive,” proposing limits \\nthat have no apparent textual or other legal bases. \\n These attempts to defend the law by limiting it in these \\nways only add to the mystery of its meaning. One is left to \\nwonder why the State proposes them. Members of this court \\nrepeatedly asked the State’s lawyers to explain why they felt \\nthese implausible limitations were needed. No answer was \\nforthcoming. \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 23\\n\\n As best I can tell, the State’s lawyers seem to be trying to \\nprevent the new law from having effects that would flow nat‐\\nurally from the statutory language but that seem not to be sen‐\\nsible from a practical or policy perspective. Implicit in the ef‐\\nfort is the concession that, as drafted, the operative portions \\nof § 1.5 will have undesired and unintended effects that will \\ninterfere with important and legitimate medical research. \\n In other words, the State’s lawyers seem to be trying to \\nsave the legislature from itself. The majority nonetheless de‐\\nfends the potentially extreme outcome of this statute, noting \\nthat there is “serious debate about when, if at all, it is ethical \\nto perform medical experiments on aborted fetal tissue.” Ante \\nat 9. Thus, regardless of whether the statute is “sensible,” the \\nfact that the Indiana legislature “cho[se] sides in an ethical de‐\\nbate does not condemn [the] law.” Ante at 10. Unfortunately, \\nthe majority describes a legislative process regarding this stat‐\\nutory provision that did not actually happen. \\n The available evidence from the Indiana legislature indi‐\\ncates that it adopted this criminal provision on fetal tissue re‐\\nsearch without realizing it would have any impact on medical \\nresearch using fetal tissue, let alone shut down this research \\non Alzheimer’s disease. The legislature simply did not engage \\nwith the hard policy choices and the natural consequences of \\nits language. The result was to distill here both concerns at the \\ncenter of vagueness doctrine, the fair notice and separation of \\npowers so critical to liberty. \\n Section 1.5 was adopted as part of a broader bill, House \\nEnrolled Act No. 1337, that imposed a variety of restrictions \\non abortions and related issues. The primary focal points of \\nthis bill have already been considered by this court. See \\nPlanned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc. v. Comm’r of \\n\\n24 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nIndiana State Dep’t of Health, 888 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 2018) (hold‐\\ning unconstitutional provisions prohibiting women from ter‐\\nminating pregnancies due to fetal genetic abnormalities, race, \\nor gender and requiring burial or cremation of embryonic or \\nfetal tissue), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Oct. 12, 2018) (No. 18‐\\n483); Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc. v. Comm’r \\nof Indiana State Dep’t of Health, 896 F.3d 809 (7th Cir. 2018) \\n(holding unconstitutional provision requiring women to ob‐\\ntain ultrasound at least 18 hours before obtaining an abor‐\\ntion), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 4, 2019) (No. 18‐1019). \\n In over six hours of archived video footage of the relevant \\nIndiana House and Senate committees’ discussions of this bill, \\ndozens of witnesses testified in favor of and against the bill. \\nNot one witness mentioned medical research using aborted \\nfetal tissue. If the legislature was actually choosing sides on \\nsuch a significant issue, one would expect some mention of it. \\nSee Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 469 (2002) (Ste‐\\nvens, J., dissenting) (“I think judges as well as detectives may \\ntake into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark \\nin the night.”), quoting Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 \\nU.S. 578, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). \\n Nor was there any discussion of § 1.5 in the floor debates \\non the bill. The only substantive discussion of the provision I \\ncould find in the legislative history came in seven minutes of \\na meeting of the Indiana Senate’s Health & Provider Services \\nCommittee. The discussion shows not a policy choice on an \\nimportant issue but instead a startling disconnect between the \\nstatutory language and the stated intentions of the legislators. \\nOne of the bill’s sponsors, Senator Holdman, said that the pro‐\\nvision “has to do with the selling of fetal tissue. Which makes \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 25\\n\\nit illegal in the state of Indiana to sell fetal tissue, which basi‐\\ncally addresses the issue we’ve seen around the country with \\nPlanned Parenthood and some of the things that have been \\ngoing on there.” Hearing, Indiana Senate Health and Provider \\nServices Committee at 18:26–18:45 (Feb. 24, 2016), \\nhttp://iga.in.gov/information/archives/2016/video/commit‐\\ntee_health_and_provider_services_3900/.4 \\n Senator Stoops asked Senator Holdman a series of ques‐\\ntions about whether parents of an aborted fetus could consent \\nto an autopsy or other research use of the tissue. Id. at 21:39–\\n22:14. Senator Holdman said that would be possible, prompt‐\\ning this follow‐up: \\n S. Stoops: Right, that is a specific autopsy. But \\n what if the parents want to donate the fetus for \\n research into the condition? I guess that would \\n not be allowed. I mean an autopsy to determine \\n maybe a genetic defect after the abortion is one \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n 4 It was widely understood that this legislation responded to the 2015 \\n\\n“controversy over undercover videos of Planned Parenthood employees \\ndiscussing fetal organ donations,” despite the fact that federal and state \\ninvestigations of Planned Parenthood, including one in Indiana, found no \\nwrongdoing, and criminal charges had instead been filed against the \\nvideo‐makers. See Chelsea Schneider and Stephanie Wang, Bill Seeks Fur‐\\nther Limits on Abortion, The Indianapolis Star at A5 (Mar. 8, 2016); see also \\nDanielle Kurtzleben, Planned Parenthood Investigations Find No Fetal Tissue \\nSales, NPR (Jan. 28, 2016, 12:47 PM), \\nhttp://www.npr.org/2016/01/28/464594826/in‐wake‐of‐videos‐planned‐\\nparenthood‐investigations‐find‐no‐fetal‐tissue‐sales (summarizing re‐\\nsults of investigations). \\n\\n26 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n thing. But I think actually allowing the fetal tis‐\\n sue to be used for research purposes seems to be \\n outlawed in this bill. \\n S. Holdman: Well, I wouldn’t say that it [research \\n with fetal tissue] is outlawed. I think the word au‐\\n topsy encompasses that research portion of \\n what is done with that piece of tissue that is di‐\\n agnosed after the fact through an autopsy. So \\n maybe it is just a matter of semantics, here, per‐\\n haps Senator Stoop. But autopsy is the word \\n that we landed on. \\n S. Miller (Committee Chair): And just if I could \\n elaborate, I was a part of those conversations. \\n This is up to a parent to request the autopsy. \\n And I think at the time the parent requests the \\n autopsy, they could list the kind of things they \\n are looking for. And what kind of results they \\n want as part of that investigation. So I think for \\n the purposes that we put in the bill, that this co‐\\n vers it, Senator Stoops. At least I’m comfortable \\n with that. \\n S. Holdman: That’s right. And to your point, \\n Madame Chair, in any case the parent has to \\n consent to this procedure being done. It is not \\n going to be done just because the physician or \\n the hospital may want to have that done. It has \\n to be consented to by the parent itself. \\n S. Stoops: Right. So on page 15, line 9, where it \\n says: ‘A person who intentionally acquires, or \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 27\\n\\n sells, etc. or transfers fetal tissue, commits un‐\\n lawful transfer of fetal tissue and is a Level 5 fel‐\\n ony.’ So, is that if that person did not get per‐\\n mission from the parent? So otherwise if the par‐\\n ent gave permission, then that does not apply? \\n S. Holdman: That would be my understanding, yes. \\n I thought you were going to ask me what a \\n Level 5 Felony outcome was. And we have the \\n Criminal Courts Chair here who could answer \\n that question for you, as well. \\nId. at 23:17–25:43 \\n That exchange is remarkable, particularly because of the \\nrole of the pregnant woman’s consent for the research. Fed‐\\neral law already made clear that fetal tissue could not be used \\nfor any research purposes without the consent of the pregnant \\nwoman. 42 U.S.C. § 289g–1(b). The evidence here shows that \\nthe birth defect laboratory in Washington always obtains the \\nwoman’s consent to use tissue for research. And when called \\nupon to explain § 1.5 to their colleagues, the sponsors said \\n(a) that it would apply only to sale of fetal tissue in Indiana, \\nand (b) that the consent of the pregnant woman for research \\nuse would amount to a complete defense to the criminal re‐\\nstrictions. \\n Now, I am fully aware that legislatures are not required to \\nproduce legislative history. They are not required to explain \\nor discuss the language they enact. Courts generally presume \\nthat all legislators have read and understood the bills they \\nvote upon. As we try to be faithful agents of the law‐makers, \\nwe thus apply the ordinary meaning of the statutory lan‐\\nguage. After all, as the majority points out, one can have a \\n\\n28 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n“serious debate about when, if at all, it is ethical to perform \\nmedical experiments on aborted fetal tissue,” ultimately \\n“choosing sides.” Ante at 10. \\n In this instance, however, there was no such debate. In‐\\nstead, the law’s defenders have backed away from those ordi‐\\nnary meanings at every opportunity, first in the legislative \\nprocess and then in the lawsuit. This highly unusual record \\nought to raise warning flags for us. The statute is fatally vague \\nbecause its supporters did not pay enough attention to render \\nit intelligible as applied to this medical research, which is the \\nrelevant core, not the periphery, of this statute. \\n Consider this warning: “Under the Constitution, the adop‐\\ntion of new laws restricting liberty is supposed to be a hard \\nbusiness, the product of an open and public debate among a \\nlarge and diverse number of elected representatives. Allow‐\\ning the legislature to hand off the job of lawmaking risks sub‐\\nstituting this design for one where legislation is made easy, \\nwith a mere handful of unelected judges and prosecutors free \\nto ‘condem[n] all that [they] personally disapprove and for no \\nbetter reason than [they] disapprove it.’” Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at \\n1228 (Gorsuch, J., concurring), quoting Jordan, 341 U.S. at 242 \\n(Jackson, J., dissenting). \\n What happened here was just such a “hand‐off” of law‐\\nmaking power. It highlights why the majority’s solution here, \\nabstaining and leaving the statute‐writing task to the state \\ncourts, is not an appropriate response. The majority proposes \\nthat Indiana state courts should be permitted a decade or two \\nto resolve “edge questions.” like the “concrete disputes such \\nas the coverage of cells derived from fetal tissue.” Ante at \\n6 & 7. \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 29\\n\\n For example, will state courts decide that “placental or \\numbilical cord tissue” counts as “any other part of a fetus”? \\nMaybe, the majority says. On one hand, the majority muses, \\n“[t]he placenta is an independent organ and so may be out‐\\nside the statutory scope, but the statute does not address the \\ntopic.” Ante at 5. On the other hand, however, Indiana per‐\\nmits the purchase or sale of fetal material for “fetal stem cell” \\nresearch if “the biological parent has given written consent for \\nthe use of the fetal stem cells,” Ind. Code § 35‐46‐5‐3, but later \\ndefines “fetal stem cell” to include only the “placenta,” “um‐\\nbilical cord,” “amniotic fluid,” and “fetal tissue” if “taken \\nfrom a fetus that was either miscarried or stillborn”—not “any \\ncells that are taken as a result of an abortion,” Ind. Code § 16‐\\n18‐2‐128.5. Although that provision is limited to commercial \\ntransactions, which § 1.5 is not, perhaps that definition will \\nsupport the criminalization of the non‐commercial acquisi‐\\ntion and transfer of abortion‐derived umbilical and placental \\ncell. Plaintiffs apparently will just have to wait and see how \\nthe Indiana state courts will write that part of the statute. \\n The majority bases its preference for a state‐court iterative \\nprocess on Johnson, in which the Supreme Court declared the \\nstatute at issue vague only after struggling with it for 20 years, \\nwhile here “the process has not even begun.” Ante at 8. But \\nthat was not the real lesson of Johnson, even though the Court \\nacknowledged that “persistent efforts” by courts to establish \\na meaningful standard for a statute can be one source of “ev‐\\nidence of vagueness.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558 (2015), \\nquoting United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921). \\nThe Court did not signal that prosecutors and judges would \\nhave several decades to define what “edge” behavior is actu‐\\nally criminal just because a court hypothesizes that there must \\n\\n30 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nbe some knowable core of prohibited conduct. To the con‐\\ntrary, Johnson observed that its “holdings squarely contradict \\nthe theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely be‐\\ncause there is some conduct that clearly falls within the pro‐\\nvision’s grasp.” Id. at 2561 (describing examples). And note, \\ncritically, that Johnson was only about a sentencing enhance‐\\nment, not whether conduct was criminal in the first place. \\n In a context more similar to this case, the Court struck \\ndown a criminal statute that required “humane and sanitary” \\ndisposal of fetal remains. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Re‐\\nproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 451 (1983), overruled on \\nother grounds by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl‐\\nvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). To defend the provision, \\nAkron argued that it clearly intended only to “preclude the \\nmindless dumping of aborted fetuses onto garbage piles.” Id. \\n(internal quotation and citation omitted). The Court did not, \\nhowever, send the matter to the state courts to work out case \\nby case what would count on the periphery as “humane and \\nsanitary.” Rather, “[t]his level of uncertainty is fatal where \\ncriminal liability is imposed” because the statute “fails to give \\na physician ‘fair notice that his contemplated conduct is for‐\\nbidden,’ United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954), [and \\nthus] it violates the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 451–52. Nei‐\\nther did the Court indulge Akron’s proposal to sever “hu‐\\nmane” from the statute: “The uncertain meaning of the phrase \\n‘humane and sanitary’ leaves doubt as to whether the city \\nwould have enacted [the statute] with the word ‘sanitary’ \\nalone.” Id. at 452 n.45. In other words, the city was free “to \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 31\\n\\nenact more carefully drawn regulations,” id., but that was a \\nlegislative job—not a prosecutorial or judicial one.5 \\n The majority also reads too much into Bauer v. Shepard, 620 \\nF.3d 704, 706–07 (7th Cir. 2010), which considered a challenge \\nby two Indiana judges and an advocacy group to provisions \\nof Indiana’s Code of Judicial Conduct. In Bauer, the plaintiff‐\\njudges feared that responding to the group’s questionnaires \\nmight violate the state’s judicial ethics code. In that case, the \\nCommission on Judicial Qualifications might issue public ad‐\\nmonitions (if the subject of the admonition agreed), or a court \\nof appeals could remove the judge from a particular case, or, \\nas a matter of last resort, “the state’s Supreme Court c[ould] \\nremove [the] judge from office or impose substantial disci‐\\npline.” Id. at 707–08. We acknowledged that “[t]o the extent \\nthere is uncertainty” regarding some provisions, “Indiana \\nprovides means of clarification,” and the Commission on Ju‐\\ndicial Qualifications “already has issued several clarifying ad‐\\nvisory opinions.” Id. at 712. Judges who worried about further \\napplications of the Code should “wait and see,” we said, \\ngiven that beyond the “advisory opinions that reduce uncer‐\\ntainty,” when the “Commission brings a proceeding the state \\njudiciary will issue an opinion that makes the rule more con‐\\ncrete.” Id. at 716. \\n The majority quotes at length from Bauer to explain that it \\nis “more respectful of our judicial colleagues in Indiana, to as‐\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n 5 The majority writes that Akron was “overruled” by Planned \\nParenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), but \\nCasey did not overrule any portion of Akron dealing with the vague crim‐\\ninal statute on fetal remains. \\n\\n32 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nsume that they will act sensibly and resolve the open ques‐\\ntions in a way that honors candidates’ rights under the first \\namendment. When a statute is accompanied by [a] system \\nthat can flesh out details, the due process clause permits those \\ndetails to be left to that system.” Ante at 7, quoting Bauer, 620 \\nF.3d at 716. The bracketed “[a]” in the majority’s quotation, \\nhowever, stands in for Bauer’s actual language: “an adminis‐\\ntrative system”—which in that case was the Commission on \\nJudicial Qualifications and its ability to provide advisory \\nopinions. There is no parallel administrative system here that \\nwould justify the majority’s novel form of abstention. See also \\nBauer, 620 F.3d at 717 (describing Pullman abstention as an‐\\nother path to same result). \\n The majority’s approach also overlooks the fact that we \\nnow have experience with this statute, litigated with able \\ncounsel on both sides and full discovery, including deposi‐\\ntions and statements from internationally recognized scien‐\\ntific experts. It turns out that interpreting this law is a mess. \\nIn fact, the whole process makes a mockery of the standard \\nthat any “normal person” could figure out what is included \\nin “any other part of an aborted fetus.”6 \\n It is not the job of courts to tell legislators what processes \\nto follow toward the final enactment of the statutory language \\n\\n \\n 6 The majority’s surprising reliance on Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 \\n\\n(1974), and Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975), is misplaced. Parker upheld the \\nmilitary law forbidding “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentle‐\\nman,” but the Court’s opinion repeatedly emphasized the special consid‐\\nerations that apply to military law and tradition. 417 U.S. at 743–52, 756–\\n57, 760. Rose upheld a conviction for a “crime against nature,” drawing on \\na long common‐law tradition that has since been superseded. See Lawrence \\nv. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 33\\n\\nof their choice. Indiana is absolutely permitted to, as one leg‐\\nislator put it, move up from being “49 out of 50” in terms of \\nabortion restrictions, and “attempt[] to be the most restrictive \\nstate in the country … shooting for 50.” Senate Committee \\nHearing at 1:47:22–1:47:32 (Feb. 24, 2016). But it is our job to \\ninsist that the effort remain within constitutional parameters: \\nthat a new criminal law give fair notice of what is criminal \\nand what is not, and that the legislature make the key choices \\nrather than delegate them to prosecutors and courts. That \\nsimply did not happen with § 1.5. I would affirm the district \\ncourt’s injunction against its enforcement as written. \\n Takings Claim: Finally, we should not decide the merits of \\nIndiana University’s claim for taking of private property \\nwithout compensation. That claim simply is not ripe yet. The \\nmajority mistakenly asserts that the statute “does render val‐\\nueless any fetal tissue, derived from abortions, owned by In‐\\ndiana University.” Ante at 11. That is not consistent with the \\nposition taken by the law’s defenders. They insist that Indiana \\nUniversity remains free to conduct research with materials on \\nhand, and even to transfer it at the request of the NIH. Supra \\nat 21–22. \\n More fundamental, the legal status of Indiana University \\nvis‐à‐vis the state government is more nuanced than the ma‐\\njority acknowledges. For example, it is well‐established that \\nthe university is an arm of the state for purposes of the Elev‐\\nenth Amendment and is a state actor for purposes of the Four‐\\nteenth Amendment and other constitutional provisions. See \\nMedlock v. Trustees of Indiana University, 738 F.3d 867, 871 (7th \\nCir. 2013); Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2000). \\nBut Indiana law does not always treat the university as the \\nstate, particularly when it comes to property. See Sendak v. \\n\\n34 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nTrustees of Indiana University, 260 N.E.2d 601, 603–05 (Ind. \\n1970) (university not subject to constitutional bar to owner‐\\nship of private stock); State Board of Accounts v. Indiana Univer‐\\nsity Foundation, 647 N.E.2d 342, 352 (Ind. App. 1995) (univer‐\\nsity is “state” for purposes of State Board of Accounts statute \\nbut not in accepting and administering private gifts). The ma‐\\njority seems to imply that state legislators could simply con‐\\nfiscate private gifts and grants to the university (as distinct \\nfrom a private foundation associated with it) and use them for \\nmore general state‐government purposes. That would be a \\ntroubling prospect for many donors and grantors. We would \\ndo better to say that the university’s takings claim is simply \\nnot yet ripe because the actual scope of the challenged statute \\nremains in so much doubt.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4377158/\", \"author_raw\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4599905/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Trustees of Indiana University v. Terry Curry\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-14\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit \n ____________________ \n\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \nTRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY, et al., \n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, Cross‐Appellants, \n\n v. \n\nTERRY CURRY, Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County, Indi‐\nana, and CHRISTOPHER GAAL, Prosecuting Attorney of Mon‐\nroe County, Indiana, \n Defendants‐Appellants, Cross‐Appellees. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the \n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. \n No. 1:16‐cv‐01289‐JMS‐DML — Jane E. Magnus‐Stinson, Chief Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 14, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit \nJudges. \n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In Indiana “[a] person who \nintentionally acquires, receives, sells, or transfers fetal tissue \ncommits unlawful transfer of fetal tissue, a Level 5 felony.” \nInd. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5(d). A federal district court held that \n\n2 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \n\nseveral terms in this statute are unconstitutionally vague and \nthat it must be treated as if it read: “A person who intention‐\nally sells fetal tissue commits unlawful transfer of fetal tis‐\nsue, a Level 5 felony.” 289 F. Supp. 3d 905, 934–35 (S.D. Ind. \n2018). The district court also held that a definitional clause is \ninvalid. As enacted, §35‐46‐5‐1.5(b) reads: “As used in this \nsection, ‘fetal tissue’ includes tissue, organs, or any other \npart of an aborted fetus.” This must be treated as if it read: \n“As used in this section, ‘fetal tissue’ includes tissue or or‐\ngans of an aborted fetus.” The district court thus held that \nthe words “acquires”, “receives”, and “transfers”, and the \nphrase “any other part”, are too uncertain to have legal \nforce. If that is right, then big chunks of the legal system are \ninvalid, because those words are ubiquitous in statutes, reg‐\nulations, and judicial opinions. \n This case began when Indiana University and three of its \nfaculty members filed this suit, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, \nagainst the state’s prosecuting attorneys in two counties. \nThey asked the district court to enjoin the prosecutors from \nattempting to enforce any part of §35‐46‐5‐1.5. According to \nthe plaintiffs, the statute not only is excessively vague but \nalso violates the First Amendment by blocking one kind of \nmedical research, takes the University’s property without \njust compensation, violates the Equal Protection Clause by \ndistinguishing fetal tissue produced by abortions from that \nproduced by miscarriages, and violates the dormant Com‐\nmerce Clause by regulating the interstate market in fetal tis‐\nsue. Plaintiffs do not contend that the statute imposes an un‐\ndue burden on any woman who seeks to have an abortion, \nnor would they have standing to make such an argument. \nInstead the three faculty‐member plaintiffs contend that the \nstatute interferes with medical scholarship. \n\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 3 \n\n As we have recounted, the district court found four \nwords or phrases to be unconstitutionally vague. It rejected \nplaintiffs’ theories under the First Amendment and the \nEqual Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And \nit did not come to a conclusion with respect to the Takings \nClause or the Commerce Clause, reasoning that because it \ncould not determine what the statute means, it could not \nproperly analyze it under either of those provisions. It then \nentered a permanent injunction in plaintiffs’ favor and \nclosed the case. Both sides have appealed. Plaintiffs want the \nwhole statute enjoined, while defendants want the injunc‐\ntion vacated and the suit dismissed. \n Justiciability is an initial problem. Indiana University, \nwhich is part of the State of Indiana, see Haynes v. Indiana \nUniversity, 902 F.3d 724, 731 (7th Cir. 2018), has sued two \nprosecutors who carry out state powers. The two defendants \nhave been sued in their official capacities, which means that \nthey must be treated as the State of Indiana. Will v. Michigan \nDepartment of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). There is consid‐\nerable doubt that federal courts are authorized to adjust \ngrievances among different parts of a state government. See, \ne.g., Illinois v. Chicago, 137 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1998) (a state \ncan’t sue part of itself); Arlington Heights v. Regional Transpor‐\ntation Authority, 653 F.2d 1149, 1150–53 (7th Cir. 1981) (part \nof a state can’t sue the state); Branson School District RE‐82 v. \nRomer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases). \nCf. South Bend v. South Bend Common Council, 865 F.3d 889 \n(7th Cir. 2017) (a city can’t sue a part of itself). The suit is \nsaved, however, by the fact that three faculty members are \nplaintiffs. All three have standing to litigate in their personal \ncapacities, and with one exception (to which we return) they \npresent all of the complaint’s legal theories. \n\n4 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \n\n We start with vagueness, the Due Process Clause theory \non which the district court based its injunction, and then ad‐\ndress the other four theories. \n The Constitution requires criminal statutes to have a core \nof understandable meaning. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, \n135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 \n(1975); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913). Some uncer‐\ntainty at the margins does not condemn a statute. It is there‐\nfore hard to see what can be wrong with words such as “ac‐\nquires,” which people use and understand in normal life. A \nperson “acquires” a car by buying it or leasing it or receiving \nit as a gift from a parent or spouse—or by stealing it. Even a \nprotean word such as “reasonable” has enough of a core to \nallow its use in situations where rights to speak are at issue. \nSee Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 324 (2002). \nWords such as “acquire” are materially (another protean le‐\ngal word) more definite than “reasonable.” \n Johnson shows that uncertainty so pervasive that most of \na law’s potential applications are impossible to evaluate may \nrule out enforcement. But the district court did not deny that \neach of the words “acquires”, “receives”, and “transfers”, \nand the phrase “any other part”, has a substantial, under‐\nstandable core. Instead the judge worried about the periph‐\nery. \n Take “transfers.” The judge thought it hard to know \nwhether a medical researcher “transfers” fetal material by \npassing a pipette containing fetal tissue to someone else at \nthe same laboratory bench. 289 F. Supp. 3d at 920. Or take \nthe phrase “any other part.” Although this ensures that the \nstatute covers every part of a fetus, the judge thought it hard \nto say how things work at the level of individual cells or \n\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 5 \n\nstrands of DNA. Suppose someone in Washington state \n(from which much of Indiana University’s fetal tissue comes) \nextracts a few cells from an aborted fetus and uses them to \ncreate a line of stem‐cell tissue, exemplars of which (dozens \nof generations later) are transferred to a researcher in Indi‐\nana. Is anything derived from fetal tissue included in the \nphrase “any other part”? The judge did not see a clear an‐\nswer. Id. at 918–19. These and similar open questions led the \njudge to deem the words and phrase unconstitutional. \n The two prosecutors did not help their defense by pro‐\nfessing to see answers to these and similar questions. They \nassured the judge that of course stem cells derived from fetal \ntissue are not “any other part” of a fetus. They asserted that \nmoving a pipette across a lab bench is of course not a “trans‐\nfer” of fetal tissue, because “transfer” means “convey own‐\nership.” That’s implausible. Federal statutes forbid the trans‐\nfer of heroin and other contraband, see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. \n§841(a)(1), and judges implementing such laws do not condi‐\ntion their application on a change of ownership; those laws \napply to people who act as agents as well as to principals. \nThe prosecutors also asserted that placental or umbilical \ncord tissue is of course not “any other part” of a fetus. Maybe: \nThe placenta is an independent organ and so may be outside \nthe statutory scope, but the statute does not address the top‐\nic. Prosecutors can’t offer definitive interpretations of crimi‐\nnal laws, and one prosecutor can’t bind a successor in office. \nMore: Indiana has 90 other counties, whose prosecutors may \nhave different ideas about the statute’s scope. The district \njudge was right to say that, if the prosecutors’ assurances are \nall the plaintiffs have to go on, they are at needless risk. \n\n6 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \n\n Yet although prosecutorial assurances should not set an‐\nyone’s mind at rest, the legal system offers a way to work \nout the uncertainties that lurk at every statute’s periphery: \nthe judiciary. Resolving edge questions is a principal role of \nthe courts. If the district court’s approach is correct, then \nevery time a court needs to decide a tough question about \njust how far a statute reaches, it should declare the law un‐\nconstitutional. That is fundamentally inconsistent with the \nSupreme Court’s approach, under which a core of meaning \nis enough to reject a vagueness challenge, leaving to future \nadjudication the inevitable questions at the statutory margin. \n A federal district judge cannot definitively interpret Ind. \nCode §35‐46‐5‐1.5, but the state judiciary can do so. Declara‐\ntory judgments are available in Indiana under Ind. Trial Rule \n57 and Ind. Code §34‐14‐1‐1. Any medical researcher can file \na suit with the theme: “I want to do X and fear that I will be \nprosecuted, so please give me a declaratory judgment that X \nis lawful.” Yet none of the plaintiffs has filed such a suit \nseeking assurances about the scope of §35‐46‐5‐1.5. Instead \nof using a readily available state‐law remedy for unwelcome \nrisk, they asked a federal court to blot the law from the \nbooks. That’s not how uncertainty should be addressed. \n We have held this already about uncertainty under Indi‐\nana law. Indiana forbids judges, and candidates for judicial \noffice, from making any public commitment “inconsistent \nwith the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of \njudicial office”. The scope for debate about the meaning of \nthat clause puts to shame any uncertainty about the meaning \nof Ind. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5, but we held the language valid, \neven when rights to speak are at stake—not because it is \nclear, but because the state offers a process to resolve debat‐\n\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 7 \n\nable issues. Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 715–17 (7th Cir. \n2010). We explained (id. at 716–17): \n Plaintiffs want us to deem the law vague by identifying situa‐\n tions in which state officials might take an untenably broad read‐\n ing of the [language], and then predicting that they will do so. It \n is far preferable, however, and more respectful of our judicial \n colleagues in Indiana, to assume that they will act sensibly and \n resolve the open questions in a way that honors candidates’ \n rights under the first amendment. \n When a statute is accompanied by [a] system that can flesh out \n details, the due process clause permits those details to be left to \n that system. Parts of the Hatch Act are every bit as vague as the \n [language here], but in [Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, \n 413 U.S. 548 (1973)] the Court held that problems of implementa‐\n tion could be tackled by administrative adjudication. 413 U.S. at \n 580. Similarly, in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), the Court \n held that an article of the Uniform Code of Military Justice mak‐\n ing it a court‐martial offense to engage in “conduct unbecoming \n an officer and a gentleman” is not unconstitutionally vague, be‐\n cause military tribunals have elaborated on what is “unbecom‐\n ing” for an officer and made it more specific than the unadorned \n words. The National Labor Relations Act is full of vague terms \n [such as “unfair labor practice”], and the National Labor Rela‐\n tions Board has yet to make all of them concrete, but no one \n supposes that the whole Act could be chucked out. The Justices \n have been chary of holding laws unconstitutional “on their face” \n precisely because they have recognized that vagueness will be \n reduced through a process of interpretation. \n\nThis is equally true of Ind. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5. Declaratory‐\njudgment actions can resolve ambiguities with limited (if \nany) risk to medical researchers. \n One thing the state judiciary might do—in addition to re‐\nsolving concrete disputes such as the coverage of cells de‐\nrived from fetal tissue—is read the word “intentionally” in \n§35‐46‐5‐1.5(d) to protect researchers who do not subjective‐\n\n8 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \n\nly understand that they are violating the law. That is what \nthe Supreme Court did in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 \n(1945), to save what is now codified as 18 U.S.C. §242, which \none might classify as the ultimately vague criminal statute. \n(It forbids any act under color of law that deprives anyone of \nany constitutional right.) This potential for risk reduction \nthrough interpretation, plus the fact that all of the contested \nterms have a substantial core of ascertainable meaning, leads \nus to reject the district court’s vagueness holding.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Trustees of Indiana University v. Terry Curry\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-14\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit \\n ____________________ \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\nTRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY, et al., \\n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, Cross‐Appellants, \\n\\n v. \\n\\nTERRY CURRY, Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County, Indi‐\\nana, and CHRISTOPHER GAAL, Prosecuting Attorney of Mon‐\\nroe County, Indiana, \\n Defendants‐Appellants, Cross‐Appellees. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the \\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. \\n No. 1:16‐cv‐01289‐JMS‐DML — Jane E. Magnus‐Stinson, Chief Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 14, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit \\nJudges. \\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In Indiana “[a] person who \\nintentionally acquires, receives, sells, or transfers fetal tissue \\ncommits unlawful transfer of fetal tissue, a Level 5 felony.” \\nInd. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5(d). A federal district court held that \\n\\n2 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nseveral terms in this statute are unconstitutionally vague and \\nthat it must be treated as if it read: “A person who intention‐\\nally sells fetal tissue commits unlawful transfer of fetal tis‐\\nsue, a Level 5 felony.” 289 F. Supp. 3d 905, 934–35 (S.D. Ind. \\n2018). The district court also held that a definitional clause is \\ninvalid. As enacted, §35‐46‐5‐1.5(b) reads: “As used in this \\nsection, ‘fetal tissue’ includes tissue, organs, or any other \\npart of an aborted fetus.” This must be treated as if it read: \\n“As used in this section, ‘fetal tissue’ includes tissue or or‐\\ngans of an aborted fetus.” The district court thus held that \\nthe words “acquires”, “receives”, and “transfers”, and the \\nphrase “any other part”, are too uncertain to have legal \\nforce. If that is right, then big chunks of the legal system are \\ninvalid, because those words are ubiquitous in statutes, reg‐\\nulations, and judicial opinions. \\n This case began when Indiana University and three of its \\nfaculty members filed this suit, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, \\nagainst the state’s prosecuting attorneys in two counties. \\nThey asked the district court to enjoin the prosecutors from \\nattempting to enforce any part of §35‐46‐5‐1.5. According to \\nthe plaintiffs, the statute not only is excessively vague but \\nalso violates the First Amendment by blocking one kind of \\nmedical research, takes the University’s property without \\njust compensation, violates the Equal Protection Clause by \\ndistinguishing fetal tissue produced by abortions from that \\nproduced by miscarriages, and violates the dormant Com‐\\nmerce Clause by regulating the interstate market in fetal tis‐\\nsue. Plaintiffs do not contend that the statute imposes an un‐\\ndue burden on any woman who seeks to have an abortion, \\nnor would they have standing to make such an argument. \\nInstead the three faculty‐member plaintiffs contend that the \\nstatute interferes with medical scholarship. \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 3 \\n\\n As we have recounted, the district court found four \\nwords or phrases to be unconstitutionally vague. It rejected \\nplaintiffs’ theories under the First Amendment and the \\nEqual Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And \\nit did not come to a conclusion with respect to the Takings \\nClause or the Commerce Clause, reasoning that because it \\ncould not determine what the statute means, it could not \\nproperly analyze it under either of those provisions. It then \\nentered a permanent injunction in plaintiffs’ favor and \\nclosed the case. Both sides have appealed. Plaintiffs want the \\nwhole statute enjoined, while defendants want the injunc‐\\ntion vacated and the suit dismissed. \\n Justiciability is an initial problem. Indiana University, \\nwhich is part of the State of Indiana, see Haynes v. Indiana \\nUniversity, 902 F.3d 724, 731 (7th Cir. 2018), has sued two \\nprosecutors who carry out state powers. The two defendants \\nhave been sued in their official capacities, which means that \\nthey must be treated as the State of Indiana. Will v. Michigan \\nDepartment of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). There is consid‐\\nerable doubt that federal courts are authorized to adjust \\ngrievances among different parts of a state government. See, \\ne.g., Illinois v. Chicago, 137 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1998) (a state \\ncan’t sue part of itself); Arlington Heights v. Regional Transpor‐\\ntation Authority, 653 F.2d 1149, 1150–53 (7th Cir. 1981) (part \\nof a state can’t sue the state); Branson School District RE‐82 v. \\nRomer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases). \\nCf. South Bend v. South Bend Common Council, 865 F.3d 889 \\n(7th Cir. 2017) (a city can’t sue a part of itself). The suit is \\nsaved, however, by the fact that three faculty members are \\nplaintiffs. All three have standing to litigate in their personal \\ncapacities, and with one exception (to which we return) they \\npresent all of the complaint’s legal theories. \\n\\n4 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n We start with vagueness, the Due Process Clause theory \\non which the district court based its injunction, and then ad‐\\ndress the other four theories. \\n The Constitution requires criminal statutes to have a core \\nof understandable meaning. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, \\n135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 \\n(1975); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913). Some uncer‐\\ntainty at the margins does not condemn a statute. It is there‐\\nfore hard to see what can be wrong with words such as “ac‐\\nquires,” which people use and understand in normal life. A \\nperson “acquires” a car by buying it or leasing it or receiving \\nit as a gift from a parent or spouse—or by stealing it. Even a \\nprotean word such as “reasonable” has enough of a core to \\nallow its use in situations where rights to speak are at issue. \\nSee Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 324 (2002). \\nWords such as “acquire” are materially (another protean le‐\\ngal word) more definite than “reasonable.” \\n Johnson shows that uncertainty so pervasive that most of \\na law’s potential applications are impossible to evaluate may \\nrule out enforcement. But the district court did not deny that \\neach of the words “acquires”, “receives”, and “transfers”, \\nand the phrase “any other part”, has a substantial, under‐\\nstandable core. Instead the judge worried about the periph‐\\nery. \\n Take “transfers.” The judge thought it hard to know \\nwhether a medical researcher “transfers” fetal material by \\npassing a pipette containing fetal tissue to someone else at \\nthe same laboratory bench. 289 F. Supp. 3d at 920. Or take \\nthe phrase “any other part.” Although this ensures that the \\nstatute covers every part of a fetus, the judge thought it hard \\nto say how things work at the level of individual cells or \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 5 \\n\\nstrands of DNA. Suppose someone in Washington state \\n(from which much of Indiana University’s fetal tissue comes) \\nextracts a few cells from an aborted fetus and uses them to \\ncreate a line of stem‐cell tissue, exemplars of which (dozens \\nof generations later) are transferred to a researcher in Indi‐\\nana. Is anything derived from fetal tissue included in the \\nphrase “any other part”? The judge did not see a clear an‐\\nswer. Id. at 918–19. These and similar open questions led the \\njudge to deem the words and phrase unconstitutional. \\n The two prosecutors did not help their defense by pro‐\\nfessing to see answers to these and similar questions. They \\nassured the judge that of course stem cells derived from fetal \\ntissue are not “any other part” of a fetus. They asserted that \\nmoving a pipette across a lab bench is of course not a “trans‐\\nfer” of fetal tissue, because “transfer” means “convey own‐\\nership.” That’s implausible. Federal statutes forbid the trans‐\\nfer of heroin and other contraband, see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. \\n§841(a)(1), and judges implementing such laws do not condi‐\\ntion their application on a change of ownership; those laws \\napply to people who act as agents as well as to principals. \\nThe prosecutors also asserted that placental or umbilical \\ncord tissue is of course not “any other part” of a fetus. Maybe: \\nThe placenta is an independent organ and so may be outside \\nthe statutory scope, but the statute does not address the top‐\\nic. Prosecutors can’t offer definitive interpretations of crimi‐\\nnal laws, and one prosecutor can’t bind a successor in office. \\nMore: Indiana has 90 other counties, whose prosecutors may \\nhave different ideas about the statute’s scope. The district \\njudge was right to say that, if the prosecutors’ assurances are \\nall the plaintiffs have to go on, they are at needless risk. \\n\\n6 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n Yet although prosecutorial assurances should not set an‐\\nyone’s mind at rest, the legal system offers a way to work \\nout the uncertainties that lurk at every statute’s periphery: \\nthe judiciary. Resolving edge questions is a principal role of \\nthe courts. If the district court’s approach is correct, then \\nevery time a court needs to decide a tough question about \\njust how far a statute reaches, it should declare the law un‐\\nconstitutional. That is fundamentally inconsistent with the \\nSupreme Court’s approach, under which a core of meaning \\nis enough to reject a vagueness challenge, leaving to future \\nadjudication the inevitable questions at the statutory margin. \\n A federal district judge cannot definitively interpret Ind. \\nCode §35‐46‐5‐1.5, but the state judiciary can do so. Declara‐\\ntory judgments are available in Indiana under Ind. Trial Rule \\n57 and Ind. Code §34‐14‐1‐1. Any medical researcher can file \\na suit with the theme: “I want to do X and fear that I will be \\nprosecuted, so please give me a declaratory judgment that X \\nis lawful.” Yet none of the plaintiffs has filed such a suit \\nseeking assurances about the scope of §35‐46‐5‐1.5. Instead \\nof using a readily available state‐law remedy for unwelcome \\nrisk, they asked a federal court to blot the law from the \\nbooks. That’s not how uncertainty should be addressed. \\n We have held this already about uncertainty under Indi‐\\nana law. Indiana forbids judges, and candidates for judicial \\noffice, from making any public commitment “inconsistent \\nwith the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of \\njudicial office”. The scope for debate about the meaning of \\nthat clause puts to shame any uncertainty about the meaning \\nof Ind. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5, but we held the language valid, \\neven when rights to speak are at stake—not because it is \\nclear, but because the state offers a process to resolve debat‐\\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 7 \\n\\nable issues. Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 715–17 (7th Cir. \\n2010). We explained (id. at 716–17): \\n Plaintiffs want us to deem the law vague by identifying situa‐\\n tions in which state officials might take an untenably broad read‐\\n ing of the [language], and then predicting that they will do so. It \\n is far preferable, however, and more respectful of our judicial \\n colleagues in Indiana, to assume that they will act sensibly and \\n resolve the open questions in a way that honors candidates’ \\n rights under the first amendment. \\n When a statute is accompanied by [a] system that can flesh out \\n details, the due process clause permits those details to be left to \\n that system. Parts of the Hatch Act are every bit as vague as the \\n [language here], but in [Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, \\n 413 U.S. 548 (1973)] the Court held that problems of implementa‐\\n tion could be tackled by administrative adjudication. 413 U.S. at \\n 580. Similarly, in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), the Court \\n held that an article of the Uniform Code of Military Justice mak‐\\n ing it a court‐martial offense to engage in “conduct unbecoming \\n an officer and a gentleman” is not unconstitutionally vague, be‐\\n cause military tribunals have elaborated on what is “unbecom‐\\n ing” for an officer and made it more specific than the unadorned \\n words. The National Labor Relations Act is full of vague terms \\n [such as “unfair labor practice”], and the National Labor Rela‐\\n tions Board has yet to make all of them concrete, but no one \\n supposes that the whole Act could be chucked out. The Justices \\n have been chary of holding laws unconstitutional “on their face” \\n precisely because they have recognized that vagueness will be \\n reduced through a process of interpretation. \\n\\nThis is equally true of Ind. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5. Declaratory‐\\njudgment actions can resolve ambiguities with limited (if \\nany) risk to medical researchers. \\n One thing the state judiciary might do—in addition to re‐\\nsolving concrete disputes such as the coverage of cells de‐\\nrived from fetal tissue—is read the word “intentionally” in \\n§35‐46‐5‐1.5(d) to protect researchers who do not subjective‐\\n\\n8 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nly understand that they are violating the law. That is what \\nthe Supreme Court did in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 \\n(1945), to save what is now codified as 18 U.S.C. §242, which \\none might classify as the ultimately vague criminal statute. \\n(It forbids any act under color of law that deprives anyone of \\nany constitutional right.) This potential for risk reduction \\nthrough interpretation, plus the fact that all of the contested \\nterms have a substantial core of ascertainable meaning, leads \\nus to reject the district court’s vagueness holding.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1192,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4599923,"string":"4,599,923"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Trustees of Indiana University v. Terry Curry"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-14"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1308"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit \\n ____________________ \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\nTRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY, et al., \\n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, Cross‐Appellants, \\n\\n v. \\n\\nTERRY CURRY, Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County, Indi‐\\nana, and CHRISTOPHER GAAL, Prosecuting Attorney of Mon‐\\nroe County, Indiana, \\n Defendants‐Appellants, Cross‐Appellees. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the \\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. \\n No. 1:16‐cv‐01289‐JMS‐DML — Jane E. Magnus‐Stinson, Chief Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 14, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit \\nJudges. \\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In Indiana “[a] person who \\nintentionally acquires, receives, sells, or transfers fetal tissue \\ncommits unlawful transfer of fetal tissue, a Level 5 felony.” \\nInd. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5(d). A federal district court held that \\n\\n2 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nseveral terms in this statute are unconstitutionally vague and \\nthat it must be treated as if it read: “A person who intention‐\\nally sells fetal tissue commits unlawful transfer of fetal tis‐\\nsue, a Level 5 felony.” 289 F. Supp. 3d 905, 934–35 (S.D. Ind. \\n2018). The district court also held that a definitional clause is \\ninvalid. As enacted, §35‐46‐5‐1.5(b) reads: “As used in this \\nsection, ‘fetal tissue’ includes tissue, organs, or any other \\npart of an aborted fetus.” This must be treated as if it read: \\n“As used in this section, ‘fetal tissue’ includes tissue or or‐\\ngans of an aborted fetus.” The district court thus held that \\nthe words “acquires”, “receives”, and “transfers”, and the \\nphrase “any other part”, are too uncertain to have legal \\nforce. If that is right, then big chunks of the legal system are \\ninvalid, because those words are ubiquitous in statutes, reg‐\\nulations, and judicial opinions. \\n This case began when Indiana University and three of its \\nfaculty members filed this suit, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, \\nagainst the state’s prosecuting attorneys in two counties. \\nThey asked the district court to enjoin the prosecutors from \\nattempting to enforce any part of §35‐46‐5‐1.5. According to \\nthe plaintiffs, the statute not only is excessively vague but \\nalso violates the First Amendment by blocking one kind of \\nmedical research, takes the University’s property without \\njust compensation, violates the Equal Protection Clause by \\ndistinguishing fetal tissue produced by abortions from that \\nproduced by miscarriages, and violates the dormant Com‐\\nmerce Clause by regulating the interstate market in fetal tis‐\\nsue. Plaintiffs do not contend that the statute imposes an un‐\\ndue burden on any woman who seeks to have an abortion, \\nnor would they have standing to make such an argument. \\nInstead the three faculty‐member plaintiffs contend that the \\nstatute interferes with medical scholarship. \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 3 \\n\\n As we have recounted, the district court found four \\nwords or phrases to be unconstitutionally vague. It rejected \\nplaintiffs’ theories under the First Amendment and the \\nEqual Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And \\nit did not come to a conclusion with respect to the Takings \\nClause or the Commerce Clause, reasoning that because it \\ncould not determine what the statute means, it could not \\nproperly analyze it under either of those provisions. It then \\nentered a permanent injunction in plaintiffs’ favor and \\nclosed the case. Both sides have appealed. Plaintiffs want the \\nwhole statute enjoined, while defendants want the injunc‐\\ntion vacated and the suit dismissed. \\n Justiciability is an initial problem. Indiana University, \\nwhich is part of the State of Indiana, see Haynes v. Indiana \\nUniversity, 902 F.3d 724, 731 (7th Cir. 2018), has sued two \\nprosecutors who carry out state powers. The two defendants \\nhave been sued in their official capacities, which means that \\nthey must be treated as the State of Indiana. Will v. Michigan \\nDepartment of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). There is consid‐\\nerable doubt that federal courts are authorized to adjust \\ngrievances among different parts of a state government. See, \\ne.g., Illinois v. Chicago, 137 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1998) (a state \\ncan’t sue part of itself); Arlington Heights v. Regional Transpor‐\\ntation Authority, 653 F.2d 1149, 1150–53 (7th Cir. 1981) (part \\nof a state can’t sue the state); Branson School District RE‐82 v. \\nRomer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases). \\nCf. South Bend v. South Bend Common Council, 865 F.3d 889 \\n(7th Cir. 2017) (a city can’t sue a part of itself). The suit is \\nsaved, however, by the fact that three faculty members are \\nplaintiffs. All three have standing to litigate in their personal \\ncapacities, and with one exception (to which we return) they \\npresent all of the complaint’s legal theories. \\n\\n4 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n We start with vagueness, the Due Process Clause theory \\non which the district court based its injunction, and then ad‐\\ndress the other four theories. \\n The Constitution requires criminal statutes to have a core \\nof understandable meaning. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, \\n135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 \\n(1975); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913). Some uncer‐\\ntainty at the margins does not condemn a statute. It is there‐\\nfore hard to see what can be wrong with words such as “ac‐\\nquires,” which people use and understand in normal life. A \\nperson “acquires” a car by buying it or leasing it or receiving \\nit as a gift from a parent or spouse—or by stealing it. Even a \\nprotean word such as “reasonable” has enough of a core to \\nallow its use in situations where rights to speak are at issue. \\nSee Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 324 (2002). \\nWords such as “acquire” are materially (another protean le‐\\ngal word) more definite than “reasonable.” \\n Johnson shows that uncertainty so pervasive that most of \\na law’s potential applications are impossible to evaluate may \\nrule out enforcement. But the district court did not deny that \\neach of the words “acquires”, “receives”, and “transfers”, \\nand the phrase “any other part”, has a substantial, under‐\\nstandable core. Instead the judge worried about the periph‐\\nery. \\n Take “transfers.” The judge thought it hard to know \\nwhether a medical researcher “transfers” fetal material by \\npassing a pipette containing fetal tissue to someone else at \\nthe same laboratory bench. 289 F. Supp. 3d at 920. Or take \\nthe phrase “any other part.” Although this ensures that the \\nstatute covers every part of a fetus, the judge thought it hard \\nto say how things work at the level of individual cells or \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 5 \\n\\nstrands of DNA. Suppose someone in Washington state \\n(from which much of Indiana University’s fetal tissue comes) \\nextracts a few cells from an aborted fetus and uses them to \\ncreate a line of stem‐cell tissue, exemplars of which (dozens \\nof generations later) are transferred to a researcher in Indi‐\\nana. Is anything derived from fetal tissue included in the \\nphrase “any other part”? The judge did not see a clear an‐\\nswer. Id. at 918–19. These and similar open questions led the \\njudge to deem the words and phrase unconstitutional. \\n The two prosecutors did not help their defense by pro‐\\nfessing to see answers to these and similar questions. They \\nassured the judge that of course stem cells derived from fetal \\ntissue are not “any other part” of a fetus. They asserted that \\nmoving a pipette across a lab bench is of course not a “trans‐\\nfer” of fetal tissue, because “transfer” means “convey own‐\\nership.” That’s implausible. Federal statutes forbid the trans‐\\nfer of heroin and other contraband, see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. \\n§841(a)(1), and judges implementing such laws do not condi‐\\ntion their application on a change of ownership; those laws \\napply to people who act as agents as well as to principals. \\nThe prosecutors also asserted that placental or umbilical \\ncord tissue is of course not “any other part” of a fetus. Maybe: \\nThe placenta is an independent organ and so may be outside \\nthe statutory scope, but the statute does not address the top‐\\nic. Prosecutors can’t offer definitive interpretations of crimi‐\\nnal laws, and one prosecutor can’t bind a successor in office. \\nMore: Indiana has 90 other counties, whose prosecutors may \\nhave different ideas about the statute’s scope. The district \\njudge was right to say that, if the prosecutors’ assurances are \\nall the plaintiffs have to go on, they are at needless risk. \\n\\n6 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n Yet although prosecutorial assurances should not set an‐\\nyone’s mind at rest, the legal system offers a way to work \\nout the uncertainties that lurk at every statute’s periphery: \\nthe judiciary. Resolving edge questions is a principal role of \\nthe courts. If the district court’s approach is correct, then \\nevery time a court needs to decide a tough question about \\njust how far a statute reaches, it should declare the law un‐\\nconstitutional. That is fundamentally inconsistent with the \\nSupreme Court’s approach, under which a core of meaning \\nis enough to reject a vagueness challenge, leaving to future \\nadjudication the inevitable questions at the statutory margin. \\n A federal district judge cannot definitively interpret Ind. \\nCode §35‐46‐5‐1.5, but the state judiciary can do so. Declara‐\\ntory judgments are available in Indiana under Ind. Trial Rule \\n57 and Ind. Code §34‐14‐1‐1. Any medical researcher can file \\na suit with the theme: “I want to do X and fear that I will be \\nprosecuted, so please give me a declaratory judgment that X \\nis lawful.” Yet none of the plaintiffs has filed such a suit \\nseeking assurances about the scope of §35‐46‐5‐1.5. Instead \\nof using a readily available state‐law remedy for unwelcome \\nrisk, they asked a federal court to blot the law from the \\nbooks. That’s not how uncertainty should be addressed. \\n We have held this already about uncertainty under Indi‐\\nana law. Indiana forbids judges, and candidates for judicial \\noffice, from making any public commitment “inconsistent \\nwith the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of \\njudicial office”. The scope for debate about the meaning of \\nthat clause puts to shame any uncertainty about the meaning \\nof Ind. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5, but we held the language valid, \\neven when rights to speak are at stake—not because it is \\nclear, but because the state offers a process to resolve debat‐\\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 7 \\n\\nable issues. Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 715–17 (7th Cir. \\n2010). We explained (id. at 716–17): \\n Plaintiffs want us to deem the law vague by identifying situa‐\\n tions in which state officials might take an untenably broad read‐\\n ing of the [language], and then predicting that they will do so. It \\n is far preferable, however, and more respectful of our judicial \\n colleagues in Indiana, to assume that they will act sensibly and \\n resolve the open questions in a way that honors candidates’ \\n rights under the first amendment. \\n When a statute is accompanied by [a] system that can flesh out \\n details, the due process clause permits those details to be left to \\n that system. Parts of the Hatch Act are every bit as vague as the \\n [language here], but in [Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, \\n 413 U.S. 548 (1973)] the Court held that problems of implementa‐\\n tion could be tackled by administrative adjudication. 413 U.S. at \\n 580. Similarly, in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), the Court \\n held that an article of the Uniform Code of Military Justice mak‐\\n ing it a court‐martial offense to engage in “conduct unbecoming \\n an officer and a gentleman” is not unconstitutionally vague, be‐\\n cause military tribunals have elaborated on what is “unbecom‐\\n ing” for an officer and made it more specific than the unadorned \\n words. The National Labor Relations Act is full of vague terms \\n [such as “unfair labor practice”], and the National Labor Rela‐\\n tions Board has yet to make all of them concrete, but no one \\n supposes that the whole Act could be chucked out. The Justices \\n have been chary of holding laws unconstitutional “on their face” \\n precisely because they have recognized that vagueness will be \\n reduced through a process of interpretation. \\n\\nThis is equally true of Ind. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5. Declaratory‐\\njudgment actions can resolve ambiguities with limited (if \\nany) risk to medical researchers. \\n One thing the state judiciary might do—in addition to re‐\\nsolving concrete disputes such as the coverage of cells de‐\\nrived from fetal tissue—is read the word “intentionally” in \\n§35‐46‐5‐1.5(d) to protect researchers who do not subjective‐\\n\\n8 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nly understand that they are violating the law. That is what \\nthe Supreme Court did in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 \\n(1945), to save what is now codified as 18 U.S.C. §242, which \\none might classify as the ultimately vague criminal statute. \\n(It forbids any act under color of law that deprives anyone of \\nany constitutional right.) This potential for risk reduction \\nthrough interpretation, plus the fact that all of the contested \\nterms have a substantial core of ascertainable meaning, leads \\nus to reject the district court’s vagueness holding.\", \"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}, {\"type\": \"dissent\", \"author\": \"Our\", \"text\": \"Our dissenting colleague calls our approach “a novel var‐\\niation on Pullman abstention” (below at 14), but it is neither \\nnovel nor a form of abstention. It reflects the Supreme \\nCourt’s holdings in Letter Carriers, Parker, and many other \\ndecisions, such as Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975), that when \\nconsidering whether statutory terms are too vague a federal \\ncourt must take into account how they have been interpreted \\nand applied. Johnson is an example. The Justices declared a \\nstatute unconstitutionally vague only after this process of \\ninterpretation had been used for more than 20 years without \\ncurtailing uncertainty. For Indiana’s fetal‐tissue statute, by \\ncontrast, the process has not even begun. Whether the pro‐\\ncess of interpretation is administrative (as in Letter Carriers \\nand Bauer) or judicial (as in Parker, Rose, and Johnson) does \\nnot matter. What does matter is whether the process can an‐\\nswer important questions about the statute’s scope. \\n Plaintiffs believe that, if they sue in federal court before \\nthe state judiciary has had a chance to interpret state law, \\nthey can ensure that the state never gets that chance. Akron v. \\nAkron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 451–52 \\n(1983), used vagueness doctrine in that fashion without cit‐\\ning Letter Carriers, Parker, or Rose. Akron was overruled by \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 9 \\n\\nPlanned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 \\n(1992), and we are not aware of any other decision by the \\nSupreme Court that has used vagueness doctrine to prevent \\nthe state judiciary from having even a chance to give the law \\na construction that will produce adequate clarity. \\n Thus we arrive at the four theories that are the subjects of \\nplaintiffs’ cross‐appeal. \\n The parties agree that the statute does not burden a sus‐\\npect class or affect a fundamental right, so the rational‐basis \\nstandard applies to the equal‐protection theory. The district \\ncourt held that ethical considerations support a distinction \\nbetween fetal tissue obtained from abortions and tissue ob‐\\ntained from miscarriages. 289 F. Supp. 3d at 931–33. There is \\na moral debate about abortion and no equivalent debate \\nabout miscarriages. The Supreme Court wrote in Washington \\nv. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997), that “[t]he State … has \\nan interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medi‐\\ncal profession.” Cf. Cavel International, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 \\nF.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2007) (ethical considerations support a ban \\non slaughtering horses for human consumption). Plaintiffs \\nstress that under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1974), and its \\nsuccessors, a fetus is not a “person.” See also Planned \\nParenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc. v. Commissioner of In‐\\ndiana State Department of Health, 888 F.3d 300, rehearing en \\nbanc denied, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 17676 (7th Cir. June 25, \\n2018), petition for certiorari pending, No. 18–483. But that \\ndoes not eliminate the possibility of serious debate about \\nwhen, if at all, it is ethical to perform medical experiments \\non aborted fetal tissue. The rational‐basis standard does not \\nrequire much in the way of justification, see FCC v. Beach \\nCommunications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993), and we \\n\\n10 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nagree with the district court that the statute survives an \\nequal‐protection challenge. Indiana’s statute may or may not \\nbe sensible—for even persons who find abortion immoral \\nmust recognize that neurological research using fetal tissue \\ncan save innocent lives—but choosing sides in an ethical de‐\\nbate does not condemn a law. \\n The First Amendment argument is a non‐starter. The \\nstatute regulates conduct, not speech. See Clark v. Community \\nfor Creative Non‐Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). True, plaintiffs \\nwant to use fetal tissue in research that could lead to speech, \\nin classrooms or research papers. But a desire to obtain an \\ninput into speech does not convert regulation of conduct into \\nregulation of speech. Surely plaintiffs do not think that re‐\\nsearchers at Indiana University are entitled to blow up a \\ncommercial airliner, or administer dangerous pathogens to \\npatients in the University’s hospital, just so that they can ob‐\\nserve the results and write down their findings. Nor do \\nplaintiffs think that they are entitled to steal pens, paper, and \\ncomputers from the local Office Depot so that they can write \\narticles at lower cost. Plaintiffs assert that the statute casts “a \\npall of orthodoxy over the classroom”, but it does not. They \\ncan say, write, and teach anything they want. They can refer \\nto results generated by work done on aborted fetal tissue in \\nother states and nations. But they cannot treat enforcement \\nof rules about conduct as equivalent to prohibitions of \\nspeech. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional \\nRights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (Solomon Amendment does \\nnot regulate speech). \\n Plaintiffs contend that Indiana’s law violates the Com‐\\nmerce Clause because much of the tissue they seek to use \\ncomes from other states. Yet the law does not discriminate \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 11 \\n\\nagainst interstate commerce; it applies equally to fetal tissue \\nfrom Indiana and fetal tissue from Iowa, Illinois, or Indone‐\\nsia. Nor does it bear more heavily on interstate commerce as \\na practical matter, the subject of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 \\nU.S. 137 (1970). We have held repeatedly that outright bans \\non particular items do not offend the dormant Commerce \\nClause. See, e.g., National Paint & Coatings Association v. Chi‐\\ncago, 45 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1995) (spray paint); Park Pet Shop, \\nInc. v. Chicago, 872 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 2017) (dogs from puppy \\nmills). Plaintiffs do not contend that Indiana’s law concerns a \\nsubject on which there is a “compelling need for national \\nuniformity in regulation.” General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 \\nU.S. 278, 298 n.12 (1997). \\n Finally, the claim under the Takings Clause is confined to \\nthe University itself. None of the three individual plaintiffs \\ncontends that he has any property interest in particular fetal \\ntissue, so nothing has been taken from any of them. The \\nstatute does render valueless any fetal tissue, derived from \\nabortions, owned by Indiana University. But as we observed \\nearlier, the University, as part of Indiana, is not entitled to \\nsue its own state. Indiana’s legislature is free to decide what \\nuse (including none) to make of Indiana’s property. See, e.g., \\nGreat Lakes Higher Education Corp. v. Cavazos, 911 F.2d 10, 14–\\n15 (7th Cir. 1990). Our decision in Illinois Clean Energy Com‐\\nmunity Foundation v. Filan, 392 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2004), does \\nnot hold otherwise. The Illinois Clean Energy Community \\nFoundation is a charitable foundation funded by private do‐\\nnations. Confiscation of its property is a taking in a way that \\na state’s decision about what to do with its own property \\nnever could be. \\n\\n12 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n Several lesser arguments have been considered but do \\nnot require discussion. We conclude that the district court \\nshould have entered judgment in defendants’ favor. The in‐\\njunction is reversed, and the case is remanded for that pur‐\\npose. \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 13\"}, {\"author\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. We should affirm. \\nThe Indiana law making it a felony to acquire, receive, sell, or \\ntransfer the “tissue, organs, or any other part of an aborted \\nfetus” is unconstitutionally vague. As explained below, some \\nunusual features of this law and this lawsuit lead me to that \\nconclusion: both the State’s lawyers and the authoring legis‐\\nlators have tried to run away from the apparent meaning of \\nthe statutory language. As a result, it’s clear that the law does \\nnot give fair notice of its scope, and it effectively abandons the \\nproper separation of powers by delegating critical policy de‐\\ncisions to prosecutors and judges. I agree with my colleagues, \\nhowever, that plaintiffs cannot prevail on their First Amend‐\\nment, Equal Protection, and Commerce Clause challenges. \\n The unusual features of this law, its enactment, and this \\nlawsuit mean that the district judge’s reasoning does not ac‐\\ntually threaten to invalidate “big chunks of the legal system.” \\nIt was not the district judge who found it hard to know what \\n“transfer” means in this statute, nor was the problem that the \\njudge “did not see a clear answer” as to what is meant by “any \\nother part.” See ante at 4–5. If the district judge erred, it was \\nin taking the State of Indiana at its word that the statutory text \\ndoes not mean what it seems to say. The subject of this litiga‐\\ntion is not handwringing about the “periphery” of the new \\nlaw. The majority’s hypothesized “core of understandable \\nmeaning”—the transfer or acquisition of fetal organs—ad‐\\ndresses a factual scenario that is not and was not actually hap‐\\npening. The new law is relevant only to practices as to which \\nits application seems, based on the State’s defense, unforeseen \\nand indeterminate. \\n This case fits comfortably within the majority’s descrip‐\\ntion of what Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) \\n\\n14 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nteaches: “that uncertainty so pervasive that most of a law’s \\npotential applications are impossible to evaluate may rule out \\nenforcement.” Ante at 4. Instead of affirming, however, the \\nmajority proposes a novel variation on Pullman abstention in \\nwhich the federal courts direct plaintiffs who reasonably fear \\nprosecution under a vague law to file a series of declaratory \\njudgment cases in the state courts. \\n Plaintiffs should not have to take such extraordinary \\nmeasures to determine the scope of a criminal law. Legisla‐\\ntures must draft criminal statutes so that ordinary people \\nhave fair notice of what acts are criminal. Skilling v. United \\nStates, 561 U.S. 358, 402–03 (2010); United States v. Sylla, 790 \\nF.3d 772, 774–75 (7th Cir. 2015). That does not mean that the \\ncorrect application of even a criminal law must be free from \\ndoubt in all cases. There will often be, perhaps will always be, \\na periphery where there is room for disagreement and inter‐\\npretation. That possibility does not mean that a law is void for \\nvagueness, particularly as applied to the core of matters \\nclearly covered by the statute. \\n Still, there are limits. Fair notice of what is prohibited is an \\nessential element of due process and the rule of law. Vague \\nlaws “can invite the exercise of arbitrary power … by leaving \\nthe people in the dark about what the law demands and al‐\\nlowing prosecutors and courts to make it up.” Sessions v. Di‐\\nmaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223–24 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); \\nsee also Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101,1108 (2018) \\n(“to rely upon prosecutorial discretion to narrow the other‐\\nwise wide‐ranging scope of a criminal statute’s highly ab‐\\nstract general statutory language places great power in the \\nhands of the prosecutor”). \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 15\\n\\n Vagueness doctrine is also built on the separation of pow‐\\ners. Legislators “may not ‘abdicate their responsibilities for \\nsetting the standards of the criminal law.’” Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. \\nat 1227 (Gorsuch, J. concurring), quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 \\nU.S. 566, 575 (1974). Vague laws transfer legislative power to \\ncourts and police and prosecutors, where such power most \\nemphatically does not belong. Id. at 1228. \\n The unusual record here shows just such a legislative ab‐\\ndication. As a result, scientists engaged in potentially invalu‐\\nable medical research risk criminal prosecution based on \\nvague statutory language that leaves the hard choices to pros‐\\necutors and judges. “Under the Constitution, the adoption of \\nnew laws restricting liberty is supposed to be a hard business, \\nthe product of an open and public debate among a large and \\ndiverse number of elected representatives. Allowing the leg‐\\nislature to hand off the job of lawmaking risks substituting \\nthis design for one where legislation is made easy, with a \\nmere handful of unelected judges and prosecutors free to \\n‘condem[n] all that [they] personally disapprove and for no \\nbetter reason than [they] disapprove it.’” Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at \\n1228 (Gorsuch, J., concurring), quoting Jordan v. De George, 341 \\nU.S. 223, 242 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). \\n To explain these issues and why they matter, I first pro‐\\nvide some background on the plaintiffs and their research on \\nAlzheimer’s disease. I then explain the vagueness problems \\nin terms of the statutory language, the unusual course of this \\nlitigation, and the legislative process that led to the chal‐\\nlenged law. I conclude with the university’s takings claim. \\n Plaintiffs and Their Alzheimer’s Research: Few diseases are as \\nfrightening as Alzheimer’s disease, a progressive disease that \\ncauses brain cells to waste away and die. The symptoms can \\n\\n16 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nprogress from severe memory loss to declines in thinking and \\nbehavioral and social skills, spiraling downward to dementia \\nand the loss of a person’s very selfhood, and ultimately to \\ndeath. Between five and ten percent of Americans aged 65 al‐\\nready have Alzheimer’s disease. Between 40 and 50 percent \\nof Americans who turn 85 years old will have Alzheimer’s. \\nDkt. 77‐3 at 6, 16 (Lamb Dep. I, at 18, 61). \\n Alzheimer’s disease is the focus of extensive medical re‐\\nsearch toward treatment and possible cure. The Indiana Uni‐\\nversity School of Medicine houses the National Cell Reposi‐\\ntory for Alzheimer’s Disease, as well as an Alzheimer’s Dis‐\\nease Center, one of 32 research centers funded by the National \\nInstitutes of Health on the subject. Indiana University also op‐\\nerates the Stark Neurosciences Research Institute, which con‐\\nducts research on Alzheimer’s disease and other neurological \\ndisorders. \\n One plaintiff, Dr. Debomoy Lahiri, is a leading neurologi‐\\ncal researcher on the university faculty. He and his colleagues \\nspecialize in the study of brain disorders, primarily Alz‐\\nheimer’s disease. They use tissue from aborted fetuses and de‐\\nrivatives from such tissue, including cells cultured in labora‐\\ntories from fetal cells, as well as DNA, RNA, proteins and \\nother molecules and sub‐cellular structures obtained from \\nsuch cells. The evidence in this record establishes that fetal \\nbrain tissue—or at least cells and complex molecules derived \\nfrom such tissue—is essential to research on possible cures \\nand treatments. There is no adequate substitute. \\n Since 2011, Dr. Lahiri has received about 25 shipments of \\nfetal tissue from the Birth Defects Research Laboratory at the \\nUniversity of Washington, which receives tissue from abor‐\\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 17\\n\\ntions performed lawfully in the State of Washington. The rec‐\\nord here shows that the nationally recognized laboratory ad‐\\nheres to strict federal and state regulations for receiving do‐\\nnated fetal tissue and providing the tissue for research, in‐\\ncluding ensuring (1) that all women donating fetal tissue have \\ngiven informed consent, and (2) that the laboratory does not \\nsell or profit from providing fetal material. Dkt. 77‐20 at 1–3 \\n(BDRL affidavit), The shipments do not include any intact or‐\\ngans but only tiny tissue samples. Each shipment includes tis‐\\nsue contained within approximately two teaspoons of liquid \\nmedium. \\n Even if one could say confidently that the Birth Defects \\nResearch Laboratory material is “fetal tissue” for purposes of \\nthe statute (and I am not so confident), it becomes even less \\nclear once Dr. Lahiri works with the material. One critical step \\nin research with these tiny samples of tissues is to “dissociate” \\nand culture them—i.e., to separate the cells from each other \\nand to place them in a laboratory dish with conditions and \\nnutrients that allow the cells to grow, divide, and re‐divide, \\nthus multiplying the material available for research. \\n Also relevant here, medical research is collaborative, both \\nwithin Indiana University and with the NIH and other insti‐\\ntutions. To be valuable, research must be replicable. That re‐\\nquires cooperation and collaboration among researchers. Dr. \\nLahiri and his colleagues are requested and expected to trans‐\\nfer tissue samples between laboratories in the course of that \\ncollaboration. Such collaboration is also, understandably, a \\ncondition of their NIH funding. \\n The Statutory Language, This Lawsuit, and the Legislative Pro‐\\ncess: The Indiana law poses serious vagueness problems in \\nterms of what counts as “fetal tissue,” what researchers may \\n\\n18 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\ndo with fetal tissue, and whether the law even applies to fetal \\ntissue that is not actually sold. Some of the problems are ap‐\\nparent from the statutory text itself. Others have emerged in \\nthis lawsuit and examination of the legislative process that led \\nto enactment of the law in 2016. \\n The statute says: “A person who intentionally acquires, re‐\\nceives, sells, or transfers fetal tissue commits unlawful trans‐\\nfer of fetal tissue, a Level 5 felony.” Ind. Code § 35‐46‐5‐1.5(d). \\nA key definition provides: “As used in this section, ‘fetal tis‐\\nsue’ includes tissue, organs, or any other part of an aborted \\nfetus.” § 1.5(b). \\n The sharpest dispute between the parties is the scope of \\nthe “any other part” phrase in the definition of fetal tissue. \\nLet’s assume the statute makes criminal the receipt of ship‐\\nments of fetal tissue like those plaintiffs received in the past \\nfrom the birth defects laboratory in Washington. \\n That raises the question whether the “any part of” defini‐\\ntion in the Indiana law extends to make criminal the receipt \\nof lines of cells derived from fetal tissue. The parties agree here \\nthat, as a matter of biology, the process of cell division pro‐\\nduces a culture that contains some cells remaining from the \\noriginal tissue. The new culture also contains other, newly‐\\ndivided cells that were not part of the original tissue, but \\nwhich may well contain complex molecules (such as DNA, \\nRNA, or proteins) that were present in the original tissue sam‐\\nple. See Prosecutors’ Br. at 10; Plaintiffs’ Br. at 40. So, to re‐\\nphrase the key question, does a second‐, third‐, tenth‐, or nth‐\\ngeneration cell with such molecules fall under the statutory \\ndefinition as “any other part” of an aborted fetus? \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 19\\n\\n That question is not at the periphery of this statute but at \\nits core. The statutory language, “any other part,” offers no \\nguidance. It does not signal that the legislature even recog‐\\nnized this critical issue. And as the law has been defended in \\nthis lawsuit, the problem has actually become even more se‐\\nvere. In the district court, the State took the position that “any \\nother part” does not apply to: \\n (a) placental or umbilical cord blood tissue or \\n cells, or biological material obtained from such \\n blood, tissue or cells; \\n (b) fetal cell lines including but not limited to \\n HEK293 (or biological material obtained from \\n such cell lines) derived from the cells of an \\n aborted fetus, but which do not contain cells \\n which were originally part of an aborted fetus; \\n (c) fetal cells (or biological material obtained \\n from such cells) which were derived from \\n aborted fetal cells, but are not cells which were \\n originally part of an aborted fetus. \\nDkt. 75 at 2.1 \\n Later in the district court proceedings, the State asserted \\nthat once cells have been separated from the fetal tissue and \\ngrow, divide into new cells, and are moved from the first dish \\nto the second dish, they can no longer be considered part of \\nthe aborted fetus. Dkt. 81 at 48. Or, the State suggests, that \\nseparation may occur even earlier in the process of culturing \\n\\n \\n 1 HEK293 is a line of cells first cultured in 1973 and widely used in \\n\\nresearch. The record indicates it is unknown whether the original cells \\ncame from an aborted fetus. See Dkt. 79‐8 at 59–62 (Cate Dep.). \\n\\n20 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\ncells, even before the first passage, when cells are dissociated. \\nId. at 48. \\n Those limits imply that the Indiana law would not inter‐\\nfere with plaintiffs’ research as long as the laboratory in \\nWashington or some other lab outside of Indiana could per‐\\nform the first round of cell growth and division. If the cultures \\nof cells would not count as “fetal tissue” under the Indiana \\nlaw, plaintiffs would be free to obtain and use them for re‐\\nsearch. \\n The vagueness problem stems from the fact that it’s im‐\\npossible to know what weight to give the State’s assurances. \\nThe proposed limits might well be sensible as a matter of pol‐\\nicy. But as the district judge pointed out, these proposed lim‐\\nits have no apparent basis in the statutory text, and the State \\nhas not explained how it derives those supposedly comfort‐\\ning limits from the Indiana law. The State’s lawyers asserted \\nin oral argument that their assurances would be binding on \\nthe State and its present and future prosecuting attorneys. \\nThat remains to be seen.2 \\n Another focus of the vagueness challenge is the key verbs \\nin the statute. If you have “fetal tissue” within the meaning of \\nthe statute, what can you do with it? A person who intention‐\\nally “acquires, receives, sells, or transfers fetal tissue” com‐\\nmits a felony. § 1.5(d). Federal law, however, already makes \\n \\n 2 The defendant prosecutors are not representing themselves, nor are \\n\\nthey represented by the Indiana Attorney General or even by private law‐\\nyers from Indiana. Nevertheless, their private lawyers have been given the \\nresponsibility of defending and interpreting the law. See Ind. Code § 4‐6‐\\n5‐3 (Attorney General must consent in writing to employment of other \\ncounsel for state agencies and the State). Their views must be taken seri‐\\nously. \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 21\\n\\nit a federal crime to sell fetal tissue for “valuable considera‐\\ntion,” regardless of source, see 42 U.S.C. § 289g–2(a), so “sell” \\nis not at issue here.3 \\n The focus is on “acquire,” “receive,” and “transfer.” My \\ncolleagues correctly point out that these are common, well‐\\nunderstood terms in criminal law. But when plaintiffs chal‐\\nlenged the new law, the State took the following position: \\n The word ‘transfer’ in Section 1.5(b) of the Stat‐\\n ute does not apply to physical movement of \\n cells or biological materials received, generated \\n or stored at Indiana University before the enact‐\\n ment of the Statute provided that: \\n (a) the physical movement is within or among \\n laboratories, buildings or physical facilities of \\n Indiana University by any faculty member, em‐\\n ployee, representative or agent of Indiana Uni‐\\n versity; \\n (b) the physical movement is the result of a fac‐\\n ulty member, employee, representative or agent \\n of Indiana University permanently removing \\n such materials from Indiana University’s build‐\\n ings or physical facilities; or \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n 3 Under the federal law, “valuable consideration” does not include \\n\\nreasonable payments associated with transportation, implantation, pro‐\\ncessing, preservation, quality control, or storage of human fetal tissue. 42 \\nU.S.C. § 289g–2(e)(3). Unlike the Indiana law, which applies only to tissue \\nfrom abortions, federal law applies regardless of the source of the tissue. \\n\\n22 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n (c) the physical movement is at the request of \\n the National Institute of Health (‘NIH’) or pur‐\\n suant to the terms or conditions of any NIH \\n grant. \\nDkt. 75 at 2. \\n The State further explained that there will be no “transfer” \\nif there is no change in ownership or possession of the tissue, \\nreferring apparently to possession by Indiana University as \\nan institution, not possession being transferred from one hu‐\\nman being to another inside a university laboratory. Dkt. 90 \\nat 16. The apparent concession that plaintiffs can move fetal \\ntissue around at the request of the NIH or to comply with a \\ngrant sounds reasonable, but where does that come from? \\n As with the proposed limits on “fetal tissue” itself, there is \\nno apparent textual basis for these limits. These proposed lim‐\\nits are also inconsistent with the way the law regulates trans‐\\nfer and possession of so many other forms of contraband, \\nsuch as illegal drug, firearms, and other weapons. If one per‐\\nson cooks crack cocaine in a kitchen and hands a pot of the \\ndrug to a confederate at the kitchen table, federal criminal law \\nwould say there was a transfer of possession, regardless of the \\nownership of the drug. The same problems are inherent in the \\nState’s approach to “acquire” and “receive,” proposing limits \\nthat have no apparent textual or other legal bases. \\n These attempts to defend the law by limiting it in these \\nways only add to the mystery of its meaning. One is left to \\nwonder why the State proposes them. Members of this court \\nrepeatedly asked the State’s lawyers to explain why they felt \\nthese implausible limitations were needed. No answer was \\nforthcoming. \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 23\\n\\n As best I can tell, the State’s lawyers seem to be trying to \\nprevent the new law from having effects that would flow nat‐\\nurally from the statutory language but that seem not to be sen‐\\nsible from a practical or policy perspective. Implicit in the ef‐\\nfort is the concession that, as drafted, the operative portions \\nof § 1.5 will have undesired and unintended effects that will \\ninterfere with important and legitimate medical research. \\n In other words, the State’s lawyers seem to be trying to \\nsave the legislature from itself. The majority nonetheless de‐\\nfends the potentially extreme outcome of this statute, noting \\nthat there is “serious debate about when, if at all, it is ethical \\nto perform medical experiments on aborted fetal tissue.” Ante \\nat 9. Thus, regardless of whether the statute is “sensible,” the \\nfact that the Indiana legislature “cho[se] sides in an ethical de‐\\nbate does not condemn [the] law.” Ante at 10. Unfortunately, \\nthe majority describes a legislative process regarding this stat‐\\nutory provision that did not actually happen. \\n The available evidence from the Indiana legislature indi‐\\ncates that it adopted this criminal provision on fetal tissue re‐\\nsearch without realizing it would have any impact on medical \\nresearch using fetal tissue, let alone shut down this research \\non Alzheimer’s disease. The legislature simply did not engage \\nwith the hard policy choices and the natural consequences of \\nits language. The result was to distill here both concerns at the \\ncenter of vagueness doctrine, the fair notice and separation of \\npowers so critical to liberty. \\n Section 1.5 was adopted as part of a broader bill, House \\nEnrolled Act No. 1337, that imposed a variety of restrictions \\non abortions and related issues. The primary focal points of \\nthis bill have already been considered by this court. See \\nPlanned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc. v. Comm’r of \\n\\n24 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nIndiana State Dep’t of Health, 888 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 2018) (hold‐\\ning unconstitutional provisions prohibiting women from ter‐\\nminating pregnancies due to fetal genetic abnormalities, race, \\nor gender and requiring burial or cremation of embryonic or \\nfetal tissue), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Oct. 12, 2018) (No. 18‐\\n483); Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc. v. Comm’r \\nof Indiana State Dep’t of Health, 896 F.3d 809 (7th Cir. 2018) \\n(holding unconstitutional provision requiring women to ob‐\\ntain ultrasound at least 18 hours before obtaining an abor‐\\ntion), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 4, 2019) (No. 18‐1019). \\n In over six hours of archived video footage of the relevant \\nIndiana House and Senate committees’ discussions of this bill, \\ndozens of witnesses testified in favor of and against the bill. \\nNot one witness mentioned medical research using aborted \\nfetal tissue. If the legislature was actually choosing sides on \\nsuch a significant issue, one would expect some mention of it. \\nSee Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 469 (2002) (Ste‐\\nvens, J., dissenting) (“I think judges as well as detectives may \\ntake into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark \\nin the night.”), quoting Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 \\nU.S. 578, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). \\n Nor was there any discussion of § 1.5 in the floor debates \\non the bill. The only substantive discussion of the provision I \\ncould find in the legislative history came in seven minutes of \\na meeting of the Indiana Senate’s Health & Provider Services \\nCommittee. The discussion shows not a policy choice on an \\nimportant issue but instead a startling disconnect between the \\nstatutory language and the stated intentions of the legislators. \\nOne of the bill’s sponsors, Senator Holdman, said that the pro‐\\nvision “has to do with the selling of fetal tissue. Which makes \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 25\\n\\nit illegal in the state of Indiana to sell fetal tissue, which basi‐\\ncally addresses the issue we’ve seen around the country with \\nPlanned Parenthood and some of the things that have been \\ngoing on there.” Hearing, Indiana Senate Health and Provider \\nServices Committee at 18:26–18:45 (Feb. 24, 2016), \\nhttp://iga.in.gov/information/archives/2016/video/commit‐\\ntee_health_and_provider_services_3900/.4 \\n Senator Stoops asked Senator Holdman a series of ques‐\\ntions about whether parents of an aborted fetus could consent \\nto an autopsy or other research use of the tissue. Id. at 21:39–\\n22:14. Senator Holdman said that would be possible, prompt‐\\ning this follow‐up: \\n S. Stoops: Right, that is a specific autopsy. But \\n what if the parents want to donate the fetus for \\n research into the condition? I guess that would \\n not be allowed. I mean an autopsy to determine \\n maybe a genetic defect after the abortion is one \\n\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n 4 It was widely understood that this legislation responded to the 2015 \\n\\n“controversy over undercover videos of Planned Parenthood employees \\ndiscussing fetal organ donations,” despite the fact that federal and state \\ninvestigations of Planned Parenthood, including one in Indiana, found no \\nwrongdoing, and criminal charges had instead been filed against the \\nvideo‐makers. See Chelsea Schneider and Stephanie Wang, Bill Seeks Fur‐\\nther Limits on Abortion, The Indianapolis Star at A5 (Mar. 8, 2016); see also \\nDanielle Kurtzleben, Planned Parenthood Investigations Find No Fetal Tissue \\nSales, NPR (Jan. 28, 2016, 12:47 PM), \\nhttp://www.npr.org/2016/01/28/464594826/in‐wake‐of‐videos‐planned‐\\nparenthood‐investigations‐find‐no‐fetal‐tissue‐sales (summarizing re‐\\nsults of investigations). \\n\\n26 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n thing. But I think actually allowing the fetal tis‐\\n sue to be used for research purposes seems to be \\n outlawed in this bill. \\n S. Holdman: Well, I wouldn’t say that it [research \\n with fetal tissue] is outlawed. I think the word au‐\\n topsy encompasses that research portion of \\n what is done with that piece of tissue that is di‐\\n agnosed after the fact through an autopsy. So \\n maybe it is just a matter of semantics, here, per‐\\n haps Senator Stoop. But autopsy is the word \\n that we landed on. \\n S. Miller (Committee Chair): And just if I could \\n elaborate, I was a part of those conversations. \\n This is up to a parent to request the autopsy. \\n And I think at the time the parent requests the \\n autopsy, they could list the kind of things they \\n are looking for. And what kind of results they \\n want as part of that investigation. So I think for \\n the purposes that we put in the bill, that this co‐\\n vers it, Senator Stoops. At least I’m comfortable \\n with that. \\n S. Holdman: That’s right. And to your point, \\n Madame Chair, in any case the parent has to \\n consent to this procedure being done. It is not \\n going to be done just because the physician or \\n the hospital may want to have that done. It has \\n to be consented to by the parent itself. \\n S. Stoops: Right. So on page 15, line 9, where it \\n says: ‘A person who intentionally acquires, or \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 27\\n\\n sells, etc. or transfers fetal tissue, commits un‐\\n lawful transfer of fetal tissue and is a Level 5 fel‐\\n ony.’ So, is that if that person did not get per‐\\n mission from the parent? So otherwise if the par‐\\n ent gave permission, then that does not apply? \\n S. Holdman: That would be my understanding, yes. \\n I thought you were going to ask me what a \\n Level 5 Felony outcome was. And we have the \\n Criminal Courts Chair here who could answer \\n that question for you, as well. \\nId. at 23:17–25:43 \\n That exchange is remarkable, particularly because of the \\nrole of the pregnant woman’s consent for the research. Fed‐\\neral law already made clear that fetal tissue could not be used \\nfor any research purposes without the consent of the pregnant \\nwoman. 42 U.S.C. § 289g–1(b). The evidence here shows that \\nthe birth defect laboratory in Washington always obtains the \\nwoman’s consent to use tissue for research. And when called \\nupon to explain § 1.5 to their colleagues, the sponsors said \\n(a) that it would apply only to sale of fetal tissue in Indiana, \\nand (b) that the consent of the pregnant woman for research \\nuse would amount to a complete defense to the criminal re‐\\nstrictions. \\n Now, I am fully aware that legislatures are not required to \\nproduce legislative history. They are not required to explain \\nor discuss the language they enact. Courts generally presume \\nthat all legislators have read and understood the bills they \\nvote upon. As we try to be faithful agents of the law‐makers, \\nwe thus apply the ordinary meaning of the statutory lan‐\\nguage. After all, as the majority points out, one can have a \\n\\n28 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n“serious debate about when, if at all, it is ethical to perform \\nmedical experiments on aborted fetal tissue,” ultimately \\n“choosing sides.” Ante at 10. \\n In this instance, however, there was no such debate. In‐\\nstead, the law’s defenders have backed away from those ordi‐\\nnary meanings at every opportunity, first in the legislative \\nprocess and then in the lawsuit. This highly unusual record \\nought to raise warning flags for us. The statute is fatally vague \\nbecause its supporters did not pay enough attention to render \\nit intelligible as applied to this medical research, which is the \\nrelevant core, not the periphery, of this statute. \\n Consider this warning: “Under the Constitution, the adop‐\\ntion of new laws restricting liberty is supposed to be a hard \\nbusiness, the product of an open and public debate among a \\nlarge and diverse number of elected representatives. Allow‐\\ning the legislature to hand off the job of lawmaking risks sub‐\\nstituting this design for one where legislation is made easy, \\nwith a mere handful of unelected judges and prosecutors free \\nto ‘condem[n] all that [they] personally disapprove and for no \\nbetter reason than [they] disapprove it.’” Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at \\n1228 (Gorsuch, J., concurring), quoting Jordan, 341 U.S. at 242 \\n(Jackson, J., dissenting). \\n What happened here was just such a “hand‐off” of law‐\\nmaking power. It highlights why the majority’s solution here, \\nabstaining and leaving the statute‐writing task to the state \\ncourts, is not an appropriate response. The majority proposes \\nthat Indiana state courts should be permitted a decade or two \\nto resolve “edge questions.” like the “concrete disputes such \\nas the coverage of cells derived from fetal tissue.” Ante at \\n6 & 7. \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 29\\n\\n For example, will state courts decide that “placental or \\numbilical cord tissue” counts as “any other part of a fetus”? \\nMaybe, the majority says. On one hand, the majority muses, \\n“[t]he placenta is an independent organ and so may be out‐\\nside the statutory scope, but the statute does not address the \\ntopic.” Ante at 5. On the other hand, however, Indiana per‐\\nmits the purchase or sale of fetal material for “fetal stem cell” \\nresearch if “the biological parent has given written consent for \\nthe use of the fetal stem cells,” Ind. Code § 35‐46‐5‐3, but later \\ndefines “fetal stem cell” to include only the “placenta,” “um‐\\nbilical cord,” “amniotic fluid,” and “fetal tissue” if “taken \\nfrom a fetus that was either miscarried or stillborn”—not “any \\ncells that are taken as a result of an abortion,” Ind. Code § 16‐\\n18‐2‐128.5. Although that provision is limited to commercial \\ntransactions, which § 1.5 is not, perhaps that definition will \\nsupport the criminalization of the non‐commercial acquisi‐\\ntion and transfer of abortion‐derived umbilical and placental \\ncell. Plaintiffs apparently will just have to wait and see how \\nthe Indiana state courts will write that part of the statute. \\n The majority bases its preference for a state‐court iterative \\nprocess on Johnson, in which the Supreme Court declared the \\nstatute at issue vague only after struggling with it for 20 years, \\nwhile here “the process has not even begun.” Ante at 8. But \\nthat was not the real lesson of Johnson, even though the Court \\nacknowledged that “persistent efforts” by courts to establish \\na meaningful standard for a statute can be one source of “ev‐\\nidence of vagueness.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558 (2015), \\nquoting United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921). \\nThe Court did not signal that prosecutors and judges would \\nhave several decades to define what “edge” behavior is actu‐\\nally criminal just because a court hypothesizes that there must \\n\\n30 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nbe some knowable core of prohibited conduct. To the con‐\\ntrary, Johnson observed that its “holdings squarely contradict \\nthe theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely be‐\\ncause there is some conduct that clearly falls within the pro‐\\nvision’s grasp.” Id. at 2561 (describing examples). And note, \\ncritically, that Johnson was only about a sentencing enhance‐\\nment, not whether conduct was criminal in the first place. \\n In a context more similar to this case, the Court struck \\ndown a criminal statute that required “humane and sanitary” \\ndisposal of fetal remains. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Re‐\\nproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 451 (1983), overruled on \\nother grounds by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl‐\\nvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). To defend the provision, \\nAkron argued that it clearly intended only to “preclude the \\nmindless dumping of aborted fetuses onto garbage piles.” Id. \\n(internal quotation and citation omitted). The Court did not, \\nhowever, send the matter to the state courts to work out case \\nby case what would count on the periphery as “humane and \\nsanitary.” Rather, “[t]his level of uncertainty is fatal where \\ncriminal liability is imposed” because the statute “fails to give \\na physician ‘fair notice that his contemplated conduct is for‐\\nbidden,’ United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954), [and \\nthus] it violates the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 451–52. Nei‐\\nther did the Court indulge Akron’s proposal to sever “hu‐\\nmane” from the statute: “The uncertain meaning of the phrase \\n‘humane and sanitary’ leaves doubt as to whether the city \\nwould have enacted [the statute] with the word ‘sanitary’ \\nalone.” Id. at 452 n.45. In other words, the city was free “to \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 31\\n\\nenact more carefully drawn regulations,” id., but that was a \\nlegislative job—not a prosecutorial or judicial one.5 \\n The majority also reads too much into Bauer v. Shepard, 620 \\nF.3d 704, 706–07 (7th Cir. 2010), which considered a challenge \\nby two Indiana judges and an advocacy group to provisions \\nof Indiana’s Code of Judicial Conduct. In Bauer, the plaintiff‐\\njudges feared that responding to the group’s questionnaires \\nmight violate the state’s judicial ethics code. In that case, the \\nCommission on Judicial Qualifications might issue public ad‐\\nmonitions (if the subject of the admonition agreed), or a court \\nof appeals could remove the judge from a particular case, or, \\nas a matter of last resort, “the state’s Supreme Court c[ould] \\nremove [the] judge from office or impose substantial disci‐\\npline.” Id. at 707–08. We acknowledged that “[t]o the extent \\nthere is uncertainty” regarding some provisions, “Indiana \\nprovides means of clarification,” and the Commission on Ju‐\\ndicial Qualifications “already has issued several clarifying ad‐\\nvisory opinions.” Id. at 712. Judges who worried about further \\napplications of the Code should “wait and see,” we said, \\ngiven that beyond the “advisory opinions that reduce uncer‐\\ntainty,” when the “Commission brings a proceeding the state \\njudiciary will issue an opinion that makes the rule more con‐\\ncrete.” Id. at 716. \\n The majority quotes at length from Bauer to explain that it \\nis “more respectful of our judicial colleagues in Indiana, to as‐\\n\\n\\n\\n \\n 5 The majority writes that Akron was “overruled” by Planned \\nParenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), but \\nCasey did not overrule any portion of Akron dealing with the vague crim‐\\ninal statute on fetal remains. \\n\\n32 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nsume that they will act sensibly and resolve the open ques‐\\ntions in a way that honors candidates’ rights under the first \\namendment. When a statute is accompanied by [a] system \\nthat can flesh out details, the due process clause permits those \\ndetails to be left to that system.” Ante at 7, quoting Bauer, 620 \\nF.3d at 716. The bracketed “[a]” in the majority’s quotation, \\nhowever, stands in for Bauer’s actual language: “an adminis‐\\ntrative system”—which in that case was the Commission on \\nJudicial Qualifications and its ability to provide advisory \\nopinions. There is no parallel administrative system here that \\nwould justify the majority’s novel form of abstention. See also \\nBauer, 620 F.3d at 717 (describing Pullman abstention as an‐\\nother path to same result). \\n The majority’s approach also overlooks the fact that we \\nnow have experience with this statute, litigated with able \\ncounsel on both sides and full discovery, including deposi‐\\ntions and statements from internationally recognized scien‐\\ntific experts. It turns out that interpreting this law is a mess. \\nIn fact, the whole process makes a mockery of the standard \\nthat any “normal person” could figure out what is included \\nin “any other part of an aborted fetus.”6 \\n It is not the job of courts to tell legislators what processes \\nto follow toward the final enactment of the statutory language \\n\\n \\n 6 The majority’s surprising reliance on Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 \\n\\n(1974), and Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975), is misplaced. Parker upheld the \\nmilitary law forbidding “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentle‐\\nman,” but the Court’s opinion repeatedly emphasized the special consid‐\\nerations that apply to military law and tradition. 417 U.S. at 743–52, 756–\\n57, 760. Rose upheld a conviction for a “crime against nature,” drawing on \\na long common‐law tradition that has since been superseded. See Lawrence \\nv. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 33\\n\\nof their choice. Indiana is absolutely permitted to, as one leg‐\\nislator put it, move up from being “49 out of 50” in terms of \\nabortion restrictions, and “attempt[] to be the most restrictive \\nstate in the country … shooting for 50.” Senate Committee \\nHearing at 1:47:22–1:47:32 (Feb. 24, 2016). But it is our job to \\ninsist that the effort remain within constitutional parameters: \\nthat a new criminal law give fair notice of what is criminal \\nand what is not, and that the legislature make the key choices \\nrather than delegate them to prosecutors and courts. That \\nsimply did not happen with § 1.5. I would affirm the district \\ncourt’s injunction against its enforcement as written. \\n Takings Claim: Finally, we should not decide the merits of \\nIndiana University’s claim for taking of private property \\nwithout compensation. That claim simply is not ripe yet. The \\nmajority mistakenly asserts that the statute “does render val‐\\nueless any fetal tissue, derived from abortions, owned by In‐\\ndiana University.” Ante at 11. That is not consistent with the \\nposition taken by the law’s defenders. They insist that Indiana \\nUniversity remains free to conduct research with materials on \\nhand, and even to transfer it at the request of the NIH. Supra \\nat 21–22. \\n More fundamental, the legal status of Indiana University \\nvis‐à‐vis the state government is more nuanced than the ma‐\\njority acknowledges. For example, it is well‐established that \\nthe university is an arm of the state for purposes of the Elev‐\\nenth Amendment and is a state actor for purposes of the Four‐\\nteenth Amendment and other constitutional provisions. See \\nMedlock v. Trustees of Indiana University, 738 F.3d 867, 871 (7th \\nCir. 2013); Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2000). \\nBut Indiana law does not always treat the university as the \\nstate, particularly when it comes to property. See Sendak v. \\n\\n34 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nTrustees of Indiana University, 260 N.E.2d 601, 603–05 (Ind. \\n1970) (university not subject to constitutional bar to owner‐\\nship of private stock); State Board of Accounts v. Indiana Univer‐\\nsity Foundation, 647 N.E.2d 342, 352 (Ind. App. 1995) (univer‐\\nsity is “state” for purposes of State Board of Accounts statute \\nbut not in accepting and administering private gifts). The ma‐\\njority seems to imply that state legislators could simply con‐\\nfiscate private gifts and grants to the university (as distinct \\nfrom a private foundation associated with it) and use them for \\nmore general state‐government purposes. That would be a \\ntroubling prospect for many donors and grantors. We would \\ndo better to say that the university’s takings claim is simply \\nnot yet ripe because the actual scope of the challenged statute \\nremains in so much doubt.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4377176/\", \"author_raw\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4599923/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Trustees of Indiana University v. Terry Curry\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-14\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit \n ____________________ \n\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \nTRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY, et al., \n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, Cross‐Appellants, \n\n v. \n\nTERRY CURRY, Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County, Indi‐\nana, and CHRISTOPHER GAAL, Prosecuting Attorney of Mon‐\nroe County, Indiana, \n Defendants‐Appellants, Cross‐Appellees. \n ____________________ \n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the \n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. \n No. 1:16‐cv‐01289‐JMS‐DML — Jane E. Magnus‐Stinson, Chief Judge. \n ____________________ \n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 14, 2019 \n ____________________ \n\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit \nJudges. \n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In Indiana “[a] person who \nintentionally acquires, receives, sells, or transfers fetal tissue \ncommits unlawful transfer of fetal tissue, a Level 5 felony.” \nInd. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5(d). A federal district court held that \n\n2 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \n\nseveral terms in this statute are unconstitutionally vague and \nthat it must be treated as if it read: “A person who intention‐\nally sells fetal tissue commits unlawful transfer of fetal tis‐\nsue, a Level 5 felony.” 289 F. Supp. 3d 905, 934–35 (S.D. Ind. \n2018). The district court also held that a definitional clause is \ninvalid. As enacted, §35‐46‐5‐1.5(b) reads: “As used in this \nsection, ‘fetal tissue’ includes tissue, organs, or any other \npart of an aborted fetus.” This must be treated as if it read: \n“As used in this section, ‘fetal tissue’ includes tissue or or‐\ngans of an aborted fetus.” The district court thus held that \nthe words “acquires”, “receives”, and “transfers”, and the \nphrase “any other part”, are too uncertain to have legal \nforce. If that is right, then big chunks of the legal system are \ninvalid, because those words are ubiquitous in statutes, reg‐\nulations, and judicial opinions. \n This case began when Indiana University and three of its \nfaculty members filed this suit, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, \nagainst the state’s prosecuting attorneys in two counties. \nThey asked the district court to enjoin the prosecutors from \nattempting to enforce any part of §35‐46‐5‐1.5. According to \nthe plaintiffs, the statute not only is excessively vague but \nalso violates the First Amendment by blocking one kind of \nmedical research, takes the University’s property without \njust compensation, violates the Equal Protection Clause by \ndistinguishing fetal tissue produced by abortions from that \nproduced by miscarriages, and violates the dormant Com‐\nmerce Clause by regulating the interstate market in fetal tis‐\nsue. Plaintiffs do not contend that the statute imposes an un‐\ndue burden on any woman who seeks to have an abortion, \nnor would they have standing to make such an argument. \nInstead the three faculty‐member plaintiffs contend that the \nstatute interferes with medical scholarship. \n\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 3 \n\n As we have recounted, the district court found four \nwords or phrases to be unconstitutionally vague. It rejected \nplaintiffs’ theories under the First Amendment and the \nEqual Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And \nit did not come to a conclusion with respect to the Takings \nClause or the Commerce Clause, reasoning that because it \ncould not determine what the statute means, it could not \nproperly analyze it under either of those provisions. It then \nentered a permanent injunction in plaintiffs’ favor and \nclosed the case. Both sides have appealed. Plaintiffs want the \nwhole statute enjoined, while defendants want the injunc‐\ntion vacated and the suit dismissed. \n Justiciability is an initial problem. Indiana University, \nwhich is part of the State of Indiana, see Haynes v. Indiana \nUniversity, 902 F.3d 724, 731 (7th Cir. 2018), has sued two \nprosecutors who carry out state powers. The two defendants \nhave been sued in their official capacities, which means that \nthey must be treated as the State of Indiana. Will v. Michigan \nDepartment of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). There is consid‐\nerable doubt that federal courts are authorized to adjust \ngrievances among different parts of a state government. See, \ne.g., Illinois v. Chicago, 137 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1998) (a state \ncan’t sue part of itself); Arlington Heights v. Regional Transpor‐\ntation Authority, 653 F.2d 1149, 1150–53 (7th Cir. 1981) (part \nof a state can’t sue the state); Branson School District RE‐82 v. \nRomer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases). \nCf. South Bend v. South Bend Common Council, 865 F.3d 889 \n(7th Cir. 2017) (a city can’t sue a part of itself). The suit is \nsaved, however, by the fact that three faculty members are \nplaintiffs. All three have standing to litigate in their personal \ncapacities, and with one exception (to which we return) they \npresent all of the complaint’s legal theories. \n\n4 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \n\n We start with vagueness, the Due Process Clause theory \non which the district court based its injunction, and then ad‐\ndress the other four theories. \n The Constitution requires criminal statutes to have a core \nof understandable meaning. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, \n135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 \n(1975); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913). Some uncer‐\ntainty at the margins does not condemn a statute. It is there‐\nfore hard to see what can be wrong with words such as “ac‐\nquires,” which people use and understand in normal life. A \nperson “acquires” a car by buying it or leasing it or receiving \nit as a gift from a parent or spouse—or by stealing it. Even a \nprotean word such as “reasonable” has enough of a core to \nallow its use in situations where rights to speak are at issue. \nSee Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 324 (2002). \nWords such as “acquire” are materially (another protean le‐\ngal word) more definite than “reasonable.” \n Johnson shows that uncertainty so pervasive that most of \na law’s potential applications are impossible to evaluate may \nrule out enforcement. But the district court did not deny that \neach of the words “acquires”, “receives”, and “transfers”, \nand the phrase “any other part”, has a substantial, under‐\nstandable core. Instead the judge worried about the periph‐\nery. \n Take “transfers.” The judge thought it hard to know \nwhether a medical researcher “transfers” fetal material by \npassing a pipette containing fetal tissue to someone else at \nthe same laboratory bench. 289 F. Supp. 3d at 920. Or take \nthe phrase “any other part.” Although this ensures that the \nstatute covers every part of a fetus, the judge thought it hard \nto say how things work at the level of individual cells or \n\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 5 \n\nstrands of DNA. Suppose someone in Washington state \n(from which much of Indiana University’s fetal tissue comes) \nextracts a few cells from an aborted fetus and uses them to \ncreate a line of stem‐cell tissue, exemplars of which (dozens \nof generations later) are transferred to a researcher in Indi‐\nana. Is anything derived from fetal tissue included in the \nphrase “any other part”? The judge did not see a clear an‐\nswer. Id. at 918–19. These and similar open questions led the \njudge to deem the words and phrase unconstitutional. \n The two prosecutors did not help their defense by pro‐\nfessing to see answers to these and similar questions. They \nassured the judge that of course stem cells derived from fetal \ntissue are not “any other part” of a fetus. They asserted that \nmoving a pipette across a lab bench is of course not a “trans‐\nfer” of fetal tissue, because “transfer” means “convey own‐\nership.” That’s implausible. Federal statutes forbid the trans‐\nfer of heroin and other contraband, see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. \n§841(a)(1), and judges implementing such laws do not condi‐\ntion their application on a change of ownership; those laws \napply to people who act as agents as well as to principals. \nThe prosecutors also asserted that placental or umbilical \ncord tissue is of course not “any other part” of a fetus. Maybe: \nThe placenta is an independent organ and so may be outside \nthe statutory scope, but the statute does not address the top‐\nic. Prosecutors can’t offer definitive interpretations of crimi‐\nnal laws, and one prosecutor can’t bind a successor in office. \nMore: Indiana has 90 other counties, whose prosecutors may \nhave different ideas about the statute’s scope. The district \njudge was right to say that, if the prosecutors’ assurances are \nall the plaintiffs have to go on, they are at needless risk. \n\n6 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \n\n Yet although prosecutorial assurances should not set an‐\nyone’s mind at rest, the legal system offers a way to work \nout the uncertainties that lurk at every statute’s periphery: \nthe judiciary. Resolving edge questions is a principal role of \nthe courts. If the district court’s approach is correct, then \nevery time a court needs to decide a tough question about \njust how far a statute reaches, it should declare the law un‐\nconstitutional. That is fundamentally inconsistent with the \nSupreme Court’s approach, under which a core of meaning \nis enough to reject a vagueness challenge, leaving to future \nadjudication the inevitable questions at the statutory margin. \n A federal district judge cannot definitively interpret Ind. \nCode §35‐46‐5‐1.5, but the state judiciary can do so. Declara‐\ntory judgments are available in Indiana under Ind. Trial Rule \n57 and Ind. Code §34‐14‐1‐1. Any medical researcher can file \na suit with the theme: “I want to do X and fear that I will be \nprosecuted, so please give me a declaratory judgment that X \nis lawful.” Yet none of the plaintiffs has filed such a suit \nseeking assurances about the scope of §35‐46‐5‐1.5. Instead \nof using a readily available state‐law remedy for unwelcome \nrisk, they asked a federal court to blot the law from the \nbooks. That’s not how uncertainty should be addressed. \n We have held this already about uncertainty under Indi‐\nana law. Indiana forbids judges, and candidates for judicial \noffice, from making any public commitment “inconsistent \nwith the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of \njudicial office”. The scope for debate about the meaning of \nthat clause puts to shame any uncertainty about the meaning \nof Ind. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5, but we held the language valid, \neven when rights to speak are at stake—not because it is \nclear, but because the state offers a process to resolve debat‐\n\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 7 \n\nable issues. Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 715–17 (7th Cir. \n2010). We explained (id. at 716–17): \n Plaintiffs want us to deem the law vague by identifying situa‐\n tions in which state officials might take an untenably broad read‐\n ing of the [language], and then predicting that they will do so. It \n is far preferable, however, and more respectful of our judicial \n colleagues in Indiana, to assume that they will act sensibly and \n resolve the open questions in a way that honors candidates’ \n rights under the first amendment. \n When a statute is accompanied by [a] system that can flesh out \n details, the due process clause permits those details to be left to \n that system. Parts of the Hatch Act are every bit as vague as the \n [language here], but in [Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, \n 413 U.S. 548 (1973)] the Court held that problems of implementa‐\n tion could be tackled by administrative adjudication. 413 U.S. at \n 580. Similarly, in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), the Court \n held that an article of the Uniform Code of Military Justice mak‐\n ing it a court‐martial offense to engage in “conduct unbecoming \n an officer and a gentleman” is not unconstitutionally vague, be‐\n cause military tribunals have elaborated on what is “unbecom‐\n ing” for an officer and made it more specific than the unadorned \n words. The National Labor Relations Act is full of vague terms \n [such as “unfair labor practice”], and the National Labor Rela‐\n tions Board has yet to make all of them concrete, but no one \n supposes that the whole Act could be chucked out. The Justices \n have been chary of holding laws unconstitutional “on their face” \n precisely because they have recognized that vagueness will be \n reduced through a process of interpretation. \n\nThis is equally true of Ind. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5. Declaratory‐\njudgment actions can resolve ambiguities with limited (if \nany) risk to medical researchers. \n One thing the state judiciary might do—in addition to re‐\nsolving concrete disputes such as the coverage of cells de‐\nrived from fetal tissue—is read the word “intentionally” in \n§35‐46‐5‐1.5(d) to protect researchers who do not subjective‐\n\n8 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \n\nly understand that they are violating the law. That is what \nthe Supreme Court did in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 \n(1945), to save what is now codified as 18 U.S.C. §242, which \none might classify as the ultimately vague criminal statute. \n(It forbids any act under color of law that deprives anyone of \nany constitutional right.) This potential for risk reduction \nthrough interpretation, plus the fact that all of the contested \nterms have a substantial core of ascertainable meaning, leads \nus to reject the district court’s vagueness holding.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Trustees of Indiana University v. Terry Curry\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-14\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit \\n ____________________ \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\nTRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY, et al., \\n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, Cross‐Appellants, \\n\\n v. \\n\\nTERRY CURRY, Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County, Indi‐\\nana, and CHRISTOPHER GAAL, Prosecuting Attorney of Mon‐\\nroe County, Indiana, \\n Defendants‐Appellants, Cross‐Appellees. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the \\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. \\n No. 1:16‐cv‐01289‐JMS‐DML — Jane E. Magnus‐Stinson, Chief Judge. \\n ____________________ \\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 14, 2019 \\n ____________________ \\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit \\nJudges. \\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. In Indiana “[a] person who \\nintentionally acquires, receives, sells, or transfers fetal tissue \\ncommits unlawful transfer of fetal tissue, a Level 5 felony.” \\nInd. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5(d). A federal district court held that \\n\\n2 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nseveral terms in this statute are unconstitutionally vague and \\nthat it must be treated as if it read: “A person who intention‐\\nally sells fetal tissue commits unlawful transfer of fetal tis‐\\nsue, a Level 5 felony.” 289 F. Supp. 3d 905, 934–35 (S.D. Ind. \\n2018). The district court also held that a definitional clause is \\ninvalid. As enacted, §35‐46‐5‐1.5(b) reads: “As used in this \\nsection, ‘fetal tissue’ includes tissue, organs, or any other \\npart of an aborted fetus.” This must be treated as if it read: \\n“As used in this section, ‘fetal tissue’ includes tissue or or‐\\ngans of an aborted fetus.” The district court thus held that \\nthe words “acquires”, “receives”, and “transfers”, and the \\nphrase “any other part”, are too uncertain to have legal \\nforce. If that is right, then big chunks of the legal system are \\ninvalid, because those words are ubiquitous in statutes, reg‐\\nulations, and judicial opinions. \\n This case began when Indiana University and three of its \\nfaculty members filed this suit, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, \\nagainst the state’s prosecuting attorneys in two counties. \\nThey asked the district court to enjoin the prosecutors from \\nattempting to enforce any part of §35‐46‐5‐1.5. According to \\nthe plaintiffs, the statute not only is excessively vague but \\nalso violates the First Amendment by blocking one kind of \\nmedical research, takes the University’s property without \\njust compensation, violates the Equal Protection Clause by \\ndistinguishing fetal tissue produced by abortions from that \\nproduced by miscarriages, and violates the dormant Com‐\\nmerce Clause by regulating the interstate market in fetal tis‐\\nsue. Plaintiffs do not contend that the statute imposes an un‐\\ndue burden on any woman who seeks to have an abortion, \\nnor would they have standing to make such an argument. \\nInstead the three faculty‐member plaintiffs contend that the \\nstatute interferes with medical scholarship. \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 3 \\n\\n As we have recounted, the district court found four \\nwords or phrases to be unconstitutionally vague. It rejected \\nplaintiffs’ theories under the First Amendment and the \\nEqual Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And \\nit did not come to a conclusion with respect to the Takings \\nClause or the Commerce Clause, reasoning that because it \\ncould not determine what the statute means, it could not \\nproperly analyze it under either of those provisions. It then \\nentered a permanent injunction in plaintiffs’ favor and \\nclosed the case. Both sides have appealed. Plaintiffs want the \\nwhole statute enjoined, while defendants want the injunc‐\\ntion vacated and the suit dismissed. \\n Justiciability is an initial problem. Indiana University, \\nwhich is part of the State of Indiana, see Haynes v. Indiana \\nUniversity, 902 F.3d 724, 731 (7th Cir. 2018), has sued two \\nprosecutors who carry out state powers. The two defendants \\nhave been sued in their official capacities, which means that \\nthey must be treated as the State of Indiana. Will v. Michigan \\nDepartment of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). There is consid‐\\nerable doubt that federal courts are authorized to adjust \\ngrievances among different parts of a state government. See, \\ne.g., Illinois v. Chicago, 137 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1998) (a state \\ncan’t sue part of itself); Arlington Heights v. Regional Transpor‐\\ntation Authority, 653 F.2d 1149, 1150–53 (7th Cir. 1981) (part \\nof a state can’t sue the state); Branson School District RE‐82 v. \\nRomer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases). \\nCf. South Bend v. South Bend Common Council, 865 F.3d 889 \\n(7th Cir. 2017) (a city can’t sue a part of itself). The suit is \\nsaved, however, by the fact that three faculty members are \\nplaintiffs. All three have standing to litigate in their personal \\ncapacities, and with one exception (to which we return) they \\npresent all of the complaint’s legal theories. \\n\\n4 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n We start with vagueness, the Due Process Clause theory \\non which the district court based its injunction, and then ad‐\\ndress the other four theories. \\n The Constitution requires criminal statutes to have a core \\nof understandable meaning. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, \\n135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 \\n(1975); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913). Some uncer‐\\ntainty at the margins does not condemn a statute. It is there‐\\nfore hard to see what can be wrong with words such as “ac‐\\nquires,” which people use and understand in normal life. A \\nperson “acquires” a car by buying it or leasing it or receiving \\nit as a gift from a parent or spouse—or by stealing it. Even a \\nprotean word such as “reasonable” has enough of a core to \\nallow its use in situations where rights to speak are at issue. \\nSee Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 324 (2002). \\nWords such as “acquire” are materially (another protean le‐\\ngal word) more definite than “reasonable.” \\n Johnson shows that uncertainty so pervasive that most of \\na law’s potential applications are impossible to evaluate may \\nrule out enforcement. But the district court did not deny that \\neach of the words “acquires”, “receives”, and “transfers”, \\nand the phrase “any other part”, has a substantial, under‐\\nstandable core. Instead the judge worried about the periph‐\\nery. \\n Take “transfers.” The judge thought it hard to know \\nwhether a medical researcher “transfers” fetal material by \\npassing a pipette containing fetal tissue to someone else at \\nthe same laboratory bench. 289 F. Supp. 3d at 920. Or take \\nthe phrase “any other part.” Although this ensures that the \\nstatute covers every part of a fetus, the judge thought it hard \\nto say how things work at the level of individual cells or \\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 5 \\n\\nstrands of DNA. Suppose someone in Washington state \\n(from which much of Indiana University’s fetal tissue comes) \\nextracts a few cells from an aborted fetus and uses them to \\ncreate a line of stem‐cell tissue, exemplars of which (dozens \\nof generations later) are transferred to a researcher in Indi‐\\nana. Is anything derived from fetal tissue included in the \\nphrase “any other part”? The judge did not see a clear an‐\\nswer. Id. at 918–19. These and similar open questions led the \\njudge to deem the words and phrase unconstitutional. \\n The two prosecutors did not help their defense by pro‐\\nfessing to see answers to these and similar questions. They \\nassured the judge that of course stem cells derived from fetal \\ntissue are not “any other part” of a fetus. They asserted that \\nmoving a pipette across a lab bench is of course not a “trans‐\\nfer” of fetal tissue, because “transfer” means “convey own‐\\nership.” That’s implausible. Federal statutes forbid the trans‐\\nfer of heroin and other contraband, see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. \\n§841(a)(1), and judges implementing such laws do not condi‐\\ntion their application on a change of ownership; those laws \\napply to people who act as agents as well as to principals. \\nThe prosecutors also asserted that placental or umbilical \\ncord tissue is of course not “any other part” of a fetus. Maybe: \\nThe placenta is an independent organ and so may be outside \\nthe statutory scope, but the statute does not address the top‐\\nic. Prosecutors can’t offer definitive interpretations of crimi‐\\nnal laws, and one prosecutor can’t bind a successor in office. \\nMore: Indiana has 90 other counties, whose prosecutors may \\nhave different ideas about the statute’s scope. The district \\njudge was right to say that, if the prosecutors’ assurances are \\nall the plaintiffs have to go on, they are at needless risk. \\n\\n6 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\n Yet although prosecutorial assurances should not set an‐\\nyone’s mind at rest, the legal system offers a way to work \\nout the uncertainties that lurk at every statute’s periphery: \\nthe judiciary. Resolving edge questions is a principal role of \\nthe courts. If the district court’s approach is correct, then \\nevery time a court needs to decide a tough question about \\njust how far a statute reaches, it should declare the law un‐\\nconstitutional. That is fundamentally inconsistent with the \\nSupreme Court’s approach, under which a core of meaning \\nis enough to reject a vagueness challenge, leaving to future \\nadjudication the inevitable questions at the statutory margin. \\n A federal district judge cannot definitively interpret Ind. \\nCode §35‐46‐5‐1.5, but the state judiciary can do so. Declara‐\\ntory judgments are available in Indiana under Ind. Trial Rule \\n57 and Ind. Code §34‐14‐1‐1. Any medical researcher can file \\na suit with the theme: “I want to do X and fear that I will be \\nprosecuted, so please give me a declaratory judgment that X \\nis lawful.” Yet none of the plaintiffs has filed such a suit \\nseeking assurances about the scope of §35‐46‐5‐1.5. Instead \\nof using a readily available state‐law remedy for unwelcome \\nrisk, they asked a federal court to blot the law from the \\nbooks. That’s not how uncertainty should be addressed. \\n We have held this already about uncertainty under Indi‐\\nana law. Indiana forbids judges, and candidates for judicial \\noffice, from making any public commitment “inconsistent \\nwith the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of \\njudicial office”. The scope for debate about the meaning of \\nthat clause puts to shame any uncertainty about the meaning \\nof Ind. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5, but we held the language valid, \\neven when rights to speak are at stake—not because it is \\nclear, but because the state offers a process to resolve debat‐\\n\\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 7 \\n\\nable issues. Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 715–17 (7th Cir. \\n2010). We explained (id. at 716–17): \\n Plaintiffs want us to deem the law vague by identifying situa‐\\n tions in which state officials might take an untenably broad read‐\\n ing of the [language], and then predicting that they will do so. It \\n is far preferable, however, and more respectful of our judicial \\n colleagues in Indiana, to assume that they will act sensibly and \\n resolve the open questions in a way that honors candidates’ \\n rights under the first amendment. \\n When a statute is accompanied by [a] system that can flesh out \\n details, the due process clause permits those details to be left to \\n that system. Parts of the Hatch Act are every bit as vague as the \\n [language here], but in [Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, \\n 413 U.S. 548 (1973)] the Court held that problems of implementa‐\\n tion could be tackled by administrative adjudication. 413 U.S. at \\n 580. Similarly, in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), the Court \\n held that an article of the Uniform Code of Military Justice mak‐\\n ing it a court‐martial offense to engage in “conduct unbecoming \\n an officer and a gentleman” is not unconstitutionally vague, be‐\\n cause military tribunals have elaborated on what is “unbecom‐\\n ing” for an officer and made it more specific than the unadorned \\n words. The National Labor Relations Act is full of vague terms \\n [such as “unfair labor practice”], and the National Labor Rela‐\\n tions Board has yet to make all of them concrete, but no one \\n supposes that the whole Act could be chucked out. The Justices \\n have been chary of holding laws unconstitutional “on their face” \\n precisely because they have recognized that vagueness will be \\n reduced through a process of interpretation. \\n\\nThis is equally true of Ind. Code §35‐46‐5‐1.5. Declaratory‐\\njudgment actions can resolve ambiguities with limited (if \\nany) risk to medical researchers. \\n One thing the state judiciary might do—in addition to re‐\\nsolving concrete disputes such as the coverage of cells de‐\\nrived from fetal tissue—is read the word “intentionally” in \\n§35‐46‐5‐1.5(d) to protect researchers who do not subjective‐\\n\\n8 Nos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \\n\\nly understand that they are violating the law. That is what \\nthe Supreme Court did in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 \\n(1945), to save what is now codified as 18 U.S.C. §242, which \\none might classify as the ultimately vague criminal statute. \\n(It forbids any act under color of law that deprives anyone of \\nany constitutional right.) This potential for risk reduction \\nthrough interpretation, plus the fact that all of the contested \\nterms have a substantial core of ascertainable meaning, leads \\nus to reject the district court’s vagueness holding.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1193,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443932,"string":"8,443,932"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"In the MATTER OF: Chester B. STEENES, Debtors-Appellees. Appeals of: City of Chicago, Illinois"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Matter Of Steenes"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-14"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"Nos. 17-3630; 17-3663 & 17-3664"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Easterbrook, Hamilton, Rovner\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415363/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443932/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: In the MATTER OF: Chester B. STEENES, Debtors-Appellees. Appeals of: City of Chicago, Illinois\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-14\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: In the MATTER OF: Chester B. STEENES, Debtors-Appellees. Appeals of: City of Chicago, Illinois\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-14\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1194,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443939,"string":"8,443,939"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"KREG THERAPEUTICS, INC. v. VITALGO, INC."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Kreg Therapeutics, Inc. v. Vitalgo, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-14"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"Nos. 17-3005 & 17-3227"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Barrett, Eve, Sykes\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415370/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443939/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: KREG THERAPEUTICS, INC. v. VITALGO, INC.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-14\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: KREG THERAPEUTICS, INC. v. VITALGO, INC.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-14\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1195,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4600327,"string":"4,600,327"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Annie Laurie GAYLOR, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Steven T. MNUCHIN, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants, and Edward Peecher, Et Al., Intervening Defendants-Appellants."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Annie Gaylor v. Steven Mnuchin"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1277 & 18-1280"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Bauer, Manion, Brennan\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"No. 16-cv-215 - Barbara B. Crabb, Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\nANNIE LAURIE GAYLOR, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\\n v.\\n\\nSTEVEN T. MNUCHIN, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellants,\\n\\n and\\nEDWARD PEECHER, et al.,\\n Intervening\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n\\n\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-215 — Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED OCTOBER 24, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Since the Founders crafted the Re-\\nligion Clauses of the First Amendment, courts have grappled\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nwith the “play in the joints” between them. Walz v. Tax Comm.\\nof City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). This case calls us to do\\nso once more. Freedom From Religion Foundation (“FFRF”)\\nclaims that a longstanding tax code exemption for religious\\nhousing, 26 U.S.C. § 107(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, vi-\\nolates the Establishment Clause. The district court agreed.\\nThe U.S. Treasury Department and several intervening reli-\\ngious organizations ask us to reinstate the exemption, assert-\\ning that the survival of many congregations hangs in the\\nbalance. We must decide whether excluding housing allow-\\nances from ministers’ taxable income is a law “respecting an\\nestablishment of religion” in violation of the First Amend-\\nment.\\n I.\\n A. History of § 107(2)\\n The facts before us are not in dispute. The Sixteenth\\nAmendment was ratified in 1913, authorizing Congress to\\nlevy an income tax. Congress imposed a federal income tax\\nthat same year and has levied one in various forms since. As\\na result, Congress and the Treasury Department needed to\\ndefine taxable “income.” A rule defining income that survives\\ntoday in the Internal Revenue Code is the “convenience-of-\\nthe-employer” doctrine. Under that doctrine, housing pro-\\nvided to employees for the convenience of their employer is\\nexempt from taxable income. Early examples of exclusions\\nunder the doctrine include housing provided to sailors living\\naboard ships, workers living in camps, and hospital employ-\\nees. But the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine was not\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 3\\n\\nmade available to ministers.1 In 1921, the Treasury Depart-\\nment announced ministers would be taxed on the fair rental\\nvalue of parsonages provided as living quarters. O.D. 862, 4\\nC.B. 85 (1921).\\n Congress reacted quickly and enacted a statute to exclude\\nchurch-provided parsonages from the taxable income of min-\\nisters. The Treasury Department interpreted this statute to\\napply only to housing provided in-kind; cash housing allow-\\nances were included in income. I.T. 1694, C.B. II-1, at 79 (1923).\\nThis continued for decades until in the 1950s several ministers\\nsuccessfully challenged the limitation to in-kind housing.2\\nCongress then enacted 26 U.S.C. § 107, which provides:\\n In the case of a minister of the gospel, gross in-\\n come does not include—\\n (1) the rental value of a home furnished to him\\n as part of his compensation; or\\n (2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of\\n his compensation, to the extent used by him to\\n rent or provide a home …\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 The text of the tax code refers specifically to “ministers of the gos-\\npel,” so we use that term. Courts have long held the provision applies to\\nreligious leaders of any denomination, regardless of formal title. See, e.g.,\\nSalkov v. Comm’r, 46 T.C. 190, 194 (1966) (holding a Jewish cantor was a\\n“minister of the gospel”).\\n 2 See, e.g., Williamson v. Comm’r, 224 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1955); Conning\\nv. Busey, 127 F. Supp. 958 (S.D. Ohio 1954); MacColl v. United States,\\n91 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1950).\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nSection 107(1) reauthorized the in-kind parsonage exemption\\nin place since the 1920s. Section 107(2) authorized the IRS to\\nalso exempt cash allowances from ministers’ taxable income.3\\n B. District Court Proceedings\\n FFRF describes itself as a “nonprophet nonprofit” organi-\\nzation that “[t]akes legal action challenging entanglement of\\nreligion and government, government endorsement or pro-\\nmotion of religion.” What Does the Foundation Do?, FREEDOM\\nFROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, https://ffrf.org/faq/item/15001-\\nwhat-does-the-foundation-do (last visited March 10, 2019).\\nSeeking to challenge both § 107(1) and § 107(2), FFRF paid its\\nco-presidents Annie Gaylor and Dan Barker a portion of their\\nsalaries in the form of a housing allowance. FFRF also paid\\nthis housing allowance to a former president of the organiza-\\ntion, Anne Nicol Gaylor (“Nicol Gaylor”).4 FFRF, Gaylor,\\nBarker, and Nicol Gaylor, none of whom meet the IRS’s defi-\\nnition of “minister,” then sued the Treasury Department,\\nclaiming § 107 violates the First Amendment because it con-\\nditions a tax benefit on religious affiliation. We dismissed this\\nchallenge for lack of standing because FFRF and its employees\\nnever applied for § 107(1) or § 107(2) exemptions, so they were\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3An amicus brief from the University of St. Thomas School of Law\\n(Minnesota) estimates that of the United States’ 384,000 congregations,\\n200,000 to 300,000 provide a housing allowance to their ministers under\\n26 U.S.C. § 107(2).\\n 4 Nicol Gaylor, Annie Gaylor’s mother and co-founder of FFRF,\\npassed away during the initial lawsuit filed by FFRF. Although the party\\nto this lawsuit is technically the Estate of Anne Nicol Gaylor, we refer to\\nher as “Nicol Gaylor” for brevity.\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 5\\n\\nnever denied them. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v.\\nLew, 773 F.3d 815, 825 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Lew”).\\n In response, Gaylor and Barker filed amended tax returns\\nfor 2012 and 2013 claiming refunds for their housing allow-\\nances under § 107(2); Nicol Gaylor did the same for 2013. The\\nIRS erroneously issued refunds to Gaylor and Barker for 2013\\nbut made no decisions on plaintiffs’ other claims. After more\\nthan six months without IRS action on plaintiffs’ claims, FFRF\\nand its employees brought this suit. The IRS then denied the\\n2012 refund claims because none of the claimants were minis-\\nters.\\n The Treasury Department moved to dismiss FFRF’s\\n§ 107(1) challenge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The\\ndistrict court granted the motion for the same reasons we\\narticulated in Lew: FFRF’s employees never claimed a § 107(1)\\nexemption. FFRF does not appeal that ruling. Later, the dis-\\ntrict court permitted several pastors who receive housing\\nallowances and their associated religious organizations to in-\\ntervene to defend § 107(2).5\\n The Treasury Department and intervenors moved for\\nsummary judgment. The district court denied their motions\\nand instead granted summary judgment to FFRF and its em-\\nployees. The court held that FFRF and its employees had\\nstanding to challenge § 107(2), and that that statute violates\\nthe Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Gaylor v.\\n\\n\\n 5 The intervening defendants are Bishop Edward Peecher, the Chicago\\n\\nEmbassy Church, Father Patrick Malone, the Holy Cross Church, the\\nDiocese of Chicago and Mid-America of the Russian Orthodox Church\\nOutside of Russia, and Pastor Christopher Butler. Each of the intervenors\\nreceive or provide housing allowances under § 107(2).\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nMnuchin, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1104 (W.D. Wis. 2017). The\\ncourt held that § 107(2) violated the secular purpose prong of\\nthe test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and\\nruled that the statute’s true purpose was to “provide aid to a\\ngroup of religious persons.” Gaylor, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 1099.\\nThe court rejected the argument that § 107(2) avoids excessive\\ngovernment entanglement with religion, because in the\\ncourt’s view “concerns about entanglement [do not] justify\\npreferential treatment for religious persons.” Id. The Treasury\\nDepartment and the intervenors appeal.\\n II.\\n Neither the Treasury Department nor the intervenors\\ndispute the district court’s ruling that FFRF has standing to\\nchallenge § 107(2). Nevertheless, even if the issue has not been\\nraised, if there is no Article III standing our court must dis-\\nmiss the suit. Diedrich v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 839 F.3d\\n583, 588 (7th Cir. 2016). We evaluate standing to determine\\nwhether FFRF resolved the deficiencies we noted in Lew.\\n To establish Article III standing, plaintiffs must show they\\nhave suffered “(1) a concrete and particularized ‘injury in fact’\\n(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the de-\\nfendant, and that is (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable\\njudicial decision.” Lew, 773 F.3d at 819 (citing Lujan v.\\nDefenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). To challenge\\nthe constitutionality of a tax provision, a plaintiff must have\\n“personally claimed and been denied the exemption.” Lew,\\n773 F.3d at 821.\\n An essential element of “injury in fact” is that the injury\\nbe “actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 7\\n\\nLujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotations and citations omit-\\nted). When FFRF filed this action, Gaylor and Barker had yet\\nto be denied a refund from their 2012 tax returns, and Nicol\\nGaylor had still, by the time of the district court’s decision,\\nreceived no answer to her 2013 refund request. Yet this does\\nnot necessarily mean FFRF lacked standing. Under 26 U.S.C.\\n§ 6532(a)(1), an income tax refund suit may be filed no earlier\\nthan six months after the refund claim was submitted. A stat-\\nute cannot “‘lower the threshold for standing below the min-\\nimum requirements imposed by the Constitution,’ but\\nCongress does have the power to ‘enact statutes creating legal\\nrights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no\\ninjury would exist without the statute.’” Sterk v. Redbox\\nAutomated Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 2014) (quot-\\ning Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 294 (7th\\nCir. 2000)).\\n The district court concluded it was reasonable to interpret\\n§ 6532(a)(1) as rendering a claim “effectively denied if the IRS\\ndoes not render a decision within six months.” Gaylor, 278\\nF. Supp. 3d at 1087. We agree. As the district court noted, pre-\\nventing a claimant from filing a refund suit until the IRS\\nresponded to the claim “would allow the IRS to deprive a\\nparty of standing indefinitely by withholding a decision.” Id.\\nat 1088. Several courts of appeals have cited the six-month fil-\\ning requirement approvingly. See, e.g., Fletcher v. United States,\\n452 Fed. App’x 547, 552 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[B]efore a taxpayer\\ncan bring a refund suit, he or she must … wait until either the\\nIRS denies the claim or six months have expired since filing\\nthe administrative claim.”); Dumont v. United States, 345 Fed.\\nApp’x 586, 590 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[A] suit … cannot be insti-\\ntuted until either the IRS denies the claim or six months pass\\nwithout its taking action.”); Sorenson v. Secʹy of Treasury of\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nU.S., 752 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1985), affʹd, 475 U.S. 851\\n(1986) (“The former section prohibits the courts from enter-\\ntaining any refund suit filed before the expiration of six\\nmonths from the date the claim for refund is filed … .”); see\\nalso Lew, 773 F.3d at 821 n.3 (“The plaintiffs could have … paid\\nincome tax on their housing allowance, claimed refunds from\\nthe IRS, and then sued if the IRS rejected or failed to act upon\\ntheir claims.”) (emphasis added).\\n Gaylor, Barker, and Nicol Gaylor have properly alleged a\\n“concrete, dollars-and-cents injury.” Lew, 773 F.3d at 821.\\n“[T]hey have incurred a cost or been denied a benefit on\\naccount of their religion [or lack thereof],” Arizona Christian\\nSch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 536 U.S. 125, 130 (2011), which con-\\nfers Article III standing. Because its members have standing\\nand the contested issue is germane to its organizational pur-\\npose, FFRF has organizational standing to sue as well. See\\nSierra Club v. United States E.P.A., 774 F.3d 383, 388–89 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (“‘An organization has standing to sue if (1) at least\\none of its members would otherwise have standing; (2) the\\ninterests at stake in the litigation are germane to the organiza-\\ntion’s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief\\nrequested requires an individual member’s participation in\\nthe lawsuit.’”) (quoting Sierra Club v. Franklin Cty. Power of Ill.\\nLLC, 546 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 2008)).\\n III.\\n This case comes to us after a grant of summary judgment,\\nso we assess the parties’ claims de novo. Freedom from Religion\\nFound., Inc. v. Concord Cmty. Sch., 885 F.3d 1038, 1045 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (“Concord”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 9\\n\\n Currently, Establishment Clause jurisprudence incorpo-\\nrates a number of tests when evaluating the constitutionality\\nof government action. Two are relevant to this case: the test\\nannounced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and the\\n“historical significance” test of Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572\\nU.S. 565, 576 (2014).6 Because the Supreme Court has not clar-\\nified which should take precedence, we evaluate FFRF’s\\nclaims under both tests and associated case law. See Concord,\\n885 F.3d at 1045 n.1 (“Indeed, there is debate among the Jus-\\ntices about the continuing validity of the endorsement\\ntest. … For now, we do not feel free to jettison that test alto-\\ngether … .”).7 We consider this case under the Lemon test in\\n\\n\\n 6 A third relevant to this challenge, the endorsement test, clarifies\\nLemon and is woven into our consideration of § 107(2) under the Lemon\\ntest, particularly under the second prong. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion\\nFound., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, Wis., 203 F.3d 487, 493 (7th Cir. 2000), as\\namended on denial of rehʹg and rehʹg en banc (Mar. 22, 2000) (“[T]he effect\\nprong of [the Lemon] test has been analyzed under the ‘perception of en-\\ndorsement’ test developed in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)\\n(O’Connor, J., concurring).”).\\n 7 An amicus brief filed by Wisconsin and fifteen other states notes the\\nSupreme Court has not applied the Lemon test to a religious freedom case\\nin many years. Even so, until the Supreme Court explicitly overturns\\nLemon we must apply it, as well as the other tests more recently relied\\nupon by the Court. Other circuit courts also apply multiple tests when\\nconsidering a challenge under the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., American\\nHumanist Assoc. v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 525–26 (5th Cir. 2017) (balancing\\nthe Lemon, endorsement, and coercion tests against the historical signifi-\\ncance test in Town of Greece); Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs,\\n788 F.3d 580, 586–87 (6th Cir. 2015) (setting forth Lemon, the endorsement\\ntest, and Town of Greece as the “three main jurisprudential threads” that\\nmust be woven together in assessing government action under the Estab-\\nlishment Clause).\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nthis Part of this opinion, and under the “historical signifi-\\ncance” test in Part IV.\\n Lemon summarized prior case law into a three-prong test:\\n“[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;\\nsecond, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither\\nadvances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not\\nfoster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”\\n403 U.S. at 612–13 (internal citations and quotations omitted).\\nThis test is not cumulative: if § 107(2) fails any of Lemon’s three\\nprongs, it violates the Establishment Clause.\\n A. Secular Legislative Purpose\\n We first examine whether § 107(2) has a secular legislative\\npurpose. “When the government acts with the ostensible and\\npredominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that\\ncentral Establishment Clause value of official religious neu-\\ntrality, there being no neutrality when the government’s os-\\ntensible object is to take sides.” McCreary Cty., Ky. v. Am. Civil\\nLiberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (citing Corpora-\\ntion of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day\\nSaints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987)). A statute is unconsti-\\ntutional under this test “only when … there [is] no question\\nthat the statute … was motivated wholly by religious consid-\\nerations.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984). The\\nTreasury Department and intervenors point to three secular\\nlegislative purposes of the statute: to eliminate discrimination\\nagainst ministers, to eliminate discrimination between minis-\\nters, and to avoid excessive entanglement with religion. FFRF\\ncounters that § 107(2) was passed to confer a government ben-\\nefit on religion, which necessarily violates the Establishment\\nClause.\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 11\\n\\n We will defer to a government’s sincere articulation of sec-\\nular purpose, so long as the plaintiffs have not proved that\\narticulation of purpose is a sham. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482\\nU.S. 578, 586–87 (1987) (“While the Court is normally defer-\\nential to a State’s articulation of a secular purpose, it is\\nrequired that the statement of such purpose be sincere and\\nnot a sham.”); Cohen v. City of Des Plaines, 8 F.3d 484, 489 (7th\\nCir. 1993) (“We will defer to a municipality’s sincere articula-\\ntion of a secular purpose.”). This does not mean “that the\\nlaw’s purpose must be unrelated to religion … .” Amos, 483\\nU.S. at 335. Instead, “the government lacks a secular purpose\\nunder Lemon only when ‘there is no question that the statute\\nor activity was motivated wholly by religious considera-\\ntions.’” Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Clarke, 588 F.3d 523,\\n527–28 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Books v. Elkhart Cty., 401 F.3d\\n857, 863 (7th Cir. 2005), in turn quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680).\\nSo we evaluate the purposes articulated by the Treasury De-\\npartment to determine whether they are sincere, or whether\\nthe government’s “‘actual purpose is to endorse or disap-\\nprove of religion.’” Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585 (quoting Lynch,\\n465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).\\n The Treasury Department first contends Congress passed\\n§ 107 to put ministers on equal footing with secular employ-\\nees receiving the same benefits; in other words, to eliminate\\ndiscrimination against ministers. The Treasury Department\\npoints to its 1921 decision to not exclude parsonages from tax-\\nable income and Congress’s quick passage of the parsonage\\nexemption, now codified at § 107(1), in response. The Treas-\\nury Department argues this is a secular purpose because it\\nsimply places religious employees on par with secular ones.\\nFFRF counters that the benefits given to ministers under\\n§ 107(2) are different—and better—than those the tax code\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\ngives to secular employees. FFRF argues putting ministers in\\na better position than secular employees promotes the dis-\\nsemination of religious ideas and thus cannot be secular.\\n To determine whether § 107(2) confers a special benefit, or\\nsimply integrates ministers into an existing tax system, we\\nmust delve into the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine.\\nThough the doctrine was originally developed in Treasury\\nDepartment regulations, it has since been codified in several\\nplaces. The principal statute is 26 U.S.C. § 119(a)(2) and ex-\\nempts meals and lodging furnished to employees if they meet\\nfive requirements: the meal or lodging is furnished (1) by an\\nemployer to an employee, (2) in kind (as opposed to in cash),\\n(3) on the business premises of the employer, (4) for the con-\\nvenience of the employer, and (5) as a condition of employ-\\nment. See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.119-1(b) (2018). This exemption\\napplies generally: any qualifying employee can rely on\\n§ 119(a)(2), including religious employees.8\\n The express proof requirements of § 119(a)(2) are relaxed\\nthroughout the tax code for various types of employees. Sec-\\ntion 119(c) exempts employees living in a foreign camp from\\nneeding to fulfill the “business premises” and “condition of\\nemployment” factors. Section 119(d) exempts certain teachers\\nand university employees from the convenience-of-the-\\nemployer doctrine altogether, and allows them to exclude\\nfrom taxable income the fair rental value of campus housing.\\n Myriad provisions in Title 26 employ this categorical\\napproach and exempt any form of housing benefits, whether\\n\\n\\n 8 For additional history on the development of the convenience-of-the-\\n\\nemployer doctrine, see Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 84–96 (1977).\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 13\\n\\nin cash or in kind: § 132 and § 162 exclude housing provided\\nto an employee away on business for less than a year; § 134\\nexcludes housing provided to current or former members of\\nthe military; § 911 excludes housing above a certain level pro-\\nvided to citizens or residents living abroad; § 912 excludes\\nhousing provided to government employees living abroad;\\nand, of course, § 107 excludes housing provided to ministers.\\nThese categorical exemptions allow hundreds of thousands of\\nemployees (including ministers) to receive tax-exempt\\nhousing every year without needing to satisfy the proof re-\\nquirements of § 119(a)(2).\\n These parallel provisions show an overarching arrange-\\nment in the tax code to exempt employer-provided housing\\nfor employees with certain job-related housing requirements.\\nCongress has exempted certain categories of employees from\\ncomplying with the specific requirements of § 119(a)(2) to\\nsimplify the application of the convenience-of-the-employer\\ndoctrine to those occupations. Section 107, including subsec-\\ntion (2), recognizes ministers often use their homes as part of\\ntheir ministry. This provision thus eases the administration of\\nthe convenience-of-the-employer doctrine by providing a\\nbright-line rule, instead of requiring that ministers and the\\nIRS repeatedly engage with a fact-intensive standard.\\n Reading § 107(2) in isolation from the other convenience-\\nof-the-employer provisions, and then highlighting the term\\n“minister,” could make the challenged statute appear to pro-\\nvide a government benefit exclusively to the religious. But\\nreading it in context, as we must, we see § 107(2) is simply one\\nof many per se rules that provide a tax exemption to employ-\\nees with work-related housing requirements. See ANTONIN\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nSCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 252 (2012) (“‘Sev-\\neral acts in pari materia, and relating to the same subject, are to\\nbe taken together, and compared in construction of them, be-\\ncause they are considered as having one object in view, and\\nas acting upon one system.’”) (quoting 1 James Kent, Commen-\\ntaries on American Law 433 (1826)); see also Mueller v. Allen, 463\\nU.S. 388, 396 (1983) (upholding Minnesota tax deduction for\\ntuition expenses, primarily used by parents of children at sec-\\ntarian schools, in part because the deduction was “only one\\namong many deductions—such as those for medical ex-\\npenses … and charitable contributions … available under the\\nMinnesota tax laws”). Congress’s policy choice to ease the ad-\\nministration of the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine by\\napplying a categorical exclusion is a secular purpose, not\\n“motivated wholly by religious considerations.” Lynch, 465\\nU.S. at 680.\\n FFRF argues considering the context of § 107(2) is inapt.\\nTo FFRF, the benefits the statute provides apply to a broader\\ncategory of persons—any minister, as opposed to any minis-\\nter that uses his or her home for religious purposes—than\\nother categorical housing exclusions in the tax code. The dis-\\ntrict court agreed, and found that § 107(2) is not analogous to\\nother bright-line housing benefit provisions in the tax code\\nbecause, in comparison, it is overinclusive. Gaylor, 278\\nF. Supp. 3d at 1095 (“[Sections 134, 911, and 912] relate to em-\\nployees whose housing is necessarily affected by their\\njobs. … Some ministers may be in a similar situation … but by\\nno means are all ministers so restricted … .”) (emphasis in\\noriginal).\\n It is not immediately apparent that § 107(2) is broader than\\nthe other categorical exemptions for employee housing. For\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 15\\n\\nexample, under 26 U.S.C. § 911, any person living abroad is\\npermitted to exclude or deduct housing expenses, regardless\\nwhether that person is living abroad at the behest of his or her\\nemployer.\\n But to the extent § 107(2) may be overinclusive, that alone\\ndoes not render the statute unconstitutional. FFRF’s argu-\\nment is a critique of categorical rules generally, rather than of\\n§ 107(2) specifically. “Read literally, rules are generally over-\\ninclusive and underinclusive if assessed by references to their\\npurposes. There is always a gap between the justification for\\na rule … and the rule itself.” Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with\\nRules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 990–91 (1995). No rule will per-\\nfectly address the concerns to which it is addressed, because\\n“[a]ll generalizations … are to some degree invalid, and hence\\nevery rule of law has a few corners that do not quite fit.” An-\\ntonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.\\n1175, 1177 (1989). Categorical rules sacrifice precision of result\\nfor administrative ease and equality of result. So it is not sur-\\nprising that § 107(2) covers some housing allowances that\\nmay be excluded under a case-by-case discretionary standard.\\nIn this respect, § 107(2) is not an outlier.\\n Important to our consideration, any imprecision does not\\nmake § 107(2) any less analogous to other “convenience-of-\\nthe-employer” related provisions in the tax code. Each covers\\na different subset of eligible taxpayers and activities, but they\\nall serve a common purpose: excluding from taxable income\\ncertain employment-related expenses. The constitutionality\\nof § 107(2) does not turn on which ministers the statute in-\\ncludes or excludes. See, e.g., Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 95–96\\n(“[A]rguments of equity have little force in construing the\\nboundaries of exclusions and deductions from income many\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nof which, to be administrable, must be arbitrary.”); Delong v.\\nDepʹt of Health & Human Servs., 264 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir.\\n2001) (“Like all bright line rules, [the statute] is both over-\\ninclusive and under-inclusive, but the imprecision of the stat-\\nute does not make it unconstitutional.”).\\n The second secular legislative purpose cited by the Treas-\\nury Department is elimination of discrimination between\\nministers. The government argues Congress passed § 107(2)\\nbecause providing the tax exemption only to ministers given\\nin-kind housing tended to exclude ministers of smaller or\\npoorer denominations. FFRF argues this is a sham and the\\ntrue justification was to subsidize religion, based on a state-\\nment made in the early 1950s by § 107(2)’s sponsoring repre-\\nsentative Peter Mack: “Certainly, in these times when we are\\nbeing threatened by a godless and antireligious world move-\\nment we should correct this discrimination against certain\\nministers who are carrying on such a courageous fight against\\nthis foe.” Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means:\\nStatement of Hon. Peter F. Mack, Jr., on H.R. 4275, Concerning the\\nTaxability of a Cash Allowance Paid to Clergymen in Lieu of\\nFurnishing Them a Dwelling, 83d. Cong. 1, at 1576 (June 9,\\n1953). The Treasury Department and intervenors respond by\\nquoting other statements by Representative Mack from the\\nsame hearing, such as that the bill was proposed because\\n“present tax laws are discriminatory among our clergy,” id. at\\n1574–75, and because he believed “a serious injustice [was]\\nbeing done to those ministers who must provide their own\\nhome,” id. at 1576.\\n This smattering of legislative history does not establish\\nRepresentative Mack’s motives in proposing the bill. Even if\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 17\\n\\nhis first quote above did so, the motivation of one representa-\\ntive in a House of 435 does not definitively reveal the impetus\\nbehind the bill’s passage. At the same hearing, other repre-\\nsentatives stated different motives. Speaking on the same pro-\\nposed provision, Representative Ray G. McKennan said the\\nchanges were proposed to “create an equitable condition for\\nministers similarly situated, and would probably eliminate\\ncourt action [by ministers suing for discrimination].” Id. at\\n1574.\\n The legislative record does not establish a singular motive\\nbehind § 107(2). Conflicting statements among members of\\nCongress—even by the same member—reveal the unreliabil-\\nity of this legislative history. Certainly, these statements do\\nnot render “a sham” the Treasury Department’s proffered\\npurpose of avoiding discrimination among religions. Cf.\\nEdwards, 482 U.S. at 586–87. As such, we take the government\\nat its word, which resolves this question. “The clearest com-\\nmand of the Establishment Clause is that one religious\\ndenomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”\\nLarson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). Avoidance of dis-\\ncrimination against certain religions in favor of others is a per-\\nmissible secular legislative purpose.\\n The third secular legislative purpose cited by the Treasury\\nDepartment is to avoid excessive entanglement with religion.\\nTo the government, Congress’s decision to exempt ministers\\nfrom the proof requirements of § 119(a)(2) prevents the IRS\\nfrom conducting intrusive inquiries into how religious organ-\\nizations use their facilities. See, e.g., Amos, 483 U.S. at 339\\n(“avoid[ing] … intrusive inquiry into religious belief …” pre-\\nvents entanglement). FFRF responds that § 107(2) does not\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\navoid such entanglement because the IRS must still adminis-\\nter a test to determine whether a taxpayer qualifies as a min-\\nister. FFRF argues this is as fact-intensive an audit as the\\ninquiry administered for the generally applicable statutory\\nexemption, § 119(a)(2).\\n On this entanglement question, two Supreme Court deci-\\nsions are particularly instructive. In Walz v. Tax Comm. of City\\nof N.Y., the Court upheld a New York property tax exemption\\nfor properties owned by churches and used exclusively for re-\\nligious worship. Walz disagreed with the lower court’s exam-\\nination of churches’ contribution to the social welfare to\\ndetermine whether the tax exemption had a secular purpose:\\n To give emphasis to so variable an aspect of the\\n work of religious bodies would introduce an\\n element of governmental evaluation and stand-\\n ards as to the worth of particular social welfare\\n programs, thus producing a kind of continuing\\n day-to-day relationship which the policy of\\n neutrality seeks to minimize.\\n397 U.S. at 674. Similarly, in Amos v. Corporation of the Presiding\\nBishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the\\nSupreme Court upheld a categorical exemption for religious\\norganizations from the provisions of Title VII of the Civil\\nRights Act of 1964. The opinion noted that, under Lemon, “it\\nis a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant\\ngovernmental interference with the ability of religious organ-\\nizations to define and carry out their religious missions.”\\nAmos, 483 U.S. at 335.\\n Any financial interaction between religion and govern-\\nment—like taxing a church, or exempting it from tax—entails\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 19\\n\\nsome degree of entanglement. But only excessive entangle-\\nment violates the Establishment Clause. See Walz, 307 U.S. at\\n674 (“We must also be sure that the end result—the effect—is\\nnot an excessive government entanglement with religion.”)\\nCrucial to our evaluation, the Supreme Court has already per-\\nmitted the level of entanglement incurred under § 107(2). In\\nHosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,\\n565 U.S. 171 (2012), the Court inquired into the facts underly-\\ning Hosanna-Tabor’s employment to determine whether she\\nwas a minister. Id. at 190–92. The IRS does the same under\\n§ 107(2) to determine whether a taxpayer qualifies as a minis-\\nter. The Court would not have so inquired if it violated the\\nEstablishment Clause.\\n In contrast, the application of § 119(a)(2) to ministers\\nwould entangle church and state far more than under\\n§ 107(2). For example, to determine what constitutes the busi-\\nness premises of the employer under § 119(a)(2), the IRS\\nwould have to determine what the “business” of the church is\\nand where and how far the “premises” of the church extend.\\nSee EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH 168–69 (2017).\\nTo do so, the IRS would need to interrogate ministers on the\\nspecifics of their worship activities, even determine which\\nactivities constitute “worship.” Such government inquiries\\ninto the internal affairs of churches to determine their eligibil-\\nity for tax relief have been rejected as excessive entanglement.\\nSee, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of Am. & Canada v.\\nMilivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708–20 (1976) (holding civil courts\\ncannot interfere with the rulings of ecclesiastical tribunals on\\nchurch affairs); Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475\\n(7th Cir. 2008) (“Congress does not want courts to interfere in\\nthe internal management of churches … .”).\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\n Worse, if subject to § 119(a)(2), congregations might alter\\ntheir religious activities to attempt to conform with its re-\\nquirements. Congress enacted § 107(2) in part to avoid that.\\nAnd congressional action “to minimize governmental inter-\\nference with the decision-making process in religions … does\\nnot violate the Establishment Clause.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 336\\n(internal citations and quotations omitted).\\n The categorical nature of § 107(2) also avoids excessive\\nentanglement by providing ministers and their churches cer-\\ntainty as to whether their housing allowances will be exempt\\nfrom tax. In Amos, the Supreme Court held “it is a significant\\nburden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of\\nsubstantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular\\ncourt will consider religious.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 336.\\n Recognizing the potentially excessive entanglement\\nthreatened by the application of § 119(a)(2) to ministers, Con-\\ngress enacted a less-entangling tax exemption. Seeking to\\navoid government entanglement is a secular legislative pur-\\npose under Lemon. See, e.g., Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives,\\n877 F.3d 1213, 1231 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court has\\nexpressly held that a purpose of avoiding government entan-\\nglement does not violate the Establishment Clause.”) (citing\\nAmos, 483 U.S. at 335). Because the government has articu-\\nlated not one, but three secular purposes, we conclude the\\nfirst prong of Lemon is satisfied.\\n B. Primary Effect of Advancing or Inhibiting Religion\\n The second prong of the Lemon test requires that a statute\\nhave a “principal or primary effect … that neither advances\\nnor inhibits religion.” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. “For a law to\\nhave forbidden ‘effects’ under Lemon, it must be fair to say\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 21\\n\\nthat the government itself has advanced religion through its\\nown activities and influence.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (emphasis\\nin original). This entails “sponsorship, financial support, and\\nactive involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”\\nWalz, 297 U.S. at 668.\\n FFRF contends the Supreme Court’s holdings in Amos and\\nWalz were superseded by Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion\\nin Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). That case\\nresolved an Establishment Clause challenge to a state tax ex-\\nemption for religious publications. To determine whether\\nJustice Brennan’s opinion controls, we examine the grounds\\nfor decision in Texas Monthly’s various concurrences. See\\nMarks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a frag-\\nmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explain-\\ning the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of\\nthe Court may be viewed as that position taken by those\\nMembers who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest\\ngrounds.”).\\n In Texas Monthly, Justice Brennan authored an opinion\\njoined by Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens and announced\\nthe result of the case; Justice White concurred in the result and\\nwrote separately; Justice Blackmun concurred in the result\\nand wrote for himself and Justice O’Connor; and Justice Scalia\\nfiled a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist\\nand Justice Kennedy. Justice Brennan’s opinion concluded\\nthat the tax exemption for religious publications violated the\\nEstablishment Clause because “[e]very tax exemption consti-\\ntutes a subsidy that affects nonqualifying taxpayers.” Texas\\nMonthly, 489 U.S. at 14 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). He\\nstated any subsidy directed “exclusively to religious organi-\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nzations that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause … can-\\nnot but convey a message of endorsement to slighted mem-\\nbers of the community.” Id. at 15 (internal citations and\\nquotations omitted).\\n The other opinions in Texas Monthly were narrower in\\nscope. Justice White’s concurrence reached the same result,\\nbut on an independent ground, the Press Clause. Justice\\nBlackmun’s concurrence agreed that the tax exemption vio-\\nlated the Establishment Clause, but did not adopt many of\\nJustice Brennan’s sweeping statements. Justice Blackmun\\nurged that the case be resolved narrowly and concluded only\\nthat “a tax exemption limited to the sale of religious literature\\nby religious organizations violates the Establishment Clause.”\\nId. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Be-\\ncause Justice Blackmun decided the case on Establishment\\nClause grounds,9 and on a narrower basis than Justice\\nBrennan’s opinion, under the Marks rule Justice Blackmun’s\\nconcurrence sets the rule of decision of Texas Monthly. His\\nconcurrence did not comment on what constitutes a forbid-\\nden effect under Lemon, so Texas Monthly does not alter our\\nanalysis of this second prong.\\n\\n\\n\\n 9 Even if Justice White’s opinion were based on narrower grounds\\nthan Justice Blackmun’s opinion, it reached the same result under a differ-\\nent constitutional clause. “Marks applies ‘only when one opinion is a log-\\nical subset of other, broader opinions.’” Gibson v. American Cyanamid Co.,\\n760 F.3d 600, 619 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781\\n(D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc)). Justice Blackmun’s opinion provided the fourth\\nand fifth votes in Texas Monthly and shared the “common denominator”\\nof resolving the issue under the Establishment Clause, so it controls. Gib-\\nson, 760 F.3d at 619 (quoting United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 884 (7th\\nCir. 2009)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 23\\n\\n With Walz and Amos still in effect, we evaluate forbidden\\neffects under their framework. FFRF contends a tax exemp-\\ntion for religion is identical to a government subsidy for reli-\\ngion. In economic terms, a subsidy and a tax exemption may\\nhave the same practical impact. See, e.g., Adam Chodorow,\\nThe Parsonage Allowance, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 854 (2018)\\n(“The claim that exemptions differ from direct subsidies for\\nEstablishment Clause purposes simply ignores economic re-\\nality.”). But the Supreme Court has already found a constitu-\\ntionally significant difference between the two on taxing\\nreligion. “The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship\\nsince the government does not transfer part of its revenue to\\nchurches but simply abstains from demanding that the\\nchurch support the state.” Walz, 397 U.S. at 675.10\\n Under Walz and Amos, then, § 107(2) does not advance re-\\nligion on behalf of the government. Providing a tax exemption\\ndoes not “connote[] sponsorship, financial support, and active\\ninvolvement of the [government] in religious activity” under\\nWalz, 397 U.S. at 668; see also Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (“[W]e do\\nnot see how any advancement of religion achieved by the [ex-\\nempt religious organization] can be fairly attributed to the\\nGovernment, as opposed to the Church.”).\\n Under these precedents, the primary effect of § 107(2) is\\nnot to advance religion on behalf of the government, but to\\n\\n 10 The Supreme Court tacitly reaffirmed this approach in its standing\\ndiscussion in Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 536 U.S. 125\\n(2011). There, it held taxpayers had no standing to challenge a tax credit\\ndirected primarily towards sectarian schools because “[w]hen the govern-\\nment declines to impose a tax, … there is no … connection between dis-\\nsenting taxpayer and alleged establishment.” Id. at 142.\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\n“allow[] churches to advance religion, which is their very pur-\\npose.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (emphasis in original). So § 107(2)\\npasses the second prong of Lemon.\\n C. Excessive Entanglement with Religion\\n The third prong of the Lemon test is whether the state “fos-\\nter[s] ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”\\nLemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674). We have\\naddressed this prong in Part III.A above. Because some level\\nof church-state interaction is unavoidable, “[e]ntanglement is\\na question of kind and degree.” Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684.\\nSection 107(2) avoids government inquiry into the use of a\\nminister’s home, but it still requires the IRS to determine who\\nqualifies as a minister eligible for the exemption. Even if the\\nIRS’s test for who qualifies as a minister involves entangle-\\nment, it is of a nature approved by the Supreme Court in\\nHosanna-Tabor. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190–95 (engag-\\ning in a fact-bound analysis to determine whether the peti-\\ntioner qualified as a minister). The alternative would be to\\nforce ministers to comply with the far more detailed and par-\\nticular, and thus more entangling, requirements of § 119(a)(2).\\n In answer to these concerns, Congress chose to enact\\n§ 107(2). Legislative determinations about the Establishment\\nClause, while not binding, are entitled to deference. “We in\\nthe Judiciary must be wary of interpreting [the Religion]\\nClauses in a manner that negates the legislative role alto-\\ngether.” Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concur-\\nring). Legislative deference is particularly great for\\nclassifications in tax legislation. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with\\nRepresentation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1997) (“Legis-\\nlatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifica-\\ntions and distinctions in tax statutes.”); Madden v. Kentucky,\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 25\\n\\n309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (holding that for tax classifications chal-\\nlenged under the Fourteenth Amendment, “the presumption\\nof constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit\\ndemonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive\\ndiscrimination against particular persons and classes”).\\nCongress decided § 107(2) is the less entangling option, so we\\nwill not disturb it.\\n We conclude § 107(2) has a secular legislative purpose, its\\nprincipal effect is neither to endorse nor to inhibit religion,\\nand it does not cause excessive government entanglement.\\nHere, “[t]here is no genuine nexus between tax exemption\\nand establishment of religion.” Walz, 397 U.S. at 675. Section\\n107(2), then, does not violate the Establishment Clause under\\nthe Lemon test.\\n IV.\\n We next examine whether § 107(2) passes the historical\\nsignificance test.11 The Supreme Court has held “the Estab-\\nlishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference to histori-\\ncal practices and understandings.’” Town of Greece v. Galloway,\\n572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014) (quoting Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil\\n\\n\\n 11 FFRF and amici curiae supporting appellees’ position offer no ar-\\nguments under the historical significance test, except to assert the test ap-\\nplies only to legislative prayer. We find no such limitation. Though Town\\nof Greece addressed legislative prayer, it stated that “the Establishment\\nClause must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and under-\\nstandings.’” 572 U.S. at 576 (quoting Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670\\n(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)). This\\nlanguage does not limit the application of the Town of Greece standard to\\nconstitutional challenges to legislative prayer. As this part discusses, other\\nSupreme Court cases have examined relevant history as to monuments as\\nwell as the ministerial exception.\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nLiberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670\\n(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-\\nsenting in part)). This fact-bound test was developed in three\\ncases. First, in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality\\nopinion), the Court considered whether a monument\\ninscribed with the Ten Commandments on Texas government\\nproperty violated the Establishment Clause. Van Orden criti-\\ncized the Lemon test for ignoring the “strong role played by\\nreligion and religious traditions throughout our Nation’s\\nhistory.” Id. at 683. Instead, the Court reviewed a number of\\nhistorical examples of governments referencing God and dis-\\nplaying the Ten Commandments without issue. On that basis,\\nthe Court held the monument did not violate the Establish-\\nment Clause. Id. at 692.\\n Next, in Hosanna-Tabor, a unanimous Supreme Court held\\nthat the Establishment Clause prevents governments from in-\\nterfering with the decision of a religious group to terminate\\none of its ministers. In so deciding, the opinion explored the\\nhistory of church-state relations in the United States and Eng-\\nland, back to the Magna Carta. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182.\\nFrom that history, the Court determined that the First\\nAmendment was adopted in part to prevent “the new Federal\\nGovernment—unlike the English Crown—[from a] role in fill-\\ning ecclesiastical offices.” Id. at 184. This determination\\nformed the basis of the Court’s decision.\\n Finally, in Town of Greece the Supreme Court applied the\\nhistorical significance test when it held legislative prayer does\\nnot violate the Establishment Clause. The Court held that\\n“[a]ny test the Court adopts [for the Establishment Clause]\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 27\\n\\nmust acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Fram-\\ners and has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political\\nchange.” Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577.\\n We now apply the historical significance test to this case.\\nFFRF offers no evidence that provisions like § 107(2) were his-\\ntorically viewed as an establishment of religion. The govern-\\nment and intervenors, and amici curiae supporting their\\nposition, have provided substantial evidence of a lengthy\\ntradition of tax exemptions for religion, particularly for\\nchurch-owned properties. For over two centuries, the states\\nhave implemented church property tax exemptions in various\\nforms. See John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property:\\nHistorical Anomaly or Valid Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL.\\nL. REV. 363, 380 (1991) (“The colonial law exemption of church\\nproperty continued largely uninterrupted in the early dec-\\nades of the American republic.”); see also id. at 389–95 (detail-\\ning state protections for religious tax exemptions from the late\\n19th to early 20th centuries). When challenged on establish-\\nment grounds, such tax exemptions typically have been up-\\nheld. See, e.g., Trustees of Griswold College v. State, 46 Iowa 275,\\n282 (1877) (ruling the state constitution’s Establishment\\nClause “does not [implicate] the exemption from taxation of\\nsuch church property as the legislature may think proper”).\\n Congress has enacted federal tax exemptions for religious\\norganizations as far back as 1802, when it permitted the\\nCounty of Alexandria (then under federal control) to exempt\\nchurch property from taxation, see 7 Cong. Ch. 53, May 3,\\n1802, 2 Stat. 194, and as recently as 2002, the last time § 107\\nwas amended. See Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification\\nAct of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–181, 116 Stat. 583. As early as\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\n1885, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged and accepted re-\\nligious property tax exemptions in Gibbons v. District of\\nColumbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886), “reflecting more than a century\\nof our history and uninterrupted practice.” Walz, 397 U.S. at\\n680. Today, more than 2,600 federal and state tax laws provide\\nreligious exemptions. NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER,\\nPOLITICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT: PROVOCATIVE FIRST\\nAMENDMENT CONFLICTS 43 (2011).\\n The district court distinguished § 107(2) from this long\\nand continuing historical tradition of property tax exemp-\\ntions by noting the statute is an income tax exemption. We\\nfind this too fine a distinction, as it ignores the impact of the\\nSixteenth Amendment. Before 1913, Congress could not con-\\nstitutionally tax housing provided to ministers as part of their\\nincome. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601,\\n637 (1895) (invalidating a state income tax). Within a few\\nyears of income becoming taxable, Congress moved to\\nexclude parsonages from income, and a few decades later ex-\\ncluded cash housing allowances as well. Congress was con-\\ntinuing its “historical practice[]” of exempting certain church\\nresources from taxation. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576. This\\nendeavor limits entanglement between church and state, see\\nsupra at Part III.C. Given this history, we conclude § 107(2)\\ndoes not violate the Establishment Clause under the historical\\nsignificance test.\\n\\n V.\\n FFRF claims § 107(2) renders unto God that which is\\nCaesar’s. But this tax provision falls into the play between the\\njoints of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment\\nClause: neither commanded by the former, nor proscribed by\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 29\\n\\nthe latter. We conclude § 107(2) is constitutional. The\\njudgment of the district court is REVERSED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4377580/\", \"author_raw\": \"No. 16-cv-215 - Barbara B. Crabb, Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4600327/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Annie Laurie GAYLOR, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Steven T. MNUCHIN, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants, and Edward Peecher, Et Al., Intervening Defendants-Appellants.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\nANNIE LAURIE GAYLOR, et al.,\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\n v.\n\nSTEVEN T. MNUCHIN, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellants,\n\n and\nEDWARD PEECHER, et al.,\n Intervening\n Defendants-Appellants.\n\n\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 16-cv-215 — Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED OCTOBER 24, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 15, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Since the Founders crafted the Re-\nligion Clauses of the First Amendment, courts have grappled\n\f2 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\nwith the “play in the joints” between them. Walz v. Tax Comm.\nof City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). This case calls us to do\nso once more. Freedom From Religion Foundation (“FFRF”)\nclaims that a longstanding tax code exemption for religious\nhousing, 26 U.S.C. § 107(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, vi-\nolates the Establishment Clause. The district court agreed.\nThe U.S. Treasury Department and several intervening reli-\ngious organizations ask us to reinstate the exemption, assert-\ning that the survival of many congregations hangs in the\nbalance. We must decide whether excluding housing allow-\nances from ministers’ taxable income is a law “respecting an\nestablishment of religion” in violation of the First Amend-\nment.\n I.\n A. History of § 107(2)\n The facts before us are not in dispute. The Sixteenth\nAmendment was ratified in 1913, authorizing Congress to\nlevy an income tax. Congress imposed a federal income tax\nthat same year and has levied one in various forms since. As\na result, Congress and the Treasury Department needed to\ndefine taxable “income.” A rule defining income that survives\ntoday in the Internal Revenue Code is the “convenience-of-\nthe-employer” doctrine. Under that doctrine, housing pro-\nvided to employees for the convenience of their employer is\nexempt from taxable income. Early examples of exclusions\nunder the doctrine include housing provided to sailors living\naboard ships, workers living in camps, and hospital employ-\nees. But the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine was not\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 3\n\nmade available to ministers.1 In 1921, the Treasury Depart-\nment announced ministers would be taxed on the fair rental\nvalue of parsonages provided as living quarters. O.D. 862, 4\nC.B. 85 (1921).\n Congress reacted quickly and enacted a statute to exclude\nchurch-provided parsonages from the taxable income of min-\nisters. The Treasury Department interpreted this statute to\napply only to housing provided in-kind; cash housing allow-\nances were included in income. I.T. 1694, C.B. II-1, at 79 (1923).\nThis continued for decades until in the 1950s several ministers\nsuccessfully challenged the limitation to in-kind housing.2\nCongress then enacted 26 U.S.C. § 107, which provides:\n In the case of a minister of the gospel, gross in-\n come does not include—\n (1) the rental value of a home furnished to him\n as part of his compensation; or\n (2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of\n his compensation, to the extent used by him to\n rent or provide a home …\n\n\n\n\n 1 The text of the tax code refers specifically to “ministers of the gos-\npel,” so we use that term. Courts have long held the provision applies to\nreligious leaders of any denomination, regardless of formal title. See, e.g.,\nSalkov v. Comm’r, 46 T.C. 190, 194 (1966) (holding a Jewish cantor was a\n“minister of the gospel”).\n 2 See, e.g., Williamson v. Comm’r, 224 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1955); Conning\nv. Busey, 127 F. Supp. 958 (S.D. Ohio 1954); MacColl v. United States,\n91 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1950).\n\f4 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\nSection 107(1) reauthorized the in-kind parsonage exemption\nin place since the 1920s. Section 107(2) authorized the IRS to\nalso exempt cash allowances from ministers’ taxable income.3\n B. District Court Proceedings\n FFRF describes itself as a “nonprophet nonprofit” organi-\nzation that “[t]akes legal action challenging entanglement of\nreligion and government, government endorsement or pro-\nmotion of religion.” What Does the Foundation Do?, FREEDOM\nFROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, https://ffrf.org/faq/item/15001-\nwhat-does-the-foundation-do (last visited March 10, 2019).\nSeeking to challenge both § 107(1) and § 107(2), FFRF paid its\nco-presidents Annie Gaylor and Dan Barker a portion of their\nsalaries in the form of a housing allowance. FFRF also paid\nthis housing allowance to a former president of the organiza-\ntion, Anne Nicol Gaylor (“Nicol Gaylor”).4 FFRF, Gaylor,\nBarker, and Nicol Gaylor, none of whom meet the IRS’s defi-\nnition of “minister,” then sued the Treasury Department,\nclaiming § 107 violates the First Amendment because it con-\nditions a tax benefit on religious affiliation. We dismissed this\nchallenge for lack of standing because FFRF and its employees\nnever applied for § 107(1) or § 107(2) exemptions, so they were\n\n\n\n\n 3An amicus brief from the University of St. Thomas School of Law\n(Minnesota) estimates that of the United States’ 384,000 congregations,\n200,000 to 300,000 provide a housing allowance to their ministers under\n26 U.S.C. § 107(2).\n 4 Nicol Gaylor, Annie Gaylor’s mother and co-founder of FFRF,\npassed away during the initial lawsuit filed by FFRF. Although the party\nto this lawsuit is technically the Estate of Anne Nicol Gaylor, we refer to\nher as “Nicol Gaylor” for brevity.\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 5\n\nnever denied them. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v.\nLew, 773 F.3d 815, 825 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Lew”).\n In response, Gaylor and Barker filed amended tax returns\nfor 2012 and 2013 claiming refunds for their housing allow-\nances under § 107(2); Nicol Gaylor did the same for 2013. The\nIRS erroneously issued refunds to Gaylor and Barker for 2013\nbut made no decisions on plaintiffs’ other claims. After more\nthan six months without IRS action on plaintiffs’ claims, FFRF\nand its employees brought this suit. The IRS then denied the\n2012 refund claims because none of the claimants were minis-\nters.\n The Treasury Department moved to dismiss FFRF’s\n§ 107(1) challenge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The\ndistrict court granted the motion for the same reasons we\narticulated in Lew: FFRF’s employees never claimed a § 107(1)\nexemption. FFRF does not appeal that ruling. Later, the dis-\ntrict court permitted several pastors who receive housing\nallowances and their associated religious organizations to in-\ntervene to defend § 107(2).5\n The Treasury Department and intervenors moved for\nsummary judgment. The district court denied their motions\nand instead granted summary judgment to FFRF and its em-\nployees. The court held that FFRF and its employees had\nstanding to challenge § 107(2), and that that statute violates\nthe Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Gaylor v.\n\n\n 5 The intervening defendants are Bishop Edward Peecher, the Chicago\n\nEmbassy Church, Father Patrick Malone, the Holy Cross Church, the\nDiocese of Chicago and Mid-America of the Russian Orthodox Church\nOutside of Russia, and Pastor Christopher Butler. Each of the intervenors\nreceive or provide housing allowances under § 107(2).\n\f6 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\nMnuchin, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1104 (W.D. Wis. 2017). The\ncourt held that § 107(2) violated the secular purpose prong of\nthe test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and\nruled that the statute’s true purpose was to “provide aid to a\ngroup of religious persons.” Gaylor, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 1099.\nThe court rejected the argument that § 107(2) avoids excessive\ngovernment entanglement with religion, because in the\ncourt’s view “concerns about entanglement [do not] justify\npreferential treatment for religious persons.” Id. The Treasury\nDepartment and the intervenors appeal.\n II.\n Neither the Treasury Department nor the intervenors\ndispute the district court’s ruling that FFRF has standing to\nchallenge § 107(2). Nevertheless, even if the issue has not been\nraised, if there is no Article III standing our court must dis-\nmiss the suit. Diedrich v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 839 F.3d\n583, 588 (7th Cir. 2016). We evaluate standing to determine\nwhether FFRF resolved the deficiencies we noted in Lew.\n To establish Article III standing, plaintiffs must show they\nhave suffered “(1) a concrete and particularized ‘injury in fact’\n(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the de-\nfendant, and that is (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable\njudicial decision.” Lew, 773 F.3d at 819 (citing Lujan v.\nDefenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). To challenge\nthe constitutionality of a tax provision, a plaintiff must have\n“personally claimed and been denied the exemption.” Lew,\n773 F.3d at 821.\n An essential element of “injury in fact” is that the injury\nbe “actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 7\n\nLujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotations and citations omit-\nted). When FFRF filed this action, Gaylor and Barker had yet\nto be denied a refund from their 2012 tax returns, and Nicol\nGaylor had still, by the time of the district court’s decision,\nreceived no answer to her 2013 refund request. Yet this does\nnot necessarily mean FFRF lacked standing. Under 26 U.S.C.\n§ 6532(a)(1), an income tax refund suit may be filed no earlier\nthan six months after the refund claim was submitted. A stat-\nute cannot “‘lower the threshold for standing below the min-\nimum requirements imposed by the Constitution,’ but\nCongress does have the power to ‘enact statutes creating legal\nrights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no\ninjury would exist without the statute.’” Sterk v. Redbox\nAutomated Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 2014) (quot-\ning Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 294 (7th\nCir. 2000)).\n The district court concluded it was reasonable to interpret\n§ 6532(a)(1) as rendering a claim “effectively denied if the IRS\ndoes not render a decision within six months.” Gaylor, 278\nF. Supp. 3d at 1087. We agree. As the district court noted, pre-\nventing a claimant from filing a refund suit until the IRS\nresponded to the claim “would allow the IRS to deprive a\nparty of standing indefinitely by withholding a decision.” Id.\nat 1088. Several courts of appeals have cited the six-month fil-\ning requirement approvingly. See, e.g., Fletcher v. United States,\n452 Fed. App’x 547, 552 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[B]efore a taxpayer\ncan bring a refund suit, he or she must … wait until either the\nIRS denies the claim or six months have expired since filing\nthe administrative claim.”); Dumont v. United States, 345 Fed.\nApp’x 586, 590 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[A] suit … cannot be insti-\ntuted until either the IRS denies the claim or six months pass\nwithout its taking action.”); Sorenson v. Secʹy of Treasury of\n\f8 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\nU.S., 752 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1985), affʹd, 475 U.S. 851\n(1986) (“The former section prohibits the courts from enter-\ntaining any refund suit filed before the expiration of six\nmonths from the date the claim for refund is filed … .”); see\nalso Lew, 773 F.3d at 821 n.3 (“The plaintiffs could have … paid\nincome tax on their housing allowance, claimed refunds from\nthe IRS, and then sued if the IRS rejected or failed to act upon\ntheir claims.”) (emphasis added).\n Gaylor, Barker, and Nicol Gaylor have properly alleged a\n“concrete, dollars-and-cents injury.” Lew, 773 F.3d at 821.\n“[T]hey have incurred a cost or been denied a benefit on\naccount of their religion [or lack thereof],” Arizona Christian\nSch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 536 U.S. 125, 130 (2011), which con-\nfers Article III standing. Because its members have standing\nand the contested issue is germane to its organizational pur-\npose, FFRF has organizational standing to sue as well. See\nSierra Club v. United States E.P.A., 774 F.3d 383, 388–89 (7th\nCir. 2014) (“‘An organization has standing to sue if (1) at least\none of its members would otherwise have standing; (2) the\ninterests at stake in the litigation are germane to the organiza-\ntion’s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief\nrequested requires an individual member’s participation in\nthe lawsuit.’”) (quoting Sierra Club v. Franklin Cty. Power of Ill.\nLLC, 546 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 2008)).\n III.\n This case comes to us after a grant of summary judgment,\nso we assess the parties’ claims de novo. Freedom from Religion\nFound., Inc. v. Concord Cmty. Sch., 885 F.3d 1038, 1045 (7th Cir.\n2018) (“Concord”).\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 9\n\n Currently, Establishment Clause jurisprudence incorpo-\nrates a number of tests when evaluating the constitutionality\nof government action. Two are relevant to this case: the test\nannounced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and the\n“historical significance” test of Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572\nU.S. 565, 576 (2014).6 Because the Supreme Court has not clar-\nified which should take precedence, we evaluate FFRF’s\nclaims under both tests and associated case law. See Concord,\n885 F.3d at 1045 n.1 (“Indeed, there is debate among the Jus-\ntices about the continuing validity of the endorsement\ntest. … For now, we do not feel free to jettison that test alto-\ngether … .”).7 We consider this case under the Lemon test in\n\n\n 6 A third relevant to this challenge, the endorsement test, clarifies\nLemon and is woven into our consideration of § 107(2) under the Lemon\ntest, particularly under the second prong. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion\nFound., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, Wis., 203 F.3d 487, 493 (7th Cir. 2000), as\namended on denial of rehʹg and rehʹg en banc (Mar. 22, 2000) (“[T]he effect\nprong of [the Lemon] test has been analyzed under the ‘perception of en-\ndorsement’ test developed in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)\n(O’Connor, J., concurring).”).\n 7 An amicus brief filed by Wisconsin and fifteen other states notes the\nSupreme Court has not applied the Lemon test to a religious freedom case\nin many years. Even so, until the Supreme Court explicitly overturns\nLemon we must apply it, as well as the other tests more recently relied\nupon by the Court. Other circuit courts also apply multiple tests when\nconsidering a challenge under the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., American\nHumanist Assoc. v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 525–26 (5th Cir. 2017) (balancing\nthe Lemon, endorsement, and coercion tests against the historical signifi-\ncance test in Town of Greece); Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs,\n788 F.3d 580, 586–87 (6th Cir. 2015) (setting forth Lemon, the endorsement\ntest, and Town of Greece as the “three main jurisprudential threads” that\nmust be woven together in assessing government action under the Estab-\nlishment Clause).\n\f10 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\nthis Part of this opinion, and under the “historical signifi-\ncance” test in Part IV.\n Lemon summarized prior case law into a three-prong test:\n“[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;\nsecond, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither\nadvances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not\nfoster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”\n403 U.S. at 612–13 (internal citations and quotations omitted).\nThis test is not cumulative: if § 107(2) fails any of Lemon’s three\nprongs, it violates the Establishment Clause.\n A. Secular Legislative Purpose\n We first examine whether § 107(2) has a secular legislative\npurpose. “When the government acts with the ostensible and\npredominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that\ncentral Establishment Clause value of official religious neu-\ntrality, there being no neutrality when the government’s os-\ntensible object is to take sides.” McCreary Cty., Ky. v. Am. Civil\nLiberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (citing Corpora-\ntion of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day\nSaints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987)). A statute is unconsti-\ntutional under this test “only when … there [is] no question\nthat the statute … was motivated wholly by religious consid-\nerations.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984). The\nTreasury Department and intervenors point to three secular\nlegislative purposes of the statute: to eliminate discrimination\nagainst ministers, to eliminate discrimination between minis-\nters, and to avoid excessive entanglement with religion. FFRF\ncounters that § 107(2) was passed to confer a government ben-\nefit on religion, which necessarily violates the Establishment\nClause.\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 11\n\n We will defer to a government’s sincere articulation of sec-\nular purpose, so long as the plaintiffs have not proved that\narticulation of purpose is a sham. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482\nU.S. 578, 586–87 (1987) (“While the Court is normally defer-\nential to a State’s articulation of a secular purpose, it is\nrequired that the statement of such purpose be sincere and\nnot a sham.”); Cohen v. City of Des Plaines, 8 F.3d 484, 489 (7th\nCir. 1993) (“We will defer to a municipality’s sincere articula-\ntion of a secular purpose.”). This does not mean “that the\nlaw’s purpose must be unrelated to religion … .” Amos, 483\nU.S. at 335. Instead, “the government lacks a secular purpose\nunder Lemon only when ‘there is no question that the statute\nor activity was motivated wholly by religious considera-\ntions.’” Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Clarke, 588 F.3d 523,\n527–28 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Books v. Elkhart Cty., 401 F.3d\n857, 863 (7th Cir. 2005), in turn quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680).\nSo we evaluate the purposes articulated by the Treasury De-\npartment to determine whether they are sincere, or whether\nthe government’s “‘actual purpose is to endorse or disap-\nprove of religion.’” Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585 (quoting Lynch,\n465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).\n The Treasury Department first contends Congress passed\n§ 107 to put ministers on equal footing with secular employ-\nees receiving the same benefits; in other words, to eliminate\ndiscrimination against ministers. The Treasury Department\npoints to its 1921 decision to not exclude parsonages from tax-\nable income and Congress’s quick passage of the parsonage\nexemption, now codified at § 107(1), in response. The Treas-\nury Department argues this is a secular purpose because it\nsimply places religious employees on par with secular ones.\nFFRF counters that the benefits given to ministers under\n§ 107(2) are different—and better—than those the tax code\n\f12 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\ngives to secular employees. FFRF argues putting ministers in\na better position than secular employees promotes the dis-\nsemination of religious ideas and thus cannot be secular.\n To determine whether § 107(2) confers a special benefit, or\nsimply integrates ministers into an existing tax system, we\nmust delve into the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine.\nThough the doctrine was originally developed in Treasury\nDepartment regulations, it has since been codified in several\nplaces. The principal statute is 26 U.S.C. § 119(a)(2) and ex-\nempts meals and lodging furnished to employees if they meet\nfive requirements: the meal or lodging is furnished (1) by an\nemployer to an employee, (2) in kind (as opposed to in cash),\n(3) on the business premises of the employer, (4) for the con-\nvenience of the employer, and (5) as a condition of employ-\nment. See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.119-1(b) (2018). This exemption\napplies generally: any qualifying employee can rely on\n§ 119(a)(2), including religious employees.8\n The express proof requirements of § 119(a)(2) are relaxed\nthroughout the tax code for various types of employees. Sec-\ntion 119(c) exempts employees living in a foreign camp from\nneeding to fulfill the “business premises” and “condition of\nemployment” factors. Section 119(d) exempts certain teachers\nand university employees from the convenience-of-the-\nemployer doctrine altogether, and allows them to exclude\nfrom taxable income the fair rental value of campus housing.\n Myriad provisions in Title 26 employ this categorical\napproach and exempt any form of housing benefits, whether\n\n\n 8 For additional history on the development of the convenience-of-the-\n\nemployer doctrine, see Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 84–96 (1977).\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 13\n\nin cash or in kind: § 132 and § 162 exclude housing provided\nto an employee away on business for less than a year; § 134\nexcludes housing provided to current or former members of\nthe military; § 911 excludes housing above a certain level pro-\nvided to citizens or residents living abroad; § 912 excludes\nhousing provided to government employees living abroad;\nand, of course, § 107 excludes housing provided to ministers.\nThese categorical exemptions allow hundreds of thousands of\nemployees (including ministers) to receive tax-exempt\nhousing every year without needing to satisfy the proof re-\nquirements of § 119(a)(2).\n These parallel provisions show an overarching arrange-\nment in the tax code to exempt employer-provided housing\nfor employees with certain job-related housing requirements.\nCongress has exempted certain categories of employees from\ncomplying with the specific requirements of § 119(a)(2) to\nsimplify the application of the convenience-of-the-employer\ndoctrine to those occupations. Section 107, including subsec-\ntion (2), recognizes ministers often use their homes as part of\ntheir ministry. This provision thus eases the administration of\nthe convenience-of-the-employer doctrine by providing a\nbright-line rule, instead of requiring that ministers and the\nIRS repeatedly engage with a fact-intensive standard.\n Reading § 107(2) in isolation from the other convenience-\nof-the-employer provisions, and then highlighting the term\n“minister,” could make the challenged statute appear to pro-\nvide a government benefit exclusively to the religious. But\nreading it in context, as we must, we see § 107(2) is simply one\nof many per se rules that provide a tax exemption to employ-\nees with work-related housing requirements. See ANTONIN\n\f14 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\nSCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 252 (2012) (“‘Sev-\neral acts in pari materia, and relating to the same subject, are to\nbe taken together, and compared in construction of them, be-\ncause they are considered as having one object in view, and\nas acting upon one system.’”) (quoting 1 James Kent, Commen-\ntaries on American Law 433 (1826)); see also Mueller v. Allen, 463\nU.S. 388, 396 (1983) (upholding Minnesota tax deduction for\ntuition expenses, primarily used by parents of children at sec-\ntarian schools, in part because the deduction was “only one\namong many deductions—such as those for medical ex-\npenses … and charitable contributions … available under the\nMinnesota tax laws”). Congress’s policy choice to ease the ad-\nministration of the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine by\napplying a categorical exclusion is a secular purpose, not\n“motivated wholly by religious considerations.” Lynch, 465\nU.S. at 680.\n FFRF argues considering the context of § 107(2) is inapt.\nTo FFRF, the benefits the statute provides apply to a broader\ncategory of persons—any minister, as opposed to any minis-\nter that uses his or her home for religious purposes—than\nother categorical housing exclusions in the tax code. The dis-\ntrict court agreed, and found that § 107(2) is not analogous to\nother bright-line housing benefit provisions in the tax code\nbecause, in comparison, it is overinclusive. Gaylor, 278\nF. Supp. 3d at 1095 (“[Sections 134, 911, and 912] relate to em-\nployees whose housing is necessarily affected by their\njobs. … Some ministers may be in a similar situation … but by\nno means are all ministers so restricted … .”) (emphasis in\noriginal).\n It is not immediately apparent that § 107(2) is broader than\nthe other categorical exemptions for employee housing. For\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 15\n\nexample, under 26 U.S.C. § 911, any person living abroad is\npermitted to exclude or deduct housing expenses, regardless\nwhether that person is living abroad at the behest of his or her\nemployer.\n But to the extent § 107(2) may be overinclusive, that alone\ndoes not render the statute unconstitutional. FFRF’s argu-\nment is a critique of categorical rules generally, rather than of\n§ 107(2) specifically. “Read literally, rules are generally over-\ninclusive and underinclusive if assessed by references to their\npurposes. There is always a gap between the justification for\na rule … and the rule itself.” Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with\nRules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 990–91 (1995). No rule will per-\nfectly address the concerns to which it is addressed, because\n“[a]ll generalizations … are to some degree invalid, and hence\nevery rule of law has a few corners that do not quite fit.” An-\ntonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.\n1175, 1177 (1989). Categorical rules sacrifice precision of result\nfor administrative ease and equality of result. So it is not sur-\nprising that § 107(2) covers some housing allowances that\nmay be excluded under a case-by-case discretionary standard.\nIn this respect, § 107(2) is not an outlier.\n Important to our consideration, any imprecision does not\nmake § 107(2) any less analogous to other “convenience-of-\nthe-employer” related provisions in the tax code. Each covers\na different subset of eligible taxpayers and activities, but they\nall serve a common purpose: excluding from taxable income\ncertain employment-related expenses. The constitutionality\nof § 107(2) does not turn on which ministers the statute in-\ncludes or excludes. See, e.g., Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 95–96\n(“[A]rguments of equity have little force in construing the\nboundaries of exclusions and deductions from income many\n\f16 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\nof which, to be administrable, must be arbitrary.”); Delong v.\nDepʹt of Health & Human Servs., 264 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir.\n2001) (“Like all bright line rules, [the statute] is both over-\ninclusive and under-inclusive, but the imprecision of the stat-\nute does not make it unconstitutional.”).\n The second secular legislative purpose cited by the Treas-\nury Department is elimination of discrimination between\nministers. The government argues Congress passed § 107(2)\nbecause providing the tax exemption only to ministers given\nin-kind housing tended to exclude ministers of smaller or\npoorer denominations. FFRF argues this is a sham and the\ntrue justification was to subsidize religion, based on a state-\nment made in the early 1950s by § 107(2)’s sponsoring repre-\nsentative Peter Mack: “Certainly, in these times when we are\nbeing threatened by a godless and antireligious world move-\nment we should correct this discrimination against certain\nministers who are carrying on such a courageous fight against\nthis foe.” Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means:\nStatement of Hon. Peter F. Mack, Jr., on H.R. 4275, Concerning the\nTaxability of a Cash Allowance Paid to Clergymen in Lieu of\nFurnishing Them a Dwelling, 83d. Cong. 1, at 1576 (June 9,\n1953). The Treasury Department and intervenors respond by\nquoting other statements by Representative Mack from the\nsame hearing, such as that the bill was proposed because\n“present tax laws are discriminatory among our clergy,” id. at\n1574–75, and because he believed “a serious injustice [was]\nbeing done to those ministers who must provide their own\nhome,” id. at 1576.\n This smattering of legislative history does not establish\nRepresentative Mack’s motives in proposing the bill. Even if\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 17\n\nhis first quote above did so, the motivation of one representa-\ntive in a House of 435 does not definitively reveal the impetus\nbehind the bill’s passage. At the same hearing, other repre-\nsentatives stated different motives. Speaking on the same pro-\nposed provision, Representative Ray G. McKennan said the\nchanges were proposed to “create an equitable condition for\nministers similarly situated, and would probably eliminate\ncourt action [by ministers suing for discrimination].” Id. at\n1574.\n The legislative record does not establish a singular motive\nbehind § 107(2). Conflicting statements among members of\nCongress—even by the same member—reveal the unreliabil-\nity of this legislative history. Certainly, these statements do\nnot render “a sham” the Treasury Department’s proffered\npurpose of avoiding discrimination among religions. Cf.\nEdwards, 482 U.S. at 586–87. As such, we take the government\nat its word, which resolves this question. “The clearest com-\nmand of the Establishment Clause is that one religious\ndenomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”\nLarson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). Avoidance of dis-\ncrimination against certain religions in favor of others is a per-\nmissible secular legislative purpose.\n The third secular legislative purpose cited by the Treasury\nDepartment is to avoid excessive entanglement with religion.\nTo the government, Congress’s decision to exempt ministers\nfrom the proof requirements of § 119(a)(2) prevents the IRS\nfrom conducting intrusive inquiries into how religious organ-\nizations use their facilities. See, e.g., Amos, 483 U.S. at 339\n(“avoid[ing] … intrusive inquiry into religious belief …” pre-\nvents entanglement). FFRF responds that § 107(2) does not\n\f18 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\navoid such entanglement because the IRS must still adminis-\nter a test to determine whether a taxpayer qualifies as a min-\nister. FFRF argues this is as fact-intensive an audit as the\ninquiry administered for the generally applicable statutory\nexemption, § 119(a)(2).\n On this entanglement question, two Supreme Court deci-\nsions are particularly instructive. In Walz v. Tax Comm. of City\nof N.Y., the Court upheld a New York property tax exemption\nfor properties owned by churches and used exclusively for re-\nligious worship. Walz disagreed with the lower court’s exam-\nination of churches’ contribution to the social welfare to\ndetermine whether the tax exemption had a secular purpose:\n To give emphasis to so variable an aspect of the\n work of religious bodies would introduce an\n element of governmental evaluation and stand-\n ards as to the worth of particular social welfare\n programs, thus producing a kind of continuing\n day-to-day relationship which the policy of\n neutrality seeks to minimize.\n397 U.S. at 674. Similarly, in Amos v. Corporation of the Presiding\nBishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the\nSupreme Court upheld a categorical exemption for religious\norganizations from the provisions of Title VII of the Civil\nRights Act of 1964. The opinion noted that, under Lemon, “it\nis a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant\ngovernmental interference with the ability of religious organ-\nizations to define and carry out their religious missions.”\nAmos, 483 U.S. at 335.\n Any financial interaction between religion and govern-\nment—like taxing a church, or exempting it from tax—entails\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 19\n\nsome degree of entanglement. But only excessive entangle-\nment violates the Establishment Clause. See Walz, 307 U.S. at\n674 (“We must also be sure that the end result—the effect—is\nnot an excessive government entanglement with religion.”)\nCrucial to our evaluation, the Supreme Court has already per-\nmitted the level of entanglement incurred under § 107(2). In\nHosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,\n565 U.S. 171 (2012), the Court inquired into the facts underly-\ning Hosanna-Tabor’s employment to determine whether she\nwas a minister. Id. at 190–92. The IRS does the same under\n§ 107(2) to determine whether a taxpayer qualifies as a minis-\nter. The Court would not have so inquired if it violated the\nEstablishment Clause.\n In contrast, the application of § 119(a)(2) to ministers\nwould entangle church and state far more than under\n§ 107(2). For example, to determine what constitutes the busi-\nness premises of the employer under § 119(a)(2), the IRS\nwould have to determine what the “business” of the church is\nand where and how far the “premises” of the church extend.\nSee EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH 168–69 (2017).\nTo do so, the IRS would need to interrogate ministers on the\nspecifics of their worship activities, even determine which\nactivities constitute “worship.” Such government inquiries\ninto the internal affairs of churches to determine their eligibil-\nity for tax relief have been rejected as excessive entanglement.\nSee, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of Am. & Canada v.\nMilivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708–20 (1976) (holding civil courts\ncannot interfere with the rulings of ecclesiastical tribunals on\nchurch affairs); Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475\n(7th Cir. 2008) (“Congress does not want courts to interfere in\nthe internal management of churches … .”).\n\f20 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\n Worse, if subject to § 119(a)(2), congregations might alter\ntheir religious activities to attempt to conform with its re-\nquirements. Congress enacted § 107(2) in part to avoid that.\nAnd congressional action “to minimize governmental inter-\nference with the decision-making process in religions … does\nnot violate the Establishment Clause.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 336\n(internal citations and quotations omitted).\n The categorical nature of § 107(2) also avoids excessive\nentanglement by providing ministers and their churches cer-\ntainty as to whether their housing allowances will be exempt\nfrom tax. In Amos, the Supreme Court held “it is a significant\nburden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of\nsubstantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular\ncourt will consider religious.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 336.\n Recognizing the potentially excessive entanglement\nthreatened by the application of § 119(a)(2) to ministers, Con-\ngress enacted a less-entangling tax exemption. Seeking to\navoid government entanglement is a secular legislative pur-\npose under Lemon. See, e.g., Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives,\n877 F.3d 1213, 1231 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court has\nexpressly held that a purpose of avoiding government entan-\nglement does not violate the Establishment Clause.”) (citing\nAmos, 483 U.S. at 335). Because the government has articu-\nlated not one, but three secular purposes, we conclude the\nfirst prong of Lemon is satisfied.\n B. Primary Effect of Advancing or Inhibiting Religion\n The second prong of the Lemon test requires that a statute\nhave a “principal or primary effect … that neither advances\nnor inhibits religion.” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. “For a law to\nhave forbidden ‘effects’ under Lemon, it must be fair to say\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 21\n\nthat the government itself has advanced religion through its\nown activities and influence.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (emphasis\nin original). This entails “sponsorship, financial support, and\nactive involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”\nWalz, 297 U.S. at 668.\n FFRF contends the Supreme Court’s holdings in Amos and\nWalz were superseded by Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion\nin Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). That case\nresolved an Establishment Clause challenge to a state tax ex-\nemption for religious publications. To determine whether\nJustice Brennan’s opinion controls, we examine the grounds\nfor decision in Texas Monthly’s various concurrences. See\nMarks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a frag-\nmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explain-\ning the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of\nthe Court may be viewed as that position taken by those\nMembers who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest\ngrounds.”).\n In Texas Monthly, Justice Brennan authored an opinion\njoined by Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens and announced\nthe result of the case; Justice White concurred in the result and\nwrote separately; Justice Blackmun concurred in the result\nand wrote for himself and Justice O’Connor; and Justice Scalia\nfiled a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist\nand Justice Kennedy. Justice Brennan’s opinion concluded\nthat the tax exemption for religious publications violated the\nEstablishment Clause because “[e]very tax exemption consti-\ntutes a subsidy that affects nonqualifying taxpayers.” Texas\nMonthly, 489 U.S. at 14 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). He\nstated any subsidy directed “exclusively to religious organi-\n\f22 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\nzations that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause … can-\nnot but convey a message of endorsement to slighted mem-\nbers of the community.” Id. at 15 (internal citations and\nquotations omitted).\n The other opinions in Texas Monthly were narrower in\nscope. Justice White’s concurrence reached the same result,\nbut on an independent ground, the Press Clause. Justice\nBlackmun’s concurrence agreed that the tax exemption vio-\nlated the Establishment Clause, but did not adopt many of\nJustice Brennan’s sweeping statements. Justice Blackmun\nurged that the case be resolved narrowly and concluded only\nthat “a tax exemption limited to the sale of religious literature\nby religious organizations violates the Establishment Clause.”\nId. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Be-\ncause Justice Blackmun decided the case on Establishment\nClause grounds,9 and on a narrower basis than Justice\nBrennan’s opinion, under the Marks rule Justice Blackmun’s\nconcurrence sets the rule of decision of Texas Monthly. His\nconcurrence did not comment on what constitutes a forbid-\nden effect under Lemon, so Texas Monthly does not alter our\nanalysis of this second prong.\n\n\n\n 9 Even if Justice White’s opinion were based on narrower grounds\nthan Justice Blackmun’s opinion, it reached the same result under a differ-\nent constitutional clause. “Marks applies ‘only when one opinion is a log-\nical subset of other, broader opinions.’” Gibson v. American Cyanamid Co.,\n760 F.3d 600, 619 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781\n(D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc)). Justice Blackmun’s opinion provided the fourth\nand fifth votes in Texas Monthly and shared the “common denominator”\nof resolving the issue under the Establishment Clause, so it controls. Gib-\nson, 760 F.3d at 619 (quoting United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 884 (7th\nCir. 2009)).\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 23\n\n With Walz and Amos still in effect, we evaluate forbidden\neffects under their framework. FFRF contends a tax exemp-\ntion for religion is identical to a government subsidy for reli-\ngion. In economic terms, a subsidy and a tax exemption may\nhave the same practical impact. See, e.g., Adam Chodorow,\nThe Parsonage Allowance, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 854 (2018)\n(“The claim that exemptions differ from direct subsidies for\nEstablishment Clause purposes simply ignores economic re-\nality.”). But the Supreme Court has already found a constitu-\ntionally significant difference between the two on taxing\nreligion. “The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship\nsince the government does not transfer part of its revenue to\nchurches but simply abstains from demanding that the\nchurch support the state.” Walz, 397 U.S. at 675.10\n Under Walz and Amos, then, § 107(2) does not advance re-\nligion on behalf of the government. Providing a tax exemption\ndoes not “connote[] sponsorship, financial support, and active\ninvolvement of the [government] in religious activity” under\nWalz, 397 U.S. at 668; see also Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (“[W]e do\nnot see how any advancement of religion achieved by the [ex-\nempt religious organization] can be fairly attributed to the\nGovernment, as opposed to the Church.”).\n Under these precedents, the primary effect of § 107(2) is\nnot to advance religion on behalf of the government, but to\n\n 10 The Supreme Court tacitly reaffirmed this approach in its standing\ndiscussion in Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 536 U.S. 125\n(2011). There, it held taxpayers had no standing to challenge a tax credit\ndirected primarily towards sectarian schools because “[w]hen the govern-\nment declines to impose a tax, … there is no … connection between dis-\nsenting taxpayer and alleged establishment.” Id. at 142.\n\f24 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\n“allow[] churches to advance religion, which is their very pur-\npose.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (emphasis in original). So § 107(2)\npasses the second prong of Lemon.\n C. Excessive Entanglement with Religion\n The third prong of the Lemon test is whether the state “fos-\nter[s] ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”\nLemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674). We have\naddressed this prong in Part III.A above. Because some level\nof church-state interaction is unavoidable, “[e]ntanglement is\na question of kind and degree.” Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684.\nSection 107(2) avoids government inquiry into the use of a\nminister’s home, but it still requires the IRS to determine who\nqualifies as a minister eligible for the exemption. Even if the\nIRS’s test for who qualifies as a minister involves entangle-\nment, it is of a nature approved by the Supreme Court in\nHosanna-Tabor. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190–95 (engag-\ning in a fact-bound analysis to determine whether the peti-\ntioner qualified as a minister). The alternative would be to\nforce ministers to comply with the far more detailed and par-\nticular, and thus more entangling, requirements of § 119(a)(2).\n In answer to these concerns, Congress chose to enact\n§ 107(2). Legislative determinations about the Establishment\nClause, while not binding, are entitled to deference. “We in\nthe Judiciary must be wary of interpreting [the Religion]\nClauses in a manner that negates the legislative role alto-\ngether.” Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concur-\nring). Legislative deference is particularly great for\nclassifications in tax legislation. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with\nRepresentation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1997) (“Legis-\nlatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifica-\ntions and distinctions in tax statutes.”); Madden v. Kentucky,\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 25\n\n309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (holding that for tax classifications chal-\nlenged under the Fourteenth Amendment, “the presumption\nof constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit\ndemonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive\ndiscrimination against particular persons and classes”).\nCongress decided § 107(2) is the less entangling option, so we\nwill not disturb it.\n We conclude § 107(2) has a secular legislative purpose, its\nprincipal effect is neither to endorse nor to inhibit religion,\nand it does not cause excessive government entanglement.\nHere, “[t]here is no genuine nexus between tax exemption\nand establishment of religion.” Walz, 397 U.S. at 675. Section\n107(2), then, does not violate the Establishment Clause under\nthe Lemon test.\n IV.\n We next examine whether § 107(2) passes the historical\nsignificance test.11 The Supreme Court has held “the Estab-\nlishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference to histori-\ncal practices and understandings.’” Town of Greece v. Galloway,\n572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014) (quoting Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil\n\n\n 11 FFRF and amici curiae supporting appellees’ position offer no ar-\nguments under the historical significance test, except to assert the test ap-\nplies only to legislative prayer. We find no such limitation. Though Town\nof Greece addressed legislative prayer, it stated that “the Establishment\nClause must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and under-\nstandings.’” 572 U.S. at 576 (quoting Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670\n(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)). This\nlanguage does not limit the application of the Town of Greece standard to\nconstitutional challenges to legislative prayer. As this part discusses, other\nSupreme Court cases have examined relevant history as to monuments as\nwell as the ministerial exception.\n\f26 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\nLiberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670\n(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-\nsenting in part)). This fact-bound test was developed in three\ncases. First, in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality\nopinion), the Court considered whether a monument\ninscribed with the Ten Commandments on Texas government\nproperty violated the Establishment Clause. Van Orden criti-\ncized the Lemon test for ignoring the “strong role played by\nreligion and religious traditions throughout our Nation’s\nhistory.” Id. at 683. Instead, the Court reviewed a number of\nhistorical examples of governments referencing God and dis-\nplaying the Ten Commandments without issue. On that basis,\nthe Court held the monument did not violate the Establish-\nment Clause. Id. at 692.\n Next, in Hosanna-Tabor, a unanimous Supreme Court held\nthat the Establishment Clause prevents governments from in-\nterfering with the decision of a religious group to terminate\none of its ministers. In so deciding, the opinion explored the\nhistory of church-state relations in the United States and Eng-\nland, back to the Magna Carta. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182.\nFrom that history, the Court determined that the First\nAmendment was adopted in part to prevent “the new Federal\nGovernment—unlike the English Crown—[from a] role in fill-\ning ecclesiastical offices.” Id. at 184. This determination\nformed the basis of the Court’s decision.\n Finally, in Town of Greece the Supreme Court applied the\nhistorical significance test when it held legislative prayer does\nnot violate the Establishment Clause. The Court held that\n“[a]ny test the Court adopts [for the Establishment Clause]\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 27\n\nmust acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Fram-\ners and has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political\nchange.” Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577.\n We now apply the historical significance test to this case.\nFFRF offers no evidence that provisions like § 107(2) were his-\ntorically viewed as an establishment of religion. The govern-\nment and intervenors, and amici curiae supporting their\nposition, have provided substantial evidence of a lengthy\ntradition of tax exemptions for religion, particularly for\nchurch-owned properties. For over two centuries, the states\nhave implemented church property tax exemptions in various\nforms. See John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property:\nHistorical Anomaly or Valid Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL.\nL. REV. 363, 380 (1991) (“The colonial law exemption of church\nproperty continued largely uninterrupted in the early dec-\nades of the American republic.”); see also id. at 389–95 (detail-\ning state protections for religious tax exemptions from the late\n19th to early 20th centuries). When challenged on establish-\nment grounds, such tax exemptions typically have been up-\nheld. See, e.g., Trustees of Griswold College v. State, 46 Iowa 275,\n282 (1877) (ruling the state constitution’s Establishment\nClause “does not [implicate] the exemption from taxation of\nsuch church property as the legislature may think proper”).\n Congress has enacted federal tax exemptions for religious\norganizations as far back as 1802, when it permitted the\nCounty of Alexandria (then under federal control) to exempt\nchurch property from taxation, see 7 Cong. Ch. 53, May 3,\n1802, 2 Stat. 194, and as recently as 2002, the last time § 107\nwas amended. See Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification\nAct of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–181, 116 Stat. 583. As early as\n\f28 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\n1885, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged and accepted re-\nligious property tax exemptions in Gibbons v. District of\nColumbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886), “reflecting more than a century\nof our history and uninterrupted practice.” Walz, 397 U.S. at\n680. Today, more than 2,600 federal and state tax laws provide\nreligious exemptions. NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER,\nPOLITICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT: PROVOCATIVE FIRST\nAMENDMENT CONFLICTS 43 (2011).\n The district court distinguished § 107(2) from this long\nand continuing historical tradition of property tax exemp-\ntions by noting the statute is an income tax exemption. We\nfind this too fine a distinction, as it ignores the impact of the\nSixteenth Amendment. Before 1913, Congress could not con-\nstitutionally tax housing provided to ministers as part of their\nincome. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601,\n637 (1895) (invalidating a state income tax). Within a few\nyears of income becoming taxable, Congress moved to\nexclude parsonages from income, and a few decades later ex-\ncluded cash housing allowances as well. Congress was con-\ntinuing its “historical practice[]” of exempting certain church\nresources from taxation. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576. This\nendeavor limits entanglement between church and state, see\nsupra at Part III.C. Given this history, we conclude § 107(2)\ndoes not violate the Establishment Clause under the historical\nsignificance test.\n\n V.\n FFRF claims § 107(2) renders unto God that which is\nCaesar’s. But this tax provision falls into the play between the\njoints of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment\nClause: neither commanded by the former, nor proscribed by\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 29\n\nthe latter. We conclude § 107(2) is constitutional. The\njudgment of the district court is REVERSED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Annie Laurie GAYLOR, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Steven T. MNUCHIN, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants, and Edward Peecher, Et Al., Intervening Defendants-Appellants.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\nANNIE LAURIE GAYLOR, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\\n v.\\n\\nSTEVEN T. MNUCHIN, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellants,\\n\\n and\\nEDWARD PEECHER, et al.,\\n Intervening\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n\\n\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-215 — Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED OCTOBER 24, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Since the Founders crafted the Re-\\nligion Clauses of the First Amendment, courts have grappled\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nwith the “play in the joints” between them. Walz v. Tax Comm.\\nof City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). This case calls us to do\\nso once more. Freedom From Religion Foundation (“FFRF”)\\nclaims that a longstanding tax code exemption for religious\\nhousing, 26 U.S.C. § 107(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, vi-\\nolates the Establishment Clause. The district court agreed.\\nThe U.S. Treasury Department and several intervening reli-\\ngious organizations ask us to reinstate the exemption, assert-\\ning that the survival of many congregations hangs in the\\nbalance. We must decide whether excluding housing allow-\\nances from ministers’ taxable income is a law “respecting an\\nestablishment of religion” in violation of the First Amend-\\nment.\\n I.\\n A. History of § 107(2)\\n The facts before us are not in dispute. The Sixteenth\\nAmendment was ratified in 1913, authorizing Congress to\\nlevy an income tax. Congress imposed a federal income tax\\nthat same year and has levied one in various forms since. As\\na result, Congress and the Treasury Department needed to\\ndefine taxable “income.” A rule defining income that survives\\ntoday in the Internal Revenue Code is the “convenience-of-\\nthe-employer” doctrine. Under that doctrine, housing pro-\\nvided to employees for the convenience of their employer is\\nexempt from taxable income. Early examples of exclusions\\nunder the doctrine include housing provided to sailors living\\naboard ships, workers living in camps, and hospital employ-\\nees. But the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine was not\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 3\\n\\nmade available to ministers.1 In 1921, the Treasury Depart-\\nment announced ministers would be taxed on the fair rental\\nvalue of parsonages provided as living quarters. O.D. 862, 4\\nC.B. 85 (1921).\\n Congress reacted quickly and enacted a statute to exclude\\nchurch-provided parsonages from the taxable income of min-\\nisters. The Treasury Department interpreted this statute to\\napply only to housing provided in-kind; cash housing allow-\\nances were included in income. I.T. 1694, C.B. II-1, at 79 (1923).\\nThis continued for decades until in the 1950s several ministers\\nsuccessfully challenged the limitation to in-kind housing.2\\nCongress then enacted 26 U.S.C. § 107, which provides:\\n In the case of a minister of the gospel, gross in-\\n come does not include—\\n (1) the rental value of a home furnished to him\\n as part of his compensation; or\\n (2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of\\n his compensation, to the extent used by him to\\n rent or provide a home …\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 The text of the tax code refers specifically to “ministers of the gos-\\npel,” so we use that term. Courts have long held the provision applies to\\nreligious leaders of any denomination, regardless of formal title. See, e.g.,\\nSalkov v. Comm’r, 46 T.C. 190, 194 (1966) (holding a Jewish cantor was a\\n“minister of the gospel”).\\n 2 See, e.g., Williamson v. Comm’r, 224 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1955); Conning\\nv. Busey, 127 F. Supp. 958 (S.D. Ohio 1954); MacColl v. United States,\\n91 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1950).\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nSection 107(1) reauthorized the in-kind parsonage exemption\\nin place since the 1920s. Section 107(2) authorized the IRS to\\nalso exempt cash allowances from ministers’ taxable income.3\\n B. District Court Proceedings\\n FFRF describes itself as a “nonprophet nonprofit” organi-\\nzation that “[t]akes legal action challenging entanglement of\\nreligion and government, government endorsement or pro-\\nmotion of religion.” What Does the Foundation Do?, FREEDOM\\nFROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, https://ffrf.org/faq/item/15001-\\nwhat-does-the-foundation-do (last visited March 10, 2019).\\nSeeking to challenge both § 107(1) and § 107(2), FFRF paid its\\nco-presidents Annie Gaylor and Dan Barker a portion of their\\nsalaries in the form of a housing allowance. FFRF also paid\\nthis housing allowance to a former president of the organiza-\\ntion, Anne Nicol Gaylor (“Nicol Gaylor”).4 FFRF, Gaylor,\\nBarker, and Nicol Gaylor, none of whom meet the IRS’s defi-\\nnition of “minister,” then sued the Treasury Department,\\nclaiming § 107 violates the First Amendment because it con-\\nditions a tax benefit on religious affiliation. We dismissed this\\nchallenge for lack of standing because FFRF and its employees\\nnever applied for § 107(1) or § 107(2) exemptions, so they were\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3An amicus brief from the University of St. Thomas School of Law\\n(Minnesota) estimates that of the United States’ 384,000 congregations,\\n200,000 to 300,000 provide a housing allowance to their ministers under\\n26 U.S.C. § 107(2).\\n 4 Nicol Gaylor, Annie Gaylor’s mother and co-founder of FFRF,\\npassed away during the initial lawsuit filed by FFRF. Although the party\\nto this lawsuit is technically the Estate of Anne Nicol Gaylor, we refer to\\nher as “Nicol Gaylor” for brevity.\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 5\\n\\nnever denied them. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v.\\nLew, 773 F.3d 815, 825 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Lew”).\\n In response, Gaylor and Barker filed amended tax returns\\nfor 2012 and 2013 claiming refunds for their housing allow-\\nances under § 107(2); Nicol Gaylor did the same for 2013. The\\nIRS erroneously issued refunds to Gaylor and Barker for 2013\\nbut made no decisions on plaintiffs’ other claims. After more\\nthan six months without IRS action on plaintiffs’ claims, FFRF\\nand its employees brought this suit. The IRS then denied the\\n2012 refund claims because none of the claimants were minis-\\nters.\\n The Treasury Department moved to dismiss FFRF’s\\n§ 107(1) challenge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The\\ndistrict court granted the motion for the same reasons we\\narticulated in Lew: FFRF’s employees never claimed a § 107(1)\\nexemption. FFRF does not appeal that ruling. Later, the dis-\\ntrict court permitted several pastors who receive housing\\nallowances and their associated religious organizations to in-\\ntervene to defend § 107(2).5\\n The Treasury Department and intervenors moved for\\nsummary judgment. The district court denied their motions\\nand instead granted summary judgment to FFRF and its em-\\nployees. The court held that FFRF and its employees had\\nstanding to challenge § 107(2), and that that statute violates\\nthe Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Gaylor v.\\n\\n\\n 5 The intervening defendants are Bishop Edward Peecher, the Chicago\\n\\nEmbassy Church, Father Patrick Malone, the Holy Cross Church, the\\nDiocese of Chicago and Mid-America of the Russian Orthodox Church\\nOutside of Russia, and Pastor Christopher Butler. Each of the intervenors\\nreceive or provide housing allowances under § 107(2).\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nMnuchin, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1104 (W.D. Wis. 2017). The\\ncourt held that § 107(2) violated the secular purpose prong of\\nthe test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and\\nruled that the statute’s true purpose was to “provide aid to a\\ngroup of religious persons.” Gaylor, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 1099.\\nThe court rejected the argument that § 107(2) avoids excessive\\ngovernment entanglement with religion, because in the\\ncourt’s view “concerns about entanglement [do not] justify\\npreferential treatment for religious persons.” Id. The Treasury\\nDepartment and the intervenors appeal.\\n II.\\n Neither the Treasury Department nor the intervenors\\ndispute the district court’s ruling that FFRF has standing to\\nchallenge § 107(2). Nevertheless, even if the issue has not been\\nraised, if there is no Article III standing our court must dis-\\nmiss the suit. Diedrich v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 839 F.3d\\n583, 588 (7th Cir. 2016). We evaluate standing to determine\\nwhether FFRF resolved the deficiencies we noted in Lew.\\n To establish Article III standing, plaintiffs must show they\\nhave suffered “(1) a concrete and particularized ‘injury in fact’\\n(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the de-\\nfendant, and that is (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable\\njudicial decision.” Lew, 773 F.3d at 819 (citing Lujan v.\\nDefenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). To challenge\\nthe constitutionality of a tax provision, a plaintiff must have\\n“personally claimed and been denied the exemption.” Lew,\\n773 F.3d at 821.\\n An essential element of “injury in fact” is that the injury\\nbe “actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 7\\n\\nLujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotations and citations omit-\\nted). When FFRF filed this action, Gaylor and Barker had yet\\nto be denied a refund from their 2012 tax returns, and Nicol\\nGaylor had still, by the time of the district court’s decision,\\nreceived no answer to her 2013 refund request. Yet this does\\nnot necessarily mean FFRF lacked standing. Under 26 U.S.C.\\n§ 6532(a)(1), an income tax refund suit may be filed no earlier\\nthan six months after the refund claim was submitted. A stat-\\nute cannot “‘lower the threshold for standing below the min-\\nimum requirements imposed by the Constitution,’ but\\nCongress does have the power to ‘enact statutes creating legal\\nrights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no\\ninjury would exist without the statute.’” Sterk v. Redbox\\nAutomated Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 2014) (quot-\\ning Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 294 (7th\\nCir. 2000)).\\n The district court concluded it was reasonable to interpret\\n§ 6532(a)(1) as rendering a claim “effectively denied if the IRS\\ndoes not render a decision within six months.” Gaylor, 278\\nF. Supp. 3d at 1087. We agree. As the district court noted, pre-\\nventing a claimant from filing a refund suit until the IRS\\nresponded to the claim “would allow the IRS to deprive a\\nparty of standing indefinitely by withholding a decision.” Id.\\nat 1088. Several courts of appeals have cited the six-month fil-\\ning requirement approvingly. See, e.g., Fletcher v. United States,\\n452 Fed. App’x 547, 552 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[B]efore a taxpayer\\ncan bring a refund suit, he or she must … wait until either the\\nIRS denies the claim or six months have expired since filing\\nthe administrative claim.”); Dumont v. United States, 345 Fed.\\nApp’x 586, 590 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[A] suit … cannot be insti-\\ntuted until either the IRS denies the claim or six months pass\\nwithout its taking action.”); Sorenson v. Secʹy of Treasury of\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nU.S., 752 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1985), affʹd, 475 U.S. 851\\n(1986) (“The former section prohibits the courts from enter-\\ntaining any refund suit filed before the expiration of six\\nmonths from the date the claim for refund is filed … .”); see\\nalso Lew, 773 F.3d at 821 n.3 (“The plaintiffs could have … paid\\nincome tax on their housing allowance, claimed refunds from\\nthe IRS, and then sued if the IRS rejected or failed to act upon\\ntheir claims.”) (emphasis added).\\n Gaylor, Barker, and Nicol Gaylor have properly alleged a\\n“concrete, dollars-and-cents injury.” Lew, 773 F.3d at 821.\\n“[T]hey have incurred a cost or been denied a benefit on\\naccount of their religion [or lack thereof],” Arizona Christian\\nSch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 536 U.S. 125, 130 (2011), which con-\\nfers Article III standing. Because its members have standing\\nand the contested issue is germane to its organizational pur-\\npose, FFRF has organizational standing to sue as well. See\\nSierra Club v. United States E.P.A., 774 F.3d 383, 388–89 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (“‘An organization has standing to sue if (1) at least\\none of its members would otherwise have standing; (2) the\\ninterests at stake in the litigation are germane to the organiza-\\ntion’s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief\\nrequested requires an individual member’s participation in\\nthe lawsuit.’”) (quoting Sierra Club v. Franklin Cty. Power of Ill.\\nLLC, 546 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 2008)).\\n III.\\n This case comes to us after a grant of summary judgment,\\nso we assess the parties’ claims de novo. Freedom from Religion\\nFound., Inc. v. Concord Cmty. Sch., 885 F.3d 1038, 1045 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (“Concord”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 9\\n\\n Currently, Establishment Clause jurisprudence incorpo-\\nrates a number of tests when evaluating the constitutionality\\nof government action. Two are relevant to this case: the test\\nannounced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and the\\n“historical significance” test of Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572\\nU.S. 565, 576 (2014).6 Because the Supreme Court has not clar-\\nified which should take precedence, we evaluate FFRF’s\\nclaims under both tests and associated case law. See Concord,\\n885 F.3d at 1045 n.1 (“Indeed, there is debate among the Jus-\\ntices about the continuing validity of the endorsement\\ntest. … For now, we do not feel free to jettison that test alto-\\ngether … .”).7 We consider this case under the Lemon test in\\n\\n\\n 6 A third relevant to this challenge, the endorsement test, clarifies\\nLemon and is woven into our consideration of § 107(2) under the Lemon\\ntest, particularly under the second prong. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion\\nFound., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, Wis., 203 F.3d 487, 493 (7th Cir. 2000), as\\namended on denial of rehʹg and rehʹg en banc (Mar. 22, 2000) (“[T]he effect\\nprong of [the Lemon] test has been analyzed under the ‘perception of en-\\ndorsement’ test developed in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)\\n(O’Connor, J., concurring).”).\\n 7 An amicus brief filed by Wisconsin and fifteen other states notes the\\nSupreme Court has not applied the Lemon test to a religious freedom case\\nin many years. Even so, until the Supreme Court explicitly overturns\\nLemon we must apply it, as well as the other tests more recently relied\\nupon by the Court. Other circuit courts also apply multiple tests when\\nconsidering a challenge under the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., American\\nHumanist Assoc. v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 525–26 (5th Cir. 2017) (balancing\\nthe Lemon, endorsement, and coercion tests against the historical signifi-\\ncance test in Town of Greece); Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs,\\n788 F.3d 580, 586–87 (6th Cir. 2015) (setting forth Lemon, the endorsement\\ntest, and Town of Greece as the “three main jurisprudential threads” that\\nmust be woven together in assessing government action under the Estab-\\nlishment Clause).\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nthis Part of this opinion, and under the “historical signifi-\\ncance” test in Part IV.\\n Lemon summarized prior case law into a three-prong test:\\n“[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;\\nsecond, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither\\nadvances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not\\nfoster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”\\n403 U.S. at 612–13 (internal citations and quotations omitted).\\nThis test is not cumulative: if § 107(2) fails any of Lemon’s three\\nprongs, it violates the Establishment Clause.\\n A. Secular Legislative Purpose\\n We first examine whether § 107(2) has a secular legislative\\npurpose. “When the government acts with the ostensible and\\npredominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that\\ncentral Establishment Clause value of official religious neu-\\ntrality, there being no neutrality when the government’s os-\\ntensible object is to take sides.” McCreary Cty., Ky. v. Am. Civil\\nLiberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (citing Corpora-\\ntion of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day\\nSaints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987)). A statute is unconsti-\\ntutional under this test “only when … there [is] no question\\nthat the statute … was motivated wholly by religious consid-\\nerations.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984). The\\nTreasury Department and intervenors point to three secular\\nlegislative purposes of the statute: to eliminate discrimination\\nagainst ministers, to eliminate discrimination between minis-\\nters, and to avoid excessive entanglement with religion. FFRF\\ncounters that § 107(2) was passed to confer a government ben-\\nefit on religion, which necessarily violates the Establishment\\nClause.\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 11\\n\\n We will defer to a government’s sincere articulation of sec-\\nular purpose, so long as the plaintiffs have not proved that\\narticulation of purpose is a sham. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482\\nU.S. 578, 586–87 (1987) (“While the Court is normally defer-\\nential to a State’s articulation of a secular purpose, it is\\nrequired that the statement of such purpose be sincere and\\nnot a sham.”); Cohen v. City of Des Plaines, 8 F.3d 484, 489 (7th\\nCir. 1993) (“We will defer to a municipality’s sincere articula-\\ntion of a secular purpose.”). This does not mean “that the\\nlaw’s purpose must be unrelated to religion … .” Amos, 483\\nU.S. at 335. Instead, “the government lacks a secular purpose\\nunder Lemon only when ‘there is no question that the statute\\nor activity was motivated wholly by religious considera-\\ntions.’” Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Clarke, 588 F.3d 523,\\n527–28 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Books v. Elkhart Cty., 401 F.3d\\n857, 863 (7th Cir. 2005), in turn quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680).\\nSo we evaluate the purposes articulated by the Treasury De-\\npartment to determine whether they are sincere, or whether\\nthe government’s “‘actual purpose is to endorse or disap-\\nprove of religion.’” Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585 (quoting Lynch,\\n465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).\\n The Treasury Department first contends Congress passed\\n§ 107 to put ministers on equal footing with secular employ-\\nees receiving the same benefits; in other words, to eliminate\\ndiscrimination against ministers. The Treasury Department\\npoints to its 1921 decision to not exclude parsonages from tax-\\nable income and Congress’s quick passage of the parsonage\\nexemption, now codified at § 107(1), in response. The Treas-\\nury Department argues this is a secular purpose because it\\nsimply places religious employees on par with secular ones.\\nFFRF counters that the benefits given to ministers under\\n§ 107(2) are different—and better—than those the tax code\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\ngives to secular employees. FFRF argues putting ministers in\\na better position than secular employees promotes the dis-\\nsemination of religious ideas and thus cannot be secular.\\n To determine whether § 107(2) confers a special benefit, or\\nsimply integrates ministers into an existing tax system, we\\nmust delve into the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine.\\nThough the doctrine was originally developed in Treasury\\nDepartment regulations, it has since been codified in several\\nplaces. The principal statute is 26 U.S.C. § 119(a)(2) and ex-\\nempts meals and lodging furnished to employees if they meet\\nfive requirements: the meal or lodging is furnished (1) by an\\nemployer to an employee, (2) in kind (as opposed to in cash),\\n(3) on the business premises of the employer, (4) for the con-\\nvenience of the employer, and (5) as a condition of employ-\\nment. See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.119-1(b) (2018). This exemption\\napplies generally: any qualifying employee can rely on\\n§ 119(a)(2), including religious employees.8\\n The express proof requirements of § 119(a)(2) are relaxed\\nthroughout the tax code for various types of employees. Sec-\\ntion 119(c) exempts employees living in a foreign camp from\\nneeding to fulfill the “business premises” and “condition of\\nemployment” factors. Section 119(d) exempts certain teachers\\nand university employees from the convenience-of-the-\\nemployer doctrine altogether, and allows them to exclude\\nfrom taxable income the fair rental value of campus housing.\\n Myriad provisions in Title 26 employ this categorical\\napproach and exempt any form of housing benefits, whether\\n\\n\\n 8 For additional history on the development of the convenience-of-the-\\n\\nemployer doctrine, see Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 84–96 (1977).\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 13\\n\\nin cash or in kind: § 132 and § 162 exclude housing provided\\nto an employee away on business for less than a year; § 134\\nexcludes housing provided to current or former members of\\nthe military; § 911 excludes housing above a certain level pro-\\nvided to citizens or residents living abroad; § 912 excludes\\nhousing provided to government employees living abroad;\\nand, of course, § 107 excludes housing provided to ministers.\\nThese categorical exemptions allow hundreds of thousands of\\nemployees (including ministers) to receive tax-exempt\\nhousing every year without needing to satisfy the proof re-\\nquirements of § 119(a)(2).\\n These parallel provisions show an overarching arrange-\\nment in the tax code to exempt employer-provided housing\\nfor employees with certain job-related housing requirements.\\nCongress has exempted certain categories of employees from\\ncomplying with the specific requirements of § 119(a)(2) to\\nsimplify the application of the convenience-of-the-employer\\ndoctrine to those occupations. Section 107, including subsec-\\ntion (2), recognizes ministers often use their homes as part of\\ntheir ministry. This provision thus eases the administration of\\nthe convenience-of-the-employer doctrine by providing a\\nbright-line rule, instead of requiring that ministers and the\\nIRS repeatedly engage with a fact-intensive standard.\\n Reading § 107(2) in isolation from the other convenience-\\nof-the-employer provisions, and then highlighting the term\\n“minister,” could make the challenged statute appear to pro-\\nvide a government benefit exclusively to the religious. But\\nreading it in context, as we must, we see § 107(2) is simply one\\nof many per se rules that provide a tax exemption to employ-\\nees with work-related housing requirements. See ANTONIN\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nSCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 252 (2012) (“‘Sev-\\neral acts in pari materia, and relating to the same subject, are to\\nbe taken together, and compared in construction of them, be-\\ncause they are considered as having one object in view, and\\nas acting upon one system.’”) (quoting 1 James Kent, Commen-\\ntaries on American Law 433 (1826)); see also Mueller v. Allen, 463\\nU.S. 388, 396 (1983) (upholding Minnesota tax deduction for\\ntuition expenses, primarily used by parents of children at sec-\\ntarian schools, in part because the deduction was “only one\\namong many deductions—such as those for medical ex-\\npenses … and charitable contributions … available under the\\nMinnesota tax laws”). Congress’s policy choice to ease the ad-\\nministration of the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine by\\napplying a categorical exclusion is a secular purpose, not\\n“motivated wholly by religious considerations.” Lynch, 465\\nU.S. at 680.\\n FFRF argues considering the context of § 107(2) is inapt.\\nTo FFRF, the benefits the statute provides apply to a broader\\ncategory of persons—any minister, as opposed to any minis-\\nter that uses his or her home for religious purposes—than\\nother categorical housing exclusions in the tax code. The dis-\\ntrict court agreed, and found that § 107(2) is not analogous to\\nother bright-line housing benefit provisions in the tax code\\nbecause, in comparison, it is overinclusive. Gaylor, 278\\nF. Supp. 3d at 1095 (“[Sections 134, 911, and 912] relate to em-\\nployees whose housing is necessarily affected by their\\njobs. … Some ministers may be in a similar situation … but by\\nno means are all ministers so restricted … .”) (emphasis in\\noriginal).\\n It is not immediately apparent that § 107(2) is broader than\\nthe other categorical exemptions for employee housing. For\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 15\\n\\nexample, under 26 U.S.C. § 911, any person living abroad is\\npermitted to exclude or deduct housing expenses, regardless\\nwhether that person is living abroad at the behest of his or her\\nemployer.\\n But to the extent § 107(2) may be overinclusive, that alone\\ndoes not render the statute unconstitutional. FFRF’s argu-\\nment is a critique of categorical rules generally, rather than of\\n§ 107(2) specifically. “Read literally, rules are generally over-\\ninclusive and underinclusive if assessed by references to their\\npurposes. There is always a gap between the justification for\\na rule … and the rule itself.” Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with\\nRules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 990–91 (1995). No rule will per-\\nfectly address the concerns to which it is addressed, because\\n“[a]ll generalizations … are to some degree invalid, and hence\\nevery rule of law has a few corners that do not quite fit.” An-\\ntonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.\\n1175, 1177 (1989). Categorical rules sacrifice precision of result\\nfor administrative ease and equality of result. So it is not sur-\\nprising that § 107(2) covers some housing allowances that\\nmay be excluded under a case-by-case discretionary standard.\\nIn this respect, § 107(2) is not an outlier.\\n Important to our consideration, any imprecision does not\\nmake § 107(2) any less analogous to other “convenience-of-\\nthe-employer” related provisions in the tax code. Each covers\\na different subset of eligible taxpayers and activities, but they\\nall serve a common purpose: excluding from taxable income\\ncertain employment-related expenses. The constitutionality\\nof § 107(2) does not turn on which ministers the statute in-\\ncludes or excludes. See, e.g., Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 95–96\\n(“[A]rguments of equity have little force in construing the\\nboundaries of exclusions and deductions from income many\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nof which, to be administrable, must be arbitrary.”); Delong v.\\nDepʹt of Health & Human Servs., 264 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir.\\n2001) (“Like all bright line rules, [the statute] is both over-\\ninclusive and under-inclusive, but the imprecision of the stat-\\nute does not make it unconstitutional.”).\\n The second secular legislative purpose cited by the Treas-\\nury Department is elimination of discrimination between\\nministers. The government argues Congress passed § 107(2)\\nbecause providing the tax exemption only to ministers given\\nin-kind housing tended to exclude ministers of smaller or\\npoorer denominations. FFRF argues this is a sham and the\\ntrue justification was to subsidize religion, based on a state-\\nment made in the early 1950s by § 107(2)’s sponsoring repre-\\nsentative Peter Mack: “Certainly, in these times when we are\\nbeing threatened by a godless and antireligious world move-\\nment we should correct this discrimination against certain\\nministers who are carrying on such a courageous fight against\\nthis foe.” Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means:\\nStatement of Hon. Peter F. Mack, Jr., on H.R. 4275, Concerning the\\nTaxability of a Cash Allowance Paid to Clergymen in Lieu of\\nFurnishing Them a Dwelling, 83d. Cong. 1, at 1576 (June 9,\\n1953). The Treasury Department and intervenors respond by\\nquoting other statements by Representative Mack from the\\nsame hearing, such as that the bill was proposed because\\n“present tax laws are discriminatory among our clergy,” id. at\\n1574–75, and because he believed “a serious injustice [was]\\nbeing done to those ministers who must provide their own\\nhome,” id. at 1576.\\n This smattering of legislative history does not establish\\nRepresentative Mack’s motives in proposing the bill. Even if\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 17\\n\\nhis first quote above did so, the motivation of one representa-\\ntive in a House of 435 does not definitively reveal the impetus\\nbehind the bill’s passage. At the same hearing, other repre-\\nsentatives stated different motives. Speaking on the same pro-\\nposed provision, Representative Ray G. McKennan said the\\nchanges were proposed to “create an equitable condition for\\nministers similarly situated, and would probably eliminate\\ncourt action [by ministers suing for discrimination].” Id. at\\n1574.\\n The legislative record does not establish a singular motive\\nbehind § 107(2). Conflicting statements among members of\\nCongress—even by the same member—reveal the unreliabil-\\nity of this legislative history. Certainly, these statements do\\nnot render “a sham” the Treasury Department’s proffered\\npurpose of avoiding discrimination among religions. Cf.\\nEdwards, 482 U.S. at 586–87. As such, we take the government\\nat its word, which resolves this question. “The clearest com-\\nmand of the Establishment Clause is that one religious\\ndenomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”\\nLarson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). Avoidance of dis-\\ncrimination against certain religions in favor of others is a per-\\nmissible secular legislative purpose.\\n The third secular legislative purpose cited by the Treasury\\nDepartment is to avoid excessive entanglement with religion.\\nTo the government, Congress’s decision to exempt ministers\\nfrom the proof requirements of § 119(a)(2) prevents the IRS\\nfrom conducting intrusive inquiries into how religious organ-\\nizations use their facilities. See, e.g., Amos, 483 U.S. at 339\\n(“avoid[ing] … intrusive inquiry into religious belief …” pre-\\nvents entanglement). FFRF responds that § 107(2) does not\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\navoid such entanglement because the IRS must still adminis-\\nter a test to determine whether a taxpayer qualifies as a min-\\nister. FFRF argues this is as fact-intensive an audit as the\\ninquiry administered for the generally applicable statutory\\nexemption, § 119(a)(2).\\n On this entanglement question, two Supreme Court deci-\\nsions are particularly instructive. In Walz v. Tax Comm. of City\\nof N.Y., the Court upheld a New York property tax exemption\\nfor properties owned by churches and used exclusively for re-\\nligious worship. Walz disagreed with the lower court’s exam-\\nination of churches’ contribution to the social welfare to\\ndetermine whether the tax exemption had a secular purpose:\\n To give emphasis to so variable an aspect of the\\n work of religious bodies would introduce an\\n element of governmental evaluation and stand-\\n ards as to the worth of particular social welfare\\n programs, thus producing a kind of continuing\\n day-to-day relationship which the policy of\\n neutrality seeks to minimize.\\n397 U.S. at 674. Similarly, in Amos v. Corporation of the Presiding\\nBishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the\\nSupreme Court upheld a categorical exemption for religious\\norganizations from the provisions of Title VII of the Civil\\nRights Act of 1964. The opinion noted that, under Lemon, “it\\nis a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant\\ngovernmental interference with the ability of religious organ-\\nizations to define and carry out their religious missions.”\\nAmos, 483 U.S. at 335.\\n Any financial interaction between religion and govern-\\nment—like taxing a church, or exempting it from tax—entails\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 19\\n\\nsome degree of entanglement. But only excessive entangle-\\nment violates the Establishment Clause. See Walz, 307 U.S. at\\n674 (“We must also be sure that the end result—the effect—is\\nnot an excessive government entanglement with religion.”)\\nCrucial to our evaluation, the Supreme Court has already per-\\nmitted the level of entanglement incurred under § 107(2). In\\nHosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,\\n565 U.S. 171 (2012), the Court inquired into the facts underly-\\ning Hosanna-Tabor’s employment to determine whether she\\nwas a minister. Id. at 190–92. The IRS does the same under\\n§ 107(2) to determine whether a taxpayer qualifies as a minis-\\nter. The Court would not have so inquired if it violated the\\nEstablishment Clause.\\n In contrast, the application of § 119(a)(2) to ministers\\nwould entangle church and state far more than under\\n§ 107(2). For example, to determine what constitutes the busi-\\nness premises of the employer under § 119(a)(2), the IRS\\nwould have to determine what the “business” of the church is\\nand where and how far the “premises” of the church extend.\\nSee EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH 168–69 (2017).\\nTo do so, the IRS would need to interrogate ministers on the\\nspecifics of their worship activities, even determine which\\nactivities constitute “worship.” Such government inquiries\\ninto the internal affairs of churches to determine their eligibil-\\nity for tax relief have been rejected as excessive entanglement.\\nSee, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of Am. & Canada v.\\nMilivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708–20 (1976) (holding civil courts\\ncannot interfere with the rulings of ecclesiastical tribunals on\\nchurch affairs); Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475\\n(7th Cir. 2008) (“Congress does not want courts to interfere in\\nthe internal management of churches … .”).\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\n Worse, if subject to § 119(a)(2), congregations might alter\\ntheir religious activities to attempt to conform with its re-\\nquirements. Congress enacted § 107(2) in part to avoid that.\\nAnd congressional action “to minimize governmental inter-\\nference with the decision-making process in religions … does\\nnot violate the Establishment Clause.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 336\\n(internal citations and quotations omitted).\\n The categorical nature of § 107(2) also avoids excessive\\nentanglement by providing ministers and their churches cer-\\ntainty as to whether their housing allowances will be exempt\\nfrom tax. In Amos, the Supreme Court held “it is a significant\\nburden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of\\nsubstantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular\\ncourt will consider religious.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 336.\\n Recognizing the potentially excessive entanglement\\nthreatened by the application of § 119(a)(2) to ministers, Con-\\ngress enacted a less-entangling tax exemption. Seeking to\\navoid government entanglement is a secular legislative pur-\\npose under Lemon. See, e.g., Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives,\\n877 F.3d 1213, 1231 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court has\\nexpressly held that a purpose of avoiding government entan-\\nglement does not violate the Establishment Clause.”) (citing\\nAmos, 483 U.S. at 335). Because the government has articu-\\nlated not one, but three secular purposes, we conclude the\\nfirst prong of Lemon is satisfied.\\n B. Primary Effect of Advancing or Inhibiting Religion\\n The second prong of the Lemon test requires that a statute\\nhave a “principal or primary effect … that neither advances\\nnor inhibits religion.” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. “For a law to\\nhave forbidden ‘effects’ under Lemon, it must be fair to say\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 21\\n\\nthat the government itself has advanced religion through its\\nown activities and influence.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (emphasis\\nin original). This entails “sponsorship, financial support, and\\nactive involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”\\nWalz, 297 U.S. at 668.\\n FFRF contends the Supreme Court’s holdings in Amos and\\nWalz were superseded by Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion\\nin Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). That case\\nresolved an Establishment Clause challenge to a state tax ex-\\nemption for religious publications. To determine whether\\nJustice Brennan’s opinion controls, we examine the grounds\\nfor decision in Texas Monthly’s various concurrences. See\\nMarks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a frag-\\nmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explain-\\ning the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of\\nthe Court may be viewed as that position taken by those\\nMembers who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest\\ngrounds.”).\\n In Texas Monthly, Justice Brennan authored an opinion\\njoined by Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens and announced\\nthe result of the case; Justice White concurred in the result and\\nwrote separately; Justice Blackmun concurred in the result\\nand wrote for himself and Justice O’Connor; and Justice Scalia\\nfiled a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist\\nand Justice Kennedy. Justice Brennan’s opinion concluded\\nthat the tax exemption for religious publications violated the\\nEstablishment Clause because “[e]very tax exemption consti-\\ntutes a subsidy that affects nonqualifying taxpayers.” Texas\\nMonthly, 489 U.S. at 14 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). He\\nstated any subsidy directed “exclusively to religious organi-\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nzations that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause … can-\\nnot but convey a message of endorsement to slighted mem-\\nbers of the community.” Id. at 15 (internal citations and\\nquotations omitted).\\n The other opinions in Texas Monthly were narrower in\\nscope. Justice White’s concurrence reached the same result,\\nbut on an independent ground, the Press Clause. Justice\\nBlackmun’s concurrence agreed that the tax exemption vio-\\nlated the Establishment Clause, but did not adopt many of\\nJustice Brennan’s sweeping statements. Justice Blackmun\\nurged that the case be resolved narrowly and concluded only\\nthat “a tax exemption limited to the sale of religious literature\\nby religious organizations violates the Establishment Clause.”\\nId. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Be-\\ncause Justice Blackmun decided the case on Establishment\\nClause grounds,9 and on a narrower basis than Justice\\nBrennan’s opinion, under the Marks rule Justice Blackmun’s\\nconcurrence sets the rule of decision of Texas Monthly. His\\nconcurrence did not comment on what constitutes a forbid-\\nden effect under Lemon, so Texas Monthly does not alter our\\nanalysis of this second prong.\\n\\n\\n\\n 9 Even if Justice White’s opinion were based on narrower grounds\\nthan Justice Blackmun’s opinion, it reached the same result under a differ-\\nent constitutional clause. “Marks applies ‘only when one opinion is a log-\\nical subset of other, broader opinions.’” Gibson v. American Cyanamid Co.,\\n760 F.3d 600, 619 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781\\n(D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc)). Justice Blackmun’s opinion provided the fourth\\nand fifth votes in Texas Monthly and shared the “common denominator”\\nof resolving the issue under the Establishment Clause, so it controls. Gib-\\nson, 760 F.3d at 619 (quoting United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 884 (7th\\nCir. 2009)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 23\\n\\n With Walz and Amos still in effect, we evaluate forbidden\\neffects under their framework. FFRF contends a tax exemp-\\ntion for religion is identical to a government subsidy for reli-\\ngion. In economic terms, a subsidy and a tax exemption may\\nhave the same practical impact. See, e.g., Adam Chodorow,\\nThe Parsonage Allowance, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 854 (2018)\\n(“The claim that exemptions differ from direct subsidies for\\nEstablishment Clause purposes simply ignores economic re-\\nality.”). But the Supreme Court has already found a constitu-\\ntionally significant difference between the two on taxing\\nreligion. “The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship\\nsince the government does not transfer part of its revenue to\\nchurches but simply abstains from demanding that the\\nchurch support the state.” Walz, 397 U.S. at 675.10\\n Under Walz and Amos, then, § 107(2) does not advance re-\\nligion on behalf of the government. Providing a tax exemption\\ndoes not “connote[] sponsorship, financial support, and active\\ninvolvement of the [government] in religious activity” under\\nWalz, 397 U.S. at 668; see also Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (“[W]e do\\nnot see how any advancement of religion achieved by the [ex-\\nempt religious organization] can be fairly attributed to the\\nGovernment, as opposed to the Church.”).\\n Under these precedents, the primary effect of § 107(2) is\\nnot to advance religion on behalf of the government, but to\\n\\n 10 The Supreme Court tacitly reaffirmed this approach in its standing\\ndiscussion in Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 536 U.S. 125\\n(2011). There, it held taxpayers had no standing to challenge a tax credit\\ndirected primarily towards sectarian schools because “[w]hen the govern-\\nment declines to impose a tax, … there is no … connection between dis-\\nsenting taxpayer and alleged establishment.” Id. at 142.\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\n“allow[] churches to advance religion, which is their very pur-\\npose.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (emphasis in original). So § 107(2)\\npasses the second prong of Lemon.\\n C. Excessive Entanglement with Religion\\n The third prong of the Lemon test is whether the state “fos-\\nter[s] ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”\\nLemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674). We have\\naddressed this prong in Part III.A above. Because some level\\nof church-state interaction is unavoidable, “[e]ntanglement is\\na question of kind and degree.” Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684.\\nSection 107(2) avoids government inquiry into the use of a\\nminister’s home, but it still requires the IRS to determine who\\nqualifies as a minister eligible for the exemption. Even if the\\nIRS’s test for who qualifies as a minister involves entangle-\\nment, it is of a nature approved by the Supreme Court in\\nHosanna-Tabor. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190–95 (engag-\\ning in a fact-bound analysis to determine whether the peti-\\ntioner qualified as a minister). The alternative would be to\\nforce ministers to comply with the far more detailed and par-\\nticular, and thus more entangling, requirements of § 119(a)(2).\\n In answer to these concerns, Congress chose to enact\\n§ 107(2). Legislative determinations about the Establishment\\nClause, while not binding, are entitled to deference. “We in\\nthe Judiciary must be wary of interpreting [the Religion]\\nClauses in a manner that negates the legislative role alto-\\ngether.” Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concur-\\nring). Legislative deference is particularly great for\\nclassifications in tax legislation. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with\\nRepresentation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1997) (“Legis-\\nlatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifica-\\ntions and distinctions in tax statutes.”); Madden v. Kentucky,\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 25\\n\\n309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (holding that for tax classifications chal-\\nlenged under the Fourteenth Amendment, “the presumption\\nof constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit\\ndemonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive\\ndiscrimination against particular persons and classes”).\\nCongress decided § 107(2) is the less entangling option, so we\\nwill not disturb it.\\n We conclude § 107(2) has a secular legislative purpose, its\\nprincipal effect is neither to endorse nor to inhibit religion,\\nand it does not cause excessive government entanglement.\\nHere, “[t]here is no genuine nexus between tax exemption\\nand establishment of religion.” Walz, 397 U.S. at 675. Section\\n107(2), then, does not violate the Establishment Clause under\\nthe Lemon test.\\n IV.\\n We next examine whether § 107(2) passes the historical\\nsignificance test.11 The Supreme Court has held “the Estab-\\nlishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference to histori-\\ncal practices and understandings.’” Town of Greece v. Galloway,\\n572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014) (quoting Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil\\n\\n\\n 11 FFRF and amici curiae supporting appellees’ position offer no ar-\\nguments under the historical significance test, except to assert the test ap-\\nplies only to legislative prayer. We find no such limitation. Though Town\\nof Greece addressed legislative prayer, it stated that “the Establishment\\nClause must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and under-\\nstandings.’” 572 U.S. at 576 (quoting Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670\\n(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)). This\\nlanguage does not limit the application of the Town of Greece standard to\\nconstitutional challenges to legislative prayer. As this part discusses, other\\nSupreme Court cases have examined relevant history as to monuments as\\nwell as the ministerial exception.\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nLiberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670\\n(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-\\nsenting in part)). This fact-bound test was developed in three\\ncases. First, in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality\\nopinion), the Court considered whether a monument\\ninscribed with the Ten Commandments on Texas government\\nproperty violated the Establishment Clause. Van Orden criti-\\ncized the Lemon test for ignoring the “strong role played by\\nreligion and religious traditions throughout our Nation’s\\nhistory.” Id. at 683. Instead, the Court reviewed a number of\\nhistorical examples of governments referencing God and dis-\\nplaying the Ten Commandments without issue. On that basis,\\nthe Court held the monument did not violate the Establish-\\nment Clause. Id. at 692.\\n Next, in Hosanna-Tabor, a unanimous Supreme Court held\\nthat the Establishment Clause prevents governments from in-\\nterfering with the decision of a religious group to terminate\\none of its ministers. In so deciding, the opinion explored the\\nhistory of church-state relations in the United States and Eng-\\nland, back to the Magna Carta. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182.\\nFrom that history, the Court determined that the First\\nAmendment was adopted in part to prevent “the new Federal\\nGovernment—unlike the English Crown—[from a] role in fill-\\ning ecclesiastical offices.” Id. at 184. This determination\\nformed the basis of the Court’s decision.\\n Finally, in Town of Greece the Supreme Court applied the\\nhistorical significance test when it held legislative prayer does\\nnot violate the Establishment Clause. The Court held that\\n“[a]ny test the Court adopts [for the Establishment Clause]\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 27\\n\\nmust acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Fram-\\ners and has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political\\nchange.” Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577.\\n We now apply the historical significance test to this case.\\nFFRF offers no evidence that provisions like § 107(2) were his-\\ntorically viewed as an establishment of religion. The govern-\\nment and intervenors, and amici curiae supporting their\\nposition, have provided substantial evidence of a lengthy\\ntradition of tax exemptions for religion, particularly for\\nchurch-owned properties. For over two centuries, the states\\nhave implemented church property tax exemptions in various\\nforms. See John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property:\\nHistorical Anomaly or Valid Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL.\\nL. REV. 363, 380 (1991) (“The colonial law exemption of church\\nproperty continued largely uninterrupted in the early dec-\\nades of the American republic.”); see also id. at 389–95 (detail-\\ning state protections for religious tax exemptions from the late\\n19th to early 20th centuries). When challenged on establish-\\nment grounds, such tax exemptions typically have been up-\\nheld. See, e.g., Trustees of Griswold College v. State, 46 Iowa 275,\\n282 (1877) (ruling the state constitution’s Establishment\\nClause “does not [implicate] the exemption from taxation of\\nsuch church property as the legislature may think proper”).\\n Congress has enacted federal tax exemptions for religious\\norganizations as far back as 1802, when it permitted the\\nCounty of Alexandria (then under federal control) to exempt\\nchurch property from taxation, see 7 Cong. Ch. 53, May 3,\\n1802, 2 Stat. 194, and as recently as 2002, the last time § 107\\nwas amended. See Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification\\nAct of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–181, 116 Stat. 583. As early as\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\n1885, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged and accepted re-\\nligious property tax exemptions in Gibbons v. District of\\nColumbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886), “reflecting more than a century\\nof our history and uninterrupted practice.” Walz, 397 U.S. at\\n680. Today, more than 2,600 federal and state tax laws provide\\nreligious exemptions. NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER,\\nPOLITICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT: PROVOCATIVE FIRST\\nAMENDMENT CONFLICTS 43 (2011).\\n The district court distinguished § 107(2) from this long\\nand continuing historical tradition of property tax exemp-\\ntions by noting the statute is an income tax exemption. We\\nfind this too fine a distinction, as it ignores the impact of the\\nSixteenth Amendment. Before 1913, Congress could not con-\\nstitutionally tax housing provided to ministers as part of their\\nincome. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601,\\n637 (1895) (invalidating a state income tax). Within a few\\nyears of income becoming taxable, Congress moved to\\nexclude parsonages from income, and a few decades later ex-\\ncluded cash housing allowances as well. Congress was con-\\ntinuing its “historical practice[]” of exempting certain church\\nresources from taxation. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576. This\\nendeavor limits entanglement between church and state, see\\nsupra at Part III.C. Given this history, we conclude § 107(2)\\ndoes not violate the Establishment Clause under the historical\\nsignificance test.\\n\\n V.\\n FFRF claims § 107(2) renders unto God that which is\\nCaesar’s. But this tax provision falls into the play between the\\njoints of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment\\nClause: neither commanded by the former, nor proscribed by\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 29\\n\\nthe latter. We conclude § 107(2) is constitutional. The\\njudgment of the district court is REVERSED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1196,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4600565,"string":"4,600,565"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Rickey I. KANTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Rickey I. Kanter v. William P. Barr"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1478"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Flaum, Ripple, Barrett\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9824672/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"040dissent\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9824673/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"Joel Martin Flaum\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1478\\nRICKEY I. KANTER,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General\\nof the United States, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-1121 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 7, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Rickey I. Kanter pleaded guilty to\\none count of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Due to his fel-\\nony conviction, he is prohibited from possessing a firearm un-\\nder both federal and Wisconsin law. At issue in this case is\\nwhether the felon dispossession statutes—18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)—violate the Second\\nAmendment as applied to Kanter. Even if Kanter could bring\\n\\n2 No. 18-1478\\n\\nan as-applied challenge, the government has met its burden\\nof establishing that the felon dispossession statutes are sub-\\nstantially related to an important government interest. We\\ntherefore affirm the district court.\\n I. Background\\n A. Federal and Wisconsin Felon Dispossession Statutes\\n Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by persons\\nconvicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term\\nexceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). State misdemean-\\nors are included under the statute if they are punishable by\\nmore than two years in prison. 1 Id. § 921(a)(20)(B). However,\\nthe statute excludes anyone convicted of “any Federal or State\\noffenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade prac-\\ntices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to\\nthe regulation of business practices.” Id. § 921(a)(20)(A).\\nMoreover, “[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set\\naside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil\\nrights restored” is not a conviction for purposes of the statute.\\nId. § 921(a)(20).\\n Although the firearms prohibition generally applies for\\nlife, the statute includes a “safety valve” that permits individ-\\nuals to apply to the Attorney General for restoration of their\\nfirearms rights. Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 28 n.1\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1Accordingly, calling the statute a “felon” dispossession statute is\\nsomewhat of a “misnomer.” Carly Lagrotteria, Note, Heller's Collateral\\nDamage: As-Applied Challenges to the Felon-in-Possession Prohibition, 86 Ford-\\nham L. Rev. 1963, 1970 (2018).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 3\\n\\n(2007). Specifically, the Attorney General 2 may remove the\\nprohibition on a case-by-case basis if an applicant sufficiently\\nestablishes “that the circumstances regarding the disability,\\nand the applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the\\napplicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to\\npublic safety and that the granting of the relief would not be\\ncontrary to the public interest.” 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).\\n Since 1992, however, “Congress has repeatedly barred\\nthe Attorney General from using appropriated funds ‘to in-\\nvestigate or act upon [relief] applications,’” rendering the pro-\\nvision “inoperative.” Logan, 552 U.S. at 28 n.1 (quoting United\\nStates v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 74–75 (2002)). The Committee on\\nAppropriations eliminated funding because the restoration\\nprocedure under § 925(c) was “a very difficult task” that re-\\nquired ATF officials to “spend many hours investigating a\\nparticular applicant for relief.” H.R. Rep. No. 102-618, at 14\\n(1992). Even then, there was “no way to know with any cer-\\ntainty whether the applicant [was] still a danger to public\\nsafety.” Id. Accordingly, ATF officials were effectively “re-\\nquired to guess whether a convicted felon … [could] be en-\\ntrusted with a firearm.” Id. Moreover, they were “forced to\\nmake these decisions knowing that a mistake could have dev-\\nastating consequences for innocent citizens.” Id. Ultimately,\\nthe Committee determined that “the $3.75 million and the 40\\nman-years annually spent investigating and acting upon\\nthese applications for relief would be better utilized by ATF\\nin fighting violent crime.” Id. The Committee addressed the\\nfunding issue again in 1995, adding that “too many of these\\n\\n 2 The Attorney General delegated its authority under § 925(c) to the\\nBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”). 28 C.F.R.\\n§ 0.130(a)(1).\\n\\n4 No. 18-1478\\n\\nfelons whose gun ownership rights were restored went on to\\ncommit violent crimes with firearms.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-183,\\nat 15 (1995).\\n In 1981, Wisconsin adopted its own felon dispossession\\nlaw. See Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m). Section 941.29(1m) prohibits\\nan individual from possessing a firearm if he has “been con-\\nvicted of a felony in” Wisconsin or “a crime elsewhere that\\nwould be a felony” in Wisconsin. Id. § 941.29(1m)(a)–(b).\\n B. Factual Background\\n Kanter lives in Mequon, Wisconsin. He was previously the\\nowner, operator, and CEO of Rikco International, LLC. Rikco\\nInternational, which did business as “Dr. Comfort,” manufac-\\ntured therapeutic shoes and inserts for individuals with dia-\\nbetes and severe foot disease. The company marketed the\\nshoes and inserts to podiatrists, who in turn sold them to in-\\ndividual consumers. Most of the shoes and inserts were billed\\nto, and paid for by, Medicare. Medicare only paid for inserts\\nthat met certain thickness and hardness standards.\\n In April 2004, Kanter submitted his inserts to Medicare to\\ndetermine whether they met those requirements. Medicare\\nrejected Kanter’s inserts because they were too thin. Kanter\\nthen submitted revised samples, which Medicare approved.\\nHowever, Kanter continued to sell the noncompliant inserts\\nwhile representing that they were Medicare-approved. All\\ntold, Medicare paid Kanter’s company $375,000 for the non-\\ncompliant inserts.\\n On May 24, 2011, Kanter pleaded guilty to one count of\\nmail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 based on a shipment of the\\nnoncompliant inserts to a podiatrist in Florida. Section 1341\\ncarries a maximum penalty of twenty years in prison and a\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 5\\n\\n$250,000 fine. Kanter was sentenced to one year and one day\\nin prison and two years of supervised release. He was also\\nordered to pay a criminal penalty of $50,000, and he reim-\\nbursed Medicare over $27 million in a related civil settlement.\\n Kanter has since served his time and paid his criminal pen-\\nalty, and he has not been charged with any additional crimi-\\nnal activity. However, because of his felony conviction, he is\\npermanently prohibited from owning a firearm under federal\\nand Wisconsin law.\\n C. Procedural Background\\n Kanter brought suit in the Eastern District of Wisconsin,\\narguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)\\nare unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as ap-\\nplied to him. The United States moved to dismiss his claim\\nunder Rule 12(b)(6), and Wisconsin moved for judgment on\\nthe pleadings under Rule 12(c). In response, Kanter moved for\\nsummary judgment, arguing that his status as a nonviolent\\noffender with no other criminal record meant that both stat-\\nutes were unconstitutional as applied to him.\\n The district court granted defendants’ motions and denied\\nKanter’s motion. In so doing, the district court held that, even\\nassuming felons are entitled to Second Amendment protec-\\ntion, the application of the federal and Wisconsin felon dis-\\npossession laws to Kanter is substantially related to the gov-\\nernment’s important interest in preventing gun violence. The\\ncourt reasoned that Congress and the Wisconsin legislature\\nare entitled to categorically disqualify all felons—even nonvi-\\nolent felons like Kanter—because both have found that such\\nindividuals are more likely to abuse firearms. The court also\\nnoted that this “bright line categorical approach … allows for\\n\\n6 No. 18-1478\\n\\nuniform application and ease of administration.” The district\\ncourt entered judgment on January 2, 2018, and this appeal\\nfollowed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to\\ndismiss for failure to state a claim and a motion for judgment\\non the pleadings. Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Hilger, 838 F.3d 821,\\n824 (7th Cir. 2016). In doing so, “we accept all well-pleaded\\nfacts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’\\nfavor.” Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir.\\n2016). To avoid dismissal, “the complaint must ‘state a claim\\nto relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.\\nv. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).\\n A. Legal Standard 3\\n The Second Amendment states: “A well regulated Militia,\\nbeing necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the\\npeople to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S.\\nConst. amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme\\nCourt identified the “core” of the Second Amendment as “the\\nright of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in de-\\nfense of hearth and home.” 554 U.S. 570, 634–35. Accordingly,\\nthe Court concluded that Washington D.C.’s ban on handgun\\npossession in the home violated the Second Amendment. Id.\\nat 635.\\n However, the Court also made clear that “the right se-\\ncured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” Id. at 626.\\n\\n\\n 3 Because “the federal and state prohibitions are equivalent in effect”\\nas to Kanter, our Second Amendment analysis of the two statutes is the\\nsame. Baer v. Lynch, 636 F. App’x 695, 698–99 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 7\\n\\nAlthough the Court did not “undertake an exhaustive histor-\\nical analysis ... of the full scope of the Second Amendment,” it\\nsaid that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast\\ndoubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of fire-\\narms by felons and the mentally ill.” Id. It described such pro-\\nhibitions as “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.” Id.\\nat 627 n.26. Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the\\nCourt “repeat[ed] [its] assurances” that felon dispossession\\nlaws remain valid. 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (plurality opinion).\\n After Heller, we developed a two-step test for Second\\nAmendment challenges. “The threshold question is whether\\nthe regulated activity falls within the scope of the Second\\nAmendment.” Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888, 892 (7th\\nCir. 2017) (“Ezell II”). “This is a textual and historical inquiry;\\nif the government can establish that the challenged law regu-\\nlates activity falling outside the scope of the right as originally\\nunderstood, then ‘the regulated activity is categorically un-\\nprotected, and the law is not subject to further Second\\nAmendment review.’” Id. (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651\\nF.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Ezell I”)).\\n However, “if the historical evidence is inconclusive or sug-\\ngests that the regulated activity is not categorically unpro-\\ntected[,] then there must be a second inquiry into the strength\\nof the government’s justification for restricting or regulating\\nthe exercise of Second Amendment rights.” Id. (quoting Ezell\\nI, 651 F.3d at 703). At step two, we evaluate “the regulatory\\nmeans the government has chosen and the public-benefits\\nend it seeks to achieve.” Id. (quoting Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 703).\\nThe rigor of the review is dependent on “how close the law\\ncomes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the se-\\nverity of the law’s burden on the right.” Id. (quoting Ezell I,\\n\\n8 No. 18-1478\\n\\n651 F.3d at 703). “Severe burdens” on this core right “require\\na very strong public-interest justification and a close means-\\nend fit; lesser burdens, and burdens on activity lying closer to\\nthe margins of the right, are more easily justified.” Id. The\\ngovernment has the burden “of justifying its law under a\\nheightened standard of scrutiny; rational-basis review does\\nnot apply.” Id. We have consistently described step two as\\n“akin to intermediate scrutiny” and have required the gov-\\nernment to show that the challenged statute is substantially\\nrelated to an important governmental objective. United States\\nv. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing\\ncases).\\n B. As-Applied Second Amendment Challenges\\n Relying on the “presumptively lawful” language in Heller\\nand McDonald, every federal court of appeals to address the\\nissue has held that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second\\nAmendment on its face. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 406 F.\\nApp’x 52, 53–54 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d\\n281, 281–82 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. Moore,\\n666 F.3d 313, 318–19 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Barton, 633\\nF.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by\\nBinderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc);\\nSchrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 989–91 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert.\\ndenied, 571 U.S. 989 (2013); United States v. Joos, 638 F.3d 581,\\n586 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Khami, 362 F. App’x 501,\\n508 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 934 (2010); United\\nStates v. Battle, 347 F. App’x 478, 480 (11th Cir. 2009) (per cu-\\nriam); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir.\\n2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 970 (2010); United States v. Smith,\\n329 F. App’x 109, 110–11 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Ander-\\nson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 9\\n\\n However, courts of appeals are split as to whether as-ap-\\nplied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) are viable.\\nOn the one hand, the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh\\nCircuits have suggested that § 922(g)(1) is always constitu-\\ntional as applied to felons as a class, regardless of their indi-\\nvidual circumstances or the nature of their offenses. See Stim-\\nmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198, 210 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have\\nupheld § 922(g)(1), which disarms even non-violent felons.”\\n(citing United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2010),\\ncert. denied, 562 U.S. 895 (2010))); United States v. Scroggins, 599\\nF.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 867 (2010)\\n(rejecting as-applied Second Amendment challenge and hold-\\ning that felon dispossession laws are constitutional even if the\\noffense was nonviolent in nature); United States v. Rozier, 598\\nF.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 958 (2010)\\n(concluding that “statutes disqualifying felons from pos-\\nsessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not of-\\nfend the Second Amendment,” and holding that § 922(g)(1) is\\n“a constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment\\nright of certain classes of people,” including convicted felons);\\nUnited States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010),\\ncert. denied, 562 U.S. 921 (2010) (rejecting nonviolent felon’s as-\\napplied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) because\\n“felons are categorically different from the individuals who\\nhave a fundamental right to bear arms”); In re U.S., 578 F.3d\\n1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We have already rejected the no-\\ntion that Heller mandates an individualized inquiry concern-\\ning felons pursuant to § 922(g)(1).” (citing McCane, 573 F.3d at\\n1047)).\\n The First Circuit has not foreclosed as-applied challenges,\\nbut it has expressed some skepticism about them. In United\\nStates v. Torres-Rosario, the court rejected the defendant’s as-\\n\\n10 No. 18-1478\\n\\napplied challenge because he had two prior convictions for\\n“serious drug offenses.” 658 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011), cert.\\ndenied, 565 U.S. 1271 (2012). However, the court noted that the\\nSupreme Court “may be open to claims that some felonies do\\nnot indicate potential violence and cannot be the basis for ap-\\nplying a categorical ban,” and “might even be open to highly\\nfact-specific objections.” Id. Yet the First Circuit cautioned that\\n“such an approach, applied to countless variations in individ-\\nual circumstances, would obviously present serious problems\\nof administration, consistency and fair warning.” Id.\\n On the other hand, we, along with the Fourth, Eighth, and\\nD.C. Circuits, have left room for as-applied challenges to the\\nstatute. See United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir.\\n2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1092 (2010) (“[W]e recognize that\\n§ 922(g)(1) may be subject to an overbreadth challenge at\\nsome point because of its disqualification of all felons, includ-\\ning those who are non-violent.”); Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d\\n152, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“We need not decide today if it is\\never possible for a convicted felon to show that he may still\\ncount as a ‘law-abiding, responsible citizen’” entitled to Sec-\\nond Amendment protections.); United States v. Woolsey, 759\\nF.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Eighth Circuit has left\\nopen the possibility that a person could bring a successful as-\\napplied challenge to § 922(g)(1)” but rejected defendant’s as-\\napplied challenge because he had multiple violent felony con-\\nvictions.); United States v. Pruess, 703 F.3d 242, 247 (4th Cir.\\n2012) (holding that § 922(g)(1) could constitutionally be ap-\\nplied to nonviolent felons, but acknowledging that “there in\\ntheory might be an as-applied Second Amendment challenge\\nto [§] 922(g)(1) that could succeed” (citations and internal\\nquotation marks omitted)).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 11\\n\\n Neither we, nor the Fourth, Eighth, or D.C. Circuits, how-\\never, have ever actually upheld such a challenge in practice.\\nIn fact, we have repeatedly rejected as-applied Second\\nAmendment challenges to § 922(g). See Baer v. Lynch, 636 F.\\nApp’x 695, 698 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that § 922(g)(1) could\\nconstitutionally be applied to individual convicted of felony\\nrobbery); United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 750–51 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (concluding that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional as ap-\\nplied to individual who had been convicted of three violent\\nfelonies); Williams, 616 F.3d at 693–94 (holding that § 922(g)(1)\\nwas constitutional as applied to individual convicted of fel-\\nony robbery who “beat[] the victim so badly that the victim\\nrequired sixty-five stitches”); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d\\n638, 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (rejecting as-applied Sec-\\nond Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(9) brought by domes-\\ntic violence misdemeanant because violence was “an element\\nof the offense” and data suggested high rates of recidivism).\\n Indeed, only one federal court of appeals has upheld an\\nas-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g). In a\\nfractured en banc decision, a narrow majority of the Third Cir-\\ncuit (eight out of fifteen judges) held that § 922(g)(1) was un-\\nconstitutional as applied to two individuals convicted of a\\nmisdemeanor for corrupting a minor and a misdemeanor for\\nunlawfully carrying a handgun without a license, respec-\\ntively. Binderup, 836 F.3d at 340, 356. Because it is the only suc-\\ncessful as-applied Second Amendment challenge in a court of\\nappeals to date—and because Kanter relies heavily upon it—\\nit is worth examining the case at some length.\\n Seven members of the Third Circuit reasoned that the his-\\ntorical justification for disarming felons was “tied to the con-\\ncept of a virtuous citizenry,” and that “persons who have\\n\\n12 No. 18-1478\\n\\ncommitted serious crimes forfeit the right to possess firearms\\nmuch the way they forfeit other civil liberties.” Id. at 348–49\\n(plurality opinion) (citations and internal quotation marks\\nomitted). Applying the civic virtue rationale, three of those\\njudges concluded that the challengers’ offenses “were not se-\\nrious enough to strip them of their Second Amendment\\nrights.” Id. at 351. They explained that, although the two of-\\nfenses were punishable by more than a year in prison, and\\nthus met the definition of a felony in § 922(g), the state legis-\\nlatures had enacted them as misdemeanors, and “a state leg-\\nislature’s classification of an offense as a misdemeanor is a\\npowerful expression of its belief that the offense is not serious\\nenough to be disqualifying.” Id. Those judges also considered\\nthat neither of the offenses at issue involved violence and that\\neach of the challengers received “a minor sentence,” and they\\npointed to the lack of a “cross-jurisdictional consensus re-\\ngarding the seriousness of the [c]hallengers’ crimes,” remark-\\ning that in some states the challengers’ conduct was not even\\nillegal. Id. at 352. At step two, those three judges concluded\\nthat § 922(g)(1) did not survive intermediate scrutiny because\\nthe government relied on “off-point statistical studies” that\\ninvolved incarcerated felons, not misdemeanants who had\\nserved no jail time. Id. at 354.\\n By contrast, the other five judges who upheld the as-ap-\\nplied challenge believed that the exclusion of felons from the\\nscope of the Second Amendment’s protections was not rooted\\nin notions of civic virtue, but rather “the time-honored prin-\\nciple that the right to keep and bear arms does not extend to\\nthose likely to commit violent offenses.” Id. at 367 (Hardiman,\\nJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgments). Ap-\\nplying dangerousness as the touchstone, those judges con-\\ncluded that persons like the challengers who were convicted\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 13\\n\\nof nonviolent offenses fall within the scope of the Second\\nAmendment’s protection. Id. at 375–76. Moreover, those five\\njudges believed that § 922(g) was “categorically unconstitu-\\ntional” when applied to “non-dangerous persons convicted of\\noffenses unassociated with violence,” such that any subse-\\nquent means-end scrutiny or judicial interest balancing was\\n“inappropriate.” Id. at 358, 378.\\n The seven dissenting judges concluded that as-applied\\nchallenges to § 922(g)(1) are never permissible. Id. at 401\\n(Fuentes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dis-\\nsenting from the judgments). In doing so, they stressed that\\nthe majority’s decision to uphold such a challenge was un-\\nprecedented. See id. at 380–81 (“The plaintiffs ask us to do\\nsomething that no federal appellate court has done before.…\\nNo federal appellate court has yet upheld a challenge, facial\\nor as-applied, to the felon-in-possession statute.”). They criti-\\ncized the majority’s approach because it “saddle[s] district\\ncourt judges with a seemingly unending obligation to review\\nas-applied challenges” and “fail[s] to provide us with any\\nworkable standards that would make such a regime adminis-\\ntratively feasible or doctrinally coherent.” Id. at 380. Accord-\\ning to the dissent, the challengers’ claim failed at step one be-\\ncause “Heller itself tells us that felons are disqualified from\\nexercising their Second Amendment rights,” and “there is no\\nprincipled basis … for distinguishing felons from misde-\\nmeanants who commit crimes punishable by more than two\\nyears in prison.” Id. at 388. In any event, the dissenting judges\\nconcluded that § 922(g)(1) survives intermediate scrutiny be-\\ncause the government’s studies established a link between\\npast criminal conduct and the government’s important inter-\\nest in preventing future gun violence. See id. at 400–01. With\\n\\n14 No. 18-1478\\n\\nrespect to plaintiffs’ contention that the studies were not tai-\\nlored to their specific characteristics, the dissenting judges ex-\\nplained that “[t]he question is not whether someone exactly\\nlike the plaintiffs poses a threat to public safety,” but rather\\n“whether the fit between the challenged regulation and the\\nasserted objective [is] reasonable, not perfect.” Id. at 400 (al-\\nteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks\\nomitted). 4\\n With this background in mind, we now apply our two-\\nstep test to this case.\\n C. Step One: The Historical Evidence is Inconclusive as\\n to Whether Felons Were Categorically Excluded From\\n the Second Amendment’s Scope\\n The first question is whether nonviolent felons as a class\\nhistorically enjoyed Second Amendment rights. Heller did not\\nanswer this question. True, “some of Heller’s language does\\nlink Second Amendment rights with the notion[] of ‘law-abid-\\ning citizens.’” Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 669; see also Heller,\\n554 U.S. at 634–35 (observing that the “core” of the Second\\nAmendment right is “the right of law-abiding, responsible cit-\\nizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home” (emphasis\\nadded)). The Heller Court also cautioned that nothing in its\\ndecision “should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding pro-\\nhibitions on the possession of firearms by felons,” which it re-\\nferred to as “presumptively lawful.” 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26.\\nMoreover, the Court mentioned that certain individuals may\\n\\n\\n 4Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court\\ndenied the petitions for writ of certiorari. See Sessions v. Binderup, 137 S. Ct.\\n2323 (2017) (noting Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor would grant the pe-\\ntition); Binderup v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (same).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 15\\n\\nbe “disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment\\nrights.” Id. at 635. However, the Court never actually ad-\\ndressed the historical pedigree of felon dispossession laws.\\nAccordingly, we have refused to read too much into the\\nCourt’s “precautionary language.” Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640; see\\nalso Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 669 (“We are reluctant to place\\nmore weight on these passing references than the Court itself\\ndid.”). 5\\n Nor has the Seventh Circuit decided whether felons were\\nhistorically outside the scope of the Second Amendment’s\\nprotection. See Baer, 636 F. App’x at 698. Although the litigants\\nin Williams raised that question, we declined to address it and\\nproceeded directly to the intermediate scrutiny analysis. 616\\nF.3d at 692. In so doing, we noted that “[t]he academic writing\\non the subject of whether felons were excluded from firearm\\npossession at the time of the founding is ‘inconclusive at best,’\\nand we refrain[ed] … from making a determination based on\\ncontradictory views.” Id. (quoting Skoien, 614 F.3d at 650\\n(Sykes, J., dissenting)).\\n To be sure, although we have not expressly decided this\\nissue before, we have suggested that felons were not histori-\\ncally understood to have Second Amendment rights. For ex-\\nample, in Skoien, which involved domestic violence misde-\\nmeanants, we explained that some “categorical limits” on fire-\\narm possession were “part of the original meaning” of the\\nSecond Amendment. 614 F.3d at 640. Similarly, in United\\n\\n\\n 5 But see Berron v. Ill. Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd., 825 F.3d 843,\\n\\n847 (7th Cir. 2016) (“When holding in [Heller] that the Second Amendment\\nestablishes personal rights, the Court observed that only law-abiding per-\\nsons enjoy these rights, even at home.”).\\n\\n16 No. 18-1478\\n\\nStates v. Yancey, we opined that “most scholars of the Second\\nAmendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied to the\\nconcept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the gov-\\nernment could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens,’” including fel-\\nons. 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting\\nVongxay, 594 F.3d at 1118). 6\\n If, as we suggested in Yancey and as most scholars have\\nconcluded, the founders conceived of the right to bear arms\\nas belonging only to virtuous citizens, even nonviolent felons\\nlike Kanter would fall outside the scope of the Second\\n\\n\\n 6 Indeed, numerous legal historians have endorsed this view. See, e.g.,\\nSaul Cornell, “Don't Know Much About History” The Current Crisis in Second\\nAmendment Scholarship, 29 N. Ky. L. Rev. 657, 679 (2002) (“Perhaps the\\nmost accurate way to describe the dominant understanding of the right to\\nbear arms in the Founding era is as a civic right [that] … was limited to\\nthose members of the polity who were deemed capable of exercising it in\\na virtuous manner.”); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitu-\\ntion or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 Okla. L. Rev. 65, 96 (1983) (“Co-\\nlonial and English societies of the eighteenth century … excluded … felons\\n[from possessing firearms].”); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and\\nthe Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 266\\n(1983) (“Felons simply did not fall within the benefits of the common law\\nright to possess arms.”); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the\\nSecond Amendment, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461, 480 (1995) (“One implication of\\nthis emphasis on the virtuous citizen is that the right to arms does not\\npreclude laws disarming the unvirtuous (i.e. criminals) ….” (citation omit-\\nted)). Moreover, according to Thomas M. Cooley’s 1868 Treatise on Con-\\nstitutional Limitations, which the Heller court described as a “massively\\npopular” treatise written by “[t]he most famous” late-nineteenth-century\\nlegal scholar, 554 U.S. at 616, certain classes of people were “almost uni-\\nversally excluded” from exercising certain civic rights, including “the id-\\niot, the lunatic, and the felon, on obvious grounds.” Thomas M. Cooley, A\\nTreatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative\\nPower of the States of the American Union 29 (1st ed. 1868).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 17\\n\\nAmendment. Indeed, several courts of appeals have con-\\ncluded that nonviolent felons are outside the scope of the Sec-\\nond Amendment. For example, in Hamilton v. Pallozzi, the\\nFourth Circuit rejected a nonviolent felon’s as-applied Second\\nAmendment challenge to a state felon dispossession statute,\\nholding that “conviction of a felony necessarily removes one\\nfrom the class of ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ for pur-\\nposes of the Second Amendment.” 848 F.3d 614, 626 (4th Cir.\\n2017). Explaining that the defendant could not rebut the pre-\\nsumption that he fell outside the category of “‘law-abiding,\\nresponsible citizens,’” the court focused on his felony convic-\\ntion for fraud and theft crimes: “Theft, fraud, and forgery are\\nnot merely errors in filling out a form or some regulatory mis-\\ndemeanor offense; these are significant offenses reflecting dis-\\nrespect for the law.” Id. at 627 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635);\\nsee also Medina, 913 F.3d at 160 (“Whether a certain crime re-\\nmoves one from the category of ‘law-abiding and responsi-\\nble,’ in some cases, may be a close question,” such as “a mis-\\ndemeanor arising from a fistfight …. Those who commit felo-\\nnies however, cannot profit from our recognition of such bor-\\nderline cases.”); United States v. Hughley, 691 F. App’x 278, 279\\n(8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Restricting gun possession by\\nfelons—even nonviolent ones—differs meaningfully from re-\\nstricting citizens who have not been convicted of serious of-\\nfenses from having guns in their home for self-defense.”);\\nVongxay, 594 F.3d at 1115–16 (“declin[ing] to make a distinc-\\ntion between violent and non-violent felons” because “felons\\nare categorically different from the individuals who have a\\nfundamental right to bear arms”); Rozier, 598 F.3d at 771 & n.5\\n(stating that a nonviolent felon’s “Second Amendment right\\nto bear arms is not weighed in the same manner as that of a\\nlaw-abiding citizen” and analogizing felon-dispossession\\n\\n18 No. 18-1478\\n\\nstatutes to felon disenfranchisement laws); United States v.\\nEverist, 368 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Irrespective of\\nwhether his offense was violent in nature, a felon has shown\\nmanifest disregard for the rights of others. He may not justly\\ncomplain of the limitation on his liberty when his possession\\nof firearms would otherwise threaten the security of his fel-\\nlow citizens.”). 7\\n On the other hand, as Judge Sykes observed in her dissent\\nin Skoien, there is scholarly “disagree[ment] about the extent\\nto which felons … were considered excluded from the right to\\nbear arms during the founding era,” and “[t]he historical evi-\\ndence is inconclusive at best.” Skoien, 614 F.3d at 650 (Sykes,\\nJ., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 8 If the founders were really\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 Although Everist was issued before the Heller decision, the Fifth Cir-\\ncuit already recognized an individual right to bear arms pre-Heller and\\nreaffirmed the validity of the Everist decision after Heller. See Scroggins, 599\\nF.3d at 451.\\n 8 For support for Judge Sykes’s observation regarding the conflicting\\nscholarship on the historical conception of the Second Amendment, see,\\ne.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of A Theory: District of\\nColumbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 Hastings L.J. 1371, 1374 (2009)\\n(“[S]o far as I can determine, no colonial or state law in eighteenth-century\\nAmerica formally restricted the ability of felons to own firearms.”); C.\\nKevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. &\\nPub. Pol’y 695, 698 (2009) (“[A]ctual ‘longstanding’ precedent in America\\nand pre-Founding England suggests that a firearms disability can be con-\\nsistent with the Second Amendment to the extent that … its basis credibly\\nindicates a present danger that one will misuse arms against others and\\nthe disability redresses that danger.”); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22,\\n56 UCLA L. Rev. 1551, 1563 (2009) (“The Founding generation had no\\nlaws … denying the right to people convicted of crimes.”).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 19\\n\\njust concerned about dangerousness, not a lack of virtue, non-\\nviolent felons like Kanter arguably fall within the scope of the\\nSecond Amendment’s protections.\\n Ultimately, we need not resolve this difficult issue regard-\\ning the historical scope of the Second Amendment to dispose\\nof this case. Instead, we proceed to the means-end scrutiny of\\nthe government’s objectives. 9\\n D. Step Two: The Felon Dispossession Statutes Survive\\n Intermediate Scrutiny\\n Categorical prohibitions on the possession of firearms by\\nfelons are “presumptively lawful,” even in disqualifying non-\\nviolent felons like Kanter. See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640 (“[S]uch\\na recent extension of [§ 922(g)(1)’s] disqualification to non-vi-\\nolent felons (embezzlers and tax evaders, for example) is pre-\\nsumptively constitutional, as Heller said in note 26.”). But be-\\ncause “Heller referred to felon disarmament bans only as ‘pre-\\nsumptively lawful,’” we require the government to “prov[e]\\n\\n 9 In fact, we usually defer the threshold historical scope inquiry and\\nproceed directly to means-end scrutiny. See, e.g., Horsley v. Trame, 808 F.3d\\n1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 2015) (declining to decide whether eighteen- to twenty-\\nyear-olds are within the scope of the Second Amendment); Yancey, 621\\nF.3d at 684–85. One notable exception to our generally restrained ap-\\nproach in this area is United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir.\\n2015). There, the majority held that undocumented immigrants were his-\\ntorically within the scope of the Second Amendment but ultimately con-\\ncluded that the statute at issue nevertheless survived intermediate scru-\\ntiny. Id. at 669–73. The concurrence advocated for a “prudential approach”\\nsince we did not need to decide the threshold question to resolve the case,\\nand proposed “reserv[ing] resolution of this challenging constitutional\\nquestion for a case that compels addressing it.” Id. at 673–74 (Flaum, J.,\\nconcurring in the judgment). We think that prudential approach is appro-\\npriate here.\\n\\n20 No. 18-1478\\n\\n“the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) … using the intermediate\\nscrutiny framework.” Williams, 616 F.3d at 692.\\n To survive intermediate scrutiny at step two, the govern-\\nment must show that the felon dispossession statute is sub-\\nstantially related to an important governmental objective.\\nConsistent with how we apply intermediate scrutiny in the\\nFirst Amendment context, the “fit” between the challenged\\nregulation and the asserted governmental objective need only\\n“be reasonable, not perfect.” United States v. Marzzarella, 614\\nF.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010); cf. FTC v. Trudeau, 662 F.3d 947, 953\\n(7th Cir. 2011). 10\\n The government has met its burden in this case. First, Kan-\\nter concedes that the government’s objective in passing\\n§ 922(g)(1) was an important one. The government identifies\\nits interest as preventing gun violence by keeping firearms\\naway from persons, such as those convicted of serious crimes,\\nwho might be expected to misuse them. This formulation of\\nthe government’s interest is consistent with our precedent in\\nthis area. See Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683 (“Congress enacted the\\nexclusions in § 922(g) to keep guns out of the hands of pre-\\n\\n\\n 10 Our means-end review is arguably less rigorous in this case because\\n\\nthe weight of the historical evidence summarized above suggests that\\nfelon dispossession laws do not restrict the “core right of armed defense,”\\nbut rather burden “activity lying closer to the margins of the right.” Ezell\\nII, 846 F.3d at 892. Indeed, we have said that “the state can prevail with\\nless evidence when, as in Skoien, guns are forbidden to a class of persons\\nwho present a higher than average risk of misusing a gun.” Moore, 702\\nF.3d at 940. We have even gone so far as to say that “empirical evidence of\\na public safety concern can be dispensed with altogether when the ban is\\nlimited to obviously dangerous persons such as felons and the mentally\\nill.” Id.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 21\\n\\nsumptively risky people.”); Williams, 616 F.3d at 693 (describ-\\ning the government’s objective as “keep[ing] firearms out of\\nthe hands of violent felons, who the government believes are\\noften those most likely to misuse firearms”); Skoien, 614 F.3d\\nat 642 (describing the government’s interest as “preventing\\narmed mayhem”). And we have previously held that this in-\\nterest is “without doubt an important one.” Yancey, 621 F.3d\\nat 684; see also Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 673 (“[T]he govern-\\nment has a[] strong interest in preventing people who already\\nhave disrespected the law (including … felons …) from pos-\\nsessing guns.”).\\n Second, the government has shown that prohibiting even\\nnonviolent felons like Kanter from possessing firearms is sub-\\nstantially related to its interest in preventing gun violence. Be-\\nfore turning to the government’s statistical evidence estab-\\nlishing such a link, it is important to note that we do not write\\non a blank slate. In Yancey, we explained that “most felons are\\nnonviolent, but someone with a felony conviction on his rec-\\nord is more likely than a nonfelon to engage in illegal and vi-\\nolent gun use.” 621 F.3d at 685. In fact, the D.C. Circuit has\\nconcluded that “nonviolent offenders not only have a higher\\nrecidivism rate than the general population, but certain\\ngroups—such as property offenders—have an even higher re-\\ncidivism rate than violent offenders, and a large percentage of\\nthe crimes nonviolent recidivists later commit are violent.”\\nKaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see\\nEwing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 26 (2003) (citing P. Langan &\\nD. Levin, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Spe-\\ncial Report: Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, at 1 (June\\n2002)).\\n\\n22 No. 18-1478\\n\\n In addition to these judicial statements, the government\\npoints to several studies that have found a connection be-\\ntween nonviolent offenders like Kanter and a risk of future\\nviolent crime. For example, one study of 210,886 nonviolent\\noffenders found that about one in five were rearrested for a\\nviolent crime within three years of his or her release. See U.S.\\nDep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Profile of Nonviolent\\nOffenders Exiting State Prisons 2, 4 (2004). A separate study\\nfound that 28.5 percent of nonviolent property offenders—a\\ncategory that includes fraud convictions—were rearrested for\\na violent offense within five years of their release. See Mat-\\nthew R. Durose, et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice\\nStatistics, Recidivism of Prisoner Released in 30 States in 2005:\\nPatterns from 2005 to 2010, at 9 (2014). Yet another study found\\nthat “even handgun purchasers with only 1 prior misdemeanor\\nconviction and no convictions for offenses involving firearms\\nor violence were nearly 5 times as likely as those with no prior\\ncriminal history to be charged with new offenses involving\\nfirearms or violence.” Garen J. Wintemute, et al., Prior Misde-\\nmeanor Convictions as a Risk Factor for Later Violent and Firearm-\\nRelated Criminal Activity Among Authorized Purchasers of Hand-\\nguns, 280 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 2083, 2083 (1998) (emphasis\\nadded). 11\\n\\n\\n\\n 11 Even the study that Kanter relies upon found that approximately 40\\n\\npercent of individuals convicted of mail fraud had at least one additional\\narrest afterward. David Weisburd & Elin Waring, White-Collar Crime and\\nCriminal Careers 12, 29 (2004). The same study found that 24.5 percent of\\nall repeat white-collar offenders had at least one violent arrest on their\\nrecord. Id. at 45. In other words, “white-collar offenders often have multi-\\nple contacts with the criminal justice system” and “are unlikely to evi-\\ndence a high degree of specialization.” Id. at 49.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 23\\n\\n Kanter’s only response to the government’s statistical\\nstudies is that they are not tailored enough to his “individual\\ncircumstances.” Specifically, Kanter asks the Court “to con-\\nsider the fact that [he] is a first-time, non-violent offender with\\nno history of violence, firearm misuses, or subsequent convic-\\ntions.” Kanter also points out that he is “employed, married,\\nand does not use illicit drugs, all of which correspond with\\nlower rates of recidivism.” In short, Kanter argues that to\\nmeet its burden the government must show “a substantial re-\\nlationship between denying Mr. Kanter a firearm and further-\\ning the government’s objective of preventing firearm misuse\\nand armed violence.”\\n Kanter is mistaken. In Skoien we held that “Congress is not\\nlimited to case-by-case exclusions of persons who have been\\nshown to be untrustworthy with weapons, nor need these\\nlimits be established by evidence presented in court. Heller\\ndid not suggest that disqualifications would be effective only\\nif the statute’s benefits are first established by admissible evi-\\ndence.” 614 F.3d at 641. Of course, not all nonviolent felons\\nwill later commit a violent crime with a firearm. In that sense,\\nthe statute is “somewhat over-inclusive.” United States v.\\nChapman, 666 F.3d 220, 231 (4th Cir. 2012). However, that\\n“does not undermine [the statute’s] constitutionality … be-\\ncause it merely suggests that the fit is not a perfect one; a rea-\\nsonable fit is all that is required under intermediate scrutiny.”\\nId.; see also Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97–98 (analogizing to inter-\\nmediate scrutiny in First Amendment context).\\n Here, unlike the challengers in Binderup, who were con-\\nvicted of “non-serious” state misdemeanors and served no\\nprison time, Kanter was convicted of a serious federal felony\\nfor conduct broadly understood to be criminal, and he did not\\n\\n24 No. 18-1478\\n\\nface a minor sentence. 836 F.3d at 353 & n.6. Instead, Kanter is\\nmore akin to the challenger in Hamilton, whose fraud and\\ntheft convictions were “black-letter mala in se felonies reflect-\\ning grave misjudgment and maladjustment.” 848 F.3d at 627.\\nKanter’s crime—defrauding the federal government out of\\nhundreds of thousands of dollars—“reflect[s] significant dis-\\nrespect for the law.” Id. at 627 n.14; see also Medina, 913 F.3d at\\n160 (rejecting as-applied challenge where plaintiff was con-\\nvicted of “felony fraud—a serious crime, malum in se, that is\\npunishable in every state”). Thus, Kanter’s serious felony con-\\nviction prevents him from challenging the constitutionality of\\n§ 922(g)(1) as applied to him. 12\\n We are further assured in our decision because the highly-\\nindividualized approach Kanter proposes raises serious insti-\\ntutional and administrative concerns. See Torres-Rosario, 658\\nF.3d at 113 (“[S]uch an approach, applied to countless varia-\\ntions in individual circumstances, would obviously present\\nserious problems of administration, consistency and fair\\nwarning.”); see also Medina, 913 F.3d at 159–60 (rejecting argu-\\nment that “non-dangerous felons have a right to bear arms”\\n\\n\\n 12 We decline to revisit our comment in Williams “that § 922(g)(1) may\\nbe subject to an overbreadth challenge at some point because of its dis-\\nqualification of all felons, including those who are non-violent.” 616 F.3d\\nat 693. That statement was dictum, and we need not determine whether\\n§ 922(g)(1) may ever be subject to an as-applied challenge to reach our de-\\ncision in this case. There may be a case in the future that requires address-\\ning whether any individual may successfully bring an as-applied chal-\\nlenge to the statute, but Kanter’s is not that case. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma,\\n413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973) (“[A] person to whom a statute may constitution-\\nally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground\\nthat it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other\\nsituations not before the Court.”).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 25\\n\\nbecause “[u]sing an amorphous ‘dangerousness’ standard to\\ndelineate the scope of the Second Amendment would require\\nthe government to make case-by-case predictive judgments\\nbefore barring the possession of weapons”). As mentioned\\nabove, Congress previously allowed the ATF to restore a\\nfelon’s gun rights under § 925(c) if the agency determined that\\n“the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous\\nto public safety and that the granting of the relief would not\\nbe contrary to the public interest.” 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). How-\\never, Congress abandoned that approach after finding that\\nthe dangerousness inquiry was a “very difficult” and time-in-\\ntensive task, H.R. Rep. No. 102-618, at 14 (1992), and that “too\\nmany of these felons whose gun ownership rights were re-\\nstored went on to commit violent crimes with firearms.” H.R.\\nRep. No. 104-183, at 15 (1995). Congress’s failed attempt to\\ndelegate this investigative task to a law enforcement agency\\n“should have a profound impact on our tailoring analysis.”\\nBinderup, 836 F.3d at 403 (Fuentes, J., concurring in part, dis-\\nsenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment).\\n At bottom, the fact-specific inquiry Kanter asks this Court\\nto undertake is “a function best performed by the Executive,\\nwhich, unlike courts, is institutionally equipped for conduct-\\ning a neutral, wide-ranging investigation.” Bean, 537 U.S. at\\n77; see also Pontarelli v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 285 F.3d 216,\\n231 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Unlike ATF, courts possess neither the re-\\nsources to conduct the requisite investigations nor the exper-\\ntise to predict accurately which felons may carry guns with-\\nout threatening the public’s safety.”). Moreover, “[i]n the con-\\ntext of firearm regulation, the legislature is far better\\nequipped than the judiciary to make sensitive public policy\\njudgments (within constitutional limits) concerning the dan-\\ngers in carrying firearms and the manner to combat those\\n\\n26 No. 18-1478\\n\\nrisks.” Schrader, 704 F.3d at 990 (citation and internal quota-\\ntion marks omitted).\\n In sum, the government has established that the felon dis-\\npossession statutes are substantially related to the important\\ngovernmental objective of keeping firearms away those con-\\nvicted of serious crimes. Because Kanter was convicted of a\\nserious federal felony for conduct broadly understood to be\\ncriminal, his challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is\\nwithout merit.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\\ndistrict court.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 27\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4377818/\", \"author_raw\": \"Joel Martin Flaum\"}, {\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting. History is consistent\\nwith common sense: it demonstrates that legislatures have the\\npower to prohibit dangerous people from possessing guns.\\nBut that power extends only to people who are dangerous.\\nFounding-era legislatures did not strip felons of the right to\\nbear arms simply because of their status as felons. Nor have\\nthe parties introduced any evidence that founding-era\\nlegislatures imposed virtue-based restrictions on the right;\\nsuch restrictions applied to civic rights like voting and jury\\nservice, not to individual rights like the right to possess a gun.\\nIn 1791—and for well more than a century afterward—\\nlegislatures disqualified categories of people from the right to\\nbear arms only when they judged that doing so was necessary\\nto protect the public safety.\\n 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and Wisconsin Statute § 941.29(1m)\\nwould stand on solid footing if their categorical bans were\\ntailored to serve the governments’ undeniably compelling\\ninterest in protecting the public from gun violence. But their\\ndispossession of all felons—both violent and nonviolent—is\\nunconstitutional as applied to Kanter, who was convicted of\\nmail fraud for falsely representing that his company’s\\ntherapeutic shoe inserts were Medicare-approved and billing\\nMedicare accordingly. Neither Wisconsin nor the United\\nStates has introduced data sufficient to show that disarming\\nall nonviolent felons substantially advances its interest in\\nkeeping the public safe. Nor have they otherwise\\ndemonstrated that Kanter himself shows a proclivity for\\nviolence. Absent evidence that he either belongs to a\\ndangerous category or bears individual markers of risk,\\n\\n28 No. 18-1478\\n\\npermanently disqualifying Kanter from possessing a gun\\nviolates the Second Amendment. 1\\n I.\\n At the outset, it is worth clarifying a conceptual point.\\nThere are competing ways of approaching the\\nconstitutionality of gun dispossession laws. Some maintain\\nthat there are certain groups of people—for example, violent\\nfelons—who fall entirely outside the Second Amendment’s\\nscope. See, e.g., Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 357\\n(3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Hardiman, J., concurring in part and\\nconcurring in the judgments) (“[T]he Founders understood\\nthat not everyone possessed Second Amendment rights.\\nThese appeals require us to decide who count among ‘the\\npeople’ entitled to keep and bear arms.”). Others maintain\\nthat all people have the right to keep and bear arms but that\\nhistory and tradition support Congress’s power to strip\\ncertain groups of that right. See Eugene Volokh, Implementing\\nthe Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical\\nFramework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1497–\\n98 (2009) (describing these competing views). These\\napproaches will typically yield the same result; one uses\\nhistory and tradition to identify the scope of the right, and the\\nother uses that same body of evidence to identify the scope of\\nthe legislature’s power to take it away.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1Because the federal and state statutes operate to the same effect as\\napplied to Kanter, my analysis applies equally to both. For simplicity’s\\nsake, I often refer only to the federal statute. In addition, I sometimes refer\\nto the statutes as imposing a “felon ban” or “felon dispossession” with the\\nunderstanding that § 922(g)(1) also encompasses state misdemeanors\\npunishable by more than two years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 29\\n\\n In my view, the latter is the better way to approach the\\nproblem. It is one thing to say that certain weapons or\\nactivities fall outside the scope of the right. See District of\\nColumbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (explaining that\\n“the sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common use\\nat the time’” (citation omitted)); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846\\nF.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2017) (Ezell II) (“[I]f … the challenged\\nlaw regulates activity falling outside the scope of the right as\\noriginally understood, then ‘the regulated activity is\\ncategorically unprotected, and the law is not subject to further\\nSecond Amendment review.’” (citation omitted)); Ezell v. City\\nof Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011) (Ezell I) (drawing\\nan analogy between categories of speech, like obscenity, that\\nfall outside the First Amendment and activities that fall\\noutside the Second Amendment). It is another thing to say\\nthat certain people fall outside the Amendment’s scope. Arms\\nand activities would always be in or out. But a person could\\nbe in one day and out the next: the moment he was convicted\\nof a violent crime or suffered the onset of mental illness, his\\nrights would be stripped as a self-executing consequence of\\nhis new status. No state action would be required.\\n To be sure, under this theory such a person could possess\\na gun as a matter of legislative grace. But he would lack\\nstanding to assert constitutional claims that other citizens\\ncould assert. For example, imagine that a legislature\\ndisqualifies those convicted of crimes of domestic violence\\nfrom possessing a gun for a period of ten years following\\nrelease from prison. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638,\\n642 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding constitutional 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g)(9), which forbids those convicted of crimes of\\ndomestic violence to possess a gun). After fifteen years pass,\\na domestic violence misdemeanant challenges a handgun ban\\n\\n30 No. 18-1478\\n\\nidentical to the one that the Court held unconstitutional in\\nHeller. Despite the legislative judgment that such a person\\ncould safely possess a gun after ten years, a court would still\\nhave to determine whether the person had standing to assert\\na Second Amendment claim. If the justification for the initial\\ndeprivation is that the person falls outside the protection of\\nthe Second Amendment, it doesn’t matter if the statutory\\ndisqualification expires. If domestic violence misdemeanants\\nare out, they’re out. 2\\n That is an unusual way of thinking about rights. In other\\ncontexts that involve the loss of a right, the deprivation occurs\\nbecause of state action, and state action determines the scope\\nof the loss (subject, of course, to any applicable constitutional\\nconstraints). Felon voting rights are a good example: a state\\ncan disenfranchise felons, but if it refrains from doing so, their\\nvoting rights remain constitutionally protected. 3 So too with\\n\\n 2 Or at least that would be true absent the unlikely event that the\\nSecond Amendment, as originally understood, imposed a very specific\\nrestriction on the length of time that such a misdemeanant was excluded\\nfrom the right.\\n 3 Felon disenfranchisement laws have a long history, and the\\nFourteenth Amendment’s protection of the right to vote expressly\\nacknowledges the authority of state legislatures to enact such laws. U.S.\\nCONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (providing that a state’s representation in the\\nHouse will be reduced if the right to vote “is denied … or in any way\\nabridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime”). The\\nSecond Amendment contains no similar acknowledgement. Legislative\\npower to strip the right from certain people or groups was nonetheless a\\nhistorically accepted feature of the pre-existing right that the Second\\nAmendment protects. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (“[T]he Second\\nAmendment … codified a pre-existing right.”); id. at 595 (“Of course the\\nright was not unlimited ….”); Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640 (“That some\\ncategorical limits are proper is part of the original meaning, leaving to the\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 31\\n\\nthe right to keep and bear arms: a state can disarm certain\\npeople (for example, those convicted of crimes of domestic\\nviolence), but if it refrains from doing so, their rights remain\\nconstitutionally protected. In other words, a person convicted\\nof a qualifying crime does not automatically lose his right to\\nkeep and bear arms but instead becomes eligible to lose it.\\n In addition to being analytically awkward, the “scope of\\nthe right” approach is at odds with Heller itself. There, the\\nCourt interpreted the word “people” as referring to “all\\nAmericans.” 554 U.S. at 580–81; see also id. at 580 (asserting\\nthat “the people” “refers to a class of persons who are part of\\na national community or who have otherwise developed\\nsufficient connection with this country to be considered part\\nof that community” (citation omitted)). Neither felons nor the\\nmentally ill are categorically excluded from our national\\ncommunity. That does not mean that the government cannot\\nprevent them from possessing guns. Instead, it means that the\\nquestion is whether the government has the power to disable\\nthe exercise of a right that they otherwise possess, rather than\\nwhether they possess the right at all.\\n Thus, I treat Kanter as falling within the scope of the\\nSecond Amendment and ask whether Congress and\\nWisconsin can nonetheless prevent him from possessing a\\ngun.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\npeople’s elected representatives the filling in of details.”). Thus, such a\\nregulation does not “infringe” the right to bear arms because the right was\\nalways qualified by the government’s power to prevent the dangerous\\nfrom exercising it.\\n\\n32 No. 18-1478\\n\\n II.\\n Heller did not “undertake an exhaustive historical\\nanalysis … of the full scope of the Second Amendment,” but\\nit did offer a list of “presumptively lawful regulatory\\nmeasures,” including “longstanding prohibitions on the\\npossession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.” See\\nHeller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26. Like the majority, I am\\n“reluctant to place more weight on these passing references\\nthan the Court itself did.” See Maj. Op. at 15 (quoting United\\nStates v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2015)). The\\nconstitutionality of felon dispossession was not before the\\nCourt in Heller, and because it explicitly deferred analysis of\\nthis issue, the scope of its assertion is unclear. For example,\\ndoes “presumptively lawful” mean that such regulations are\\npresumed lawful unless a historical study shows otherwise?\\nDoes it mean that as-applied challenges are available? Does\\nthe Court’s reference to “felons” suggest that the legislature\\ncannot disqualify misdemeanants from possessing guns?\\nDoes the word “longstanding” mean that prohibitions of\\nrecent vintage are suspect? As we observed in Skoien, judicial\\nopinions are not statutes, and we don’t dissect them word-by-\\nword as if they were. 614 F.3d at 640. Thus, I agree with the\\nmajority that Heller’s dictum does not settle the question\\nbefore us.\\n It does, however, give us a place to start. Heller’s reference\\nendorses the proposition that the legislature can impose some\\ncategorical bans on the possession of firearms. See id. (“That\\nsome categorical limits are proper is part of the original\\nmeaning.”). Our task is to determine whether all felons—\\nviolent and nonviolent alike—comprise one such category.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 33\\n\\n Wisconsin and the United States advance three basic\\nhistorical arguments in support of this categorical exclusion.\\nFirst, they say that there is some evidence suggesting that\\nfounding-era legislatures deprived felons of the right. Second,\\nthey argue that because the states put felons to death at the\\ntime of the founding, no one would have questioned their\\nauthority to take felons’ guns too. And third, they insist that\\nfounding-era legislatures permitted only virtuous citizens to\\nhave guns, and felons are not virtuous citizens.\\n As I explain below, none of these rationales supports the\\nproposition that the legislature can permanently deprive\\nfelons of the right to possess arms simply because of their\\nstatus as felons. The historical evidence does, however,\\nsupport a different proposition: that the legislature may\\ndisarm those who have demonstrated a proclivity for violence\\nor whose possession of guns would otherwise threaten the\\npublic safety. This is a category simultaneously broader and\\nnarrower than “felons”—it includes dangerous people who\\nhave not been convicted of felonies but not felons lacking\\nindicia of dangerousness.\\n A.\\n The best historical support for a legislative power to\\npermanently dispossess all felons would be founding-era\\nlaws explicitly imposing—or explicitly authorizing the\\nlegislature to impose—such a ban. But at least thus far,\\nscholars have not been able to identify any such laws. The\\nonly evidence coming remotely close lies in proposals made\\nin the New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania\\nratifying conventions. In recommending that protection for\\nthe right to arms be added to the Constitution, each of these\\nproposals included limiting language arguably tied to\\n\\n34 No. 18-1478\\n\\ncriminality. See, e.g., Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and\\nthe Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV.\\n204, 222, 266 (1983); Steven P. Halbrook, The Right of the People\\nor the Power of the State: Bearing Arms, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 131,\\n147, 185 (1991); see also C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha\\nStewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 712 (2009)\\n(“For relevant authority before World War I for disabling\\nfelons from keeping firearms, then, one is reduced to three\\nproposals emerging from the ratification of the\\nConstitution.”).\\n A majority of the New Hampshire convention\\nrecommended that a bill of rights include the following\\nprotection: “Congress shall never disarm any citizen, unless\\nsuch as are or have been in actual rebellion.” See 1 JONATHAN\\nELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON\\nTHE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 326 (2d ed. 1891)\\n(emphasis added). In the Massachusetts convention, Samuel\\nAdams proposed to protect the right to arms with the\\nfollowing language: “And that the said Constitution be never\\nconstrued to authorize Congress to … prevent the people of\\nthe United States, who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their\\nown arms.” See 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A\\nDOCUMENTARY HISTORY 675, 681 (1971) (emphasis added).\\nFinally, the influential Pennsylvania Minority suggested an\\naddition stating: “That the people have a right to bear arms\\nfor the defense of themselves and their own State or the\\nUnited States, or for the purpose of killing game; and no law\\nshall be passed for disarming the people or any of them unless\\nfor crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from\\nindividuals ….” 2 SCHWARTZ, supra, at 662, 665 (emphasis\\nadded). On the basis of these three proposals some conclude\\nthat “[a]ll the ratifying convention proposals which most\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 35\\n\\nexplicitly detailed the recommended right-to-arms\\namendment excluded criminals and the violent.” See, e.g.,\\nKates, 82 MICH. L. REV. at 266.\\n Several things bear emphasis here. First, none of the\\nrelevant limiting language made its way into the Second\\nAmendment. Second, only New Hampshire’s proposal—the\\nleast restrictive of the three—even carried a majority of its\\nconvention. See 2 SCHWARTZ, supra, at 628, 675, 758. Third,\\nproposals from other states that advocated a constitutional\\nright to arms did not contain similar language of limitation or\\nexclusion. See Kates, 82 MICH. L. REV. at 222 (citing 1 ELLIOT,\\nsupra, at 328, 335). And finally, similar limitations or\\nexclusions do not appear in any of the four parallel state\\nconstitutional provisions enacted before ratification of the\\nSecond Amendment. See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional\\nRights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 191, 208\\n(2006) (North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont,\\nMassachusetts). All that said, these proposals may “indicate\\nsome common if imprecise understanding at the Founding\\nregarding the boundaries of a right to keep and bear arms.”\\nMarshall, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y at 713. And at a\\nminimum, the fact that they are routinely invoked in support\\nof blanket felon disarmament makes it necessary to consider\\nthem.\\n I’ll begin with the New Hampshire proposal, which did\\nnot embrace the disarmament of all felons, but rather of those\\ncitizens who “are or have been in actual rebellion.” 1 ELLIOT,\\nsupra, at 326 (emphasis added). This limitation targeted a\\nnarrow group because “rebellion” was a very specific crime.\\nSee Rebellion, 2 NEW UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH\\nDICTIONARY (4th ed. 1756) (explaining that the term is “now\\n\\n36 No. 18-1478\\n\\nused for a traiterous taking up arms, or a tumultuous\\nopposing the authority of the king, etc. or supreme power in\\na nation”). There are obvious reasons why the government\\nwould take guns away from those bent on overthrowing it,\\nand, as I discuss later, stripping rebels of their gun rights\\nfollowed well-established practice in both England and the\\ncolonies. Thus, while this proposal reflects support for\\ndisarming rebels, it does not say anything about disarming\\nthose who have committed other crimes, much less\\nnonviolent ones.\\n Samuel Adams’s proposed language to the Massachusetts\\nconvention, which would have limited the right to “peaceable\\ncitizens,” see 2 SCHWARTZ, supra, at 681, sweeps more\\nbroadly—but not so broadly that it encompasses all criminals,\\nor even all felons. At the time, “peaceable” was defined as\\n“[f]ree from war; free from tumult”; “[q]uiet; undisturbed”;\\n“[n]ot violent; not bloody”; “[n]ot quarrelsome; not\\nturbulent.” 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH\\nLANGUAGE (5th ed. 1773). Those who “breach[ed] the peace”\\ncaused “[a] violation of the public peace, as by a riot, affray,\\nor any tumult which is contrary to law, and destructive to the\\npublic tranquility.” See Breach, NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN\\nDICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828); see also Atwater\\nv. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 327 & n.2 (2001) (noting some\\n“variations in the common-law usage of the term ‘breach of\\nthe peace’” but assuming that the definition “entail[ed] at\\nleast a threat of violence”); id. (quoting MICHAEL DALTON, THE\\nCOUNTRY JUSTICE 9 (1727) (“The Breach of th[e] Peace seemeth\\nto be any injurious Force or Violence moved against the\\nPerson of another, his Goods, Lands, or other Possessions,\\nwhether by threatening words, or by furious Gesture, or Force\\nof the Body, or any other Force used in terrorem.”)); Pearce v.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 37\\n\\nAtwood, 13 Mass. 324, 332 (1816) (“Breaches of the peace\\ncomprise not only cases of actual violence to the person of\\nanother, but any unlawful acts, tending to produce an actual\\nbreach of the peace; whether the peace of the public, or an\\nindividual, be in fact disturbed or not.”). Not all crimes are\\nviolent; nor, for that matter, is every non-peaceable person a\\ncriminal. In short, the phrase “peaceable citizens” was not a\\nsynonym for “non-felons” or even “non-criminals.”\\n That leaves the strongest support for a blanket felon\\nexclusion: the Pennsylvania Minority’s suggested guarantee\\nof the right to arms “unless for crimes committed, or real\\ndanger of public injury from individuals.” 2 SCHWARTZ, supra,\\nat 665. This proposal can be read in two ways. The first, which\\nwould support a broad exclusion, is to interpret it as\\ncapturing two groups: (1) those who have committed any\\ncrime—felony or misdemeanor, violent or nonviolent—and\\n(2) those who have not committed a crime but nonetheless\\npose a danger to public safety. The second, which would\\nsupport a more targeted exclusion, is to interpret it as\\ncapturing one group: those who pose a danger to public\\nsafety, whether or not they have committed a crime. On this\\nreading, the catchall phrase limiting the rights of individuals\\nwho pose a “real danger of public injury” would be an effort\\nto capture non-criminals whose possession of guns would\\npose the same kind of danger as possession by those who have\\ncommitted crimes. And unless the founding generation\\nunderstood all crimes—even nonviolent misdemeanors—to\\nbe markers for that risk, the relevant “crimes committed”\\nwould be the subset of crimes suggesting a proclivity for\\nviolence. (As far as I can find, no one even today reads this\\nprovision to support the disarmament of literally all\\ncriminals, even nonviolent misdemeanants.) If “crimes\\n\\n38 No. 18-1478\\n\\ncommitted” refers only to a subset of crimes, that subset must\\nbe defined; using “real danger of public injury” to draw the\\nline is both internally coherent and consistent with founding-\\nera practice.\\n Whatever else may be said about the particulars of each of\\nthese three proposals, they are most helpful taken together as\\nevidence of the scope of founding-era understandings\\nregarding categorical exclusions from the enjoyment of the\\nright to keep and bear arms. The concern common to all three\\nis not about felons in particular or even criminals in general;\\nit is about threatened violence and the risk of public injury.\\nSee Binderup, 836 F.3d at 368 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part\\nand concurring in the judgments). This is the same concern\\nthat animated English and early American restrictions on\\narms possession.\\n In England, officers of the Crown had the power to disarm\\nanyone they judged to be “dangerous to the Peace of the\\nKingdom.” Militia Act of 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 13 (1662).\\nRelatedly, English common law “punish[ed] people who\\n[went] armed to terrify the King’s subjects” with\\nimprisonment and forfeiture of their “armour.” 4 Sir John\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 This common-law offense was adapted from the 1328 Statute of\\nNorthampton, which decreed that a person may not “go nor ride armed\\nby night nor by day in fairs, markets, … nor in no part elsewhere, upon\\npain to forfeit their armour to the King, and their bodies to prison at the\\nKing’s pleasure.” Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328). By the\\nmiddle of the seventeenth century, the statute was “almost gone in\\ndesuetudinem,” because the law recognized “a general connivance to\\ngentlemen to ride armed for their security.” Rex v. Knight, 90 Eng. Rep.\\n330, 330 (K.B. 1686). But it was still enforced against those who violated\\nthe terms of the statute “malo animo,” id.—that is, those who carried arms\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 39\\n\\nKnight’s Case, 87 Eng. Rep. 75, 76 (K.B. 1686). And—perhaps\\nunsurprisingly because they were presumptively thought to\\npose a similar threat or terror—Parliament also disarmed\\nCatholics. See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS\\n18–19, 122 (1994) (explaining that Protestants feared revolt,\\nmassacre, and counter-revolution from Catholics); see also\\nADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT 115 (2011) (explaining that\\nParliament disarmed Catholics because the Protestant\\nmajority found them “untrustworthy”); Marshall, 32 HARV.\\nJ.L. & PUB. POL’Y at 723 (“In short, the stated principle\\nsupporting the disability was cause to fear that a person,\\nalthough technically an English subject, was because of his\\nbeliefs effectively a resident enemy alien liable to violence\\nagainst the king.”). 5\\n Similar laws and restrictions appeared in the American\\ncolonies, adapted to the fears and threats of that time and\\nplace. See ALEXANDER DECONDE, GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA\\n22 (2001) (“Although the colonial demand for such\\ndiscriminatory controls sprang from circumstances different\\nfrom those in England, as in applying them against Indians\\nand blacks, colonists usually followed home-country\\npractices of excluding other distrusted people from\\n\\n\\nwith intent “to terrorize their neighbors,” see JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO\\nKEEP AND BEAR ARMS at 104 (1994).\\n 5 To be sure, the American experience does not map on exactly to the\\nEnglish one. For one thing, the right protected by the Second Amendment\\nwas decidedly broader than the one protected in the English Bill of Rights.\\nSee MALCOLM, supra, at 162. Still, the American version was derived from\\nits English predecessor, see id. at 150, 164, which makes English practice\\ninstructive. That is especially true when the patterns from English practice\\nrepeat themselves in American law.\\n\\n40 No. 18-1478\\n\\nownership.”). In some places, Catholics were still disarmed,\\nbut “on the basis of allegiance, not on the basis of faith.” See\\nRobert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the\\nRight to Keep Arms in Early America: The Legal Context of the\\nSecond Amendment, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 139, 157 (2007) (citing\\nVirginia’s 1756 “disarmament of all those refusing the test of\\nallegiance”) 6; see also DECONDE, supra, at 22–23 (associating\\nCatholics with the “distrusted inhabitants” from whom the\\ncolonies seized guns “with the intent of preventing social\\nupheavals” and “rebellion”). Those “willing to swear\\nundivided allegiance to the sovereign” were permitted to\\nkeep their arms. See Churchill, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. at 157.\\nAfter all, confiscation of guns from those who refused to\\nswear an oath of allegiance was meant to “deal with the\\npotential threat coming from armed citizens who remained\\nloyal to” another sovereign. See Saul Cornell & Nathan\\nDeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of\\nGun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 506 (2004); see also NRA\\nv. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 700 F.3d\\n185, 200 (5th Cir. 2012) (“American legislators had\\ndetermined that permitting [those who refused to swear an\\noath of allegiance] to keep and bear arms posed a potential\\ndanger.”). But that particular threat dissipated when a person\\npledged his allegiance to the United States or to a particular\\nstate.\\n\\n\\n 6First, the allegiance required was to the Crown, and later, it was to\\nthe sovereign and independent states. See id. at 159 & n.49 (quoting 4\\nJOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 201–05 (1906)\\n(calling for the disarmament of those “who are notoriously disaffected to\\nthe cause of America, or who have not associated, and shall refuse to\\nassociate, to defend, by arms, these United Colonies”)).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 41\\n\\n Slaves and Native Americans, on the other hand, were\\nthought to pose more immediate threats to public safety and\\nstability and were disarmed as a matter of course. See\\nMALCOLM, supra, at 140–41; WINKLER, supra, at 115–16 (noting\\n“forcible disarmament” out of “fear that these groups would\\nuse guns to revolt” or otherwise threaten the “public safety”);\\nDECONDE, supra, at 21–22 (noting “anxiety that slaves would\\nrebel”). And this practice of keeping guns out of the hands of\\n“distrusted” groups continued after the Revolution. For\\nexample, many states even constitutionalized the\\ndisarmament of slaves and Native Americans. See Volokh, 11\\nTEX. REV. L. & POL. at 208–09. 7\\n In sum, founding-era legislatures categorically disarmed\\ngroups whom they judged to be a threat to the public safety.\\nBut neither the convention proposals nor historical practice\\nsupports a legislative power to categorically disarm felons\\nbecause of their status as felons.\\n B.\\n A common response to the dearth of felon-disarmament\\nlaws in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is to say that\\nsuch laws would have been unnecessary given the severity\\nwith which felons were punished. Because felons were\\nroutinely executed or stripped of all rights, the argument\\ngoes, explicit provisions depriving them of firearms would\\nhave been redundant. See, e.g., Brief of Defendant-Appellee\\nBrad D. Schimel at 9 (“[I]n eighteenth-century America,\\nfelonies were punishable by death, so no early American\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 It should go without saying that such race-based exclusions would\\nbe unconstitutional today.\\n\\n42 No. 18-1478\\n\\nlawmaker would have questioned the propriety of a proposal\\nto disarm serious offenders.”); Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d\\n152, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[I]t is difficult to conclude that the\\npublic, in 1791, would have understood someone facing death\\nand estate forfeiture to be within the scope of those entitled to\\npossess arms.”). One scholar puts it this way:\\n The constitutionality of [bans on felon\\n possession] cannot seriously be questioned …\\n [because f]elons simply did not fall within the\\n benefits of the common law right to possess\\n arms. That law punished felons with automatic\\n forfeiture of all goods, usually accompanied by\\n death. We may presume that persons confined\\n in gaols awaiting trial on criminal charges were\\n also debarred from the possession of arms.\\nKates, 82 MICH. L. REV. at 266. On this view, the criminal law\\nprovides a historical justification for felon disarmament even\\nif laws regulating gun safety do not.\\n The premise of this argument—that the states\\npermanently extinguished the rights of felons, either by death\\nor operation of law, in the eighteenth and nineteenth\\ncenturies—is shaky. While it accurately describes the\\npunishment of felons at English common law, the American\\npicture is far more complex. It is true that at common law, the\\n“idea of felony” was intertwined with the punishments of\\ndeath and civil death. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES\\nON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 98 (1769) (“The idea of felony is\\nindeed so generally connected with that of capital\\npunishment, that we find it hard to separate them ….”); Avery\\nv. Everett, 18 N.E. 148, 150 (N.Y. 1888) (“By the ancient\\ncommon law … [t]here were three principle incidents\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 43\\n\\nconsequent upon an attainder for treason or felony, forfeiture,\\ncorruption of blood, and an extinction of civil rights, more or\\nless complete, which was denominated civil death.”). Civil\\ndeath was a state in which a person “though living, was\\nconsidered dead”—a status “very similar to natural death in\\nthat all civil rights were extinguished.” See Harry David\\nSaunders, Note, Civil Death—A New Look at an Ancient\\nDoctrine, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 988, 988–89 (1970). As\\noriginally conceived, civil death signified “a transitional\\nstatus in the period between a capital sentence and its\\nexecution.” Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking\\nPunishment in the Era of Mass Incarceration, 160 U. PA. L. REV.\\n1789, 1797 (2012). It “was intended to merely settle the estate\\nof an executed or banished felon.” Saunders, 11 WM. & MARY\\nL. REV. at 990.\\n During the period leading up to the founding, the\\nconnection between felonies and capital punishment started\\nto fray. Once a short, specified list of offenses, felonies in\\nEngland grew to “no less than an hundred and sixty,” which\\nis likely what forced Blackstone to define them in terms of\\ntheir most common characteristic: capital punishment. See 4\\nBLACKSTONE, supra, at 18, 97–98. But as the number of\\ndesignated felonies continued to grow, so did the variations\\non punishment, especially in the American colonies.\\nThroughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, capital\\npunishment in the colonies was used “sparingly,” and\\nproperty crimes including variations on theft, burglary, and\\nrobbery “were, on the whole, not capital.” LAWRENCE M.\\nFRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 42\\n(1993). By the time the Constitution was ratified, James\\nWilson observed that while the term “felony” was once “very\\nstrongly connected with capital punishment,” that was no\\n\\n44 No. 18-1478\\n\\nlonger true. JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL & UNUSUAL 52–53 (2012)\\n(quoting 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 348 (James DeWitt\\nAndrews ed., 1896)); see also 6 NATHAN DANE, DIGEST OF\\nAMERICAN LAW 715 (1823) (“[W]e have many felonies, not one\\npunished with forfeiture of estate, and but a very few with\\ndeath.”). Of course, many crimes remained eligible for the\\ndeath penalty, and the extent to which that was true varied by\\nstate. Death, however, no longer inevitably followed a felony\\nconviction.\\n Because it was no longer defined with reference to a list of\\nspecific crimes or even a specific punishment, the definition\\nof “felony” was difficult to pin down at the time of the\\nfounding. See Will Tress, Unintended Collateral Consequences:\\nDefining Felony in the Early American Republic, 57 CLEV. ST. L.\\nREV. 461, 465 (2009) (emphasizing the “ambiguity in the\\nmeaning of felony” at the founding). According to James\\nMadison, “felony” was “a term of loose signification even in\\nthe common law of England,” but more so in the States where\\n“[t]he meaning of the term … [was] not precisely the same in\\nany two of the States; and varie[d] in each with every revision\\nof its criminal laws.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 228 (J. R. Pole\\ned., 2005); see also DANE, supra, at 715 (“[T]he word felony, in\\nthe process of many centuries, has derived so many meanings\\nfrom so many parts of the common law, and so many statutes\\nin England, and has got to be used in such a vast number of\\ndifferent senses, that it is now impossible to know precisely\\nin what sense we are to understand this word.”).\\n The shift in punishment for felonies necessitated a shift in\\nthe meaning of civil death, which had been previously\\nconnected to a capital sentence. And so civil death came to be\\nunderstood “as an incident of life conviction.” See Saunders,\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 45\\n\\n11 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 990; see also Troup v. Wood, 4 Johns.\\nCh. 228, 248 (N.Y. Ch. 1820) (a person convicted of felony and\\nsentenced to imprisonment in the state prison for life is\\n“civiliter mortuus”). But applying the ancient concept of civil\\ndeath in this context proved difficult. Because\\n“[i]mprisonment for life was a punishment unknown to the\\ncommon law,” courts quickly realized that common-law civil\\ndeath did not automatically apply. See Platner v. Sherwood, 6\\nJohns. Ch. 118, 122 (N.Y. Ch. 1822) (¶ 2 argument of Butler\\nand Henry, counsel for the plaintiff); id. at 128 (Opinion of the\\nChancellor). Thus, courts soon decided that civil death\\napplied only when statutes explicitly attached it to life\\nsentences, and statutes did not universally do so. Id. at 129\\n(holding that a person convicted of a felony and sentenced to\\nlife imprisonment was not “deemed and taken to be civilly\\ndead, to all intents and purposes in the law” until an act of the\\nlegislature made it so) 8; see also Frazer v. Fulcher, 17 Ohio 260,\\n\\n\\n 8 The same court had two years earlier suggested that where a statute\\nchanged punishment from death to a life sentence, the statute may be read\\nas an affirmance of the common law punishment of civil death. See Platner,\\n6 Johns. Ch. at 127–28 (citing Troup, 4 Johns. Ch. 228)). But in Platner, the\\ncourt explicitly rejected its earlier assumption and replaced it with a well-\\nreasoned, widely-adopted, and enduring view that civil death existed\\nonly if authorized by statute. Id. at 128 (“The same point arose,\\nincidentally, in respect to this same conviction, in the case of Troup v.\\nWood, and I was there induced to think, upon the authority of Lord Coke,\\nthat every person attainted of felony was accounted, in law, civiliter\\nmortuus. It was not a necessary or very material point in that case, and I\\ndid not pursue the subject to the extent I should have done, if it had been\\nthen, as it is now, the direct and material point in issue. I have, likewise,\\nsince, had the benefit of a full and able discussion, and of a diligent and\\naccurate research, particularly on the part of the plaintiff, respecting this\\nvery unusual question of law.” (citation omitted)).\\n\\n46 No. 18-1478\\n\\n262 (1848) (“But it is said that, by the rules of the common law,\\nthere is such a thing as a civil death as well as a natural death.\\nWe know that in England there are cases in which a man,\\nalthough in full life, is said to be civilly dead, but I have not\\nlearned, until this case was brought before us, that there was\\nbut one kind of death known to our laws.”); Cannon v.\\nWindsor, 1 Houst. 143, 144 (Del. 1855) (“But here there is no\\nsuch general forfeiture of property, or the right to maintain an\\naction, on a conviction for treason or felony, and the maxim\\nor principle of civilter mortuus cannot therefore apply in this\\nState, even when he is a party plaintiff.”); Chin, 160 U. PA. L.\\nREV. at 1796 (“In England, civil death was a common law\\npunishment, but in the United States, it existed only if\\nauthorized by statute. It was far from universal….”). And\\neven when it applied to life sentences, the doctrine of civil\\ndeath had to be at least partially reconceived because it had\\nbegun as a time-limited doctrine justified by the anticipation\\nof natural death—it was “not a condition applicable\\npotentially for decades.” See Chin, 160 U. PA. L. REV. at 1797.\\nAs courts hammered out the incongruities between civil\\ndeath and continued life over the next century, they settled\\nuncomfortably on an American version of civil death that\\nrequired explicit statutory authorization and deprived a felon\\nof many, but not all, rights. 9 See, e.g., Avery, 18 N.E. at 154–55\\n\\n\\n 9 Courts were consistent and explicit about the difficulty of trying to\\napply the doctrine of civil death outside the context of the death penalty.\\nSee, e.g., Shapiro v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 45 N.Y.S.2d 717 (N.Y.\\nSup. Ct. 1943) (“Palpable anomaly inevitably results from attempting to\\nattribute civil death, not only to persons about to be executed, but, also, to\\npersons who may remain physically alive for many years and also may be\\nparoled of pardoned.”); Byers v. Sun Sav. Bank, 139 P. 948, 949 (Okla. 1914)\\n(“[Civil death] had its origin in the fogs and fictions of feudal\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 47\\n\\n(suggesting that a life convict maintained a right to defend an\\naction brought against him and certain property rights,\\nincluding the ability to transfer property by will or deed).\\n Of particular relevance to Kanter’s case, courts also\\nstruggled to determine how—if at all—the old concept of civil\\ndeath applied to felons serving sentences for a term of years.\\nCases decided in the early nineteenth century, like Troup v.\\nWood and Platner v. Sherwood, associated the loss of rights\\nunder a theory of civil death only with capital and life\\nsentences. Later cases building on that reasoning held that the\\nrights of felons serving less than life were merely suspended\\nduring the term of the sentence. See, e.g., In re Estate of Nerac,\\n35 Cal. 392, 396 (1868) (“If the convict be sentenced for life, he\\nbecomes civiliter mortuus, or dead in law …. If, however, he be\\nsentenced for a term less than life, his civil rights are only\\nsuspended during the term.”); Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va.\\n790, 796 (1871) (explaining that a convict is “civiliter mortuus,”\\nbut only “[f]or the time being, during his term of service in\\n\\n\\njurisprudence and doubtlessly has been brought forward into modern\\nstatutes without fully realizing either the effect of its literal significance or\\nthe extent of its infringement upon the spirit of our system of government.\\nAt any rate, the full significance of such statutes have never been enforced\\nby our courts for the principal reason that they are out of harmony with\\nthe spirit of our fundamental laws and with other provisions of statutes.”);\\nAvery, 18 N.E. at 155 (“Any one who takes the pains to explore the ancient\\nand in many respects obsolete learning connected with the doctrine of civil\\ndeath in consequence of crime, will find that he has to grope his way along\\npaths marked by uncertain, flickering, and sometimes misleading lights;\\nand he cannot feel sure that at some point in his course he has not missed\\nthe true road.”). But here, defining the precise impact of “civil death” on\\na felon sentenced to life is not as important as underscoring that the impact\\nwas no longer complete destruction of rights and death to the law.\\n\\n48 No. 18-1478\\n\\nthe penitentiary”); Bowles v. Habermann, 95 N.Y. 246, 247\\n(1884) (applying a statute, which provided that “a sentence of\\nimprisonment in a State prison for any term less than for\\nlife … suspends, during the term of the sentence, all the civil\\nrights … of, or held by, the person sentenced.”).\\n The upshot of this history for present purposes is that the\\nconsequences of a felony conviction were not as categorically\\nsevere as the governments suggest. Capital punishment was\\nless pervasive than one might think. Outside the capital\\ncontext, civil death applied exclusively to life sentences and\\nonly if authorized by statute—and even then, it was more\\nmodest than the ancient version because the convict retained\\nsome rights. Felons serving a term of years did not suffer civil\\ndeath; their rights were suspended but not destroyed. In sum,\\na felony conviction and the loss of all rights did not\\nnecessarily go hand-in-hand.\\n Because they did not go hand-in-hand, the argument that\\nthe severity of punishment at the founding implicitly\\nsanctions the blanket stripping of rights from all felons,\\nincluding those serving a term of years, is misguided. Those\\nwho ratified the Second Amendment would not have\\nassumed that a free man, previously convicted, lived in a\\nsociety without any rights and without the protection of law.\\nThis is not to say that felons could not lose rights under\\nanother theory. Indeed, state legislatures did explicitly\\nexclude felons from the enjoyment of particular rights. See\\ninfra Section II.C. But history confirms that the basis for the\\npermanent and pervasive loss of all rights cannot be tied\\ngenerally to one’s status as a convicted felon or to the uniform\\nseverity of punishment that befell the class.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 49\\n\\n Even if it could be, though, one might reasonably ask: “So\\nwhat?” We wouldn’t draw this inference from the severity of\\nfounding-era punishment in other contexts—for example, we\\nwouldn’t say that the state can deprive felons of the right to\\nfree speech because felons lost that right via execution at the\\ntime of the founding. The obvious point that the dead enjoy\\nno rights does not tell us what the founding-era generation\\nwould have understood about the rights of felons who lived,\\ndischarged their sentences, and returned to society.\\n C.\\n While scholars have not identified eighteenth or\\nnineteenth century laws depriving felons of the right to bear\\narms, history does show that felons could be disqualified\\nfrom exercising certain rights—like the rights to vote and\\nserve on juries—because these rights belonged only to\\nvirtuous citizens. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE\\nCONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 29 (1st ed. 1868) (explaining\\nthat certain classes of people were “almost universally\\nexcluded” from the franchise for “want of capacity or of moral\\nfitness”); Saul Cornell, “Don’t Know Much About History” The\\nCurrent Crisis in Second Amendment Scholarship, 29 N. KY. L.\\nREV. 657, 679 (2002) (identifying the “right to sit on juries” as\\n“limited to those members of the polity who were deemed\\ncapable of exercising it in a virtuous manner”). Some\\nmaintain that the right to bear arms is similarly limited by a\\nvirtue requirement. See, e.g., Don. B. Kates Jr., The Second\\nAmendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter\\n1986, at 143, 146 (“[T]he right to arms does not preclude laws\\ndisarming the unvirtuous citizens (i.e., criminals) or those\\nwho, like children or the mentally unbalanced, are deemed\\nincapable of virtue.”). On this view, the legislature can disarm\\n\\n50 No. 18-1478\\n\\nfelons because of their poor character, without regard to\\nwhether they are dangerous. See Medina, 913 F.3d at 159\\n(endorsing the view that the Second Amendment excludes\\nnot only the dangerous, but also the “unvirtuous”) The\\nmajority is sympathetic to this view. See Maj. Op. at 16.\\n The problem with this argument is that virtue exclusions\\nare associated with civic rights—individual rights that\\n“require[] citizens to act in a collective manner for distinctly\\npublic purposes.” See Saul Cornell, A New Paradigm for the\\nSecond Amendment, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 161, 165 (2004). For\\nexample, the right to vote is held by individuals, but they do\\nnot exercise it solely for their own sake; rather, they cast votes\\nas part of the collective enterprise of self-governance.\\nSimilarly, individuals do not serve on juries for their own\\nsake, but as part of the collective enterprise of administering\\njustice. Some scholars have characterized the right to keep\\nand bear arms as a civic right, because it was “one exercised\\nby citizens, not individuals …, who act together in a collective\\nmanner, for a distinctly public purpose: participation in a well\\nregulated militia.” See Cornell & DeDino, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.\\nat 491 (“[T]he text [of the Second Amendment] fits a civic\\nrights model better than either the individual or collective\\nrights paradigms.”). Saul Cornell explains:\\n Perhaps the most accurate way to describe the\\n dominant understanding of the right to bear\\n arms in the Founding era is as a civic right. Such\\n a right was not something that all persons could\\n claim, but was limited to those members of the\\n polity who were deemed capable of exercising\\n it in a virtuous manner. Freedom of religion,\\n freedom of the press, trial by jury were\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 51\\n\\n genuinely rights belonging to individuals and\\n were treated differently than were civic rights\\n such as militia service, or the right to sit on\\n juries.\\nCornell, 29 N. KY. L. REV. at 679 (footnotes omitted). And as a\\nright that was exercised for the benefit of the community (like\\nvoting and jury service), rather than for the benefit of the\\nindividual (like free speech or free exercise), it belonged only\\nto virtuous citizens.\\n Heller, however, expressly rejects the argument that the\\nSecond Amendment protects a purely civic right. Moore v.\\nMadigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012). It squarely holds\\nthat “the Second Amendment confer[s] an individual right to\\nkeep and bear arms,” Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (emphasis added),\\nand it emphasizes that the Second Amendment is rooted in\\nthe individual’s right to defend himself—not in his right to\\nserve in a well-regulated militia, id. at 582–86. The “civic\\nrights” approach runs headlong into both propositions. See\\nBinderup, 836 F.3d at 371 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part and\\nconcurring in the judgments) (“[T]his virtuous-citizens-only\\nconception of the right to keep and bear arms is closely\\nassociated with pre-Heller interpretations of the Second\\nAmendment by proponents of the ‘sophisticated collective\\nrights model’ who rejected the view that the Amendment\\nconfers an individual right and instead characterized the right\\nas a ‘civic right ….’” (citation omitted)). The parties have\\nintroduced no evidence that virtue exclusions ever applied to\\nindividual, as opposed to civic, rights. 10 And if virtue\\n\\n\\n 10 The governments gesture towards Heller as support for a virtue\\nexclusion, citing Heller’s assertion that the Second Amendment “surely\\n\\n52 No. 18-1478\\n\\nexclusions don’t apply to individual rights, they don’t apply\\nto the Second Amendment.\\n It bears emphasis that virtue exclusions from the exercise\\nof civic rights were explicit. If the right to bear arms was\\nsimilarly subject to a virtue exclusion, we would expect to see\\nprovisions expressly depriving felons of that right too—but\\nwe don’t. By 1820, ten states’ constitutions included\\nprovisions excluding or authorizing the exclusion of those\\nwho “had committed crimes, particularly felonies or so-called\\ninfamous crimes” from the franchise. See ALEXANDER\\nKEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 62–63 & tbl. A.7 (Kentucky,\\nVermont, Ohio, Louisiana, Indiana, Mississippi, Connecticut,\\nIllinois, Alabama, Missouri). By 1857, twenty-four state\\nconstitutions included such provisions. Id. The same crimes\\noften “made a person ineligible to serve as a witness in a legal\\nproceeding,” id. at 62, and to serve on a jury. 11\\n\\n\\n\\nelevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible\\ncitizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” 554 U.S. at 635. That\\nstatement implies that the legislature might have the power to more\\nheavily regulate those who are not law-abiding or responsible. But it does\\nnot purport to analyze the scope of that power, nor does it endorse the\\nvery specific concept of a virtue exclusion.\\n 11See, e.g., Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 92, § 1, in ACTS AND LAWS OF THE\\nCOMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 173 (Wright & Potter 1898) (jurors\\nmust be “of good Moral Character” and qualified to vote; “and if any\\nperson, whose name shall be put into either [jury] Box, shall be convicted\\nof any Scandalous crime, or be guilty of any gross immorality, his name\\nshall be withdrawn from the [jury] Box, by Selectmen of his town”); Act\\nof Feb. 2, 1811, ch. 158, § 2, in 4 LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, at 445,\\n449 (Bradford & Porter 1816) (grand jurors must be “sober, substantial and\\njudicious freeholders, lawful men, of fair characters”); id. § 7 (petit jurors\\nmust be “sober, discreet and judicious freeholders,… lawful men of fair\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 53\\n\\n State constitutions protecting the right to bear arms do not\\nfollow a similar pattern. Between 1790 and 1820, nine states\\nenacted their own right-to-arms provisions in their\\nconstitutions. See Volokh, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. at 208–09\\n(four more had enacted such provisions prior to 1790). None\\nof those provisions made an exception for criminals. Id. And\\nnotably, seven of those nine states explicitly excluded or\\nauthorized the exclusion of certain criminals from the right to\\nvote. Compare id. (identifying Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana,\\nMississippi, Connecticut, Alabama, and Missouri as seven of\\nthe nine states with right-to-arms provisions in their\\nconstitutions by 1820), with KEYSSAR, supra, at tbl. A.7 (the\\nsame seven state constitutions specifically excluded certain\\ncriminals from the right to vote). The same pattern held true\\nin 1857. Compare Volokh, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. at 209–10, with\\nKEYSSAR, supra, at tbl. A.7. There is no basis, then, for\\nassuming that a virtue requirement on the right to vote\\napplies equally to the right to keep and bear arms. See\\nBinderup, 836 F.3d at 372 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part and\\nconcurring in the judgments) (“We have found no historical\\nevidence on the public meaning of the right to keep and bear\\narms indicating that ‘virtuousness’ was a limitation on one’s\\nqualification for the right—contemporary insistence to the\\ncontrary falls somewhere between guesswork and ipse\\ndixit.”). 12\\n\\n\\ncharacters”); Act of Dec. 17, 1796, § 52, in ACTS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH\\nOF KENTUCKY 134 (Stewart 1796) (jurors must “be of good demeanor”).\\n 12 The fact that the first general prohibition on felon gun possession\\nwas not enacted until 1961 further undercuts the argument that either\\nhistory or tradition supports a virtue-based restriction on the right. See An\\nAct to Strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757\\n\\n54 No. 18-1478\\n\\n In sum, the available evidence suggests that the right to\\narms differs from rights that depend on civic virtue for\\nenjoyment. The Second Amendment confers an individual\\nright, intimately connected with the natural right of self-\\ndefense, and not limited to civic participation (i.e., militia\\nservice). By the very terms of the civic-rights argument, then,\\nthe right to arms would have been “treated differently” than\\nrights like the right to vote or to sit on juries. See Cornell, 29\\nN. KY. L. REV. at 679 (“[R]ights belonging to individuals …\\nwere treated differently than were civic rights such as militia\\nservice, or the right to sit on juries.”). And that difference is\\nborne out by historical treatment: we see no explicit criminal,\\nor even more general virtue-based, exclusions from the right\\nto bear arms like we do in other contexts. Thus, although the\\nright protected by the Second Amendment is not unlimited,\\nsee Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, its limits are not defined by a general\\nfelon ban tied to a lack of virtue or good character.\\n III.\\n The history canvassed in Part II yields two conclusions\\nthat are important for present purposes. History does not\\nsupport the proposition that felons lose their Second\\nAmendment rights solely because of their status as felons. But\\nit does support the proposition that the state can take the right\\nto bear arms away from a category of people that it deems\\ndangerous. Our precedent is consistent with this principle: we\\nhave held that “Congress is not limited to case-by-case\\nexclusions of persons who have been shown to be\\n\\n\\n(1961) (amending the Federal Firearms Act by “deleting the words ‘crime\\nof violence’ … and inserting in lieu thereof the words ‘crime publishable\\nby imprisonment for a term exceeding one year’”).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 55\\n\\nuntrustworthy with weapons, nor need these limits be\\nestablished by evidence presented in court.” Skoien, 614 F.3d\\nat 641. Instead, the legislature can make that judgment on a\\nclass-wide basis. See id. at 640 (“That some categorical limits\\nare proper is part of the original meaning, leaving to the\\npeople’s elected representatives the filling in of details.”).\\nAnd it may do so based on present-day judgments about\\ncategories of people whose possession of guns would\\nendanger the public safety; as we said in Skoien, “exclusions\\nneed not mirror limits that were on the books in 1791.” Id. at\\n641. Such restrictions are “lineal descendants” of historical\\nlaws banning dangerous people from possessing guns. See\\nTranscript of Oral Argument at 77, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No.\\n07–290) (Chief Justice Roberts: “[W]e are talking about lineal\\ndescendants of the arms but presumably there are lineal\\ndescendants of the restrictions as well.”).\\n That said, “the government does not get a free pass simply\\nbecause Congress has established a ‘categorical ban.’” United\\nStates v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010). The\\ngovernment could quickly swallow the right if it had broad\\npower to designate any group as dangerous and thereby\\ndisqualify its members from having a gun. See Skoien, 614 F.3d\\nat 641 (“We do not mean that a categorical limit on the\\npossession of firearms can be justified under the rational-basis\\ntest, which deems a law valid if any justification for it may be\\nimagined.”). The legislature must be able to justify its\\ndesignation, and the rigor with which we review this\\njustification “depends on ‘how close the law comes to the core\\nof the Second Amendment right and the severity of the law’s\\nburden on the right.’” Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 892 (citation\\nomitted). “Severe burdens on the core right of armed defense\\n\\n56 No. 18-1478\\n\\nrequire a very strong public-interest justification and a close\\nmeans-ends fit ….” Id.\\n The majority contends that the means-end review should\\nbe “arguably less rigorous in this case because … felon\\ndispossession laws do not restrict the ‘core right of armed\\ndefense,’ but rather burden ‘activity lying closer to the\\nmargins of the right.’” Maj. Op. at 20 n.10 (quoting Ezell II, 846\\nF.3d at 892). I disagree. First, felon dispossession statutes\\ntarget the whole right, including its core: they restrict even\\nmere possession of a firearm in the home for the purpose of\\nself-defense. Cf. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630–35 (finding\\nunconstitutional a law that made it impossible for citizens to\\nuse firearms for “the core lawful purpose of self-defense”); id.\\nat 628 (“[T]he inherent right of self-defense has been central\\nto the Second Amendment right.”). 13 And second, the burden\\nis severe: it is a permanent disqualification from the exercise of\\na fundamental right. See Maj. Op. at 2–4; see also United States\\nv. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1048–49 (10th Cir. 2009)\\n(Tymkovich, J., concurring) (“[T]he broad scope of\\n§ 922(g)(1)—which permanently disqualifies all felons from\\npossessing firearms—would conflict with the ‘core’ self-\\n\\n\\n 13 The majority suggests that who exercises the right changes what the\\ncore of the right is, see Maj. Op. at 20 n.10, but that is circular. Heller\\ndistinguishes the two inquiries: First, it held that the District of Columbia’s\\nban on handgun possession violated the Second Amendment (the what).\\n554 U.S. at 635. Then, it indicated the need to consider whether Heller\\ncould be disqualified from exercising that right (the who). Id. (“Assuming\\nthat Heller is not disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment\\nrights, the District must permit him to register his handgun and must issue\\nhim a license to carry it in the home.”). Heller’s qualification or lack\\nthereof did not change the content of the right itself; it affected whether\\nthe legislature could take it away. The same is true of Kanter here.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 57\\n\\ndefense right embodied in the Second Amendment.”). Thus,\\n“a very strong public-interest justification and a close means-\\nends fit” is required before Kanter may be constitutionally\\nsubject to the United States and Wisconsin dispossession\\nstatutes. Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 892.\\n There is no question that the interest identified by the\\ngovernments and supported by history—keeping guns out of\\nthe hands of those who are likely to misuse them—is very\\nstrong. And we have held that several of the other categorical\\nbans within § 922(g) demonstrate the necessary fit between\\nthis public-safety end and the government’s chosen means. In\\nSkoien, we upheld § 922(g)(9), which prohibits those convicted\\nof domestic violence misdemeanors from possessing\\nfirearms, because “no one doubts that the goal of § 922(g)(9),\\npreventing armed mayhem, is an important governmental\\nobjective” and “[b]oth logic and data establish a substantial\\nrelation between § 922(g)(9) and this objective.” 614 F.3d at\\n642; see also id. at 644 (“[N]o matter how you slice these\\nnumbers, people convicted of domestic violence remain\\ndangerous to their spouses and partners.”). In United States v.\\nYancey, we sustained § 922(g)(3), which prohibits any person\\n“who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled\\nsubstance” from possessing a gun, because “studies amply\\ndemonstrate the connection between chronic drug abuse and\\nviolent crime, and illuminate the nexus between Congress’s\\nattempt to keep firearms away from habitual drug abusers\\nand its goal of reducing violent crime.” 621 F.3d 681, 686 (7th\\nCir. 2010). And in United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, we rejected\\na challenge to § 922(g)(5), which prohibits aliens unlawfully\\npresent in the United States from possessing firearms,\\nreasoning that keeping guns out of the hands of “persons who\\nare difficult to track and who have an interest in eluding law\\n\\n58 No. 18-1478\\n\\nenforcement” serves the public-safety objectives of § 922(g).\\n798 F.3d 664, 673 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n In contrast to these narrowly defined categorical bans,\\n§ 922(g)(1), which applies to all felons, is “wildly\\noverinclusive.” Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second\\nAmendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 721 (2007). Its application\\nis not limited to those who have committed violent crimes like\\nmurder, assault, and rape. 14 It also encompasses those who\\nhave committed any nonviolent felony or qualifying state-law\\nmisdemeanor—and that is an immense and diverse category.\\nIt includes everything from Kanter’s offense, mail fraud, to\\nselling pigs without a license in Massachusetts, redeeming\\nlarge quantities of out-of-state bottle deposits in Michigan,\\nand countless other state and federal offenses. See Mass. Gen.\\n\\n\\n 14Section 922(g)(1)’s predecessor, the Federal Firearms Act of 1938,\\ndid not permanently ban all felons from possessing firearms, but rather\\nthose convicted of “crime[s] of violence,” defined then as “murder,\\nmanslaughter, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, burglary, housebreaking,” and\\ncertain forms of aggravated assault. See Marshall, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB.\\nPOL’Y at 698–99 (citing Federal Firearms Act, ch. 850, § 1(6), 52 Stat. 1250,\\n1250 (1938)). Even today, many scholars cited as supporting a general\\nfelon ban actually seem to assume or advocate something much closer to\\na violent-felon ban. See, e.g., Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second\\nAmendment Limitations and Criminological Considerations, 60 HASTINGS L. J.\\n1339, 1362–63 (2009) (“At early common law, the term ‘felony’ applied\\nonly to a few very serious, very dangerous offenses such as murder, rape,\\narson, and robbery.… Insofar as federal or state statutes would seek to bar\\narms possession by [felons who ‘pos[e] no physical danger to others’],\\nthose laws would seem to be invalid on their face.”); Stephen P. Halbrook,\\nWhat the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to “Bear Arms”,\\n49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1986, at 151, 161 (“[V]iolent criminals,\\nchildren, and those of unsound mind may be deprived of firearms .…”\\n(emphasis added)).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 59\\n\\nLaws ch. 129, §§ 39, 43; Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.574a(1)(a),\\n(2)(d); see also, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 676 (violating the Federal Meat\\nInspection Act in certain ways); 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (committing\\nperjury); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 30A (shoplifting goods\\nvalued at $100). 15 These crimes, like many others captured by\\n§ 922(g), “rais[e] no particular suspicion that the convict is a\\nthreat to public safety.” Winkler, 105 MICH. L. REV. at 721. Put\\nmore colorfully, “It is hard to imagine how banning Martha\\nStewart or Enron’s Andrew Fastow from possessing a gun\\nfurthers public safety.” Id.\\n We have addressed the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)\\nbefore. In United States v. Williams, a defendant with a prior\\nrobbery conviction challenged the statute as applied to him.\\n616 F.3d at 691. We held that the provision is constitutional as\\napplied to violent felons, including the defendant in that case.\\n616 F.3d at 694 (“Because Williams was convicted of a violent\\nfelony, his claim that § 922(g)(1) unconstitutionally infringes\\non his right to possess a firearm is without merit.”). But our\\ndecision came with an important qualification: we expressly\\nnoted that “§ 922(g)(1) may be subject to an overbreadth\\nchallenge at some point because of its disqualification of all\\nfelons, including those who are non-violent.” Id. at 693. We\\nasserted that “[e]ven if the government may face a difficult\\n\\n\\n 15 It’s worth noting that, in addition to the eclectic and wide-ranging\\noffenses already included in this category, there are very few limits on the\\nability of Congress and state legislatures to expand the number of\\nqualifying nonviolent offenses. Cf. United States v. Phillips, 827 F.3d 1171,\\n1176 n.5 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Can Congress or the States define petty larceny\\nas a felony? Of course. Can a conviction for stealing a lollipop then serve\\nas a basis under § 922(g)(1) to a ban a person for the rest of his life from\\never possessing a firearm, consistent with the Second Amendment?”).\\n\\n60 No. 18-1478\\n\\nburden of proving § 922(g)(1)’s ‘strong showing’ in future\\ncases, it certainly satisfies its burden in this case, where [the\\ndefendant] challenges § 922(g)(1) as it was applied to him.”\\nId. As a violent felon, the defendant in Williams was in no\\nposition to challenge § 922(g)(1) on the ground that its\\napplication to nonviolent felons is unconstitutional. See\\nSkoien, 614 F.3d at 645 (“A person to whom a statute properly\\napplies can’t obtain relief based on arguments that a\\ndifferently situated person might present.”). As a nonviolent\\nfelon, however, Kanter is in a position to make that argument.\\n The first step in analyzing Kanter’s as-applied challenge is\\nto consider whether banning all nonviolent felons is\\nsubstantially related to the governments’ interest in\\npreventing future gun violence. See Williams, 616 F.3d at 692–\\n93. Williams held that because the characteristic common to all\\nviolent felons is a demonstrated propensity for violence, the\\nban on possessing firearms is constitutional as applied to all\\nmembers of that class. Id. at 693–94. In contrast, and to state\\nthe obvious, the characteristic common to all nonviolent\\nfelons is that their criminal conduct was nonviolent. 16 Thus,\\nthe reasoning that supports the categorical disarmament of\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 The majority suggests that nonviolent felonies are united by\\nanother characteristic relevant to the constitutionality of disarmament:\\nthat the commission of “mala in se felonies reflect[s] grave misjudgment\\nand maladjustment.” Maj. Op. at 24 (citation omitted). But that is just\\nanother way of saying that nonviolent felons have demonstrated a lack of\\nvirtue. Absent evidence that this lack of virtue is tied to a propensity for\\nrisky behavior that threatens public safety, it does not justify stripping\\nthem of their Second Amendment rights.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 61\\n\\nviolent felons—that past violence is predictive of future\\nviolence—simply does not apply.\\n The governments argue, though, that being convicted of a\\nnonviolent crime is also predictive of future violence. They try\\nto support that position with statistics showing that\\nnonviolent felons are likely to commit violent crimes in the\\nfuture. These statistics are entirely unhelpful, however,\\nbecause they lump all nonviolent felons together—and while\\nsome nonviolent felons may be likely to misuse firearms, the\\ncharacteristics that make them risky cannot be generalized to\\nthe whole class. For example, the characteristics of an\\nindividual convicted of a drug-related offense tell us little if\\nanything about the tendency of an individual convicted of\\nperjury—or, for that matter, mail fraud—to commit gun\\nviolence. The sheer diversity of crimes encompassed by these\\nstatutes makes it virtually impossible for the governments to\\nshow that banning all nonviolent felons from possessing guns\\nis closely tailored to the goal of protecting the public safety.\\nThus, we must decide whether the statutes are\\nunconstitutional as applied to Kanter in particular. See\\nWilliams, 616 F.3d at 692–93.\\n If Kanter’s conviction—mail fraud—is substantially\\nrelated to violent behavior, the governments can disarm him\\nwithout regard to any personal circumstances or\\ncharacteristics suggesting that he poses a low risk to public\\nsafety. But their case for tying mail fraud to a risk of future\\nviolence rests on a single study related to mail-fraud\\nrecidivism. See DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., WHITE-COLLAR CRIME\\nAND CRIMINAL CAREERS (2004). This study suggests that\\nalmost 40% of individuals convicted of mail fraud were later\\nrearrested. Id. at 29. It does not say, however, whether those\\n\\n62 No. 18-1478\\n\\narrests were for violent or nonviolent offenses. Nor does it say\\nwhat percentage of those individuals were convicted. A\\ndifferent portion of the same study suggests that 25% of all\\nwhite-collar repeat offenders (on the numbers provided, I’ll\\nassume that means roughly 10% of those with a mail-fraud\\nconviction, though we have been given no way to know) 17\\nhave an arrest for a violent crime. Id at 45. But it does not\\nspecify whether the violent arrest preceded or post-dated the\\nwhite-collar arrests, and the numbers drop dramatically for\\nthose with only two total offenses, id., suggesting that a\\npattern of criminality, rather than a particular mail-fraud\\narrest, might be an indication of future dangerousness, see id.\\nat 46 (“[T]hose with fewer arrests seldom had violent crimes\\nin their criminal histories.”). This study falls well short of\\nestablishing the “close means-ends fit” required before the\\ngovernments may totally and permanently strip offenders\\nlike Kanter of the ability to exercise a fundamental right. 18\\n This does not mean that Wisconsin and the United States\\ncannot disarm Kanter. Even though the mail-fraud\\nconviction, standing alone, is not enough, they might still be\\nable to show that Kanter’s history or characteristics make him\\n\\n\\n 17This assumes that the rate of violent arrest for mail fraudsters who\\nreoffend tracks that of all white-collar criminals who reoffend. The\\ngovernments’ study doesn’t speak to this question, underscoring the\\ninability of the data provided to support the governments’ arguments.\\n 18\\n My analysis is limited to the total bans that Congress and the\\nWisconsin legislature enacted. It might be that this study or other evidence\\nwould support other, more limited intrusions on Kanter’s Second\\nAmendment right. But the constitutionality of a more limited measure (for\\nexample, a temporary ban or one that limits the places in which Kanter\\ncan have a gun) is not presented by this case.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 63\\n\\nlikely to misuse firearms. And if banning Kanter, in\\nparticular, from possessing a gun is substantially related to\\nthe governments’ goal of “preventing armed mayhem,” then\\nthe statutes could be constitutionally applied to him. Skoien,\\n614 F.3d at 642.\\n At this point, however, neither Wisconsin nor the United\\nStates has presented any evidence that Kanter would be\\ndangerous if armed. Instead, as the majority notes, “Kanter is\\na first-time, non-violent offender with no history of violence,\\nfirearm misuses, or subsequent convictions,” and he is\\n“employed, married, and does not use illicit drugs, all of\\nwhich correspond with lower rates of recidivism.” Maj. Op.\\nat 23. Absent evidence that Kanter would pose a risk to the\\npublic safety if he possessed a gun, the governments cannot\\npermanently deprive him of his right to keep and bear arms.\\n ***\\n If the Second Amendment were subject to a virtue\\nlimitation, there would be no need for the government to\\nproduce—or for the court to assess—evidence that nonviolent\\nfelons have a propensity for dangerous behavior. But Heller\\nforecloses the “civic right” argument on which a virtue\\nlimitation depends. And while both Wisconsin and the United\\nStates have an unquestionably strong interest in protecting\\nthe public from gun violence, they have failed to show, by\\neither logic or data, cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642, that disarming\\nKanter substantially advances that interest. On this record,\\nholding that the ban is constitutional as applied to Kanter\\ndoes not “put[] the government through its paces,” see\\nWilliams, 616 F.3d at 692, but instead treats the Second\\nAmendment as a “second-class right, subject to an entirely\\ndifferent body of rules than the other Bill of Rights\\n\\n64 No. 18-1478\\n\\nguarantees,” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780\\n(2010) (plurality opinion). I therefore dissent.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4377818/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4600565/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Rickey I. KANTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1478\nRICKEY I. KANTER,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General\nof the United States, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.\n No. 16-cv-1121 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 7, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 15, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Rickey I. Kanter pleaded guilty to\none count of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Due to his fel-\nony conviction, he is prohibited from possessing a firearm un-\nder both federal and Wisconsin law. At issue in this case is\nwhether the felon dispossession statutes—18 U.S.C.\n§ 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)—violate the Second\nAmendment as applied to Kanter. Even if Kanter could bring\n\n2 No. 18-1478\n\nan as-applied challenge, the government has met its burden\nof establishing that the felon dispossession statutes are sub-\nstantially related to an important government interest. We\ntherefore affirm the district court.\n I. Background\n A. Federal and Wisconsin Felon Dispossession Statutes\n Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by persons\nconvicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term\nexceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). State misdemean-\nors are included under the statute if they are punishable by\nmore than two years in prison. 1 Id. § 921(a)(20)(B). However,\nthe statute excludes anyone convicted of “any Federal or State\noffenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade prac-\ntices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to\nthe regulation of business practices.” Id. § 921(a)(20)(A).\nMoreover, “[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set\naside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil\nrights restored” is not a conviction for purposes of the statute.\nId. § 921(a)(20).\n Although the firearms prohibition generally applies for\nlife, the statute includes a “safety valve” that permits individ-\nuals to apply to the Attorney General for restoration of their\nfirearms rights. Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 28 n.1\n\n\n\n\n 1Accordingly, calling the statute a “felon” dispossession statute is\nsomewhat of a “misnomer.” Carly Lagrotteria, Note, Heller's Collateral\nDamage: As-Applied Challenges to the Felon-in-Possession Prohibition, 86 Ford-\nham L. Rev. 1963, 1970 (2018).\n\nNo. 18-1478 3\n\n(2007). Specifically, the Attorney General 2 may remove the\nprohibition on a case-by-case basis if an applicant sufficiently\nestablishes “that the circumstances regarding the disability,\nand the applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the\napplicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to\npublic safety and that the granting of the relief would not be\ncontrary to the public interest.” 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).\n Since 1992, however, “Congress has repeatedly barred\nthe Attorney General from using appropriated funds ‘to in-\nvestigate or act upon [relief] applications,’” rendering the pro-\nvision “inoperative.” Logan, 552 U.S. at 28 n.1 (quoting United\nStates v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 74–75 (2002)). The Committee on\nAppropriations eliminated funding because the restoration\nprocedure under § 925(c) was “a very difficult task” that re-\nquired ATF officials to “spend many hours investigating a\nparticular applicant for relief.” H.R. Rep. No. 102-618, at 14\n(1992). Even then, there was “no way to know with any cer-\ntainty whether the applicant [was] still a danger to public\nsafety.” Id. Accordingly, ATF officials were effectively “re-\nquired to guess whether a convicted felon … [could] be en-\ntrusted with a firearm.” Id. Moreover, they were “forced to\nmake these decisions knowing that a mistake could have dev-\nastating consequences for innocent citizens.” Id. Ultimately,\nthe Committee determined that “the $3.75 million and the 40\nman-years annually spent investigating and acting upon\nthese applications for relief would be better utilized by ATF\nin fighting violent crime.” Id. The Committee addressed the\nfunding issue again in 1995, adding that “too many of these\n\n 2 The Attorney General delegated its authority under § 925(c) to the\nBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”). 28 C.F.R.\n§ 0.130(a)(1).\n\n4 No. 18-1478\n\nfelons whose gun ownership rights were restored went on to\ncommit violent crimes with firearms.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-183,\nat 15 (1995).\n In 1981, Wisconsin adopted its own felon dispossession\nlaw. See Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m). Section 941.29(1m) prohibits\nan individual from possessing a firearm if he has “been con-\nvicted of a felony in” Wisconsin or “a crime elsewhere that\nwould be a felony” in Wisconsin. Id. § 941.29(1m)(a)–(b).\n B. Factual Background\n Kanter lives in Mequon, Wisconsin. He was previously the\nowner, operator, and CEO of Rikco International, LLC. Rikco\nInternational, which did business as “Dr. Comfort,” manufac-\ntured therapeutic shoes and inserts for individuals with dia-\nbetes and severe foot disease. The company marketed the\nshoes and inserts to podiatrists, who in turn sold them to in-\ndividual consumers. Most of the shoes and inserts were billed\nto, and paid for by, Medicare. Medicare only paid for inserts\nthat met certain thickness and hardness standards.\n In April 2004, Kanter submitted his inserts to Medicare to\ndetermine whether they met those requirements. Medicare\nrejected Kanter’s inserts because they were too thin. Kanter\nthen submitted revised samples, which Medicare approved.\nHowever, Kanter continued to sell the noncompliant inserts\nwhile representing that they were Medicare-approved. All\ntold, Medicare paid Kanter’s company $375,000 for the non-\ncompliant inserts.\n On May 24, 2011, Kanter pleaded guilty to one count of\nmail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 based on a shipment of the\nnoncompliant inserts to a podiatrist in Florida. Section 1341\ncarries a maximum penalty of twenty years in prison and a\n\nNo. 18-1478 5\n\n$250,000 fine. Kanter was sentenced to one year and one day\nin prison and two years of supervised release. He was also\nordered to pay a criminal penalty of $50,000, and he reim-\nbursed Medicare over $27 million in a related civil settlement.\n Kanter has since served his time and paid his criminal pen-\nalty, and he has not been charged with any additional crimi-\nnal activity. However, because of his felony conviction, he is\npermanently prohibited from owning a firearm under federal\nand Wisconsin law.\n C. Procedural Background\n Kanter brought suit in the Eastern District of Wisconsin,\narguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)\nare unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as ap-\nplied to him. The United States moved to dismiss his claim\nunder Rule 12(b)(6), and Wisconsin moved for judgment on\nthe pleadings under Rule 12(c). In response, Kanter moved for\nsummary judgment, arguing that his status as a nonviolent\noffender with no other criminal record meant that both stat-\nutes were unconstitutional as applied to him.\n The district court granted defendants’ motions and denied\nKanter’s motion. In so doing, the district court held that, even\nassuming felons are entitled to Second Amendment protec-\ntion, the application of the federal and Wisconsin felon dis-\npossession laws to Kanter is substantially related to the gov-\nernment’s important interest in preventing gun violence. The\ncourt reasoned that Congress and the Wisconsin legislature\nare entitled to categorically disqualify all felons—even nonvi-\nolent felons like Kanter—because both have found that such\nindividuals are more likely to abuse firearms. The court also\nnoted that this “bright line categorical approach … allows for\n\n6 No. 18-1478\n\nuniform application and ease of administration.” The district\ncourt entered judgment on January 2, 2018, and this appeal\nfollowed.\n II. Discussion\n We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to\ndismiss for failure to state a claim and a motion for judgment\non the pleadings. Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Hilger, 838 F.3d 821,\n824 (7th Cir. 2016). In doing so, “we accept all well-pleaded\nfacts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’\nfavor.” Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir.\n2016). To avoid dismissal, “the complaint must ‘state a claim\nto relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.\nv. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).\n A. Legal Standard 3\n The Second Amendment states: “A well regulated Militia,\nbeing necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the\npeople to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S.\nConst. amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme\nCourt identified the “core” of the Second Amendment as “the\nright of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in de-\nfense of hearth and home.” 554 U.S. 570, 634–35. Accordingly,\nthe Court concluded that Washington D.C.’s ban on handgun\npossession in the home violated the Second Amendment. Id.\nat 635.\n However, the Court also made clear that “the right se-\ncured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” Id. at 626.\n\n\n 3 Because “the federal and state prohibitions are equivalent in effect”\nas to Kanter, our Second Amendment analysis of the two statutes is the\nsame. Baer v. Lynch, 636 F. App’x 695, 698–99 (7th Cir. 2016).\n\nNo. 18-1478 7\n\nAlthough the Court did not “undertake an exhaustive histor-\nical analysis ... of the full scope of the Second Amendment,” it\nsaid that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast\ndoubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of fire-\narms by felons and the mentally ill.” Id. It described such pro-\nhibitions as “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.” Id.\nat 627 n.26. Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the\nCourt “repeat[ed] [its] assurances” that felon dispossession\nlaws remain valid. 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (plurality opinion).\n After Heller, we developed a two-step test for Second\nAmendment challenges. “The threshold question is whether\nthe regulated activity falls within the scope of the Second\nAmendment.” Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888, 892 (7th\nCir. 2017) (“Ezell II”). “This is a textual and historical inquiry;\nif the government can establish that the challenged law regu-\nlates activity falling outside the scope of the right as originally\nunderstood, then ‘the regulated activity is categorically un-\nprotected, and the law is not subject to further Second\nAmendment review.’” Id. (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651\nF.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Ezell I”)).\n However, “if the historical evidence is inconclusive or sug-\ngests that the regulated activity is not categorically unpro-\ntected[,] then there must be a second inquiry into the strength\nof the government’s justification for restricting or regulating\nthe exercise of Second Amendment rights.” Id. (quoting Ezell\nI, 651 F.3d at 703). At step two, we evaluate “the regulatory\nmeans the government has chosen and the public-benefits\nend it seeks to achieve.” Id. (quoting Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 703).\nThe rigor of the review is dependent on “how close the law\ncomes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the se-\nverity of the law’s burden on the right.” Id. (quoting Ezell I,\n\n8 No. 18-1478\n\n651 F.3d at 703). “Severe burdens” on this core right “require\na very strong public-interest justification and a close means-\nend fit; lesser burdens, and burdens on activity lying closer to\nthe margins of the right, are more easily justified.” Id. The\ngovernment has the burden “of justifying its law under a\nheightened standard of scrutiny; rational-basis review does\nnot apply.” Id. We have consistently described step two as\n“akin to intermediate scrutiny” and have required the gov-\nernment to show that the challenged statute is substantially\nrelated to an important governmental objective. United States\nv. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing\ncases).\n B. As-Applied Second Amendment Challenges\n Relying on the “presumptively lawful” language in Heller\nand McDonald, every federal court of appeals to address the\nissue has held that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second\nAmendment on its face. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 406 F.\nApp’x 52, 53–54 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d\n281, 281–82 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. Moore,\n666 F.3d 313, 318–19 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Barton, 633\nF.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by\nBinderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc);\nSchrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 989–91 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert.\ndenied, 571 U.S. 989 (2013); United States v. Joos, 638 F.3d 581,\n586 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Khami, 362 F. App’x 501,\n508 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 934 (2010); United\nStates v. Battle, 347 F. App’x 478, 480 (11th Cir. 2009) (per cu-\nriam); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir.\n2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 970 (2010); United States v. Smith,\n329 F. App’x 109, 110–11 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Ander-\nson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009).\n\nNo. 18-1478 9\n\n However, courts of appeals are split as to whether as-ap-\nplied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) are viable.\nOn the one hand, the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh\nCircuits have suggested that § 922(g)(1) is always constitu-\ntional as applied to felons as a class, regardless of their indi-\nvidual circumstances or the nature of their offenses. See Stim-\nmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198, 210 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have\nupheld § 922(g)(1), which disarms even non-violent felons.”\n(citing United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2010),\ncert. denied, 562 U.S. 895 (2010))); United States v. Scroggins, 599\nF.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 867 (2010)\n(rejecting as-applied Second Amendment challenge and hold-\ning that felon dispossession laws are constitutional even if the\noffense was nonviolent in nature); United States v. Rozier, 598\nF.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 958 (2010)\n(concluding that “statutes disqualifying felons from pos-\nsessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not of-\nfend the Second Amendment,” and holding that § 922(g)(1) is\n“a constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment\nright of certain classes of people,” including convicted felons);\nUnited States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010),\ncert. denied, 562 U.S. 921 (2010) (rejecting nonviolent felon’s as-\napplied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) because\n“felons are categorically different from the individuals who\nhave a fundamental right to bear arms”); In re U.S., 578 F.3d\n1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We have already rejected the no-\ntion that Heller mandates an individualized inquiry concern-\ning felons pursuant to § 922(g)(1).” (citing McCane, 573 F.3d at\n1047)).\n The First Circuit has not foreclosed as-applied challenges,\nbut it has expressed some skepticism about them. In United\nStates v. Torres-Rosario, the court rejected the defendant’s as-\n\n10 No. 18-1478\n\napplied challenge because he had two prior convictions for\n“serious drug offenses.” 658 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011), cert.\ndenied, 565 U.S. 1271 (2012). However, the court noted that the\nSupreme Court “may be open to claims that some felonies do\nnot indicate potential violence and cannot be the basis for ap-\nplying a categorical ban,” and “might even be open to highly\nfact-specific objections.” Id. Yet the First Circuit cautioned that\n“such an approach, applied to countless variations in individ-\nual circumstances, would obviously present serious problems\nof administration, consistency and fair warning.” Id.\n On the other hand, we, along with the Fourth, Eighth, and\nD.C. Circuits, have left room for as-applied challenges to the\nstatute. See United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir.\n2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1092 (2010) (“[W]e recognize that\n§ 922(g)(1) may be subject to an overbreadth challenge at\nsome point because of its disqualification of all felons, includ-\ning those who are non-violent.”); Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d\n152, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“We need not decide today if it is\never possible for a convicted felon to show that he may still\ncount as a ‘law-abiding, responsible citizen’” entitled to Sec-\nond Amendment protections.); United States v. Woolsey, 759\nF.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Eighth Circuit has left\nopen the possibility that a person could bring a successful as-\napplied challenge to § 922(g)(1)” but rejected defendant’s as-\napplied challenge because he had multiple violent felony con-\nvictions.); United States v. Pruess, 703 F.3d 242, 247 (4th Cir.\n2012) (holding that § 922(g)(1) could constitutionally be ap-\nplied to nonviolent felons, but acknowledging that “there in\ntheory might be an as-applied Second Amendment challenge\nto [§] 922(g)(1) that could succeed” (citations and internal\nquotation marks omitted)).\n\nNo. 18-1478 11\n\n Neither we, nor the Fourth, Eighth, or D.C. Circuits, how-\never, have ever actually upheld such a challenge in practice.\nIn fact, we have repeatedly rejected as-applied Second\nAmendment challenges to § 922(g). See Baer v. Lynch, 636 F.\nApp’x 695, 698 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that § 922(g)(1) could\nconstitutionally be applied to individual convicted of felony\nrobbery); United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 750–51 (7th Cir.\n2015) (concluding that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional as ap-\nplied to individual who had been convicted of three violent\nfelonies); Williams, 616 F.3d at 693–94 (holding that § 922(g)(1)\nwas constitutional as applied to individual convicted of fel-\nony robbery who “beat[] the victim so badly that the victim\nrequired sixty-five stitches”); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d\n638, 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (rejecting as-applied Sec-\nond Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(9) brought by domes-\ntic violence misdemeanant because violence was “an element\nof the offense” and data suggested high rates of recidivism).\n Indeed, only one federal court of appeals has upheld an\nas-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g). In a\nfractured en banc decision, a narrow majority of the Third Cir-\ncuit (eight out of fifteen judges) held that § 922(g)(1) was un-\nconstitutional as applied to two individuals convicted of a\nmisdemeanor for corrupting a minor and a misdemeanor for\nunlawfully carrying a handgun without a license, respec-\ntively. Binderup, 836 F.3d at 340, 356. Because it is the only suc-\ncessful as-applied Second Amendment challenge in a court of\nappeals to date—and because Kanter relies heavily upon it—\nit is worth examining the case at some length.\n Seven members of the Third Circuit reasoned that the his-\ntorical justification for disarming felons was “tied to the con-\ncept of a virtuous citizenry,” and that “persons who have\n\n12 No. 18-1478\n\ncommitted serious crimes forfeit the right to possess firearms\nmuch the way they forfeit other civil liberties.” Id. at 348–49\n(plurality opinion) (citations and internal quotation marks\nomitted). Applying the civic virtue rationale, three of those\njudges concluded that the challengers’ offenses “were not se-\nrious enough to strip them of their Second Amendment\nrights.” Id. at 351. They explained that, although the two of-\nfenses were punishable by more than a year in prison, and\nthus met the definition of a felony in § 922(g), the state legis-\nlatures had enacted them as misdemeanors, and “a state leg-\nislature’s classification of an offense as a misdemeanor is a\npowerful expression of its belief that the offense is not serious\nenough to be disqualifying.” Id. Those judges also considered\nthat neither of the offenses at issue involved violence and that\neach of the challengers received “a minor sentence,” and they\npointed to the lack of a “cross-jurisdictional consensus re-\ngarding the seriousness of the [c]hallengers’ crimes,” remark-\ning that in some states the challengers’ conduct was not even\nillegal. Id. at 352. At step two, those three judges concluded\nthat § 922(g)(1) did not survive intermediate scrutiny because\nthe government relied on “off-point statistical studies” that\ninvolved incarcerated felons, not misdemeanants who had\nserved no jail time. Id. at 354.\n By contrast, the other five judges who upheld the as-ap-\nplied challenge believed that the exclusion of felons from the\nscope of the Second Amendment’s protections was not rooted\nin notions of civic virtue, but rather “the time-honored prin-\nciple that the right to keep and bear arms does not extend to\nthose likely to commit violent offenses.” Id. at 367 (Hardiman,\nJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgments). Ap-\nplying dangerousness as the touchstone, those judges con-\ncluded that persons like the challengers who were convicted\n\nNo. 18-1478 13\n\nof nonviolent offenses fall within the scope of the Second\nAmendment’s protection. Id. at 375–76. Moreover, those five\njudges believed that § 922(g) was “categorically unconstitu-\ntional” when applied to “non-dangerous persons convicted of\noffenses unassociated with violence,” such that any subse-\nquent means-end scrutiny or judicial interest balancing was\n“inappropriate.” Id. at 358, 378.\n The seven dissenting judges concluded that as-applied\nchallenges to § 922(g)(1) are never permissible. Id. at 401\n(Fuentes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dis-\nsenting from the judgments). In doing so, they stressed that\nthe majority’s decision to uphold such a challenge was un-\nprecedented. See id. at 380–81 (“The plaintiffs ask us to do\nsomething that no federal appellate court has done before.…\nNo federal appellate court has yet upheld a challenge, facial\nor as-applied, to the felon-in-possession statute.”). They criti-\ncized the majority’s approach because it “saddle[s] district\ncourt judges with a seemingly unending obligation to review\nas-applied challenges” and “fail[s] to provide us with any\nworkable standards that would make such a regime adminis-\ntratively feasible or doctrinally coherent.” Id. at 380. Accord-\ning to the dissent, the challengers’ claim failed at step one be-\ncause “Heller itself tells us that felons are disqualified from\nexercising their Second Amendment rights,” and “there is no\nprincipled basis … for distinguishing felons from misde-\nmeanants who commit crimes punishable by more than two\nyears in prison.” Id. at 388. In any event, the dissenting judges\nconcluded that § 922(g)(1) survives intermediate scrutiny be-\ncause the government’s studies established a link between\npast criminal conduct and the government’s important inter-\nest in preventing future gun violence. See id. at 400–01. With\n\n14 No. 18-1478\n\nrespect to plaintiffs’ contention that the studies were not tai-\nlored to their specific characteristics, the dissenting judges ex-\nplained that “[t]he question is not whether someone exactly\nlike the plaintiffs poses a threat to public safety,” but rather\n“whether the fit between the challenged regulation and the\nasserted objective [is] reasonable, not perfect.” Id. at 400 (al-\nteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks\nomitted). 4\n With this background in mind, we now apply our two-\nstep test to this case.\n C. Step One: The Historical Evidence is Inconclusive as\n to Whether Felons Were Categorically Excluded From\n the Second Amendment’s Scope\n The first question is whether nonviolent felons as a class\nhistorically enjoyed Second Amendment rights. Heller did not\nanswer this question. True, “some of Heller’s language does\nlink Second Amendment rights with the notion[] of ‘law-abid-\ning citizens.’” Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 669; see also Heller,\n554 U.S. at 634–35 (observing that the “core” of the Second\nAmendment right is “the right of law-abiding, responsible cit-\nizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home” (emphasis\nadded)). The Heller Court also cautioned that nothing in its\ndecision “should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding pro-\nhibitions on the possession of firearms by felons,” which it re-\nferred to as “presumptively lawful.” 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26.\nMoreover, the Court mentioned that certain individuals may\n\n\n 4Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court\ndenied the petitions for writ of certiorari. See Sessions v. Binderup, 137 S. Ct.\n2323 (2017) (noting Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor would grant the pe-\ntition); Binderup v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (same).\n\nNo. 18-1478 15\n\nbe “disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment\nrights.” Id. at 635. However, the Court never actually ad-\ndressed the historical pedigree of felon dispossession laws.\nAccordingly, we have refused to read too much into the\nCourt’s “precautionary language.” Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640; see\nalso Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 669 (“We are reluctant to place\nmore weight on these passing references than the Court itself\ndid.”). 5\n Nor has the Seventh Circuit decided whether felons were\nhistorically outside the scope of the Second Amendment’s\nprotection. See Baer, 636 F. App’x at 698. Although the litigants\nin Williams raised that question, we declined to address it and\nproceeded directly to the intermediate scrutiny analysis. 616\nF.3d at 692. In so doing, we noted that “[t]he academic writing\non the subject of whether felons were excluded from firearm\npossession at the time of the founding is ‘inconclusive at best,’\nand we refrain[ed] … from making a determination based on\ncontradictory views.” Id. (quoting Skoien, 614 F.3d at 650\n(Sykes, J., dissenting)).\n To be sure, although we have not expressly decided this\nissue before, we have suggested that felons were not histori-\ncally understood to have Second Amendment rights. For ex-\nample, in Skoien, which involved domestic violence misde-\nmeanants, we explained that some “categorical limits” on fire-\narm possession were “part of the original meaning” of the\nSecond Amendment. 614 F.3d at 640. Similarly, in United\n\n\n 5 But see Berron v. Ill. Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd., 825 F.3d 843,\n\n847 (7th Cir. 2016) (“When holding in [Heller] that the Second Amendment\nestablishes personal rights, the Court observed that only law-abiding per-\nsons enjoy these rights, even at home.”).\n\n16 No. 18-1478\n\nStates v. Yancey, we opined that “most scholars of the Second\nAmendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied to the\nconcept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the gov-\nernment could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens,’” including fel-\nons. 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting\nVongxay, 594 F.3d at 1118). 6\n If, as we suggested in Yancey and as most scholars have\nconcluded, the founders conceived of the right to bear arms\nas belonging only to virtuous citizens, even nonviolent felons\nlike Kanter would fall outside the scope of the Second\n\n\n 6 Indeed, numerous legal historians have endorsed this view. See, e.g.,\nSaul Cornell, “Don't Know Much About History” The Current Crisis in Second\nAmendment Scholarship, 29 N. Ky. L. Rev. 657, 679 (2002) (“Perhaps the\nmost accurate way to describe the dominant understanding of the right to\nbear arms in the Founding era is as a civic right [that] … was limited to\nthose members of the polity who were deemed capable of exercising it in\na virtuous manner.”); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitu-\ntion or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 Okla. L. Rev. 65, 96 (1983) (“Co-\nlonial and English societies of the eighteenth century … excluded … felons\n[from possessing firearms].”); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and\nthe Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 266\n(1983) (“Felons simply did not fall within the benefits of the common law\nright to possess arms.”); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the\nSecond Amendment, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461, 480 (1995) (“One implication of\nthis emphasis on the virtuous citizen is that the right to arms does not\npreclude laws disarming the unvirtuous (i.e. criminals) ….” (citation omit-\nted)). Moreover, according to Thomas M. Cooley’s 1868 Treatise on Con-\nstitutional Limitations, which the Heller court described as a “massively\npopular” treatise written by “[t]he most famous” late-nineteenth-century\nlegal scholar, 554 U.S. at 616, certain classes of people were “almost uni-\nversally excluded” from exercising certain civic rights, including “the id-\niot, the lunatic, and the felon, on obvious grounds.” Thomas M. Cooley, A\nTreatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative\nPower of the States of the American Union 29 (1st ed. 1868).\n\nNo. 18-1478 17\n\nAmendment. Indeed, several courts of appeals have con-\ncluded that nonviolent felons are outside the scope of the Sec-\nond Amendment. For example, in Hamilton v. Pallozzi, the\nFourth Circuit rejected a nonviolent felon’s as-applied Second\nAmendment challenge to a state felon dispossession statute,\nholding that “conviction of a felony necessarily removes one\nfrom the class of ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ for pur-\nposes of the Second Amendment.” 848 F.3d 614, 626 (4th Cir.\n2017). Explaining that the defendant could not rebut the pre-\nsumption that he fell outside the category of “‘law-abiding,\nresponsible citizens,’” the court focused on his felony convic-\ntion for fraud and theft crimes: “Theft, fraud, and forgery are\nnot merely errors in filling out a form or some regulatory mis-\ndemeanor offense; these are significant offenses reflecting dis-\nrespect for the law.” Id. at 627 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635);\nsee also Medina, 913 F.3d at 160 (“Whether a certain crime re-\nmoves one from the category of ‘law-abiding and responsi-\nble,’ in some cases, may be a close question,” such as “a mis-\ndemeanor arising from a fistfight …. Those who commit felo-\nnies however, cannot profit from our recognition of such bor-\nderline cases.”); United States v. Hughley, 691 F. App’x 278, 279\n(8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Restricting gun possession by\nfelons—even nonviolent ones—differs meaningfully from re-\nstricting citizens who have not been convicted of serious of-\nfenses from having guns in their home for self-defense.”);\nVongxay, 594 F.3d at 1115–16 (“declin[ing] to make a distinc-\ntion between violent and non-violent felons” because “felons\nare categorically different from the individuals who have a\nfundamental right to bear arms”); Rozier, 598 F.3d at 771 & n.5\n(stating that a nonviolent felon’s “Second Amendment right\nto bear arms is not weighed in the same manner as that of a\nlaw-abiding citizen” and analogizing felon-dispossession\n\n18 No. 18-1478\n\nstatutes to felon disenfranchisement laws); United States v.\nEverist, 368 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Irrespective of\nwhether his offense was violent in nature, a felon has shown\nmanifest disregard for the rights of others. He may not justly\ncomplain of the limitation on his liberty when his possession\nof firearms would otherwise threaten the security of his fel-\nlow citizens.”). 7\n On the other hand, as Judge Sykes observed in her dissent\nin Skoien, there is scholarly “disagree[ment] about the extent\nto which felons … were considered excluded from the right to\nbear arms during the founding era,” and “[t]he historical evi-\ndence is inconclusive at best.” Skoien, 614 F.3d at 650 (Sykes,\nJ., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 8 If the founders were really\n\n\n\n\n 7 Although Everist was issued before the Heller decision, the Fifth Cir-\ncuit already recognized an individual right to bear arms pre-Heller and\nreaffirmed the validity of the Everist decision after Heller. See Scroggins, 599\nF.3d at 451.\n 8 For support for Judge Sykes’s observation regarding the conflicting\nscholarship on the historical conception of the Second Amendment, see,\ne.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of A Theory: District of\nColumbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 Hastings L.J. 1371, 1374 (2009)\n(“[S]o far as I can determine, no colonial or state law in eighteenth-century\nAmerica formally restricted the ability of felons to own firearms.”); C.\nKevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. &\nPub. Pol’y 695, 698 (2009) (“[A]ctual ‘longstanding’ precedent in America\nand pre-Founding England suggests that a firearms disability can be con-\nsistent with the Second Amendment to the extent that … its basis credibly\nindicates a present danger that one will misuse arms against others and\nthe disability redresses that danger.”); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22,\n56 UCLA L. Rev. 1551, 1563 (2009) (“The Founding generation had no\nlaws … denying the right to people convicted of crimes.”).\n\nNo. 18-1478 19\n\njust concerned about dangerousness, not a lack of virtue, non-\nviolent felons like Kanter arguably fall within the scope of the\nSecond Amendment’s protections.\n Ultimately, we need not resolve this difficult issue regard-\ning the historical scope of the Second Amendment to dispose\nof this case. Instead, we proceed to the means-end scrutiny of\nthe government’s objectives. 9\n D. Step Two: The Felon Dispossession Statutes Survive\n Intermediate Scrutiny\n Categorical prohibitions on the possession of firearms by\nfelons are “presumptively lawful,” even in disqualifying non-\nviolent felons like Kanter. See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640 (“[S]uch\na recent extension of [§ 922(g)(1)’s] disqualification to non-vi-\nolent felons (embezzlers and tax evaders, for example) is pre-\nsumptively constitutional, as Heller said in note 26.”). But be-\ncause “Heller referred to felon disarmament bans only as ‘pre-\nsumptively lawful,’” we require the government to “prov[e]\n\n 9 In fact, we usually defer the threshold historical scope inquiry and\nproceed directly to means-end scrutiny. See, e.g., Horsley v. Trame, 808 F.3d\n1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 2015) (declining to decide whether eighteen- to twenty-\nyear-olds are within the scope of the Second Amendment); Yancey, 621\nF.3d at 684–85. One notable exception to our generally restrained ap-\nproach in this area is United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir.\n2015). There, the majority held that undocumented immigrants were his-\ntorically within the scope of the Second Amendment but ultimately con-\ncluded that the statute at issue nevertheless survived intermediate scru-\ntiny. Id. at 669–73. The concurrence advocated for a “prudential approach”\nsince we did not need to decide the threshold question to resolve the case,\nand proposed “reserv[ing] resolution of this challenging constitutional\nquestion for a case that compels addressing it.” Id. at 673–74 (Flaum, J.,\nconcurring in the judgment). We think that prudential approach is appro-\npriate here.\n\n20 No. 18-1478\n\n“the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) … using the intermediate\nscrutiny framework.” Williams, 616 F.3d at 692.\n To survive intermediate scrutiny at step two, the govern-\nment must show that the felon dispossession statute is sub-\nstantially related to an important governmental objective.\nConsistent with how we apply intermediate scrutiny in the\nFirst Amendment context, the “fit” between the challenged\nregulation and the asserted governmental objective need only\n“be reasonable, not perfect.” United States v. Marzzarella, 614\nF.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010); cf. FTC v. Trudeau, 662 F.3d 947, 953\n(7th Cir. 2011). 10\n The government has met its burden in this case. First, Kan-\nter concedes that the government’s objective in passing\n§ 922(g)(1) was an important one. The government identifies\nits interest as preventing gun violence by keeping firearms\naway from persons, such as those convicted of serious crimes,\nwho might be expected to misuse them. This formulation of\nthe government’s interest is consistent with our precedent in\nthis area. See Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683 (“Congress enacted the\nexclusions in § 922(g) to keep guns out of the hands of pre-\n\n\n 10 Our means-end review is arguably less rigorous in this case because\n\nthe weight of the historical evidence summarized above suggests that\nfelon dispossession laws do not restrict the “core right of armed defense,”\nbut rather burden “activity lying closer to the margins of the right.” Ezell\nII, 846 F.3d at 892. Indeed, we have said that “the state can prevail with\nless evidence when, as in Skoien, guns are forbidden to a class of persons\nwho present a higher than average risk of misusing a gun.” Moore, 702\nF.3d at 940. We have even gone so far as to say that “empirical evidence of\na public safety concern can be dispensed with altogether when the ban is\nlimited to obviously dangerous persons such as felons and the mentally\nill.” Id.\n\nNo. 18-1478 21\n\nsumptively risky people.”); Williams, 616 F.3d at 693 (describ-\ning the government’s objective as “keep[ing] firearms out of\nthe hands of violent felons, who the government believes are\noften those most likely to misuse firearms”); Skoien, 614 F.3d\nat 642 (describing the government’s interest as “preventing\narmed mayhem”). And we have previously held that this in-\nterest is “without doubt an important one.” Yancey, 621 F.3d\nat 684; see also Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 673 (“[T]he govern-\nment has a[] strong interest in preventing people who already\nhave disrespected the law (including … felons …) from pos-\nsessing guns.”).\n Second, the government has shown that prohibiting even\nnonviolent felons like Kanter from possessing firearms is sub-\nstantially related to its interest in preventing gun violence. Be-\nfore turning to the government’s statistical evidence estab-\nlishing such a link, it is important to note that we do not write\non a blank slate. In Yancey, we explained that “most felons are\nnonviolent, but someone with a felony conviction on his rec-\nord is more likely than a nonfelon to engage in illegal and vi-\nolent gun use.” 621 F.3d at 685. In fact, the D.C. Circuit has\nconcluded that “nonviolent offenders not only have a higher\nrecidivism rate than the general population, but certain\ngroups—such as property offenders—have an even higher re-\ncidivism rate than violent offenders, and a large percentage of\nthe crimes nonviolent recidivists later commit are violent.”\nKaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see\nEwing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 26 (2003) (citing P. Langan &\nD. Levin, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Spe-\ncial Report: Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, at 1 (June\n2002)).\n\n22 No. 18-1478\n\n In addition to these judicial statements, the government\npoints to several studies that have found a connection be-\ntween nonviolent offenders like Kanter and a risk of future\nviolent crime. For example, one study of 210,886 nonviolent\noffenders found that about one in five were rearrested for a\nviolent crime within three years of his or her release. See U.S.\nDep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Profile of Nonviolent\nOffenders Exiting State Prisons 2, 4 (2004). A separate study\nfound that 28.5 percent of nonviolent property offenders—a\ncategory that includes fraud convictions—were rearrested for\na violent offense within five years of their release. See Mat-\nthew R. Durose, et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice\nStatistics, Recidivism of Prisoner Released in 30 States in 2005:\nPatterns from 2005 to 2010, at 9 (2014). Yet another study found\nthat “even handgun purchasers with only 1 prior misdemeanor\nconviction and no convictions for offenses involving firearms\nor violence were nearly 5 times as likely as those with no prior\ncriminal history to be charged with new offenses involving\nfirearms or violence.” Garen J. Wintemute, et al., Prior Misde-\nmeanor Convictions as a Risk Factor for Later Violent and Firearm-\nRelated Criminal Activity Among Authorized Purchasers of Hand-\nguns, 280 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 2083, 2083 (1998) (emphasis\nadded). 11\n\n\n\n 11 Even the study that Kanter relies upon found that approximately 40\n\npercent of individuals convicted of mail fraud had at least one additional\narrest afterward. David Weisburd & Elin Waring, White-Collar Crime and\nCriminal Careers 12, 29 (2004). The same study found that 24.5 percent of\nall repeat white-collar offenders had at least one violent arrest on their\nrecord. Id. at 45. In other words, “white-collar offenders often have multi-\nple contacts with the criminal justice system” and “are unlikely to evi-\ndence a high degree of specialization.” Id. at 49.\n\nNo. 18-1478 23\n\n Kanter’s only response to the government’s statistical\nstudies is that they are not tailored enough to his “individual\ncircumstances.” Specifically, Kanter asks the Court “to con-\nsider the fact that [he] is a first-time, non-violent offender with\nno history of violence, firearm misuses, or subsequent convic-\ntions.” Kanter also points out that he is “employed, married,\nand does not use illicit drugs, all of which correspond with\nlower rates of recidivism.” In short, Kanter argues that to\nmeet its burden the government must show “a substantial re-\nlationship between denying Mr. Kanter a firearm and further-\ning the government’s objective of preventing firearm misuse\nand armed violence.”\n Kanter is mistaken. In Skoien we held that “Congress is not\nlimited to case-by-case exclusions of persons who have been\nshown to be untrustworthy with weapons, nor need these\nlimits be established by evidence presented in court. Heller\ndid not suggest that disqualifications would be effective only\nif the statute’s benefits are first established by admissible evi-\ndence.” 614 F.3d at 641. Of course, not all nonviolent felons\nwill later commit a violent crime with a firearm. In that sense,\nthe statute is “somewhat over-inclusive.” United States v.\nChapman, 666 F.3d 220, 231 (4th Cir. 2012). However, that\n“does not undermine [the statute’s] constitutionality … be-\ncause it merely suggests that the fit is not a perfect one; a rea-\nsonable fit is all that is required under intermediate scrutiny.”\nId.; see also Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97–98 (analogizing to inter-\nmediate scrutiny in First Amendment context).\n Here, unlike the challengers in Binderup, who were con-\nvicted of “non-serious” state misdemeanors and served no\nprison time, Kanter was convicted of a serious federal felony\nfor conduct broadly understood to be criminal, and he did not\n\n24 No. 18-1478\n\nface a minor sentence. 836 F.3d at 353 & n.6. Instead, Kanter is\nmore akin to the challenger in Hamilton, whose fraud and\ntheft convictions were “black-letter mala in se felonies reflect-\ning grave misjudgment and maladjustment.” 848 F.3d at 627.\nKanter’s crime—defrauding the federal government out of\nhundreds of thousands of dollars—“reflect[s] significant dis-\nrespect for the law.” Id. at 627 n.14; see also Medina, 913 F.3d at\n160 (rejecting as-applied challenge where plaintiff was con-\nvicted of “felony fraud—a serious crime, malum in se, that is\npunishable in every state”). Thus, Kanter’s serious felony con-\nviction prevents him from challenging the constitutionality of\n§ 922(g)(1) as applied to him. 12\n We are further assured in our decision because the highly-\nindividualized approach Kanter proposes raises serious insti-\ntutional and administrative concerns. See Torres-Rosario, 658\nF.3d at 113 (“[S]uch an approach, applied to countless varia-\ntions in individual circumstances, would obviously present\nserious problems of administration, consistency and fair\nwarning.”); see also Medina, 913 F.3d at 159–60 (rejecting argu-\nment that “non-dangerous felons have a right to bear arms”\n\n\n 12 We decline to revisit our comment in Williams “that § 922(g)(1) may\nbe subject to an overbreadth challenge at some point because of its dis-\nqualification of all felons, including those who are non-violent.” 616 F.3d\nat 693. That statement was dictum, and we need not determine whether\n§ 922(g)(1) may ever be subject to an as-applied challenge to reach our de-\ncision in this case. There may be a case in the future that requires address-\ning whether any individual may successfully bring an as-applied chal-\nlenge to the statute, but Kanter’s is not that case. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma,\n413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973) (“[A] person to whom a statute may constitution-\nally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground\nthat it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other\nsituations not before the Court.”).\n\nNo. 18-1478 25\n\nbecause “[u]sing an amorphous ‘dangerousness’ standard to\ndelineate the scope of the Second Amendment would require\nthe government to make case-by-case predictive judgments\nbefore barring the possession of weapons”). As mentioned\nabove, Congress previously allowed the ATF to restore a\nfelon’s gun rights under § 925(c) if the agency determined that\n“the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous\nto public safety and that the granting of the relief would not\nbe contrary to the public interest.” 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). How-\never, Congress abandoned that approach after finding that\nthe dangerousness inquiry was a “very difficult” and time-in-\ntensive task, H.R. Rep. No. 102-618, at 14 (1992), and that “too\nmany of these felons whose gun ownership rights were re-\nstored went on to commit violent crimes with firearms.” H.R.\nRep. No. 104-183, at 15 (1995). Congress’s failed attempt to\ndelegate this investigative task to a law enforcement agency\n“should have a profound impact on our tailoring analysis.”\nBinderup, 836 F.3d at 403 (Fuentes, J., concurring in part, dis-\nsenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment).\n At bottom, the fact-specific inquiry Kanter asks this Court\nto undertake is “a function best performed by the Executive,\nwhich, unlike courts, is institutionally equipped for conduct-\ning a neutral, wide-ranging investigation.” Bean, 537 U.S. at\n77; see also Pontarelli v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 285 F.3d 216,\n231 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Unlike ATF, courts possess neither the re-\nsources to conduct the requisite investigations nor the exper-\ntise to predict accurately which felons may carry guns with-\nout threatening the public’s safety.”). Moreover, “[i]n the con-\ntext of firearm regulation, the legislature is far better\nequipped than the judiciary to make sensitive public policy\njudgments (within constitutional limits) concerning the dan-\ngers in carrying firearms and the manner to combat those\n\n26 No. 18-1478\n\nrisks.” Schrader, 704 F.3d at 990 (citation and internal quota-\ntion marks omitted).\n In sum, the government has established that the felon dis-\npossession statutes are substantially related to the important\ngovernmental objective of keeping firearms away those con-\nvicted of serious crimes. Because Kanter was convicted of a\nserious federal felony for conduct broadly understood to be\ncriminal, his challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is\nwithout merit.\n III. Conclusion\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\ndistrict court.\n\nNo. 18-1478 27\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Rickey I. KANTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1478\\nRICKEY I. KANTER,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General\\nof the United States, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-1121 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 7, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Rickey I. Kanter pleaded guilty to\\none count of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Due to his fel-\\nony conviction, he is prohibited from possessing a firearm un-\\nder both federal and Wisconsin law. At issue in this case is\\nwhether the felon dispossession statutes—18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)—violate the Second\\nAmendment as applied to Kanter. Even if Kanter could bring\\n\\n2 No. 18-1478\\n\\nan as-applied challenge, the government has met its burden\\nof establishing that the felon dispossession statutes are sub-\\nstantially related to an important government interest. We\\ntherefore affirm the district court.\\n I. Background\\n A. Federal and Wisconsin Felon Dispossession Statutes\\n Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by persons\\nconvicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term\\nexceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). State misdemean-\\nors are included under the statute if they are punishable by\\nmore than two years in prison. 1 Id. § 921(a)(20)(B). However,\\nthe statute excludes anyone convicted of “any Federal or State\\noffenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade prac-\\ntices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to\\nthe regulation of business practices.” Id. § 921(a)(20)(A).\\nMoreover, “[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set\\naside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil\\nrights restored” is not a conviction for purposes of the statute.\\nId. § 921(a)(20).\\n Although the firearms prohibition generally applies for\\nlife, the statute includes a “safety valve” that permits individ-\\nuals to apply to the Attorney General for restoration of their\\nfirearms rights. Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 28 n.1\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1Accordingly, calling the statute a “felon” dispossession statute is\\nsomewhat of a “misnomer.” Carly Lagrotteria, Note, Heller's Collateral\\nDamage: As-Applied Challenges to the Felon-in-Possession Prohibition, 86 Ford-\\nham L. Rev. 1963, 1970 (2018).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 3\\n\\n(2007). Specifically, the Attorney General 2 may remove the\\nprohibition on a case-by-case basis if an applicant sufficiently\\nestablishes “that the circumstances regarding the disability,\\nand the applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the\\napplicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to\\npublic safety and that the granting of the relief would not be\\ncontrary to the public interest.” 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).\\n Since 1992, however, “Congress has repeatedly barred\\nthe Attorney General from using appropriated funds ‘to in-\\nvestigate or act upon [relief] applications,’” rendering the pro-\\nvision “inoperative.” Logan, 552 U.S. at 28 n.1 (quoting United\\nStates v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 74–75 (2002)). The Committee on\\nAppropriations eliminated funding because the restoration\\nprocedure under § 925(c) was “a very difficult task” that re-\\nquired ATF officials to “spend many hours investigating a\\nparticular applicant for relief.” H.R. Rep. No. 102-618, at 14\\n(1992). Even then, there was “no way to know with any cer-\\ntainty whether the applicant [was] still a danger to public\\nsafety.” Id. Accordingly, ATF officials were effectively “re-\\nquired to guess whether a convicted felon … [could] be en-\\ntrusted with a firearm.” Id. Moreover, they were “forced to\\nmake these decisions knowing that a mistake could have dev-\\nastating consequences for innocent citizens.” Id. Ultimately,\\nthe Committee determined that “the $3.75 million and the 40\\nman-years annually spent investigating and acting upon\\nthese applications for relief would be better utilized by ATF\\nin fighting violent crime.” Id. The Committee addressed the\\nfunding issue again in 1995, adding that “too many of these\\n\\n 2 The Attorney General delegated its authority under § 925(c) to the\\nBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”). 28 C.F.R.\\n§ 0.130(a)(1).\\n\\n4 No. 18-1478\\n\\nfelons whose gun ownership rights were restored went on to\\ncommit violent crimes with firearms.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-183,\\nat 15 (1995).\\n In 1981, Wisconsin adopted its own felon dispossession\\nlaw. See Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m). Section 941.29(1m) prohibits\\nan individual from possessing a firearm if he has “been con-\\nvicted of a felony in” Wisconsin or “a crime elsewhere that\\nwould be a felony” in Wisconsin. Id. § 941.29(1m)(a)–(b).\\n B. Factual Background\\n Kanter lives in Mequon, Wisconsin. He was previously the\\nowner, operator, and CEO of Rikco International, LLC. Rikco\\nInternational, which did business as “Dr. Comfort,” manufac-\\ntured therapeutic shoes and inserts for individuals with dia-\\nbetes and severe foot disease. The company marketed the\\nshoes and inserts to podiatrists, who in turn sold them to in-\\ndividual consumers. Most of the shoes and inserts were billed\\nto, and paid for by, Medicare. Medicare only paid for inserts\\nthat met certain thickness and hardness standards.\\n In April 2004, Kanter submitted his inserts to Medicare to\\ndetermine whether they met those requirements. Medicare\\nrejected Kanter’s inserts because they were too thin. Kanter\\nthen submitted revised samples, which Medicare approved.\\nHowever, Kanter continued to sell the noncompliant inserts\\nwhile representing that they were Medicare-approved. All\\ntold, Medicare paid Kanter’s company $375,000 for the non-\\ncompliant inserts.\\n On May 24, 2011, Kanter pleaded guilty to one count of\\nmail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 based on a shipment of the\\nnoncompliant inserts to a podiatrist in Florida. Section 1341\\ncarries a maximum penalty of twenty years in prison and a\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 5\\n\\n$250,000 fine. Kanter was sentenced to one year and one day\\nin prison and two years of supervised release. He was also\\nordered to pay a criminal penalty of $50,000, and he reim-\\nbursed Medicare over $27 million in a related civil settlement.\\n Kanter has since served his time and paid his criminal pen-\\nalty, and he has not been charged with any additional crimi-\\nnal activity. However, because of his felony conviction, he is\\npermanently prohibited from owning a firearm under federal\\nand Wisconsin law.\\n C. Procedural Background\\n Kanter brought suit in the Eastern District of Wisconsin,\\narguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)\\nare unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as ap-\\nplied to him. The United States moved to dismiss his claim\\nunder Rule 12(b)(6), and Wisconsin moved for judgment on\\nthe pleadings under Rule 12(c). In response, Kanter moved for\\nsummary judgment, arguing that his status as a nonviolent\\noffender with no other criminal record meant that both stat-\\nutes were unconstitutional as applied to him.\\n The district court granted defendants’ motions and denied\\nKanter’s motion. In so doing, the district court held that, even\\nassuming felons are entitled to Second Amendment protec-\\ntion, the application of the federal and Wisconsin felon dis-\\npossession laws to Kanter is substantially related to the gov-\\nernment’s important interest in preventing gun violence. The\\ncourt reasoned that Congress and the Wisconsin legislature\\nare entitled to categorically disqualify all felons—even nonvi-\\nolent felons like Kanter—because both have found that such\\nindividuals are more likely to abuse firearms. The court also\\nnoted that this “bright line categorical approach … allows for\\n\\n6 No. 18-1478\\n\\nuniform application and ease of administration.” The district\\ncourt entered judgment on January 2, 2018, and this appeal\\nfollowed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to\\ndismiss for failure to state a claim and a motion for judgment\\non the pleadings. Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Hilger, 838 F.3d 821,\\n824 (7th Cir. 2016). In doing so, “we accept all well-pleaded\\nfacts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’\\nfavor.” Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir.\\n2016). To avoid dismissal, “the complaint must ‘state a claim\\nto relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.\\nv. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).\\n A. Legal Standard 3\\n The Second Amendment states: “A well regulated Militia,\\nbeing necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the\\npeople to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S.\\nConst. amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme\\nCourt identified the “core” of the Second Amendment as “the\\nright of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in de-\\nfense of hearth and home.” 554 U.S. 570, 634–35. Accordingly,\\nthe Court concluded that Washington D.C.’s ban on handgun\\npossession in the home violated the Second Amendment. Id.\\nat 635.\\n However, the Court also made clear that “the right se-\\ncured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” Id. at 626.\\n\\n\\n 3 Because “the federal and state prohibitions are equivalent in effect”\\nas to Kanter, our Second Amendment analysis of the two statutes is the\\nsame. Baer v. Lynch, 636 F. App’x 695, 698–99 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 7\\n\\nAlthough the Court did not “undertake an exhaustive histor-\\nical analysis ... of the full scope of the Second Amendment,” it\\nsaid that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast\\ndoubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of fire-\\narms by felons and the mentally ill.” Id. It described such pro-\\nhibitions as “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.” Id.\\nat 627 n.26. Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the\\nCourt “repeat[ed] [its] assurances” that felon dispossession\\nlaws remain valid. 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (plurality opinion).\\n After Heller, we developed a two-step test for Second\\nAmendment challenges. “The threshold question is whether\\nthe regulated activity falls within the scope of the Second\\nAmendment.” Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888, 892 (7th\\nCir. 2017) (“Ezell II”). “This is a textual and historical inquiry;\\nif the government can establish that the challenged law regu-\\nlates activity falling outside the scope of the right as originally\\nunderstood, then ‘the regulated activity is categorically un-\\nprotected, and the law is not subject to further Second\\nAmendment review.’” Id. (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651\\nF.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Ezell I”)).\\n However, “if the historical evidence is inconclusive or sug-\\ngests that the regulated activity is not categorically unpro-\\ntected[,] then there must be a second inquiry into the strength\\nof the government’s justification for restricting or regulating\\nthe exercise of Second Amendment rights.” Id. (quoting Ezell\\nI, 651 F.3d at 703). At step two, we evaluate “the regulatory\\nmeans the government has chosen and the public-benefits\\nend it seeks to achieve.” Id. (quoting Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 703).\\nThe rigor of the review is dependent on “how close the law\\ncomes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the se-\\nverity of the law’s burden on the right.” Id. (quoting Ezell I,\\n\\n8 No. 18-1478\\n\\n651 F.3d at 703). “Severe burdens” on this core right “require\\na very strong public-interest justification and a close means-\\nend fit; lesser burdens, and burdens on activity lying closer to\\nthe margins of the right, are more easily justified.” Id. The\\ngovernment has the burden “of justifying its law under a\\nheightened standard of scrutiny; rational-basis review does\\nnot apply.” Id. We have consistently described step two as\\n“akin to intermediate scrutiny” and have required the gov-\\nernment to show that the challenged statute is substantially\\nrelated to an important governmental objective. United States\\nv. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing\\ncases).\\n B. As-Applied Second Amendment Challenges\\n Relying on the “presumptively lawful” language in Heller\\nand McDonald, every federal court of appeals to address the\\nissue has held that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second\\nAmendment on its face. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 406 F.\\nApp’x 52, 53–54 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d\\n281, 281–82 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. Moore,\\n666 F.3d 313, 318–19 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Barton, 633\\nF.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by\\nBinderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc);\\nSchrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 989–91 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert.\\ndenied, 571 U.S. 989 (2013); United States v. Joos, 638 F.3d 581,\\n586 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Khami, 362 F. App’x 501,\\n508 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 934 (2010); United\\nStates v. Battle, 347 F. App’x 478, 480 (11th Cir. 2009) (per cu-\\nriam); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir.\\n2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 970 (2010); United States v. Smith,\\n329 F. App’x 109, 110–11 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Ander-\\nson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 9\\n\\n However, courts of appeals are split as to whether as-ap-\\nplied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) are viable.\\nOn the one hand, the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh\\nCircuits have suggested that § 922(g)(1) is always constitu-\\ntional as applied to felons as a class, regardless of their indi-\\nvidual circumstances or the nature of their offenses. See Stim-\\nmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198, 210 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have\\nupheld § 922(g)(1), which disarms even non-violent felons.”\\n(citing United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2010),\\ncert. denied, 562 U.S. 895 (2010))); United States v. Scroggins, 599\\nF.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 867 (2010)\\n(rejecting as-applied Second Amendment challenge and hold-\\ning that felon dispossession laws are constitutional even if the\\noffense was nonviolent in nature); United States v. Rozier, 598\\nF.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 958 (2010)\\n(concluding that “statutes disqualifying felons from pos-\\nsessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not of-\\nfend the Second Amendment,” and holding that § 922(g)(1) is\\n“a constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment\\nright of certain classes of people,” including convicted felons);\\nUnited States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010),\\ncert. denied, 562 U.S. 921 (2010) (rejecting nonviolent felon’s as-\\napplied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) because\\n“felons are categorically different from the individuals who\\nhave a fundamental right to bear arms”); In re U.S., 578 F.3d\\n1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We have already rejected the no-\\ntion that Heller mandates an individualized inquiry concern-\\ning felons pursuant to § 922(g)(1).” (citing McCane, 573 F.3d at\\n1047)).\\n The First Circuit has not foreclosed as-applied challenges,\\nbut it has expressed some skepticism about them. In United\\nStates v. Torres-Rosario, the court rejected the defendant’s as-\\n\\n10 No. 18-1478\\n\\napplied challenge because he had two prior convictions for\\n“serious drug offenses.” 658 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011), cert.\\ndenied, 565 U.S. 1271 (2012). However, the court noted that the\\nSupreme Court “may be open to claims that some felonies do\\nnot indicate potential violence and cannot be the basis for ap-\\nplying a categorical ban,” and “might even be open to highly\\nfact-specific objections.” Id. Yet the First Circuit cautioned that\\n“such an approach, applied to countless variations in individ-\\nual circumstances, would obviously present serious problems\\nof administration, consistency and fair warning.” Id.\\n On the other hand, we, along with the Fourth, Eighth, and\\nD.C. Circuits, have left room for as-applied challenges to the\\nstatute. See United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir.\\n2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1092 (2010) (“[W]e recognize that\\n§ 922(g)(1) may be subject to an overbreadth challenge at\\nsome point because of its disqualification of all felons, includ-\\ning those who are non-violent.”); Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d\\n152, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“We need not decide today if it is\\never possible for a convicted felon to show that he may still\\ncount as a ‘law-abiding, responsible citizen’” entitled to Sec-\\nond Amendment protections.); United States v. Woolsey, 759\\nF.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Eighth Circuit has left\\nopen the possibility that a person could bring a successful as-\\napplied challenge to § 922(g)(1)” but rejected defendant’s as-\\napplied challenge because he had multiple violent felony con-\\nvictions.); United States v. Pruess, 703 F.3d 242, 247 (4th Cir.\\n2012) (holding that § 922(g)(1) could constitutionally be ap-\\nplied to nonviolent felons, but acknowledging that “there in\\ntheory might be an as-applied Second Amendment challenge\\nto [§] 922(g)(1) that could succeed” (citations and internal\\nquotation marks omitted)).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 11\\n\\n Neither we, nor the Fourth, Eighth, or D.C. Circuits, how-\\never, have ever actually upheld such a challenge in practice.\\nIn fact, we have repeatedly rejected as-applied Second\\nAmendment challenges to § 922(g). See Baer v. Lynch, 636 F.\\nApp’x 695, 698 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that § 922(g)(1) could\\nconstitutionally be applied to individual convicted of felony\\nrobbery); United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 750–51 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (concluding that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional as ap-\\nplied to individual who had been convicted of three violent\\nfelonies); Williams, 616 F.3d at 693–94 (holding that § 922(g)(1)\\nwas constitutional as applied to individual convicted of fel-\\nony robbery who “beat[] the victim so badly that the victim\\nrequired sixty-five stitches”); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d\\n638, 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (rejecting as-applied Sec-\\nond Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(9) brought by domes-\\ntic violence misdemeanant because violence was “an element\\nof the offense” and data suggested high rates of recidivism).\\n Indeed, only one federal court of appeals has upheld an\\nas-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g). In a\\nfractured en banc decision, a narrow majority of the Third Cir-\\ncuit (eight out of fifteen judges) held that § 922(g)(1) was un-\\nconstitutional as applied to two individuals convicted of a\\nmisdemeanor for corrupting a minor and a misdemeanor for\\nunlawfully carrying a handgun without a license, respec-\\ntively. Binderup, 836 F.3d at 340, 356. Because it is the only suc-\\ncessful as-applied Second Amendment challenge in a court of\\nappeals to date—and because Kanter relies heavily upon it—\\nit is worth examining the case at some length.\\n Seven members of the Third Circuit reasoned that the his-\\ntorical justification for disarming felons was “tied to the con-\\ncept of a virtuous citizenry,” and that “persons who have\\n\\n12 No. 18-1478\\n\\ncommitted serious crimes forfeit the right to possess firearms\\nmuch the way they forfeit other civil liberties.” Id. at 348–49\\n(plurality opinion) (citations and internal quotation marks\\nomitted). Applying the civic virtue rationale, three of those\\njudges concluded that the challengers’ offenses “were not se-\\nrious enough to strip them of their Second Amendment\\nrights.” Id. at 351. They explained that, although the two of-\\nfenses were punishable by more than a year in prison, and\\nthus met the definition of a felony in § 922(g), the state legis-\\nlatures had enacted them as misdemeanors, and “a state leg-\\nislature’s classification of an offense as a misdemeanor is a\\npowerful expression of its belief that the offense is not serious\\nenough to be disqualifying.” Id. Those judges also considered\\nthat neither of the offenses at issue involved violence and that\\neach of the challengers received “a minor sentence,” and they\\npointed to the lack of a “cross-jurisdictional consensus re-\\ngarding the seriousness of the [c]hallengers’ crimes,” remark-\\ning that in some states the challengers’ conduct was not even\\nillegal. Id. at 352. At step two, those three judges concluded\\nthat § 922(g)(1) did not survive intermediate scrutiny because\\nthe government relied on “off-point statistical studies” that\\ninvolved incarcerated felons, not misdemeanants who had\\nserved no jail time. Id. at 354.\\n By contrast, the other five judges who upheld the as-ap-\\nplied challenge believed that the exclusion of felons from the\\nscope of the Second Amendment’s protections was not rooted\\nin notions of civic virtue, but rather “the time-honored prin-\\nciple that the right to keep and bear arms does not extend to\\nthose likely to commit violent offenses.” Id. at 367 (Hardiman,\\nJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgments). Ap-\\nplying dangerousness as the touchstone, those judges con-\\ncluded that persons like the challengers who were convicted\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 13\\n\\nof nonviolent offenses fall within the scope of the Second\\nAmendment’s protection. Id. at 375–76. Moreover, those five\\njudges believed that § 922(g) was “categorically unconstitu-\\ntional” when applied to “non-dangerous persons convicted of\\noffenses unassociated with violence,” such that any subse-\\nquent means-end scrutiny or judicial interest balancing was\\n“inappropriate.” Id. at 358, 378.\\n The seven dissenting judges concluded that as-applied\\nchallenges to § 922(g)(1) are never permissible. Id. at 401\\n(Fuentes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dis-\\nsenting from the judgments). In doing so, they stressed that\\nthe majority’s decision to uphold such a challenge was un-\\nprecedented. See id. at 380–81 (“The plaintiffs ask us to do\\nsomething that no federal appellate court has done before.…\\nNo federal appellate court has yet upheld a challenge, facial\\nor as-applied, to the felon-in-possession statute.”). They criti-\\ncized the majority’s approach because it “saddle[s] district\\ncourt judges with a seemingly unending obligation to review\\nas-applied challenges” and “fail[s] to provide us with any\\nworkable standards that would make such a regime adminis-\\ntratively feasible or doctrinally coherent.” Id. at 380. Accord-\\ning to the dissent, the challengers’ claim failed at step one be-\\ncause “Heller itself tells us that felons are disqualified from\\nexercising their Second Amendment rights,” and “there is no\\nprincipled basis … for distinguishing felons from misde-\\nmeanants who commit crimes punishable by more than two\\nyears in prison.” Id. at 388. In any event, the dissenting judges\\nconcluded that § 922(g)(1) survives intermediate scrutiny be-\\ncause the government’s studies established a link between\\npast criminal conduct and the government’s important inter-\\nest in preventing future gun violence. See id. at 400–01. With\\n\\n14 No. 18-1478\\n\\nrespect to plaintiffs’ contention that the studies were not tai-\\nlored to their specific characteristics, the dissenting judges ex-\\nplained that “[t]he question is not whether someone exactly\\nlike the plaintiffs poses a threat to public safety,” but rather\\n“whether the fit between the challenged regulation and the\\nasserted objective [is] reasonable, not perfect.” Id. at 400 (al-\\nteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks\\nomitted). 4\\n With this background in mind, we now apply our two-\\nstep test to this case.\\n C. Step One: The Historical Evidence is Inconclusive as\\n to Whether Felons Were Categorically Excluded From\\n the Second Amendment’s Scope\\n The first question is whether nonviolent felons as a class\\nhistorically enjoyed Second Amendment rights. Heller did not\\nanswer this question. True, “some of Heller’s language does\\nlink Second Amendment rights with the notion[] of ‘law-abid-\\ning citizens.’” Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 669; see also Heller,\\n554 U.S. at 634–35 (observing that the “core” of the Second\\nAmendment right is “the right of law-abiding, responsible cit-\\nizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home” (emphasis\\nadded)). The Heller Court also cautioned that nothing in its\\ndecision “should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding pro-\\nhibitions on the possession of firearms by felons,” which it re-\\nferred to as “presumptively lawful.” 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26.\\nMoreover, the Court mentioned that certain individuals may\\n\\n\\n 4Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court\\ndenied the petitions for writ of certiorari. See Sessions v. Binderup, 137 S. Ct.\\n2323 (2017) (noting Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor would grant the pe-\\ntition); Binderup v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (same).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 15\\n\\nbe “disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment\\nrights.” Id. at 635. However, the Court never actually ad-\\ndressed the historical pedigree of felon dispossession laws.\\nAccordingly, we have refused to read too much into the\\nCourt’s “precautionary language.” Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640; see\\nalso Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 669 (“We are reluctant to place\\nmore weight on these passing references than the Court itself\\ndid.”). 5\\n Nor has the Seventh Circuit decided whether felons were\\nhistorically outside the scope of the Second Amendment’s\\nprotection. See Baer, 636 F. App’x at 698. Although the litigants\\nin Williams raised that question, we declined to address it and\\nproceeded directly to the intermediate scrutiny analysis. 616\\nF.3d at 692. In so doing, we noted that “[t]he academic writing\\non the subject of whether felons were excluded from firearm\\npossession at the time of the founding is ‘inconclusive at best,’\\nand we refrain[ed] … from making a determination based on\\ncontradictory views.” Id. (quoting Skoien, 614 F.3d at 650\\n(Sykes, J., dissenting)).\\n To be sure, although we have not expressly decided this\\nissue before, we have suggested that felons were not histori-\\ncally understood to have Second Amendment rights. For ex-\\nample, in Skoien, which involved domestic violence misde-\\nmeanants, we explained that some “categorical limits” on fire-\\narm possession were “part of the original meaning” of the\\nSecond Amendment. 614 F.3d at 640. Similarly, in United\\n\\n\\n 5 But see Berron v. Ill. Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd., 825 F.3d 843,\\n\\n847 (7th Cir. 2016) (“When holding in [Heller] that the Second Amendment\\nestablishes personal rights, the Court observed that only law-abiding per-\\nsons enjoy these rights, even at home.”).\\n\\n16 No. 18-1478\\n\\nStates v. Yancey, we opined that “most scholars of the Second\\nAmendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied to the\\nconcept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the gov-\\nernment could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens,’” including fel-\\nons. 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting\\nVongxay, 594 F.3d at 1118). 6\\n If, as we suggested in Yancey and as most scholars have\\nconcluded, the founders conceived of the right to bear arms\\nas belonging only to virtuous citizens, even nonviolent felons\\nlike Kanter would fall outside the scope of the Second\\n\\n\\n 6 Indeed, numerous legal historians have endorsed this view. See, e.g.,\\nSaul Cornell, “Don't Know Much About History” The Current Crisis in Second\\nAmendment Scholarship, 29 N. Ky. L. Rev. 657, 679 (2002) (“Perhaps the\\nmost accurate way to describe the dominant understanding of the right to\\nbear arms in the Founding era is as a civic right [that] … was limited to\\nthose members of the polity who were deemed capable of exercising it in\\na virtuous manner.”); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitu-\\ntion or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 Okla. L. Rev. 65, 96 (1983) (“Co-\\nlonial and English societies of the eighteenth century … excluded … felons\\n[from possessing firearms].”); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and\\nthe Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 266\\n(1983) (“Felons simply did not fall within the benefits of the common law\\nright to possess arms.”); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the\\nSecond Amendment, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461, 480 (1995) (“One implication of\\nthis emphasis on the virtuous citizen is that the right to arms does not\\npreclude laws disarming the unvirtuous (i.e. criminals) ….” (citation omit-\\nted)). Moreover, according to Thomas M. Cooley’s 1868 Treatise on Con-\\nstitutional Limitations, which the Heller court described as a “massively\\npopular” treatise written by “[t]he most famous” late-nineteenth-century\\nlegal scholar, 554 U.S. at 616, certain classes of people were “almost uni-\\nversally excluded” from exercising certain civic rights, including “the id-\\niot, the lunatic, and the felon, on obvious grounds.” Thomas M. Cooley, A\\nTreatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative\\nPower of the States of the American Union 29 (1st ed. 1868).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 17\\n\\nAmendment. Indeed, several courts of appeals have con-\\ncluded that nonviolent felons are outside the scope of the Sec-\\nond Amendment. For example, in Hamilton v. Pallozzi, the\\nFourth Circuit rejected a nonviolent felon’s as-applied Second\\nAmendment challenge to a state felon dispossession statute,\\nholding that “conviction of a felony necessarily removes one\\nfrom the class of ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ for pur-\\nposes of the Second Amendment.” 848 F.3d 614, 626 (4th Cir.\\n2017). Explaining that the defendant could not rebut the pre-\\nsumption that he fell outside the category of “‘law-abiding,\\nresponsible citizens,’” the court focused on his felony convic-\\ntion for fraud and theft crimes: “Theft, fraud, and forgery are\\nnot merely errors in filling out a form or some regulatory mis-\\ndemeanor offense; these are significant offenses reflecting dis-\\nrespect for the law.” Id. at 627 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635);\\nsee also Medina, 913 F.3d at 160 (“Whether a certain crime re-\\nmoves one from the category of ‘law-abiding and responsi-\\nble,’ in some cases, may be a close question,” such as “a mis-\\ndemeanor arising from a fistfight …. Those who commit felo-\\nnies however, cannot profit from our recognition of such bor-\\nderline cases.”); United States v. Hughley, 691 F. App’x 278, 279\\n(8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Restricting gun possession by\\nfelons—even nonviolent ones—differs meaningfully from re-\\nstricting citizens who have not been convicted of serious of-\\nfenses from having guns in their home for self-defense.”);\\nVongxay, 594 F.3d at 1115–16 (“declin[ing] to make a distinc-\\ntion between violent and non-violent felons” because “felons\\nare categorically different from the individuals who have a\\nfundamental right to bear arms”); Rozier, 598 F.3d at 771 & n.5\\n(stating that a nonviolent felon’s “Second Amendment right\\nto bear arms is not weighed in the same manner as that of a\\nlaw-abiding citizen” and analogizing felon-dispossession\\n\\n18 No. 18-1478\\n\\nstatutes to felon disenfranchisement laws); United States v.\\nEverist, 368 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Irrespective of\\nwhether his offense was violent in nature, a felon has shown\\nmanifest disregard for the rights of others. He may not justly\\ncomplain of the limitation on his liberty when his possession\\nof firearms would otherwise threaten the security of his fel-\\nlow citizens.”). 7\\n On the other hand, as Judge Sykes observed in her dissent\\nin Skoien, there is scholarly “disagree[ment] about the extent\\nto which felons … were considered excluded from the right to\\nbear arms during the founding era,” and “[t]he historical evi-\\ndence is inconclusive at best.” Skoien, 614 F.3d at 650 (Sykes,\\nJ., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 8 If the founders were really\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 Although Everist was issued before the Heller decision, the Fifth Cir-\\ncuit already recognized an individual right to bear arms pre-Heller and\\nreaffirmed the validity of the Everist decision after Heller. See Scroggins, 599\\nF.3d at 451.\\n 8 For support for Judge Sykes’s observation regarding the conflicting\\nscholarship on the historical conception of the Second Amendment, see,\\ne.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of A Theory: District of\\nColumbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 Hastings L.J. 1371, 1374 (2009)\\n(“[S]o far as I can determine, no colonial or state law in eighteenth-century\\nAmerica formally restricted the ability of felons to own firearms.”); C.\\nKevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. &\\nPub. Pol’y 695, 698 (2009) (“[A]ctual ‘longstanding’ precedent in America\\nand pre-Founding England suggests that a firearms disability can be con-\\nsistent with the Second Amendment to the extent that … its basis credibly\\nindicates a present danger that one will misuse arms against others and\\nthe disability redresses that danger.”); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22,\\n56 UCLA L. Rev. 1551, 1563 (2009) (“The Founding generation had no\\nlaws … denying the right to people convicted of crimes.”).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 19\\n\\njust concerned about dangerousness, not a lack of virtue, non-\\nviolent felons like Kanter arguably fall within the scope of the\\nSecond Amendment’s protections.\\n Ultimately, we need not resolve this difficult issue regard-\\ning the historical scope of the Second Amendment to dispose\\nof this case. Instead, we proceed to the means-end scrutiny of\\nthe government’s objectives. 9\\n D. Step Two: The Felon Dispossession Statutes Survive\\n Intermediate Scrutiny\\n Categorical prohibitions on the possession of firearms by\\nfelons are “presumptively lawful,” even in disqualifying non-\\nviolent felons like Kanter. See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640 (“[S]uch\\na recent extension of [§ 922(g)(1)’s] disqualification to non-vi-\\nolent felons (embezzlers and tax evaders, for example) is pre-\\nsumptively constitutional, as Heller said in note 26.”). But be-\\ncause “Heller referred to felon disarmament bans only as ‘pre-\\nsumptively lawful,’” we require the government to “prov[e]\\n\\n 9 In fact, we usually defer the threshold historical scope inquiry and\\nproceed directly to means-end scrutiny. See, e.g., Horsley v. Trame, 808 F.3d\\n1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 2015) (declining to decide whether eighteen- to twenty-\\nyear-olds are within the scope of the Second Amendment); Yancey, 621\\nF.3d at 684–85. One notable exception to our generally restrained ap-\\nproach in this area is United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir.\\n2015). There, the majority held that undocumented immigrants were his-\\ntorically within the scope of the Second Amendment but ultimately con-\\ncluded that the statute at issue nevertheless survived intermediate scru-\\ntiny. Id. at 669–73. The concurrence advocated for a “prudential approach”\\nsince we did not need to decide the threshold question to resolve the case,\\nand proposed “reserv[ing] resolution of this challenging constitutional\\nquestion for a case that compels addressing it.” Id. at 673–74 (Flaum, J.,\\nconcurring in the judgment). We think that prudential approach is appro-\\npriate here.\\n\\n20 No. 18-1478\\n\\n“the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) … using the intermediate\\nscrutiny framework.” Williams, 616 F.3d at 692.\\n To survive intermediate scrutiny at step two, the govern-\\nment must show that the felon dispossession statute is sub-\\nstantially related to an important governmental objective.\\nConsistent with how we apply intermediate scrutiny in the\\nFirst Amendment context, the “fit” between the challenged\\nregulation and the asserted governmental objective need only\\n“be reasonable, not perfect.” United States v. Marzzarella, 614\\nF.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010); cf. FTC v. Trudeau, 662 F.3d 947, 953\\n(7th Cir. 2011). 10\\n The government has met its burden in this case. First, Kan-\\nter concedes that the government’s objective in passing\\n§ 922(g)(1) was an important one. The government identifies\\nits interest as preventing gun violence by keeping firearms\\naway from persons, such as those convicted of serious crimes,\\nwho might be expected to misuse them. This formulation of\\nthe government’s interest is consistent with our precedent in\\nthis area. See Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683 (“Congress enacted the\\nexclusions in § 922(g) to keep guns out of the hands of pre-\\n\\n\\n 10 Our means-end review is arguably less rigorous in this case because\\n\\nthe weight of the historical evidence summarized above suggests that\\nfelon dispossession laws do not restrict the “core right of armed defense,”\\nbut rather burden “activity lying closer to the margins of the right.” Ezell\\nII, 846 F.3d at 892. Indeed, we have said that “the state can prevail with\\nless evidence when, as in Skoien, guns are forbidden to a class of persons\\nwho present a higher than average risk of misusing a gun.” Moore, 702\\nF.3d at 940. We have even gone so far as to say that “empirical evidence of\\na public safety concern can be dispensed with altogether when the ban is\\nlimited to obviously dangerous persons such as felons and the mentally\\nill.” Id.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 21\\n\\nsumptively risky people.”); Williams, 616 F.3d at 693 (describ-\\ning the government’s objective as “keep[ing] firearms out of\\nthe hands of violent felons, who the government believes are\\noften those most likely to misuse firearms”); Skoien, 614 F.3d\\nat 642 (describing the government’s interest as “preventing\\narmed mayhem”). And we have previously held that this in-\\nterest is “without doubt an important one.” Yancey, 621 F.3d\\nat 684; see also Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 673 (“[T]he govern-\\nment has a[] strong interest in preventing people who already\\nhave disrespected the law (including … felons …) from pos-\\nsessing guns.”).\\n Second, the government has shown that prohibiting even\\nnonviolent felons like Kanter from possessing firearms is sub-\\nstantially related to its interest in preventing gun violence. Be-\\nfore turning to the government’s statistical evidence estab-\\nlishing such a link, it is important to note that we do not write\\non a blank slate. In Yancey, we explained that “most felons are\\nnonviolent, but someone with a felony conviction on his rec-\\nord is more likely than a nonfelon to engage in illegal and vi-\\nolent gun use.” 621 F.3d at 685. In fact, the D.C. Circuit has\\nconcluded that “nonviolent offenders not only have a higher\\nrecidivism rate than the general population, but certain\\ngroups—such as property offenders—have an even higher re-\\ncidivism rate than violent offenders, and a large percentage of\\nthe crimes nonviolent recidivists later commit are violent.”\\nKaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see\\nEwing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 26 (2003) (citing P. Langan &\\nD. Levin, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Spe-\\ncial Report: Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, at 1 (June\\n2002)).\\n\\n22 No. 18-1478\\n\\n In addition to these judicial statements, the government\\npoints to several studies that have found a connection be-\\ntween nonviolent offenders like Kanter and a risk of future\\nviolent crime. For example, one study of 210,886 nonviolent\\noffenders found that about one in five were rearrested for a\\nviolent crime within three years of his or her release. See U.S.\\nDep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Profile of Nonviolent\\nOffenders Exiting State Prisons 2, 4 (2004). A separate study\\nfound that 28.5 percent of nonviolent property offenders—a\\ncategory that includes fraud convictions—were rearrested for\\na violent offense within five years of their release. See Mat-\\nthew R. Durose, et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice\\nStatistics, Recidivism of Prisoner Released in 30 States in 2005:\\nPatterns from 2005 to 2010, at 9 (2014). Yet another study found\\nthat “even handgun purchasers with only 1 prior misdemeanor\\nconviction and no convictions for offenses involving firearms\\nor violence were nearly 5 times as likely as those with no prior\\ncriminal history to be charged with new offenses involving\\nfirearms or violence.” Garen J. Wintemute, et al., Prior Misde-\\nmeanor Convictions as a Risk Factor for Later Violent and Firearm-\\nRelated Criminal Activity Among Authorized Purchasers of Hand-\\nguns, 280 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 2083, 2083 (1998) (emphasis\\nadded). 11\\n\\n\\n\\n 11 Even the study that Kanter relies upon found that approximately 40\\n\\npercent of individuals convicted of mail fraud had at least one additional\\narrest afterward. David Weisburd & Elin Waring, White-Collar Crime and\\nCriminal Careers 12, 29 (2004). The same study found that 24.5 percent of\\nall repeat white-collar offenders had at least one violent arrest on their\\nrecord. Id. at 45. In other words, “white-collar offenders often have multi-\\nple contacts with the criminal justice system” and “are unlikely to evi-\\ndence a high degree of specialization.” Id. at 49.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 23\\n\\n Kanter’s only response to the government’s statistical\\nstudies is that they are not tailored enough to his “individual\\ncircumstances.” Specifically, Kanter asks the Court “to con-\\nsider the fact that [he] is a first-time, non-violent offender with\\nno history of violence, firearm misuses, or subsequent convic-\\ntions.” Kanter also points out that he is “employed, married,\\nand does not use illicit drugs, all of which correspond with\\nlower rates of recidivism.” In short, Kanter argues that to\\nmeet its burden the government must show “a substantial re-\\nlationship between denying Mr. Kanter a firearm and further-\\ning the government’s objective of preventing firearm misuse\\nand armed violence.”\\n Kanter is mistaken. In Skoien we held that “Congress is not\\nlimited to case-by-case exclusions of persons who have been\\nshown to be untrustworthy with weapons, nor need these\\nlimits be established by evidence presented in court. Heller\\ndid not suggest that disqualifications would be effective only\\nif the statute’s benefits are first established by admissible evi-\\ndence.” 614 F.3d at 641. Of course, not all nonviolent felons\\nwill later commit a violent crime with a firearm. In that sense,\\nthe statute is “somewhat over-inclusive.” United States v.\\nChapman, 666 F.3d 220, 231 (4th Cir. 2012). However, that\\n“does not undermine [the statute’s] constitutionality … be-\\ncause it merely suggests that the fit is not a perfect one; a rea-\\nsonable fit is all that is required under intermediate scrutiny.”\\nId.; see also Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97–98 (analogizing to inter-\\nmediate scrutiny in First Amendment context).\\n Here, unlike the challengers in Binderup, who were con-\\nvicted of “non-serious” state misdemeanors and served no\\nprison time, Kanter was convicted of a serious federal felony\\nfor conduct broadly understood to be criminal, and he did not\\n\\n24 No. 18-1478\\n\\nface a minor sentence. 836 F.3d at 353 & n.6. Instead, Kanter is\\nmore akin to the challenger in Hamilton, whose fraud and\\ntheft convictions were “black-letter mala in se felonies reflect-\\ning grave misjudgment and maladjustment.” 848 F.3d at 627.\\nKanter’s crime—defrauding the federal government out of\\nhundreds of thousands of dollars—“reflect[s] significant dis-\\nrespect for the law.” Id. at 627 n.14; see also Medina, 913 F.3d at\\n160 (rejecting as-applied challenge where plaintiff was con-\\nvicted of “felony fraud—a serious crime, malum in se, that is\\npunishable in every state”). Thus, Kanter’s serious felony con-\\nviction prevents him from challenging the constitutionality of\\n§ 922(g)(1) as applied to him. 12\\n We are further assured in our decision because the highly-\\nindividualized approach Kanter proposes raises serious insti-\\ntutional and administrative concerns. See Torres-Rosario, 658\\nF.3d at 113 (“[S]uch an approach, applied to countless varia-\\ntions in individual circumstances, would obviously present\\nserious problems of administration, consistency and fair\\nwarning.”); see also Medina, 913 F.3d at 159–60 (rejecting argu-\\nment that “non-dangerous felons have a right to bear arms”\\n\\n\\n 12 We decline to revisit our comment in Williams “that § 922(g)(1) may\\nbe subject to an overbreadth challenge at some point because of its dis-\\nqualification of all felons, including those who are non-violent.” 616 F.3d\\nat 693. That statement was dictum, and we need not determine whether\\n§ 922(g)(1) may ever be subject to an as-applied challenge to reach our de-\\ncision in this case. There may be a case in the future that requires address-\\ning whether any individual may successfully bring an as-applied chal-\\nlenge to the statute, but Kanter’s is not that case. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma,\\n413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973) (“[A] person to whom a statute may constitution-\\nally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground\\nthat it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other\\nsituations not before the Court.”).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 25\\n\\nbecause “[u]sing an amorphous ‘dangerousness’ standard to\\ndelineate the scope of the Second Amendment would require\\nthe government to make case-by-case predictive judgments\\nbefore barring the possession of weapons”). As mentioned\\nabove, Congress previously allowed the ATF to restore a\\nfelon’s gun rights under § 925(c) if the agency determined that\\n“the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous\\nto public safety and that the granting of the relief would not\\nbe contrary to the public interest.” 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). How-\\never, Congress abandoned that approach after finding that\\nthe dangerousness inquiry was a “very difficult” and time-in-\\ntensive task, H.R. Rep. No. 102-618, at 14 (1992), and that “too\\nmany of these felons whose gun ownership rights were re-\\nstored went on to commit violent crimes with firearms.” H.R.\\nRep. No. 104-183, at 15 (1995). Congress’s failed attempt to\\ndelegate this investigative task to a law enforcement agency\\n“should have a profound impact on our tailoring analysis.”\\nBinderup, 836 F.3d at 403 (Fuentes, J., concurring in part, dis-\\nsenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment).\\n At bottom, the fact-specific inquiry Kanter asks this Court\\nto undertake is “a function best performed by the Executive,\\nwhich, unlike courts, is institutionally equipped for conduct-\\ning a neutral, wide-ranging investigation.” Bean, 537 U.S. at\\n77; see also Pontarelli v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 285 F.3d 216,\\n231 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Unlike ATF, courts possess neither the re-\\nsources to conduct the requisite investigations nor the exper-\\ntise to predict accurately which felons may carry guns with-\\nout threatening the public’s safety.”). Moreover, “[i]n the con-\\ntext of firearm regulation, the legislature is far better\\nequipped than the judiciary to make sensitive public policy\\njudgments (within constitutional limits) concerning the dan-\\ngers in carrying firearms and the manner to combat those\\n\\n26 No. 18-1478\\n\\nrisks.” Schrader, 704 F.3d at 990 (citation and internal quota-\\ntion marks omitted).\\n In sum, the government has established that the felon dis-\\npossession statutes are substantially related to the important\\ngovernmental objective of keeping firearms away those con-\\nvicted of serious crimes. Because Kanter was convicted of a\\nserious federal felony for conduct broadly understood to be\\ncriminal, his challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is\\nwithout merit.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\\ndistrict court.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 27\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1197,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4600566,"string":"4,600,566"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Annie Gaylor v. Steven Mnuchin"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1280"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"No. 16-cv-215 - Barbara B. Crabb, Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\nANNIE LAURIE GAYLOR, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\\n v.\\n\\nSTEVEN T. MNUCHIN, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellants,\\n\\n and\\nEDWARD PEECHER, et al.,\\n Intervening\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n\\n\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-215 — Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED OCTOBER 24, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Since the Founders crafted the Re-\\nligion Clauses of the First Amendment, courts have grappled\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nwith the “play in the joints” between them. Walz v. Tax Comm.\\nof City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). This case calls us to do\\nso once more. Freedom From Religion Foundation (“FFRF”)\\nclaims that a longstanding tax code exemption for religious\\nhousing, 26 U.S.C. § 107(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, vi-\\nolates the Establishment Clause. The district court agreed.\\nThe U.S. Treasury Department and several intervening reli-\\ngious organizations ask us to reinstate the exemption, assert-\\ning that the survival of many congregations hangs in the\\nbalance. We must decide whether excluding housing allow-\\nances from ministers’ taxable income is a law “respecting an\\nestablishment of religion” in violation of the First Amend-\\nment.\\n I.\\n A. History of § 107(2)\\n The facts before us are not in dispute. The Sixteenth\\nAmendment was ratified in 1913, authorizing Congress to\\nlevy an income tax. Congress imposed a federal income tax\\nthat same year and has levied one in various forms since. As\\na result, Congress and the Treasury Department needed to\\ndefine taxable “income.” A rule defining income that survives\\ntoday in the Internal Revenue Code is the “convenience-of-\\nthe-employer” doctrine. Under that doctrine, housing pro-\\nvided to employees for the convenience of their employer is\\nexempt from taxable income. Early examples of exclusions\\nunder the doctrine include housing provided to sailors living\\naboard ships, workers living in camps, and hospital employ-\\nees. But the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine was not\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 3\\n\\nmade available to ministers.1 In 1921, the Treasury Depart-\\nment announced ministers would be taxed on the fair rental\\nvalue of parsonages provided as living quarters. O.D. 862, 4\\nC.B. 85 (1921).\\n Congress reacted quickly and enacted a statute to exclude\\nchurch-provided parsonages from the taxable income of min-\\nisters. The Treasury Department interpreted this statute to\\napply only to housing provided in-kind; cash housing allow-\\nances were included in income. I.T. 1694, C.B. II-1, at 79 (1923).\\nThis continued for decades until in the 1950s several ministers\\nsuccessfully challenged the limitation to in-kind housing.2\\nCongress then enacted 26 U.S.C. § 107, which provides:\\n In the case of a minister of the gospel, gross in-\\n come does not include—\\n (1) the rental value of a home furnished to him\\n as part of his compensation; or\\n (2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of\\n his compensation, to the extent used by him to\\n rent or provide a home …\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 The text of the tax code refers specifically to “ministers of the gos-\\npel,” so we use that term. Courts have long held the provision applies to\\nreligious leaders of any denomination, regardless of formal title. See, e.g.,\\nSalkov v. Comm’r, 46 T.C. 190, 194 (1966) (holding a Jewish cantor was a\\n“minister of the gospel”).\\n 2 See, e.g., Williamson v. Comm’r, 224 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1955); Conning\\nv. Busey, 127 F. Supp. 958 (S.D. Ohio 1954); MacColl v. United States,\\n91 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1950).\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nSection 107(1) reauthorized the in-kind parsonage exemption\\nin place since the 1920s. Section 107(2) authorized the IRS to\\nalso exempt cash allowances from ministers’ taxable income.3\\n B. District Court Proceedings\\n FFRF describes itself as a “nonprophet nonprofit” organi-\\nzation that “[t]akes legal action challenging entanglement of\\nreligion and government, government endorsement or pro-\\nmotion of religion.” What Does the Foundation Do?, FREEDOM\\nFROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, https://ffrf.org/faq/item/15001-\\nwhat-does-the-foundation-do (last visited March 10, 2019).\\nSeeking to challenge both § 107(1) and § 107(2), FFRF paid its\\nco-presidents Annie Gaylor and Dan Barker a portion of their\\nsalaries in the form of a housing allowance. FFRF also paid\\nthis housing allowance to a former president of the organiza-\\ntion, Anne Nicol Gaylor (“Nicol Gaylor”).4 FFRF, Gaylor,\\nBarker, and Nicol Gaylor, none of whom meet the IRS’s defi-\\nnition of “minister,” then sued the Treasury Department,\\nclaiming § 107 violates the First Amendment because it con-\\nditions a tax benefit on religious affiliation. We dismissed this\\nchallenge for lack of standing because FFRF and its employees\\nnever applied for § 107(1) or § 107(2) exemptions, so they were\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3An amicus brief from the University of St. Thomas School of Law\\n(Minnesota) estimates that of the United States’ 384,000 congregations,\\n200,000 to 300,000 provide a housing allowance to their ministers under\\n26 U.S.C. § 107(2).\\n 4 Nicol Gaylor, Annie Gaylor’s mother and co-founder of FFRF,\\npassed away during the initial lawsuit filed by FFRF. Although the party\\nto this lawsuit is technically the Estate of Anne Nicol Gaylor, we refer to\\nher as “Nicol Gaylor” for brevity.\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 5\\n\\nnever denied them. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v.\\nLew, 773 F.3d 815, 825 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Lew”).\\n In response, Gaylor and Barker filed amended tax returns\\nfor 2012 and 2013 claiming refunds for their housing allow-\\nances under § 107(2); Nicol Gaylor did the same for 2013. The\\nIRS erroneously issued refunds to Gaylor and Barker for 2013\\nbut made no decisions on plaintiffs’ other claims. After more\\nthan six months without IRS action on plaintiffs’ claims, FFRF\\nand its employees brought this suit. The IRS then denied the\\n2012 refund claims because none of the claimants were minis-\\nters.\\n The Treasury Department moved to dismiss FFRF’s\\n§ 107(1) challenge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The\\ndistrict court granted the motion for the same reasons we\\narticulated in Lew: FFRF’s employees never claimed a § 107(1)\\nexemption. FFRF does not appeal that ruling. Later, the dis-\\ntrict court permitted several pastors who receive housing\\nallowances and their associated religious organizations to in-\\ntervene to defend § 107(2).5\\n The Treasury Department and intervenors moved for\\nsummary judgment. The district court denied their motions\\nand instead granted summary judgment to FFRF and its em-\\nployees. The court held that FFRF and its employees had\\nstanding to challenge § 107(2), and that that statute violates\\nthe Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Gaylor v.\\n\\n\\n 5 The intervening defendants are Bishop Edward Peecher, the Chicago\\n\\nEmbassy Church, Father Patrick Malone, the Holy Cross Church, the\\nDiocese of Chicago and Mid-America of the Russian Orthodox Church\\nOutside of Russia, and Pastor Christopher Butler. Each of the intervenors\\nreceive or provide housing allowances under § 107(2).\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nMnuchin, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1104 (W.D. Wis. 2017). The\\ncourt held that § 107(2) violated the secular purpose prong of\\nthe test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and\\nruled that the statute’s true purpose was to “provide aid to a\\ngroup of religious persons.” Gaylor, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 1099.\\nThe court rejected the argument that § 107(2) avoids excessive\\ngovernment entanglement with religion, because in the\\ncourt’s view “concerns about entanglement [do not] justify\\npreferential treatment for religious persons.” Id. The Treasury\\nDepartment and the intervenors appeal.\\n II.\\n Neither the Treasury Department nor the intervenors\\ndispute the district court’s ruling that FFRF has standing to\\nchallenge § 107(2). Nevertheless, even if the issue has not been\\nraised, if there is no Article III standing our court must dis-\\nmiss the suit. Diedrich v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 839 F.3d\\n583, 588 (7th Cir. 2016). We evaluate standing to determine\\nwhether FFRF resolved the deficiencies we noted in Lew.\\n To establish Article III standing, plaintiffs must show they\\nhave suffered “(1) a concrete and particularized ‘injury in fact’\\n(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the de-\\nfendant, and that is (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable\\njudicial decision.” Lew, 773 F.3d at 819 (citing Lujan v.\\nDefenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). To challenge\\nthe constitutionality of a tax provision, a plaintiff must have\\n“personally claimed and been denied the exemption.” Lew,\\n773 F.3d at 821.\\n An essential element of “injury in fact” is that the injury\\nbe “actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 7\\n\\nLujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotations and citations omit-\\nted). When FFRF filed this action, Gaylor and Barker had yet\\nto be denied a refund from their 2012 tax returns, and Nicol\\nGaylor had still, by the time of the district court’s decision,\\nreceived no answer to her 2013 refund request. Yet this does\\nnot necessarily mean FFRF lacked standing. Under 26 U.S.C.\\n§ 6532(a)(1), an income tax refund suit may be filed no earlier\\nthan six months after the refund claim was submitted. A stat-\\nute cannot “‘lower the threshold for standing below the min-\\nimum requirements imposed by the Constitution,’ but\\nCongress does have the power to ‘enact statutes creating legal\\nrights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no\\ninjury would exist without the statute.’” Sterk v. Redbox\\nAutomated Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 2014) (quot-\\ning Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 294 (7th\\nCir. 2000)).\\n The district court concluded it was reasonable to interpret\\n§ 6532(a)(1) as rendering a claim “effectively denied if the IRS\\ndoes not render a decision within six months.” Gaylor, 278\\nF. Supp. 3d at 1087. We agree. As the district court noted, pre-\\nventing a claimant from filing a refund suit until the IRS\\nresponded to the claim “would allow the IRS to deprive a\\nparty of standing indefinitely by withholding a decision.” Id.\\nat 1088. Several courts of appeals have cited the six-month fil-\\ning requirement approvingly. See, e.g., Fletcher v. United States,\\n452 Fed. App’x 547, 552 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[B]efore a taxpayer\\ncan bring a refund suit, he or she must … wait until either the\\nIRS denies the claim or six months have expired since filing\\nthe administrative claim.”); Dumont v. United States, 345 Fed.\\nApp’x 586, 590 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[A] suit … cannot be insti-\\ntuted until either the IRS denies the claim or six months pass\\nwithout its taking action.”); Sorenson v. Secʹy of Treasury of\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nU.S., 752 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1985), affʹd, 475 U.S. 851\\n(1986) (“The former section prohibits the courts from enter-\\ntaining any refund suit filed before the expiration of six\\nmonths from the date the claim for refund is filed … .”); see\\nalso Lew, 773 F.3d at 821 n.3 (“The plaintiffs could have … paid\\nincome tax on their housing allowance, claimed refunds from\\nthe IRS, and then sued if the IRS rejected or failed to act upon\\ntheir claims.”) (emphasis added).\\n Gaylor, Barker, and Nicol Gaylor have properly alleged a\\n“concrete, dollars-and-cents injury.” Lew, 773 F.3d at 821.\\n“[T]hey have incurred a cost or been denied a benefit on\\naccount of their religion [or lack thereof],” Arizona Christian\\nSch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 536 U.S. 125, 130 (2011), which con-\\nfers Article III standing. Because its members have standing\\nand the contested issue is germane to its organizational pur-\\npose, FFRF has organizational standing to sue as well. See\\nSierra Club v. United States E.P.A., 774 F.3d 383, 388–89 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (“‘An organization has standing to sue if (1) at least\\none of its members would otherwise have standing; (2) the\\ninterests at stake in the litigation are germane to the organiza-\\ntion’s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief\\nrequested requires an individual member’s participation in\\nthe lawsuit.’”) (quoting Sierra Club v. Franklin Cty. Power of Ill.\\nLLC, 546 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 2008)).\\n III.\\n This case comes to us after a grant of summary judgment,\\nso we assess the parties’ claims de novo. Freedom from Religion\\nFound., Inc. v. Concord Cmty. Sch., 885 F.3d 1038, 1045 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (“Concord”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 9\\n\\n Currently, Establishment Clause jurisprudence incorpo-\\nrates a number of tests when evaluating the constitutionality\\nof government action. Two are relevant to this case: the test\\nannounced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and the\\n“historical significance” test of Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572\\nU.S. 565, 576 (2014).6 Because the Supreme Court has not clar-\\nified which should take precedence, we evaluate FFRF’s\\nclaims under both tests and associated case law. See Concord,\\n885 F.3d at 1045 n.1 (“Indeed, there is debate among the Jus-\\ntices about the continuing validity of the endorsement\\ntest. … For now, we do not feel free to jettison that test alto-\\ngether … .”).7 We consider this case under the Lemon test in\\n\\n\\n 6 A third relevant to this challenge, the endorsement test, clarifies\\nLemon and is woven into our consideration of § 107(2) under the Lemon\\ntest, particularly under the second prong. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion\\nFound., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, Wis., 203 F.3d 487, 493 (7th Cir. 2000), as\\namended on denial of rehʹg and rehʹg en banc (Mar. 22, 2000) (“[T]he effect\\nprong of [the Lemon] test has been analyzed under the ‘perception of en-\\ndorsement’ test developed in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)\\n(O’Connor, J., concurring).”).\\n 7 An amicus brief filed by Wisconsin and fifteen other states notes the\\nSupreme Court has not applied the Lemon test to a religious freedom case\\nin many years. Even so, until the Supreme Court explicitly overturns\\nLemon we must apply it, as well as the other tests more recently relied\\nupon by the Court. Other circuit courts also apply multiple tests when\\nconsidering a challenge under the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., American\\nHumanist Assoc. v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 525–26 (5th Cir. 2017) (balancing\\nthe Lemon, endorsement, and coercion tests against the historical signifi-\\ncance test in Town of Greece); Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs,\\n788 F.3d 580, 586–87 (6th Cir. 2015) (setting forth Lemon, the endorsement\\ntest, and Town of Greece as the “three main jurisprudential threads” that\\nmust be woven together in assessing government action under the Estab-\\nlishment Clause).\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nthis Part of this opinion, and under the “historical signifi-\\ncance” test in Part IV.\\n Lemon summarized prior case law into a three-prong test:\\n“[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;\\nsecond, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither\\nadvances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not\\nfoster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”\\n403 U.S. at 612–13 (internal citations and quotations omitted).\\nThis test is not cumulative: if § 107(2) fails any of Lemon’s three\\nprongs, it violates the Establishment Clause.\\n A. Secular Legislative Purpose\\n We first examine whether § 107(2) has a secular legislative\\npurpose. “When the government acts with the ostensible and\\npredominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that\\ncentral Establishment Clause value of official religious neu-\\ntrality, there being no neutrality when the government’s os-\\ntensible object is to take sides.” McCreary Cty., Ky. v. Am. Civil\\nLiberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (citing Corpora-\\ntion of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day\\nSaints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987)). A statute is unconsti-\\ntutional under this test “only when … there [is] no question\\nthat the statute … was motivated wholly by religious consid-\\nerations.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984). The\\nTreasury Department and intervenors point to three secular\\nlegislative purposes of the statute: to eliminate discrimination\\nagainst ministers, to eliminate discrimination between minis-\\nters, and to avoid excessive entanglement with religion. FFRF\\ncounters that § 107(2) was passed to confer a government ben-\\nefit on religion, which necessarily violates the Establishment\\nClause.\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 11\\n\\n We will defer to a government’s sincere articulation of sec-\\nular purpose, so long as the plaintiffs have not proved that\\narticulation of purpose is a sham. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482\\nU.S. 578, 586–87 (1987) (“While the Court is normally defer-\\nential to a State’s articulation of a secular purpose, it is\\nrequired that the statement of such purpose be sincere and\\nnot a sham.”); Cohen v. City of Des Plaines, 8 F.3d 484, 489 (7th\\nCir. 1993) (“We will defer to a municipality’s sincere articula-\\ntion of a secular purpose.”). This does not mean “that the\\nlaw’s purpose must be unrelated to religion … .” Amos, 483\\nU.S. at 335. Instead, “the government lacks a secular purpose\\nunder Lemon only when ‘there is no question that the statute\\nor activity was motivated wholly by religious considera-\\ntions.’” Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Clarke, 588 F.3d 523,\\n527–28 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Books v. Elkhart Cty., 401 F.3d\\n857, 863 (7th Cir. 2005), in turn quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680).\\nSo we evaluate the purposes articulated by the Treasury De-\\npartment to determine whether they are sincere, or whether\\nthe government’s “‘actual purpose is to endorse or disap-\\nprove of religion.’” Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585 (quoting Lynch,\\n465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).\\n The Treasury Department first contends Congress passed\\n§ 107 to put ministers on equal footing with secular employ-\\nees receiving the same benefits; in other words, to eliminate\\ndiscrimination against ministers. The Treasury Department\\npoints to its 1921 decision to not exclude parsonages from tax-\\nable income and Congress’s quick passage of the parsonage\\nexemption, now codified at § 107(1), in response. The Treas-\\nury Department argues this is a secular purpose because it\\nsimply places religious employees on par with secular ones.\\nFFRF counters that the benefits given to ministers under\\n§ 107(2) are different—and better—than those the tax code\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\ngives to secular employees. FFRF argues putting ministers in\\na better position than secular employees promotes the dis-\\nsemination of religious ideas and thus cannot be secular.\\n To determine whether § 107(2) confers a special benefit, or\\nsimply integrates ministers into an existing tax system, we\\nmust delve into the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine.\\nThough the doctrine was originally developed in Treasury\\nDepartment regulations, it has since been codified in several\\nplaces. The principal statute is 26 U.S.C. § 119(a)(2) and ex-\\nempts meals and lodging furnished to employees if they meet\\nfive requirements: the meal or lodging is furnished (1) by an\\nemployer to an employee, (2) in kind (as opposed to in cash),\\n(3) on the business premises of the employer, (4) for the con-\\nvenience of the employer, and (5) as a condition of employ-\\nment. See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.119-1(b) (2018). This exemption\\napplies generally: any qualifying employee can rely on\\n§ 119(a)(2), including religious employees.8\\n The express proof requirements of § 119(a)(2) are relaxed\\nthroughout the tax code for various types of employees. Sec-\\ntion 119(c) exempts employees living in a foreign camp from\\nneeding to fulfill the “business premises” and “condition of\\nemployment” factors. Section 119(d) exempts certain teachers\\nand university employees from the convenience-of-the-\\nemployer doctrine altogether, and allows them to exclude\\nfrom taxable income the fair rental value of campus housing.\\n Myriad provisions in Title 26 employ this categorical\\napproach and exempt any form of housing benefits, whether\\n\\n\\n 8 For additional history on the development of the convenience-of-the-\\n\\nemployer doctrine, see Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 84–96 (1977).\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 13\\n\\nin cash or in kind: § 132 and § 162 exclude housing provided\\nto an employee away on business for less than a year; § 134\\nexcludes housing provided to current or former members of\\nthe military; § 911 excludes housing above a certain level pro-\\nvided to citizens or residents living abroad; § 912 excludes\\nhousing provided to government employees living abroad;\\nand, of course, § 107 excludes housing provided to ministers.\\nThese categorical exemptions allow hundreds of thousands of\\nemployees (including ministers) to receive tax-exempt\\nhousing every year without needing to satisfy the proof re-\\nquirements of § 119(a)(2).\\n These parallel provisions show an overarching arrange-\\nment in the tax code to exempt employer-provided housing\\nfor employees with certain job-related housing requirements.\\nCongress has exempted certain categories of employees from\\ncomplying with the specific requirements of § 119(a)(2) to\\nsimplify the application of the convenience-of-the-employer\\ndoctrine to those occupations. Section 107, including subsec-\\ntion (2), recognizes ministers often use their homes as part of\\ntheir ministry. This provision thus eases the administration of\\nthe convenience-of-the-employer doctrine by providing a\\nbright-line rule, instead of requiring that ministers and the\\nIRS repeatedly engage with a fact-intensive standard.\\n Reading § 107(2) in isolation from the other convenience-\\nof-the-employer provisions, and then highlighting the term\\n“minister,” could make the challenged statute appear to pro-\\nvide a government benefit exclusively to the religious. But\\nreading it in context, as we must, we see § 107(2) is simply one\\nof many per se rules that provide a tax exemption to employ-\\nees with work-related housing requirements. See ANTONIN\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nSCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 252 (2012) (“‘Sev-\\neral acts in pari materia, and relating to the same subject, are to\\nbe taken together, and compared in construction of them, be-\\ncause they are considered as having one object in view, and\\nas acting upon one system.’”) (quoting 1 James Kent, Commen-\\ntaries on American Law 433 (1826)); see also Mueller v. Allen, 463\\nU.S. 388, 396 (1983) (upholding Minnesota tax deduction for\\ntuition expenses, primarily used by parents of children at sec-\\ntarian schools, in part because the deduction was “only one\\namong many deductions—such as those for medical ex-\\npenses … and charitable contributions … available under the\\nMinnesota tax laws”). Congress’s policy choice to ease the ad-\\nministration of the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine by\\napplying a categorical exclusion is a secular purpose, not\\n“motivated wholly by religious considerations.” Lynch, 465\\nU.S. at 680.\\n FFRF argues considering the context of § 107(2) is inapt.\\nTo FFRF, the benefits the statute provides apply to a broader\\ncategory of persons—any minister, as opposed to any minis-\\nter that uses his or her home for religious purposes—than\\nother categorical housing exclusions in the tax code. The dis-\\ntrict court agreed, and found that § 107(2) is not analogous to\\nother bright-line housing benefit provisions in the tax code\\nbecause, in comparison, it is overinclusive. Gaylor, 278\\nF. Supp. 3d at 1095 (“[Sections 134, 911, and 912] relate to em-\\nployees whose housing is necessarily affected by their\\njobs. … Some ministers may be in a similar situation … but by\\nno means are all ministers so restricted … .”) (emphasis in\\noriginal).\\n It is not immediately apparent that § 107(2) is broader than\\nthe other categorical exemptions for employee housing. For\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 15\\n\\nexample, under 26 U.S.C. § 911, any person living abroad is\\npermitted to exclude or deduct housing expenses, regardless\\nwhether that person is living abroad at the behest of his or her\\nemployer.\\n But to the extent § 107(2) may be overinclusive, that alone\\ndoes not render the statute unconstitutional. FFRF’s argu-\\nment is a critique of categorical rules generally, rather than of\\n§ 107(2) specifically. “Read literally, rules are generally over-\\ninclusive and underinclusive if assessed by references to their\\npurposes. There is always a gap between the justification for\\na rule … and the rule itself.” Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with\\nRules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 990–91 (1995). No rule will per-\\nfectly address the concerns to which it is addressed, because\\n“[a]ll generalizations … are to some degree invalid, and hence\\nevery rule of law has a few corners that do not quite fit.” An-\\ntonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.\\n1175, 1177 (1989). Categorical rules sacrifice precision of result\\nfor administrative ease and equality of result. So it is not sur-\\nprising that § 107(2) covers some housing allowances that\\nmay be excluded under a case-by-case discretionary standard.\\nIn this respect, § 107(2) is not an outlier.\\n Important to our consideration, any imprecision does not\\nmake § 107(2) any less analogous to other “convenience-of-\\nthe-employer” related provisions in the tax code. Each covers\\na different subset of eligible taxpayers and activities, but they\\nall serve a common purpose: excluding from taxable income\\ncertain employment-related expenses. The constitutionality\\nof § 107(2) does not turn on which ministers the statute in-\\ncludes or excludes. See, e.g., Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 95–96\\n(“[A]rguments of equity have little force in construing the\\nboundaries of exclusions and deductions from income many\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nof which, to be administrable, must be arbitrary.”); Delong v.\\nDepʹt of Health & Human Servs., 264 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir.\\n2001) (“Like all bright line rules, [the statute] is both over-\\ninclusive and under-inclusive, but the imprecision of the stat-\\nute does not make it unconstitutional.”).\\n The second secular legislative purpose cited by the Treas-\\nury Department is elimination of discrimination between\\nministers. The government argues Congress passed § 107(2)\\nbecause providing the tax exemption only to ministers given\\nin-kind housing tended to exclude ministers of smaller or\\npoorer denominations. FFRF argues this is a sham and the\\ntrue justification was to subsidize religion, based on a state-\\nment made in the early 1950s by § 107(2)’s sponsoring repre-\\nsentative Peter Mack: “Certainly, in these times when we are\\nbeing threatened by a godless and antireligious world move-\\nment we should correct this discrimination against certain\\nministers who are carrying on such a courageous fight against\\nthis foe.” Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means:\\nStatement of Hon. Peter F. Mack, Jr., on H.R. 4275, Concerning the\\nTaxability of a Cash Allowance Paid to Clergymen in Lieu of\\nFurnishing Them a Dwelling, 83d. Cong. 1, at 1576 (June 9,\\n1953). The Treasury Department and intervenors respond by\\nquoting other statements by Representative Mack from the\\nsame hearing, such as that the bill was proposed because\\n“present tax laws are discriminatory among our clergy,” id. at\\n1574–75, and because he believed “a serious injustice [was]\\nbeing done to those ministers who must provide their own\\nhome,” id. at 1576.\\n This smattering of legislative history does not establish\\nRepresentative Mack’s motives in proposing the bill. Even if\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 17\\n\\nhis first quote above did so, the motivation of one representa-\\ntive in a House of 435 does not definitively reveal the impetus\\nbehind the bill’s passage. At the same hearing, other repre-\\nsentatives stated different motives. Speaking on the same pro-\\nposed provision, Representative Ray G. McKennan said the\\nchanges were proposed to “create an equitable condition for\\nministers similarly situated, and would probably eliminate\\ncourt action [by ministers suing for discrimination].” Id. at\\n1574.\\n The legislative record does not establish a singular motive\\nbehind § 107(2). Conflicting statements among members of\\nCongress—even by the same member—reveal the unreliabil-\\nity of this legislative history. Certainly, these statements do\\nnot render “a sham” the Treasury Department’s proffered\\npurpose of avoiding discrimination among religions. Cf.\\nEdwards, 482 U.S. at 586–87. As such, we take the government\\nat its word, which resolves this question. “The clearest com-\\nmand of the Establishment Clause is that one religious\\ndenomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”\\nLarson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). Avoidance of dis-\\ncrimination against certain religions in favor of others is a per-\\nmissible secular legislative purpose.\\n The third secular legislative purpose cited by the Treasury\\nDepartment is to avoid excessive entanglement with religion.\\nTo the government, Congress’s decision to exempt ministers\\nfrom the proof requirements of § 119(a)(2) prevents the IRS\\nfrom conducting intrusive inquiries into how religious organ-\\nizations use their facilities. See, e.g., Amos, 483 U.S. at 339\\n(“avoid[ing] … intrusive inquiry into religious belief …” pre-\\nvents entanglement). FFRF responds that § 107(2) does not\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\navoid such entanglement because the IRS must still adminis-\\nter a test to determine whether a taxpayer qualifies as a min-\\nister. FFRF argues this is as fact-intensive an audit as the\\ninquiry administered for the generally applicable statutory\\nexemption, § 119(a)(2).\\n On this entanglement question, two Supreme Court deci-\\nsions are particularly instructive. In Walz v. Tax Comm. of City\\nof N.Y., the Court upheld a New York property tax exemption\\nfor properties owned by churches and used exclusively for re-\\nligious worship. Walz disagreed with the lower court’s exam-\\nination of churches’ contribution to the social welfare to\\ndetermine whether the tax exemption had a secular purpose:\\n To give emphasis to so variable an aspect of the\\n work of religious bodies would introduce an\\n element of governmental evaluation and stand-\\n ards as to the worth of particular social welfare\\n programs, thus producing a kind of continuing\\n day-to-day relationship which the policy of\\n neutrality seeks to minimize.\\n397 U.S. at 674. Similarly, in Amos v. Corporation of the Presiding\\nBishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the\\nSupreme Court upheld a categorical exemption for religious\\norganizations from the provisions of Title VII of the Civil\\nRights Act of 1964. The opinion noted that, under Lemon, “it\\nis a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant\\ngovernmental interference with the ability of religious organ-\\nizations to define and carry out their religious missions.”\\nAmos, 483 U.S. at 335.\\n Any financial interaction between religion and govern-\\nment—like taxing a church, or exempting it from tax—entails\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 19\\n\\nsome degree of entanglement. But only excessive entangle-\\nment violates the Establishment Clause. See Walz, 307 U.S. at\\n674 (“We must also be sure that the end result—the effect—is\\nnot an excessive government entanglement with religion.”)\\nCrucial to our evaluation, the Supreme Court has already per-\\nmitted the level of entanglement incurred under § 107(2). In\\nHosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,\\n565 U.S. 171 (2012), the Court inquired into the facts underly-\\ning Hosanna-Tabor’s employment to determine whether she\\nwas a minister. Id. at 190–92. The IRS does the same under\\n§ 107(2) to determine whether a taxpayer qualifies as a minis-\\nter. The Court would not have so inquired if it violated the\\nEstablishment Clause.\\n In contrast, the application of § 119(a)(2) to ministers\\nwould entangle church and state far more than under\\n§ 107(2). For example, to determine what constitutes the busi-\\nness premises of the employer under § 119(a)(2), the IRS\\nwould have to determine what the “business” of the church is\\nand where and how far the “premises” of the church extend.\\nSee EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH 168–69 (2017).\\nTo do so, the IRS would need to interrogate ministers on the\\nspecifics of their worship activities, even determine which\\nactivities constitute “worship.” Such government inquiries\\ninto the internal affairs of churches to determine their eligibil-\\nity for tax relief have been rejected as excessive entanglement.\\nSee, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of Am. & Canada v.\\nMilivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708–20 (1976) (holding civil courts\\ncannot interfere with the rulings of ecclesiastical tribunals on\\nchurch affairs); Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475\\n(7th Cir. 2008) (“Congress does not want courts to interfere in\\nthe internal management of churches … .”).\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\n Worse, if subject to § 119(a)(2), congregations might alter\\ntheir religious activities to attempt to conform with its re-\\nquirements. Congress enacted § 107(2) in part to avoid that.\\nAnd congressional action “to minimize governmental inter-\\nference with the decision-making process in religions … does\\nnot violate the Establishment Clause.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 336\\n(internal citations and quotations omitted).\\n The categorical nature of § 107(2) also avoids excessive\\nentanglement by providing ministers and their churches cer-\\ntainty as to whether their housing allowances will be exempt\\nfrom tax. In Amos, the Supreme Court held “it is a significant\\nburden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of\\nsubstantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular\\ncourt will consider religious.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 336.\\n Recognizing the potentially excessive entanglement\\nthreatened by the application of § 119(a)(2) to ministers, Con-\\ngress enacted a less-entangling tax exemption. Seeking to\\navoid government entanglement is a secular legislative pur-\\npose under Lemon. See, e.g., Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives,\\n877 F.3d 1213, 1231 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court has\\nexpressly held that a purpose of avoiding government entan-\\nglement does not violate the Establishment Clause.”) (citing\\nAmos, 483 U.S. at 335). Because the government has articu-\\nlated not one, but three secular purposes, we conclude the\\nfirst prong of Lemon is satisfied.\\n B. Primary Effect of Advancing or Inhibiting Religion\\n The second prong of the Lemon test requires that a statute\\nhave a “principal or primary effect … that neither advances\\nnor inhibits religion.” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. “For a law to\\nhave forbidden ‘effects’ under Lemon, it must be fair to say\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 21\\n\\nthat the government itself has advanced religion through its\\nown activities and influence.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (emphasis\\nin original). This entails “sponsorship, financial support, and\\nactive involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”\\nWalz, 297 U.S. at 668.\\n FFRF contends the Supreme Court’s holdings in Amos and\\nWalz were superseded by Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion\\nin Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). That case\\nresolved an Establishment Clause challenge to a state tax ex-\\nemption for religious publications. To determine whether\\nJustice Brennan’s opinion controls, we examine the grounds\\nfor decision in Texas Monthly’s various concurrences. See\\nMarks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a frag-\\nmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explain-\\ning the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of\\nthe Court may be viewed as that position taken by those\\nMembers who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest\\ngrounds.”).\\n In Texas Monthly, Justice Brennan authored an opinion\\njoined by Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens and announced\\nthe result of the case; Justice White concurred in the result and\\nwrote separately; Justice Blackmun concurred in the result\\nand wrote for himself and Justice O’Connor; and Justice Scalia\\nfiled a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist\\nand Justice Kennedy. Justice Brennan’s opinion concluded\\nthat the tax exemption for religious publications violated the\\nEstablishment Clause because “[e]very tax exemption consti-\\ntutes a subsidy that affects nonqualifying taxpayers.” Texas\\nMonthly, 489 U.S. at 14 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). He\\nstated any subsidy directed “exclusively to religious organi-\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nzations that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause … can-\\nnot but convey a message of endorsement to slighted mem-\\nbers of the community.” Id. at 15 (internal citations and\\nquotations omitted).\\n The other opinions in Texas Monthly were narrower in\\nscope. Justice White’s concurrence reached the same result,\\nbut on an independent ground, the Press Clause. Justice\\nBlackmun’s concurrence agreed that the tax exemption vio-\\nlated the Establishment Clause, but did not adopt many of\\nJustice Brennan’s sweeping statements. Justice Blackmun\\nurged that the case be resolved narrowly and concluded only\\nthat “a tax exemption limited to the sale of religious literature\\nby religious organizations violates the Establishment Clause.”\\nId. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Be-\\ncause Justice Blackmun decided the case on Establishment\\nClause grounds,9 and on a narrower basis than Justice\\nBrennan’s opinion, under the Marks rule Justice Blackmun’s\\nconcurrence sets the rule of decision of Texas Monthly. His\\nconcurrence did not comment on what constitutes a forbid-\\nden effect under Lemon, so Texas Monthly does not alter our\\nanalysis of this second prong.\\n\\n\\n\\n 9 Even if Justice White’s opinion were based on narrower grounds\\nthan Justice Blackmun’s opinion, it reached the same result under a differ-\\nent constitutional clause. “Marks applies ‘only when one opinion is a log-\\nical subset of other, broader opinions.’” Gibson v. American Cyanamid Co.,\\n760 F.3d 600, 619 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781\\n(D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc)). Justice Blackmun’s opinion provided the fourth\\nand fifth votes in Texas Monthly and shared the “common denominator”\\nof resolving the issue under the Establishment Clause, so it controls. Gib-\\nson, 760 F.3d at 619 (quoting United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 884 (7th\\nCir. 2009)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 23\\n\\n With Walz and Amos still in effect, we evaluate forbidden\\neffects under their framework. FFRF contends a tax exemp-\\ntion for religion is identical to a government subsidy for reli-\\ngion. In economic terms, a subsidy and a tax exemption may\\nhave the same practical impact. See, e.g., Adam Chodorow,\\nThe Parsonage Allowance, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 854 (2018)\\n(“The claim that exemptions differ from direct subsidies for\\nEstablishment Clause purposes simply ignores economic re-\\nality.”). But the Supreme Court has already found a constitu-\\ntionally significant difference between the two on taxing\\nreligion. “The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship\\nsince the government does not transfer part of its revenue to\\nchurches but simply abstains from demanding that the\\nchurch support the state.” Walz, 397 U.S. at 675.10\\n Under Walz and Amos, then, § 107(2) does not advance re-\\nligion on behalf of the government. Providing a tax exemption\\ndoes not “connote[] sponsorship, financial support, and active\\ninvolvement of the [government] in religious activity” under\\nWalz, 397 U.S. at 668; see also Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (“[W]e do\\nnot see how any advancement of religion achieved by the [ex-\\nempt religious organization] can be fairly attributed to the\\nGovernment, as opposed to the Church.”).\\n Under these precedents, the primary effect of § 107(2) is\\nnot to advance religion on behalf of the government, but to\\n\\n 10 The Supreme Court tacitly reaffirmed this approach in its standing\\ndiscussion in Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 536 U.S. 125\\n(2011). There, it held taxpayers had no standing to challenge a tax credit\\ndirected primarily towards sectarian schools because “[w]hen the govern-\\nment declines to impose a tax, … there is no … connection between dis-\\nsenting taxpayer and alleged establishment.” Id. at 142.\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\n“allow[] churches to advance religion, which is their very pur-\\npose.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (emphasis in original). So § 107(2)\\npasses the second prong of Lemon.\\n C. Excessive Entanglement with Religion\\n The third prong of the Lemon test is whether the state “fos-\\nter[s] ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”\\nLemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674). We have\\naddressed this prong in Part III.A above. Because some level\\nof church-state interaction is unavoidable, “[e]ntanglement is\\na question of kind and degree.” Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684.\\nSection 107(2) avoids government inquiry into the use of a\\nminister’s home, but it still requires the IRS to determine who\\nqualifies as a minister eligible for the exemption. Even if the\\nIRS’s test for who qualifies as a minister involves entangle-\\nment, it is of a nature approved by the Supreme Court in\\nHosanna-Tabor. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190–95 (engag-\\ning in a fact-bound analysis to determine whether the peti-\\ntioner qualified as a minister). The alternative would be to\\nforce ministers to comply with the far more detailed and par-\\nticular, and thus more entangling, requirements of § 119(a)(2).\\n In answer to these concerns, Congress chose to enact\\n§ 107(2). Legislative determinations about the Establishment\\nClause, while not binding, are entitled to deference. “We in\\nthe Judiciary must be wary of interpreting [the Religion]\\nClauses in a manner that negates the legislative role alto-\\ngether.” Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concur-\\nring). Legislative deference is particularly great for\\nclassifications in tax legislation. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with\\nRepresentation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1997) (“Legis-\\nlatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifica-\\ntions and distinctions in tax statutes.”); Madden v. Kentucky,\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 25\\n\\n309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (holding that for tax classifications chal-\\nlenged under the Fourteenth Amendment, “the presumption\\nof constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit\\ndemonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive\\ndiscrimination against particular persons and classes”).\\nCongress decided § 107(2) is the less entangling option, so we\\nwill not disturb it.\\n We conclude § 107(2) has a secular legislative purpose, its\\nprincipal effect is neither to endorse nor to inhibit religion,\\nand it does not cause excessive government entanglement.\\nHere, “[t]here is no genuine nexus between tax exemption\\nand establishment of religion.” Walz, 397 U.S. at 675. Section\\n107(2), then, does not violate the Establishment Clause under\\nthe Lemon test.\\n IV.\\n We next examine whether § 107(2) passes the historical\\nsignificance test.11 The Supreme Court has held “the Estab-\\nlishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference to histori-\\ncal practices and understandings.’” Town of Greece v. Galloway,\\n572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014) (quoting Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil\\n\\n\\n 11 FFRF and amici curiae supporting appellees’ position offer no ar-\\nguments under the historical significance test, except to assert the test ap-\\nplies only to legislative prayer. We find no such limitation. Though Town\\nof Greece addressed legislative prayer, it stated that “the Establishment\\nClause must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and under-\\nstandings.’” 572 U.S. at 576 (quoting Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670\\n(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)). This\\nlanguage does not limit the application of the Town of Greece standard to\\nconstitutional challenges to legislative prayer. As this part discusses, other\\nSupreme Court cases have examined relevant history as to monuments as\\nwell as the ministerial exception.\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nLiberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670\\n(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-\\nsenting in part)). This fact-bound test was developed in three\\ncases. First, in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality\\nopinion), the Court considered whether a monument\\ninscribed with the Ten Commandments on Texas government\\nproperty violated the Establishment Clause. Van Orden criti-\\ncized the Lemon test for ignoring the “strong role played by\\nreligion and religious traditions throughout our Nation’s\\nhistory.” Id. at 683. Instead, the Court reviewed a number of\\nhistorical examples of governments referencing God and dis-\\nplaying the Ten Commandments without issue. On that basis,\\nthe Court held the monument did not violate the Establish-\\nment Clause. Id. at 692.\\n Next, in Hosanna-Tabor, a unanimous Supreme Court held\\nthat the Establishment Clause prevents governments from in-\\nterfering with the decision of a religious group to terminate\\none of its ministers. In so deciding, the opinion explored the\\nhistory of church-state relations in the United States and Eng-\\nland, back to the Magna Carta. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182.\\nFrom that history, the Court determined that the First\\nAmendment was adopted in part to prevent “the new Federal\\nGovernment—unlike the English Crown—[from a] role in fill-\\ning ecclesiastical offices.” Id. at 184. This determination\\nformed the basis of the Court’s decision.\\n Finally, in Town of Greece the Supreme Court applied the\\nhistorical significance test when it held legislative prayer does\\nnot violate the Establishment Clause. The Court held that\\n“[a]ny test the Court adopts [for the Establishment Clause]\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 27\\n\\nmust acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Fram-\\ners and has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political\\nchange.” Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577.\\n We now apply the historical significance test to this case.\\nFFRF offers no evidence that provisions like § 107(2) were his-\\ntorically viewed as an establishment of religion. The govern-\\nment and intervenors, and amici curiae supporting their\\nposition, have provided substantial evidence of a lengthy\\ntradition of tax exemptions for religion, particularly for\\nchurch-owned properties. For over two centuries, the states\\nhave implemented church property tax exemptions in various\\nforms. See John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property:\\nHistorical Anomaly or Valid Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL.\\nL. REV. 363, 380 (1991) (“The colonial law exemption of church\\nproperty continued largely uninterrupted in the early dec-\\nades of the American republic.”); see also id. at 389–95 (detail-\\ning state protections for religious tax exemptions from the late\\n19th to early 20th centuries). When challenged on establish-\\nment grounds, such tax exemptions typically have been up-\\nheld. See, e.g., Trustees of Griswold College v. State, 46 Iowa 275,\\n282 (1877) (ruling the state constitution’s Establishment\\nClause “does not [implicate] the exemption from taxation of\\nsuch church property as the legislature may think proper”).\\n Congress has enacted federal tax exemptions for religious\\norganizations as far back as 1802, when it permitted the\\nCounty of Alexandria (then under federal control) to exempt\\nchurch property from taxation, see 7 Cong. Ch. 53, May 3,\\n1802, 2 Stat. 194, and as recently as 2002, the last time § 107\\nwas amended. See Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification\\nAct of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–181, 116 Stat. 583. As early as\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\n1885, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged and accepted re-\\nligious property tax exemptions in Gibbons v. District of\\nColumbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886), “reflecting more than a century\\nof our history and uninterrupted practice.” Walz, 397 U.S. at\\n680. Today, more than 2,600 federal and state tax laws provide\\nreligious exemptions. NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER,\\nPOLITICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT: PROVOCATIVE FIRST\\nAMENDMENT CONFLICTS 43 (2011).\\n The district court distinguished § 107(2) from this long\\nand continuing historical tradition of property tax exemp-\\ntions by noting the statute is an income tax exemption. We\\nfind this too fine a distinction, as it ignores the impact of the\\nSixteenth Amendment. Before 1913, Congress could not con-\\nstitutionally tax housing provided to ministers as part of their\\nincome. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601,\\n637 (1895) (invalidating a state income tax). Within a few\\nyears of income becoming taxable, Congress moved to\\nexclude parsonages from income, and a few decades later ex-\\ncluded cash housing allowances as well. Congress was con-\\ntinuing its “historical practice[]” of exempting certain church\\nresources from taxation. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576. This\\nendeavor limits entanglement between church and state, see\\nsupra at Part III.C. Given this history, we conclude § 107(2)\\ndoes not violate the Establishment Clause under the historical\\nsignificance test.\\n\\n V.\\n FFRF claims § 107(2) renders unto God that which is\\nCaesar’s. But this tax provision falls into the play between the\\njoints of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment\\nClause: neither commanded by the former, nor proscribed by\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 29\\n\\nthe latter. We conclude § 107(2) is constitutional. The\\njudgment of the district court is REVERSED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4377819/\", \"author_raw\": \"No. 16-cv-215 - Barbara B. Crabb, Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4600566/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Annie Gaylor v. Steven Mnuchin\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\nANNIE LAURIE GAYLOR, et al.,\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\n v.\n\nSTEVEN T. MNUCHIN, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellants,\n\n and\nEDWARD PEECHER, et al.,\n Intervening\n Defendants-Appellants.\n\n\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 16-cv-215 — Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED OCTOBER 24, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 15, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Since the Founders crafted the Re-\nligion Clauses of the First Amendment, courts have grappled\n\f2 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\nwith the “play in the joints” between them. Walz v. Tax Comm.\nof City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). This case calls us to do\nso once more. Freedom From Religion Foundation (“FFRF”)\nclaims that a longstanding tax code exemption for religious\nhousing, 26 U.S.C. § 107(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, vi-\nolates the Establishment Clause. The district court agreed.\nThe U.S. Treasury Department and several intervening reli-\ngious organizations ask us to reinstate the exemption, assert-\ning that the survival of many congregations hangs in the\nbalance. We must decide whether excluding housing allow-\nances from ministers’ taxable income is a law “respecting an\nestablishment of religion” in violation of the First Amend-\nment.\n I.\n A. History of § 107(2)\n The facts before us are not in dispute. The Sixteenth\nAmendment was ratified in 1913, authorizing Congress to\nlevy an income tax. Congress imposed a federal income tax\nthat same year and has levied one in various forms since. As\na result, Congress and the Treasury Department needed to\ndefine taxable “income.” A rule defining income that survives\ntoday in the Internal Revenue Code is the “convenience-of-\nthe-employer” doctrine. Under that doctrine, housing pro-\nvided to employees for the convenience of their employer is\nexempt from taxable income. Early examples of exclusions\nunder the doctrine include housing provided to sailors living\naboard ships, workers living in camps, and hospital employ-\nees. But the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine was not\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 3\n\nmade available to ministers.1 In 1921, the Treasury Depart-\nment announced ministers would be taxed on the fair rental\nvalue of parsonages provided as living quarters. O.D. 862, 4\nC.B. 85 (1921).\n Congress reacted quickly and enacted a statute to exclude\nchurch-provided parsonages from the taxable income of min-\nisters. The Treasury Department interpreted this statute to\napply only to housing provided in-kind; cash housing allow-\nances were included in income. I.T. 1694, C.B. II-1, at 79 (1923).\nThis continued for decades until in the 1950s several ministers\nsuccessfully challenged the limitation to in-kind housing.2\nCongress then enacted 26 U.S.C. § 107, which provides:\n In the case of a minister of the gospel, gross in-\n come does not include—\n (1) the rental value of a home furnished to him\n as part of his compensation; or\n (2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of\n his compensation, to the extent used by him to\n rent or provide a home …\n\n\n\n\n 1 The text of the tax code refers specifically to “ministers of the gos-\npel,” so we use that term. Courts have long held the provision applies to\nreligious leaders of any denomination, regardless of formal title. See, e.g.,\nSalkov v. Comm’r, 46 T.C. 190, 194 (1966) (holding a Jewish cantor was a\n“minister of the gospel”).\n 2 See, e.g., Williamson v. Comm’r, 224 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1955); Conning\nv. Busey, 127 F. Supp. 958 (S.D. Ohio 1954); MacColl v. United States,\n91 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1950).\n\f4 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\nSection 107(1) reauthorized the in-kind parsonage exemption\nin place since the 1920s. Section 107(2) authorized the IRS to\nalso exempt cash allowances from ministers’ taxable income.3\n B. District Court Proceedings\n FFRF describes itself as a “nonprophet nonprofit” organi-\nzation that “[t]akes legal action challenging entanglement of\nreligion and government, government endorsement or pro-\nmotion of religion.” What Does the Foundation Do?, FREEDOM\nFROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, https://ffrf.org/faq/item/15001-\nwhat-does-the-foundation-do (last visited March 10, 2019).\nSeeking to challenge both § 107(1) and § 107(2), FFRF paid its\nco-presidents Annie Gaylor and Dan Barker a portion of their\nsalaries in the form of a housing allowance. FFRF also paid\nthis housing allowance to a former president of the organiza-\ntion, Anne Nicol Gaylor (“Nicol Gaylor”).4 FFRF, Gaylor,\nBarker, and Nicol Gaylor, none of whom meet the IRS’s defi-\nnition of “minister,” then sued the Treasury Department,\nclaiming § 107 violates the First Amendment because it con-\nditions a tax benefit on religious affiliation. We dismissed this\nchallenge for lack of standing because FFRF and its employees\nnever applied for § 107(1) or § 107(2) exemptions, so they were\n\n\n\n\n 3An amicus brief from the University of St. Thomas School of Law\n(Minnesota) estimates that of the United States’ 384,000 congregations,\n200,000 to 300,000 provide a housing allowance to their ministers under\n26 U.S.C. § 107(2).\n 4 Nicol Gaylor, Annie Gaylor’s mother and co-founder of FFRF,\npassed away during the initial lawsuit filed by FFRF. Although the party\nto this lawsuit is technically the Estate of Anne Nicol Gaylor, we refer to\nher as “Nicol Gaylor” for brevity.\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 5\n\nnever denied them. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v.\nLew, 773 F.3d 815, 825 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Lew”).\n In response, Gaylor and Barker filed amended tax returns\nfor 2012 and 2013 claiming refunds for their housing allow-\nances under § 107(2); Nicol Gaylor did the same for 2013. The\nIRS erroneously issued refunds to Gaylor and Barker for 2013\nbut made no decisions on plaintiffs’ other claims. After more\nthan six months without IRS action on plaintiffs’ claims, FFRF\nand its employees brought this suit. The IRS then denied the\n2012 refund claims because none of the claimants were minis-\nters.\n The Treasury Department moved to dismiss FFRF’s\n§ 107(1) challenge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The\ndistrict court granted the motion for the same reasons we\narticulated in Lew: FFRF’s employees never claimed a § 107(1)\nexemption. FFRF does not appeal that ruling. Later, the dis-\ntrict court permitted several pastors who receive housing\nallowances and their associated religious organizations to in-\ntervene to defend § 107(2).5\n The Treasury Department and intervenors moved for\nsummary judgment. The district court denied their motions\nand instead granted summary judgment to FFRF and its em-\nployees. The court held that FFRF and its employees had\nstanding to challenge § 107(2), and that that statute violates\nthe Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Gaylor v.\n\n\n 5 The intervening defendants are Bishop Edward Peecher, the Chicago\n\nEmbassy Church, Father Patrick Malone, the Holy Cross Church, the\nDiocese of Chicago and Mid-America of the Russian Orthodox Church\nOutside of Russia, and Pastor Christopher Butler. Each of the intervenors\nreceive or provide housing allowances under § 107(2).\n\f6 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\nMnuchin, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1104 (W.D. Wis. 2017). The\ncourt held that § 107(2) violated the secular purpose prong of\nthe test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and\nruled that the statute’s true purpose was to “provide aid to a\ngroup of religious persons.” Gaylor, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 1099.\nThe court rejected the argument that § 107(2) avoids excessive\ngovernment entanglement with religion, because in the\ncourt’s view “concerns about entanglement [do not] justify\npreferential treatment for religious persons.” Id. The Treasury\nDepartment and the intervenors appeal.\n II.\n Neither the Treasury Department nor the intervenors\ndispute the district court’s ruling that FFRF has standing to\nchallenge § 107(2). Nevertheless, even if the issue has not been\nraised, if there is no Article III standing our court must dis-\nmiss the suit. Diedrich v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 839 F.3d\n583, 588 (7th Cir. 2016). We evaluate standing to determine\nwhether FFRF resolved the deficiencies we noted in Lew.\n To establish Article III standing, plaintiffs must show they\nhave suffered “(1) a concrete and particularized ‘injury in fact’\n(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the de-\nfendant, and that is (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable\njudicial decision.” Lew, 773 F.3d at 819 (citing Lujan v.\nDefenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). To challenge\nthe constitutionality of a tax provision, a plaintiff must have\n“personally claimed and been denied the exemption.” Lew,\n773 F.3d at 821.\n An essential element of “injury in fact” is that the injury\nbe “actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 7\n\nLujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotations and citations omit-\nted). When FFRF filed this action, Gaylor and Barker had yet\nto be denied a refund from their 2012 tax returns, and Nicol\nGaylor had still, by the time of the district court’s decision,\nreceived no answer to her 2013 refund request. Yet this does\nnot necessarily mean FFRF lacked standing. Under 26 U.S.C.\n§ 6532(a)(1), an income tax refund suit may be filed no earlier\nthan six months after the refund claim was submitted. A stat-\nute cannot “‘lower the threshold for standing below the min-\nimum requirements imposed by the Constitution,’ but\nCongress does have the power to ‘enact statutes creating legal\nrights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no\ninjury would exist without the statute.’” Sterk v. Redbox\nAutomated Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 2014) (quot-\ning Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 294 (7th\nCir. 2000)).\n The district court concluded it was reasonable to interpret\n§ 6532(a)(1) as rendering a claim “effectively denied if the IRS\ndoes not render a decision within six months.” Gaylor, 278\nF. Supp. 3d at 1087. We agree. As the district court noted, pre-\nventing a claimant from filing a refund suit until the IRS\nresponded to the claim “would allow the IRS to deprive a\nparty of standing indefinitely by withholding a decision.” Id.\nat 1088. Several courts of appeals have cited the six-month fil-\ning requirement approvingly. See, e.g., Fletcher v. United States,\n452 Fed. App’x 547, 552 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[B]efore a taxpayer\ncan bring a refund suit, he or she must … wait until either the\nIRS denies the claim or six months have expired since filing\nthe administrative claim.”); Dumont v. United States, 345 Fed.\nApp’x 586, 590 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[A] suit … cannot be insti-\ntuted until either the IRS denies the claim or six months pass\nwithout its taking action.”); Sorenson v. Secʹy of Treasury of\n\f8 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\nU.S., 752 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1985), affʹd, 475 U.S. 851\n(1986) (“The former section prohibits the courts from enter-\ntaining any refund suit filed before the expiration of six\nmonths from the date the claim for refund is filed … .”); see\nalso Lew, 773 F.3d at 821 n.3 (“The plaintiffs could have … paid\nincome tax on their housing allowance, claimed refunds from\nthe IRS, and then sued if the IRS rejected or failed to act upon\ntheir claims.”) (emphasis added).\n Gaylor, Barker, and Nicol Gaylor have properly alleged a\n“concrete, dollars-and-cents injury.” Lew, 773 F.3d at 821.\n“[T]hey have incurred a cost or been denied a benefit on\naccount of their religion [or lack thereof],” Arizona Christian\nSch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 536 U.S. 125, 130 (2011), which con-\nfers Article III standing. Because its members have standing\nand the contested issue is germane to its organizational pur-\npose, FFRF has organizational standing to sue as well. See\nSierra Club v. United States E.P.A., 774 F.3d 383, 388–89 (7th\nCir. 2014) (“‘An organization has standing to sue if (1) at least\none of its members would otherwise have standing; (2) the\ninterests at stake in the litigation are germane to the organiza-\ntion’s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief\nrequested requires an individual member’s participation in\nthe lawsuit.’”) (quoting Sierra Club v. Franklin Cty. Power of Ill.\nLLC, 546 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 2008)).\n III.\n This case comes to us after a grant of summary judgment,\nso we assess the parties’ claims de novo. Freedom from Religion\nFound., Inc. v. Concord Cmty. Sch., 885 F.3d 1038, 1045 (7th Cir.\n2018) (“Concord”).\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 9\n\n Currently, Establishment Clause jurisprudence incorpo-\nrates a number of tests when evaluating the constitutionality\nof government action. Two are relevant to this case: the test\nannounced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and the\n“historical significance” test of Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572\nU.S. 565, 576 (2014).6 Because the Supreme Court has not clar-\nified which should take precedence, we evaluate FFRF’s\nclaims under both tests and associated case law. See Concord,\n885 F.3d at 1045 n.1 (“Indeed, there is debate among the Jus-\ntices about the continuing validity of the endorsement\ntest. … For now, we do not feel free to jettison that test alto-\ngether … .”).7 We consider this case under the Lemon test in\n\n\n 6 A third relevant to this challenge, the endorsement test, clarifies\nLemon and is woven into our consideration of § 107(2) under the Lemon\ntest, particularly under the second prong. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion\nFound., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, Wis., 203 F.3d 487, 493 (7th Cir. 2000), as\namended on denial of rehʹg and rehʹg en banc (Mar. 22, 2000) (“[T]he effect\nprong of [the Lemon] test has been analyzed under the ‘perception of en-\ndorsement’ test developed in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)\n(O’Connor, J., concurring).”).\n 7 An amicus brief filed by Wisconsin and fifteen other states notes the\nSupreme Court has not applied the Lemon test to a religious freedom case\nin many years. Even so, until the Supreme Court explicitly overturns\nLemon we must apply it, as well as the other tests more recently relied\nupon by the Court. Other circuit courts also apply multiple tests when\nconsidering a challenge under the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., American\nHumanist Assoc. v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 525–26 (5th Cir. 2017) (balancing\nthe Lemon, endorsement, and coercion tests against the historical signifi-\ncance test in Town of Greece); Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs,\n788 F.3d 580, 586–87 (6th Cir. 2015) (setting forth Lemon, the endorsement\ntest, and Town of Greece as the “three main jurisprudential threads” that\nmust be woven together in assessing government action under the Estab-\nlishment Clause).\n\f10 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\nthis Part of this opinion, and under the “historical signifi-\ncance” test in Part IV.\n Lemon summarized prior case law into a three-prong test:\n“[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;\nsecond, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither\nadvances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not\nfoster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”\n403 U.S. at 612–13 (internal citations and quotations omitted).\nThis test is not cumulative: if § 107(2) fails any of Lemon’s three\nprongs, it violates the Establishment Clause.\n A. Secular Legislative Purpose\n We first examine whether § 107(2) has a secular legislative\npurpose. “When the government acts with the ostensible and\npredominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that\ncentral Establishment Clause value of official religious neu-\ntrality, there being no neutrality when the government’s os-\ntensible object is to take sides.” McCreary Cty., Ky. v. Am. Civil\nLiberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (citing Corpora-\ntion of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day\nSaints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987)). A statute is unconsti-\ntutional under this test “only when … there [is] no question\nthat the statute … was motivated wholly by religious consid-\nerations.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984). The\nTreasury Department and intervenors point to three secular\nlegislative purposes of the statute: to eliminate discrimination\nagainst ministers, to eliminate discrimination between minis-\nters, and to avoid excessive entanglement with religion. FFRF\ncounters that § 107(2) was passed to confer a government ben-\nefit on religion, which necessarily violates the Establishment\nClause.\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 11\n\n We will defer to a government’s sincere articulation of sec-\nular purpose, so long as the plaintiffs have not proved that\narticulation of purpose is a sham. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482\nU.S. 578, 586–87 (1987) (“While the Court is normally defer-\nential to a State’s articulation of a secular purpose, it is\nrequired that the statement of such purpose be sincere and\nnot a sham.”); Cohen v. City of Des Plaines, 8 F.3d 484, 489 (7th\nCir. 1993) (“We will defer to a municipality’s sincere articula-\ntion of a secular purpose.”). This does not mean “that the\nlaw’s purpose must be unrelated to religion … .” Amos, 483\nU.S. at 335. Instead, “the government lacks a secular purpose\nunder Lemon only when ‘there is no question that the statute\nor activity was motivated wholly by religious considera-\ntions.’” Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Clarke, 588 F.3d 523,\n527–28 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Books v. Elkhart Cty., 401 F.3d\n857, 863 (7th Cir. 2005), in turn quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680).\nSo we evaluate the purposes articulated by the Treasury De-\npartment to determine whether they are sincere, or whether\nthe government’s “‘actual purpose is to endorse or disap-\nprove of religion.’” Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585 (quoting Lynch,\n465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).\n The Treasury Department first contends Congress passed\n§ 107 to put ministers on equal footing with secular employ-\nees receiving the same benefits; in other words, to eliminate\ndiscrimination against ministers. The Treasury Department\npoints to its 1921 decision to not exclude parsonages from tax-\nable income and Congress’s quick passage of the parsonage\nexemption, now codified at § 107(1), in response. The Treas-\nury Department argues this is a secular purpose because it\nsimply places religious employees on par with secular ones.\nFFRF counters that the benefits given to ministers under\n§ 107(2) are different—and better—than those the tax code\n\f12 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\ngives to secular employees. FFRF argues putting ministers in\na better position than secular employees promotes the dis-\nsemination of religious ideas and thus cannot be secular.\n To determine whether § 107(2) confers a special benefit, or\nsimply integrates ministers into an existing tax system, we\nmust delve into the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine.\nThough the doctrine was originally developed in Treasury\nDepartment regulations, it has since been codified in several\nplaces. The principal statute is 26 U.S.C. § 119(a)(2) and ex-\nempts meals and lodging furnished to employees if they meet\nfive requirements: the meal or lodging is furnished (1) by an\nemployer to an employee, (2) in kind (as opposed to in cash),\n(3) on the business premises of the employer, (4) for the con-\nvenience of the employer, and (5) as a condition of employ-\nment. See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.119-1(b) (2018). This exemption\napplies generally: any qualifying employee can rely on\n§ 119(a)(2), including religious employees.8\n The express proof requirements of § 119(a)(2) are relaxed\nthroughout the tax code for various types of employees. Sec-\ntion 119(c) exempts employees living in a foreign camp from\nneeding to fulfill the “business premises” and “condition of\nemployment” factors. Section 119(d) exempts certain teachers\nand university employees from the convenience-of-the-\nemployer doctrine altogether, and allows them to exclude\nfrom taxable income the fair rental value of campus housing.\n Myriad provisions in Title 26 employ this categorical\napproach and exempt any form of housing benefits, whether\n\n\n 8 For additional history on the development of the convenience-of-the-\n\nemployer doctrine, see Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 84–96 (1977).\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 13\n\nin cash or in kind: § 132 and § 162 exclude housing provided\nto an employee away on business for less than a year; § 134\nexcludes housing provided to current or former members of\nthe military; § 911 excludes housing above a certain level pro-\nvided to citizens or residents living abroad; § 912 excludes\nhousing provided to government employees living abroad;\nand, of course, § 107 excludes housing provided to ministers.\nThese categorical exemptions allow hundreds of thousands of\nemployees (including ministers) to receive tax-exempt\nhousing every year without needing to satisfy the proof re-\nquirements of § 119(a)(2).\n These parallel provisions show an overarching arrange-\nment in the tax code to exempt employer-provided housing\nfor employees with certain job-related housing requirements.\nCongress has exempted certain categories of employees from\ncomplying with the specific requirements of § 119(a)(2) to\nsimplify the application of the convenience-of-the-employer\ndoctrine to those occupations. Section 107, including subsec-\ntion (2), recognizes ministers often use their homes as part of\ntheir ministry. This provision thus eases the administration of\nthe convenience-of-the-employer doctrine by providing a\nbright-line rule, instead of requiring that ministers and the\nIRS repeatedly engage with a fact-intensive standard.\n Reading § 107(2) in isolation from the other convenience-\nof-the-employer provisions, and then highlighting the term\n“minister,” could make the challenged statute appear to pro-\nvide a government benefit exclusively to the religious. But\nreading it in context, as we must, we see § 107(2) is simply one\nof many per se rules that provide a tax exemption to employ-\nees with work-related housing requirements. See ANTONIN\n\f14 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\nSCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 252 (2012) (“‘Sev-\neral acts in pari materia, and relating to the same subject, are to\nbe taken together, and compared in construction of them, be-\ncause they are considered as having one object in view, and\nas acting upon one system.’”) (quoting 1 James Kent, Commen-\ntaries on American Law 433 (1826)); see also Mueller v. Allen, 463\nU.S. 388, 396 (1983) (upholding Minnesota tax deduction for\ntuition expenses, primarily used by parents of children at sec-\ntarian schools, in part because the deduction was “only one\namong many deductions—such as those for medical ex-\npenses … and charitable contributions … available under the\nMinnesota tax laws”). Congress’s policy choice to ease the ad-\nministration of the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine by\napplying a categorical exclusion is a secular purpose, not\n“motivated wholly by religious considerations.” Lynch, 465\nU.S. at 680.\n FFRF argues considering the context of § 107(2) is inapt.\nTo FFRF, the benefits the statute provides apply to a broader\ncategory of persons—any minister, as opposed to any minis-\nter that uses his or her home for religious purposes—than\nother categorical housing exclusions in the tax code. The dis-\ntrict court agreed, and found that § 107(2) is not analogous to\nother bright-line housing benefit provisions in the tax code\nbecause, in comparison, it is overinclusive. Gaylor, 278\nF. Supp. 3d at 1095 (“[Sections 134, 911, and 912] relate to em-\nployees whose housing is necessarily affected by their\njobs. … Some ministers may be in a similar situation … but by\nno means are all ministers so restricted … .”) (emphasis in\noriginal).\n It is not immediately apparent that § 107(2) is broader than\nthe other categorical exemptions for employee housing. For\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 15\n\nexample, under 26 U.S.C. § 911, any person living abroad is\npermitted to exclude or deduct housing expenses, regardless\nwhether that person is living abroad at the behest of his or her\nemployer.\n But to the extent § 107(2) may be overinclusive, that alone\ndoes not render the statute unconstitutional. FFRF’s argu-\nment is a critique of categorical rules generally, rather than of\n§ 107(2) specifically. “Read literally, rules are generally over-\ninclusive and underinclusive if assessed by references to their\npurposes. There is always a gap between the justification for\na rule … and the rule itself.” Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with\nRules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 990–91 (1995). No rule will per-\nfectly address the concerns to which it is addressed, because\n“[a]ll generalizations … are to some degree invalid, and hence\nevery rule of law has a few corners that do not quite fit.” An-\ntonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.\n1175, 1177 (1989). Categorical rules sacrifice precision of result\nfor administrative ease and equality of result. So it is not sur-\nprising that § 107(2) covers some housing allowances that\nmay be excluded under a case-by-case discretionary standard.\nIn this respect, § 107(2) is not an outlier.\n Important to our consideration, any imprecision does not\nmake § 107(2) any less analogous to other “convenience-of-\nthe-employer” related provisions in the tax code. Each covers\na different subset of eligible taxpayers and activities, but they\nall serve a common purpose: excluding from taxable income\ncertain employment-related expenses. The constitutionality\nof § 107(2) does not turn on which ministers the statute in-\ncludes or excludes. See, e.g., Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 95–96\n(“[A]rguments of equity have little force in construing the\nboundaries of exclusions and deductions from income many\n\f16 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\nof which, to be administrable, must be arbitrary.”); Delong v.\nDepʹt of Health & Human Servs., 264 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir.\n2001) (“Like all bright line rules, [the statute] is both over-\ninclusive and under-inclusive, but the imprecision of the stat-\nute does not make it unconstitutional.”).\n The second secular legislative purpose cited by the Treas-\nury Department is elimination of discrimination between\nministers. The government argues Congress passed § 107(2)\nbecause providing the tax exemption only to ministers given\nin-kind housing tended to exclude ministers of smaller or\npoorer denominations. FFRF argues this is a sham and the\ntrue justification was to subsidize religion, based on a state-\nment made in the early 1950s by § 107(2)’s sponsoring repre-\nsentative Peter Mack: “Certainly, in these times when we are\nbeing threatened by a godless and antireligious world move-\nment we should correct this discrimination against certain\nministers who are carrying on such a courageous fight against\nthis foe.” Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means:\nStatement of Hon. Peter F. Mack, Jr., on H.R. 4275, Concerning the\nTaxability of a Cash Allowance Paid to Clergymen in Lieu of\nFurnishing Them a Dwelling, 83d. Cong. 1, at 1576 (June 9,\n1953). The Treasury Department and intervenors respond by\nquoting other statements by Representative Mack from the\nsame hearing, such as that the bill was proposed because\n“present tax laws are discriminatory among our clergy,” id. at\n1574–75, and because he believed “a serious injustice [was]\nbeing done to those ministers who must provide their own\nhome,” id. at 1576.\n This smattering of legislative history does not establish\nRepresentative Mack’s motives in proposing the bill. Even if\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 17\n\nhis first quote above did so, the motivation of one representa-\ntive in a House of 435 does not definitively reveal the impetus\nbehind the bill’s passage. At the same hearing, other repre-\nsentatives stated different motives. Speaking on the same pro-\nposed provision, Representative Ray G. McKennan said the\nchanges were proposed to “create an equitable condition for\nministers similarly situated, and would probably eliminate\ncourt action [by ministers suing for discrimination].” Id. at\n1574.\n The legislative record does not establish a singular motive\nbehind § 107(2). Conflicting statements among members of\nCongress—even by the same member—reveal the unreliabil-\nity of this legislative history. Certainly, these statements do\nnot render “a sham” the Treasury Department’s proffered\npurpose of avoiding discrimination among religions. Cf.\nEdwards, 482 U.S. at 586–87. As such, we take the government\nat its word, which resolves this question. “The clearest com-\nmand of the Establishment Clause is that one religious\ndenomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”\nLarson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). Avoidance of dis-\ncrimination against certain religions in favor of others is a per-\nmissible secular legislative purpose.\n The third secular legislative purpose cited by the Treasury\nDepartment is to avoid excessive entanglement with religion.\nTo the government, Congress’s decision to exempt ministers\nfrom the proof requirements of § 119(a)(2) prevents the IRS\nfrom conducting intrusive inquiries into how religious organ-\nizations use their facilities. See, e.g., Amos, 483 U.S. at 339\n(“avoid[ing] … intrusive inquiry into religious belief …” pre-\nvents entanglement). FFRF responds that § 107(2) does not\n\f18 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\navoid such entanglement because the IRS must still adminis-\nter a test to determine whether a taxpayer qualifies as a min-\nister. FFRF argues this is as fact-intensive an audit as the\ninquiry administered for the generally applicable statutory\nexemption, § 119(a)(2).\n On this entanglement question, two Supreme Court deci-\nsions are particularly instructive. In Walz v. Tax Comm. of City\nof N.Y., the Court upheld a New York property tax exemption\nfor properties owned by churches and used exclusively for re-\nligious worship. Walz disagreed with the lower court’s exam-\nination of churches’ contribution to the social welfare to\ndetermine whether the tax exemption had a secular purpose:\n To give emphasis to so variable an aspect of the\n work of religious bodies would introduce an\n element of governmental evaluation and stand-\n ards as to the worth of particular social welfare\n programs, thus producing a kind of continuing\n day-to-day relationship which the policy of\n neutrality seeks to minimize.\n397 U.S. at 674. Similarly, in Amos v. Corporation of the Presiding\nBishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the\nSupreme Court upheld a categorical exemption for religious\norganizations from the provisions of Title VII of the Civil\nRights Act of 1964. The opinion noted that, under Lemon, “it\nis a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant\ngovernmental interference with the ability of religious organ-\nizations to define and carry out their religious missions.”\nAmos, 483 U.S. at 335.\n Any financial interaction between religion and govern-\nment—like taxing a church, or exempting it from tax—entails\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 19\n\nsome degree of entanglement. But only excessive entangle-\nment violates the Establishment Clause. See Walz, 307 U.S. at\n674 (“We must also be sure that the end result—the effect—is\nnot an excessive government entanglement with religion.”)\nCrucial to our evaluation, the Supreme Court has already per-\nmitted the level of entanglement incurred under § 107(2). In\nHosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,\n565 U.S. 171 (2012), the Court inquired into the facts underly-\ning Hosanna-Tabor’s employment to determine whether she\nwas a minister. Id. at 190–92. The IRS does the same under\n§ 107(2) to determine whether a taxpayer qualifies as a minis-\nter. The Court would not have so inquired if it violated the\nEstablishment Clause.\n In contrast, the application of § 119(a)(2) to ministers\nwould entangle church and state far more than under\n§ 107(2). For example, to determine what constitutes the busi-\nness premises of the employer under § 119(a)(2), the IRS\nwould have to determine what the “business” of the church is\nand where and how far the “premises” of the church extend.\nSee EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH 168–69 (2017).\nTo do so, the IRS would need to interrogate ministers on the\nspecifics of their worship activities, even determine which\nactivities constitute “worship.” Such government inquiries\ninto the internal affairs of churches to determine their eligibil-\nity for tax relief have been rejected as excessive entanglement.\nSee, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of Am. & Canada v.\nMilivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708–20 (1976) (holding civil courts\ncannot interfere with the rulings of ecclesiastical tribunals on\nchurch affairs); Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475\n(7th Cir. 2008) (“Congress does not want courts to interfere in\nthe internal management of churches … .”).\n\f20 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\n Worse, if subject to § 119(a)(2), congregations might alter\ntheir religious activities to attempt to conform with its re-\nquirements. Congress enacted § 107(2) in part to avoid that.\nAnd congressional action “to minimize governmental inter-\nference with the decision-making process in religions … does\nnot violate the Establishment Clause.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 336\n(internal citations and quotations omitted).\n The categorical nature of § 107(2) also avoids excessive\nentanglement by providing ministers and their churches cer-\ntainty as to whether their housing allowances will be exempt\nfrom tax. In Amos, the Supreme Court held “it is a significant\nburden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of\nsubstantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular\ncourt will consider religious.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 336.\n Recognizing the potentially excessive entanglement\nthreatened by the application of § 119(a)(2) to ministers, Con-\ngress enacted a less-entangling tax exemption. Seeking to\navoid government entanglement is a secular legislative pur-\npose under Lemon. See, e.g., Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives,\n877 F.3d 1213, 1231 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court has\nexpressly held that a purpose of avoiding government entan-\nglement does not violate the Establishment Clause.”) (citing\nAmos, 483 U.S. at 335). Because the government has articu-\nlated not one, but three secular purposes, we conclude the\nfirst prong of Lemon is satisfied.\n B. Primary Effect of Advancing or Inhibiting Religion\n The second prong of the Lemon test requires that a statute\nhave a “principal or primary effect … that neither advances\nnor inhibits religion.” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. “For a law to\nhave forbidden ‘effects’ under Lemon, it must be fair to say\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 21\n\nthat the government itself has advanced religion through its\nown activities and influence.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (emphasis\nin original). This entails “sponsorship, financial support, and\nactive involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”\nWalz, 297 U.S. at 668.\n FFRF contends the Supreme Court’s holdings in Amos and\nWalz were superseded by Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion\nin Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). That case\nresolved an Establishment Clause challenge to a state tax ex-\nemption for religious publications. To determine whether\nJustice Brennan’s opinion controls, we examine the grounds\nfor decision in Texas Monthly’s various concurrences. See\nMarks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a frag-\nmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explain-\ning the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of\nthe Court may be viewed as that position taken by those\nMembers who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest\ngrounds.”).\n In Texas Monthly, Justice Brennan authored an opinion\njoined by Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens and announced\nthe result of the case; Justice White concurred in the result and\nwrote separately; Justice Blackmun concurred in the result\nand wrote for himself and Justice O’Connor; and Justice Scalia\nfiled a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist\nand Justice Kennedy. Justice Brennan’s opinion concluded\nthat the tax exemption for religious publications violated the\nEstablishment Clause because “[e]very tax exemption consti-\ntutes a subsidy that affects nonqualifying taxpayers.” Texas\nMonthly, 489 U.S. at 14 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). He\nstated any subsidy directed “exclusively to religious organi-\n\f22 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\nzations that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause … can-\nnot but convey a message of endorsement to slighted mem-\nbers of the community.” Id. at 15 (internal citations and\nquotations omitted).\n The other opinions in Texas Monthly were narrower in\nscope. Justice White’s concurrence reached the same result,\nbut on an independent ground, the Press Clause. Justice\nBlackmun’s concurrence agreed that the tax exemption vio-\nlated the Establishment Clause, but did not adopt many of\nJustice Brennan’s sweeping statements. Justice Blackmun\nurged that the case be resolved narrowly and concluded only\nthat “a tax exemption limited to the sale of religious literature\nby religious organizations violates the Establishment Clause.”\nId. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Be-\ncause Justice Blackmun decided the case on Establishment\nClause grounds,9 and on a narrower basis than Justice\nBrennan’s opinion, under the Marks rule Justice Blackmun’s\nconcurrence sets the rule of decision of Texas Monthly. His\nconcurrence did not comment on what constitutes a forbid-\nden effect under Lemon, so Texas Monthly does not alter our\nanalysis of this second prong.\n\n\n\n 9 Even if Justice White’s opinion were based on narrower grounds\nthan Justice Blackmun’s opinion, it reached the same result under a differ-\nent constitutional clause. “Marks applies ‘only when one opinion is a log-\nical subset of other, broader opinions.’” Gibson v. American Cyanamid Co.,\n760 F.3d 600, 619 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781\n(D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc)). Justice Blackmun’s opinion provided the fourth\nand fifth votes in Texas Monthly and shared the “common denominator”\nof resolving the issue under the Establishment Clause, so it controls. Gib-\nson, 760 F.3d at 619 (quoting United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 884 (7th\nCir. 2009)).\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 23\n\n With Walz and Amos still in effect, we evaluate forbidden\neffects under their framework. FFRF contends a tax exemp-\ntion for religion is identical to a government subsidy for reli-\ngion. In economic terms, a subsidy and a tax exemption may\nhave the same practical impact. See, e.g., Adam Chodorow,\nThe Parsonage Allowance, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 854 (2018)\n(“The claim that exemptions differ from direct subsidies for\nEstablishment Clause purposes simply ignores economic re-\nality.”). But the Supreme Court has already found a constitu-\ntionally significant difference between the two on taxing\nreligion. “The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship\nsince the government does not transfer part of its revenue to\nchurches but simply abstains from demanding that the\nchurch support the state.” Walz, 397 U.S. at 675.10\n Under Walz and Amos, then, § 107(2) does not advance re-\nligion on behalf of the government. Providing a tax exemption\ndoes not “connote[] sponsorship, financial support, and active\ninvolvement of the [government] in religious activity” under\nWalz, 397 U.S. at 668; see also Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (“[W]e do\nnot see how any advancement of religion achieved by the [ex-\nempt religious organization] can be fairly attributed to the\nGovernment, as opposed to the Church.”).\n Under these precedents, the primary effect of § 107(2) is\nnot to advance religion on behalf of the government, but to\n\n 10 The Supreme Court tacitly reaffirmed this approach in its standing\ndiscussion in Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 536 U.S. 125\n(2011). There, it held taxpayers had no standing to challenge a tax credit\ndirected primarily towards sectarian schools because “[w]hen the govern-\nment declines to impose a tax, … there is no … connection between dis-\nsenting taxpayer and alleged establishment.” Id. at 142.\n\f24 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\n“allow[] churches to advance religion, which is their very pur-\npose.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (emphasis in original). So § 107(2)\npasses the second prong of Lemon.\n C. Excessive Entanglement with Religion\n The third prong of the Lemon test is whether the state “fos-\nter[s] ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”\nLemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674). We have\naddressed this prong in Part III.A above. Because some level\nof church-state interaction is unavoidable, “[e]ntanglement is\na question of kind and degree.” Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684.\nSection 107(2) avoids government inquiry into the use of a\nminister’s home, but it still requires the IRS to determine who\nqualifies as a minister eligible for the exemption. Even if the\nIRS’s test for who qualifies as a minister involves entangle-\nment, it is of a nature approved by the Supreme Court in\nHosanna-Tabor. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190–95 (engag-\ning in a fact-bound analysis to determine whether the peti-\ntioner qualified as a minister). The alternative would be to\nforce ministers to comply with the far more detailed and par-\nticular, and thus more entangling, requirements of § 119(a)(2).\n In answer to these concerns, Congress chose to enact\n§ 107(2). Legislative determinations about the Establishment\nClause, while not binding, are entitled to deference. “We in\nthe Judiciary must be wary of interpreting [the Religion]\nClauses in a manner that negates the legislative role alto-\ngether.” Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concur-\nring). Legislative deference is particularly great for\nclassifications in tax legislation. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with\nRepresentation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1997) (“Legis-\nlatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifica-\ntions and distinctions in tax statutes.”); Madden v. Kentucky,\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 25\n\n309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (holding that for tax classifications chal-\nlenged under the Fourteenth Amendment, “the presumption\nof constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit\ndemonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive\ndiscrimination against particular persons and classes”).\nCongress decided § 107(2) is the less entangling option, so we\nwill not disturb it.\n We conclude § 107(2) has a secular legislative purpose, its\nprincipal effect is neither to endorse nor to inhibit religion,\nand it does not cause excessive government entanglement.\nHere, “[t]here is no genuine nexus between tax exemption\nand establishment of religion.” Walz, 397 U.S. at 675. Section\n107(2), then, does not violate the Establishment Clause under\nthe Lemon test.\n IV.\n We next examine whether § 107(2) passes the historical\nsignificance test.11 The Supreme Court has held “the Estab-\nlishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference to histori-\ncal practices and understandings.’” Town of Greece v. Galloway,\n572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014) (quoting Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil\n\n\n 11 FFRF and amici curiae supporting appellees’ position offer no ar-\nguments under the historical significance test, except to assert the test ap-\nplies only to legislative prayer. We find no such limitation. Though Town\nof Greece addressed legislative prayer, it stated that “the Establishment\nClause must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and under-\nstandings.’” 572 U.S. at 576 (quoting Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670\n(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)). This\nlanguage does not limit the application of the Town of Greece standard to\nconstitutional challenges to legislative prayer. As this part discusses, other\nSupreme Court cases have examined relevant history as to monuments as\nwell as the ministerial exception.\n\f26 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\nLiberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670\n(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-\nsenting in part)). This fact-bound test was developed in three\ncases. First, in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality\nopinion), the Court considered whether a monument\ninscribed with the Ten Commandments on Texas government\nproperty violated the Establishment Clause. Van Orden criti-\ncized the Lemon test for ignoring the “strong role played by\nreligion and religious traditions throughout our Nation’s\nhistory.” Id. at 683. Instead, the Court reviewed a number of\nhistorical examples of governments referencing God and dis-\nplaying the Ten Commandments without issue. On that basis,\nthe Court held the monument did not violate the Establish-\nment Clause. Id. at 692.\n Next, in Hosanna-Tabor, a unanimous Supreme Court held\nthat the Establishment Clause prevents governments from in-\nterfering with the decision of a religious group to terminate\none of its ministers. In so deciding, the opinion explored the\nhistory of church-state relations in the United States and Eng-\nland, back to the Magna Carta. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182.\nFrom that history, the Court determined that the First\nAmendment was adopted in part to prevent “the new Federal\nGovernment—unlike the English Crown—[from a] role in fill-\ning ecclesiastical offices.” Id. at 184. This determination\nformed the basis of the Court’s decision.\n Finally, in Town of Greece the Supreme Court applied the\nhistorical significance test when it held legislative prayer does\nnot violate the Establishment Clause. The Court held that\n“[a]ny test the Court adopts [for the Establishment Clause]\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 27\n\nmust acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Fram-\ners and has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political\nchange.” Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577.\n We now apply the historical significance test to this case.\nFFRF offers no evidence that provisions like § 107(2) were his-\ntorically viewed as an establishment of religion. The govern-\nment and intervenors, and amici curiae supporting their\nposition, have provided substantial evidence of a lengthy\ntradition of tax exemptions for religion, particularly for\nchurch-owned properties. For over two centuries, the states\nhave implemented church property tax exemptions in various\nforms. See John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property:\nHistorical Anomaly or Valid Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL.\nL. REV. 363, 380 (1991) (“The colonial law exemption of church\nproperty continued largely uninterrupted in the early dec-\nades of the American republic.”); see also id. at 389–95 (detail-\ning state protections for religious tax exemptions from the late\n19th to early 20th centuries). When challenged on establish-\nment grounds, such tax exemptions typically have been up-\nheld. See, e.g., Trustees of Griswold College v. State, 46 Iowa 275,\n282 (1877) (ruling the state constitution’s Establishment\nClause “does not [implicate] the exemption from taxation of\nsuch church property as the legislature may think proper”).\n Congress has enacted federal tax exemptions for religious\norganizations as far back as 1802, when it permitted the\nCounty of Alexandria (then under federal control) to exempt\nchurch property from taxation, see 7 Cong. Ch. 53, May 3,\n1802, 2 Stat. 194, and as recently as 2002, the last time § 107\nwas amended. See Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification\nAct of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–181, 116 Stat. 583. As early as\n\f28 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\n\n1885, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged and accepted re-\nligious property tax exemptions in Gibbons v. District of\nColumbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886), “reflecting more than a century\nof our history and uninterrupted practice.” Walz, 397 U.S. at\n680. Today, more than 2,600 federal and state tax laws provide\nreligious exemptions. NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER,\nPOLITICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT: PROVOCATIVE FIRST\nAMENDMENT CONFLICTS 43 (2011).\n The district court distinguished § 107(2) from this long\nand continuing historical tradition of property tax exemp-\ntions by noting the statute is an income tax exemption. We\nfind this too fine a distinction, as it ignores the impact of the\nSixteenth Amendment. Before 1913, Congress could not con-\nstitutionally tax housing provided to ministers as part of their\nincome. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601,\n637 (1895) (invalidating a state income tax). Within a few\nyears of income becoming taxable, Congress moved to\nexclude parsonages from income, and a few decades later ex-\ncluded cash housing allowances as well. Congress was con-\ntinuing its “historical practice[]” of exempting certain church\nresources from taxation. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576. This\nendeavor limits entanglement between church and state, see\nsupra at Part III.C. Given this history, we conclude § 107(2)\ndoes not violate the Establishment Clause under the historical\nsignificance test.\n\n V.\n FFRF claims § 107(2) renders unto God that which is\nCaesar’s. But this tax provision falls into the play between the\njoints of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment\nClause: neither commanded by the former, nor proscribed by\n\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 29\n\nthe latter. We conclude § 107(2) is constitutional. The\njudgment of the district court is REVERSED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Annie Gaylor v. Steven Mnuchin\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\nANNIE LAURIE GAYLOR, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\\n v.\\n\\nSTEVEN T. MNUCHIN, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellants,\\n\\n and\\nEDWARD PEECHER, et al.,\\n Intervening\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n\\n\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-215 — Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED OCTOBER 24, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Since the Founders crafted the Re-\\nligion Clauses of the First Amendment, courts have grappled\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nwith the “play in the joints” between them. Walz v. Tax Comm.\\nof City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). This case calls us to do\\nso once more. Freedom From Religion Foundation (“FFRF”)\\nclaims that a longstanding tax code exemption for religious\\nhousing, 26 U.S.C. § 107(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, vi-\\nolates the Establishment Clause. The district court agreed.\\nThe U.S. Treasury Department and several intervening reli-\\ngious organizations ask us to reinstate the exemption, assert-\\ning that the survival of many congregations hangs in the\\nbalance. We must decide whether excluding housing allow-\\nances from ministers’ taxable income is a law “respecting an\\nestablishment of religion” in violation of the First Amend-\\nment.\\n I.\\n A. History of § 107(2)\\n The facts before us are not in dispute. The Sixteenth\\nAmendment was ratified in 1913, authorizing Congress to\\nlevy an income tax. Congress imposed a federal income tax\\nthat same year and has levied one in various forms since. As\\na result, Congress and the Treasury Department needed to\\ndefine taxable “income.” A rule defining income that survives\\ntoday in the Internal Revenue Code is the “convenience-of-\\nthe-employer” doctrine. Under that doctrine, housing pro-\\nvided to employees for the convenience of their employer is\\nexempt from taxable income. Early examples of exclusions\\nunder the doctrine include housing provided to sailors living\\naboard ships, workers living in camps, and hospital employ-\\nees. But the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine was not\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 3\\n\\nmade available to ministers.1 In 1921, the Treasury Depart-\\nment announced ministers would be taxed on the fair rental\\nvalue of parsonages provided as living quarters. O.D. 862, 4\\nC.B. 85 (1921).\\n Congress reacted quickly and enacted a statute to exclude\\nchurch-provided parsonages from the taxable income of min-\\nisters. The Treasury Department interpreted this statute to\\napply only to housing provided in-kind; cash housing allow-\\nances were included in income. I.T. 1694, C.B. II-1, at 79 (1923).\\nThis continued for decades until in the 1950s several ministers\\nsuccessfully challenged the limitation to in-kind housing.2\\nCongress then enacted 26 U.S.C. § 107, which provides:\\n In the case of a minister of the gospel, gross in-\\n come does not include—\\n (1) the rental value of a home furnished to him\\n as part of his compensation; or\\n (2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of\\n his compensation, to the extent used by him to\\n rent or provide a home …\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 The text of the tax code refers specifically to “ministers of the gos-\\npel,” so we use that term. Courts have long held the provision applies to\\nreligious leaders of any denomination, regardless of formal title. See, e.g.,\\nSalkov v. Comm’r, 46 T.C. 190, 194 (1966) (holding a Jewish cantor was a\\n“minister of the gospel”).\\n 2 See, e.g., Williamson v. Comm’r, 224 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1955); Conning\\nv. Busey, 127 F. Supp. 958 (S.D. Ohio 1954); MacColl v. United States,\\n91 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1950).\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nSection 107(1) reauthorized the in-kind parsonage exemption\\nin place since the 1920s. Section 107(2) authorized the IRS to\\nalso exempt cash allowances from ministers’ taxable income.3\\n B. District Court Proceedings\\n FFRF describes itself as a “nonprophet nonprofit” organi-\\nzation that “[t]akes legal action challenging entanglement of\\nreligion and government, government endorsement or pro-\\nmotion of religion.” What Does the Foundation Do?, FREEDOM\\nFROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, https://ffrf.org/faq/item/15001-\\nwhat-does-the-foundation-do (last visited March 10, 2019).\\nSeeking to challenge both § 107(1) and § 107(2), FFRF paid its\\nco-presidents Annie Gaylor and Dan Barker a portion of their\\nsalaries in the form of a housing allowance. FFRF also paid\\nthis housing allowance to a former president of the organiza-\\ntion, Anne Nicol Gaylor (“Nicol Gaylor”).4 FFRF, Gaylor,\\nBarker, and Nicol Gaylor, none of whom meet the IRS’s defi-\\nnition of “minister,” then sued the Treasury Department,\\nclaiming § 107 violates the First Amendment because it con-\\nditions a tax benefit on religious affiliation. We dismissed this\\nchallenge for lack of standing because FFRF and its employees\\nnever applied for § 107(1) or § 107(2) exemptions, so they were\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3An amicus brief from the University of St. Thomas School of Law\\n(Minnesota) estimates that of the United States’ 384,000 congregations,\\n200,000 to 300,000 provide a housing allowance to their ministers under\\n26 U.S.C. § 107(2).\\n 4 Nicol Gaylor, Annie Gaylor’s mother and co-founder of FFRF,\\npassed away during the initial lawsuit filed by FFRF. Although the party\\nto this lawsuit is technically the Estate of Anne Nicol Gaylor, we refer to\\nher as “Nicol Gaylor” for brevity.\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 5\\n\\nnever denied them. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v.\\nLew, 773 F.3d 815, 825 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Lew”).\\n In response, Gaylor and Barker filed amended tax returns\\nfor 2012 and 2013 claiming refunds for their housing allow-\\nances under § 107(2); Nicol Gaylor did the same for 2013. The\\nIRS erroneously issued refunds to Gaylor and Barker for 2013\\nbut made no decisions on plaintiffs’ other claims. After more\\nthan six months without IRS action on plaintiffs’ claims, FFRF\\nand its employees brought this suit. The IRS then denied the\\n2012 refund claims because none of the claimants were minis-\\nters.\\n The Treasury Department moved to dismiss FFRF’s\\n§ 107(1) challenge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The\\ndistrict court granted the motion for the same reasons we\\narticulated in Lew: FFRF’s employees never claimed a § 107(1)\\nexemption. FFRF does not appeal that ruling. Later, the dis-\\ntrict court permitted several pastors who receive housing\\nallowances and their associated religious organizations to in-\\ntervene to defend § 107(2).5\\n The Treasury Department and intervenors moved for\\nsummary judgment. The district court denied their motions\\nand instead granted summary judgment to FFRF and its em-\\nployees. The court held that FFRF and its employees had\\nstanding to challenge § 107(2), and that that statute violates\\nthe Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Gaylor v.\\n\\n\\n 5 The intervening defendants are Bishop Edward Peecher, the Chicago\\n\\nEmbassy Church, Father Patrick Malone, the Holy Cross Church, the\\nDiocese of Chicago and Mid-America of the Russian Orthodox Church\\nOutside of Russia, and Pastor Christopher Butler. Each of the intervenors\\nreceive or provide housing allowances under § 107(2).\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nMnuchin, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1104 (W.D. Wis. 2017). The\\ncourt held that § 107(2) violated the secular purpose prong of\\nthe test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and\\nruled that the statute’s true purpose was to “provide aid to a\\ngroup of religious persons.” Gaylor, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 1099.\\nThe court rejected the argument that § 107(2) avoids excessive\\ngovernment entanglement with religion, because in the\\ncourt’s view “concerns about entanglement [do not] justify\\npreferential treatment for religious persons.” Id. The Treasury\\nDepartment and the intervenors appeal.\\n II.\\n Neither the Treasury Department nor the intervenors\\ndispute the district court’s ruling that FFRF has standing to\\nchallenge § 107(2). Nevertheless, even if the issue has not been\\nraised, if there is no Article III standing our court must dis-\\nmiss the suit. Diedrich v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 839 F.3d\\n583, 588 (7th Cir. 2016). We evaluate standing to determine\\nwhether FFRF resolved the deficiencies we noted in Lew.\\n To establish Article III standing, plaintiffs must show they\\nhave suffered “(1) a concrete and particularized ‘injury in fact’\\n(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the de-\\nfendant, and that is (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable\\njudicial decision.” Lew, 773 F.3d at 819 (citing Lujan v.\\nDefenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). To challenge\\nthe constitutionality of a tax provision, a plaintiff must have\\n“personally claimed and been denied the exemption.” Lew,\\n773 F.3d at 821.\\n An essential element of “injury in fact” is that the injury\\nbe “actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 7\\n\\nLujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotations and citations omit-\\nted). When FFRF filed this action, Gaylor and Barker had yet\\nto be denied a refund from their 2012 tax returns, and Nicol\\nGaylor had still, by the time of the district court’s decision,\\nreceived no answer to her 2013 refund request. Yet this does\\nnot necessarily mean FFRF lacked standing. Under 26 U.S.C.\\n§ 6532(a)(1), an income tax refund suit may be filed no earlier\\nthan six months after the refund claim was submitted. A stat-\\nute cannot “‘lower the threshold for standing below the min-\\nimum requirements imposed by the Constitution,’ but\\nCongress does have the power to ‘enact statutes creating legal\\nrights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no\\ninjury would exist without the statute.’” Sterk v. Redbox\\nAutomated Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 2014) (quot-\\ning Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 294 (7th\\nCir. 2000)).\\n The district court concluded it was reasonable to interpret\\n§ 6532(a)(1) as rendering a claim “effectively denied if the IRS\\ndoes not render a decision within six months.” Gaylor, 278\\nF. Supp. 3d at 1087. We agree. As the district court noted, pre-\\nventing a claimant from filing a refund suit until the IRS\\nresponded to the claim “would allow the IRS to deprive a\\nparty of standing indefinitely by withholding a decision.” Id.\\nat 1088. Several courts of appeals have cited the six-month fil-\\ning requirement approvingly. See, e.g., Fletcher v. United States,\\n452 Fed. App’x 547, 552 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[B]efore a taxpayer\\ncan bring a refund suit, he or she must … wait until either the\\nIRS denies the claim or six months have expired since filing\\nthe administrative claim.”); Dumont v. United States, 345 Fed.\\nApp’x 586, 590 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[A] suit … cannot be insti-\\ntuted until either the IRS denies the claim or six months pass\\nwithout its taking action.”); Sorenson v. Secʹy of Treasury of\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nU.S., 752 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1985), affʹd, 475 U.S. 851\\n(1986) (“The former section prohibits the courts from enter-\\ntaining any refund suit filed before the expiration of six\\nmonths from the date the claim for refund is filed … .”); see\\nalso Lew, 773 F.3d at 821 n.3 (“The plaintiffs could have … paid\\nincome tax on their housing allowance, claimed refunds from\\nthe IRS, and then sued if the IRS rejected or failed to act upon\\ntheir claims.”) (emphasis added).\\n Gaylor, Barker, and Nicol Gaylor have properly alleged a\\n“concrete, dollars-and-cents injury.” Lew, 773 F.3d at 821.\\n“[T]hey have incurred a cost or been denied a benefit on\\naccount of their religion [or lack thereof],” Arizona Christian\\nSch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 536 U.S. 125, 130 (2011), which con-\\nfers Article III standing. Because its members have standing\\nand the contested issue is germane to its organizational pur-\\npose, FFRF has organizational standing to sue as well. See\\nSierra Club v. United States E.P.A., 774 F.3d 383, 388–89 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (“‘An organization has standing to sue if (1) at least\\none of its members would otherwise have standing; (2) the\\ninterests at stake in the litigation are germane to the organiza-\\ntion’s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief\\nrequested requires an individual member’s participation in\\nthe lawsuit.’”) (quoting Sierra Club v. Franklin Cty. Power of Ill.\\nLLC, 546 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 2008)).\\n III.\\n This case comes to us after a grant of summary judgment,\\nso we assess the parties’ claims de novo. Freedom from Religion\\nFound., Inc. v. Concord Cmty. Sch., 885 F.3d 1038, 1045 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (“Concord”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 9\\n\\n Currently, Establishment Clause jurisprudence incorpo-\\nrates a number of tests when evaluating the constitutionality\\nof government action. Two are relevant to this case: the test\\nannounced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and the\\n“historical significance” test of Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572\\nU.S. 565, 576 (2014).6 Because the Supreme Court has not clar-\\nified which should take precedence, we evaluate FFRF’s\\nclaims under both tests and associated case law. See Concord,\\n885 F.3d at 1045 n.1 (“Indeed, there is debate among the Jus-\\ntices about the continuing validity of the endorsement\\ntest. … For now, we do not feel free to jettison that test alto-\\ngether … .”).7 We consider this case under the Lemon test in\\n\\n\\n 6 A third relevant to this challenge, the endorsement test, clarifies\\nLemon and is woven into our consideration of § 107(2) under the Lemon\\ntest, particularly under the second prong. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion\\nFound., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, Wis., 203 F.3d 487, 493 (7th Cir. 2000), as\\namended on denial of rehʹg and rehʹg en banc (Mar. 22, 2000) (“[T]he effect\\nprong of [the Lemon] test has been analyzed under the ‘perception of en-\\ndorsement’ test developed in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)\\n(O’Connor, J., concurring).”).\\n 7 An amicus brief filed by Wisconsin and fifteen other states notes the\\nSupreme Court has not applied the Lemon test to a religious freedom case\\nin many years. Even so, until the Supreme Court explicitly overturns\\nLemon we must apply it, as well as the other tests more recently relied\\nupon by the Court. Other circuit courts also apply multiple tests when\\nconsidering a challenge under the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., American\\nHumanist Assoc. v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 525–26 (5th Cir. 2017) (balancing\\nthe Lemon, endorsement, and coercion tests against the historical signifi-\\ncance test in Town of Greece); Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs,\\n788 F.3d 580, 586–87 (6th Cir. 2015) (setting forth Lemon, the endorsement\\ntest, and Town of Greece as the “three main jurisprudential threads” that\\nmust be woven together in assessing government action under the Estab-\\nlishment Clause).\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nthis Part of this opinion, and under the “historical signifi-\\ncance” test in Part IV.\\n Lemon summarized prior case law into a three-prong test:\\n“[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;\\nsecond, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither\\nadvances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not\\nfoster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”\\n403 U.S. at 612–13 (internal citations and quotations omitted).\\nThis test is not cumulative: if § 107(2) fails any of Lemon’s three\\nprongs, it violates the Establishment Clause.\\n A. Secular Legislative Purpose\\n We first examine whether § 107(2) has a secular legislative\\npurpose. “When the government acts with the ostensible and\\npredominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that\\ncentral Establishment Clause value of official religious neu-\\ntrality, there being no neutrality when the government’s os-\\ntensible object is to take sides.” McCreary Cty., Ky. v. Am. Civil\\nLiberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (citing Corpora-\\ntion of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day\\nSaints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987)). A statute is unconsti-\\ntutional under this test “only when … there [is] no question\\nthat the statute … was motivated wholly by religious consid-\\nerations.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984). The\\nTreasury Department and intervenors point to three secular\\nlegislative purposes of the statute: to eliminate discrimination\\nagainst ministers, to eliminate discrimination between minis-\\nters, and to avoid excessive entanglement with religion. FFRF\\ncounters that § 107(2) was passed to confer a government ben-\\nefit on religion, which necessarily violates the Establishment\\nClause.\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 11\\n\\n We will defer to a government’s sincere articulation of sec-\\nular purpose, so long as the plaintiffs have not proved that\\narticulation of purpose is a sham. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482\\nU.S. 578, 586–87 (1987) (“While the Court is normally defer-\\nential to a State’s articulation of a secular purpose, it is\\nrequired that the statement of such purpose be sincere and\\nnot a sham.”); Cohen v. City of Des Plaines, 8 F.3d 484, 489 (7th\\nCir. 1993) (“We will defer to a municipality’s sincere articula-\\ntion of a secular purpose.”). This does not mean “that the\\nlaw’s purpose must be unrelated to religion … .” Amos, 483\\nU.S. at 335. Instead, “the government lacks a secular purpose\\nunder Lemon only when ‘there is no question that the statute\\nor activity was motivated wholly by religious considera-\\ntions.’” Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Clarke, 588 F.3d 523,\\n527–28 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Books v. Elkhart Cty., 401 F.3d\\n857, 863 (7th Cir. 2005), in turn quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680).\\nSo we evaluate the purposes articulated by the Treasury De-\\npartment to determine whether they are sincere, or whether\\nthe government’s “‘actual purpose is to endorse or disap-\\nprove of religion.’” Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585 (quoting Lynch,\\n465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).\\n The Treasury Department first contends Congress passed\\n§ 107 to put ministers on equal footing with secular employ-\\nees receiving the same benefits; in other words, to eliminate\\ndiscrimination against ministers. The Treasury Department\\npoints to its 1921 decision to not exclude parsonages from tax-\\nable income and Congress’s quick passage of the parsonage\\nexemption, now codified at § 107(1), in response. The Treas-\\nury Department argues this is a secular purpose because it\\nsimply places religious employees on par with secular ones.\\nFFRF counters that the benefits given to ministers under\\n§ 107(2) are different—and better—than those the tax code\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\ngives to secular employees. FFRF argues putting ministers in\\na better position than secular employees promotes the dis-\\nsemination of religious ideas and thus cannot be secular.\\n To determine whether § 107(2) confers a special benefit, or\\nsimply integrates ministers into an existing tax system, we\\nmust delve into the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine.\\nThough the doctrine was originally developed in Treasury\\nDepartment regulations, it has since been codified in several\\nplaces. The principal statute is 26 U.S.C. § 119(a)(2) and ex-\\nempts meals and lodging furnished to employees if they meet\\nfive requirements: the meal or lodging is furnished (1) by an\\nemployer to an employee, (2) in kind (as opposed to in cash),\\n(3) on the business premises of the employer, (4) for the con-\\nvenience of the employer, and (5) as a condition of employ-\\nment. See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.119-1(b) (2018). This exemption\\napplies generally: any qualifying employee can rely on\\n§ 119(a)(2), including religious employees.8\\n The express proof requirements of § 119(a)(2) are relaxed\\nthroughout the tax code for various types of employees. Sec-\\ntion 119(c) exempts employees living in a foreign camp from\\nneeding to fulfill the “business premises” and “condition of\\nemployment” factors. Section 119(d) exempts certain teachers\\nand university employees from the convenience-of-the-\\nemployer doctrine altogether, and allows them to exclude\\nfrom taxable income the fair rental value of campus housing.\\n Myriad provisions in Title 26 employ this categorical\\napproach and exempt any form of housing benefits, whether\\n\\n\\n 8 For additional history on the development of the convenience-of-the-\\n\\nemployer doctrine, see Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 84–96 (1977).\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 13\\n\\nin cash or in kind: § 132 and § 162 exclude housing provided\\nto an employee away on business for less than a year; § 134\\nexcludes housing provided to current or former members of\\nthe military; § 911 excludes housing above a certain level pro-\\nvided to citizens or residents living abroad; § 912 excludes\\nhousing provided to government employees living abroad;\\nand, of course, § 107 excludes housing provided to ministers.\\nThese categorical exemptions allow hundreds of thousands of\\nemployees (including ministers) to receive tax-exempt\\nhousing every year without needing to satisfy the proof re-\\nquirements of § 119(a)(2).\\n These parallel provisions show an overarching arrange-\\nment in the tax code to exempt employer-provided housing\\nfor employees with certain job-related housing requirements.\\nCongress has exempted certain categories of employees from\\ncomplying with the specific requirements of § 119(a)(2) to\\nsimplify the application of the convenience-of-the-employer\\ndoctrine to those occupations. Section 107, including subsec-\\ntion (2), recognizes ministers often use their homes as part of\\ntheir ministry. This provision thus eases the administration of\\nthe convenience-of-the-employer doctrine by providing a\\nbright-line rule, instead of requiring that ministers and the\\nIRS repeatedly engage with a fact-intensive standard.\\n Reading § 107(2) in isolation from the other convenience-\\nof-the-employer provisions, and then highlighting the term\\n“minister,” could make the challenged statute appear to pro-\\nvide a government benefit exclusively to the religious. But\\nreading it in context, as we must, we see § 107(2) is simply one\\nof many per se rules that provide a tax exemption to employ-\\nees with work-related housing requirements. See ANTONIN\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nSCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 252 (2012) (“‘Sev-\\neral acts in pari materia, and relating to the same subject, are to\\nbe taken together, and compared in construction of them, be-\\ncause they are considered as having one object in view, and\\nas acting upon one system.’”) (quoting 1 James Kent, Commen-\\ntaries on American Law 433 (1826)); see also Mueller v. Allen, 463\\nU.S. 388, 396 (1983) (upholding Minnesota tax deduction for\\ntuition expenses, primarily used by parents of children at sec-\\ntarian schools, in part because the deduction was “only one\\namong many deductions—such as those for medical ex-\\npenses … and charitable contributions … available under the\\nMinnesota tax laws”). Congress’s policy choice to ease the ad-\\nministration of the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine by\\napplying a categorical exclusion is a secular purpose, not\\n“motivated wholly by religious considerations.” Lynch, 465\\nU.S. at 680.\\n FFRF argues considering the context of § 107(2) is inapt.\\nTo FFRF, the benefits the statute provides apply to a broader\\ncategory of persons—any minister, as opposed to any minis-\\nter that uses his or her home for religious purposes—than\\nother categorical housing exclusions in the tax code. The dis-\\ntrict court agreed, and found that § 107(2) is not analogous to\\nother bright-line housing benefit provisions in the tax code\\nbecause, in comparison, it is overinclusive. Gaylor, 278\\nF. Supp. 3d at 1095 (“[Sections 134, 911, and 912] relate to em-\\nployees whose housing is necessarily affected by their\\njobs. … Some ministers may be in a similar situation … but by\\nno means are all ministers so restricted … .”) (emphasis in\\noriginal).\\n It is not immediately apparent that § 107(2) is broader than\\nthe other categorical exemptions for employee housing. For\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 15\\n\\nexample, under 26 U.S.C. § 911, any person living abroad is\\npermitted to exclude or deduct housing expenses, regardless\\nwhether that person is living abroad at the behest of his or her\\nemployer.\\n But to the extent § 107(2) may be overinclusive, that alone\\ndoes not render the statute unconstitutional. FFRF’s argu-\\nment is a critique of categorical rules generally, rather than of\\n§ 107(2) specifically. “Read literally, rules are generally over-\\ninclusive and underinclusive if assessed by references to their\\npurposes. There is always a gap between the justification for\\na rule … and the rule itself.” Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with\\nRules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 990–91 (1995). No rule will per-\\nfectly address the concerns to which it is addressed, because\\n“[a]ll generalizations … are to some degree invalid, and hence\\nevery rule of law has a few corners that do not quite fit.” An-\\ntonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.\\n1175, 1177 (1989). Categorical rules sacrifice precision of result\\nfor administrative ease and equality of result. So it is not sur-\\nprising that § 107(2) covers some housing allowances that\\nmay be excluded under a case-by-case discretionary standard.\\nIn this respect, § 107(2) is not an outlier.\\n Important to our consideration, any imprecision does not\\nmake § 107(2) any less analogous to other “convenience-of-\\nthe-employer” related provisions in the tax code. Each covers\\na different subset of eligible taxpayers and activities, but they\\nall serve a common purpose: excluding from taxable income\\ncertain employment-related expenses. The constitutionality\\nof § 107(2) does not turn on which ministers the statute in-\\ncludes or excludes. See, e.g., Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 95–96\\n(“[A]rguments of equity have little force in construing the\\nboundaries of exclusions and deductions from income many\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nof which, to be administrable, must be arbitrary.”); Delong v.\\nDepʹt of Health & Human Servs., 264 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir.\\n2001) (“Like all bright line rules, [the statute] is both over-\\ninclusive and under-inclusive, but the imprecision of the stat-\\nute does not make it unconstitutional.”).\\n The second secular legislative purpose cited by the Treas-\\nury Department is elimination of discrimination between\\nministers. The government argues Congress passed § 107(2)\\nbecause providing the tax exemption only to ministers given\\nin-kind housing tended to exclude ministers of smaller or\\npoorer denominations. FFRF argues this is a sham and the\\ntrue justification was to subsidize religion, based on a state-\\nment made in the early 1950s by § 107(2)’s sponsoring repre-\\nsentative Peter Mack: “Certainly, in these times when we are\\nbeing threatened by a godless and antireligious world move-\\nment we should correct this discrimination against certain\\nministers who are carrying on such a courageous fight against\\nthis foe.” Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means:\\nStatement of Hon. Peter F. Mack, Jr., on H.R. 4275, Concerning the\\nTaxability of a Cash Allowance Paid to Clergymen in Lieu of\\nFurnishing Them a Dwelling, 83d. Cong. 1, at 1576 (June 9,\\n1953). The Treasury Department and intervenors respond by\\nquoting other statements by Representative Mack from the\\nsame hearing, such as that the bill was proposed because\\n“present tax laws are discriminatory among our clergy,” id. at\\n1574–75, and because he believed “a serious injustice [was]\\nbeing done to those ministers who must provide their own\\nhome,” id. at 1576.\\n This smattering of legislative history does not establish\\nRepresentative Mack’s motives in proposing the bill. Even if\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 17\\n\\nhis first quote above did so, the motivation of one representa-\\ntive in a House of 435 does not definitively reveal the impetus\\nbehind the bill’s passage. At the same hearing, other repre-\\nsentatives stated different motives. Speaking on the same pro-\\nposed provision, Representative Ray G. McKennan said the\\nchanges were proposed to “create an equitable condition for\\nministers similarly situated, and would probably eliminate\\ncourt action [by ministers suing for discrimination].” Id. at\\n1574.\\n The legislative record does not establish a singular motive\\nbehind § 107(2). Conflicting statements among members of\\nCongress—even by the same member—reveal the unreliabil-\\nity of this legislative history. Certainly, these statements do\\nnot render “a sham” the Treasury Department’s proffered\\npurpose of avoiding discrimination among religions. Cf.\\nEdwards, 482 U.S. at 586–87. As such, we take the government\\nat its word, which resolves this question. “The clearest com-\\nmand of the Establishment Clause is that one religious\\ndenomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”\\nLarson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). Avoidance of dis-\\ncrimination against certain religions in favor of others is a per-\\nmissible secular legislative purpose.\\n The third secular legislative purpose cited by the Treasury\\nDepartment is to avoid excessive entanglement with religion.\\nTo the government, Congress’s decision to exempt ministers\\nfrom the proof requirements of § 119(a)(2) prevents the IRS\\nfrom conducting intrusive inquiries into how religious organ-\\nizations use their facilities. See, e.g., Amos, 483 U.S. at 339\\n(“avoid[ing] … intrusive inquiry into religious belief …” pre-\\nvents entanglement). FFRF responds that § 107(2) does not\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\navoid such entanglement because the IRS must still adminis-\\nter a test to determine whether a taxpayer qualifies as a min-\\nister. FFRF argues this is as fact-intensive an audit as the\\ninquiry administered for the generally applicable statutory\\nexemption, § 119(a)(2).\\n On this entanglement question, two Supreme Court deci-\\nsions are particularly instructive. In Walz v. Tax Comm. of City\\nof N.Y., the Court upheld a New York property tax exemption\\nfor properties owned by churches and used exclusively for re-\\nligious worship. Walz disagreed with the lower court’s exam-\\nination of churches’ contribution to the social welfare to\\ndetermine whether the tax exemption had a secular purpose:\\n To give emphasis to so variable an aspect of the\\n work of religious bodies would introduce an\\n element of governmental evaluation and stand-\\n ards as to the worth of particular social welfare\\n programs, thus producing a kind of continuing\\n day-to-day relationship which the policy of\\n neutrality seeks to minimize.\\n397 U.S. at 674. Similarly, in Amos v. Corporation of the Presiding\\nBishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the\\nSupreme Court upheld a categorical exemption for religious\\norganizations from the provisions of Title VII of the Civil\\nRights Act of 1964. The opinion noted that, under Lemon, “it\\nis a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant\\ngovernmental interference with the ability of religious organ-\\nizations to define and carry out their religious missions.”\\nAmos, 483 U.S. at 335.\\n Any financial interaction between religion and govern-\\nment—like taxing a church, or exempting it from tax—entails\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 19\\n\\nsome degree of entanglement. But only excessive entangle-\\nment violates the Establishment Clause. See Walz, 307 U.S. at\\n674 (“We must also be sure that the end result—the effect—is\\nnot an excessive government entanglement with religion.”)\\nCrucial to our evaluation, the Supreme Court has already per-\\nmitted the level of entanglement incurred under § 107(2). In\\nHosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,\\n565 U.S. 171 (2012), the Court inquired into the facts underly-\\ning Hosanna-Tabor’s employment to determine whether she\\nwas a minister. Id. at 190–92. The IRS does the same under\\n§ 107(2) to determine whether a taxpayer qualifies as a minis-\\nter. The Court would not have so inquired if it violated the\\nEstablishment Clause.\\n In contrast, the application of § 119(a)(2) to ministers\\nwould entangle church and state far more than under\\n§ 107(2). For example, to determine what constitutes the busi-\\nness premises of the employer under § 119(a)(2), the IRS\\nwould have to determine what the “business” of the church is\\nand where and how far the “premises” of the church extend.\\nSee EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH 168–69 (2017).\\nTo do so, the IRS would need to interrogate ministers on the\\nspecifics of their worship activities, even determine which\\nactivities constitute “worship.” Such government inquiries\\ninto the internal affairs of churches to determine their eligibil-\\nity for tax relief have been rejected as excessive entanglement.\\nSee, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of Am. & Canada v.\\nMilivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708–20 (1976) (holding civil courts\\ncannot interfere with the rulings of ecclesiastical tribunals on\\nchurch affairs); Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475\\n(7th Cir. 2008) (“Congress does not want courts to interfere in\\nthe internal management of churches … .”).\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\n Worse, if subject to § 119(a)(2), congregations might alter\\ntheir religious activities to attempt to conform with its re-\\nquirements. Congress enacted § 107(2) in part to avoid that.\\nAnd congressional action “to minimize governmental inter-\\nference with the decision-making process in religions … does\\nnot violate the Establishment Clause.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 336\\n(internal citations and quotations omitted).\\n The categorical nature of § 107(2) also avoids excessive\\nentanglement by providing ministers and their churches cer-\\ntainty as to whether their housing allowances will be exempt\\nfrom tax. In Amos, the Supreme Court held “it is a significant\\nburden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of\\nsubstantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular\\ncourt will consider religious.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 336.\\n Recognizing the potentially excessive entanglement\\nthreatened by the application of § 119(a)(2) to ministers, Con-\\ngress enacted a less-entangling tax exemption. Seeking to\\navoid government entanglement is a secular legislative pur-\\npose under Lemon. See, e.g., Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives,\\n877 F.3d 1213, 1231 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court has\\nexpressly held that a purpose of avoiding government entan-\\nglement does not violate the Establishment Clause.”) (citing\\nAmos, 483 U.S. at 335). Because the government has articu-\\nlated not one, but three secular purposes, we conclude the\\nfirst prong of Lemon is satisfied.\\n B. Primary Effect of Advancing or Inhibiting Religion\\n The second prong of the Lemon test requires that a statute\\nhave a “principal or primary effect … that neither advances\\nnor inhibits religion.” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. “For a law to\\nhave forbidden ‘effects’ under Lemon, it must be fair to say\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 21\\n\\nthat the government itself has advanced religion through its\\nown activities and influence.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (emphasis\\nin original). This entails “sponsorship, financial support, and\\nactive involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”\\nWalz, 297 U.S. at 668.\\n FFRF contends the Supreme Court’s holdings in Amos and\\nWalz were superseded by Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion\\nin Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). That case\\nresolved an Establishment Clause challenge to a state tax ex-\\nemption for religious publications. To determine whether\\nJustice Brennan’s opinion controls, we examine the grounds\\nfor decision in Texas Monthly’s various concurrences. See\\nMarks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a frag-\\nmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explain-\\ning the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of\\nthe Court may be viewed as that position taken by those\\nMembers who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest\\ngrounds.”).\\n In Texas Monthly, Justice Brennan authored an opinion\\njoined by Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens and announced\\nthe result of the case; Justice White concurred in the result and\\nwrote separately; Justice Blackmun concurred in the result\\nand wrote for himself and Justice O’Connor; and Justice Scalia\\nfiled a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist\\nand Justice Kennedy. Justice Brennan’s opinion concluded\\nthat the tax exemption for religious publications violated the\\nEstablishment Clause because “[e]very tax exemption consti-\\ntutes a subsidy that affects nonqualifying taxpayers.” Texas\\nMonthly, 489 U.S. at 14 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). He\\nstated any subsidy directed “exclusively to religious organi-\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nzations that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause … can-\\nnot but convey a message of endorsement to slighted mem-\\nbers of the community.” Id. at 15 (internal citations and\\nquotations omitted).\\n The other opinions in Texas Monthly were narrower in\\nscope. Justice White’s concurrence reached the same result,\\nbut on an independent ground, the Press Clause. Justice\\nBlackmun’s concurrence agreed that the tax exemption vio-\\nlated the Establishment Clause, but did not adopt many of\\nJustice Brennan’s sweeping statements. Justice Blackmun\\nurged that the case be resolved narrowly and concluded only\\nthat “a tax exemption limited to the sale of religious literature\\nby religious organizations violates the Establishment Clause.”\\nId. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Be-\\ncause Justice Blackmun decided the case on Establishment\\nClause grounds,9 and on a narrower basis than Justice\\nBrennan’s opinion, under the Marks rule Justice Blackmun’s\\nconcurrence sets the rule of decision of Texas Monthly. His\\nconcurrence did not comment on what constitutes a forbid-\\nden effect under Lemon, so Texas Monthly does not alter our\\nanalysis of this second prong.\\n\\n\\n\\n 9 Even if Justice White’s opinion were based on narrower grounds\\nthan Justice Blackmun’s opinion, it reached the same result under a differ-\\nent constitutional clause. “Marks applies ‘only when one opinion is a log-\\nical subset of other, broader opinions.’” Gibson v. American Cyanamid Co.,\\n760 F.3d 600, 619 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781\\n(D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc)). Justice Blackmun’s opinion provided the fourth\\nand fifth votes in Texas Monthly and shared the “common denominator”\\nof resolving the issue under the Establishment Clause, so it controls. Gib-\\nson, 760 F.3d at 619 (quoting United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 884 (7th\\nCir. 2009)).\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 23\\n\\n With Walz and Amos still in effect, we evaluate forbidden\\neffects under their framework. FFRF contends a tax exemp-\\ntion for religion is identical to a government subsidy for reli-\\ngion. In economic terms, a subsidy and a tax exemption may\\nhave the same practical impact. See, e.g., Adam Chodorow,\\nThe Parsonage Allowance, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 854 (2018)\\n(“The claim that exemptions differ from direct subsidies for\\nEstablishment Clause purposes simply ignores economic re-\\nality.”). But the Supreme Court has already found a constitu-\\ntionally significant difference between the two on taxing\\nreligion. “The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship\\nsince the government does not transfer part of its revenue to\\nchurches but simply abstains from demanding that the\\nchurch support the state.” Walz, 397 U.S. at 675.10\\n Under Walz and Amos, then, § 107(2) does not advance re-\\nligion on behalf of the government. Providing a tax exemption\\ndoes not “connote[] sponsorship, financial support, and active\\ninvolvement of the [government] in religious activity” under\\nWalz, 397 U.S. at 668; see also Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (“[W]e do\\nnot see how any advancement of religion achieved by the [ex-\\nempt religious organization] can be fairly attributed to the\\nGovernment, as opposed to the Church.”).\\n Under these precedents, the primary effect of § 107(2) is\\nnot to advance religion on behalf of the government, but to\\n\\n 10 The Supreme Court tacitly reaffirmed this approach in its standing\\ndiscussion in Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 536 U.S. 125\\n(2011). There, it held taxpayers had no standing to challenge a tax credit\\ndirected primarily towards sectarian schools because “[w]hen the govern-\\nment declines to impose a tax, … there is no … connection between dis-\\nsenting taxpayer and alleged establishment.” Id. at 142.\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\n“allow[] churches to advance religion, which is their very pur-\\npose.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (emphasis in original). So § 107(2)\\npasses the second prong of Lemon.\\n C. Excessive Entanglement with Religion\\n The third prong of the Lemon test is whether the state “fos-\\nter[s] ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”\\nLemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674). We have\\naddressed this prong in Part III.A above. Because some level\\nof church-state interaction is unavoidable, “[e]ntanglement is\\na question of kind and degree.” Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684.\\nSection 107(2) avoids government inquiry into the use of a\\nminister’s home, but it still requires the IRS to determine who\\nqualifies as a minister eligible for the exemption. Even if the\\nIRS’s test for who qualifies as a minister involves entangle-\\nment, it is of a nature approved by the Supreme Court in\\nHosanna-Tabor. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190–95 (engag-\\ning in a fact-bound analysis to determine whether the peti-\\ntioner qualified as a minister). The alternative would be to\\nforce ministers to comply with the far more detailed and par-\\nticular, and thus more entangling, requirements of § 119(a)(2).\\n In answer to these concerns, Congress chose to enact\\n§ 107(2). Legislative determinations about the Establishment\\nClause, while not binding, are entitled to deference. “We in\\nthe Judiciary must be wary of interpreting [the Religion]\\nClauses in a manner that negates the legislative role alto-\\ngether.” Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concur-\\nring). Legislative deference is particularly great for\\nclassifications in tax legislation. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with\\nRepresentation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1997) (“Legis-\\nlatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifica-\\ntions and distinctions in tax statutes.”); Madden v. Kentucky,\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 25\\n\\n309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (holding that for tax classifications chal-\\nlenged under the Fourteenth Amendment, “the presumption\\nof constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit\\ndemonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive\\ndiscrimination against particular persons and classes”).\\nCongress decided § 107(2) is the less entangling option, so we\\nwill not disturb it.\\n We conclude § 107(2) has a secular legislative purpose, its\\nprincipal effect is neither to endorse nor to inhibit religion,\\nand it does not cause excessive government entanglement.\\nHere, “[t]here is no genuine nexus between tax exemption\\nand establishment of religion.” Walz, 397 U.S. at 675. Section\\n107(2), then, does not violate the Establishment Clause under\\nthe Lemon test.\\n IV.\\n We next examine whether § 107(2) passes the historical\\nsignificance test.11 The Supreme Court has held “the Estab-\\nlishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference to histori-\\ncal practices and understandings.’” Town of Greece v. Galloway,\\n572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014) (quoting Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil\\n\\n\\n 11 FFRF and amici curiae supporting appellees’ position offer no ar-\\nguments under the historical significance test, except to assert the test ap-\\nplies only to legislative prayer. We find no such limitation. Though Town\\nof Greece addressed legislative prayer, it stated that “the Establishment\\nClause must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and under-\\nstandings.’” 572 U.S. at 576 (quoting Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670\\n(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)). This\\nlanguage does not limit the application of the Town of Greece standard to\\nconstitutional challenges to legislative prayer. As this part discusses, other\\nSupreme Court cases have examined relevant history as to monuments as\\nwell as the ministerial exception.\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\nLiberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670\\n(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-\\nsenting in part)). This fact-bound test was developed in three\\ncases. First, in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality\\nopinion), the Court considered whether a monument\\ninscribed with the Ten Commandments on Texas government\\nproperty violated the Establishment Clause. Van Orden criti-\\ncized the Lemon test for ignoring the “strong role played by\\nreligion and religious traditions throughout our Nation’s\\nhistory.” Id. at 683. Instead, the Court reviewed a number of\\nhistorical examples of governments referencing God and dis-\\nplaying the Ten Commandments without issue. On that basis,\\nthe Court held the monument did not violate the Establish-\\nment Clause. Id. at 692.\\n Next, in Hosanna-Tabor, a unanimous Supreme Court held\\nthat the Establishment Clause prevents governments from in-\\nterfering with the decision of a religious group to terminate\\none of its ministers. In so deciding, the opinion explored the\\nhistory of church-state relations in the United States and Eng-\\nland, back to the Magna Carta. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182.\\nFrom that history, the Court determined that the First\\nAmendment was adopted in part to prevent “the new Federal\\nGovernment—unlike the English Crown—[from a] role in fill-\\ning ecclesiastical offices.” Id. at 184. This determination\\nformed the basis of the Court’s decision.\\n Finally, in Town of Greece the Supreme Court applied the\\nhistorical significance test when it held legislative prayer does\\nnot violate the Establishment Clause. The Court held that\\n“[a]ny test the Court adopts [for the Establishment Clause]\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 27\\n\\nmust acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Fram-\\ners and has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political\\nchange.” Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577.\\n We now apply the historical significance test to this case.\\nFFRF offers no evidence that provisions like § 107(2) were his-\\ntorically viewed as an establishment of religion. The govern-\\nment and intervenors, and amici curiae supporting their\\nposition, have provided substantial evidence of a lengthy\\ntradition of tax exemptions for religion, particularly for\\nchurch-owned properties. For over two centuries, the states\\nhave implemented church property tax exemptions in various\\nforms. See John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property:\\nHistorical Anomaly or Valid Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL.\\nL. REV. 363, 380 (1991) (“The colonial law exemption of church\\nproperty continued largely uninterrupted in the early dec-\\nades of the American republic.”); see also id. at 389–95 (detail-\\ning state protections for religious tax exemptions from the late\\n19th to early 20th centuries). When challenged on establish-\\nment grounds, such tax exemptions typically have been up-\\nheld. See, e.g., Trustees of Griswold College v. State, 46 Iowa 275,\\n282 (1877) (ruling the state constitution’s Establishment\\nClause “does not [implicate] the exemption from taxation of\\nsuch church property as the legislature may think proper”).\\n Congress has enacted federal tax exemptions for religious\\norganizations as far back as 1802, when it permitted the\\nCounty of Alexandria (then under federal control) to exempt\\nchurch property from taxation, see 7 Cong. Ch. 53, May 3,\\n1802, 2 Stat. 194, and as recently as 2002, the last time § 107\\nwas amended. See Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification\\nAct of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–181, 116 Stat. 583. As early as\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\\n\\n1885, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged and accepted re-\\nligious property tax exemptions in Gibbons v. District of\\nColumbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886), “reflecting more than a century\\nof our history and uninterrupted practice.” Walz, 397 U.S. at\\n680. Today, more than 2,600 federal and state tax laws provide\\nreligious exemptions. NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER,\\nPOLITICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT: PROVOCATIVE FIRST\\nAMENDMENT CONFLICTS 43 (2011).\\n The district court distinguished § 107(2) from this long\\nand continuing historical tradition of property tax exemp-\\ntions by noting the statute is an income tax exemption. We\\nfind this too fine a distinction, as it ignores the impact of the\\nSixteenth Amendment. Before 1913, Congress could not con-\\nstitutionally tax housing provided to ministers as part of their\\nincome. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601,\\n637 (1895) (invalidating a state income tax). Within a few\\nyears of income becoming taxable, Congress moved to\\nexclude parsonages from income, and a few decades later ex-\\ncluded cash housing allowances as well. Congress was con-\\ntinuing its “historical practice[]” of exempting certain church\\nresources from taxation. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576. This\\nendeavor limits entanglement between church and state, see\\nsupra at Part III.C. Given this history, we conclude § 107(2)\\ndoes not violate the Establishment Clause under the historical\\nsignificance test.\\n\\n V.\\n FFRF claims § 107(2) renders unto God that which is\\nCaesar’s. But this tax provision falls into the play between the\\njoints of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment\\nClause: neither commanded by the former, nor proscribed by\\n\\fNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280 29\\n\\nthe latter. We conclude § 107(2) is constitutional. The\\njudgment of the district court is REVERSED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1198,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4600633,"string":"4,600,633"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Rickey I. Kanter v. William P. Barr"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1478"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Joel Martin Flaum\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1478\\nRICKEY I. KANTER,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General\\nof the United States, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-1121 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 7, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Rickey I. Kanter pleaded guilty to\\none count of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Due to his fel-\\nony conviction, he is prohibited from possessing a firearm un-\\nder both federal and Wisconsin law. At issue in this case is\\nwhether the felon dispossession statutes—18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)—violate the Second\\nAmendment as applied to Kanter. Even if Kanter could bring\\n\\n2 No. 18-1478\\n\\nan as-applied challenge, the government has met its burden\\nof establishing that the felon dispossession statutes are sub-\\nstantially related to an important government interest. We\\ntherefore affirm the district court.\\n I. Background\\n A. Federal and Wisconsin Felon Dispossession Statutes\\n Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by persons\\nconvicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term\\nexceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). State misdemean-\\nors are included under the statute if they are punishable by\\nmore than two years in prison. 1 Id. § 921(a)(20)(B). However,\\nthe statute excludes anyone convicted of “any Federal or State\\noffenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade prac-\\ntices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to\\nthe regulation of business practices.” Id. § 921(a)(20)(A).\\nMoreover, “[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set\\naside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil\\nrights restored” is not a conviction for purposes of the statute.\\nId. § 921(a)(20).\\n Although the firearms prohibition generally applies for\\nlife, the statute includes a “safety valve” that permits individ-\\nuals to apply to the Attorney General for restoration of their\\nfirearms rights. Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 28 n.1\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1Accordingly, calling the statute a “felon” dispossession statute is\\nsomewhat of a “misnomer.” Carly Lagrotteria, Note, Heller's Collateral\\nDamage: As-Applied Challenges to the Felon-in-Possession Prohibition, 86 Ford-\\nham L. Rev. 1963, 1970 (2018).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 3\\n\\n(2007). Specifically, the Attorney General 2 may remove the\\nprohibition on a case-by-case basis if an applicant sufficiently\\nestablishes “that the circumstances regarding the disability,\\nand the applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the\\napplicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to\\npublic safety and that the granting of the relief would not be\\ncontrary to the public interest.” 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).\\n Since 1992, however, “Congress has repeatedly barred\\nthe Attorney General from using appropriated funds ‘to in-\\nvestigate or act upon [relief] applications,’” rendering the pro-\\nvision “inoperative.” Logan, 552 U.S. at 28 n.1 (quoting United\\nStates v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 74–75 (2002)). The Committee on\\nAppropriations eliminated funding because the restoration\\nprocedure under § 925(c) was “a very difficult task” that re-\\nquired ATF officials to “spend many hours investigating a\\nparticular applicant for relief.” H.R. Rep. No. 102-618, at 14\\n(1992). Even then, there was “no way to know with any cer-\\ntainty whether the applicant [was] still a danger to public\\nsafety.” Id. Accordingly, ATF officials were effectively “re-\\nquired to guess whether a convicted felon … [could] be en-\\ntrusted with a firearm.” Id. Moreover, they were “forced to\\nmake these decisions knowing that a mistake could have dev-\\nastating consequences for innocent citizens.” Id. Ultimately,\\nthe Committee determined that “the $3.75 million and the 40\\nman-years annually spent investigating and acting upon\\nthese applications for relief would be better utilized by ATF\\nin fighting violent crime.” Id. The Committee addressed the\\nfunding issue again in 1995, adding that “too many of these\\n\\n 2 The Attorney General delegated its authority under § 925(c) to the\\nBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”). 28 C.F.R.\\n§ 0.130(a)(1).\\n\\n4 No. 18-1478\\n\\nfelons whose gun ownership rights were restored went on to\\ncommit violent crimes with firearms.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-183,\\nat 15 (1995).\\n In 1981, Wisconsin adopted its own felon dispossession\\nlaw. See Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m). Section 941.29(1m) prohibits\\nan individual from possessing a firearm if he has “been con-\\nvicted of a felony in” Wisconsin or “a crime elsewhere that\\nwould be a felony” in Wisconsin. Id. § 941.29(1m)(a)–(b).\\n B. Factual Background\\n Kanter lives in Mequon, Wisconsin. He was previously the\\nowner, operator, and CEO of Rikco International, LLC. Rikco\\nInternational, which did business as “Dr. Comfort,” manufac-\\ntured therapeutic shoes and inserts for individuals with dia-\\nbetes and severe foot disease. The company marketed the\\nshoes and inserts to podiatrists, who in turn sold them to in-\\ndividual consumers. Most of the shoes and inserts were billed\\nto, and paid for by, Medicare. Medicare only paid for inserts\\nthat met certain thickness and hardness standards.\\n In April 2004, Kanter submitted his inserts to Medicare to\\ndetermine whether they met those requirements. Medicare\\nrejected Kanter’s inserts because they were too thin. Kanter\\nthen submitted revised samples, which Medicare approved.\\nHowever, Kanter continued to sell the noncompliant inserts\\nwhile representing that they were Medicare-approved. All\\ntold, Medicare paid Kanter’s company $375,000 for the non-\\ncompliant inserts.\\n On May 24, 2011, Kanter pleaded guilty to one count of\\nmail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 based on a shipment of the\\nnoncompliant inserts to a podiatrist in Florida. Section 1341\\ncarries a maximum penalty of twenty years in prison and a\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 5\\n\\n$250,000 fine. Kanter was sentenced to one year and one day\\nin prison and two years of supervised release. He was also\\nordered to pay a criminal penalty of $50,000, and he reim-\\nbursed Medicare over $27 million in a related civil settlement.\\n Kanter has since served his time and paid his criminal pen-\\nalty, and he has not been charged with any additional crimi-\\nnal activity. However, because of his felony conviction, he is\\npermanently prohibited from owning a firearm under federal\\nand Wisconsin law.\\n C. Procedural Background\\n Kanter brought suit in the Eastern District of Wisconsin,\\narguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)\\nare unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as ap-\\nplied to him. The United States moved to dismiss his claim\\nunder Rule 12(b)(6), and Wisconsin moved for judgment on\\nthe pleadings under Rule 12(c). In response, Kanter moved for\\nsummary judgment, arguing that his status as a nonviolent\\noffender with no other criminal record meant that both stat-\\nutes were unconstitutional as applied to him.\\n The district court granted defendants’ motions and denied\\nKanter’s motion. In so doing, the district court held that, even\\nassuming felons are entitled to Second Amendment protec-\\ntion, the application of the federal and Wisconsin felon dis-\\npossession laws to Kanter is substantially related to the gov-\\nernment’s important interest in preventing gun violence. The\\ncourt reasoned that Congress and the Wisconsin legislature\\nare entitled to categorically disqualify all felons—even nonvi-\\nolent felons like Kanter—because both have found that such\\nindividuals are more likely to abuse firearms. The court also\\nnoted that this “bright line categorical approach … allows for\\n\\n6 No. 18-1478\\n\\nuniform application and ease of administration.” The district\\ncourt entered judgment on January 2, 2018, and this appeal\\nfollowed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to\\ndismiss for failure to state a claim and a motion for judgment\\non the pleadings. Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Hilger, 838 F.3d 821,\\n824 (7th Cir. 2016). In doing so, “we accept all well-pleaded\\nfacts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’\\nfavor.” Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir.\\n2016). To avoid dismissal, “the complaint must ‘state a claim\\nto relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.\\nv. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).\\n A. Legal Standard 3\\n The Second Amendment states: “A well regulated Militia,\\nbeing necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the\\npeople to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S.\\nConst. amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme\\nCourt identified the “core” of the Second Amendment as “the\\nright of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in de-\\nfense of hearth and home.” 554 U.S. 570, 634–35. Accordingly,\\nthe Court concluded that Washington D.C.’s ban on handgun\\npossession in the home violated the Second Amendment. Id.\\nat 635.\\n However, the Court also made clear that “the right se-\\ncured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” Id. at 626.\\n\\n\\n 3 Because “the federal and state prohibitions are equivalent in effect”\\nas to Kanter, our Second Amendment analysis of the two statutes is the\\nsame. Baer v. Lynch, 636 F. App’x 695, 698–99 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 7\\n\\nAlthough the Court did not “undertake an exhaustive histor-\\nical analysis ... of the full scope of the Second Amendment,” it\\nsaid that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast\\ndoubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of fire-\\narms by felons and the mentally ill.” Id. It described such pro-\\nhibitions as “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.” Id.\\nat 627 n.26. Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the\\nCourt “repeat[ed] [its] assurances” that felon dispossession\\nlaws remain valid. 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (plurality opinion).\\n After Heller, we developed a two-step test for Second\\nAmendment challenges. “The threshold question is whether\\nthe regulated activity falls within the scope of the Second\\nAmendment.” Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888, 892 (7th\\nCir. 2017) (“Ezell II”). “This is a textual and historical inquiry;\\nif the government can establish that the challenged law regu-\\nlates activity falling outside the scope of the right as originally\\nunderstood, then ‘the regulated activity is categorically un-\\nprotected, and the law is not subject to further Second\\nAmendment review.’” Id. (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651\\nF.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Ezell I”)).\\n However, “if the historical evidence is inconclusive or sug-\\ngests that the regulated activity is not categorically unpro-\\ntected[,] then there must be a second inquiry into the strength\\nof the government’s justification for restricting or regulating\\nthe exercise of Second Amendment rights.” Id. (quoting Ezell\\nI, 651 F.3d at 703). At step two, we evaluate “the regulatory\\nmeans the government has chosen and the public-benefits\\nend it seeks to achieve.” Id. (quoting Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 703).\\nThe rigor of the review is dependent on “how close the law\\ncomes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the se-\\nverity of the law’s burden on the right.” Id. (quoting Ezell I,\\n\\n8 No. 18-1478\\n\\n651 F.3d at 703). “Severe burdens” on this core right “require\\na very strong public-interest justification and a close means-\\nend fit; lesser burdens, and burdens on activity lying closer to\\nthe margins of the right, are more easily justified.” Id. The\\ngovernment has the burden “of justifying its law under a\\nheightened standard of scrutiny; rational-basis review does\\nnot apply.” Id. We have consistently described step two as\\n“akin to intermediate scrutiny” and have required the gov-\\nernment to show that the challenged statute is substantially\\nrelated to an important governmental objective. United States\\nv. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing\\ncases).\\n B. As-Applied Second Amendment Challenges\\n Relying on the “presumptively lawful” language in Heller\\nand McDonald, every federal court of appeals to address the\\nissue has held that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second\\nAmendment on its face. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 406 F.\\nApp’x 52, 53–54 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d\\n281, 281–82 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. Moore,\\n666 F.3d 313, 318–19 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Barton, 633\\nF.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by\\nBinderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc);\\nSchrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 989–91 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert.\\ndenied, 571 U.S. 989 (2013); United States v. Joos, 638 F.3d 581,\\n586 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Khami, 362 F. App’x 501,\\n508 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 934 (2010); United\\nStates v. Battle, 347 F. App’x 478, 480 (11th Cir. 2009) (per cu-\\nriam); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir.\\n2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 970 (2010); United States v. Smith,\\n329 F. App’x 109, 110–11 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Ander-\\nson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 9\\n\\n However, courts of appeals are split as to whether as-ap-\\nplied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) are viable.\\nOn the one hand, the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh\\nCircuits have suggested that § 922(g)(1) is always constitu-\\ntional as applied to felons as a class, regardless of their indi-\\nvidual circumstances or the nature of their offenses. See Stim-\\nmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198, 210 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have\\nupheld § 922(g)(1), which disarms even non-violent felons.”\\n(citing United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2010),\\ncert. denied, 562 U.S. 895 (2010))); United States v. Scroggins, 599\\nF.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 867 (2010)\\n(rejecting as-applied Second Amendment challenge and hold-\\ning that felon dispossession laws are constitutional even if the\\noffense was nonviolent in nature); United States v. Rozier, 598\\nF.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 958 (2010)\\n(concluding that “statutes disqualifying felons from pos-\\nsessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not of-\\nfend the Second Amendment,” and holding that § 922(g)(1) is\\n“a constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment\\nright of certain classes of people,” including convicted felons);\\nUnited States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010),\\ncert. denied, 562 U.S. 921 (2010) (rejecting nonviolent felon’s as-\\napplied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) because\\n“felons are categorically different from the individuals who\\nhave a fundamental right to bear arms”); In re U.S., 578 F.3d\\n1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We have already rejected the no-\\ntion that Heller mandates an individualized inquiry concern-\\ning felons pursuant to § 922(g)(1).” (citing McCane, 573 F.3d at\\n1047)).\\n The First Circuit has not foreclosed as-applied challenges,\\nbut it has expressed some skepticism about them. In United\\nStates v. Torres-Rosario, the court rejected the defendant’s as-\\n\\n10 No. 18-1478\\n\\napplied challenge because he had two prior convictions for\\n“serious drug offenses.” 658 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011), cert.\\ndenied, 565 U.S. 1271 (2012). However, the court noted that the\\nSupreme Court “may be open to claims that some felonies do\\nnot indicate potential violence and cannot be the basis for ap-\\nplying a categorical ban,” and “might even be open to highly\\nfact-specific objections.” Id. Yet the First Circuit cautioned that\\n“such an approach, applied to countless variations in individ-\\nual circumstances, would obviously present serious problems\\nof administration, consistency and fair warning.” Id.\\n On the other hand, we, along with the Fourth, Eighth, and\\nD.C. Circuits, have left room for as-applied challenges to the\\nstatute. See United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir.\\n2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1092 (2010) (“[W]e recognize that\\n§ 922(g)(1) may be subject to an overbreadth challenge at\\nsome point because of its disqualification of all felons, includ-\\ning those who are non-violent.”); Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d\\n152, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“We need not decide today if it is\\never possible for a convicted felon to show that he may still\\ncount as a ‘law-abiding, responsible citizen’” entitled to Sec-\\nond Amendment protections.); United States v. Woolsey, 759\\nF.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Eighth Circuit has left\\nopen the possibility that a person could bring a successful as-\\napplied challenge to § 922(g)(1)” but rejected defendant’s as-\\napplied challenge because he had multiple violent felony con-\\nvictions.); United States v. Pruess, 703 F.3d 242, 247 (4th Cir.\\n2012) (holding that § 922(g)(1) could constitutionally be ap-\\nplied to nonviolent felons, but acknowledging that “there in\\ntheory might be an as-applied Second Amendment challenge\\nto [§] 922(g)(1) that could succeed” (citations and internal\\nquotation marks omitted)).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 11\\n\\n Neither we, nor the Fourth, Eighth, or D.C. Circuits, how-\\never, have ever actually upheld such a challenge in practice.\\nIn fact, we have repeatedly rejected as-applied Second\\nAmendment challenges to § 922(g). See Baer v. Lynch, 636 F.\\nApp’x 695, 698 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that § 922(g)(1) could\\nconstitutionally be applied to individual convicted of felony\\nrobbery); United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 750–51 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (concluding that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional as ap-\\nplied to individual who had been convicted of three violent\\nfelonies); Williams, 616 F.3d at 693–94 (holding that § 922(g)(1)\\nwas constitutional as applied to individual convicted of fel-\\nony robbery who “beat[] the victim so badly that the victim\\nrequired sixty-five stitches”); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d\\n638, 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (rejecting as-applied Sec-\\nond Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(9) brought by domes-\\ntic violence misdemeanant because violence was “an element\\nof the offense” and data suggested high rates of recidivism).\\n Indeed, only one federal court of appeals has upheld an\\nas-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g). In a\\nfractured en banc decision, a narrow majority of the Third Cir-\\ncuit (eight out of fifteen judges) held that § 922(g)(1) was un-\\nconstitutional as applied to two individuals convicted of a\\nmisdemeanor for corrupting a minor and a misdemeanor for\\nunlawfully carrying a handgun without a license, respec-\\ntively. Binderup, 836 F.3d at 340, 356. Because it is the only suc-\\ncessful as-applied Second Amendment challenge in a court of\\nappeals to date—and because Kanter relies heavily upon it—\\nit is worth examining the case at some length.\\n Seven members of the Third Circuit reasoned that the his-\\ntorical justification for disarming felons was “tied to the con-\\ncept of a virtuous citizenry,” and that “persons who have\\n\\n12 No. 18-1478\\n\\ncommitted serious crimes forfeit the right to possess firearms\\nmuch the way they forfeit other civil liberties.” Id. at 348–49\\n(plurality opinion) (citations and internal quotation marks\\nomitted). Applying the civic virtue rationale, three of those\\njudges concluded that the challengers’ offenses “were not se-\\nrious enough to strip them of their Second Amendment\\nrights.” Id. at 351. They explained that, although the two of-\\nfenses were punishable by more than a year in prison, and\\nthus met the definition of a felony in § 922(g), the state legis-\\nlatures had enacted them as misdemeanors, and “a state leg-\\nislature’s classification of an offense as a misdemeanor is a\\npowerful expression of its belief that the offense is not serious\\nenough to be disqualifying.” Id. Those judges also considered\\nthat neither of the offenses at issue involved violence and that\\neach of the challengers received “a minor sentence,” and they\\npointed to the lack of a “cross-jurisdictional consensus re-\\ngarding the seriousness of the [c]hallengers’ crimes,” remark-\\ning that in some states the challengers’ conduct was not even\\nillegal. Id. at 352. At step two, those three judges concluded\\nthat § 922(g)(1) did not survive intermediate scrutiny because\\nthe government relied on “off-point statistical studies” that\\ninvolved incarcerated felons, not misdemeanants who had\\nserved no jail time. Id. at 354.\\n By contrast, the other five judges who upheld the as-ap-\\nplied challenge believed that the exclusion of felons from the\\nscope of the Second Amendment’s protections was not rooted\\nin notions of civic virtue, but rather “the time-honored prin-\\nciple that the right to keep and bear arms does not extend to\\nthose likely to commit violent offenses.” Id. at 367 (Hardiman,\\nJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgments). Ap-\\nplying dangerousness as the touchstone, those judges con-\\ncluded that persons like the challengers who were convicted\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 13\\n\\nof nonviolent offenses fall within the scope of the Second\\nAmendment’s protection. Id. at 375–76. Moreover, those five\\njudges believed that § 922(g) was “categorically unconstitu-\\ntional” when applied to “non-dangerous persons convicted of\\noffenses unassociated with violence,” such that any subse-\\nquent means-end scrutiny or judicial interest balancing was\\n“inappropriate.” Id. at 358, 378.\\n The seven dissenting judges concluded that as-applied\\nchallenges to § 922(g)(1) are never permissible. Id. at 401\\n(Fuentes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dis-\\nsenting from the judgments). In doing so, they stressed that\\nthe majority’s decision to uphold such a challenge was un-\\nprecedented. See id. at 380–81 (“The plaintiffs ask us to do\\nsomething that no federal appellate court has done before.…\\nNo federal appellate court has yet upheld a challenge, facial\\nor as-applied, to the felon-in-possession statute.”). They criti-\\ncized the majority’s approach because it “saddle[s] district\\ncourt judges with a seemingly unending obligation to review\\nas-applied challenges” and “fail[s] to provide us with any\\nworkable standards that would make such a regime adminis-\\ntratively feasible or doctrinally coherent.” Id. at 380. Accord-\\ning to the dissent, the challengers’ claim failed at step one be-\\ncause “Heller itself tells us that felons are disqualified from\\nexercising their Second Amendment rights,” and “there is no\\nprincipled basis … for distinguishing felons from misde-\\nmeanants who commit crimes punishable by more than two\\nyears in prison.” Id. at 388. In any event, the dissenting judges\\nconcluded that § 922(g)(1) survives intermediate scrutiny be-\\ncause the government’s studies established a link between\\npast criminal conduct and the government’s important inter-\\nest in preventing future gun violence. See id. at 400–01. With\\n\\n14 No. 18-1478\\n\\nrespect to plaintiffs’ contention that the studies were not tai-\\nlored to their specific characteristics, the dissenting judges ex-\\nplained that “[t]he question is not whether someone exactly\\nlike the plaintiffs poses a threat to public safety,” but rather\\n“whether the fit between the challenged regulation and the\\nasserted objective [is] reasonable, not perfect.” Id. at 400 (al-\\nteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks\\nomitted). 4\\n With this background in mind, we now apply our two-\\nstep test to this case.\\n C. Step One: The Historical Evidence is Inconclusive as\\n to Whether Felons Were Categorically Excluded From\\n the Second Amendment’s Scope\\n The first question is whether nonviolent felons as a class\\nhistorically enjoyed Second Amendment rights. Heller did not\\nanswer this question. True, “some of Heller’s language does\\nlink Second Amendment rights with the notion[] of ‘law-abid-\\ning citizens.’” Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 669; see also Heller,\\n554 U.S. at 634–35 (observing that the “core” of the Second\\nAmendment right is “the right of law-abiding, responsible cit-\\nizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home” (emphasis\\nadded)). The Heller Court also cautioned that nothing in its\\ndecision “should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding pro-\\nhibitions on the possession of firearms by felons,” which it re-\\nferred to as “presumptively lawful.” 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26.\\nMoreover, the Court mentioned that certain individuals may\\n\\n\\n 4Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court\\ndenied the petitions for writ of certiorari. See Sessions v. Binderup, 137 S. Ct.\\n2323 (2017) (noting Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor would grant the pe-\\ntition); Binderup v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (same).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 15\\n\\nbe “disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment\\nrights.” Id. at 635. However, the Court never actually ad-\\ndressed the historical pedigree of felon dispossession laws.\\nAccordingly, we have refused to read too much into the\\nCourt’s “precautionary language.” Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640; see\\nalso Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 669 (“We are reluctant to place\\nmore weight on these passing references than the Court itself\\ndid.”). 5\\n Nor has the Seventh Circuit decided whether felons were\\nhistorically outside the scope of the Second Amendment’s\\nprotection. See Baer, 636 F. App’x at 698. Although the litigants\\nin Williams raised that question, we declined to address it and\\nproceeded directly to the intermediate scrutiny analysis. 616\\nF.3d at 692. In so doing, we noted that “[t]he academic writing\\non the subject of whether felons were excluded from firearm\\npossession at the time of the founding is ‘inconclusive at best,’\\nand we refrain[ed] … from making a determination based on\\ncontradictory views.” Id. (quoting Skoien, 614 F.3d at 650\\n(Sykes, J., dissenting)).\\n To be sure, although we have not expressly decided this\\nissue before, we have suggested that felons were not histori-\\ncally understood to have Second Amendment rights. For ex-\\nample, in Skoien, which involved domestic violence misde-\\nmeanants, we explained that some “categorical limits” on fire-\\narm possession were “part of the original meaning” of the\\nSecond Amendment. 614 F.3d at 640. Similarly, in United\\n\\n\\n 5 But see Berron v. Ill. Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd., 825 F.3d 843,\\n\\n847 (7th Cir. 2016) (“When holding in [Heller] that the Second Amendment\\nestablishes personal rights, the Court observed that only law-abiding per-\\nsons enjoy these rights, even at home.”).\\n\\n16 No. 18-1478\\n\\nStates v. Yancey, we opined that “most scholars of the Second\\nAmendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied to the\\nconcept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the gov-\\nernment could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens,’” including fel-\\nons. 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting\\nVongxay, 594 F.3d at 1118). 6\\n If, as we suggested in Yancey and as most scholars have\\nconcluded, the founders conceived of the right to bear arms\\nas belonging only to virtuous citizens, even nonviolent felons\\nlike Kanter would fall outside the scope of the Second\\n\\n\\n 6 Indeed, numerous legal historians have endorsed this view. See, e.g.,\\nSaul Cornell, “Don't Know Much About History” The Current Crisis in Second\\nAmendment Scholarship, 29 N. Ky. L. Rev. 657, 679 (2002) (“Perhaps the\\nmost accurate way to describe the dominant understanding of the right to\\nbear arms in the Founding era is as a civic right [that] … was limited to\\nthose members of the polity who were deemed capable of exercising it in\\na virtuous manner.”); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitu-\\ntion or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 Okla. L. Rev. 65, 96 (1983) (“Co-\\nlonial and English societies of the eighteenth century … excluded … felons\\n[from possessing firearms].”); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and\\nthe Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 266\\n(1983) (“Felons simply did not fall within the benefits of the common law\\nright to possess arms.”); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the\\nSecond Amendment, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461, 480 (1995) (“One implication of\\nthis emphasis on the virtuous citizen is that the right to arms does not\\npreclude laws disarming the unvirtuous (i.e. criminals) ….” (citation omit-\\nted)). Moreover, according to Thomas M. Cooley’s 1868 Treatise on Con-\\nstitutional Limitations, which the Heller court described as a “massively\\npopular” treatise written by “[t]he most famous” late-nineteenth-century\\nlegal scholar, 554 U.S. at 616, certain classes of people were “almost uni-\\nversally excluded” from exercising certain civic rights, including “the id-\\niot, the lunatic, and the felon, on obvious grounds.” Thomas M. Cooley, A\\nTreatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative\\nPower of the States of the American Union 29 (1st ed. 1868).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 17\\n\\nAmendment. Indeed, several courts of appeals have con-\\ncluded that nonviolent felons are outside the scope of the Sec-\\nond Amendment. For example, in Hamilton v. Pallozzi, the\\nFourth Circuit rejected a nonviolent felon’s as-applied Second\\nAmendment challenge to a state felon dispossession statute,\\nholding that “conviction of a felony necessarily removes one\\nfrom the class of ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ for pur-\\nposes of the Second Amendment.” 848 F.3d 614, 626 (4th Cir.\\n2017). Explaining that the defendant could not rebut the pre-\\nsumption that he fell outside the category of “‘law-abiding,\\nresponsible citizens,’” the court focused on his felony convic-\\ntion for fraud and theft crimes: “Theft, fraud, and forgery are\\nnot merely errors in filling out a form or some regulatory mis-\\ndemeanor offense; these are significant offenses reflecting dis-\\nrespect for the law.” Id. at 627 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635);\\nsee also Medina, 913 F.3d at 160 (“Whether a certain crime re-\\nmoves one from the category of ‘law-abiding and responsi-\\nble,’ in some cases, may be a close question,” such as “a mis-\\ndemeanor arising from a fistfight …. Those who commit felo-\\nnies however, cannot profit from our recognition of such bor-\\nderline cases.”); United States v. Hughley, 691 F. App’x 278, 279\\n(8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Restricting gun possession by\\nfelons—even nonviolent ones—differs meaningfully from re-\\nstricting citizens who have not been convicted of serious of-\\nfenses from having guns in their home for self-defense.”);\\nVongxay, 594 F.3d at 1115–16 (“declin[ing] to make a distinc-\\ntion between violent and non-violent felons” because “felons\\nare categorically different from the individuals who have a\\nfundamental right to bear arms”); Rozier, 598 F.3d at 771 & n.5\\n(stating that a nonviolent felon’s “Second Amendment right\\nto bear arms is not weighed in the same manner as that of a\\nlaw-abiding citizen” and analogizing felon-dispossession\\n\\n18 No. 18-1478\\n\\nstatutes to felon disenfranchisement laws); United States v.\\nEverist, 368 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Irrespective of\\nwhether his offense was violent in nature, a felon has shown\\nmanifest disregard for the rights of others. He may not justly\\ncomplain of the limitation on his liberty when his possession\\nof firearms would otherwise threaten the security of his fel-\\nlow citizens.”). 7\\n On the other hand, as Judge Sykes observed in her dissent\\nin Skoien, there is scholarly “disagree[ment] about the extent\\nto which felons … were considered excluded from the right to\\nbear arms during the founding era,” and “[t]he historical evi-\\ndence is inconclusive at best.” Skoien, 614 F.3d at 650 (Sykes,\\nJ., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 8 If the founders were really\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 Although Everist was issued before the Heller decision, the Fifth Cir-\\ncuit already recognized an individual right to bear arms pre-Heller and\\nreaffirmed the validity of the Everist decision after Heller. See Scroggins, 599\\nF.3d at 451.\\n 8 For support for Judge Sykes’s observation regarding the conflicting\\nscholarship on the historical conception of the Second Amendment, see,\\ne.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of A Theory: District of\\nColumbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 Hastings L.J. 1371, 1374 (2009)\\n(“[S]o far as I can determine, no colonial or state law in eighteenth-century\\nAmerica formally restricted the ability of felons to own firearms.”); C.\\nKevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. &\\nPub. Pol’y 695, 698 (2009) (“[A]ctual ‘longstanding’ precedent in America\\nand pre-Founding England suggests that a firearms disability can be con-\\nsistent with the Second Amendment to the extent that … its basis credibly\\nindicates a present danger that one will misuse arms against others and\\nthe disability redresses that danger.”); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22,\\n56 UCLA L. Rev. 1551, 1563 (2009) (“The Founding generation had no\\nlaws … denying the right to people convicted of crimes.”).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 19\\n\\njust concerned about dangerousness, not a lack of virtue, non-\\nviolent felons like Kanter arguably fall within the scope of the\\nSecond Amendment’s protections.\\n Ultimately, we need not resolve this difficult issue regard-\\ning the historical scope of the Second Amendment to dispose\\nof this case. Instead, we proceed to the means-end scrutiny of\\nthe government’s objectives. 9\\n D. Step Two: The Felon Dispossession Statutes Survive\\n Intermediate Scrutiny\\n Categorical prohibitions on the possession of firearms by\\nfelons are “presumptively lawful,” even in disqualifying non-\\nviolent felons like Kanter. See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640 (“[S]uch\\na recent extension of [§ 922(g)(1)’s] disqualification to non-vi-\\nolent felons (embezzlers and tax evaders, for example) is pre-\\nsumptively constitutional, as Heller said in note 26.”). But be-\\ncause “Heller referred to felon disarmament bans only as ‘pre-\\nsumptively lawful,’” we require the government to “prov[e]\\n\\n 9 In fact, we usually defer the threshold historical scope inquiry and\\nproceed directly to means-end scrutiny. See, e.g., Horsley v. Trame, 808 F.3d\\n1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 2015) (declining to decide whether eighteen- to twenty-\\nyear-olds are within the scope of the Second Amendment); Yancey, 621\\nF.3d at 684–85. One notable exception to our generally restrained ap-\\nproach in this area is United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir.\\n2015). There, the majority held that undocumented immigrants were his-\\ntorically within the scope of the Second Amendment but ultimately con-\\ncluded that the statute at issue nevertheless survived intermediate scru-\\ntiny. Id. at 669–73. The concurrence advocated for a “prudential approach”\\nsince we did not need to decide the threshold question to resolve the case,\\nand proposed “reserv[ing] resolution of this challenging constitutional\\nquestion for a case that compels addressing it.” Id. at 673–74 (Flaum, J.,\\nconcurring in the judgment). We think that prudential approach is appro-\\npriate here.\\n\\n20 No. 18-1478\\n\\n“the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) … using the intermediate\\nscrutiny framework.” Williams, 616 F.3d at 692.\\n To survive intermediate scrutiny at step two, the govern-\\nment must show that the felon dispossession statute is sub-\\nstantially related to an important governmental objective.\\nConsistent with how we apply intermediate scrutiny in the\\nFirst Amendment context, the “fit” between the challenged\\nregulation and the asserted governmental objective need only\\n“be reasonable, not perfect.” United States v. Marzzarella, 614\\nF.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010); cf. FTC v. Trudeau, 662 F.3d 947, 953\\n(7th Cir. 2011). 10\\n The government has met its burden in this case. First, Kan-\\nter concedes that the government’s objective in passing\\n§ 922(g)(1) was an important one. The government identifies\\nits interest as preventing gun violence by keeping firearms\\naway from persons, such as those convicted of serious crimes,\\nwho might be expected to misuse them. This formulation of\\nthe government’s interest is consistent with our precedent in\\nthis area. See Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683 (“Congress enacted the\\nexclusions in § 922(g) to keep guns out of the hands of pre-\\n\\n\\n 10 Our means-end review is arguably less rigorous in this case because\\n\\nthe weight of the historical evidence summarized above suggests that\\nfelon dispossession laws do not restrict the “core right of armed defense,”\\nbut rather burden “activity lying closer to the margins of the right.” Ezell\\nII, 846 F.3d at 892. Indeed, we have said that “the state can prevail with\\nless evidence when, as in Skoien, guns are forbidden to a class of persons\\nwho present a higher than average risk of misusing a gun.” Moore, 702\\nF.3d at 940. We have even gone so far as to say that “empirical evidence of\\na public safety concern can be dispensed with altogether when the ban is\\nlimited to obviously dangerous persons such as felons and the mentally\\nill.” Id.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 21\\n\\nsumptively risky people.”); Williams, 616 F.3d at 693 (describ-\\ning the government’s objective as “keep[ing] firearms out of\\nthe hands of violent felons, who the government believes are\\noften those most likely to misuse firearms”); Skoien, 614 F.3d\\nat 642 (describing the government’s interest as “preventing\\narmed mayhem”). And we have previously held that this in-\\nterest is “without doubt an important one.” Yancey, 621 F.3d\\nat 684; see also Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 673 (“[T]he govern-\\nment has a[] strong interest in preventing people who already\\nhave disrespected the law (including … felons …) from pos-\\nsessing guns.”).\\n Second, the government has shown that prohibiting even\\nnonviolent felons like Kanter from possessing firearms is sub-\\nstantially related to its interest in preventing gun violence. Be-\\nfore turning to the government’s statistical evidence estab-\\nlishing such a link, it is important to note that we do not write\\non a blank slate. In Yancey, we explained that “most felons are\\nnonviolent, but someone with a felony conviction on his rec-\\nord is more likely than a nonfelon to engage in illegal and vi-\\nolent gun use.” 621 F.3d at 685. In fact, the D.C. Circuit has\\nconcluded that “nonviolent offenders not only have a higher\\nrecidivism rate than the general population, but certain\\ngroups—such as property offenders—have an even higher re-\\ncidivism rate than violent offenders, and a large percentage of\\nthe crimes nonviolent recidivists later commit are violent.”\\nKaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see\\nEwing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 26 (2003) (citing P. Langan &\\nD. Levin, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Spe-\\ncial Report: Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, at 1 (June\\n2002)).\\n\\n22 No. 18-1478\\n\\n In addition to these judicial statements, the government\\npoints to several studies that have found a connection be-\\ntween nonviolent offenders like Kanter and a risk of future\\nviolent crime. For example, one study of 210,886 nonviolent\\noffenders found that about one in five were rearrested for a\\nviolent crime within three years of his or her release. See U.S.\\nDep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Profile of Nonviolent\\nOffenders Exiting State Prisons 2, 4 (2004). A separate study\\nfound that 28.5 percent of nonviolent property offenders—a\\ncategory that includes fraud convictions—were rearrested for\\na violent offense within five years of their release. See Mat-\\nthew R. Durose, et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice\\nStatistics, Recidivism of Prisoner Released in 30 States in 2005:\\nPatterns from 2005 to 2010, at 9 (2014). Yet another study found\\nthat “even handgun purchasers with only 1 prior misdemeanor\\nconviction and no convictions for offenses involving firearms\\nor violence were nearly 5 times as likely as those with no prior\\ncriminal history to be charged with new offenses involving\\nfirearms or violence.” Garen J. Wintemute, et al., Prior Misde-\\nmeanor Convictions as a Risk Factor for Later Violent and Firearm-\\nRelated Criminal Activity Among Authorized Purchasers of Hand-\\nguns, 280 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 2083, 2083 (1998) (emphasis\\nadded). 11\\n\\n\\n\\n 11 Even the study that Kanter relies upon found that approximately 40\\n\\npercent of individuals convicted of mail fraud had at least one additional\\narrest afterward. David Weisburd & Elin Waring, White-Collar Crime and\\nCriminal Careers 12, 29 (2004). The same study found that 24.5 percent of\\nall repeat white-collar offenders had at least one violent arrest on their\\nrecord. Id. at 45. In other words, “white-collar offenders often have multi-\\nple contacts with the criminal justice system” and “are unlikely to evi-\\ndence a high degree of specialization.” Id. at 49.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 23\\n\\n Kanter’s only response to the government’s statistical\\nstudies is that they are not tailored enough to his “individual\\ncircumstances.” Specifically, Kanter asks the Court “to con-\\nsider the fact that [he] is a first-time, non-violent offender with\\nno history of violence, firearm misuses, or subsequent convic-\\ntions.” Kanter also points out that he is “employed, married,\\nand does not use illicit drugs, all of which correspond with\\nlower rates of recidivism.” In short, Kanter argues that to\\nmeet its burden the government must show “a substantial re-\\nlationship between denying Mr. Kanter a firearm and further-\\ning the government’s objective of preventing firearm misuse\\nand armed violence.”\\n Kanter is mistaken. In Skoien we held that “Congress is not\\nlimited to case-by-case exclusions of persons who have been\\nshown to be untrustworthy with weapons, nor need these\\nlimits be established by evidence presented in court. Heller\\ndid not suggest that disqualifications would be effective only\\nif the statute’s benefits are first established by admissible evi-\\ndence.” 614 F.3d at 641. Of course, not all nonviolent felons\\nwill later commit a violent crime with a firearm. In that sense,\\nthe statute is “somewhat over-inclusive.” United States v.\\nChapman, 666 F.3d 220, 231 (4th Cir. 2012). However, that\\n“does not undermine [the statute’s] constitutionality … be-\\ncause it merely suggests that the fit is not a perfect one; a rea-\\nsonable fit is all that is required under intermediate scrutiny.”\\nId.; see also Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97–98 (analogizing to inter-\\nmediate scrutiny in First Amendment context).\\n Here, unlike the challengers in Binderup, who were con-\\nvicted of “non-serious” state misdemeanors and served no\\nprison time, Kanter was convicted of a serious federal felony\\nfor conduct broadly understood to be criminal, and he did not\\n\\n24 No. 18-1478\\n\\nface a minor sentence. 836 F.3d at 353 & n.6. Instead, Kanter is\\nmore akin to the challenger in Hamilton, whose fraud and\\ntheft convictions were “black-letter mala in se felonies reflect-\\ning grave misjudgment and maladjustment.” 848 F.3d at 627.\\nKanter’s crime—defrauding the federal government out of\\nhundreds of thousands of dollars—“reflect[s] significant dis-\\nrespect for the law.” Id. at 627 n.14; see also Medina, 913 F.3d at\\n160 (rejecting as-applied challenge where plaintiff was con-\\nvicted of “felony fraud—a serious crime, malum in se, that is\\npunishable in every state”). Thus, Kanter’s serious felony con-\\nviction prevents him from challenging the constitutionality of\\n§ 922(g)(1) as applied to him. 12\\n We are further assured in our decision because the highly-\\nindividualized approach Kanter proposes raises serious insti-\\ntutional and administrative concerns. See Torres-Rosario, 658\\nF.3d at 113 (“[S]uch an approach, applied to countless varia-\\ntions in individual circumstances, would obviously present\\nserious problems of administration, consistency and fair\\nwarning.”); see also Medina, 913 F.3d at 159–60 (rejecting argu-\\nment that “non-dangerous felons have a right to bear arms”\\n\\n\\n 12 We decline to revisit our comment in Williams “that § 922(g)(1) may\\nbe subject to an overbreadth challenge at some point because of its dis-\\nqualification of all felons, including those who are non-violent.” 616 F.3d\\nat 693. That statement was dictum, and we need not determine whether\\n§ 922(g)(1) may ever be subject to an as-applied challenge to reach our de-\\ncision in this case. There may be a case in the future that requires address-\\ning whether any individual may successfully bring an as-applied chal-\\nlenge to the statute, but Kanter’s is not that case. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma,\\n413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973) (“[A] person to whom a statute may constitution-\\nally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground\\nthat it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other\\nsituations not before the Court.”).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 25\\n\\nbecause “[u]sing an amorphous ‘dangerousness’ standard to\\ndelineate the scope of the Second Amendment would require\\nthe government to make case-by-case predictive judgments\\nbefore barring the possession of weapons”). As mentioned\\nabove, Congress previously allowed the ATF to restore a\\nfelon’s gun rights under § 925(c) if the agency determined that\\n“the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous\\nto public safety and that the granting of the relief would not\\nbe contrary to the public interest.” 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). How-\\never, Congress abandoned that approach after finding that\\nthe dangerousness inquiry was a “very difficult” and time-in-\\ntensive task, H.R. Rep. No. 102-618, at 14 (1992), and that “too\\nmany of these felons whose gun ownership rights were re-\\nstored went on to commit violent crimes with firearms.” H.R.\\nRep. No. 104-183, at 15 (1995). Congress’s failed attempt to\\ndelegate this investigative task to a law enforcement agency\\n“should have a profound impact on our tailoring analysis.”\\nBinderup, 836 F.3d at 403 (Fuentes, J., concurring in part, dis-\\nsenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment).\\n At bottom, the fact-specific inquiry Kanter asks this Court\\nto undertake is “a function best performed by the Executive,\\nwhich, unlike courts, is institutionally equipped for conduct-\\ning a neutral, wide-ranging investigation.” Bean, 537 U.S. at\\n77; see also Pontarelli v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 285 F.3d 216,\\n231 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Unlike ATF, courts possess neither the re-\\nsources to conduct the requisite investigations nor the exper-\\ntise to predict accurately which felons may carry guns with-\\nout threatening the public’s safety.”). Moreover, “[i]n the con-\\ntext of firearm regulation, the legislature is far better\\nequipped than the judiciary to make sensitive public policy\\njudgments (within constitutional limits) concerning the dan-\\ngers in carrying firearms and the manner to combat those\\n\\n26 No. 18-1478\\n\\nrisks.” Schrader, 704 F.3d at 990 (citation and internal quota-\\ntion marks omitted).\\n In sum, the government has established that the felon dis-\\npossession statutes are substantially related to the important\\ngovernmental objective of keeping firearms away those con-\\nvicted of serious crimes. Because Kanter was convicted of a\\nserious federal felony for conduct broadly understood to be\\ncriminal, his challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is\\nwithout merit.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\\ndistrict court.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 27\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4377886/\", \"author_raw\": \"Joel Martin Flaum\"}, {\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting. History is consistent\\nwith common sense: it demonstrates that legislatures have the\\npower to prohibit dangerous people from possessing guns.\\nBut that power extends only to people who are dangerous.\\nFounding-era legislatures did not strip felons of the right to\\nbear arms simply because of their status as felons. Nor have\\nthe parties introduced any evidence that founding-era\\nlegislatures imposed virtue-based restrictions on the right;\\nsuch restrictions applied to civic rights like voting and jury\\nservice, not to individual rights like the right to possess a gun.\\nIn 1791—and for well more than a century afterward—\\nlegislatures disqualified categories of people from the right to\\nbear arms only when they judged that doing so was necessary\\nto protect the public safety.\\n 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and Wisconsin Statute § 941.29(1m)\\nwould stand on solid footing if their categorical bans were\\ntailored to serve the governments’ undeniably compelling\\ninterest in protecting the public from gun violence. But their\\ndispossession of all felons—both violent and nonviolent—is\\nunconstitutional as applied to Kanter, who was convicted of\\nmail fraud for falsely representing that his company’s\\ntherapeutic shoe inserts were Medicare-approved and billing\\nMedicare accordingly. Neither Wisconsin nor the United\\nStates has introduced data sufficient to show that disarming\\nall nonviolent felons substantially advances its interest in\\nkeeping the public safe. Nor have they otherwise\\ndemonstrated that Kanter himself shows a proclivity for\\nviolence. Absent evidence that he either belongs to a\\ndangerous category or bears individual markers of risk,\\n\\n28 No. 18-1478\\n\\npermanently disqualifying Kanter from possessing a gun\\nviolates the Second Amendment. 1\\n I.\\n At the outset, it is worth clarifying a conceptual point.\\nThere are competing ways of approaching the\\nconstitutionality of gun dispossession laws. Some maintain\\nthat there are certain groups of people—for example, violent\\nfelons—who fall entirely outside the Second Amendment’s\\nscope. See, e.g., Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 357\\n(3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Hardiman, J., concurring in part and\\nconcurring in the judgments) (“[T]he Founders understood\\nthat not everyone possessed Second Amendment rights.\\nThese appeals require us to decide who count among ‘the\\npeople’ entitled to keep and bear arms.”). Others maintain\\nthat all people have the right to keep and bear arms but that\\nhistory and tradition support Congress’s power to strip\\ncertain groups of that right. See Eugene Volokh, Implementing\\nthe Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical\\nFramework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1497–\\n98 (2009) (describing these competing views). These\\napproaches will typically yield the same result; one uses\\nhistory and tradition to identify the scope of the right, and the\\nother uses that same body of evidence to identify the scope of\\nthe legislature’s power to take it away.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1Because the federal and state statutes operate to the same effect as\\napplied to Kanter, my analysis applies equally to both. For simplicity’s\\nsake, I often refer only to the federal statute. In addition, I sometimes refer\\nto the statutes as imposing a “felon ban” or “felon dispossession” with the\\nunderstanding that § 922(g)(1) also encompasses state misdemeanors\\npunishable by more than two years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 29\\n\\n In my view, the latter is the better way to approach the\\nproblem. It is one thing to say that certain weapons or\\nactivities fall outside the scope of the right. See District of\\nColumbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (explaining that\\n“the sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common use\\nat the time’” (citation omitted)); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846\\nF.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2017) (Ezell II) (“[I]f … the challenged\\nlaw regulates activity falling outside the scope of the right as\\noriginally understood, then ‘the regulated activity is\\ncategorically unprotected, and the law is not subject to further\\nSecond Amendment review.’” (citation omitted)); Ezell v. City\\nof Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011) (Ezell I) (drawing\\nan analogy between categories of speech, like obscenity, that\\nfall outside the First Amendment and activities that fall\\noutside the Second Amendment). It is another thing to say\\nthat certain people fall outside the Amendment’s scope. Arms\\nand activities would always be in or out. But a person could\\nbe in one day and out the next: the moment he was convicted\\nof a violent crime or suffered the onset of mental illness, his\\nrights would be stripped as a self-executing consequence of\\nhis new status. No state action would be required.\\n To be sure, under this theory such a person could possess\\na gun as a matter of legislative grace. But he would lack\\nstanding to assert constitutional claims that other citizens\\ncould assert. For example, imagine that a legislature\\ndisqualifies those convicted of crimes of domestic violence\\nfrom possessing a gun for a period of ten years following\\nrelease from prison. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638,\\n642 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding constitutional 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g)(9), which forbids those convicted of crimes of\\ndomestic violence to possess a gun). After fifteen years pass,\\na domestic violence misdemeanant challenges a handgun ban\\n\\n30 No. 18-1478\\n\\nidentical to the one that the Court held unconstitutional in\\nHeller. Despite the legislative judgment that such a person\\ncould safely possess a gun after ten years, a court would still\\nhave to determine whether the person had standing to assert\\na Second Amendment claim. If the justification for the initial\\ndeprivation is that the person falls outside the protection of\\nthe Second Amendment, it doesn’t matter if the statutory\\ndisqualification expires. If domestic violence misdemeanants\\nare out, they’re out. 2\\n That is an unusual way of thinking about rights. In other\\ncontexts that involve the loss of a right, the deprivation occurs\\nbecause of state action, and state action determines the scope\\nof the loss (subject, of course, to any applicable constitutional\\nconstraints). Felon voting rights are a good example: a state\\ncan disenfranchise felons, but if it refrains from doing so, their\\nvoting rights remain constitutionally protected. 3 So too with\\n\\n 2 Or at least that would be true absent the unlikely event that the\\nSecond Amendment, as originally understood, imposed a very specific\\nrestriction on the length of time that such a misdemeanant was excluded\\nfrom the right.\\n 3 Felon disenfranchisement laws have a long history, and the\\nFourteenth Amendment’s protection of the right to vote expressly\\nacknowledges the authority of state legislatures to enact such laws. U.S.\\nCONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (providing that a state’s representation in the\\nHouse will be reduced if the right to vote “is denied … or in any way\\nabridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime”). The\\nSecond Amendment contains no similar acknowledgement. Legislative\\npower to strip the right from certain people or groups was nonetheless a\\nhistorically accepted feature of the pre-existing right that the Second\\nAmendment protects. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (“[T]he Second\\nAmendment … codified a pre-existing right.”); id. at 595 (“Of course the\\nright was not unlimited ….”); Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640 (“That some\\ncategorical limits are proper is part of the original meaning, leaving to the\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 31\\n\\nthe right to keep and bear arms: a state can disarm certain\\npeople (for example, those convicted of crimes of domestic\\nviolence), but if it refrains from doing so, their rights remain\\nconstitutionally protected. In other words, a person convicted\\nof a qualifying crime does not automatically lose his right to\\nkeep and bear arms but instead becomes eligible to lose it.\\n In addition to being analytically awkward, the “scope of\\nthe right” approach is at odds with Heller itself. There, the\\nCourt interpreted the word “people” as referring to “all\\nAmericans.” 554 U.S. at 580–81; see also id. at 580 (asserting\\nthat “the people” “refers to a class of persons who are part of\\na national community or who have otherwise developed\\nsufficient connection with this country to be considered part\\nof that community” (citation omitted)). Neither felons nor the\\nmentally ill are categorically excluded from our national\\ncommunity. That does not mean that the government cannot\\nprevent them from possessing guns. Instead, it means that the\\nquestion is whether the government has the power to disable\\nthe exercise of a right that they otherwise possess, rather than\\nwhether they possess the right at all.\\n Thus, I treat Kanter as falling within the scope of the\\nSecond Amendment and ask whether Congress and\\nWisconsin can nonetheless prevent him from possessing a\\ngun.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\npeople’s elected representatives the filling in of details.”). Thus, such a\\nregulation does not “infringe” the right to bear arms because the right was\\nalways qualified by the government’s power to prevent the dangerous\\nfrom exercising it.\\n\\n32 No. 18-1478\\n\\n II.\\n Heller did not “undertake an exhaustive historical\\nanalysis … of the full scope of the Second Amendment,” but\\nit did offer a list of “presumptively lawful regulatory\\nmeasures,” including “longstanding prohibitions on the\\npossession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.” See\\nHeller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26. Like the majority, I am\\n“reluctant to place more weight on these passing references\\nthan the Court itself did.” See Maj. Op. at 15 (quoting United\\nStates v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2015)). The\\nconstitutionality of felon dispossession was not before the\\nCourt in Heller, and because it explicitly deferred analysis of\\nthis issue, the scope of its assertion is unclear. For example,\\ndoes “presumptively lawful” mean that such regulations are\\npresumed lawful unless a historical study shows otherwise?\\nDoes it mean that as-applied challenges are available? Does\\nthe Court’s reference to “felons” suggest that the legislature\\ncannot disqualify misdemeanants from possessing guns?\\nDoes the word “longstanding” mean that prohibitions of\\nrecent vintage are suspect? As we observed in Skoien, judicial\\nopinions are not statutes, and we don’t dissect them word-by-\\nword as if they were. 614 F.3d at 640. Thus, I agree with the\\nmajority that Heller’s dictum does not settle the question\\nbefore us.\\n It does, however, give us a place to start. Heller’s reference\\nendorses the proposition that the legislature can impose some\\ncategorical bans on the possession of firearms. See id. (“That\\nsome categorical limits are proper is part of the original\\nmeaning.”). Our task is to determine whether all felons—\\nviolent and nonviolent alike—comprise one such category.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 33\\n\\n Wisconsin and the United States advance three basic\\nhistorical arguments in support of this categorical exclusion.\\nFirst, they say that there is some evidence suggesting that\\nfounding-era legislatures deprived felons of the right. Second,\\nthey argue that because the states put felons to death at the\\ntime of the founding, no one would have questioned their\\nauthority to take felons’ guns too. And third, they insist that\\nfounding-era legislatures permitted only virtuous citizens to\\nhave guns, and felons are not virtuous citizens.\\n As I explain below, none of these rationales supports the\\nproposition that the legislature can permanently deprive\\nfelons of the right to possess arms simply because of their\\nstatus as felons. The historical evidence does, however,\\nsupport a different proposition: that the legislature may\\ndisarm those who have demonstrated a proclivity for violence\\nor whose possession of guns would otherwise threaten the\\npublic safety. This is a category simultaneously broader and\\nnarrower than “felons”—it includes dangerous people who\\nhave not been convicted of felonies but not felons lacking\\nindicia of dangerousness.\\n A.\\n The best historical support for a legislative power to\\npermanently dispossess all felons would be founding-era\\nlaws explicitly imposing—or explicitly authorizing the\\nlegislature to impose—such a ban. But at least thus far,\\nscholars have not been able to identify any such laws. The\\nonly evidence coming remotely close lies in proposals made\\nin the New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania\\nratifying conventions. In recommending that protection for\\nthe right to arms be added to the Constitution, each of these\\nproposals included limiting language arguably tied to\\n\\n34 No. 18-1478\\n\\ncriminality. See, e.g., Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and\\nthe Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV.\\n204, 222, 266 (1983); Steven P. Halbrook, The Right of the People\\nor the Power of the State: Bearing Arms, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 131,\\n147, 185 (1991); see also C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha\\nStewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 712 (2009)\\n(“For relevant authority before World War I for disabling\\nfelons from keeping firearms, then, one is reduced to three\\nproposals emerging from the ratification of the\\nConstitution.”).\\n A majority of the New Hampshire convention\\nrecommended that a bill of rights include the following\\nprotection: “Congress shall never disarm any citizen, unless\\nsuch as are or have been in actual rebellion.” See 1 JONATHAN\\nELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON\\nTHE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 326 (2d ed. 1891)\\n(emphasis added). In the Massachusetts convention, Samuel\\nAdams proposed to protect the right to arms with the\\nfollowing language: “And that the said Constitution be never\\nconstrued to authorize Congress to … prevent the people of\\nthe United States, who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their\\nown arms.” See 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A\\nDOCUMENTARY HISTORY 675, 681 (1971) (emphasis added).\\nFinally, the influential Pennsylvania Minority suggested an\\naddition stating: “That the people have a right to bear arms\\nfor the defense of themselves and their own State or the\\nUnited States, or for the purpose of killing game; and no law\\nshall be passed for disarming the people or any of them unless\\nfor crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from\\nindividuals ….” 2 SCHWARTZ, supra, at 662, 665 (emphasis\\nadded). On the basis of these three proposals some conclude\\nthat “[a]ll the ratifying convention proposals which most\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 35\\n\\nexplicitly detailed the recommended right-to-arms\\namendment excluded criminals and the violent.” See, e.g.,\\nKates, 82 MICH. L. REV. at 266.\\n Several things bear emphasis here. First, none of the\\nrelevant limiting language made its way into the Second\\nAmendment. Second, only New Hampshire’s proposal—the\\nleast restrictive of the three—even carried a majority of its\\nconvention. See 2 SCHWARTZ, supra, at 628, 675, 758. Third,\\nproposals from other states that advocated a constitutional\\nright to arms did not contain similar language of limitation or\\nexclusion. See Kates, 82 MICH. L. REV. at 222 (citing 1 ELLIOT,\\nsupra, at 328, 335). And finally, similar limitations or\\nexclusions do not appear in any of the four parallel state\\nconstitutional provisions enacted before ratification of the\\nSecond Amendment. See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional\\nRights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 191, 208\\n(2006) (North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont,\\nMassachusetts). All that said, these proposals may “indicate\\nsome common if imprecise understanding at the Founding\\nregarding the boundaries of a right to keep and bear arms.”\\nMarshall, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y at 713. And at a\\nminimum, the fact that they are routinely invoked in support\\nof blanket felon disarmament makes it necessary to consider\\nthem.\\n I’ll begin with the New Hampshire proposal, which did\\nnot embrace the disarmament of all felons, but rather of those\\ncitizens who “are or have been in actual rebellion.” 1 ELLIOT,\\nsupra, at 326 (emphasis added). This limitation targeted a\\nnarrow group because “rebellion” was a very specific crime.\\nSee Rebellion, 2 NEW UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH\\nDICTIONARY (4th ed. 1756) (explaining that the term is “now\\n\\n36 No. 18-1478\\n\\nused for a traiterous taking up arms, or a tumultuous\\nopposing the authority of the king, etc. or supreme power in\\na nation”). There are obvious reasons why the government\\nwould take guns away from those bent on overthrowing it,\\nand, as I discuss later, stripping rebels of their gun rights\\nfollowed well-established practice in both England and the\\ncolonies. Thus, while this proposal reflects support for\\ndisarming rebels, it does not say anything about disarming\\nthose who have committed other crimes, much less\\nnonviolent ones.\\n Samuel Adams’s proposed language to the Massachusetts\\nconvention, which would have limited the right to “peaceable\\ncitizens,” see 2 SCHWARTZ, supra, at 681, sweeps more\\nbroadly—but not so broadly that it encompasses all criminals,\\nor even all felons. At the time, “peaceable” was defined as\\n“[f]ree from war; free from tumult”; “[q]uiet; undisturbed”;\\n“[n]ot violent; not bloody”; “[n]ot quarrelsome; not\\nturbulent.” 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH\\nLANGUAGE (5th ed. 1773). Those who “breach[ed] the peace”\\ncaused “[a] violation of the public peace, as by a riot, affray,\\nor any tumult which is contrary to law, and destructive to the\\npublic tranquility.” See Breach, NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN\\nDICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828); see also Atwater\\nv. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 327 & n.2 (2001) (noting some\\n“variations in the common-law usage of the term ‘breach of\\nthe peace’” but assuming that the definition “entail[ed] at\\nleast a threat of violence”); id. (quoting MICHAEL DALTON, THE\\nCOUNTRY JUSTICE 9 (1727) (“The Breach of th[e] Peace seemeth\\nto be any injurious Force or Violence moved against the\\nPerson of another, his Goods, Lands, or other Possessions,\\nwhether by threatening words, or by furious Gesture, or Force\\nof the Body, or any other Force used in terrorem.”)); Pearce v.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 37\\n\\nAtwood, 13 Mass. 324, 332 (1816) (“Breaches of the peace\\ncomprise not only cases of actual violence to the person of\\nanother, but any unlawful acts, tending to produce an actual\\nbreach of the peace; whether the peace of the public, or an\\nindividual, be in fact disturbed or not.”). Not all crimes are\\nviolent; nor, for that matter, is every non-peaceable person a\\ncriminal. In short, the phrase “peaceable citizens” was not a\\nsynonym for “non-felons” or even “non-criminals.”\\n That leaves the strongest support for a blanket felon\\nexclusion: the Pennsylvania Minority’s suggested guarantee\\nof the right to arms “unless for crimes committed, or real\\ndanger of public injury from individuals.” 2 SCHWARTZ, supra,\\nat 665. This proposal can be read in two ways. The first, which\\nwould support a broad exclusion, is to interpret it as\\ncapturing two groups: (1) those who have committed any\\ncrime—felony or misdemeanor, violent or nonviolent—and\\n(2) those who have not committed a crime but nonetheless\\npose a danger to public safety. The second, which would\\nsupport a more targeted exclusion, is to interpret it as\\ncapturing one group: those who pose a danger to public\\nsafety, whether or not they have committed a crime. On this\\nreading, the catchall phrase limiting the rights of individuals\\nwho pose a “real danger of public injury” would be an effort\\nto capture non-criminals whose possession of guns would\\npose the same kind of danger as possession by those who have\\ncommitted crimes. And unless the founding generation\\nunderstood all crimes—even nonviolent misdemeanors—to\\nbe markers for that risk, the relevant “crimes committed”\\nwould be the subset of crimes suggesting a proclivity for\\nviolence. (As far as I can find, no one even today reads this\\nprovision to support the disarmament of literally all\\ncriminals, even nonviolent misdemeanants.) If “crimes\\n\\n38 No. 18-1478\\n\\ncommitted” refers only to a subset of crimes, that subset must\\nbe defined; using “real danger of public injury” to draw the\\nline is both internally coherent and consistent with founding-\\nera practice.\\n Whatever else may be said about the particulars of each of\\nthese three proposals, they are most helpful taken together as\\nevidence of the scope of founding-era understandings\\nregarding categorical exclusions from the enjoyment of the\\nright to keep and bear arms. The concern common to all three\\nis not about felons in particular or even criminals in general;\\nit is about threatened violence and the risk of public injury.\\nSee Binderup, 836 F.3d at 368 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part\\nand concurring in the judgments). This is the same concern\\nthat animated English and early American restrictions on\\narms possession.\\n In England, officers of the Crown had the power to disarm\\nanyone they judged to be “dangerous to the Peace of the\\nKingdom.” Militia Act of 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, § 13 (1662).\\nRelatedly, English common law “punish[ed] people who\\n[went] armed to terrify the King’s subjects” with\\nimprisonment and forfeiture of their “armour.” 4 Sir John\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 This common-law offense was adapted from the 1328 Statute of\\nNorthampton, which decreed that a person may not “go nor ride armed\\nby night nor by day in fairs, markets, … nor in no part elsewhere, upon\\npain to forfeit their armour to the King, and their bodies to prison at the\\nKing’s pleasure.” Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328). By the\\nmiddle of the seventeenth century, the statute was “almost gone in\\ndesuetudinem,” because the law recognized “a general connivance to\\ngentlemen to ride armed for their security.” Rex v. Knight, 90 Eng. Rep.\\n330, 330 (K.B. 1686). But it was still enforced against those who violated\\nthe terms of the statute “malo animo,” id.—that is, those who carried arms\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 39\\n\\nKnight’s Case, 87 Eng. Rep. 75, 76 (K.B. 1686). And—perhaps\\nunsurprisingly because they were presumptively thought to\\npose a similar threat or terror—Parliament also disarmed\\nCatholics. See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS\\n18–19, 122 (1994) (explaining that Protestants feared revolt,\\nmassacre, and counter-revolution from Catholics); see also\\nADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT 115 (2011) (explaining that\\nParliament disarmed Catholics because the Protestant\\nmajority found them “untrustworthy”); Marshall, 32 HARV.\\nJ.L. & PUB. POL’Y at 723 (“In short, the stated principle\\nsupporting the disability was cause to fear that a person,\\nalthough technically an English subject, was because of his\\nbeliefs effectively a resident enemy alien liable to violence\\nagainst the king.”). 5\\n Similar laws and restrictions appeared in the American\\ncolonies, adapted to the fears and threats of that time and\\nplace. See ALEXANDER DECONDE, GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA\\n22 (2001) (“Although the colonial demand for such\\ndiscriminatory controls sprang from circumstances different\\nfrom those in England, as in applying them against Indians\\nand blacks, colonists usually followed home-country\\npractices of excluding other distrusted people from\\n\\n\\nwith intent “to terrorize their neighbors,” see JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO\\nKEEP AND BEAR ARMS at 104 (1994).\\n 5 To be sure, the American experience does not map on exactly to the\\nEnglish one. For one thing, the right protected by the Second Amendment\\nwas decidedly broader than the one protected in the English Bill of Rights.\\nSee MALCOLM, supra, at 162. Still, the American version was derived from\\nits English predecessor, see id. at 150, 164, which makes English practice\\ninstructive. That is especially true when the patterns from English practice\\nrepeat themselves in American law.\\n\\n40 No. 18-1478\\n\\nownership.”). In some places, Catholics were still disarmed,\\nbut “on the basis of allegiance, not on the basis of faith.” See\\nRobert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the\\nRight to Keep Arms in Early America: The Legal Context of the\\nSecond Amendment, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 139, 157 (2007) (citing\\nVirginia’s 1756 “disarmament of all those refusing the test of\\nallegiance”) 6; see also DECONDE, supra, at 22–23 (associating\\nCatholics with the “distrusted inhabitants” from whom the\\ncolonies seized guns “with the intent of preventing social\\nupheavals” and “rebellion”). Those “willing to swear\\nundivided allegiance to the sovereign” were permitted to\\nkeep their arms. See Churchill, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. at 157.\\nAfter all, confiscation of guns from those who refused to\\nswear an oath of allegiance was meant to “deal with the\\npotential threat coming from armed citizens who remained\\nloyal to” another sovereign. See Saul Cornell & Nathan\\nDeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of\\nGun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 506 (2004); see also NRA\\nv. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 700 F.3d\\n185, 200 (5th Cir. 2012) (“American legislators had\\ndetermined that permitting [those who refused to swear an\\noath of allegiance] to keep and bear arms posed a potential\\ndanger.”). But that particular threat dissipated when a person\\npledged his allegiance to the United States or to a particular\\nstate.\\n\\n\\n 6First, the allegiance required was to the Crown, and later, it was to\\nthe sovereign and independent states. See id. at 159 & n.49 (quoting 4\\nJOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 201–05 (1906)\\n(calling for the disarmament of those “who are notoriously disaffected to\\nthe cause of America, or who have not associated, and shall refuse to\\nassociate, to defend, by arms, these United Colonies”)).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 41\\n\\n Slaves and Native Americans, on the other hand, were\\nthought to pose more immediate threats to public safety and\\nstability and were disarmed as a matter of course. See\\nMALCOLM, supra, at 140–41; WINKLER, supra, at 115–16 (noting\\n“forcible disarmament” out of “fear that these groups would\\nuse guns to revolt” or otherwise threaten the “public safety”);\\nDECONDE, supra, at 21–22 (noting “anxiety that slaves would\\nrebel”). And this practice of keeping guns out of the hands of\\n“distrusted” groups continued after the Revolution. For\\nexample, many states even constitutionalized the\\ndisarmament of slaves and Native Americans. See Volokh, 11\\nTEX. REV. L. & POL. at 208–09. 7\\n In sum, founding-era legislatures categorically disarmed\\ngroups whom they judged to be a threat to the public safety.\\nBut neither the convention proposals nor historical practice\\nsupports a legislative power to categorically disarm felons\\nbecause of their status as felons.\\n B.\\n A common response to the dearth of felon-disarmament\\nlaws in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is to say that\\nsuch laws would have been unnecessary given the severity\\nwith which felons were punished. Because felons were\\nroutinely executed or stripped of all rights, the argument\\ngoes, explicit provisions depriving them of firearms would\\nhave been redundant. See, e.g., Brief of Defendant-Appellee\\nBrad D. Schimel at 9 (“[I]n eighteenth-century America,\\nfelonies were punishable by death, so no early American\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 It should go without saying that such race-based exclusions would\\nbe unconstitutional today.\\n\\n42 No. 18-1478\\n\\nlawmaker would have questioned the propriety of a proposal\\nto disarm serious offenders.”); Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d\\n152, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[I]t is difficult to conclude that the\\npublic, in 1791, would have understood someone facing death\\nand estate forfeiture to be within the scope of those entitled to\\npossess arms.”). One scholar puts it this way:\\n The constitutionality of [bans on felon\\n possession] cannot seriously be questioned …\\n [because f]elons simply did not fall within the\\n benefits of the common law right to possess\\n arms. That law punished felons with automatic\\n forfeiture of all goods, usually accompanied by\\n death. We may presume that persons confined\\n in gaols awaiting trial on criminal charges were\\n also debarred from the possession of arms.\\nKates, 82 MICH. L. REV. at 266. On this view, the criminal law\\nprovides a historical justification for felon disarmament even\\nif laws regulating gun safety do not.\\n The premise of this argument—that the states\\npermanently extinguished the rights of felons, either by death\\nor operation of law, in the eighteenth and nineteenth\\ncenturies—is shaky. While it accurately describes the\\npunishment of felons at English common law, the American\\npicture is far more complex. It is true that at common law, the\\n“idea of felony” was intertwined with the punishments of\\ndeath and civil death. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES\\nON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 98 (1769) (“The idea of felony is\\nindeed so generally connected with that of capital\\npunishment, that we find it hard to separate them ….”); Avery\\nv. Everett, 18 N.E. 148, 150 (N.Y. 1888) (“By the ancient\\ncommon law … [t]here were three principle incidents\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 43\\n\\nconsequent upon an attainder for treason or felony, forfeiture,\\ncorruption of blood, and an extinction of civil rights, more or\\nless complete, which was denominated civil death.”). Civil\\ndeath was a state in which a person “though living, was\\nconsidered dead”—a status “very similar to natural death in\\nthat all civil rights were extinguished.” See Harry David\\nSaunders, Note, Civil Death—A New Look at an Ancient\\nDoctrine, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 988, 988–89 (1970). As\\noriginally conceived, civil death signified “a transitional\\nstatus in the period between a capital sentence and its\\nexecution.” Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking\\nPunishment in the Era of Mass Incarceration, 160 U. PA. L. REV.\\n1789, 1797 (2012). It “was intended to merely settle the estate\\nof an executed or banished felon.” Saunders, 11 WM. & MARY\\nL. REV. at 990.\\n During the period leading up to the founding, the\\nconnection between felonies and capital punishment started\\nto fray. Once a short, specified list of offenses, felonies in\\nEngland grew to “no less than an hundred and sixty,” which\\nis likely what forced Blackstone to define them in terms of\\ntheir most common characteristic: capital punishment. See 4\\nBLACKSTONE, supra, at 18, 97–98. But as the number of\\ndesignated felonies continued to grow, so did the variations\\non punishment, especially in the American colonies.\\nThroughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, capital\\npunishment in the colonies was used “sparingly,” and\\nproperty crimes including variations on theft, burglary, and\\nrobbery “were, on the whole, not capital.” LAWRENCE M.\\nFRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 42\\n(1993). By the time the Constitution was ratified, James\\nWilson observed that while the term “felony” was once “very\\nstrongly connected with capital punishment,” that was no\\n\\n44 No. 18-1478\\n\\nlonger true. JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL & UNUSUAL 52–53 (2012)\\n(quoting 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 348 (James DeWitt\\nAndrews ed., 1896)); see also 6 NATHAN DANE, DIGEST OF\\nAMERICAN LAW 715 (1823) (“[W]e have many felonies, not one\\npunished with forfeiture of estate, and but a very few with\\ndeath.”). Of course, many crimes remained eligible for the\\ndeath penalty, and the extent to which that was true varied by\\nstate. Death, however, no longer inevitably followed a felony\\nconviction.\\n Because it was no longer defined with reference to a list of\\nspecific crimes or even a specific punishment, the definition\\nof “felony” was difficult to pin down at the time of the\\nfounding. See Will Tress, Unintended Collateral Consequences:\\nDefining Felony in the Early American Republic, 57 CLEV. ST. L.\\nREV. 461, 465 (2009) (emphasizing the “ambiguity in the\\nmeaning of felony” at the founding). According to James\\nMadison, “felony” was “a term of loose signification even in\\nthe common law of England,” but more so in the States where\\n“[t]he meaning of the term … [was] not precisely the same in\\nany two of the States; and varie[d] in each with every revision\\nof its criminal laws.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 228 (J. R. Pole\\ned., 2005); see also DANE, supra, at 715 (“[T]he word felony, in\\nthe process of many centuries, has derived so many meanings\\nfrom so many parts of the common law, and so many statutes\\nin England, and has got to be used in such a vast number of\\ndifferent senses, that it is now impossible to know precisely\\nin what sense we are to understand this word.”).\\n The shift in punishment for felonies necessitated a shift in\\nthe meaning of civil death, which had been previously\\nconnected to a capital sentence. And so civil death came to be\\nunderstood “as an incident of life conviction.” See Saunders,\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 45\\n\\n11 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 990; see also Troup v. Wood, 4 Johns.\\nCh. 228, 248 (N.Y. Ch. 1820) (a person convicted of felony and\\nsentenced to imprisonment in the state prison for life is\\n“civiliter mortuus”). But applying the ancient concept of civil\\ndeath in this context proved difficult. Because\\n“[i]mprisonment for life was a punishment unknown to the\\ncommon law,” courts quickly realized that common-law civil\\ndeath did not automatically apply. See Platner v. Sherwood, 6\\nJohns. Ch. 118, 122 (N.Y. Ch. 1822) (¶ 2 argument of Butler\\nand Henry, counsel for the plaintiff); id. at 128 (Opinion of the\\nChancellor). Thus, courts soon decided that civil death\\napplied only when statutes explicitly attached it to life\\nsentences, and statutes did not universally do so. Id. at 129\\n(holding that a person convicted of a felony and sentenced to\\nlife imprisonment was not “deemed and taken to be civilly\\ndead, to all intents and purposes in the law” until an act of the\\nlegislature made it so) 8; see also Frazer v. Fulcher, 17 Ohio 260,\\n\\n\\n 8 The same court had two years earlier suggested that where a statute\\nchanged punishment from death to a life sentence, the statute may be read\\nas an affirmance of the common law punishment of civil death. See Platner,\\n6 Johns. Ch. at 127–28 (citing Troup, 4 Johns. Ch. 228)). But in Platner, the\\ncourt explicitly rejected its earlier assumption and replaced it with a well-\\nreasoned, widely-adopted, and enduring view that civil death existed\\nonly if authorized by statute. Id. at 128 (“The same point arose,\\nincidentally, in respect to this same conviction, in the case of Troup v.\\nWood, and I was there induced to think, upon the authority of Lord Coke,\\nthat every person attainted of felony was accounted, in law, civiliter\\nmortuus. It was not a necessary or very material point in that case, and I\\ndid not pursue the subject to the extent I should have done, if it had been\\nthen, as it is now, the direct and material point in issue. I have, likewise,\\nsince, had the benefit of a full and able discussion, and of a diligent and\\naccurate research, particularly on the part of the plaintiff, respecting this\\nvery unusual question of law.” (citation omitted)).\\n\\n46 No. 18-1478\\n\\n262 (1848) (“But it is said that, by the rules of the common law,\\nthere is such a thing as a civil death as well as a natural death.\\nWe know that in England there are cases in which a man,\\nalthough in full life, is said to be civilly dead, but I have not\\nlearned, until this case was brought before us, that there was\\nbut one kind of death known to our laws.”); Cannon v.\\nWindsor, 1 Houst. 143, 144 (Del. 1855) (“But here there is no\\nsuch general forfeiture of property, or the right to maintain an\\naction, on a conviction for treason or felony, and the maxim\\nor principle of civilter mortuus cannot therefore apply in this\\nState, even when he is a party plaintiff.”); Chin, 160 U. PA. L.\\nREV. at 1796 (“In England, civil death was a common law\\npunishment, but in the United States, it existed only if\\nauthorized by statute. It was far from universal….”). And\\neven when it applied to life sentences, the doctrine of civil\\ndeath had to be at least partially reconceived because it had\\nbegun as a time-limited doctrine justified by the anticipation\\nof natural death—it was “not a condition applicable\\npotentially for decades.” See Chin, 160 U. PA. L. REV. at 1797.\\nAs courts hammered out the incongruities between civil\\ndeath and continued life over the next century, they settled\\nuncomfortably on an American version of civil death that\\nrequired explicit statutory authorization and deprived a felon\\nof many, but not all, rights. 9 See, e.g., Avery, 18 N.E. at 154–55\\n\\n\\n 9 Courts were consistent and explicit about the difficulty of trying to\\napply the doctrine of civil death outside the context of the death penalty.\\nSee, e.g., Shapiro v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 45 N.Y.S.2d 717 (N.Y.\\nSup. Ct. 1943) (“Palpable anomaly inevitably results from attempting to\\nattribute civil death, not only to persons about to be executed, but, also, to\\npersons who may remain physically alive for many years and also may be\\nparoled of pardoned.”); Byers v. Sun Sav. Bank, 139 P. 948, 949 (Okla. 1914)\\n(“[Civil death] had its origin in the fogs and fictions of feudal\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 47\\n\\n(suggesting that a life convict maintained a right to defend an\\naction brought against him and certain property rights,\\nincluding the ability to transfer property by will or deed).\\n Of particular relevance to Kanter’s case, courts also\\nstruggled to determine how—if at all—the old concept of civil\\ndeath applied to felons serving sentences for a term of years.\\nCases decided in the early nineteenth century, like Troup v.\\nWood and Platner v. Sherwood, associated the loss of rights\\nunder a theory of civil death only with capital and life\\nsentences. Later cases building on that reasoning held that the\\nrights of felons serving less than life were merely suspended\\nduring the term of the sentence. See, e.g., In re Estate of Nerac,\\n35 Cal. 392, 396 (1868) (“If the convict be sentenced for life, he\\nbecomes civiliter mortuus, or dead in law …. If, however, he be\\nsentenced for a term less than life, his civil rights are only\\nsuspended during the term.”); Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va.\\n790, 796 (1871) (explaining that a convict is “civiliter mortuus,”\\nbut only “[f]or the time being, during his term of service in\\n\\n\\njurisprudence and doubtlessly has been brought forward into modern\\nstatutes without fully realizing either the effect of its literal significance or\\nthe extent of its infringement upon the spirit of our system of government.\\nAt any rate, the full significance of such statutes have never been enforced\\nby our courts for the principal reason that they are out of harmony with\\nthe spirit of our fundamental laws and with other provisions of statutes.”);\\nAvery, 18 N.E. at 155 (“Any one who takes the pains to explore the ancient\\nand in many respects obsolete learning connected with the doctrine of civil\\ndeath in consequence of crime, will find that he has to grope his way along\\npaths marked by uncertain, flickering, and sometimes misleading lights;\\nand he cannot feel sure that at some point in his course he has not missed\\nthe true road.”). But here, defining the precise impact of “civil death” on\\na felon sentenced to life is not as important as underscoring that the impact\\nwas no longer complete destruction of rights and death to the law.\\n\\n48 No. 18-1478\\n\\nthe penitentiary”); Bowles v. Habermann, 95 N.Y. 246, 247\\n(1884) (applying a statute, which provided that “a sentence of\\nimprisonment in a State prison for any term less than for\\nlife … suspends, during the term of the sentence, all the civil\\nrights … of, or held by, the person sentenced.”).\\n The upshot of this history for present purposes is that the\\nconsequences of a felony conviction were not as categorically\\nsevere as the governments suggest. Capital punishment was\\nless pervasive than one might think. Outside the capital\\ncontext, civil death applied exclusively to life sentences and\\nonly if authorized by statute—and even then, it was more\\nmodest than the ancient version because the convict retained\\nsome rights. Felons serving a term of years did not suffer civil\\ndeath; their rights were suspended but not destroyed. In sum,\\na felony conviction and the loss of all rights did not\\nnecessarily go hand-in-hand.\\n Because they did not go hand-in-hand, the argument that\\nthe severity of punishment at the founding implicitly\\nsanctions the blanket stripping of rights from all felons,\\nincluding those serving a term of years, is misguided. Those\\nwho ratified the Second Amendment would not have\\nassumed that a free man, previously convicted, lived in a\\nsociety without any rights and without the protection of law.\\nThis is not to say that felons could not lose rights under\\nanother theory. Indeed, state legislatures did explicitly\\nexclude felons from the enjoyment of particular rights. See\\ninfra Section II.C. But history confirms that the basis for the\\npermanent and pervasive loss of all rights cannot be tied\\ngenerally to one’s status as a convicted felon or to the uniform\\nseverity of punishment that befell the class.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 49\\n\\n Even if it could be, though, one might reasonably ask: “So\\nwhat?” We wouldn’t draw this inference from the severity of\\nfounding-era punishment in other contexts—for example, we\\nwouldn’t say that the state can deprive felons of the right to\\nfree speech because felons lost that right via execution at the\\ntime of the founding. The obvious point that the dead enjoy\\nno rights does not tell us what the founding-era generation\\nwould have understood about the rights of felons who lived,\\ndischarged their sentences, and returned to society.\\n C.\\n While scholars have not identified eighteenth or\\nnineteenth century laws depriving felons of the right to bear\\narms, history does show that felons could be disqualified\\nfrom exercising certain rights—like the rights to vote and\\nserve on juries—because these rights belonged only to\\nvirtuous citizens. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE\\nCONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 29 (1st ed. 1868) (explaining\\nthat certain classes of people were “almost universally\\nexcluded” from the franchise for “want of capacity or of moral\\nfitness”); Saul Cornell, “Don’t Know Much About History” The\\nCurrent Crisis in Second Amendment Scholarship, 29 N. KY. L.\\nREV. 657, 679 (2002) (identifying the “right to sit on juries” as\\n“limited to those members of the polity who were deemed\\ncapable of exercising it in a virtuous manner”). Some\\nmaintain that the right to bear arms is similarly limited by a\\nvirtue requirement. See, e.g., Don. B. Kates Jr., The Second\\nAmendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter\\n1986, at 143, 146 (“[T]he right to arms does not preclude laws\\ndisarming the unvirtuous citizens (i.e., criminals) or those\\nwho, like children or the mentally unbalanced, are deemed\\nincapable of virtue.”). On this view, the legislature can disarm\\n\\n50 No. 18-1478\\n\\nfelons because of their poor character, without regard to\\nwhether they are dangerous. See Medina, 913 F.3d at 159\\n(endorsing the view that the Second Amendment excludes\\nnot only the dangerous, but also the “unvirtuous”) The\\nmajority is sympathetic to this view. See Maj. Op. at 16.\\n The problem with this argument is that virtue exclusions\\nare associated with civic rights—individual rights that\\n“require[] citizens to act in a collective manner for distinctly\\npublic purposes.” See Saul Cornell, A New Paradigm for the\\nSecond Amendment, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 161, 165 (2004). For\\nexample, the right to vote is held by individuals, but they do\\nnot exercise it solely for their own sake; rather, they cast votes\\nas part of the collective enterprise of self-governance.\\nSimilarly, individuals do not serve on juries for their own\\nsake, but as part of the collective enterprise of administering\\njustice. Some scholars have characterized the right to keep\\nand bear arms as a civic right, because it was “one exercised\\nby citizens, not individuals …, who act together in a collective\\nmanner, for a distinctly public purpose: participation in a well\\nregulated militia.” See Cornell & DeDino, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.\\nat 491 (“[T]he text [of the Second Amendment] fits a civic\\nrights model better than either the individual or collective\\nrights paradigms.”). Saul Cornell explains:\\n Perhaps the most accurate way to describe the\\n dominant understanding of the right to bear\\n arms in the Founding era is as a civic right. Such\\n a right was not something that all persons could\\n claim, but was limited to those members of the\\n polity who were deemed capable of exercising\\n it in a virtuous manner. Freedom of religion,\\n freedom of the press, trial by jury were\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 51\\n\\n genuinely rights belonging to individuals and\\n were treated differently than were civic rights\\n such as militia service, or the right to sit on\\n juries.\\nCornell, 29 N. KY. L. REV. at 679 (footnotes omitted). And as a\\nright that was exercised for the benefit of the community (like\\nvoting and jury service), rather than for the benefit of the\\nindividual (like free speech or free exercise), it belonged only\\nto virtuous citizens.\\n Heller, however, expressly rejects the argument that the\\nSecond Amendment protects a purely civic right. Moore v.\\nMadigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012). It squarely holds\\nthat “the Second Amendment confer[s] an individual right to\\nkeep and bear arms,” Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (emphasis added),\\nand it emphasizes that the Second Amendment is rooted in\\nthe individual’s right to defend himself—not in his right to\\nserve in a well-regulated militia, id. at 582–86. The “civic\\nrights” approach runs headlong into both propositions. See\\nBinderup, 836 F.3d at 371 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part and\\nconcurring in the judgments) (“[T]his virtuous-citizens-only\\nconception of the right to keep and bear arms is closely\\nassociated with pre-Heller interpretations of the Second\\nAmendment by proponents of the ‘sophisticated collective\\nrights model’ who rejected the view that the Amendment\\nconfers an individual right and instead characterized the right\\nas a ‘civic right ….’” (citation omitted)). The parties have\\nintroduced no evidence that virtue exclusions ever applied to\\nindividual, as opposed to civic, rights. 10 And if virtue\\n\\n\\n 10 The governments gesture towards Heller as support for a virtue\\nexclusion, citing Heller’s assertion that the Second Amendment “surely\\n\\n52 No. 18-1478\\n\\nexclusions don’t apply to individual rights, they don’t apply\\nto the Second Amendment.\\n It bears emphasis that virtue exclusions from the exercise\\nof civic rights were explicit. If the right to bear arms was\\nsimilarly subject to a virtue exclusion, we would expect to see\\nprovisions expressly depriving felons of that right too—but\\nwe don’t. By 1820, ten states’ constitutions included\\nprovisions excluding or authorizing the exclusion of those\\nwho “had committed crimes, particularly felonies or so-called\\ninfamous crimes” from the franchise. See ALEXANDER\\nKEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 62–63 & tbl. A.7 (Kentucky,\\nVermont, Ohio, Louisiana, Indiana, Mississippi, Connecticut,\\nIllinois, Alabama, Missouri). By 1857, twenty-four state\\nconstitutions included such provisions. Id. The same crimes\\noften “made a person ineligible to serve as a witness in a legal\\nproceeding,” id. at 62, and to serve on a jury. 11\\n\\n\\n\\nelevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible\\ncitizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” 554 U.S. at 635. That\\nstatement implies that the legislature might have the power to more\\nheavily regulate those who are not law-abiding or responsible. But it does\\nnot purport to analyze the scope of that power, nor does it endorse the\\nvery specific concept of a virtue exclusion.\\n 11See, e.g., Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 92, § 1, in ACTS AND LAWS OF THE\\nCOMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 173 (Wright & Potter 1898) (jurors\\nmust be “of good Moral Character” and qualified to vote; “and if any\\nperson, whose name shall be put into either [jury] Box, shall be convicted\\nof any Scandalous crime, or be guilty of any gross immorality, his name\\nshall be withdrawn from the [jury] Box, by Selectmen of his town”); Act\\nof Feb. 2, 1811, ch. 158, § 2, in 4 LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, at 445,\\n449 (Bradford & Porter 1816) (grand jurors must be “sober, substantial and\\njudicious freeholders, lawful men, of fair characters”); id. § 7 (petit jurors\\nmust be “sober, discreet and judicious freeholders,… lawful men of fair\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 53\\n\\n State constitutions protecting the right to bear arms do not\\nfollow a similar pattern. Between 1790 and 1820, nine states\\nenacted their own right-to-arms provisions in their\\nconstitutions. See Volokh, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. at 208–09\\n(four more had enacted such provisions prior to 1790). None\\nof those provisions made an exception for criminals. Id. And\\nnotably, seven of those nine states explicitly excluded or\\nauthorized the exclusion of certain criminals from the right to\\nvote. Compare id. (identifying Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana,\\nMississippi, Connecticut, Alabama, and Missouri as seven of\\nthe nine states with right-to-arms provisions in their\\nconstitutions by 1820), with KEYSSAR, supra, at tbl. A.7 (the\\nsame seven state constitutions specifically excluded certain\\ncriminals from the right to vote). The same pattern held true\\nin 1857. Compare Volokh, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. at 209–10, with\\nKEYSSAR, supra, at tbl. A.7. There is no basis, then, for\\nassuming that a virtue requirement on the right to vote\\napplies equally to the right to keep and bear arms. See\\nBinderup, 836 F.3d at 372 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part and\\nconcurring in the judgments) (“We have found no historical\\nevidence on the public meaning of the right to keep and bear\\narms indicating that ‘virtuousness’ was a limitation on one’s\\nqualification for the right—contemporary insistence to the\\ncontrary falls somewhere between guesswork and ipse\\ndixit.”). 12\\n\\n\\ncharacters”); Act of Dec. 17, 1796, § 52, in ACTS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH\\nOF KENTUCKY 134 (Stewart 1796) (jurors must “be of good demeanor”).\\n 12 The fact that the first general prohibition on felon gun possession\\nwas not enacted until 1961 further undercuts the argument that either\\nhistory or tradition supports a virtue-based restriction on the right. See An\\nAct to Strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757\\n\\n54 No. 18-1478\\n\\n In sum, the available evidence suggests that the right to\\narms differs from rights that depend on civic virtue for\\nenjoyment. The Second Amendment confers an individual\\nright, intimately connected with the natural right of self-\\ndefense, and not limited to civic participation (i.e., militia\\nservice). By the very terms of the civic-rights argument, then,\\nthe right to arms would have been “treated differently” than\\nrights like the right to vote or to sit on juries. See Cornell, 29\\nN. KY. L. REV. at 679 (“[R]ights belonging to individuals …\\nwere treated differently than were civic rights such as militia\\nservice, or the right to sit on juries.”). And that difference is\\nborne out by historical treatment: we see no explicit criminal,\\nor even more general virtue-based, exclusions from the right\\nto bear arms like we do in other contexts. Thus, although the\\nright protected by the Second Amendment is not unlimited,\\nsee Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, its limits are not defined by a general\\nfelon ban tied to a lack of virtue or good character.\\n III.\\n The history canvassed in Part II yields two conclusions\\nthat are important for present purposes. History does not\\nsupport the proposition that felons lose their Second\\nAmendment rights solely because of their status as felons. But\\nit does support the proposition that the state can take the right\\nto bear arms away from a category of people that it deems\\ndangerous. Our precedent is consistent with this principle: we\\nhave held that “Congress is not limited to case-by-case\\nexclusions of persons who have been shown to be\\n\\n\\n(1961) (amending the Federal Firearms Act by “deleting the words ‘crime\\nof violence’ … and inserting in lieu thereof the words ‘crime publishable\\nby imprisonment for a term exceeding one year’”).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 55\\n\\nuntrustworthy with weapons, nor need these limits be\\nestablished by evidence presented in court.” Skoien, 614 F.3d\\nat 641. Instead, the legislature can make that judgment on a\\nclass-wide basis. See id. at 640 (“That some categorical limits\\nare proper is part of the original meaning, leaving to the\\npeople’s elected representatives the filling in of details.”).\\nAnd it may do so based on present-day judgments about\\ncategories of people whose possession of guns would\\nendanger the public safety; as we said in Skoien, “exclusions\\nneed not mirror limits that were on the books in 1791.” Id. at\\n641. Such restrictions are “lineal descendants” of historical\\nlaws banning dangerous people from possessing guns. See\\nTranscript of Oral Argument at 77, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No.\\n07–290) (Chief Justice Roberts: “[W]e are talking about lineal\\ndescendants of the arms but presumably there are lineal\\ndescendants of the restrictions as well.”).\\n That said, “the government does not get a free pass simply\\nbecause Congress has established a ‘categorical ban.’” United\\nStates v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010). The\\ngovernment could quickly swallow the right if it had broad\\npower to designate any group as dangerous and thereby\\ndisqualify its members from having a gun. See Skoien, 614 F.3d\\nat 641 (“We do not mean that a categorical limit on the\\npossession of firearms can be justified under the rational-basis\\ntest, which deems a law valid if any justification for it may be\\nimagined.”). The legislature must be able to justify its\\ndesignation, and the rigor with which we review this\\njustification “depends on ‘how close the law comes to the core\\nof the Second Amendment right and the severity of the law’s\\nburden on the right.’” Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 892 (citation\\nomitted). “Severe burdens on the core right of armed defense\\n\\n56 No. 18-1478\\n\\nrequire a very strong public-interest justification and a close\\nmeans-ends fit ….” Id.\\n The majority contends that the means-end review should\\nbe “arguably less rigorous in this case because … felon\\ndispossession laws do not restrict the ‘core right of armed\\ndefense,’ but rather burden ‘activity lying closer to the\\nmargins of the right.’” Maj. Op. at 20 n.10 (quoting Ezell II, 846\\nF.3d at 892). I disagree. First, felon dispossession statutes\\ntarget the whole right, including its core: they restrict even\\nmere possession of a firearm in the home for the purpose of\\nself-defense. Cf. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630–35 (finding\\nunconstitutional a law that made it impossible for citizens to\\nuse firearms for “the core lawful purpose of self-defense”); id.\\nat 628 (“[T]he inherent right of self-defense has been central\\nto the Second Amendment right.”). 13 And second, the burden\\nis severe: it is a permanent disqualification from the exercise of\\na fundamental right. See Maj. Op. at 2–4; see also United States\\nv. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1048–49 (10th Cir. 2009)\\n(Tymkovich, J., concurring) (“[T]he broad scope of\\n§ 922(g)(1)—which permanently disqualifies all felons from\\npossessing firearms—would conflict with the ‘core’ self-\\n\\n\\n 13 The majority suggests that who exercises the right changes what the\\ncore of the right is, see Maj. Op. at 20 n.10, but that is circular. Heller\\ndistinguishes the two inquiries: First, it held that the District of Columbia’s\\nban on handgun possession violated the Second Amendment (the what).\\n554 U.S. at 635. Then, it indicated the need to consider whether Heller\\ncould be disqualified from exercising that right (the who). Id. (“Assuming\\nthat Heller is not disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment\\nrights, the District must permit him to register his handgun and must issue\\nhim a license to carry it in the home.”). Heller’s qualification or lack\\nthereof did not change the content of the right itself; it affected whether\\nthe legislature could take it away. The same is true of Kanter here.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 57\\n\\ndefense right embodied in the Second Amendment.”). Thus,\\n“a very strong public-interest justification and a close means-\\nends fit” is required before Kanter may be constitutionally\\nsubject to the United States and Wisconsin dispossession\\nstatutes. Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 892.\\n There is no question that the interest identified by the\\ngovernments and supported by history—keeping guns out of\\nthe hands of those who are likely to misuse them—is very\\nstrong. And we have held that several of the other categorical\\nbans within § 922(g) demonstrate the necessary fit between\\nthis public-safety end and the government’s chosen means. In\\nSkoien, we upheld § 922(g)(9), which prohibits those convicted\\nof domestic violence misdemeanors from possessing\\nfirearms, because “no one doubts that the goal of § 922(g)(9),\\npreventing armed mayhem, is an important governmental\\nobjective” and “[b]oth logic and data establish a substantial\\nrelation between § 922(g)(9) and this objective.” 614 F.3d at\\n642; see also id. at 644 (“[N]o matter how you slice these\\nnumbers, people convicted of domestic violence remain\\ndangerous to their spouses and partners.”). In United States v.\\nYancey, we sustained § 922(g)(3), which prohibits any person\\n“who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled\\nsubstance” from possessing a gun, because “studies amply\\ndemonstrate the connection between chronic drug abuse and\\nviolent crime, and illuminate the nexus between Congress’s\\nattempt to keep firearms away from habitual drug abusers\\nand its goal of reducing violent crime.” 621 F.3d 681, 686 (7th\\nCir. 2010). And in United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, we rejected\\na challenge to § 922(g)(5), which prohibits aliens unlawfully\\npresent in the United States from possessing firearms,\\nreasoning that keeping guns out of the hands of “persons who\\nare difficult to track and who have an interest in eluding law\\n\\n58 No. 18-1478\\n\\nenforcement” serves the public-safety objectives of § 922(g).\\n798 F.3d 664, 673 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n In contrast to these narrowly defined categorical bans,\\n§ 922(g)(1), which applies to all felons, is “wildly\\noverinclusive.” Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second\\nAmendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 721 (2007). Its application\\nis not limited to those who have committed violent crimes like\\nmurder, assault, and rape. 14 It also encompasses those who\\nhave committed any nonviolent felony or qualifying state-law\\nmisdemeanor—and that is an immense and diverse category.\\nIt includes everything from Kanter’s offense, mail fraud, to\\nselling pigs without a license in Massachusetts, redeeming\\nlarge quantities of out-of-state bottle deposits in Michigan,\\nand countless other state and federal offenses. See Mass. Gen.\\n\\n\\n 14Section 922(g)(1)’s predecessor, the Federal Firearms Act of 1938,\\ndid not permanently ban all felons from possessing firearms, but rather\\nthose convicted of “crime[s] of violence,” defined then as “murder,\\nmanslaughter, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, burglary, housebreaking,” and\\ncertain forms of aggravated assault. See Marshall, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB.\\nPOL’Y at 698–99 (citing Federal Firearms Act, ch. 850, § 1(6), 52 Stat. 1250,\\n1250 (1938)). Even today, many scholars cited as supporting a general\\nfelon ban actually seem to assume or advocate something much closer to\\na violent-felon ban. See, e.g., Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second\\nAmendment Limitations and Criminological Considerations, 60 HASTINGS L. J.\\n1339, 1362–63 (2009) (“At early common law, the term ‘felony’ applied\\nonly to a few very serious, very dangerous offenses such as murder, rape,\\narson, and robbery.… Insofar as federal or state statutes would seek to bar\\narms possession by [felons who ‘pos[e] no physical danger to others’],\\nthose laws would seem to be invalid on their face.”); Stephen P. Halbrook,\\nWhat the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to “Bear Arms”,\\n49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1986, at 151, 161 (“[V]iolent criminals,\\nchildren, and those of unsound mind may be deprived of firearms .…”\\n(emphasis added)).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 59\\n\\nLaws ch. 129, §§ 39, 43; Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.574a(1)(a),\\n(2)(d); see also, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 676 (violating the Federal Meat\\nInspection Act in certain ways); 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (committing\\nperjury); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 30A (shoplifting goods\\nvalued at $100). 15 These crimes, like many others captured by\\n§ 922(g), “rais[e] no particular suspicion that the convict is a\\nthreat to public safety.” Winkler, 105 MICH. L. REV. at 721. Put\\nmore colorfully, “It is hard to imagine how banning Martha\\nStewart or Enron’s Andrew Fastow from possessing a gun\\nfurthers public safety.” Id.\\n We have addressed the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)\\nbefore. In United States v. Williams, a defendant with a prior\\nrobbery conviction challenged the statute as applied to him.\\n616 F.3d at 691. We held that the provision is constitutional as\\napplied to violent felons, including the defendant in that case.\\n616 F.3d at 694 (“Because Williams was convicted of a violent\\nfelony, his claim that § 922(g)(1) unconstitutionally infringes\\non his right to possess a firearm is without merit.”). But our\\ndecision came with an important qualification: we expressly\\nnoted that “§ 922(g)(1) may be subject to an overbreadth\\nchallenge at some point because of its disqualification of all\\nfelons, including those who are non-violent.” Id. at 693. We\\nasserted that “[e]ven if the government may face a difficult\\n\\n\\n 15 It’s worth noting that, in addition to the eclectic and wide-ranging\\noffenses already included in this category, there are very few limits on the\\nability of Congress and state legislatures to expand the number of\\nqualifying nonviolent offenses. Cf. United States v. Phillips, 827 F.3d 1171,\\n1176 n.5 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Can Congress or the States define petty larceny\\nas a felony? Of course. Can a conviction for stealing a lollipop then serve\\nas a basis under § 922(g)(1) to a ban a person for the rest of his life from\\never possessing a firearm, consistent with the Second Amendment?”).\\n\\n60 No. 18-1478\\n\\nburden of proving § 922(g)(1)’s ‘strong showing’ in future\\ncases, it certainly satisfies its burden in this case, where [the\\ndefendant] challenges § 922(g)(1) as it was applied to him.”\\nId. As a violent felon, the defendant in Williams was in no\\nposition to challenge § 922(g)(1) on the ground that its\\napplication to nonviolent felons is unconstitutional. See\\nSkoien, 614 F.3d at 645 (“A person to whom a statute properly\\napplies can’t obtain relief based on arguments that a\\ndifferently situated person might present.”). As a nonviolent\\nfelon, however, Kanter is in a position to make that argument.\\n The first step in analyzing Kanter’s as-applied challenge is\\nto consider whether banning all nonviolent felons is\\nsubstantially related to the governments’ interest in\\npreventing future gun violence. See Williams, 616 F.3d at 692–\\n93. Williams held that because the characteristic common to all\\nviolent felons is a demonstrated propensity for violence, the\\nban on possessing firearms is constitutional as applied to all\\nmembers of that class. Id. at 693–94. In contrast, and to state\\nthe obvious, the characteristic common to all nonviolent\\nfelons is that their criminal conduct was nonviolent. 16 Thus,\\nthe reasoning that supports the categorical disarmament of\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 The majority suggests that nonviolent felonies are united by\\nanother characteristic relevant to the constitutionality of disarmament:\\nthat the commission of “mala in se felonies reflect[s] grave misjudgment\\nand maladjustment.” Maj. Op. at 24 (citation omitted). But that is just\\nanother way of saying that nonviolent felons have demonstrated a lack of\\nvirtue. Absent evidence that this lack of virtue is tied to a propensity for\\nrisky behavior that threatens public safety, it does not justify stripping\\nthem of their Second Amendment rights.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 61\\n\\nviolent felons—that past violence is predictive of future\\nviolence—simply does not apply.\\n The governments argue, though, that being convicted of a\\nnonviolent crime is also predictive of future violence. They try\\nto support that position with statistics showing that\\nnonviolent felons are likely to commit violent crimes in the\\nfuture. These statistics are entirely unhelpful, however,\\nbecause they lump all nonviolent felons together—and while\\nsome nonviolent felons may be likely to misuse firearms, the\\ncharacteristics that make them risky cannot be generalized to\\nthe whole class. For example, the characteristics of an\\nindividual convicted of a drug-related offense tell us little if\\nanything about the tendency of an individual convicted of\\nperjury—or, for that matter, mail fraud—to commit gun\\nviolence. The sheer diversity of crimes encompassed by these\\nstatutes makes it virtually impossible for the governments to\\nshow that banning all nonviolent felons from possessing guns\\nis closely tailored to the goal of protecting the public safety.\\nThus, we must decide whether the statutes are\\nunconstitutional as applied to Kanter in particular. See\\nWilliams, 616 F.3d at 692–93.\\n If Kanter’s conviction—mail fraud—is substantially\\nrelated to violent behavior, the governments can disarm him\\nwithout regard to any personal circumstances or\\ncharacteristics suggesting that he poses a low risk to public\\nsafety. But their case for tying mail fraud to a risk of future\\nviolence rests on a single study related to mail-fraud\\nrecidivism. See DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., WHITE-COLLAR CRIME\\nAND CRIMINAL CAREERS (2004). This study suggests that\\nalmost 40% of individuals convicted of mail fraud were later\\nrearrested. Id. at 29. It does not say, however, whether those\\n\\n62 No. 18-1478\\n\\narrests were for violent or nonviolent offenses. Nor does it say\\nwhat percentage of those individuals were convicted. A\\ndifferent portion of the same study suggests that 25% of all\\nwhite-collar repeat offenders (on the numbers provided, I’ll\\nassume that means roughly 10% of those with a mail-fraud\\nconviction, though we have been given no way to know) 17\\nhave an arrest for a violent crime. Id at 45. But it does not\\nspecify whether the violent arrest preceded or post-dated the\\nwhite-collar arrests, and the numbers drop dramatically for\\nthose with only two total offenses, id., suggesting that a\\npattern of criminality, rather than a particular mail-fraud\\narrest, might be an indication of future dangerousness, see id.\\nat 46 (“[T]hose with fewer arrests seldom had violent crimes\\nin their criminal histories.”). This study falls well short of\\nestablishing the “close means-ends fit” required before the\\ngovernments may totally and permanently strip offenders\\nlike Kanter of the ability to exercise a fundamental right. 18\\n This does not mean that Wisconsin and the United States\\ncannot disarm Kanter. Even though the mail-fraud\\nconviction, standing alone, is not enough, they might still be\\nable to show that Kanter’s history or characteristics make him\\n\\n\\n 17This assumes that the rate of violent arrest for mail fraudsters who\\nreoffend tracks that of all white-collar criminals who reoffend. The\\ngovernments’ study doesn’t speak to this question, underscoring the\\ninability of the data provided to support the governments’ arguments.\\n 18\\n My analysis is limited to the total bans that Congress and the\\nWisconsin legislature enacted. It might be that this study or other evidence\\nwould support other, more limited intrusions on Kanter’s Second\\nAmendment right. But the constitutionality of a more limited measure (for\\nexample, a temporary ban or one that limits the places in which Kanter\\ncan have a gun) is not presented by this case.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 63\\n\\nlikely to misuse firearms. And if banning Kanter, in\\nparticular, from possessing a gun is substantially related to\\nthe governments’ goal of “preventing armed mayhem,” then\\nthe statutes could be constitutionally applied to him. Skoien,\\n614 F.3d at 642.\\n At this point, however, neither Wisconsin nor the United\\nStates has presented any evidence that Kanter would be\\ndangerous if armed. Instead, as the majority notes, “Kanter is\\na first-time, non-violent offender with no history of violence,\\nfirearm misuses, or subsequent convictions,” and he is\\n“employed, married, and does not use illicit drugs, all of\\nwhich correspond with lower rates of recidivism.” Maj. Op.\\nat 23. Absent evidence that Kanter would pose a risk to the\\npublic safety if he possessed a gun, the governments cannot\\npermanently deprive him of his right to keep and bear arms.\\n ***\\n If the Second Amendment were subject to a virtue\\nlimitation, there would be no need for the government to\\nproduce—or for the court to assess—evidence that nonviolent\\nfelons have a propensity for dangerous behavior. But Heller\\nforecloses the “civic right” argument on which a virtue\\nlimitation depends. And while both Wisconsin and the United\\nStates have an unquestionably strong interest in protecting\\nthe public from gun violence, they have failed to show, by\\neither logic or data, cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642, that disarming\\nKanter substantially advances that interest. On this record,\\nholding that the ban is constitutional as applied to Kanter\\ndoes not “put[] the government through its paces,” see\\nWilliams, 616 F.3d at 692, but instead treats the Second\\nAmendment as a “second-class right, subject to an entirely\\ndifferent body of rules than the other Bill of Rights\\n\\n64 No. 18-1478\\n\\nguarantees,” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780\\n(2010) (plurality opinion). I therefore dissent.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4377886/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4600633/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Rickey I. Kanter v. William P. Barr\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1478\nRICKEY I. KANTER,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General\nof the United States, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.\n No. 16-cv-1121 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 7, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 15, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Rickey I. Kanter pleaded guilty to\none count of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Due to his fel-\nony conviction, he is prohibited from possessing a firearm un-\nder both federal and Wisconsin law. At issue in this case is\nwhether the felon dispossession statutes—18 U.S.C.\n§ 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)—violate the Second\nAmendment as applied to Kanter. Even if Kanter could bring\n\n2 No. 18-1478\n\nan as-applied challenge, the government has met its burden\nof establishing that the felon dispossession statutes are sub-\nstantially related to an important government interest. We\ntherefore affirm the district court.\n I. Background\n A. Federal and Wisconsin Felon Dispossession Statutes\n Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by persons\nconvicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term\nexceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). State misdemean-\nors are included under the statute if they are punishable by\nmore than two years in prison. 1 Id. § 921(a)(20)(B). However,\nthe statute excludes anyone convicted of “any Federal or State\noffenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade prac-\ntices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to\nthe regulation of business practices.” Id. § 921(a)(20)(A).\nMoreover, “[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set\naside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil\nrights restored” is not a conviction for purposes of the statute.\nId. § 921(a)(20).\n Although the firearms prohibition generally applies for\nlife, the statute includes a “safety valve” that permits individ-\nuals to apply to the Attorney General for restoration of their\nfirearms rights. Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 28 n.1\n\n\n\n\n 1Accordingly, calling the statute a “felon” dispossession statute is\nsomewhat of a “misnomer.” Carly Lagrotteria, Note, Heller's Collateral\nDamage: As-Applied Challenges to the Felon-in-Possession Prohibition, 86 Ford-\nham L. Rev. 1963, 1970 (2018).\n\nNo. 18-1478 3\n\n(2007). Specifically, the Attorney General 2 may remove the\nprohibition on a case-by-case basis if an applicant sufficiently\nestablishes “that the circumstances regarding the disability,\nand the applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the\napplicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to\npublic safety and that the granting of the relief would not be\ncontrary to the public interest.” 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).\n Since 1992, however, “Congress has repeatedly barred\nthe Attorney General from using appropriated funds ‘to in-\nvestigate or act upon [relief] applications,’” rendering the pro-\nvision “inoperative.” Logan, 552 U.S. at 28 n.1 (quoting United\nStates v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 74–75 (2002)). The Committee on\nAppropriations eliminated funding because the restoration\nprocedure under § 925(c) was “a very difficult task” that re-\nquired ATF officials to “spend many hours investigating a\nparticular applicant for relief.” H.R. Rep. No. 102-618, at 14\n(1992). Even then, there was “no way to know with any cer-\ntainty whether the applicant [was] still a danger to public\nsafety.” Id. Accordingly, ATF officials were effectively “re-\nquired to guess whether a convicted felon … [could] be en-\ntrusted with a firearm.” Id. Moreover, they were “forced to\nmake these decisions knowing that a mistake could have dev-\nastating consequences for innocent citizens.” Id. Ultimately,\nthe Committee determined that “the $3.75 million and the 40\nman-years annually spent investigating and acting upon\nthese applications for relief would be better utilized by ATF\nin fighting violent crime.” Id. The Committee addressed the\nfunding issue again in 1995, adding that “too many of these\n\n 2 The Attorney General delegated its authority under § 925(c) to the\nBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”). 28 C.F.R.\n§ 0.130(a)(1).\n\n4 No. 18-1478\n\nfelons whose gun ownership rights were restored went on to\ncommit violent crimes with firearms.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-183,\nat 15 (1995).\n In 1981, Wisconsin adopted its own felon dispossession\nlaw. See Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m). Section 941.29(1m) prohibits\nan individual from possessing a firearm if he has “been con-\nvicted of a felony in” Wisconsin or “a crime elsewhere that\nwould be a felony” in Wisconsin. Id. § 941.29(1m)(a)–(b).\n B. Factual Background\n Kanter lives in Mequon, Wisconsin. He was previously the\nowner, operator, and CEO of Rikco International, LLC. Rikco\nInternational, which did business as “Dr. Comfort,” manufac-\ntured therapeutic shoes and inserts for individuals with dia-\nbetes and severe foot disease. The company marketed the\nshoes and inserts to podiatrists, who in turn sold them to in-\ndividual consumers. Most of the shoes and inserts were billed\nto, and paid for by, Medicare. Medicare only paid for inserts\nthat met certain thickness and hardness standards.\n In April 2004, Kanter submitted his inserts to Medicare to\ndetermine whether they met those requirements. Medicare\nrejected Kanter’s inserts because they were too thin. Kanter\nthen submitted revised samples, which Medicare approved.\nHowever, Kanter continued to sell the noncompliant inserts\nwhile representing that they were Medicare-approved. All\ntold, Medicare paid Kanter’s company $375,000 for the non-\ncompliant inserts.\n On May 24, 2011, Kanter pleaded guilty to one count of\nmail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 based on a shipment of the\nnoncompliant inserts to a podiatrist in Florida. Section 1341\ncarries a maximum penalty of twenty years in prison and a\n\nNo. 18-1478 5\n\n$250,000 fine. Kanter was sentenced to one year and one day\nin prison and two years of supervised release. He was also\nordered to pay a criminal penalty of $50,000, and he reim-\nbursed Medicare over $27 million in a related civil settlement.\n Kanter has since served his time and paid his criminal pen-\nalty, and he has not been charged with any additional crimi-\nnal activity. However, because of his felony conviction, he is\npermanently prohibited from owning a firearm under federal\nand Wisconsin law.\n C. Procedural Background\n Kanter brought suit in the Eastern District of Wisconsin,\narguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)\nare unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as ap-\nplied to him. The United States moved to dismiss his claim\nunder Rule 12(b)(6), and Wisconsin moved for judgment on\nthe pleadings under Rule 12(c). In response, Kanter moved for\nsummary judgment, arguing that his status as a nonviolent\noffender with no other criminal record meant that both stat-\nutes were unconstitutional as applied to him.\n The district court granted defendants’ motions and denied\nKanter’s motion. In so doing, the district court held that, even\nassuming felons are entitled to Second Amendment protec-\ntion, the application of the federal and Wisconsin felon dis-\npossession laws to Kanter is substantially related to the gov-\nernment’s important interest in preventing gun violence. The\ncourt reasoned that Congress and the Wisconsin legislature\nare entitled to categorically disqualify all felons—even nonvi-\nolent felons like Kanter—because both have found that such\nindividuals are more likely to abuse firearms. The court also\nnoted that this “bright line categorical approach … allows for\n\n6 No. 18-1478\n\nuniform application and ease of administration.” The district\ncourt entered judgment on January 2, 2018, and this appeal\nfollowed.\n II. Discussion\n We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to\ndismiss for failure to state a claim and a motion for judgment\non the pleadings. Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Hilger, 838 F.3d 821,\n824 (7th Cir. 2016). In doing so, “we accept all well-pleaded\nfacts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’\nfavor.” Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir.\n2016). To avoid dismissal, “the complaint must ‘state a claim\nto relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.\nv. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).\n A. Legal Standard 3\n The Second Amendment states: “A well regulated Militia,\nbeing necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the\npeople to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S.\nConst. amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme\nCourt identified the “core” of the Second Amendment as “the\nright of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in de-\nfense of hearth and home.” 554 U.S. 570, 634–35. Accordingly,\nthe Court concluded that Washington D.C.’s ban on handgun\npossession in the home violated the Second Amendment. Id.\nat 635.\n However, the Court also made clear that “the right se-\ncured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” Id. at 626.\n\n\n 3 Because “the federal and state prohibitions are equivalent in effect”\nas to Kanter, our Second Amendment analysis of the two statutes is the\nsame. Baer v. Lynch, 636 F. App’x 695, 698–99 (7th Cir. 2016).\n\nNo. 18-1478 7\n\nAlthough the Court did not “undertake an exhaustive histor-\nical analysis ... of the full scope of the Second Amendment,” it\nsaid that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast\ndoubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of fire-\narms by felons and the mentally ill.” Id. It described such pro-\nhibitions as “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.” Id.\nat 627 n.26. Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the\nCourt “repeat[ed] [its] assurances” that felon dispossession\nlaws remain valid. 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (plurality opinion).\n After Heller, we developed a two-step test for Second\nAmendment challenges. “The threshold question is whether\nthe regulated activity falls within the scope of the Second\nAmendment.” Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888, 892 (7th\nCir. 2017) (“Ezell II”). “This is a textual and historical inquiry;\nif the government can establish that the challenged law regu-\nlates activity falling outside the scope of the right as originally\nunderstood, then ‘the regulated activity is categorically un-\nprotected, and the law is not subject to further Second\nAmendment review.’” Id. (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651\nF.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Ezell I”)).\n However, “if the historical evidence is inconclusive or sug-\ngests that the regulated activity is not categorically unpro-\ntected[,] then there must be a second inquiry into the strength\nof the government’s justification for restricting or regulating\nthe exercise of Second Amendment rights.” Id. (quoting Ezell\nI, 651 F.3d at 703). At step two, we evaluate “the regulatory\nmeans the government has chosen and the public-benefits\nend it seeks to achieve.” Id. (quoting Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 703).\nThe rigor of the review is dependent on “how close the law\ncomes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the se-\nverity of the law’s burden on the right.” Id. (quoting Ezell I,\n\n8 No. 18-1478\n\n651 F.3d at 703). “Severe burdens” on this core right “require\na very strong public-interest justification and a close means-\nend fit; lesser burdens, and burdens on activity lying closer to\nthe margins of the right, are more easily justified.” Id. The\ngovernment has the burden “of justifying its law under a\nheightened standard of scrutiny; rational-basis review does\nnot apply.” Id. We have consistently described step two as\n“akin to intermediate scrutiny” and have required the gov-\nernment to show that the challenged statute is substantially\nrelated to an important governmental objective. United States\nv. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing\ncases).\n B. As-Applied Second Amendment Challenges\n Relying on the “presumptively lawful” language in Heller\nand McDonald, every federal court of appeals to address the\nissue has held that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second\nAmendment on its face. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 406 F.\nApp’x 52, 53–54 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d\n281, 281–82 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. Moore,\n666 F.3d 313, 318–19 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Barton, 633\nF.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by\nBinderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc);\nSchrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 989–91 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert.\ndenied, 571 U.S. 989 (2013); United States v. Joos, 638 F.3d 581,\n586 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Khami, 362 F. App’x 501,\n508 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 934 (2010); United\nStates v. Battle, 347 F. App’x 478, 480 (11th Cir. 2009) (per cu-\nriam); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir.\n2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 970 (2010); United States v. Smith,\n329 F. App’x 109, 110–11 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Ander-\nson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009).\n\nNo. 18-1478 9\n\n However, courts of appeals are split as to whether as-ap-\nplied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) are viable.\nOn the one hand, the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh\nCircuits have suggested that § 922(g)(1) is always constitu-\ntional as applied to felons as a class, regardless of their indi-\nvidual circumstances or the nature of their offenses. See Stim-\nmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198, 210 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have\nupheld § 922(g)(1), which disarms even non-violent felons.”\n(citing United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2010),\ncert. denied, 562 U.S. 895 (2010))); United States v. Scroggins, 599\nF.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 867 (2010)\n(rejecting as-applied Second Amendment challenge and hold-\ning that felon dispossession laws are constitutional even if the\noffense was nonviolent in nature); United States v. Rozier, 598\nF.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 958 (2010)\n(concluding that “statutes disqualifying felons from pos-\nsessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not of-\nfend the Second Amendment,” and holding that § 922(g)(1) is\n“a constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment\nright of certain classes of people,” including convicted felons);\nUnited States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010),\ncert. denied, 562 U.S. 921 (2010) (rejecting nonviolent felon’s as-\napplied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) because\n“felons are categorically different from the individuals who\nhave a fundamental right to bear arms”); In re U.S., 578 F.3d\n1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We have already rejected the no-\ntion that Heller mandates an individualized inquiry concern-\ning felons pursuant to § 922(g)(1).” (citing McCane, 573 F.3d at\n1047)).\n The First Circuit has not foreclosed as-applied challenges,\nbut it has expressed some skepticism about them. In United\nStates v. Torres-Rosario, the court rejected the defendant’s as-\n\n10 No. 18-1478\n\napplied challenge because he had two prior convictions for\n“serious drug offenses.” 658 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011), cert.\ndenied, 565 U.S. 1271 (2012). However, the court noted that the\nSupreme Court “may be open to claims that some felonies do\nnot indicate potential violence and cannot be the basis for ap-\nplying a categorical ban,” and “might even be open to highly\nfact-specific objections.” Id. Yet the First Circuit cautioned that\n“such an approach, applied to countless variations in individ-\nual circumstances, would obviously present serious problems\nof administration, consistency and fair warning.” Id.\n On the other hand, we, along with the Fourth, Eighth, and\nD.C. Circuits, have left room for as-applied challenges to the\nstatute. See United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir.\n2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1092 (2010) (“[W]e recognize that\n§ 922(g)(1) may be subject to an overbreadth challenge at\nsome point because of its disqualification of all felons, includ-\ning those who are non-violent.”); Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d\n152, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“We need not decide today if it is\never possible for a convicted felon to show that he may still\ncount as a ‘law-abiding, responsible citizen’” entitled to Sec-\nond Amendment protections.); United States v. Woolsey, 759\nF.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Eighth Circuit has left\nopen the possibility that a person could bring a successful as-\napplied challenge to § 922(g)(1)” but rejected defendant’s as-\napplied challenge because he had multiple violent felony con-\nvictions.); United States v. Pruess, 703 F.3d 242, 247 (4th Cir.\n2012) (holding that § 922(g)(1) could constitutionally be ap-\nplied to nonviolent felons, but acknowledging that “there in\ntheory might be an as-applied Second Amendment challenge\nto [§] 922(g)(1) that could succeed” (citations and internal\nquotation marks omitted)).\n\nNo. 18-1478 11\n\n Neither we, nor the Fourth, Eighth, or D.C. Circuits, how-\never, have ever actually upheld such a challenge in practice.\nIn fact, we have repeatedly rejected as-applied Second\nAmendment challenges to § 922(g). See Baer v. Lynch, 636 F.\nApp’x 695, 698 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that § 922(g)(1) could\nconstitutionally be applied to individual convicted of felony\nrobbery); United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 750–51 (7th Cir.\n2015) (concluding that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional as ap-\nplied to individual who had been convicted of three violent\nfelonies); Williams, 616 F.3d at 693–94 (holding that § 922(g)(1)\nwas constitutional as applied to individual convicted of fel-\nony robbery who “beat[] the victim so badly that the victim\nrequired sixty-five stitches”); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d\n638, 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (rejecting as-applied Sec-\nond Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(9) brought by domes-\ntic violence misdemeanant because violence was “an element\nof the offense” and data suggested high rates of recidivism).\n Indeed, only one federal court of appeals has upheld an\nas-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g). In a\nfractured en banc decision, a narrow majority of the Third Cir-\ncuit (eight out of fifteen judges) held that § 922(g)(1) was un-\nconstitutional as applied to two individuals convicted of a\nmisdemeanor for corrupting a minor and a misdemeanor for\nunlawfully carrying a handgun without a license, respec-\ntively. Binderup, 836 F.3d at 340, 356. Because it is the only suc-\ncessful as-applied Second Amendment challenge in a court of\nappeals to date—and because Kanter relies heavily upon it—\nit is worth examining the case at some length.\n Seven members of the Third Circuit reasoned that the his-\ntorical justification for disarming felons was “tied to the con-\ncept of a virtuous citizenry,” and that “persons who have\n\n12 No. 18-1478\n\ncommitted serious crimes forfeit the right to possess firearms\nmuch the way they forfeit other civil liberties.” Id. at 348–49\n(plurality opinion) (citations and internal quotation marks\nomitted). Applying the civic virtue rationale, three of those\njudges concluded that the challengers’ offenses “were not se-\nrious enough to strip them of their Second Amendment\nrights.” Id. at 351. They explained that, although the two of-\nfenses were punishable by more than a year in prison, and\nthus met the definition of a felony in § 922(g), the state legis-\nlatures had enacted them as misdemeanors, and “a state leg-\nislature’s classification of an offense as a misdemeanor is a\npowerful expression of its belief that the offense is not serious\nenough to be disqualifying.” Id. Those judges also considered\nthat neither of the offenses at issue involved violence and that\neach of the challengers received “a minor sentence,” and they\npointed to the lack of a “cross-jurisdictional consensus re-\ngarding the seriousness of the [c]hallengers’ crimes,” remark-\ning that in some states the challengers’ conduct was not even\nillegal. Id. at 352. At step two, those three judges concluded\nthat § 922(g)(1) did not survive intermediate scrutiny because\nthe government relied on “off-point statistical studies” that\ninvolved incarcerated felons, not misdemeanants who had\nserved no jail time. Id. at 354.\n By contrast, the other five judges who upheld the as-ap-\nplied challenge believed that the exclusion of felons from the\nscope of the Second Amendment’s protections was not rooted\nin notions of civic virtue, but rather “the time-honored prin-\nciple that the right to keep and bear arms does not extend to\nthose likely to commit violent offenses.” Id. at 367 (Hardiman,\nJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgments). Ap-\nplying dangerousness as the touchstone, those judges con-\ncluded that persons like the challengers who were convicted\n\nNo. 18-1478 13\n\nof nonviolent offenses fall within the scope of the Second\nAmendment’s protection. Id. at 375–76. Moreover, those five\njudges believed that § 922(g) was “categorically unconstitu-\ntional” when applied to “non-dangerous persons convicted of\noffenses unassociated with violence,” such that any subse-\nquent means-end scrutiny or judicial interest balancing was\n“inappropriate.” Id. at 358, 378.\n The seven dissenting judges concluded that as-applied\nchallenges to § 922(g)(1) are never permissible. Id. at 401\n(Fuentes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dis-\nsenting from the judgments). In doing so, they stressed that\nthe majority’s decision to uphold such a challenge was un-\nprecedented. See id. at 380–81 (“The plaintiffs ask us to do\nsomething that no federal appellate court has done before.…\nNo federal appellate court has yet upheld a challenge, facial\nor as-applied, to the felon-in-possession statute.”). They criti-\ncized the majority’s approach because it “saddle[s] district\ncourt judges with a seemingly unending obligation to review\nas-applied challenges” and “fail[s] to provide us with any\nworkable standards that would make such a regime adminis-\ntratively feasible or doctrinally coherent.” Id. at 380. Accord-\ning to the dissent, the challengers’ claim failed at step one be-\ncause “Heller itself tells us that felons are disqualified from\nexercising their Second Amendment rights,” and “there is no\nprincipled basis … for distinguishing felons from misde-\nmeanants who commit crimes punishable by more than two\nyears in prison.” Id. at 388. In any event, the dissenting judges\nconcluded that § 922(g)(1) survives intermediate scrutiny be-\ncause the government’s studies established a link between\npast criminal conduct and the government’s important inter-\nest in preventing future gun violence. See id. at 400–01. With\n\n14 No. 18-1478\n\nrespect to plaintiffs’ contention that the studies were not tai-\nlored to their specific characteristics, the dissenting judges ex-\nplained that “[t]he question is not whether someone exactly\nlike the plaintiffs poses a threat to public safety,” but rather\n“whether the fit between the challenged regulation and the\nasserted objective [is] reasonable, not perfect.” Id. at 400 (al-\nteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks\nomitted). 4\n With this background in mind, we now apply our two-\nstep test to this case.\n C. Step One: The Historical Evidence is Inconclusive as\n to Whether Felons Were Categorically Excluded From\n the Second Amendment’s Scope\n The first question is whether nonviolent felons as a class\nhistorically enjoyed Second Amendment rights. Heller did not\nanswer this question. True, “some of Heller’s language does\nlink Second Amendment rights with the notion[] of ‘law-abid-\ning citizens.’” Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 669; see also Heller,\n554 U.S. at 634–35 (observing that the “core” of the Second\nAmendment right is “the right of law-abiding, responsible cit-\nizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home” (emphasis\nadded)). The Heller Court also cautioned that nothing in its\ndecision “should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding pro-\nhibitions on the possession of firearms by felons,” which it re-\nferred to as “presumptively lawful.” 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26.\nMoreover, the Court mentioned that certain individuals may\n\n\n 4Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court\ndenied the petitions for writ of certiorari. See Sessions v. Binderup, 137 S. Ct.\n2323 (2017) (noting Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor would grant the pe-\ntition); Binderup v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (same).\n\nNo. 18-1478 15\n\nbe “disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment\nrights.” Id. at 635. However, the Court never actually ad-\ndressed the historical pedigree of felon dispossession laws.\nAccordingly, we have refused to read too much into the\nCourt’s “precautionary language.” Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640; see\nalso Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 669 (“We are reluctant to place\nmore weight on these passing references than the Court itself\ndid.”). 5\n Nor has the Seventh Circuit decided whether felons were\nhistorically outside the scope of the Second Amendment’s\nprotection. See Baer, 636 F. App’x at 698. Although the litigants\nin Williams raised that question, we declined to address it and\nproceeded directly to the intermediate scrutiny analysis. 616\nF.3d at 692. In so doing, we noted that “[t]he academic writing\non the subject of whether felons were excluded from firearm\npossession at the time of the founding is ‘inconclusive at best,’\nand we refrain[ed] … from making a determination based on\ncontradictory views.” Id. (quoting Skoien, 614 F.3d at 650\n(Sykes, J., dissenting)).\n To be sure, although we have not expressly decided this\nissue before, we have suggested that felons were not histori-\ncally understood to have Second Amendment rights. For ex-\nample, in Skoien, which involved domestic violence misde-\nmeanants, we explained that some “categorical limits” on fire-\narm possession were “part of the original meaning” of the\nSecond Amendment. 614 F.3d at 640. Similarly, in United\n\n\n 5 But see Berron v. Ill. Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd., 825 F.3d 843,\n\n847 (7th Cir. 2016) (“When holding in [Heller] that the Second Amendment\nestablishes personal rights, the Court observed that only law-abiding per-\nsons enjoy these rights, even at home.”).\n\n16 No. 18-1478\n\nStates v. Yancey, we opined that “most scholars of the Second\nAmendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied to the\nconcept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the gov-\nernment could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens,’” including fel-\nons. 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting\nVongxay, 594 F.3d at 1118). 6\n If, as we suggested in Yancey and as most scholars have\nconcluded, the founders conceived of the right to bear arms\nas belonging only to virtuous citizens, even nonviolent felons\nlike Kanter would fall outside the scope of the Second\n\n\n 6 Indeed, numerous legal historians have endorsed this view. See, e.g.,\nSaul Cornell, “Don't Know Much About History” The Current Crisis in Second\nAmendment Scholarship, 29 N. Ky. L. Rev. 657, 679 (2002) (“Perhaps the\nmost accurate way to describe the dominant understanding of the right to\nbear arms in the Founding era is as a civic right [that] … was limited to\nthose members of the polity who were deemed capable of exercising it in\na virtuous manner.”); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitu-\ntion or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 Okla. L. Rev. 65, 96 (1983) (“Co-\nlonial and English societies of the eighteenth century … excluded … felons\n[from possessing firearms].”); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and\nthe Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 266\n(1983) (“Felons simply did not fall within the benefits of the common law\nright to possess arms.”); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the\nSecond Amendment, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461, 480 (1995) (“One implication of\nthis emphasis on the virtuous citizen is that the right to arms does not\npreclude laws disarming the unvirtuous (i.e. criminals) ….” (citation omit-\nted)). Moreover, according to Thomas M. Cooley’s 1868 Treatise on Con-\nstitutional Limitations, which the Heller court described as a “massively\npopular” treatise written by “[t]he most famous” late-nineteenth-century\nlegal scholar, 554 U.S. at 616, certain classes of people were “almost uni-\nversally excluded” from exercising certain civic rights, including “the id-\niot, the lunatic, and the felon, on obvious grounds.” Thomas M. Cooley, A\nTreatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative\nPower of the States of the American Union 29 (1st ed. 1868).\n\nNo. 18-1478 17\n\nAmendment. Indeed, several courts of appeals have con-\ncluded that nonviolent felons are outside the scope of the Sec-\nond Amendment. For example, in Hamilton v. Pallozzi, the\nFourth Circuit rejected a nonviolent felon’s as-applied Second\nAmendment challenge to a state felon dispossession statute,\nholding that “conviction of a felony necessarily removes one\nfrom the class of ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ for pur-\nposes of the Second Amendment.” 848 F.3d 614, 626 (4th Cir.\n2017). Explaining that the defendant could not rebut the pre-\nsumption that he fell outside the category of “‘law-abiding,\nresponsible citizens,’” the court focused on his felony convic-\ntion for fraud and theft crimes: “Theft, fraud, and forgery are\nnot merely errors in filling out a form or some regulatory mis-\ndemeanor offense; these are significant offenses reflecting dis-\nrespect for the law.” Id. at 627 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635);\nsee also Medina, 913 F.3d at 160 (“Whether a certain crime re-\nmoves one from the category of ‘law-abiding and responsi-\nble,’ in some cases, may be a close question,” such as “a mis-\ndemeanor arising from a fistfight …. Those who commit felo-\nnies however, cannot profit from our recognition of such bor-\nderline cases.”); United States v. Hughley, 691 F. App’x 278, 279\n(8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Restricting gun possession by\nfelons—even nonviolent ones—differs meaningfully from re-\nstricting citizens who have not been convicted of serious of-\nfenses from having guns in their home for self-defense.”);\nVongxay, 594 F.3d at 1115–16 (“declin[ing] to make a distinc-\ntion between violent and non-violent felons” because “felons\nare categorically different from the individuals who have a\nfundamental right to bear arms”); Rozier, 598 F.3d at 771 & n.5\n(stating that a nonviolent felon’s “Second Amendment right\nto bear arms is not weighed in the same manner as that of a\nlaw-abiding citizen” and analogizing felon-dispossession\n\n18 No. 18-1478\n\nstatutes to felon disenfranchisement laws); United States v.\nEverist, 368 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Irrespective of\nwhether his offense was violent in nature, a felon has shown\nmanifest disregard for the rights of others. He may not justly\ncomplain of the limitation on his liberty when his possession\nof firearms would otherwise threaten the security of his fel-\nlow citizens.”). 7\n On the other hand, as Judge Sykes observed in her dissent\nin Skoien, there is scholarly “disagree[ment] about the extent\nto which felons … were considered excluded from the right to\nbear arms during the founding era,” and “[t]he historical evi-\ndence is inconclusive at best.” Skoien, 614 F.3d at 650 (Sykes,\nJ., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 8 If the founders were really\n\n\n\n\n 7 Although Everist was issued before the Heller decision, the Fifth Cir-\ncuit already recognized an individual right to bear arms pre-Heller and\nreaffirmed the validity of the Everist decision after Heller. See Scroggins, 599\nF.3d at 451.\n 8 For support for Judge Sykes’s observation regarding the conflicting\nscholarship on the historical conception of the Second Amendment, see,\ne.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of A Theory: District of\nColumbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 Hastings L.J. 1371, 1374 (2009)\n(“[S]o far as I can determine, no colonial or state law in eighteenth-century\nAmerica formally restricted the ability of felons to own firearms.”); C.\nKevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. &\nPub. Pol’y 695, 698 (2009) (“[A]ctual ‘longstanding’ precedent in America\nand pre-Founding England suggests that a firearms disability can be con-\nsistent with the Second Amendment to the extent that … its basis credibly\nindicates a present danger that one will misuse arms against others and\nthe disability redresses that danger.”); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22,\n56 UCLA L. Rev. 1551, 1563 (2009) (“The Founding generation had no\nlaws … denying the right to people convicted of crimes.”).\n\nNo. 18-1478 19\n\njust concerned about dangerousness, not a lack of virtue, non-\nviolent felons like Kanter arguably fall within the scope of the\nSecond Amendment’s protections.\n Ultimately, we need not resolve this difficult issue regard-\ning the historical scope of the Second Amendment to dispose\nof this case. Instead, we proceed to the means-end scrutiny of\nthe government’s objectives. 9\n D. Step Two: The Felon Dispossession Statutes Survive\n Intermediate Scrutiny\n Categorical prohibitions on the possession of firearms by\nfelons are “presumptively lawful,” even in disqualifying non-\nviolent felons like Kanter. See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640 (“[S]uch\na recent extension of [§ 922(g)(1)’s] disqualification to non-vi-\nolent felons (embezzlers and tax evaders, for example) is pre-\nsumptively constitutional, as Heller said in note 26.”). But be-\ncause “Heller referred to felon disarmament bans only as ‘pre-\nsumptively lawful,’” we require the government to “prov[e]\n\n 9 In fact, we usually defer the threshold historical scope inquiry and\nproceed directly to means-end scrutiny. See, e.g., Horsley v. Trame, 808 F.3d\n1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 2015) (declining to decide whether eighteen- to twenty-\nyear-olds are within the scope of the Second Amendment); Yancey, 621\nF.3d at 684–85. One notable exception to our generally restrained ap-\nproach in this area is United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir.\n2015). There, the majority held that undocumented immigrants were his-\ntorically within the scope of the Second Amendment but ultimately con-\ncluded that the statute at issue nevertheless survived intermediate scru-\ntiny. Id. at 669–73. The concurrence advocated for a “prudential approach”\nsince we did not need to decide the threshold question to resolve the case,\nand proposed “reserv[ing] resolution of this challenging constitutional\nquestion for a case that compels addressing it.” Id. at 673–74 (Flaum, J.,\nconcurring in the judgment). We think that prudential approach is appro-\npriate here.\n\n20 No. 18-1478\n\n“the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) … using the intermediate\nscrutiny framework.” Williams, 616 F.3d at 692.\n To survive intermediate scrutiny at step two, the govern-\nment must show that the felon dispossession statute is sub-\nstantially related to an important governmental objective.\nConsistent with how we apply intermediate scrutiny in the\nFirst Amendment context, the “fit” between the challenged\nregulation and the asserted governmental objective need only\n“be reasonable, not perfect.” United States v. Marzzarella, 614\nF.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010); cf. FTC v. Trudeau, 662 F.3d 947, 953\n(7th Cir. 2011). 10\n The government has met its burden in this case. First, Kan-\nter concedes that the government’s objective in passing\n§ 922(g)(1) was an important one. The government identifies\nits interest as preventing gun violence by keeping firearms\naway from persons, such as those convicted of serious crimes,\nwho might be expected to misuse them. This formulation of\nthe government’s interest is consistent with our precedent in\nthis area. See Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683 (“Congress enacted the\nexclusions in § 922(g) to keep guns out of the hands of pre-\n\n\n 10 Our means-end review is arguably less rigorous in this case because\n\nthe weight of the historical evidence summarized above suggests that\nfelon dispossession laws do not restrict the “core right of armed defense,”\nbut rather burden “activity lying closer to the margins of the right.” Ezell\nII, 846 F.3d at 892. Indeed, we have said that “the state can prevail with\nless evidence when, as in Skoien, guns are forbidden to a class of persons\nwho present a higher than average risk of misusing a gun.” Moore, 702\nF.3d at 940. We have even gone so far as to say that “empirical evidence of\na public safety concern can be dispensed with altogether when the ban is\nlimited to obviously dangerous persons such as felons and the mentally\nill.” Id.\n\nNo. 18-1478 21\n\nsumptively risky people.”); Williams, 616 F.3d at 693 (describ-\ning the government’s objective as “keep[ing] firearms out of\nthe hands of violent felons, who the government believes are\noften those most likely to misuse firearms”); Skoien, 614 F.3d\nat 642 (describing the government’s interest as “preventing\narmed mayhem”). And we have previously held that this in-\nterest is “without doubt an important one.” Yancey, 621 F.3d\nat 684; see also Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 673 (“[T]he govern-\nment has a[] strong interest in preventing people who already\nhave disrespected the law (including … felons …) from pos-\nsessing guns.”).\n Second, the government has shown that prohibiting even\nnonviolent felons like Kanter from possessing firearms is sub-\nstantially related to its interest in preventing gun violence. Be-\nfore turning to the government’s statistical evidence estab-\nlishing such a link, it is important to note that we do not write\non a blank slate. In Yancey, we explained that “most felons are\nnonviolent, but someone with a felony conviction on his rec-\nord is more likely than a nonfelon to engage in illegal and vi-\nolent gun use.” 621 F.3d at 685. In fact, the D.C. Circuit has\nconcluded that “nonviolent offenders not only have a higher\nrecidivism rate than the general population, but certain\ngroups—such as property offenders—have an even higher re-\ncidivism rate than violent offenders, and a large percentage of\nthe crimes nonviolent recidivists later commit are violent.”\nKaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see\nEwing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 26 (2003) (citing P. Langan &\nD. Levin, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Spe-\ncial Report: Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, at 1 (June\n2002)).\n\n22 No. 18-1478\n\n In addition to these judicial statements, the government\npoints to several studies that have found a connection be-\ntween nonviolent offenders like Kanter and a risk of future\nviolent crime. For example, one study of 210,886 nonviolent\noffenders found that about one in five were rearrested for a\nviolent crime within three years of his or her release. See U.S.\nDep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Profile of Nonviolent\nOffenders Exiting State Prisons 2, 4 (2004). A separate study\nfound that 28.5 percent of nonviolent property offenders—a\ncategory that includes fraud convictions—were rearrested for\na violent offense within five years of their release. See Mat-\nthew R. Durose, et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice\nStatistics, Recidivism of Prisoner Released in 30 States in 2005:\nPatterns from 2005 to 2010, at 9 (2014). Yet another study found\nthat “even handgun purchasers with only 1 prior misdemeanor\nconviction and no convictions for offenses involving firearms\nor violence were nearly 5 times as likely as those with no prior\ncriminal history to be charged with new offenses involving\nfirearms or violence.” Garen J. Wintemute, et al., Prior Misde-\nmeanor Convictions as a Risk Factor for Later Violent and Firearm-\nRelated Criminal Activity Among Authorized Purchasers of Hand-\nguns, 280 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 2083, 2083 (1998) (emphasis\nadded). 11\n\n\n\n 11 Even the study that Kanter relies upon found that approximately 40\n\npercent of individuals convicted of mail fraud had at least one additional\narrest afterward. David Weisburd & Elin Waring, White-Collar Crime and\nCriminal Careers 12, 29 (2004). The same study found that 24.5 percent of\nall repeat white-collar offenders had at least one violent arrest on their\nrecord. Id. at 45. In other words, “white-collar offenders often have multi-\nple contacts with the criminal justice system” and “are unlikely to evi-\ndence a high degree of specialization.” Id. at 49.\n\nNo. 18-1478 23\n\n Kanter’s only response to the government’s statistical\nstudies is that they are not tailored enough to his “individual\ncircumstances.” Specifically, Kanter asks the Court “to con-\nsider the fact that [he] is a first-time, non-violent offender with\nno history of violence, firearm misuses, or subsequent convic-\ntions.” Kanter also points out that he is “employed, married,\nand does not use illicit drugs, all of which correspond with\nlower rates of recidivism.” In short, Kanter argues that to\nmeet its burden the government must show “a substantial re-\nlationship between denying Mr. Kanter a firearm and further-\ning the government’s objective of preventing firearm misuse\nand armed violence.”\n Kanter is mistaken. In Skoien we held that “Congress is not\nlimited to case-by-case exclusions of persons who have been\nshown to be untrustworthy with weapons, nor need these\nlimits be established by evidence presented in court. Heller\ndid not suggest that disqualifications would be effective only\nif the statute’s benefits are first established by admissible evi-\ndence.” 614 F.3d at 641. Of course, not all nonviolent felons\nwill later commit a violent crime with a firearm. In that sense,\nthe statute is “somewhat over-inclusive.” United States v.\nChapman, 666 F.3d 220, 231 (4th Cir. 2012). However, that\n“does not undermine [the statute’s] constitutionality … be-\ncause it merely suggests that the fit is not a perfect one; a rea-\nsonable fit is all that is required under intermediate scrutiny.”\nId.; see also Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97–98 (analogizing to inter-\nmediate scrutiny in First Amendment context).\n Here, unlike the challengers in Binderup, who were con-\nvicted of “non-serious” state misdemeanors and served no\nprison time, Kanter was convicted of a serious federal felony\nfor conduct broadly understood to be criminal, and he did not\n\n24 No. 18-1478\n\nface a minor sentence. 836 F.3d at 353 & n.6. Instead, Kanter is\nmore akin to the challenger in Hamilton, whose fraud and\ntheft convictions were “black-letter mala in se felonies reflect-\ning grave misjudgment and maladjustment.” 848 F.3d at 627.\nKanter’s crime—defrauding the federal government out of\nhundreds of thousands of dollars—“reflect[s] significant dis-\nrespect for the law.” Id. at 627 n.14; see also Medina, 913 F.3d at\n160 (rejecting as-applied challenge where plaintiff was con-\nvicted of “felony fraud—a serious crime, malum in se, that is\npunishable in every state”). Thus, Kanter’s serious felony con-\nviction prevents him from challenging the constitutionality of\n§ 922(g)(1) as applied to him. 12\n We are further assured in our decision because the highly-\nindividualized approach Kanter proposes raises serious insti-\ntutional and administrative concerns. See Torres-Rosario, 658\nF.3d at 113 (“[S]uch an approach, applied to countless varia-\ntions in individual circumstances, would obviously present\nserious problems of administration, consistency and fair\nwarning.”); see also Medina, 913 F.3d at 159–60 (rejecting argu-\nment that “non-dangerous felons have a right to bear arms”\n\n\n 12 We decline to revisit our comment in Williams “that § 922(g)(1) may\nbe subject to an overbreadth challenge at some point because of its dis-\nqualification of all felons, including those who are non-violent.” 616 F.3d\nat 693. That statement was dictum, and we need not determine whether\n§ 922(g)(1) may ever be subject to an as-applied challenge to reach our de-\ncision in this case. There may be a case in the future that requires address-\ning whether any individual may successfully bring an as-applied chal-\nlenge to the statute, but Kanter’s is not that case. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma,\n413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973) (“[A] person to whom a statute may constitution-\nally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground\nthat it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other\nsituations not before the Court.”).\n\nNo. 18-1478 25\n\nbecause “[u]sing an amorphous ‘dangerousness’ standard to\ndelineate the scope of the Second Amendment would require\nthe government to make case-by-case predictive judgments\nbefore barring the possession of weapons”). As mentioned\nabove, Congress previously allowed the ATF to restore a\nfelon’s gun rights under § 925(c) if the agency determined that\n“the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous\nto public safety and that the granting of the relief would not\nbe contrary to the public interest.” 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). How-\never, Congress abandoned that approach after finding that\nthe dangerousness inquiry was a “very difficult” and time-in-\ntensive task, H.R. Rep. No. 102-618, at 14 (1992), and that “too\nmany of these felons whose gun ownership rights were re-\nstored went on to commit violent crimes with firearms.” H.R.\nRep. No. 104-183, at 15 (1995). Congress’s failed attempt to\ndelegate this investigative task to a law enforcement agency\n“should have a profound impact on our tailoring analysis.”\nBinderup, 836 F.3d at 403 (Fuentes, J., concurring in part, dis-\nsenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment).\n At bottom, the fact-specific inquiry Kanter asks this Court\nto undertake is “a function best performed by the Executive,\nwhich, unlike courts, is institutionally equipped for conduct-\ning a neutral, wide-ranging investigation.” Bean, 537 U.S. at\n77; see also Pontarelli v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 285 F.3d 216,\n231 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Unlike ATF, courts possess neither the re-\nsources to conduct the requisite investigations nor the exper-\ntise to predict accurately which felons may carry guns with-\nout threatening the public’s safety.”). Moreover, “[i]n the con-\ntext of firearm regulation, the legislature is far better\nequipped than the judiciary to make sensitive public policy\njudgments (within constitutional limits) concerning the dan-\ngers in carrying firearms and the manner to combat those\n\n26 No. 18-1478\n\nrisks.” Schrader, 704 F.3d at 990 (citation and internal quota-\ntion marks omitted).\n In sum, the government has established that the felon dis-\npossession statutes are substantially related to the important\ngovernmental objective of keeping firearms away those con-\nvicted of serious crimes. Because Kanter was convicted of a\nserious federal felony for conduct broadly understood to be\ncriminal, his challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is\nwithout merit.\n III. Conclusion\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\ndistrict court.\n\nNo. 18-1478 27\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Rickey I. Kanter v. William P. Barr\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1478\\nRICKEY I. KANTER,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General\\nof the United States, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-1121 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 7, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Rickey I. Kanter pleaded guilty to\\none count of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Due to his fel-\\nony conviction, he is prohibited from possessing a firearm un-\\nder both federal and Wisconsin law. At issue in this case is\\nwhether the felon dispossession statutes—18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)—violate the Second\\nAmendment as applied to Kanter. Even if Kanter could bring\\n\\n2 No. 18-1478\\n\\nan as-applied challenge, the government has met its burden\\nof establishing that the felon dispossession statutes are sub-\\nstantially related to an important government interest. We\\ntherefore affirm the district court.\\n I. Background\\n A. Federal and Wisconsin Felon Dispossession Statutes\\n Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by persons\\nconvicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term\\nexceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). State misdemean-\\nors are included under the statute if they are punishable by\\nmore than two years in prison. 1 Id. § 921(a)(20)(B). However,\\nthe statute excludes anyone convicted of “any Federal or State\\noffenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade prac-\\ntices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to\\nthe regulation of business practices.” Id. § 921(a)(20)(A).\\nMoreover, “[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set\\naside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil\\nrights restored” is not a conviction for purposes of the statute.\\nId. § 921(a)(20).\\n Although the firearms prohibition generally applies for\\nlife, the statute includes a “safety valve” that permits individ-\\nuals to apply to the Attorney General for restoration of their\\nfirearms rights. Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 28 n.1\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1Accordingly, calling the statute a “felon” dispossession statute is\\nsomewhat of a “misnomer.” Carly Lagrotteria, Note, Heller's Collateral\\nDamage: As-Applied Challenges to the Felon-in-Possession Prohibition, 86 Ford-\\nham L. Rev. 1963, 1970 (2018).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 3\\n\\n(2007). Specifically, the Attorney General 2 may remove the\\nprohibition on a case-by-case basis if an applicant sufficiently\\nestablishes “that the circumstances regarding the disability,\\nand the applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the\\napplicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to\\npublic safety and that the granting of the relief would not be\\ncontrary to the public interest.” 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).\\n Since 1992, however, “Congress has repeatedly barred\\nthe Attorney General from using appropriated funds ‘to in-\\nvestigate or act upon [relief] applications,’” rendering the pro-\\nvision “inoperative.” Logan, 552 U.S. at 28 n.1 (quoting United\\nStates v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 74–75 (2002)). The Committee on\\nAppropriations eliminated funding because the restoration\\nprocedure under § 925(c) was “a very difficult task” that re-\\nquired ATF officials to “spend many hours investigating a\\nparticular applicant for relief.” H.R. Rep. No. 102-618, at 14\\n(1992). Even then, there was “no way to know with any cer-\\ntainty whether the applicant [was] still a danger to public\\nsafety.” Id. Accordingly, ATF officials were effectively “re-\\nquired to guess whether a convicted felon … [could] be en-\\ntrusted with a firearm.” Id. Moreover, they were “forced to\\nmake these decisions knowing that a mistake could have dev-\\nastating consequences for innocent citizens.” Id. Ultimately,\\nthe Committee determined that “the $3.75 million and the 40\\nman-years annually spent investigating and acting upon\\nthese applications for relief would be better utilized by ATF\\nin fighting violent crime.” Id. The Committee addressed the\\nfunding issue again in 1995, adding that “too many of these\\n\\n 2 The Attorney General delegated its authority under § 925(c) to the\\nBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”). 28 C.F.R.\\n§ 0.130(a)(1).\\n\\n4 No. 18-1478\\n\\nfelons whose gun ownership rights were restored went on to\\ncommit violent crimes with firearms.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-183,\\nat 15 (1995).\\n In 1981, Wisconsin adopted its own felon dispossession\\nlaw. See Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m). Section 941.29(1m) prohibits\\nan individual from possessing a firearm if he has “been con-\\nvicted of a felony in” Wisconsin or “a crime elsewhere that\\nwould be a felony” in Wisconsin. Id. § 941.29(1m)(a)–(b).\\n B. Factual Background\\n Kanter lives in Mequon, Wisconsin. He was previously the\\nowner, operator, and CEO of Rikco International, LLC. Rikco\\nInternational, which did business as “Dr. Comfort,” manufac-\\ntured therapeutic shoes and inserts for individuals with dia-\\nbetes and severe foot disease. The company marketed the\\nshoes and inserts to podiatrists, who in turn sold them to in-\\ndividual consumers. Most of the shoes and inserts were billed\\nto, and paid for by, Medicare. Medicare only paid for inserts\\nthat met certain thickness and hardness standards.\\n In April 2004, Kanter submitted his inserts to Medicare to\\ndetermine whether they met those requirements. Medicare\\nrejected Kanter’s inserts because they were too thin. Kanter\\nthen submitted revised samples, which Medicare approved.\\nHowever, Kanter continued to sell the noncompliant inserts\\nwhile representing that they were Medicare-approved. All\\ntold, Medicare paid Kanter’s company $375,000 for the non-\\ncompliant inserts.\\n On May 24, 2011, Kanter pleaded guilty to one count of\\nmail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 based on a shipment of the\\nnoncompliant inserts to a podiatrist in Florida. Section 1341\\ncarries a maximum penalty of twenty years in prison and a\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 5\\n\\n$250,000 fine. Kanter was sentenced to one year and one day\\nin prison and two years of supervised release. He was also\\nordered to pay a criminal penalty of $50,000, and he reim-\\nbursed Medicare over $27 million in a related civil settlement.\\n Kanter has since served his time and paid his criminal pen-\\nalty, and he has not been charged with any additional crimi-\\nnal activity. However, because of his felony conviction, he is\\npermanently prohibited from owning a firearm under federal\\nand Wisconsin law.\\n C. Procedural Background\\n Kanter brought suit in the Eastern District of Wisconsin,\\narguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)\\nare unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as ap-\\nplied to him. The United States moved to dismiss his claim\\nunder Rule 12(b)(6), and Wisconsin moved for judgment on\\nthe pleadings under Rule 12(c). In response, Kanter moved for\\nsummary judgment, arguing that his status as a nonviolent\\noffender with no other criminal record meant that both stat-\\nutes were unconstitutional as applied to him.\\n The district court granted defendants’ motions and denied\\nKanter’s motion. In so doing, the district court held that, even\\nassuming felons are entitled to Second Amendment protec-\\ntion, the application of the federal and Wisconsin felon dis-\\npossession laws to Kanter is substantially related to the gov-\\nernment’s important interest in preventing gun violence. The\\ncourt reasoned that Congress and the Wisconsin legislature\\nare entitled to categorically disqualify all felons—even nonvi-\\nolent felons like Kanter—because both have found that such\\nindividuals are more likely to abuse firearms. The court also\\nnoted that this “bright line categorical approach … allows for\\n\\n6 No. 18-1478\\n\\nuniform application and ease of administration.” The district\\ncourt entered judgment on January 2, 2018, and this appeal\\nfollowed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to\\ndismiss for failure to state a claim and a motion for judgment\\non the pleadings. Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Hilger, 838 F.3d 821,\\n824 (7th Cir. 2016). In doing so, “we accept all well-pleaded\\nfacts as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’\\nfavor.” Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir.\\n2016). To avoid dismissal, “the complaint must ‘state a claim\\nto relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.\\nv. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).\\n A. Legal Standard 3\\n The Second Amendment states: “A well regulated Militia,\\nbeing necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the\\npeople to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S.\\nConst. amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme\\nCourt identified the “core” of the Second Amendment as “the\\nright of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in de-\\nfense of hearth and home.” 554 U.S. 570, 634–35. Accordingly,\\nthe Court concluded that Washington D.C.’s ban on handgun\\npossession in the home violated the Second Amendment. Id.\\nat 635.\\n However, the Court also made clear that “the right se-\\ncured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” Id. at 626.\\n\\n\\n 3 Because “the federal and state prohibitions are equivalent in effect”\\nas to Kanter, our Second Amendment analysis of the two statutes is the\\nsame. Baer v. Lynch, 636 F. App’x 695, 698–99 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 7\\n\\nAlthough the Court did not “undertake an exhaustive histor-\\nical analysis ... of the full scope of the Second Amendment,” it\\nsaid that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast\\ndoubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of fire-\\narms by felons and the mentally ill.” Id. It described such pro-\\nhibitions as “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.” Id.\\nat 627 n.26. Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the\\nCourt “repeat[ed] [its] assurances” that felon dispossession\\nlaws remain valid. 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (plurality opinion).\\n After Heller, we developed a two-step test for Second\\nAmendment challenges. “The threshold question is whether\\nthe regulated activity falls within the scope of the Second\\nAmendment.” Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888, 892 (7th\\nCir. 2017) (“Ezell II”). “This is a textual and historical inquiry;\\nif the government can establish that the challenged law regu-\\nlates activity falling outside the scope of the right as originally\\nunderstood, then ‘the regulated activity is categorically un-\\nprotected, and the law is not subject to further Second\\nAmendment review.’” Id. (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651\\nF.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Ezell I”)).\\n However, “if the historical evidence is inconclusive or sug-\\ngests that the regulated activity is not categorically unpro-\\ntected[,] then there must be a second inquiry into the strength\\nof the government’s justification for restricting or regulating\\nthe exercise of Second Amendment rights.” Id. (quoting Ezell\\nI, 651 F.3d at 703). At step two, we evaluate “the regulatory\\nmeans the government has chosen and the public-benefits\\nend it seeks to achieve.” Id. (quoting Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 703).\\nThe rigor of the review is dependent on “how close the law\\ncomes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the se-\\nverity of the law’s burden on the right.” Id. (quoting Ezell I,\\n\\n8 No. 18-1478\\n\\n651 F.3d at 703). “Severe burdens” on this core right “require\\na very strong public-interest justification and a close means-\\nend fit; lesser burdens, and burdens on activity lying closer to\\nthe margins of the right, are more easily justified.” Id. The\\ngovernment has the burden “of justifying its law under a\\nheightened standard of scrutiny; rational-basis review does\\nnot apply.” Id. We have consistently described step two as\\n“akin to intermediate scrutiny” and have required the gov-\\nernment to show that the challenged statute is substantially\\nrelated to an important governmental objective. United States\\nv. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing\\ncases).\\n B. As-Applied Second Amendment Challenges\\n Relying on the “presumptively lawful” language in Heller\\nand McDonald, every federal court of appeals to address the\\nissue has held that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second\\nAmendment on its face. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 406 F.\\nApp’x 52, 53–54 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d\\n281, 281–82 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. Moore,\\n666 F.3d 313, 318–19 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Barton, 633\\nF.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by\\nBinderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc);\\nSchrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 989–91 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert.\\ndenied, 571 U.S. 989 (2013); United States v. Joos, 638 F.3d 581,\\n586 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Khami, 362 F. App’x 501,\\n508 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 934 (2010); United\\nStates v. Battle, 347 F. App’x 478, 480 (11th Cir. 2009) (per cu-\\nriam); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir.\\n2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 970 (2010); United States v. Smith,\\n329 F. App’x 109, 110–11 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Ander-\\nson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 9\\n\\n However, courts of appeals are split as to whether as-ap-\\nplied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) are viable.\\nOn the one hand, the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh\\nCircuits have suggested that § 922(g)(1) is always constitu-\\ntional as applied to felons as a class, regardless of their indi-\\nvidual circumstances or the nature of their offenses. See Stim-\\nmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198, 210 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have\\nupheld § 922(g)(1), which disarms even non-violent felons.”\\n(citing United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2010),\\ncert. denied, 562 U.S. 895 (2010))); United States v. Scroggins, 599\\nF.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 867 (2010)\\n(rejecting as-applied Second Amendment challenge and hold-\\ning that felon dispossession laws are constitutional even if the\\noffense was nonviolent in nature); United States v. Rozier, 598\\nF.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 958 (2010)\\n(concluding that “statutes disqualifying felons from pos-\\nsessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not of-\\nfend the Second Amendment,” and holding that § 922(g)(1) is\\n“a constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment\\nright of certain classes of people,” including convicted felons);\\nUnited States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010),\\ncert. denied, 562 U.S. 921 (2010) (rejecting nonviolent felon’s as-\\napplied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) because\\n“felons are categorically different from the individuals who\\nhave a fundamental right to bear arms”); In re U.S., 578 F.3d\\n1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We have already rejected the no-\\ntion that Heller mandates an individualized inquiry concern-\\ning felons pursuant to § 922(g)(1).” (citing McCane, 573 F.3d at\\n1047)).\\n The First Circuit has not foreclosed as-applied challenges,\\nbut it has expressed some skepticism about them. In United\\nStates v. Torres-Rosario, the court rejected the defendant’s as-\\n\\n10 No. 18-1478\\n\\napplied challenge because he had two prior convictions for\\n“serious drug offenses.” 658 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011), cert.\\ndenied, 565 U.S. 1271 (2012). However, the court noted that the\\nSupreme Court “may be open to claims that some felonies do\\nnot indicate potential violence and cannot be the basis for ap-\\nplying a categorical ban,” and “might even be open to highly\\nfact-specific objections.” Id. Yet the First Circuit cautioned that\\n“such an approach, applied to countless variations in individ-\\nual circumstances, would obviously present serious problems\\nof administration, consistency and fair warning.” Id.\\n On the other hand, we, along with the Fourth, Eighth, and\\nD.C. Circuits, have left room for as-applied challenges to the\\nstatute. See United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir.\\n2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1092 (2010) (“[W]e recognize that\\n§ 922(g)(1) may be subject to an overbreadth challenge at\\nsome point because of its disqualification of all felons, includ-\\ning those who are non-violent.”); Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d\\n152, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“We need not decide today if it is\\never possible for a convicted felon to show that he may still\\ncount as a ‘law-abiding, responsible citizen’” entitled to Sec-\\nond Amendment protections.); United States v. Woolsey, 759\\nF.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Eighth Circuit has left\\nopen the possibility that a person could bring a successful as-\\napplied challenge to § 922(g)(1)” but rejected defendant’s as-\\napplied challenge because he had multiple violent felony con-\\nvictions.); United States v. Pruess, 703 F.3d 242, 247 (4th Cir.\\n2012) (holding that § 922(g)(1) could constitutionally be ap-\\nplied to nonviolent felons, but acknowledging that “there in\\ntheory might be an as-applied Second Amendment challenge\\nto [§] 922(g)(1) that could succeed” (citations and internal\\nquotation marks omitted)).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 11\\n\\n Neither we, nor the Fourth, Eighth, or D.C. Circuits, how-\\never, have ever actually upheld such a challenge in practice.\\nIn fact, we have repeatedly rejected as-applied Second\\nAmendment challenges to § 922(g). See Baer v. Lynch, 636 F.\\nApp’x 695, 698 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that § 922(g)(1) could\\nconstitutionally be applied to individual convicted of felony\\nrobbery); United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 750–51 (7th Cir.\\n2015) (concluding that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional as ap-\\nplied to individual who had been convicted of three violent\\nfelonies); Williams, 616 F.3d at 693–94 (holding that § 922(g)(1)\\nwas constitutional as applied to individual convicted of fel-\\nony robbery who “beat[] the victim so badly that the victim\\nrequired sixty-five stitches”); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d\\n638, 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (rejecting as-applied Sec-\\nond Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(9) brought by domes-\\ntic violence misdemeanant because violence was “an element\\nof the offense” and data suggested high rates of recidivism).\\n Indeed, only one federal court of appeals has upheld an\\nas-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g). In a\\nfractured en banc decision, a narrow majority of the Third Cir-\\ncuit (eight out of fifteen judges) held that § 922(g)(1) was un-\\nconstitutional as applied to two individuals convicted of a\\nmisdemeanor for corrupting a minor and a misdemeanor for\\nunlawfully carrying a handgun without a license, respec-\\ntively. Binderup, 836 F.3d at 340, 356. Because it is the only suc-\\ncessful as-applied Second Amendment challenge in a court of\\nappeals to date—and because Kanter relies heavily upon it—\\nit is worth examining the case at some length.\\n Seven members of the Third Circuit reasoned that the his-\\ntorical justification for disarming felons was “tied to the con-\\ncept of a virtuous citizenry,” and that “persons who have\\n\\n12 No. 18-1478\\n\\ncommitted serious crimes forfeit the right to possess firearms\\nmuch the way they forfeit other civil liberties.” Id. at 348–49\\n(plurality opinion) (citations and internal quotation marks\\nomitted). Applying the civic virtue rationale, three of those\\njudges concluded that the challengers’ offenses “were not se-\\nrious enough to strip them of their Second Amendment\\nrights.” Id. at 351. They explained that, although the two of-\\nfenses were punishable by more than a year in prison, and\\nthus met the definition of a felony in § 922(g), the state legis-\\nlatures had enacted them as misdemeanors, and “a state leg-\\nislature’s classification of an offense as a misdemeanor is a\\npowerful expression of its belief that the offense is not serious\\nenough to be disqualifying.” Id. Those judges also considered\\nthat neither of the offenses at issue involved violence and that\\neach of the challengers received “a minor sentence,” and they\\npointed to the lack of a “cross-jurisdictional consensus re-\\ngarding the seriousness of the [c]hallengers’ crimes,” remark-\\ning that in some states the challengers’ conduct was not even\\nillegal. Id. at 352. At step two, those three judges concluded\\nthat § 922(g)(1) did not survive intermediate scrutiny because\\nthe government relied on “off-point statistical studies” that\\ninvolved incarcerated felons, not misdemeanants who had\\nserved no jail time. Id. at 354.\\n By contrast, the other five judges who upheld the as-ap-\\nplied challenge believed that the exclusion of felons from the\\nscope of the Second Amendment’s protections was not rooted\\nin notions of civic virtue, but rather “the time-honored prin-\\nciple that the right to keep and bear arms does not extend to\\nthose likely to commit violent offenses.” Id. at 367 (Hardiman,\\nJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgments). Ap-\\nplying dangerousness as the touchstone, those judges con-\\ncluded that persons like the challengers who were convicted\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 13\\n\\nof nonviolent offenses fall within the scope of the Second\\nAmendment’s protection. Id. at 375–76. Moreover, those five\\njudges believed that § 922(g) was “categorically unconstitu-\\ntional” when applied to “non-dangerous persons convicted of\\noffenses unassociated with violence,” such that any subse-\\nquent means-end scrutiny or judicial interest balancing was\\n“inappropriate.” Id. at 358, 378.\\n The seven dissenting judges concluded that as-applied\\nchallenges to § 922(g)(1) are never permissible. Id. at 401\\n(Fuentes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dis-\\nsenting from the judgments). In doing so, they stressed that\\nthe majority’s decision to uphold such a challenge was un-\\nprecedented. See id. at 380–81 (“The plaintiffs ask us to do\\nsomething that no federal appellate court has done before.…\\nNo federal appellate court has yet upheld a challenge, facial\\nor as-applied, to the felon-in-possession statute.”). They criti-\\ncized the majority’s approach because it “saddle[s] district\\ncourt judges with a seemingly unending obligation to review\\nas-applied challenges” and “fail[s] to provide us with any\\nworkable standards that would make such a regime adminis-\\ntratively feasible or doctrinally coherent.” Id. at 380. Accord-\\ning to the dissent, the challengers’ claim failed at step one be-\\ncause “Heller itself tells us that felons are disqualified from\\nexercising their Second Amendment rights,” and “there is no\\nprincipled basis … for distinguishing felons from misde-\\nmeanants who commit crimes punishable by more than two\\nyears in prison.” Id. at 388. In any event, the dissenting judges\\nconcluded that § 922(g)(1) survives intermediate scrutiny be-\\ncause the government’s studies established a link between\\npast criminal conduct and the government’s important inter-\\nest in preventing future gun violence. See id. at 400–01. With\\n\\n14 No. 18-1478\\n\\nrespect to plaintiffs’ contention that the studies were not tai-\\nlored to their specific characteristics, the dissenting judges ex-\\nplained that “[t]he question is not whether someone exactly\\nlike the plaintiffs poses a threat to public safety,” but rather\\n“whether the fit between the challenged regulation and the\\nasserted objective [is] reasonable, not perfect.” Id. at 400 (al-\\nteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks\\nomitted). 4\\n With this background in mind, we now apply our two-\\nstep test to this case.\\n C. Step One: The Historical Evidence is Inconclusive as\\n to Whether Felons Were Categorically Excluded From\\n the Second Amendment’s Scope\\n The first question is whether nonviolent felons as a class\\nhistorically enjoyed Second Amendment rights. Heller did not\\nanswer this question. True, “some of Heller’s language does\\nlink Second Amendment rights with the notion[] of ‘law-abid-\\ning citizens.’” Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 669; see also Heller,\\n554 U.S. at 634–35 (observing that the “core” of the Second\\nAmendment right is “the right of law-abiding, responsible cit-\\nizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home” (emphasis\\nadded)). The Heller Court also cautioned that nothing in its\\ndecision “should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding pro-\\nhibitions on the possession of firearms by felons,” which it re-\\nferred to as “presumptively lawful.” 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26.\\nMoreover, the Court mentioned that certain individuals may\\n\\n\\n 4Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court\\ndenied the petitions for writ of certiorari. See Sessions v. Binderup, 137 S. Ct.\\n2323 (2017) (noting Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor would grant the pe-\\ntition); Binderup v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (same).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 15\\n\\nbe “disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment\\nrights.” Id. at 635. However, the Court never actually ad-\\ndressed the historical pedigree of felon dispossession laws.\\nAccordingly, we have refused to read too much into the\\nCourt’s “precautionary language.” Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640; see\\nalso Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 669 (“We are reluctant to place\\nmore weight on these passing references than the Court itself\\ndid.”). 5\\n Nor has the Seventh Circuit decided whether felons were\\nhistorically outside the scope of the Second Amendment’s\\nprotection. See Baer, 636 F. App’x at 698. Although the litigants\\nin Williams raised that question, we declined to address it and\\nproceeded directly to the intermediate scrutiny analysis. 616\\nF.3d at 692. In so doing, we noted that “[t]he academic writing\\non the subject of whether felons were excluded from firearm\\npossession at the time of the founding is ‘inconclusive at best,’\\nand we refrain[ed] … from making a determination based on\\ncontradictory views.” Id. (quoting Skoien, 614 F.3d at 650\\n(Sykes, J., dissenting)).\\n To be sure, although we have not expressly decided this\\nissue before, we have suggested that felons were not histori-\\ncally understood to have Second Amendment rights. For ex-\\nample, in Skoien, which involved domestic violence misde-\\nmeanants, we explained that some “categorical limits” on fire-\\narm possession were “part of the original meaning” of the\\nSecond Amendment. 614 F.3d at 640. Similarly, in United\\n\\n\\n 5 But see Berron v. Ill. Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd., 825 F.3d 843,\\n\\n847 (7th Cir. 2016) (“When holding in [Heller] that the Second Amendment\\nestablishes personal rights, the Court observed that only law-abiding per-\\nsons enjoy these rights, even at home.”).\\n\\n16 No. 18-1478\\n\\nStates v. Yancey, we opined that “most scholars of the Second\\nAmendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied to the\\nconcept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the gov-\\nernment could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens,’” including fel-\\nons. 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting\\nVongxay, 594 F.3d at 1118). 6\\n If, as we suggested in Yancey and as most scholars have\\nconcluded, the founders conceived of the right to bear arms\\nas belonging only to virtuous citizens, even nonviolent felons\\nlike Kanter would fall outside the scope of the Second\\n\\n\\n 6 Indeed, numerous legal historians have endorsed this view. See, e.g.,\\nSaul Cornell, “Don't Know Much About History” The Current Crisis in Second\\nAmendment Scholarship, 29 N. Ky. L. Rev. 657, 679 (2002) (“Perhaps the\\nmost accurate way to describe the dominant understanding of the right to\\nbear arms in the Founding era is as a civic right [that] … was limited to\\nthose members of the polity who were deemed capable of exercising it in\\na virtuous manner.”); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitu-\\ntion or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 Okla. L. Rev. 65, 96 (1983) (“Co-\\nlonial and English societies of the eighteenth century … excluded … felons\\n[from possessing firearms].”); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and\\nthe Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 266\\n(1983) (“Felons simply did not fall within the benefits of the common law\\nright to possess arms.”); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the\\nSecond Amendment, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461, 480 (1995) (“One implication of\\nthis emphasis on the virtuous citizen is that the right to arms does not\\npreclude laws disarming the unvirtuous (i.e. criminals) ….” (citation omit-\\nted)). Moreover, according to Thomas M. Cooley’s 1868 Treatise on Con-\\nstitutional Limitations, which the Heller court described as a “massively\\npopular” treatise written by “[t]he most famous” late-nineteenth-century\\nlegal scholar, 554 U.S. at 616, certain classes of people were “almost uni-\\nversally excluded” from exercising certain civic rights, including “the id-\\niot, the lunatic, and the felon, on obvious grounds.” Thomas M. Cooley, A\\nTreatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative\\nPower of the States of the American Union 29 (1st ed. 1868).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 17\\n\\nAmendment. Indeed, several courts of appeals have con-\\ncluded that nonviolent felons are outside the scope of the Sec-\\nond Amendment. For example, in Hamilton v. Pallozzi, the\\nFourth Circuit rejected a nonviolent felon’s as-applied Second\\nAmendment challenge to a state felon dispossession statute,\\nholding that “conviction of a felony necessarily removes one\\nfrom the class of ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ for pur-\\nposes of the Second Amendment.” 848 F.3d 614, 626 (4th Cir.\\n2017). Explaining that the defendant could not rebut the pre-\\nsumption that he fell outside the category of “‘law-abiding,\\nresponsible citizens,’” the court focused on his felony convic-\\ntion for fraud and theft crimes: “Theft, fraud, and forgery are\\nnot merely errors in filling out a form or some regulatory mis-\\ndemeanor offense; these are significant offenses reflecting dis-\\nrespect for the law.” Id. at 627 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635);\\nsee also Medina, 913 F.3d at 160 (“Whether a certain crime re-\\nmoves one from the category of ‘law-abiding and responsi-\\nble,’ in some cases, may be a close question,” such as “a mis-\\ndemeanor arising from a fistfight …. Those who commit felo-\\nnies however, cannot profit from our recognition of such bor-\\nderline cases.”); United States v. Hughley, 691 F. App’x 278, 279\\n(8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Restricting gun possession by\\nfelons—even nonviolent ones—differs meaningfully from re-\\nstricting citizens who have not been convicted of serious of-\\nfenses from having guns in their home for self-defense.”);\\nVongxay, 594 F.3d at 1115–16 (“declin[ing] to make a distinc-\\ntion between violent and non-violent felons” because “felons\\nare categorically different from the individuals who have a\\nfundamental right to bear arms”); Rozier, 598 F.3d at 771 & n.5\\n(stating that a nonviolent felon’s “Second Amendment right\\nto bear arms is not weighed in the same manner as that of a\\nlaw-abiding citizen” and analogizing felon-dispossession\\n\\n18 No. 18-1478\\n\\nstatutes to felon disenfranchisement laws); United States v.\\nEverist, 368 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Irrespective of\\nwhether his offense was violent in nature, a felon has shown\\nmanifest disregard for the rights of others. He may not justly\\ncomplain of the limitation on his liberty when his possession\\nof firearms would otherwise threaten the security of his fel-\\nlow citizens.”). 7\\n On the other hand, as Judge Sykes observed in her dissent\\nin Skoien, there is scholarly “disagree[ment] about the extent\\nto which felons … were considered excluded from the right to\\nbear arms during the founding era,” and “[t]he historical evi-\\ndence is inconclusive at best.” Skoien, 614 F.3d at 650 (Sykes,\\nJ., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 8 If the founders were really\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 Although Everist was issued before the Heller decision, the Fifth Cir-\\ncuit already recognized an individual right to bear arms pre-Heller and\\nreaffirmed the validity of the Everist decision after Heller. See Scroggins, 599\\nF.3d at 451.\\n 8 For support for Judge Sykes’s observation regarding the conflicting\\nscholarship on the historical conception of the Second Amendment, see,\\ne.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of A Theory: District of\\nColumbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 Hastings L.J. 1371, 1374 (2009)\\n(“[S]o far as I can determine, no colonial or state law in eighteenth-century\\nAmerica formally restricted the ability of felons to own firearms.”); C.\\nKevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. &\\nPub. Pol’y 695, 698 (2009) (“[A]ctual ‘longstanding’ precedent in America\\nand pre-Founding England suggests that a firearms disability can be con-\\nsistent with the Second Amendment to the extent that … its basis credibly\\nindicates a present danger that one will misuse arms against others and\\nthe disability redresses that danger.”); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22,\\n56 UCLA L. Rev. 1551, 1563 (2009) (“The Founding generation had no\\nlaws … denying the right to people convicted of crimes.”).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 19\\n\\njust concerned about dangerousness, not a lack of virtue, non-\\nviolent felons like Kanter arguably fall within the scope of the\\nSecond Amendment’s protections.\\n Ultimately, we need not resolve this difficult issue regard-\\ning the historical scope of the Second Amendment to dispose\\nof this case. Instead, we proceed to the means-end scrutiny of\\nthe government’s objectives. 9\\n D. Step Two: The Felon Dispossession Statutes Survive\\n Intermediate Scrutiny\\n Categorical prohibitions on the possession of firearms by\\nfelons are “presumptively lawful,” even in disqualifying non-\\nviolent felons like Kanter. See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640 (“[S]uch\\na recent extension of [§ 922(g)(1)’s] disqualification to non-vi-\\nolent felons (embezzlers and tax evaders, for example) is pre-\\nsumptively constitutional, as Heller said in note 26.”). But be-\\ncause “Heller referred to felon disarmament bans only as ‘pre-\\nsumptively lawful,’” we require the government to “prov[e]\\n\\n 9 In fact, we usually defer the threshold historical scope inquiry and\\nproceed directly to means-end scrutiny. See, e.g., Horsley v. Trame, 808 F.3d\\n1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 2015) (declining to decide whether eighteen- to twenty-\\nyear-olds are within the scope of the Second Amendment); Yancey, 621\\nF.3d at 684–85. One notable exception to our generally restrained ap-\\nproach in this area is United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir.\\n2015). There, the majority held that undocumented immigrants were his-\\ntorically within the scope of the Second Amendment but ultimately con-\\ncluded that the statute at issue nevertheless survived intermediate scru-\\ntiny. Id. at 669–73. The concurrence advocated for a “prudential approach”\\nsince we did not need to decide the threshold question to resolve the case,\\nand proposed “reserv[ing] resolution of this challenging constitutional\\nquestion for a case that compels addressing it.” Id. at 673–74 (Flaum, J.,\\nconcurring in the judgment). We think that prudential approach is appro-\\npriate here.\\n\\n20 No. 18-1478\\n\\n“the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) … using the intermediate\\nscrutiny framework.” Williams, 616 F.3d at 692.\\n To survive intermediate scrutiny at step two, the govern-\\nment must show that the felon dispossession statute is sub-\\nstantially related to an important governmental objective.\\nConsistent with how we apply intermediate scrutiny in the\\nFirst Amendment context, the “fit” between the challenged\\nregulation and the asserted governmental objective need only\\n“be reasonable, not perfect.” United States v. Marzzarella, 614\\nF.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010); cf. FTC v. Trudeau, 662 F.3d 947, 953\\n(7th Cir. 2011). 10\\n The government has met its burden in this case. First, Kan-\\nter concedes that the government’s objective in passing\\n§ 922(g)(1) was an important one. The government identifies\\nits interest as preventing gun violence by keeping firearms\\naway from persons, such as those convicted of serious crimes,\\nwho might be expected to misuse them. This formulation of\\nthe government’s interest is consistent with our precedent in\\nthis area. See Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683 (“Congress enacted the\\nexclusions in § 922(g) to keep guns out of the hands of pre-\\n\\n\\n 10 Our means-end review is arguably less rigorous in this case because\\n\\nthe weight of the historical evidence summarized above suggests that\\nfelon dispossession laws do not restrict the “core right of armed defense,”\\nbut rather burden “activity lying closer to the margins of the right.” Ezell\\nII, 846 F.3d at 892. Indeed, we have said that “the state can prevail with\\nless evidence when, as in Skoien, guns are forbidden to a class of persons\\nwho present a higher than average risk of misusing a gun.” Moore, 702\\nF.3d at 940. We have even gone so far as to say that “empirical evidence of\\na public safety concern can be dispensed with altogether when the ban is\\nlimited to obviously dangerous persons such as felons and the mentally\\nill.” Id.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 21\\n\\nsumptively risky people.”); Williams, 616 F.3d at 693 (describ-\\ning the government’s objective as “keep[ing] firearms out of\\nthe hands of violent felons, who the government believes are\\noften those most likely to misuse firearms”); Skoien, 614 F.3d\\nat 642 (describing the government’s interest as “preventing\\narmed mayhem”). And we have previously held that this in-\\nterest is “without doubt an important one.” Yancey, 621 F.3d\\nat 684; see also Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 673 (“[T]he govern-\\nment has a[] strong interest in preventing people who already\\nhave disrespected the law (including … felons …) from pos-\\nsessing guns.”).\\n Second, the government has shown that prohibiting even\\nnonviolent felons like Kanter from possessing firearms is sub-\\nstantially related to its interest in preventing gun violence. Be-\\nfore turning to the government’s statistical evidence estab-\\nlishing such a link, it is important to note that we do not write\\non a blank slate. In Yancey, we explained that “most felons are\\nnonviolent, but someone with a felony conviction on his rec-\\nord is more likely than a nonfelon to engage in illegal and vi-\\nolent gun use.” 621 F.3d at 685. In fact, the D.C. Circuit has\\nconcluded that “nonviolent offenders not only have a higher\\nrecidivism rate than the general population, but certain\\ngroups—such as property offenders—have an even higher re-\\ncidivism rate than violent offenders, and a large percentage of\\nthe crimes nonviolent recidivists later commit are violent.”\\nKaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see\\nEwing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 26 (2003) (citing P. Langan &\\nD. Levin, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Spe-\\ncial Report: Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, at 1 (June\\n2002)).\\n\\n22 No. 18-1478\\n\\n In addition to these judicial statements, the government\\npoints to several studies that have found a connection be-\\ntween nonviolent offenders like Kanter and a risk of future\\nviolent crime. For example, one study of 210,886 nonviolent\\noffenders found that about one in five were rearrested for a\\nviolent crime within three years of his or her release. See U.S.\\nDep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Profile of Nonviolent\\nOffenders Exiting State Prisons 2, 4 (2004). A separate study\\nfound that 28.5 percent of nonviolent property offenders—a\\ncategory that includes fraud convictions—were rearrested for\\na violent offense within five years of their release. See Mat-\\nthew R. Durose, et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice\\nStatistics, Recidivism of Prisoner Released in 30 States in 2005:\\nPatterns from 2005 to 2010, at 9 (2014). Yet another study found\\nthat “even handgun purchasers with only 1 prior misdemeanor\\nconviction and no convictions for offenses involving firearms\\nor violence were nearly 5 times as likely as those with no prior\\ncriminal history to be charged with new offenses involving\\nfirearms or violence.” Garen J. Wintemute, et al., Prior Misde-\\nmeanor Convictions as a Risk Factor for Later Violent and Firearm-\\nRelated Criminal Activity Among Authorized Purchasers of Hand-\\nguns, 280 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 2083, 2083 (1998) (emphasis\\nadded). 11\\n\\n\\n\\n 11 Even the study that Kanter relies upon found that approximately 40\\n\\npercent of individuals convicted of mail fraud had at least one additional\\narrest afterward. David Weisburd & Elin Waring, White-Collar Crime and\\nCriminal Careers 12, 29 (2004). The same study found that 24.5 percent of\\nall repeat white-collar offenders had at least one violent arrest on their\\nrecord. Id. at 45. In other words, “white-collar offenders often have multi-\\nple contacts with the criminal justice system” and “are unlikely to evi-\\ndence a high degree of specialization.” Id. at 49.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 23\\n\\n Kanter’s only response to the government’s statistical\\nstudies is that they are not tailored enough to his “individual\\ncircumstances.” Specifically, Kanter asks the Court “to con-\\nsider the fact that [he] is a first-time, non-violent offender with\\nno history of violence, firearm misuses, or subsequent convic-\\ntions.” Kanter also points out that he is “employed, married,\\nand does not use illicit drugs, all of which correspond with\\nlower rates of recidivism.” In short, Kanter argues that to\\nmeet its burden the government must show “a substantial re-\\nlationship between denying Mr. Kanter a firearm and further-\\ning the government’s objective of preventing firearm misuse\\nand armed violence.”\\n Kanter is mistaken. In Skoien we held that “Congress is not\\nlimited to case-by-case exclusions of persons who have been\\nshown to be untrustworthy with weapons, nor need these\\nlimits be established by evidence presented in court. Heller\\ndid not suggest that disqualifications would be effective only\\nif the statute’s benefits are first established by admissible evi-\\ndence.” 614 F.3d at 641. Of course, not all nonviolent felons\\nwill later commit a violent crime with a firearm. In that sense,\\nthe statute is “somewhat over-inclusive.” United States v.\\nChapman, 666 F.3d 220, 231 (4th Cir. 2012). However, that\\n“does not undermine [the statute’s] constitutionality … be-\\ncause it merely suggests that the fit is not a perfect one; a rea-\\nsonable fit is all that is required under intermediate scrutiny.”\\nId.; see also Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97–98 (analogizing to inter-\\nmediate scrutiny in First Amendment context).\\n Here, unlike the challengers in Binderup, who were con-\\nvicted of “non-serious” state misdemeanors and served no\\nprison time, Kanter was convicted of a serious federal felony\\nfor conduct broadly understood to be criminal, and he did not\\n\\n24 No. 18-1478\\n\\nface a minor sentence. 836 F.3d at 353 & n.6. Instead, Kanter is\\nmore akin to the challenger in Hamilton, whose fraud and\\ntheft convictions were “black-letter mala in se felonies reflect-\\ning grave misjudgment and maladjustment.” 848 F.3d at 627.\\nKanter’s crime—defrauding the federal government out of\\nhundreds of thousands of dollars—“reflect[s] significant dis-\\nrespect for the law.” Id. at 627 n.14; see also Medina, 913 F.3d at\\n160 (rejecting as-applied challenge where plaintiff was con-\\nvicted of “felony fraud—a serious crime, malum in se, that is\\npunishable in every state”). Thus, Kanter’s serious felony con-\\nviction prevents him from challenging the constitutionality of\\n§ 922(g)(1) as applied to him. 12\\n We are further assured in our decision because the highly-\\nindividualized approach Kanter proposes raises serious insti-\\ntutional and administrative concerns. See Torres-Rosario, 658\\nF.3d at 113 (“[S]uch an approach, applied to countless varia-\\ntions in individual circumstances, would obviously present\\nserious problems of administration, consistency and fair\\nwarning.”); see also Medina, 913 F.3d at 159–60 (rejecting argu-\\nment that “non-dangerous felons have a right to bear arms”\\n\\n\\n 12 We decline to revisit our comment in Williams “that § 922(g)(1) may\\nbe subject to an overbreadth challenge at some point because of its dis-\\nqualification of all felons, including those who are non-violent.” 616 F.3d\\nat 693. That statement was dictum, and we need not determine whether\\n§ 922(g)(1) may ever be subject to an as-applied challenge to reach our de-\\ncision in this case. There may be a case in the future that requires address-\\ning whether any individual may successfully bring an as-applied chal-\\nlenge to the statute, but Kanter’s is not that case. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma,\\n413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973) (“[A] person to whom a statute may constitution-\\nally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground\\nthat it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other\\nsituations not before the Court.”).\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 25\\n\\nbecause “[u]sing an amorphous ‘dangerousness’ standard to\\ndelineate the scope of the Second Amendment would require\\nthe government to make case-by-case predictive judgments\\nbefore barring the possession of weapons”). As mentioned\\nabove, Congress previously allowed the ATF to restore a\\nfelon’s gun rights under § 925(c) if the agency determined that\\n“the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous\\nto public safety and that the granting of the relief would not\\nbe contrary to the public interest.” 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). How-\\never, Congress abandoned that approach after finding that\\nthe dangerousness inquiry was a “very difficult” and time-in-\\ntensive task, H.R. Rep. No. 102-618, at 14 (1992), and that “too\\nmany of these felons whose gun ownership rights were re-\\nstored went on to commit violent crimes with firearms.” H.R.\\nRep. No. 104-183, at 15 (1995). Congress’s failed attempt to\\ndelegate this investigative task to a law enforcement agency\\n“should have a profound impact on our tailoring analysis.”\\nBinderup, 836 F.3d at 403 (Fuentes, J., concurring in part, dis-\\nsenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment).\\n At bottom, the fact-specific inquiry Kanter asks this Court\\nto undertake is “a function best performed by the Executive,\\nwhich, unlike courts, is institutionally equipped for conduct-\\ning a neutral, wide-ranging investigation.” Bean, 537 U.S. at\\n77; see also Pontarelli v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 285 F.3d 216,\\n231 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Unlike ATF, courts possess neither the re-\\nsources to conduct the requisite investigations nor the exper-\\ntise to predict accurately which felons may carry guns with-\\nout threatening the public’s safety.”). Moreover, “[i]n the con-\\ntext of firearm regulation, the legislature is far better\\nequipped than the judiciary to make sensitive public policy\\njudgments (within constitutional limits) concerning the dan-\\ngers in carrying firearms and the manner to combat those\\n\\n26 No. 18-1478\\n\\nrisks.” Schrader, 704 F.3d at 990 (citation and internal quota-\\ntion marks omitted).\\n In sum, the government has established that the felon dis-\\npossession statutes are substantially related to the important\\ngovernmental objective of keeping firearms away those con-\\nvicted of serious crimes. Because Kanter was convicted of a\\nserious federal felony for conduct broadly understood to be\\ncriminal, his challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is\\nwithout merit.\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the\\ndistrict court.\\n\\nNo. 18-1478 27\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":1199,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4600944,"string":"4,600,944"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Rafael Giovanni HERRERA-GARCIA, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Rafael Herrera-Garcia v. William P. Barr"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-03-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1511 & 18-3196"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Kanne, Rovner, Barrett\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1511 & 18-3196\\nRAFAEL GIOVANNI HERRERA-GARCIA,\\n Petitioner,\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR,\\nAttorney General of the United States,\\n Respondent.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Petitions for Review of Decisions of\\n the Board of Immigration Appeals.\\n No. A074-211-058\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Rafael Giovanni Herrera-Garcia\\nseeks to avoid removal to El Salvador because he says that he\\nwill be tortured by gangs or corrupt government authorities\\nif he is forced to return there. An immigration judge found\\nthat Herrera-Garcia had not shown that he, specifically,\\nwould be in danger and denied his request for relief. The\\njudge also concluded that Herrera-Garcia had not established\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1511 & 18-3196\\n\\nthat the government would have inflicted or allowed the\\nalleged torture. The Board adopted and affirmed that\\ndecision.\\n Because the administrative decisions are supported by\\nsubstantial evidence in the record, we deny Herrera-Garcia’s\\npetition for review of these decisions. We also reject his\\nsecond petition for review on the denial of his motion for\\nreconsideration because we agree with the Board that it was\\nuntimely.\\n I.\\n Herrera-Garcia is a native and citizen of El Salvador. He\\nentered the United States illegally in 1990 and has remained\\nhere for the past twenty-seven years. In 2016, the Department\\nof Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against\\nhim under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.1 It alleged that he was removable\\nas an alien because he was (1) convicted of a crime of moral\\nturpitude and (2) present in the United States without being\\nadmitted or paroled. In his removal proceedings before the\\nimmigration judge (IJ), Herrera-Garcia denied both claims\\nand argued that he qualified for asylum, withholding of\\nremoval, and relief under the Convention Against Torture\\n(CAT).\\n Herrera-Garcia’s argument for withholding centered on\\nhis time growing up in El Salvador. He testified that when he\\nwas nine years old, guerrillas stopped him and his friends to\\nget information about people in his neighborhood who might\\nbe working for the military—because at that time, the\\n\\n\\n 1 Herrera-Garcia had previously been in removal proceedings that are\\n\\nnot relevant to this appeal.\\n\\fNos. 18-1511 & 18-3196 3\\n\\nguerillas and the El Salvadoran government were fighting a\\ncivil war. Herrera-Garcia said that the guerrillas continued to\\nstop by every three weeks or so to ask similar questions. He\\nadmitted, however, that he never saw any of the guerillas\\nwith guns. He also said that during one encounter, the\\nguerrillas stopped him and a few friends and forced his\\nfriend, Franklin, to smoke marijuana. He claimed that\\nalthough he escaped from the guerillas, they kidnapped\\nFranklin.\\n Herrera-Garcia also testified that several of his friends\\nwere forced to join the military. He explained that he didn’t\\nwant to be involved in the violence between the military and\\nthe guerillas. Ultimately, out of fear of both the military and\\nthe guerillas, he fled to the United States in 1990 and has\\nremained here illegally since then.\\n Herrera-Garcia testified that his fear of living in El\\nSalvador is worse today than it was twenty-seven years ago\\nbecause of the growing number of gangs and kidnappings\\nthere. His parents also testified about the current state of gang\\nviolence in the country. They said that they worry about El\\nSalvadoran gangs kidnapping him for ransom given his\\nAmerican accent—because the gangs believe that Americans\\nare wealthy.\\n The IJ found Herrera-Garcia removable and denied his\\napplications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief\\nunder CAT. On his CAT claim, the IJ held that Herrera-Garcia\\nhad failed to show that it was more likely than not that he\\nwould be tortured if he returned to El Salvador. The IJ also\\nfound “entirely speculative” his claims that he would be\\ntortured by gangs. Lastly, the IJ concluded that Herrera-\\nGarcia had failed to provide sufficient evidence that the El\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1511 & 18-3196\\n\\nSalvadoran government would participate or acquiesce in the\\nalleged torture.\\n Herrera-Garcia appealed to the Board of Immigration\\nAppeals, which adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision.\\nHerrera-Garcia’s petition for review makes only one\\nargument: he claims that he is entitled to relief under CAT.\\nConvention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or\\nDegrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty\\nDoc. No. 100-20 (1990), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.\\n While his petition was pending before us, he filed a\\nmotion to reconsider with the Board, asserting that a new\\nSupreme Court decision, Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105\\n(2018), affected his case. Pereira held that a notice to appear\\nthat fails to specify the time or place of a removal hearing does\\nnot trigger the “stop-time rule” for purposes of cancellation\\nof removal. 138 S. Ct. at 2115. Herrera-Garcia argued that\\nPereira should be extended outside the context of the stop-\\ntime rule to preclude the agency’s jurisdiction over his\\nproceedings. The Board denied his motion, concluding that it\\nwas both untimely and, in any event, failed on the merits.\\nBecause he also filed a petition for review from that order, we\\nconsolidated the two petitions but concluded that oral\\nargument was unnecessary for the second. See Khan v. Holder,\\n766 F.3d 689, 695 (7th Cir. 2014); FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).\\n II.\\n When the Board adopts and supplements an IJ’s decision,\\nwe review the IJ’s decision as well as any additional reasoning\\nprovided by the Board. Ndonyi v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 702, 709\\n(7th Cir. 2008). We consider the decisions “under the\\ndeferential substantial evidence standard, meaning that we\\n\\fNos. 18-1511 & 18-3196 5\\n\\nmay only reverse their factual findings if the facts compel an\\nopposite conclusion.” Minghai Tian v. Holder, 745 F.3d 822, 828\\n(7th Cir. 2014).\\n To qualify for relief under CAT, an alien must prove that\\nhe would more likely than not be tortured if removed. 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 1208.16(c)(2); see Perez-Montes v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 849, 850\\n(7th Cir. 2018). Torture is defined as the intentional infliction\\nof “‘severe pain or suffering’ for the purpose of coercion,\\npunishment, or discrimination.” Borovsky v. Holder, 612 F.3d\\n917, 923 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing § 1208.18(a)(1)). We consider\\nseveral factors in assessing possible future torture: “evidence\\nof past torture; evidence that the applicant could relocate to a\\ndifferent part of [his] home country; evidence of ‘gross,\\nflagrant or mass violations of human rights within the\\ncountry of removal’; and other relevant country conditions.”\\nTchemkou v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 785, 795 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing 8\\nC.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)(i)–(iv)). To receive protection under CAT,\\nan alien must also prove that he would be tortured by the\\ngovernment or with its acquiescence. Jabateh v. Lynch, 845 F.3d\\n332, 342 (7th Cir. 2017). We agree with both the Board and the\\nIJ that Herrera-Garcia failed to meet this standard.\\n For one, as the IJ pointed out, Herrera-Garcia provided no\\nevidence of past torture or persecution. See 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 1208.16(c)(3)(i). Though his interactions with guerillas when\\nhe was a child may have been stressful, they do not rise to the\\nlevel of “severe pain or suffering.”\\n More importantly, we agree with the IJ that Herrera-\\nGarcia’s allegation of future torture is too speculative. He\\nargues that he fears both corrupt government authorities and\\nthe growing number of gangs in El Salvador. But this has\\nnothing to do with his experience in El Salvador over twenty-\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1511 & 18-3196\\n\\nseven years ago. His argument instead focuses on a general\\nfear of violence that any person moving to El Salvador might\\nhave. And as we have said before, “[e]vidence of generalized\\nviolence is not enough”; there must be “a substantial risk that\\nthe petitioner will be targeted specifically.” Bernard v. Sessions,\\n881 F.3d 1042, 1047 (7th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added); see\\nRamos-Braga v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 871, 882 (7th Cir. 2018)\\n(explaining that “fear of generalized violence is insufficient to\\nestablish that [the petitioner] in particular is more likely than\\nnot to be tortured”); Rashiah v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 1126, 1133\\n(7th Cir. 2004).\\n Herrera-Garcia does claim that gangs will target him\\nbecause of his American accent. And although there is some\\nevidence in the record showing that gangs have extorted\\nAmericans, we agree with the IJ that this allegation is again\\ntoo speculative. There is insufficient evidence to show that it\\nis likely that Herrera-Garcia specifically will be extorted or that\\nany extortion would rise to the level of torture. See AR at 422,\\n441, 460, 501. And as the IJ also pointed out, no one in Herrera-\\nGarcia’s extended family has been harmed while living in El\\nSalvador. Nor have his parents, who are American citizens,\\nbeen harmed on any of their regular trips there.\\n Finally, Herrera-Garcia fails to tie his claims of future\\ntorture to government action. To receive relief under CAT, the\\ngovernment must inflict or acquiesce in the torture. 8 C.F.R\\n§ 1208.18(a)(1); id. § 1208.18(a)(8) (“Acquiescence of a public\\nofficial requires that the public official, prior to the activity\\nconstituting torture, have awareness of such activity and\\nthereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to\\nprevent such activity.”) The IJ emphasized that the El\\nSalvadoran government recently put in place “extraordinary\\n\\fNos. 18-1511 & 18-3196 7\\n\\nmeasures” to thwart the rising gang violence, including\\nfocusing “on moving gang members to maximum security\\nprisons, putting up cell phone signal blockers around the\\nprisons, and conducting coordinated law enforcement\\noperations.” Although not dispositive of a lack of government\\nacquiescence, see Rodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134,\\n1139 (7th Cir. 2015), these efforts contradict Herrera-Garcia’s\\nclaim that the El Salvadoran government is generally\\ncomplicit with the ongoing gang violence. And Herrera-\\nGarcia hasn’t provided any other evidence—besides broad\\nallegations that “gangs operate with impunity throughout El\\nSalvador”—that would indicate that it is likely that the\\ngovernment would acquiesce in Herrera-Garcia’s torture. Cf.\\nid. at 1138–39 (finding acquiescence when petitioner provided\\nevidence that he had been previously tortured by Mexican\\npolice).\\n In short, Herrera-Garcia fails to prove that if he returned\\nto El Salvador (1) he would be specifically targeted by gangs\\nor the military or (2) that the government would acquiesce in\\nany torture. There is thus substantial evidence to support the\\nIJ’s and Board’s decisions, and so we deny Herrera-Garcia’s\\npetition.\\n III.\\n Herrera-Garcia contends in his second petition that the\\nBoard erred in denying his motion for reconsideration. We\\nreview the Board’s decision under the deferential abuse of\\ndiscretion standard and “will uphold the BIA’s decision\\nunless it ‘was made without a rational explanation,\\ninexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on\\nan impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination\\nagainst a particular race or group.’” Khan, 766 F.3d at 696\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1511 & 18-3196\\n\\n(citation omitted). We agree with the Board that Herrera-\\nGarcia’s motion was untimely because it was filed over four\\nmonths after the due date. See 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(b)(2) (stating\\nthat motions to reconsider a Board decision must be filed\\nwithin 30 days of that decision).\\n And Herrera-Garcia has not established that equitable\\ntolling excused this failure. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631,\\n649 (2010) (explaining that to prove equitable tolling, one\\nmust show diligence and extraordinary circumstances). He\\nhas provided no evidence that he acted diligently in\\npreserving his rights over the initial 30 days or the four-\\nmonths after. See El-Gazawy v. Holder, 690 F.3d 852, 860 (7th\\nCir. 2012) (“In light of his failure to offer any support for his\\nclaim that he acted diligently to preserve his rights during\\nthat time, we cannot say that the BIA abused its discretion in\\nfinding that [the petitioner] failed to meet the standard for\\ndue diligence.”). Nor has he shown that extraordinary\\ncircumstances prevented him from filing. He implies that he\\nwas prevented from filing as long as Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S.\\nCt. 2105 (2018), remained pending. But Herrera-Garcia\\nignores the fact that he could have raised the issue under\\nconsideration in Pereira with the IJ or the Board earlier or at\\nleast requested a stay until the case was decided. Cf. Gonzalez\\nv. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 536 (2005) (“It is hardly extraordinary\\nthat subsequently, after petitioner’s case was no longer\\npending, this Court arrived at a different interpretation.”).\\n In sum, we do not think that the Board abused its\\ndiscretion in concluding that Herrera-Garcia’s motion was\\nuntimely and that no exception applied.\\n\\fNos. 18-1511 & 18-3196 9\\n\\n ***\\n We DENY both petitions for review.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4378197/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4600944/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Rafael Giovanni HERRERA-GARCIA, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-03-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1511 & 18-3196\nRAFAEL GIOVANNI HERRERA-GARCIA,\n Petitioner,\n v.\n\nWILLIAM P. BARR,\nAttorney General of the United States,\n Respondent.\n ____________________\n\n Petitions for Review of Decisions of\n the Board of Immigration Appeals.\n No. A074-211-058\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 18, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Rafael Giovanni Herrera-Garcia\nseeks to avoid removal to El Salvador because he says that he\nwill be tortured by gangs or corrupt government authorities\nif he is forced to return there. An immigration judge found\nthat Herrera-Garcia had not shown that he, specifically,\nwould be in danger and denied his request for relief. The\njudge also concluded that Herrera-Garcia had not established\n\f2 Nos. 18-1511 & 18-3196\n\nthat the government would have inflicted or allowed the\nalleged torture. The Board adopted and affirmed that\ndecision.\n Because the administrative decisions are supported by\nsubstantial evidence in the record, we deny Herrera-Garcia’s\npetition for review of these decisions. We also reject his\nsecond petition for review on the denial of his motion for\nreconsideration because we agree with the Board that it was\nuntimely.\n I.\n Herrera-Garcia is a native and citizen of El Salvador. He\nentered the United States illegally in 1990 and has remained\nhere for the past twenty-seven years. In 2016, the Department\nof Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against\nhim under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.1 It alleged that he was removable\nas an alien because he was (1) convicted of a crime of moral\nturpitude and (2) present in the United States without being\nadmitted or paroled. In his removal proceedings before the\nimmigration judge (IJ), Herrera-Garcia denied both claims\nand argued that he qualified for asylum, withholding of\nremoval, and relief under the Convention Against Torture\n(CAT).\n Herrera-Garcia’s argument for withholding centered on\nhis time growing up in El Salvador. He testified that when he\nwas nine years old, guerrillas stopped him and his friends to\nget information about people in his neighborhood who might\nbe working for the military—because at that time, the\n\n\n 1 Herrera-Garcia had previously been in removal proceedings that are\n\nnot relevant to this appeal.\n\fNos. 18-1511 & 18-3196 3\n\nguerillas and the El Salvadoran government were fighting a\ncivil war. Herrera-Garcia said that the guerrillas continued to\nstop by every three weeks or so to ask similar questions. He\nadmitted, however, that he never saw any of the guerillas\nwith guns. He also said that during one encounter, the\nguerrillas stopped him and a few friends and forced his\nfriend, Franklin, to smoke marijuana. He claimed that\nalthough he escaped from the guerillas, they kidnapped\nFranklin.\n Herrera-Garcia also testified that several of his friends\nwere forced to join the military. He explained that he didn’t\nwant to be involved in the violence between the military and\nthe guerillas. Ultimately, out of fear of both the military and\nthe guerillas, he fled to the United States in 1990 and has\nremained here illegally since then.\n Herrera-Garcia testified that his fear of living in El\nSalvador is worse today than it was twenty-seven years ago\nbecause of the growing number of gangs and kidnappings\nthere. His parents also testified about the current state of gang\nviolence in the country. They said that they worry about El\nSalvadoran gangs kidnapping him for ransom given his\nAmerican accent—because the gangs believe that Americans\nare wealthy.\n The IJ found Herrera-Garcia removable and denied his\napplications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief\nunder CAT. On his CAT claim, the IJ held that Herrera-Garcia\nhad failed to show that it was more likely than not that he\nwould be tortured if he returned to El Salvador. The IJ also\nfound “entirely speculative” his claims that he would be\ntortured by gangs. Lastly, the IJ concluded that Herrera-\nGarcia had failed to provide sufficient evidence that the El\n\f4 Nos. 18-1511 & 18-3196\n\nSalvadoran government would participate or acquiesce in the\nalleged torture.\n Herrera-Garcia appealed to the Board of Immigration\nAppeals, which adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision.\nHerrera-Garcia’s petition for review makes only one\nargument: he claims that he is entitled to relief under CAT.\nConvention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or\nDegrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty\nDoc. No. 100-20 (1990), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.\n While his petition was pending before us, he filed a\nmotion to reconsider with the Board, asserting that a new\nSupreme Court decision, Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105\n(2018), affected his case. Pereira held that a notice to appear\nthat fails to specify the time or place of a removal hearing does\nnot trigger the “stop-time rule” for purposes of cancellation\nof removal. 138 S. Ct. at 2115. Herrera-Garcia argued that\nPereira should be extended outside the context of the stop-\ntime rule to preclude the agency’s jurisdiction over his\nproceedings. The Board denied his motion, concluding that it\nwas both untimely and, in any event, failed on the merits.\nBecause he also filed a petition for review from that order, we\nconsolidated the two petitions but concluded that oral\nargument was unnecessary for the second. See Khan v. Holder,\n766 F.3d 689, 695 (7th Cir. 2014); FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).\n II.\n When the Board adopts and supplements an IJ’s decision,\nwe review the IJ’s decision as well as any additional reasoning\nprovided by the Board. Ndonyi v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 702, 709\n(7th Cir. 2008). We consider the decisions “under the\ndeferential substantial evidence standard, meaning that we\n\fNos. 18-1511 & 18-3196 5\n\nmay only reverse their factual findings if the facts compel an\nopposite conclusion.” Minghai Tian v. Holder, 745 F.3d 822, 828\n(7th Cir. 2014).\n To qualify for relief under CAT, an alien must prove that\nhe would more likely than not be tortured if removed. 8 C.F.R.\n§ 1208.16(c)(2); see Perez-Montes v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 849, 850\n(7th Cir. 2018). Torture is defined as the intentional infliction\nof “‘severe pain or suffering’ for the purpose of coercion,\npunishment, or discrimination.” Borovsky v. Holder, 612 F.3d\n917, 923 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing § 1208.18(a)(1)). We consider\nseveral factors in assessing possible future torture: “evidence\nof past torture; evidence that the applicant could relocate to a\ndifferent part of [his] home country; evidence of ‘gross,\nflagrant or mass violations of human rights within the\ncountry of removal’; and other relevant country conditions.”\nTchemkou v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 785, 795 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing 8\nC.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)(i)–(iv)). To receive protection under CAT,\nan alien must also prove that he would be tortured by the\ngovernment or with its acquiescence. Jabateh v. Lynch, 845 F.3d\n332, 342 (7th Cir. 2017). We agree with both the Board and the\nIJ that Herrera-Garcia failed to meet this standard.\n For one, as the IJ pointed out, Herrera-Garcia provided no\nevidence of past torture or persecution. See 8 C.F.R.\n§ 1208.16(c)(3)(i). Though his interactions with guerillas when\nhe was a child may have been stressful, they do not rise to the\nlevel of “severe pain or suffering.”\n More importantly, we agree with the IJ that Herrera-\nGarcia’s allegation of future torture is too speculative. He\nargues that he fears both corrupt government authorities and\nthe growing number of gangs in El Salvador. But this has\nnothing to do with his experience in El Salvador over twenty-\n\f6 Nos. 18-1511 & 18-3196\n\nseven years ago. His argument instead focuses on a general\nfear of violence that any person moving to El Salvador might\nhave. And as we have said before, “[e]vidence of generalized\nviolence is not enough”; there must be “a substantial risk that\nthe petitioner will be targeted specifically.” Bernard v. Sessions,\n881 F.3d 1042, 1047 (7th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added); see\nRamos-Braga v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 871, 882 (7th Cir. 2018)\n(explaining that “fear of generalized violence is insufficient to\nestablish that [the petitioner] in particular is more likely than\nnot to be tortured”); Rashiah v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 1126, 1133\n(7th Cir. 2004).\n Herrera-Garcia does claim that gangs will target him\nbecause of his American accent. And although there is some\nevidence in the record showing that gangs have extorted\nAmericans, we agree with the IJ that this allegation is again\ntoo speculative. There is insufficient evidence to show that it\nis likely that Herrera-Garcia specifically will be extorted or that\nany extortion would rise to the level of torture. See AR at 422,\n441, 460, 501. And as the IJ also pointed out, no one in Herrera-\nGarcia’s extended family has been harmed while living in El\nSalvador. Nor have his parents, who are American citizens,\nbeen harmed on any of their regular trips there.\n Finally, Herrera-Garcia fails to tie his claims of future\ntorture to government action. To receive relief under CAT, the\ngovernment must inflict or acquiesce in the torture. 8 C.F.R\n§ 1208.18(a)(1); id. § 1208.18(a)(8) (“Acquiescence of a public\nofficial requires that the public official, prior to the activity\nconstituting torture, have awareness of such activity and\nthereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to\nprevent such activity.”) The IJ emphasized that the El\nSalvadoran government recently put in place “extraordinary\n\fNos. 18-1511 & 18-3196 7\n\nmeasures” to thwart the rising gang violence, including\nfocusing “on moving gang members to maximum security\nprisons, putting up cell phone signal blockers around the\nprisons, and conducting coordinated law enforcement\noperations.” Although not dispositive of a lack of government\nacquiescence, see Rodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134,\n1139 (7th Cir. 2015), these efforts contradict Herrera-Garcia’s\nclaim that the El Salvadoran government is generally\ncomplicit with the ongoing gang violence. And Herrera-\nGarcia hasn’t provided any other evidence—besides broad\nallegations that “gangs operate with impunity throughout El\nSalvador”—that would indicate that it is likely that the\ngovernment would acquiesce in Herrera-Garcia’s torture. Cf.\nid. at 1138–39 (finding acquiescence when petitioner provided\nevidence that he had been previously tortured by Mexican\npolice).\n In short, Herrera-Garcia fails to prove that if he returned\nto El Salvador (1) he would be specifically targeted by gangs\nor the military or (2) that the government would acquiesce in\nany torture. There is thus substantial evidence to support the\nIJ’s and Board’s decisions, and so we deny Herrera-Garcia’s\npetition.\n III.\n Herrera-Garcia contends in his second petition that the\nBoard erred in denying his motion for reconsideration. We\nreview the Board’s decision under the deferential abuse of\ndiscretion standard and “will uphold the BIA’s decision\nunless it ‘was made without a rational explanation,\ninexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on\nan impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination\nagainst a particular race or group.’” Khan, 766 F.3d at 696\n\f8 Nos. 18-1511 & 18-3196\n\n(citation omitted). We agree with the Board that Herrera-\nGarcia’s motion was untimely because it was filed over four\nmonths after the due date. See 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(b)(2) (stating\nthat motions to reconsider a Board decision must be filed\nwithin 30 days of that decision).\n And Herrera-Garcia has not established that equitable\ntolling excused this failure. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631,\n649 (2010) (explaining that to prove equitable tolling, one\nmust show diligence and extraordinary circumstances). He\nhas provided no evidence that he acted diligently in\npreserving his rights over the initial 30 days or the four-\nmonths after. See El-Gazawy v. Holder, 690 F.3d 852, 860 (7th\nCir. 2012) (“In light of his failure to offer any support for his\nclaim that he acted diligently to preserve his rights during\nthat time, we cannot say that the BIA abused its discretion in\nfinding that [the petitioner] failed to meet the standard for\ndue diligence.”). Nor has he shown that extraordinary\ncircumstances prevented him from filing. He implies that he\nwas prevented from filing as long as Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S.\nCt. 2105 (2018), remained pending. But Herrera-Garcia\nignores the fact that he could have raised the issue under\nconsideration in Pereira with the IJ or the Board earlier or at\nleast requested a stay until the case was decided. Cf. Gonzalez\nv. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 536 (2005) (“It is hardly extraordinary\nthat subsequently, after petitioner’s case was no longer\npending, this Court arrived at a different interpretation.”).\n In sum, we do not think that the Board abused its\ndiscretion in concluding that Herrera-Garcia’s motion was\nuntimely and that no exception applied.\n\fNos. 18-1511 & 18-3196 9\n\n ***\n We DENY both petitions for review.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Rafael Giovanni HERRERA-GARCIA, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-03-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1511 & 18-3196\\nRAFAEL GIOVANNI HERRERA-GARCIA,\\n Petitioner,\\n v.\\n\\nWILLIAM P. BARR,\\nAttorney General of the United States,\\n Respondent.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Petitions for Review of Decisions of\\n the Board of Immigration Appeals.\\n No. A074-211-058\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Rafael Giovanni Herrera-Garcia\\nseeks to avoid removal to El Salvador because he says that he\\nwill be tortured by gangs or corrupt government authorities\\nif he is forced to return there. An immigration judge found\\nthat Herrera-Garcia had not shown that he, specifically,\\nwould be in danger and denied his request for relief. The\\njudge also concluded that Herrera-Garcia had not established\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1511 & 18-3196\\n\\nthat the government would have inflicted or allowed the\\nalleged torture. The Board adopted and affirmed that\\ndecision.\\n Because the administrative decisions are supported by\\nsubstantial evidence in the record, we deny Herrera-Garcia’s\\npetition for review of these decisions. We also reject his\\nsecond petition for review on the denial of his motion for\\nreconsideration because we agree with the Board that it was\\nuntimely.\\n I.\\n Herrera-Garcia is a native and citizen of El Salvador. He\\nentered the United States illegally in 1990 and has remained\\nhere for the past twenty-seven years. In 2016, the Department\\nof Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against\\nhim under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.1 It alleged that he was removable\\nas an alien because he was (1) convicted of a crime of moral\\nturpitude and (2) present in the United States without being\\nadmitted or paroled. In his removal proceedings before the\\nimmigration judge (IJ), Herrera-Garcia denied both claims\\nand argued that he qualified for asylum, withholding of\\nremoval, and relief under the Convention Against Torture\\n(CAT).\\n Herrera-Garcia’s argument for withholding centered on\\nhis time growing up in El Salvador. He testified that when he\\nwas nine years old, guerrillas stopped him and his friends to\\nget information about people in his neighborhood who might\\nbe working for the military—because at that time, the\\n\\n\\n 1 Herrera-Garcia had previously been in removal proceedings that are\\n\\nnot relevant to this appeal.\\n\\fNos. 18-1511 & 18-3196 3\\n\\nguerillas and the El Salvadoran government were fighting a\\ncivil war. Herrera-Garcia said that the guerrillas continued to\\nstop by every three weeks or so to ask similar questions. He\\nadmitted, however, that he never saw any of the guerillas\\nwith guns. He also said that during one encounter, the\\nguerrillas stopped him and a few friends and forced his\\nfriend, Franklin, to smoke marijuana. He claimed that\\nalthough he escaped from the guerillas, they kidnapped\\nFranklin.\\n Herrera-Garcia also testified that several of his friends\\nwere forced to join the military. He explained that he didn’t\\nwant to be involved in the violence between the military and\\nthe guerillas. Ultimately, out of fear of both the military and\\nthe guerillas, he fled to the United States in 1990 and has\\nremained here illegally since then.\\n Herrera-Garcia testified that his fear of living in El\\nSalvador is worse today than it was twenty-seven years ago\\nbecause of the growing number of gangs and kidnappings\\nthere. His parents also testified about the current state of gang\\nviolence in the country. They said that they worry about El\\nSalvadoran gangs kidnapping him for ransom given his\\nAmerican accent—because the gangs believe that Americans\\nare wealthy.\\n The IJ found Herrera-Garcia removable and denied his\\napplications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief\\nunder CAT. On his CAT claim, the IJ held that Herrera-Garcia\\nhad failed to show that it was more likely than not that he\\nwould be tortured if he returned to El Salvador. The IJ also\\nfound “entirely speculative” his claims that he would be\\ntortured by gangs. Lastly, the IJ concluded that Herrera-\\nGarcia had failed to provide sufficient evidence that the El\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1511 & 18-3196\\n\\nSalvadoran government would participate or acquiesce in the\\nalleged torture.\\n Herrera-Garcia appealed to the Board of Immigration\\nAppeals, which adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision.\\nHerrera-Garcia’s petition for review makes only one\\nargument: he claims that he is entitled to relief under CAT.\\nConvention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or\\nDegrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty\\nDoc. No. 100-20 (1990), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.\\n While his petition was pending before us, he filed a\\nmotion to reconsider with the Board, asserting that a new\\nSupreme Court decision, Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105\\n(2018), affected his case. Pereira held that a notice to appear\\nthat fails to specify the time or place of a removal hearing does\\nnot trigger the “stop-time rule” for purposes of cancellation\\nof removal. 138 S. Ct. at 2115. Herrera-Garcia argued that\\nPereira should be extended outside the context of the stop-\\ntime rule to preclude the agency’s jurisdiction over his\\nproceedings. The Board denied his motion, concluding that it\\nwas both untimely and, in any event, failed on the merits.\\nBecause he also filed a petition for review from that order, we\\nconsolidated the two petitions but concluded that oral\\nargument was unnecessary for the second. See Khan v. Holder,\\n766 F.3d 689, 695 (7th Cir. 2014); FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).\\n II.\\n When the Board adopts and supplements an IJ’s decision,\\nwe review the IJ’s decision as well as any additional reasoning\\nprovided by the Board. Ndonyi v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 702, 709\\n(7th Cir. 2008). We consider the decisions “under the\\ndeferential substantial evidence standard, meaning that we\\n\\fNos. 18-1511 & 18-3196 5\\n\\nmay only reverse their factual findings if the facts compel an\\nopposite conclusion.” Minghai Tian v. Holder, 745 F.3d 822, 828\\n(7th Cir. 2014).\\n To qualify for relief under CAT, an alien must prove that\\nhe would more likely than not be tortured if removed. 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 1208.16(c)(2); see Perez-Montes v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 849, 850\\n(7th Cir. 2018). Torture is defined as the intentional infliction\\nof “‘severe pain or suffering’ for the purpose of coercion,\\npunishment, or discrimination.” Borovsky v. Holder, 612 F.3d\\n917, 923 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing § 1208.18(a)(1)). We consider\\nseveral factors in assessing possible future torture: “evidence\\nof past torture; evidence that the applicant could relocate to a\\ndifferent part of [his] home country; evidence of ‘gross,\\nflagrant or mass violations of human rights within the\\ncountry of removal’; and other relevant country conditions.”\\nTchemkou v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 785, 795 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing 8\\nC.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)(i)–(iv)). To receive protection under CAT,\\nan alien must also prove that he would be tortured by the\\ngovernment or with its acquiescence. Jabateh v. Lynch, 845 F.3d\\n332, 342 (7th Cir. 2017). We agree with both the Board and the\\nIJ that Herrera-Garcia failed to meet this standard.\\n For one, as the IJ pointed out, Herrera-Garcia provided no\\nevidence of past torture or persecution. See 8 C.F.R.\\n§ 1208.16(c)(3)(i). Though his interactions with guerillas when\\nhe was a child may have been stressful, they do not rise to the\\nlevel of “severe pain or suffering.”\\n More importantly, we agree with the IJ that Herrera-\\nGarcia’s allegation of future torture is too speculative. He\\nargues that he fears both corrupt government authorities and\\nthe growing number of gangs in El Salvador. But this has\\nnothing to do with his experience in El Salvador over twenty-\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1511 & 18-3196\\n\\nseven years ago. His argument instead focuses on a general\\nfear of violence that any person moving to El Salvador might\\nhave. And as we have said before, “[e]vidence of generalized\\nviolence is not enough”; there must be “a substantial risk that\\nthe petitioner will be targeted specifically.” Bernard v. Sessions,\\n881 F.3d 1042, 1047 (7th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added); see\\nRamos-Braga v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 871, 882 (7th Cir. 2018)\\n(explaining that “fear of generalized violence is insufficient to\\nestablish that [the petitioner] in particular is more likely than\\nnot to be tortured”); Rashiah v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 1126, 1133\\n(7th Cir. 2004).\\n Herrera-Garcia does claim that gangs will target him\\nbecause of his American accent. And although there is some\\nevidence in the record showing that gangs have extorted\\nAmericans, we agree with the IJ that this allegation is again\\ntoo speculative. There is insufficient evidence to show that it\\nis likely that Herrera-Garcia specifically will be extorted or that\\nany extortion would rise to the level of torture. See AR at 422,\\n441, 460, 501. And as the IJ also pointed out, no one in Herrera-\\nGarcia’s extended family has been harmed while living in El\\nSalvador. Nor have his parents, who are American citizens,\\nbeen harmed on any of their regular trips there.\\n Finally, Herrera-Garcia fails to tie his claims of future\\ntorture to government action. To receive relief under CAT, the\\ngovernment must inflict or acquiesce in the torture. 8 C.F.R\\n§ 1208.18(a)(1); id. § 1208.18(a)(8) (“Acquiescence of a public\\nofficial requires that the public official, prior to the activity\\nconstituting torture, have awareness of such activity and\\nthereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to\\nprevent such activity.”) The IJ emphasized that the El\\nSalvadoran government recently put in place “extraordinary\\n\\fNos. 18-1511 & 18-3196 7\\n\\nmeasures” to thwart the rising gang violence, including\\nfocusing “on moving gang members to maximum security\\nprisons, putting up cell phone signal blockers around the\\nprisons, and conducting coordinated law enforcement\\noperations.” Although not dispositive of a lack of government\\nacquiescence, see Rodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134,\\n1139 (7th Cir. 2015), these efforts contradict Herrera-Garcia’s\\nclaim that the El Salvadoran government is generally\\ncomplicit with the ongoing gang violence. And Herrera-\\nGarcia hasn’t provided any other evidence—besides broad\\nallegations that “gangs operate with impunity throughout El\\nSalvador”—that would indicate that it is likely that the\\ngovernment would acquiesce in Herrera-Garcia’s torture. Cf.\\nid. at 1138–39 (finding acquiescence when petitioner provided\\nevidence that he had been previously tortured by Mexican\\npolice).\\n In short, Herrera-Garcia fails to prove that if he returned\\nto El Salvador (1) he would be specifically targeted by gangs\\nor the military or (2) that the government would acquiesce in\\nany torture. There is thus substantial evidence to support the\\nIJ’s and Board’s decisions, and so we deny Herrera-Garcia’s\\npetition.\\n III.\\n Herrera-Garcia contends in his second petition that the\\nBoard erred in denying his motion for reconsideration. We\\nreview the Board’s decision under the deferential abuse of\\ndiscretion standard and “will uphold the BIA’s decision\\nunless it ‘was made without a rational explanation,\\ninexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on\\nan impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination\\nagainst a particular race or group.’” Khan, 766 F.3d at 696\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1511 & 18-3196\\n\\n(citation omitted). We agree with the Board that Herrera-\\nGarcia’s motion was untimely because it was filed over four\\nmonths after the due date. See 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(b)(2) (stating\\nthat motions to reconsider a Board decision must be filed\\nwithin 30 days of that decision).\\n And Herrera-Garcia has not established that equitable\\ntolling excused this failure. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631,\\n649 (2010) (explaining that to prove equitable tolling, one\\nmust show diligence and extraordinary circumstances). He\\nhas provided no evidence that he acted diligently in\\npreserving his rights over the initial 30 days or the four-\\nmonths after. See El-Gazawy v. Holder, 690 F.3d 852, 860 (7th\\nCir. 2012) (“In light of his failure to offer any support for his\\nclaim that he acted diligently to preserve his rights during\\nthat time, we cannot say that the BIA abused its discretion in\\nfinding that [the petitioner] failed to meet the standard for\\ndue diligence.”). Nor has he shown that extraordinary\\ncircumstances prevented him from filing. He implies that he\\nwas prevented from filing as long as Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S.\\nCt. 2105 (2018), remained pending. But Herrera-Garcia\\nignores the fact that he could have raised the issue under\\nconsideration in Pereira with the IJ or the Board earlier or at\\nleast requested a stay until the case was decided. Cf. Gonzalez\\nv. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 536 (2005) (“It is hardly extraordinary\\nthat subsequently, after petitioner’s case was no longer\\npending, this Court arrived at a different interpretation.”).\\n In sum, we do not think that the Board abused its\\ndiscretion in concluding that Herrera-Garcia’s motion was\\nuntimely and that no exception applied.\\n\\fNos. 18-1511 & 18-3196 9\\n\\n ***\\n We DENY both petitions for review.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}}],"truncated":false,"partial":false},"paginationData":{"pageIndex":11,"numItemsPerPage":100,"numTotalItems":31175,"offset":1100,"length":100}},"jwt":"eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSJ9.eyJyZWFkIjp0cnVlLCJwZXJtaXNzaW9ucyI6eyJyZXBvLmNvbnRlbnQucmVhZCI6dHJ1ZX0sImlhdCI6MTc3ODc4MTU3OCwic3ViIjoiL2RhdGFzZXRzL2VpdGFucy1wdS9jbC1jb2RpbmctaW5wdXQiLCJleHAiOjE3Nzg3ODUxNzgsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaHVnZ2luZ2ZhY2UuY28ifQ.3frxUbnij0kAz_txd7u67IMSGrffEVasGic5LBY9Dvqwrc3vaw9NmmdI1xwNnBBD39O3Vrgqq0E9VIpAdTX9Ag","displayUrls":true,"splitSizeSummaries":[{"config":"default","split":"train","numRows":31175,"numBytesParquet":1629387251}]},"discussionsStats":{"closed":0,"open":1,"total":1},"fullWidth":true,"hasGatedAccess":true,"hasFullAccess":true,"isEmbedded":false,"savedQueries":{"community":[],"user":[]}}">
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4,603,850 | Ana Christine SHELTON, in Her Capacity as Both the Natural Tutrix of the Minor Children S.A. and T.A. and the Independent Administratrix of the Succession of Nelson Arce, Deceased, Plaintiff - Appellant v. LOUISIANA STATE; Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections; Joseph Lopinto, in His Official Capacity a... | Nelson Arce v. Louisiana State | 2019-03-26 | 18-30349 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Higginbotham, Smith, Higginson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30349 Document: 00514887707 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/26/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH ... | HIGGINBOTHAM | SMITH | HIGGINSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4603850/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
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4,603,853 | Blanca ARIZMENDI, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Patrick GABBERT, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Criminal Investigator, Defendant - Appellant | Blanca Arizmendi v. Brownsville Indep Sch Dist | 2019-03-26 | 17-40597 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Higginbotham, Southwick, Costa", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-40597 Document: 00514888033 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/26/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE F... | HIGGINBOTHAM | SOUTHWICK | COSTA | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4603853/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
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"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,603,854 | ADAM JOSEPH RESOURCES (M) SDN. BHD., Plaintiff - Appellant Brown Sims, Movant - Appellant v. CNA METALS LIMITED, Defendant - Appellee | Adam Joseph Res. (M) Sdn. Bhd. v. Cna Metals Ltd. | 2019-03-26 | 17-20685 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Jolly, Dennis, Higginson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-20685 Document: 00514888296 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/26/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n\n\... | JOLLY | DENNIS | HIGGINSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4603854/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
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"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,603,914 | RETRACTABLE TECHNOLOGIES, INCORPORATED; Thomas J. Shaw, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. BECTON DICKINSON & COMPANY, Defendant - Appellee | Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co. | 2019-03-26 | 17-40960 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Higginbotham, Smith, Graves", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-40960 Document: 00514888678 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/26/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH C... | HIGGINBOTHAM | SMITH | GRAVES | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4603914/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
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4,603,918 | Abdifatah Gaas QORANE, Also Known as Qorane Abdifatah Gaas, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent. | Abdifatah Gaas Qorane v. William Barr, U. S. Atty | 2019-03-26 | 17-60394 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Clement, Graves, Oldham", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ANDREW S. OLDHAM, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-60394 Document: 00514888763 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/26/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ... | CLEMENT | GRAVES | OLDHAM | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4603918/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
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"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,604,200 | BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INCORPORATED; BP America Production Company; BP, P.L.C., Requesting Parties - Appellants, v. CLAIMANT ID 100141850, Objecting Party - Appellee. | BP Exploration & Prodn, Inc. v. ID | 2019-03-26 | 18-30835 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Higginbotham, Elrod, Duncan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30835 Document: 00514888433 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/26/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | HIGGINBOTHAM | ELROD | DUNCAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4604200/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
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4,604,199 | In RE: Jonathan B. ANDRY, Appellant | In Re: Jonathan Andry | 2019-03-27 | 18-31245 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Barksdale, Southwick, Haynes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "HAYNES, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-31245 Document: 00514890507 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/27/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUI... | BARKSDALE | SOUTHWICK | HAYNES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4604199/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
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"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,604,667 | Patrick Henry MURPHY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bryan COLLIER, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice; Lorie Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division ; Billy Lewis, Warden, Defendants-Appellees. | Patrick Murphy v. Bryan Collier | 2019-03-27 | 19-70007 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Elrod, Higginson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 19-70007 Document: 00514891372 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/27/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | SMITH | ELROD | HIGGINSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4604667/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
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4,604,668 | ENI US Operating Company, Inc. v. Transocean Offsh | 2019-03-28 | 18-20115 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before CLEMENT, OWEN, and HO, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-20115 Document: 00514892163 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/28/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | CLEMENT | OWEN | HO | 1 | {"CLEMENT": ", Circuit", "OWEN": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4604668/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
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4,604,669 | BANK OF LOUISIANA; G. Harrison Scott; Sharry Scott; Johnny Crow, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant - Appellee | Bank of Louisiana v. F.D.I.C. | 2019-03-28 | 17-30044 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Duncan, Engelhardt", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STUART KYLE DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-30044 Document: 00514892004 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/28/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ... | SMITH | DUNCAN | ENGELHARDT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4604669/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
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"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,604,804 | BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INCORPORATED; BP America Production Company; BP, P.L.C., Requesting Parties-Appellants, v. CLAIMANT ID 100261922, Objecting Party-Appellee. | BP Exploration & Prodn, Inc. v. ID | 2019-03-28 | 18-30844 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Higginbotham, Elrod, Duncan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30844 Document: 00514892706 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/28/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CI... | HIGGINBOTHAM | ELROD | DUNCAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4604804/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,946 | ENI US OPERATING COMPANY, INCORPORATED v. TRANSOCEAN OFFSHORE DEEPWATER DRILLING, INCORPORATED | Eni U.S. Operating Co. v. TRANSOCEAN OFFSHORE | 2019-03-28 | No. 18-20115 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Clement, Owen", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415377/", "author_raw": ""}]} | CLEMENT | OWEN | CLEMENT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443946/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,605,372 | UPTOWN GRILL, L.L.C., Plaintiff - Appellee v. CAMELLIA GRILL HOLDINGS, INC., Defendant - Appellant Camellia Grill Holdings, Inc., Plaintiff - Appellant v. Grill Holdings, L.L.C.; Chartres Grill, L.L.C., Doing Business as Grill; Uptown Grill of Destin, L.L.C.; RANO, L.L.C.; Hicham Khodr; Uptown Grill, L.L.C.; K & L Inve... | Uptown Grill, L. L.C. v. Camellia Grill Holdings, Inc. | 2019-03-29 | 18-30515 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before CLEMENT, OWEN, and HO, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30515 Document: 00514895093 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/29/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | CLEMENT | OWEN | HO | 1 | {"CLEMENT": ", Circuit", "OWEN": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605372/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,605,377 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellant v. Craig A. TAFFARO, Defendant - Appellee | United States v. Craig Taffaro | 2019-03-29 | 18-30498 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before CLEMENT, OWEN, and HO, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30498 Document: 00514894783 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/29/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | CLEMENT | OWEN | HO | 1 | {"CLEMENT": ", Circuit", "OWEN": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605377/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,605,379 | Scott Lynn GIBSON, Also Known as Vanessa Lynn, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Bryan COLLIER ; Dr. D. Greene, Defendants-Appellees | Scott Gibson v. Bryan Collier | 2019-03-29 | 16-51148 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "James, Smith, Barksdale", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 16-51148 Document: 00514894694 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/29/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | JAMES | SMITH | BARKSDALE | 1 | {} | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605379/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,605,387 | BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION, INCORPORATED; BP America Production Company; BP, P.L.C., Requesting Parties - Appellees v. CLAIMANT ID 100246928, Objecting Party - Appellant | BP Exploration & Prodn, Inc. v. ID | 2019-03-29 | 18-30375 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Costa", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE", "type": "010combined", "text": "IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n ... | COSTA | COSTA | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605387/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,595,446 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roy C. BRADLEY, Sr., Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Roy Bradley, Sr. | 2019-03-01 | 17-1727 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Clay, Donald, Moore", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0032p.06\n\n ... | CLAY | DONALD | MOORE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4595446/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,595,447 | ECONOMY LINEN AND TOWEL SERVICE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 637, Defendant-Appellee. | Econ. Linen & Towel Serv., Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Teamsters Local Union 637 | 2019-03-01 | 18-3369 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: BATCHELDER, SUTTON, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SUTTON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Nam... | BATCHELDER | SUTTON | DONALD | 1 | {"BATCHELDER": ", Circuit", "SUTTON": ", Circuit", "DONALD": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4595447/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,596,032 | David SAMARRIPA (17-6048/6260); Stephon Mason (17-6166); Jose Adrian Hernandez (17-6213); Arnulfo Torres Perez (17-6299); Timmie D. Cole, SR. (17-6333), Petitioners-Appellants, v. J. Ray ORMOND, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. | Timmie Cole, Sr. v. J. Ray Ormond | 2019-03-04 | 17-6333 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Sutton, Griffin, Larsen", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SUTTON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0034p.06\n\n ... | SUTTON | GRIFFIN | LARSEN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4596032/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,596,731 | In RE: Jerry Wayne OAKES, Et Al., Debtors. Donald F. Harker, III, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PNC Mortgage Company, Defendant-Appellant. | Harker v. PNC Mortg. Co. (In Re Oakes) | 2019-03-05 | 18-3194 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Gibbons, Batchelder, Rogers", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0... | GIBBONS | BATCHELDER | ROGERS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4596731/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,596,940 | Timothy Eugene SAMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Cathy M. GARRETT, Wayne County Clerk Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Timothy Sampson v. Cathy Garrett | 2019-03-06 | 18-1900 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Norris, Sutton, Cook", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SUTTON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0036p.06\n\n ... | NORRIS | SUTTON | COOK | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4596940/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,597,489 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Azat MARTIROSSIAN, Defendant-Appellant. in Re: Azat Martirossian, Petitioner. | United States v. Azat Martirossian | 2019-03-07 | 18-4035; 18-4114 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Norris, Sutton, Cook", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SUTTON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0037p.06\n\n ... | NORRIS | SUTTON | COOK | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597489/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,598,087 | In RE: Courtney M. CALDWELL, Movant. | In re Courtney Caldwell | 2019-03-08 | 18-6074 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Norris, Sutton, Cook", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SUTTON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0038p.06\n\n ... | NORRIS | SUTTON | COOK | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4598087/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,598,442 | Duryane Lewis CHANEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee. | Duryane Chaney v. United States | 2019-03-11 | 17-2024 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Batchelder, Gibbons, Rogers", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ROGERS, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0039p.06\n\n ... | BATCHELDER | GIBBONS | ROGERS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4598442/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,598,443 | AMERICAN MUNICIPAL POWER, INC., Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner. | Am. Mun. Power, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. | 2019-03-11 | 18-1958/1995 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Sutton, White, Donald", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SUTTON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0040p.06\n\n ... | SUTTON | WHITE | DONALD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4598443/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,598,750 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kenneth J. JACKSON, Jr. (17-3896); Antowine Palmer (17-3902), Defendants-Appellants. | United States v. Kennth Jackson | 2019-03-12 | 17-3896/3902 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "White, Donald, Larsen", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0041p.06\n\n ... | WHITE | DONALD | LARSEN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4598750/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,598,752 | PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF GREATER OHIO; Planned Parenthood of Southwest Ohio Region, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Richard HODGES, in His Official Capacity as Director of the Ohio Department of Health, Defendant-Appellant. | Planned Parenthood of Greater Ohio v. Richard Hodges | 2019-03-12 | 16-4027 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: COLE, Chief Judge; SILER, BATCHELDER, MOORE, CLAY, GIBBONS, SUTTON, COOK, GRIFFIN, KETHLEDGE, WHITE, STRANCH, DONALD, THAPAR, BUSH, LARSEN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SUTTON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBL... | COLE | SILER | BATCHELDER | 2 | MOORE; CLAY; GIBBONS; SUTTON; COOK; GRIFFIN; KETHLEDGE; WHITE; STRANCH; DONALD; THAPAR; BUSH; LARSEN; NALBANDIAN | {"COLE": ", Chief", "SILER": ", Circuit", "BATCHELDER": ", Circuit", "MOORE": ", Circuit", "CLAY": ", Circuit", "GIBBONS": ", Circuit", "SUTTON": ", Circuit", "COOK": ", Circuit", "GRIFFIN": ", Circuit", "KETHLEDGE": ", Circuit", "WHITE": ", Circuit", "STRANCH": ", Circuit", "DONALD": ", Circuit", "THAPAR": ", Circuit"... | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4598752/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||
8,443,930 | Debra Lee CRUISE-GULYAS v. Matthew Wayne MINARD, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Taylor Police Officer | Cruise-Gulyas v. Minard | 2019-03-13 | No. 18-2196 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Donald, Sutton, White", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415361/", "author_raw": ""}]} | DONALD | SUTTON | WHITE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443930/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,931 | Rogelio MENDOZA-GARCIA v. William P. BARR, Attorney General | Mendoza-Garcia v. Barr | 2019-03-13 | No. 18-3513 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Donald, Keith, Stranch", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415362/", "author_raw": ""}]} | DONALD | KEITH | STRANCH | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443931/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,600,880 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tamela M. LEE, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Tamela Lee | 2019-03-18 | 17-3868 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Clay, Nalbandian", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9824684/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "030concurrence", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opini... | CLAY | NALBANDIAN | CLAY | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4600880/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,600,882 | R. Alexander ACOSTA, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. MIN & KIM, INCORPORATED, Dba Seoul Garden of Ann Arbor, a Michigan Corporation; Kounwoo Hur; Sung Hee Kim, Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees. | R. Alexander Acosta v. Min & Kim, Inc. | 2019-03-18 | 18-1190/1338 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Batchelder, Sutton, Donald", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SUTTON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0046p.06\n\n ... | BATCHELDER | SUTTON | DONALD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4600882/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,601,151 | United States v. Tamela Lee | 2019-03-18 | 17-3868 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: KEITH, CLAY, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "CLAY, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: ... | KEITH | CLAY | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {"KEITH": ", Circuit", "CLAY": ", Circuit", "NALBANDIAN": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4601151/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,601,143 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sirous ASGARI, Defendant-Appellee. | United States v. Sirous Asgari | 2019-03-19 | 18-3302 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Batchelder, Sutton, Donald", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SUTTON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0047p.06\n\n ... | BATCHELDER | SUTTON | DONALD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4601143/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,601,476 | Michelle VALENT, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Respondent. | Michelle Valent v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. | 2019-03-20 | 17-2109 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Gilman, Kethledge", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9824716/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions... | GILMAN | KETHLEDGE | GILMAN | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4601476/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,602,299 | Michelle Valent v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. | 2019-03-20 | 17-2109 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: GILMAN, KETHLEDGE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n ... | GILMAN | KETHLEDGE | BUSH | 1 | {"GILMAN": ", Circuit", "KETHLEDGE": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4602299/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,602,298 | TRUSTEES OF OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 324 PENSION FUND, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOURDOW CONTRACTING, INC., Defendant-Appellant. | Operating Eng'rs Local 324 v. Bourdow Contracting, Inc. | 2019-03-21 | 18-1491 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Clay, Cook, Larsen", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "CLAY, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0049p.06\n\n UNITE... | CLAY | COOK | LARSEN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4602298/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,602,998 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles EASON, Defendant-Appellee. | United States v. Charles Eason | 2019-03-22 | 18-5387 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Siler, Cook, Bush", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SILER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0050p.06\n\n ... | SILER | COOK | BUSH | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4602998/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,603,630 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Shawn STEELE, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. William Steele | 2019-03-26 | 18-1146 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Keith, Stranch, Donald", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0051p.06\n\n ... | KEITH | STRANCH | DONALD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4603630/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,603,631 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles OLIVER, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Charles Oliver | 2019-03-26 | 18-5465 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Cole, Suhrheinrich, Moore", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0052p.06\n... | COLE | SUHRHEINRICH | MOORE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4603631/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,605,802 | United States v. William Steele | 2019-03-26 | 18-1146 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: KEITH, STRANCH, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n ... | KEITH | STRANCH | DONALD | 1 | {"KEITH": ", Circuit", "STRANCH": ", Circuit", "DONALD": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605802/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,605,804 | United States v. Charles Oliver | 2019-03-26 | 18-5465 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: COLE, Chief Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and MOORE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n ... | COLE | SUHRHEINRICH | MOORE | 1 | {"COLE": ", Chief", "SUHRHEINRICH": ", Circuit", "MOORE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605804/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,604,149 | Paul Edward DANIEL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Dewayne BURTON, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. | Paul Daniel v. DeWayne Burton | 2019-03-27 | 18-1276 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Boggs, Gibbons, Bush", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BUSH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0053p.06\n\n ... | BOGGS | GIBBONS | BUSH | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4604149/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,605,800 | Paul Daniel v. DeWayne Burton | 2019-03-27 | 18-1276 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: BOGGS, GIBBONS, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BUSH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: ... | BOGGS | GIBBONS | BUSH | 1 | {"BOGGS": ", Circuit", "GIBBONS": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605800/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,605,813 | Paul Daniel v. DeWayne Burton | 2019-03-27 | 18-1276 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: BOGGS, GIBBONS, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BUSH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: ... | BOGGS | GIBBONS | BUSH | 1 | {"BOGGS": ", Circuit", "GIBBONS": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605813/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,604,717 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John ROBERTS, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. John Roberts | 2019-03-28 | 17-6512 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Moore, Gibbons, Cook", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COOK, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0054p.06\n\n ... | MOORE | GIBBONS | COOK | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4604717/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,604,722 | Tamarin LINDENBERG, Individually and as Natural Guardian of Her Minor Children ZTL and SML, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. JACKSON NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, State of Tennessee, Intervenor-Appellee. | Tamarin Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. | 2019-03-28 | 17-6034/6079 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: CLAY, STRANCH, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "However, a federal judge's assessment of state law “cannot escape being a forecast rather", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Cir... | CLAY | STRANCH | LARSEN | 1 | {"CLAY": ", Circuit", "STRANCH": ", Circuit", "LARSEN": ", Circuit"} | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4604722/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,604,723 | Ricky JACKSON (17-3840); Kwame Ajamu, Fka Ronnie Bridgeman, and Wiley Edward Bridgeman (17-3843), Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF CLEVELAND; Jerold Englehart; Karen Lamendola, Guardian Ad Litem on Behalf of Frank Stoiker; Estate of Eugene Terpay, Administrator; Estate of James T. Farmer, Administrator; Estate of John... | Ricky Jackson v. City of Cleveland | 2019-03-28 | 17-3840/3843 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Bush, Keith", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888220/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "030concurrence", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9... | BUSH | KEITH | BUSH | 1 | {} | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4604723/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,605,129 | United States v. John Roberts | 2019-03-28 | 17-6512 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: MOORE, GIBBONS, and COOK, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COOK, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 1... | MOORE | GIBBONS | COOK | 1 | {"MOORE": ", Circuit", "GIBBONS": ", Circuit", "COOK": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605129/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,605,792 | United States v. John Roberts | 2019-03-28 | 17-6512 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: MOORE, GIBBONS, and COOK, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COOK, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 1... | MOORE | GIBBONS | COOK | 1 | {"MOORE": ", Circuit", "GIBBONS": ", Circuit", "COOK": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605792/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,605,796 | Tamarin Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. | 2019-03-28 | 17-6079 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: CLAY, STRANCH, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "However, a federal judge's assessment of state law “cannot escape being a forecast rather", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Cir... | CLAY | STRANCH | LARSEN | 1 | {"CLAY": ", Circuit", "STRANCH": ", Circuit", "LARSEN": ", Circuit"} | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605796/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,605,801 | Tamarin Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. | 2019-03-28 | 17-6079 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: CLAY, STRANCH, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "However, a federal judge's assessment of state law “cannot escape being a forecast rather", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Cir... | CLAY | STRANCH | LARSEN | 1 | {"CLAY": ", Circuit", "STRANCH": ", Circuit", "LARSEN": ", Circuit"} | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605801/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,605,803 | Tamarin Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. | 2019-03-28 | 17-6034 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: CLAY, STRANCH, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "However, a federal judge's assessment of state law “cannot escape being a forecast rather", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Cir... | CLAY | STRANCH | LARSEN | 1 | {"CLAY": ", Circuit", "STRANCH": ", Circuit", "LARSEN": ", Circuit"} | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605803/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,605,805 | Ricky Jackson v. City of Cleveland | 2019-03-28 | 17-3840 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: KEITH, ROGERS, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0055p.06\n\n UNI... | KEITH | ROGERS | BUSH | 1 | {"KEITH": ", Circuit", "ROGERS": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit"} | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605805/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,605,808 | Kwame Ajamu v. City of Cleveland | 2019-03-28 | 17-3843 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: KEITH, ROGERS, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0055p.06\n\n UNI... | KEITH | ROGERS | BUSH | 1 | {"KEITH": ", Circuit", "ROGERS": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit"} | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4605808/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,595,564 | United States v. Keycie Street | 2019-03-01 | 18-1209 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐1209 \nUNITED STAT... | ROVNER | HAMILTON | BARRETT | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4595564/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,595,622 | United States v. Keycie Street | 2019-03-01 | 18-1209 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐1209 \nUNITED STAT... | ROVNER | HAMILTON | BARRETT | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4595622/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,595,623 | TRINITY 83 DEVELOPMENT, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLFIN MIDWEST FUNDING, LLC, Defendant-Appellee. | Trinity 83 Development LLC v. Colfin Midwest Funding LLC | 2019-03-01 | 18-2117 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Barrett, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-2117\nTRINITY 83 DEVELOPMENT, LLC,\n ... | EASTERBROOK | BARRETT | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4595623/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,595,748 | Trinity 83 Development LLC v. Colfin Midwest Funding LLC | 2019-03-01 | 18-2117 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-2117\nTRI... | EASTERBROOK | BARRETT | SCUDDER | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4595748/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,909 | United States v. Keycie A. STREET | United States v. Street | 2019-03-01 | No. 18-1209 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Barrett, Hamilton, Rovner", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415340/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BARRETT | HAMILTON | ROVNER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443909/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,596,115 | Martha Conway v. General Electric Company | 2019-03-04 | 18-1522 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\nLAJIM, ... | FLAUM | KANNE | HAMILTON | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4596115/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,596,240 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jason GALLOWAY, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Jason Galloway | 2019-03-04 | 18-1304 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Kanne, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1304\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | BAUER | KANNE | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4596240/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,596,241 | Martha Conway v. General Electric Company | 2019-03-04 | 18-1522 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1522 & 18-2880\nLAJIM, ... | FLAUM | KANNE | HAMILTON | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4596241/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,596,361 | United States v. Jason Galloway | 2019-03-04 | 18-1304 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1304\nUNITED STATES OF ... | BAUER | KANNE | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4596361/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,911 | LAJIM, LLC v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY | LAJIM, LLC v. Gen. Elec. Co. | 2019-03-04 | Nos. 18-1522 & 18-2880 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Hamilton, Kanne", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415342/", "author_raw": ""}]} | FLAUM | HAMILTON | KANNE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443911/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,597,177 | William LIEBHART & Nancy Liebhart, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SPX CORPORATION, TRC Environmental Corporation, & Apollo Dismantling Services, Inc. Defendants-Appellees. | William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation | 2019-03-06 | 18-1918 & 18-2598 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Kanne, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\nWILLIAM LIEBHART & NANCY LIEBHART,\... | BAUER | KANNE | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597177/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,597,178 | William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation | 2019-03-06 | 18-1918 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Kanne", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4374431/", "author_raw": "Michael Stephen Kanne"}]} | KANNE | KANNE | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597178/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||||
4,597,289 | William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation | 2019-03-06 | 18-2598 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\nWILLIAM... | BAUER | KANNE | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597289/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,597,290 | United States v. Jesus Salgado | 2019-03-06 | 18-2194 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597290/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,597,307 | William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation | 2019-03-06 | 18-2598 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\nWILLIAM... | BAUER | KANNE | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597307/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,597,308 | United States v. Steve Briggins | 2019-03-06 | 18-1921 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐1921 \nUNITED ... | MANION | BRENNAN | SCUDDER | 1 | {"MANION": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597308/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,597,309 | United States v. Jesus Salgado | 2019-03-06 | 18-2194 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597309/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,597,311 | Anthony SANSONE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Megan J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General of the United States, Defendant-Appellant. | Anthony Sansone v. Megan Brennan | 2019-03-06 | 17-3534 & 17-3632 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Kanne, Rovner, Barrett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3534 & No. 17-3632\nANTHONY SANSONE,\n ... | KANNE | ROVNER | BARRETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597311/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,597,314 | William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation | 2019-03-06 | 18-2598 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\nWILLIAM... | BAUER | KANNE | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597314/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,597,315 | United States v. Steve Briggins | 2019-03-06 | 18-1921 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐1921 \nUNITED ... | MANION | BRENNAN | SCUDDER | 1 | {"MANION": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597315/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,597,316 | United States v. Jesus Salgado | 2019-03-06 | 18-2194 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597316/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,597,320 | Anthony Sansone v. Megan Brennan | 2019-03-06 | 17-3632 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3534 & No. 17-3632\nAN... | KANNE | ROVNER | BARRETT | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597320/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,597,350 | William Liebhart v. SPX Corporation | 2019-03-06 | 18-2598 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1918 & 18-2598\nWILLIAM... | BAUER | KANNE | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597350/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,597,351 | United States v. Steve Briggins | 2019-03-06 | 18-1921 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18‐1921 \nUNITED ... | MANION | BRENNAN | SCUDDER | 1 | {"MANION": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597351/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,597,352 | United States v. Jesus Salgado | 2019-03-06 | 18-2194 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________ \nNo. 18... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597352/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,597,356 | Anthony Sansone v. Megan Brennan | 2019-03-06 | 17-3632 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3534 & No. 17-3632\nAN... | KANNE | ROVNER | BARRETT | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4597356/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,912 | United States v. Jesus SALGADO | United States v. Salgado | 2019-03-06 | No. 18-2194 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Eve, Wood", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415343/", "author_raw": ""}]} | EASTERBROOK | WOOD | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443912/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,913 | United States v. Steve BRIGGINS | United States v. Briggins | 2019-03-06 | No. 18-1921 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Brennan, Manion, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415344/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BRENNAN | MANION | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443913/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,598,150 | Charles GREENHILL and Amphib, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Richard M. VARTANIAN and Platinum Fighter Sales, Inc., Defendants-Appellants. | Charles Greenhill v. Richard Vartanian | 2019-03-08 | 17-3526 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Easterbrook, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 17-3526\nCHARLES GREENHILL and AMPHIB, INC.,\n ... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4598150/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,598,239 | Charles Greenhill v. Richard Vartanian | 2019-03-08 | 17-3526 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 1... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4598239/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,598,418 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Maurice WALKER, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Maurice Walker | 2019-03-11 | 18-2825 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Ripple, Manion, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2825\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | RIPPLE | MANION | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4598418/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,598,596 | United States v. Maurice Walker | 2019-03-11 | 18-2825 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2825\nUNITED STATES O... | RIPPLE | MANION | BRENNAN | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4598596/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,599,324 | Paul REGAINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee. | Paul Regains v. City of Chicago | 2019-03-13 | 15-2444 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Hamilton, Pepper", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PEPPER, District Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 15-2444\nPAUL REGAINS,\n ... | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | PEPPER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4599324/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,599,424 | Paul Regains v. City of Chicago | 2019-03-13 | 15-2444 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PEPPER, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PEPPER, District Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ... | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | PEPPER | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "PEPPER": ", District"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4599424/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,599,469 | Paul Regains v. City of Chicago | 2019-03-13 | 15-2444 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PEPPER, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PEPPER, District Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ... | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | PEPPER | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "PEPPER": ", District"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4599469/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,599,680 | Paul Regains v. City of Chicago | 2019-03-13 | 15-2444 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PEPPER, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PEPPER, District Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ... | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | PEPPER | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "PEPPER": ", District"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4599680/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,599,879 | TRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. Terry CURRY, Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County, Indiana, and Christopher Gaal, Prosecuting Attorney of Monroe County, Indiana, Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees. | Trustees of Indiana University v. Terry Curry | 2019-03-14 | 18-1146; 18-1247; 18-1308 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Hamilton, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888151/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/res... | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 5 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4599879/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,599,905 | Trustees of Indiana University v. Terry Curry | 2019-03-14 | 18-1308 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit \n ____________________ \n\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \nTRUSTEES OF IND... | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4599905/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,599,923 | Trustees of Indiana University v. Terry Curry | 2019-03-14 | 18-1308 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit \n ____________________ \n\nNos. 18‐1146, 18‐1247 & 18‐1308 \nTRUSTEES OF IND... | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4599923/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,932 | In the MATTER OF: Chester B. STEENES, Debtors-Appellees. Appeals of: City of Chicago, Illinois | Matter Of Steenes | 2019-03-14 | Nos. 17-3630; 17-3663 & 17-3664 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Hamilton, Rovner", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415363/", "author_raw": ""}]} | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | ROVNER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443932/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,939 | KREG THERAPEUTICS, INC. v. VITALGO, INC. | Kreg Therapeutics, Inc. v. Vitalgo, Inc. | 2019-03-14 | Nos. 17-3005 & 17-3227 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Barrett, Eve, Sykes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415370/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BARRETT | SYKES | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443939/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,600,327 | Annie Laurie GAYLOR, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Steven T. MNUCHIN, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants, and Edward Peecher, Et Al., Intervening Defendants-Appellants. | Annie Gaylor v. Steven Mnuchin | 2019-03-15 | 18-1277 & 18-1280 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Manion, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "No. 16-cv-215 - Barbara B. Crabb, Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1277 & 18-1280\nANNIE LAURIE GAY... | BAUER | MANION | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4600327/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,600,565 | Rickey I. KANTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Rickey I. Kanter v. William P. Barr | 2019-03-15 | 18-1478 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Ripple, Barrett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9824672/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opi... | FLAUM | RIPPLE | BARRETT | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4600565/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,600,566 | Annie Gaylor v. Steven Mnuchin | 2019-03-15 | 18-1280 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "No. 16-cv-215 - Barbara B. Crabb, Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1277... | BAUER | MANION | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4600566/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,600,633 | Rickey I. Kanter v. William P. Barr | 2019-03-15 | 18-1478 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Joel Martin Flaum", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1478\nRICKEY I. KANTER,\n ... | FLAUM | RIPPLE | BARRETT | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4600633/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,600,944 | Rafael Giovanni HERRERA-GARCIA, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. | Rafael Herrera-Garcia v. William P. Barr | 2019-03-18 | 18-1511 & 18-3196 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Kanne, Rovner, Barrett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1511 & 18-3196\nRAFAEL GIOVANNI HERRERA-GARCIA,\n ... | KANNE | ROVNER | BARRETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4600944/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 3 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
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